
Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States in January 2017. During his election campaign, he was portrayed by the media as a most controversial personality based on his opinions and blunt approach towards foreign policy and domestic issues. However, by writing and publishing the book ‘Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America’ in the summer of 2016, Trump clarified his ideas and opinions on various issues ranging from his immigration policy to economic uplift of the US, foreign to healthcare policy, and from tax to education reforms. The book contains a preface, seventeen chapters and a conclusion.

In the book, Trump promises that unlike his predecessors, he will focus on actions. He believes that American politicians often speak a great deal, but remain reluctant in taking actions. He dissociates himself from them and considers himself a successful businessman - one who will act timely and wisely for the betterment of the US. Trump writes that he learned the value of education from his father Fred and his father’s brother John G Trump. Fred Trump was a businessman who supported the education of his brother John after their father passed away. Due to his support, John earned PhD in Physics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and became the first American to invent the million-volt X-ray generator. In recognition of his services to science and technology, he was awarded the National Medal of Science by President Ronald Reagan (p. 32). Donald Trump considers the 70s and 80s as the great eras of US education, science and technology. He writes that his immediate predecessors did not focus on provision of quality education to all Americans, hence, the US is ranked 26th in school performance globally, which is an embarrassment according to him (p. 32). He stresses the need for reforming the education system in order to make it more practical and aligning it with 21st Century requirements.

He also clarifies his policy on immigration and dedicates a whole chapter to this issue. He believes that illegal immigrants have caused serious damage to the national interests of America. According to him, the 11 million illegal immigrants in USA are a source of crimes such as rape, robberies and drug trafficking (p. 19). He writes that a 1000-km long wall along the border with Mexico is inevitable (p.20). For him, it is the duty of Mexicans to pay the cost of its construction and he offers some options for
gathering funds by increasing visa fees and cutting the annual aid to Mexico.

Donald Trump’s foreign policy approach is to ‘operate from strength’ (p.24). He believes in the carrot and stick policy, that is, rewarding countries which protect American interests and ‘punishing’ those that are against them (p. 24). For this purpose, he believes that a strong economy is a prerequisite. Trump appears to be against military invasions and believes that the US should refrain from invading other countries. He criticises the Iraq invasion, which according to him not only destabilised the Middle East but also severely damaged the American economy (p. 25); and also the US nuclear deal with Iran. He writes that the deal will not protect American interests and will be detrimental to the national security of Israel, which is the closest ally of America in the Middle East (p. 31).

He is critical of Obama for declaring Climate Change the biggest security threat for the entire world. For Trump, Climate Change is not a priority issue as he considers the Islamic State (IS), Syrian crisis and America’s crippled economy, bigger national security threats to the US and the world (p.37). In fact, he does not agree with the environmentalists and politicians who promulgate the use of clean energy resources. He believes that America has immense indigenous oil resources (enough to last for the next 285 years [p.72]) which should be used for the development of its industries. Therefore, a policy shift in the White House over climate-related issues is certainly on the cards under the Trump administration. According to the New York Times dated March 28, 2017, President Trump nullified Obama’s policies on Climate Change and revived the coal industry in order to improve the American economy. Thus, his intentions as revealed in the book seem solid and it is likely that he will keep implementing them.

Change in healthcare also seems inevitable after Trump’s entry into the Oval Office. He has strongly rejected Obama’s healthcare policy popularly known as ‘Obamacare’ and considers it unrealistic and a source of profit for the insurance lobby which has politicians in its pocket. In less than 100 days of assuming office, he signed an Executive Order to dismantle ‘Obamacare’. While he could not get Congress on board to repeal it, it just goes to show how he remains or at least wants to appear as a man of action, a man of his word.
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Trump also proposed tax reforms in the book. He believes that by simplifying the tax code, the Government can widen the tax base as well as unburden the middle class. He proposed that single individuals earning less than USD 25,000 and married couples earning USD 50,000 annually should be exempt from the income tax net (p.79). Instead of multiple tax brackets, Trump proposes only four - 0, 10, 20 and 25 per cent. He claims that his tax reforms will provide relief to over 75 million US citizens (p.80).

Trump concludes in his book that it is easy to make America ‘a great nation’ once again. However, this is only possible when politicians speak the truth and their actions are aligned with their words. The book negates various popularly held stereotypes about him. The book is an attempt to show that his promises during the election campaign were based on his in-depth study of various national and international issues. Unlike his image in the media, he seems more realistic and clear about national and international policy issues. The book shows a Trump who is a relatively straightforward politician and does not have a complicated personality. He wants to deal with complicated issues in a simple but organised manner. Whether one likes or approves of his methods and actions, in his first 100 days, as promised in the book and in his campaign to the American public, he has tried to undo the Paris Climate Deal, change America’s healthcare system and enforce stringent immigration laws, including building a wall along the border and putting travel restrictions on certain Muslim countries. He has faced and will continue to face various internal legal and structural challenges during the implementation on his plans, but he moving and shaking things up for America and Americans.

Policymakers, diplomats, scholars and students interested in US politics must read this book to understand Trump’s personality, thinking and approaches to various national and global issues. It is highly likely that after reading it, a reader’s mind and opinion about Donald Trump may change from one where he is viewed as a blunt and frivolous man to a sober, knowledgeable and practical person who has strong conviction in his beliefs which help him to stand up against various odds.

Reviewed by Khurram Abbas, Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Pakistan.

International politics is often characterised by hegemonic world orders that ensure peace and stability in international system. Post-Cold War, two decades have seen absolute American hegemony. With China’s economic and military rise, US primacy stands contested (p.2).

Power transition theorists argue that transition of power leads to conflict and confrontation between a declining hegemon and the rising challenger state. The book attempts to highlight the current transition of power in Asia and India’s foreign policy choices. It underlines the theme that China’s rise and United States’ gradual decline has created a ‘systemic instability in Asian geo-politics’ (p.125).

The book is authored by Harsh V. Pant, Professor of International Relations at Defence Studies Department and India Institute at Kings College, London, UK and his co-author Yogesh Joshi, a student of International Politics at the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India. They identify that apart from India, many other Asian states are also growing and call them ‘swing states’ as ‘the unknown nature of their intentions and their choices could tilt balance of power in one way or the other’ (p.4). According to the authors, given the structural imperative of strategic challenges, India has been following a ‘hedging strategy’ that has three pillars – ‘strategic partnership with the US, normalisation of relations with China and developing local balance of power mechanism by seeking close strategic cooperation with Asia’s middle powers’ (p.125). The authors also highlight India’s domestic political environment and previous as well as the current government’s strategies to deal with power transition phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific.

The authors touch upon the subject of Indo-US ties in the ‘age of pivot.’ They briefly enumerate the Indo-US strategic partnership that was developed under George Bush’s presidency and identify that the power transition in Asia-Pacific has been the most compelling factor in enhancing this partnership. They contend that the US considers India as the only Asian power to balance rising China (p.42). While highlighting India’s importance in the US Asia-Pacific strategy, they talk about major
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debates in India’s strategic circles. Proponents of neo-nonalignment (a new version of Cold War non-alignment) favour keeping an equal distance from both China and the US. While the opponents of non-alignment see the US pivot policy as a strategic opportunity for India who by harnessing greater cooperation with the US can confront China. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) had been pursuing the neo-nonalignment policy, while Modi’s government has been considering the US pivot policy as an opportunity to counter China.

The authors also highlight Sino-Indian relations and point out that with the passage of time their rivalry has increased. They list the Sino-Indian border dispute as the main reason for their increased mistrust, while so-called ‘Sino-Pakistan Axis’ has also been a grave concern for defence planners of India. According to them, the most important contributing factor in the rivalry has been China’s increasing political and economic clout. They argue that managing China’s rise has been a security and foreign policy priority for India and has given rise to heightened debate in internal circles. One school of thought, for example, supports the idea of ‘Chindia’ and believes in economic interdependence and does not view the two states as ‘natural enemies’ (p.67). The authors juxtapose the policies of Manmohan Singh’s Government and the current Modi Government and observe that both have been different in terms of overall policy towards China. Singh’s Government tried to appease China even at the expense of India’s other strategic partners such as the US. On the other hand, while Modi also desires good relations with China, his Government does not wish to ruffle any feathers at the expense of allies such as US and Japan (p.76).

In this regard, a chapter has been devoted to India’s relations with Japan and the factors that have fuelled this relationship. These include India’s economic development, its engagement with the US and its interest in East Asia, while China’s economic as well as military rise has been a mutual concern as well as defining factor for their enhanced relations. The authors view Indo-Japanese cooperation as a means to meet future uncertainties as a result of regional power transitions. They identify three areas of cooperation – defence, economic engagement and enhanced multilateral cooperation against China’s increasing influence in international and regional institutions (p.89). Indo-Japanese defence cooperation has been a unique feature of their bilateral strategic relations. India is desirous of purchasing defence equipment from Japan and in case
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this materialises, India would be the first country to which Japan exports defence equipment since the Second World War (p.84). Moreover, maritime cooperation such as joint naval exercises have been institutionalised to check the hegemony of any state in the Pacific or Indian Ocean. As far as economic cooperation is concerned, India has been the largest recipient of Japanese aid and desires to improve its manufacturing sector by Japanese investment and technical help. In fact, India would be more comfortable having Japanese investment in infrastructure projects rather than Chinese assistance that could pose security challenges to India. Similarly, given troubled Sino-Japanese relations, enhanced cooperation with India would reduce Japan’s dependence on China. Fearful of Chinese hegemony, both opt for multilateralism in their foreign policy as China is opposed to their permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council and Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unlike Chinese cooperation with other South Asian states, India has welcomed Japanese engagement with them. But, the authors do identify one area of disagreement between Indo-Japanese relations vis-à-vis civil nuclear cooperation. Japan has set preconditions for any nuclear related cooperation with India, but the latter is not willing to consider these concerns. How this divergence could affect their future bilateral relations has not been addressed in the book.

Apart from discussing India’s relations with US and Japan, the authors also briefly touch upon India’s relations with other Asia-Pacific states, including Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea that have parallel concerns about China (p.104). They identify a serious dilemma in their foreign and security policies vis-à-vis their relations with the US (who leads a security order in the Asia-Pacific region) and China (who leads the economic order in the region). Both offer different trajectories and complex choices for these states (p.106). In the end, the authors discuss how New Delhi’s regional balancing act to signal to China the impending concert of power in the region would not help India narrow the power difference between the two states (p.119). They view India’s partnership with the US as instrumental in developing enhanced relations with other regional states who are already Washington’s security allies.

The book is an interesting read for students of International Politics in general and for researchers who are specifically focusing on the Asia-
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Pacific region. Apart from identifying systemic variables and bilateral as well as multilateral state interests, the authors give equal importance to domestic political dynamics of India that play a major role in its foreign and security architecture.

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Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 2016), 384.

The author Robert D. Blackwill is a retired American diplomat, currently serving as Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, while his co-author Jennifer M. Harris is an academician and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in USA.

In their latest publication, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, Blackwill and Harris describe the relation between geoeconomics and statecraft vis-à-vis the quest for geopolitical ambitions through the use of various economic instruments. As put, the book suggests that geoeconomics is re-emerging as a favoured form of geopolitical combat for some of the world’s most powerful states and is shaping policy outcomes across the world (p. 18). More so, the authors critically discuss the geoeconomic moves both coercive and incentivizing and the counterweighing strategies employed by various powers to influence their near and extensive neighbourhood to tackle their enemy, thus changing the nature of the ‘battlefield’ from the military to economics.

Blackwill and Harris believe that the word ‘geoeconomics’ is almost always used without a specific working definition. Some authors broadly define it as the entanglement of international economics with geopolitics and strategy, while others tend to focus on the use of military power and geopolitical means to achieve economic ends (p. 19). In reality, none of the existing written interpretations capture the entire concept comprehensively. The authors point that two particular events have had a direct bearing on geopolitics, which likely caused the revival of interest in this area - the 2008-09 financial crisis and the rise of China (p. 21).

The authors highlight that while this concept is emerging as an important phenomenon, there exists no common consensus or policy discussion to explain the motivating factors behind it, specifically in the United States. As quoted, Leslie Gelb urges the United States to replace the historic anti-Soviet focus of US Asian Policy with a new emphasis on geoeconomics, to forge new economic bonds to resolve political problems and prevent economic disputes from exploding into political confrontations. More so, Reginald Dale notes that with the end of the Cold
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War and the advent of the global economy, geopolitics and geoeconomics are becoming ever more closely intertwined. Whereby, Thomas Stewart calls that the US must create a geoeconomic equivalent of deterrence as a way to project its economic power, win those unavoidable for the US and its policy operations, prevent disagreements, and encourage nations to seek affluence together rather than being beggars to their neighbours (p. 33).

The authors also highlight that there are three primary factors behind the modern resurgence of geoeconomics which includes increasing inclination of the rising powers towards economic instruments as primary means of projecting influence and conducting geopolitical combat in the 21st century meanwhile providing states with vast resources at their direct disposal which are prone to economic displays of power today and lastly, that this resurgence has more to do with changing global markets than evolving patterns of state behaviour.

In the international system, this resurgence has also left a deeper structural impact on the very logic and operation of foreign policy as it not only offers new policy choices but enables states to use new foreign policy tools in changing the nature of diplomacy alongside global markets, thus adding to a state’s foreign policy calculus by reinforcing security and economic cooperation among states to a greater degree as compared to previous eras. Blackwill and Harris have further identified seven economic tools or instruments which suit the geopolitical application of the phenomenon such as economic sanctions, investment and trade policies, cyber, aid, monetary and financial policies alongside energy and flow of commodities (p. 49).

The book further draws a comparative analysis of the geoeconomic strategy employed by China and the US in their foreign policy. Being considered the world’s leading practitioner of geoeconomics, China believes in staying out of political confrontations, zeroing in on business so that it can maintain its global influence. And it is audaciously visible that nations today fear the Chinese ability to give or withhold trade and investment more than its military might (p. 93). As quoted in the book:

Beijing builds and exercises its power projection not primarily through the deployment of military assets but rather through coercive and incentivizing geoeconomic policies toward its neighbours (p. 110).
For instance, the obvious example is China’s dedicated two-pronged economic encirclement strategy for Taiwan, continuous rapprochement towards North Korea and Japan, a US ally in the rim, and Southeast Asia and the transactional one with Pakistan and India in South Asia. However, while the Chinese geoeconomic policy tries to engage states economically, it also seeks to deter the US military alliance system in Asia, strategically. Moreover, a body of evidence shows that China flexes its geoeconomic muscle both positively and negatively and most of the time, it succeeds in advancing its geopolitical interests at some degree especially on issues of its concern (p. 130). The authors further analyse that the Chinese use of geoeconomic instruments has emerged as a robust diplomatic tool to shape other nation’s policies (p. 151).

Meanwhile, several factors are considered as primary reasons behind the current hesitancy in the US towards geoeconomics which includes lack of presidential leadership in both the Democrat and Republican parties, the dominance of economic sanctions as the near reflexive geoeconomic instrument of choice and difficult bureaucratic politics (p. 152). Historically, this concept has had a very traditional yet key role in the country’s foreign policy, which the authors believe is forgotten by policymakers. It is believed that ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ are relatively separable and autonomous spheres of activity and in terms of the bearing one has on the other, it is economic rationality that determines political relations only. Analysts believe that in the current system, all governments step into economic matters in way unthinkable in the US at the moment. For instance, the authors consider the potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and US-EU trade deal as adhesive in nature to shore up the transatlantic relationship, but deem it entirely wrong if they are perceived as ‘economic NATO’. These assertions reflect a widely held worldview that markets are somehow apolitical and they must be kept free from geopolitical encroachments as they are surely not the arena for state power politics (p. 153). It is strongly felt that foreign economic policy must be left alone, very much free from interference by political considerations.

The need for US to re-define or re-establish its robust geoeconomic policy has become a challenge for its foreign policy vis-à-vis rise of China. The authors quote Henry Kissinger:
...as Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increase infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will depend less on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China’s political influence (p. 179).

Suffice to say that given the persistent use of geoeconomic instruments by China, Russia and others, it would be wrong to expect that its issues and stakes will diminish anytime soon, which implies that the US should also bring a shift in its foreign policy, questioning how it can maintain its global leadership in an age importantly defined by geoeconomics and related powers (p. 220).

In the global set-up, where major value resides in economic means for changing mindsets and capturing global and regional weaknesses or opportunities available, this book is certainly an authentic account of geoeconomics and its importance in today’s world. This book comprehensively analyses the geoeconomic policies employed by China, Russia and others, which are particularly missing in the US policy framework. As a scholarly addition to the present literature, the book extensively quotes examples along with summarised background of the specific events to help readers grasp the main idea without searching for answers from any other source.

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After assuming premiership in May 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a new push to traditional Indian inclination towards indigenous production under the new slogan ‘Making in India’ in general and with regard to the military industrial complex in particular (p. ix). Indian government has undertaken a number of enabling reforms in the domain of defence industry (p.63), especially its private sector whose contribution has traditionally been non-existent (p.64). Ministry of Defence (MoD) has also promulgated a host of compliance related measures.

The book under review analyses the current status of Indian Defence Industrial Base (DIB) and seeks to answer the intriguing question: Does the Indian DIB, especially its private sub-sector, has requisite strength to shoulder the responsibility of achieving the benchmarks stipulated by ‘Making in India’ initiative. Dr Laxman answers this question in an implicit manner, combining an apologetic ‘yes’ and a reluctant ‘no’, while adding intriguing ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’.

India’s civil and military industrial complexes have historically been obsessed with the politically motivated mantra of ‘Making in India’ since the Nehru days (p. 4). The route to achieving this objective has remained focused on transfer of technology under licensed production. This model ‘excluded the necessity for India to undertake Research and Development (R&D) in advanced systems’ (p. 6).

The situation in aircraft industry, which took some bold initiatives, was even worse. [It] was not only dependent on foreign sources for special steel and aluminium but also for all instrumentation, undercarriage, braking systems, communication systems and electronic systems (p. 7).

This approach had its drawback: under the cover of indigenous development, it patronised mushrooming of well-entrenched mafias dealing in reverse engineering and licensed for the production of foreign brands’ *Indianised* products under local names (p. 5). The legacy, left behind by this faulty developmental strategy, which was adopted in 1948, continues to haunt the Indian industrial base, and more so its defence production:
India has a huge military industrial complex with 48 factory level public sector enterprises under the administrative tutelage of Ministry of Defence, supplemented by around 150 private sector companies; and supported by 52 dedicated research laboratories and establishments which fall in the domain of the DRDO [Defence Research and Development Organization]. Despite this vastness of defence industrial base, India continued as the largest importer of major weapon systems during 2011-14, amounting to 15 percent of global share. Moreover, it signed arms import deals worth USD 46 billion during 2004-11. Various audit reports presented to the Indian Parliament have indicated ‘up to 90 per cent import dependency by some flagship enterprises coupled with misreporting on indigenisation (p. 1-3).

While counting its achievements, the author eulogises India for being:

…one of the few countries to have designed and produced a fourth-plus generation fighter aircraft, nuclear submarine, main battle tank, and intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of more than 5000 km (p. ix).

In the same stride, author points out that an earlier ‘target of 70 per cent self-reliance in defence procurement set for 2005 is still to be achieved. Currently, India’s self-reliance is hovering at around 35-40 per cent’ (p. ix). Dr Laxman notes:

If earlier USSR/Russia was the primary supplier, in recent times the US has taken the lead, at least for the period 2011-14. By the end of 2015, the US has sealed defence deals worth over USD10 billion with India, of which over USD 7 billion agreements were signed between 2007 and 2014 under Foreign Military Sales (p. 8).

Examining the public sector defence production entities, namely the Ordnance Factories and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (p. 24-27 & p. 44-50), he points out that their gross inefficiency has been the main reason for India’s failure in becoming self-reliant in defence industrialisation (p. x & 56).

Although the author tends to showcase the development of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) ‘Teja’ as a success story (p.1), he acknowledges
‘90 per cent import dependency’ of manufacture of ‘Teja’—state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (p.2). The author recommends that:

DRDO, the monopolistic defence R&D agency, which is often blamed for India’s poor self-reliance in the defence sector would have to perforce play a far more significant role to not only reduce India’s arms import dependence but turn back India’s traditional licence-based production approach to one based on own intellectual property, indigenous design and development (p xi).

Dr Laxman commends the way Modi government has quickly put in place some of the reforms to support the Make in India programme:

In less than two years of coming to power, the Modi government has already taken several broad reform measures pertaining to the defence industry. These pertain to industrial licensing, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) cap, defence exports and level playing field between private and public sectors. The reform in licensing which came in the form of a series of government notifications issued between 26 June 2014 and 22 September 2015 is an attempt to codify and simplify the process of granting industrial licence and remove procedural hurdles and other complexities in the process (p. 14)

Much the work of this book has been done well before the publication of the revised version of India’s MoD’s capital procurement manual, the Defence Procurement Procedure 2016 and the report of the Task Force on the Selection of Strategic Partners. Therefore, some of the author’s recommendations do resonate in these documents. This book has eight chapters supported by four Annexures, and the flow of arguments is logical, supported by well-designed tables, charts, graphs etc. Though the overwhelming purpose behind this work appears to be to influence the Indian policy tier, it is of equal benefit for the wider strategy making community as well as amateur researchers and students interested in understanding the evolution and current dynamics of the Indian military industrial complex.

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