**Book Review-I**

**Pakistan's Foreign Policy — A Re-Appraisal**

Shahid M. Amin, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, Pages 327, Price Rs. 495.00

_by Colonel (Retired) Ghulam Sarwar_

Shahid M. Amin, an accomplished diplomat and foreign affairs expert, sets out to analyse the successes and failures of Pakistan's foreign policy, as pursued by various governments. He concedes that despite many failings on the part of various rulers, their over-riding motivation has been the desire to safeguard the country's independence and territorial integrity. In view of India's persistent hostile attitude towards Pakistan, our quest for security has been marked by a consistent and unvarying dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy. Much that Pakistan has done for furtherance of its foreign relations has been influenced greatly by its perception of threat from India.

Fully aware of nefarious design of Hindu leadership, the Muslim League leaders had come to the conclusion that instead of fighting each other interminably, it was better for Hindus and Muslims both, to part company and live side by side as independent neighbours. Motivated by this spirit, Quaid-e-Azam had said in a statement issued only a week before Pakistan gained independence. He said, “Our objective should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and have friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. We have no aggressive designs against anyone. We stand by the United Nations Charter.” Thus, consolidation of friendly relations after independence was Quaid’s sincere hope, which was frustrated by India's persistent intransigence.

Here, the author regrets that had Indian leaders shown even a fraction of goodwill and accommodation, as well as the necessary statesmanship, it would not been difficult for them to adopt a mutually beneficial course of compromise and cooperation. This could have saved both the countries huge expenditure on defence, which has kept hundreds of millions of their countrymen so deeply impoverished.

With passage of time, it is now abundantly clear that the Indian leadership, in the early years of our independence, held on to the belief that the Partition of India would shortly be undone. As such, ‘Akhand Bharat’, remained the cherished dream of Hindu leaders. The then President of the Congress Party, Mr. Kriplani’s remarks merit special attention. He says, “Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a United India.” This hostile attitude towards Pakistan, obviously, could not but create bitterness and suspicion in Pakistan. Jinnah’s own expectations about peaceful existence were shattered within two months of Independence.

Soon after partition, India forcefully annexed Kashmir and this problem has been a constant eye-sore ever since. This dispute has sapped, energies of both the countries, with no solution in sight. Pakistan’s policy makers have always remained convinced that India, several times bigger than Pakistan in size and resources, was conspiring against Pakistan’s very independence and territorial
integrity. In their perception, India’s hostile designs not only consisted of the conventional methods of warfare, but also included diverse political and other pressures, including a psychological war of relentless propaganda, questioning the very raison d'etre of Pakistan’s creation.

Here, the author maintains that to overcome these grave challenges to Pakistan's security, Pakistan, perforce, had to find an equalizer against India. This has, ever since, remained the most important pre-occupation of Pakistan's foreign and defence policies. However, through the years, Pakistan’s quest for security had to undergo various phases.

Talking about the 1965 War, the author feels convinced, that the war ended up with adverse consequences for Pakistan — both short-term as well as long-term. To him, these effects were far-more damaging than what most people in Pakistan could ever imagine. The most menacing feature of this futile exercise was that the internal cohesion of Pakistan was greatly disturbed, thus, hastening, the separation of East Pakistan.

With regard to the 1971 War, the author asserts that Pakistan's defeat was mainly due to the alienation of the east wing’s Bengali population and perceived injustice to East Pakistan. Then, a point of no-return was reached in 1971, when Islamabad decided to suppress the secessionists with an iron hand. India too, had played an active role in these developments through years of sustained propaganda in East Pakistan against West Pakistan. The 1971 war had been an unmitigated disaster for Pakistan. In the words of British historian, Huge Trevor-Roper, “In December 1971, Pakistan was divided, defeated, demoralized and in the eyes of the world, disgraced.” However, in spite of these setbacks, Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance remained in tact and indeed came to the country’s rescue. Later, a number of developments helped Pakistan, not only recover from the initial trauma, but in some ways, helped it emerge stronger in the international setting.

Talking about Pakistan’s relations with the Islamic world the author regrets to say that Pakistan received minimal support in the past from the Arab and Islamic world in its confrontation with India. Instead, some Islamic countries had more cordial and friendly relations with India rather than Pakistan. In view of these stark realities, it will be rather naive to make any strategic planning for the future on the assumption of any solid support from the Arab and Islamic world for Pakistan in its conflict with India. The author firmly believes that realistically speaking, there is no such thing as an Islamic bloc. To him, Pan-Islamism as a philosophy has had little appeal in Islamic countries in the twentieth century.

Highlighting Pakistan's relations with China, the author holds that Pakistan enjoyed a remarkably close relationship with China from the early years of its independence. Considering that the two countries have been ideologically far apart, and have at times, even belonged to two opposite military blocs, China-Pakistan friendship has aroused considerable curiosity for this seemingly odd partnership. Past history of the relationship reveals that the two countries have proceeded step-by-step towards establishing friendship on the basis of a mutuality of interest, which side tracked even ideological differences, India, no doubt, figured in an important way in the calculation of both sides. However, both Pakistan and China are moved by wider geo-strategic considerations as well.

As hinted earlier, long-tangled issue of Kashmir has embittered relations between India and Pakistan over the years. The disproportionate burden of defence expenditure over the years has hurt Pakistan more than India. Against the backdrop, there is need for some cool-headed thinking in Pakistan. We must try and stick to our old stance of securing self-determination for people of Jammu and Kashmir, but
at the same time, we must see to it that in the process of securing Kashmir, Pakistan’s own survival is not put at stake. Our policy makers in Pakistan must, therefore, make some hard calculation and adopt a rational policy so as to suit best interests of the country. Playing politics with Kashmir issue has got to end. It is, therefore, in Pakistan’s own interest to try to come out of the present impasse and seek a change for the better. Realism and cold calculation of national interests should become the hallmarks of the foreign policy of Pakistan. While the presentation of Pakistan’s sovereign independence and territorial integrity should be our over-riding objective, internal consolidation and high economic growth would need to become our main priorities. Peace with honour with India and promotion of regional cooperation should be adopted as our immediate policy objective. The development of nuclear capability has, no doubt, given Pakistan’s defence a big boost, but the example of the Soviet Union shows that nuclear capability itself is not enough. It does not necessarily guarantee a country’s survival. After all, the Soviet Union had possessed thousands of nuclear war heads, ICBM and other latest weapons but it felt like a house of cards and its nuclear might did not come to its aid. The Soviet economy proved to be its Achilles heel and the ground simply gave in under its feet. It would, therefore, be unwise to ignore this historical lesson since Pakistan’s precarious economy can be its undoing as well. The hard reality is that living beyond means can be dangerous for nations, no less, than it is for individuals!
A Nuclear Strategy for India

Rear Admiral Raja Menon, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000, Pages 316, Rs. 595.00

by
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South Asian security witnessed a sea change when India conducted its nuclear tests provoking similar response from Pakistan and brought about qualitative shift to their adversarial relations. Since then, a wave of literature featuring nuclear policies and operational strategies of both India and Pakistan has surfaced to detect the possible course of their nuclear doctrines. In this pursuit, Indian nuclear policies and possible nuclear doctrines have gravitated more attention among the Indian security analysts. Apart from others, Raja Menon’s contribution stands prominent.

The book comprises seven chapters and has dealt the subject of strategic studies at length with remarkable precision, to construct the background for narration of Indian nuclear policy and to track its flaws that make it distinctive from nuclear policies of the other nuclear powers. He broached with defining international relations and India’s geopolitical environment and explained initial Indian policy in the framework of Gandhian moral principles that guided Indian foreign and defence policies. In the first chapter especially, he explained Morgenthau’s six principles of realism and sought their selective application on few events to establish that initially Indian policies had been governed by idealism. For this purpose, he streamlined Indian stances on arms control and disarmament regimes during 1960s and onwards, without referring to ground realities that by that time India was actively pursuing its weapon oriented nuclear programme. In the same line of thinking, he has tried to underplay the role of military power in Indian pursuit of national interests by categorising wars with Pakistan and attributing their inconclusive results to “India’s lack of understanding of difference between violence and politics.” He further opined that India pursued Nehruvian policy, believing that the world would change according to moral principles, overcoming the intrinsic evil nature of human mind. He referred to this practice when India carried out nuclear tests and did not pursue weaponisation and declared no first use even before it conducted its series of nuclear tests, while cherishing the notion of disarmament. He, in fact, has tried to downplay the role of Indian diplomacy which wrapped the hidden intentions in to well knit campaign of moral politics based on nuclear disarmament.

The second chapter reviews the Western nuclear theology since the advent and the use of nuclear weapons and for this purpose it mainly focussed on U.S. nuclear policies. It underscored the evolution and development of the concept and policy of nuclear deterrence and traced its link with U.S. nuclear strategy. He discussed briefly the nuclear doctrinal development in the U.S. and dwelt upon the dynamics of nuclear technology that helped drag U.S. nuclear policy forward. The author contends that minimum nuclear deterrence must be adhered to, as he says, “If
there is to be nuclear weaponsing and if arms race is not spiral, the level at which mutuality must occur should be arrived at as early as possible.”

Consistent with Western narrative, he discussed Indian nuclear theology since the beginning of Indian nuclear programme. The roles of Homi Bhabha and Nehru were the defining features of Indian nuclear policy. The Cold War played a significant role in the development of Indian nuclear policy, combined with internal political dynamics, accelerated the pace. However, war with China and subsequent Chinese nuclear test played a catalyst in meriting the Western attention and dividends that trailed to India during and after the war. “There are even unconfirmed reports that in 1965-66, the Americans let it be known that they would not take it amiss if India produced a nuclear device, a message said to have been delivered orally through Dean Rusk.” Menon regretted that India should have taken the opportunity and gone nuclear to avoid excessive pressure on succeeding generations. Conversely, Pakistan by 1980s had reached near the nuclear weapon capability and India missed the first chance to do so. While the second chance to go nuclear was missed when “in 1987 Pakistan had a weapon, and India was still scrambling towards one.” This assertion is quite debatable, for India had started its missile programme in early 1980s to achieve nuclear delivery system. Without a nuclear weapon programme, initiating missile programme seemed illogical and unconvincing. He has further tried to establish that China tried to develop Pakistan as its proxy against India through supplying nuclear and missile related material and components. Then he briefly goes through Brasstacks, policy of nuclear ambiguity and CTBT, linking them to evolving phases of Indian nuclear programme and strategy.

To develop interest for readers, he discussed pure strategy and the role of technology in its development. Many times, both have been mutually reinforcing. For this purpose, he focussed on Western literature on nuclear strategy, evolution and development of nuclear doctrines that held sway during the Cold War period. Deterrence, for that matter, became his focal point of discussion and he presented its various dimensions. In the next chapter he reviewed Chinese and Pakistani nuclear programmes and analysed their logic, to determine the reasonableness of Indian nuclear programme and developing nuclear policy. Constructing the background, he discussed Indian nuclear programme, its potential, warhead designs, missiles and their probable accuracy of hitting their targets. He analysed some options for India to accommodate them in its nuclear policy and then develop a viable nuclear doctrine. To accomplish this objective he points out and proposes, Indian missile force, nuclear submarines, mobile launchers, silos, and cruise missiles.

Nuclear command and control system of India attracted considerable attention in this book because it is one of the main elements that stabilises nuclear deterrence, and discourages the use by unauthorised authority. Conventional war and its potential escalation to nuclear war has been his major concern and, therefore, proposes that in case of conventional war with Pakistan, Central National Command Post (CNP) must manage its transition to nuclear level. It would be composed of two sections. One sub-section will manage conventional war in three modes and the other will manage nuclear war. Complete control of CNP on conventional war with Pakistan would increase greater possibility to contain it. In the same line of thinking, he pleaded formulation of operationally viable nuclear strategy so that adequate use of nuclear weapons could be invoked when it is required. He evaluated various options that are exercisable to manage tight nuclear control and its subsequent use on premeditated targets during war. That presupposes acquisition of
hi-tech modern infrastructure required to support viable nuclear doctrine, with a complete chain of authority for the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, he evaluates regional and international environment in which Indian nuclear policy will have to develop and operate. Operationally the international environment, in fact, will lend legitimacy to emerging nuclear posture of India. “India does not have a completely free hand in navigating its way to a unilateral nuclear strategy is acknowledged.” The sanctions, CTBT, the level of development of reliable relations with Pakistan, and reduction of nuclear risks, influence of international agencies and the behaviour of superpowers about nuclear use will tend to dictate the kind of nuclear strategy India needs. Raja Menon tried to overcome the problem of technology replacement after a new technology enters the arena. This is the major problem India faces in the development of its nuclear strategy and, therefore, advocates that India cannot afford the luxury of nuclear deterrence based on Triad, and best available option for India is to maintain minimum nuclear deterrence. “For us minimum deterrence will always remain barely above the poverty line.”

But he has not defined clearly as to what really constitute minimum nuclear deterrence? Minimum nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which is not bound by time and space. The changes in threat perception and military technology would force corresponding changes in the quality and quantity of minimum nuclear deterrence force. Thus, the rhetoric of minimum nuclear deterrence appears to be eyewash, devised to cater to nuclear diplomacy and political expediency. The fundamental impediment in the definition of minimum nuclear deterrence of India is not mere technological improvements but strategic mythmakers in its decision-making circle. They continue to create myths about unfounded security threats and propagate them to solicit national and international legitimacy. Raja Menon, perhaps deliberately or otherwise, failed to address this dilemma that drives Indian nuclear policy at a greater pace.
The title of the book is very intriguing. Terrorism is perhaps one of the greatest challenges being faced by both developing and developed countries alike. The book arouses inquisitiveness about the ultimate terrorist. It comprises eight chapters and by looking at the contents it becomes clear that it is not only about the most serious form of terrorism; nuclear terrorism, but the causes and motivations, and the channels through which this crime flows. The author starts by portraying a gruesome and horrifying detail of a possible terrorist nuclear attack on the Empire State Building. The effects will be long term in intensity and scale of devastation. The greatest cost will be the shattering of balance between the civil liberties and public safety. These details were unimaginable before September 11, 2001, incident, but the theme is comprehensible in the current international scenario.

The author gives an account of the psyche of an average American, who has become paranoid. Explaining the Oklahoma bombing incident, it was due to paranoia that the Americans jumped to the conclusion that this bombing was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists, leading to the harassment of the Americans of Arab origin. The leaders will now be forced to take actions internationally in deporting the foreigners alleged of having suspicious links or liaisons with terrorist organisations. This action is liable to violate the civil rights. The American way of life has changed substantially with people running off to other cities. There are economic costs too. Stern talks of a probability of an Anthrax attack. As the disease caused by Anthrax attack is difficult to be detected at early stage, the infection goes unnoticed as the symptoms take time to show.

Modern societies are called ‘vulnerable societies’, as the members live in close proximity. People have a lack of trust towards their social order and the panic, in turn becomes more susceptible and a cause of psychological torment. The modern trend in this type of terrorism has arisen due to the belief that America is a difficult nation to be militarily defeated in a conventional conflict. The adversaries of America believe that the only way to get even or to defeat America is through the weapons of mass destruction, without openly declaring war. The writer identifies Iran and Syria as symbols of terrorism.

US may have contributed to terrorism by training and financing guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan. The morality of these actions in terrorists’ view would be to give the countries that have used these weapons in the past, a taste of their own deadly medicine. There is a rise in the fanatic groups. The disintegration of USSR has offered a black market for nuclear weapons with inadequate safety at the nuclear installations. Mentioning the incident of Project Sapphire, she has quoted an
example where highly enriched Uranium was left behind in a metallurgical plant in the former Soviet Union and was highly vulnerable to theft, as it was not properly protected. The implication is to the possibility of many such places that went unnoticed and theft of fissile material could have taken place.

Describing the Agents of Death as the biological, chemical and radiological agents, Stern gives detailed, yet a simple, explanation of all the toxic agents. Quoting the Bhopal incident, Stern explains the leak of Methyl Isocyanate, caused by the addition of water to a storage tank by a mentally deranged individual. This caused uncontrollable damage and devastation, where 4,000 people died and 11,000 were left disabled. She gives an account of the technicalities in the fission and fusion reaction and explains how the implosion weapons, consisting of highly explosive chemicals around the core of the fissile material can be the weapons of terror.

The writer calls the use of nuclear weapons barbaric, morally unacceptable and the nuclear war unthinkable. The after effects of radiation are the Trojan Horses of the human body that show their effects after they slip inside the body. Additionally, the fears of food contamination and the probable ailments due to stress at work are also explained. Dread and disgust are more terrible than fear and horror. She asserts that using poisons, as a weapon is immoral and considered the weapons of the weak, but fails to suggest a morally justified response by the weak, to counter the insurmountable weapon arsenal of the powerful aggressors. These have reduced the trust of the American people in prevention against the exposure to toxic agents by their government. The writer contends that it is easy to obtain fissile or chemical material, literature and hire people to make bombs.

This idea puts the central theme to question, that why the terrorists would want to acquire nuclear weapons if they can cause similar damage through chemical and biological weapons, which are easier to obtain. Macro-terrorism is to influence large population and spread dread worldwide. This theme motivated some of the cults to profess the ideas like Armageddon and the End of the World. Terrorists use dread of radiation and the maladies associated with it, as a weapon of influencing the audience, thus introducing psychological factor to the concept.

The threat of terrorism cannot be eliminated altogether, but minimised. The first prerequisite is to address the threat of nuclear terrorism and all the associated biological, chemical and radiation elements liable or capable of causing damage at a large scale. Terrorists are reactionaries, which makes it even more difficult to deal and bargain with them. The states sponsoring terrorism must be penalised and refrained from exporting terrorism. The last chapter is devoted to the possibilities of a state dealing with such attacks and there are recommendations for the improvement in civil defence, advanced biological research in preventions against diseases from radiation, raising emergency funds to cope with the unexpected damage and making international laws more stringent.

The research methodology is the most modern and references are very professionally quoted. The references are mainly secondary but of most authentic authors on the subject. The book is very relevant in the current scenario especially for those who do not have a prior knowledge of the subject. It is informative and educative. The book stimulates curiosity about the ultimate terrorist and when the origins of the problem are studied, the causes and motivations imply that people who are branded as the terrorist of today, have actually been terrorised by some one in the past. The conclusion to be drawn is that terrorism is essentially a reactionary phenomenon. Ironically, the reader is left to ponder upon question, from whom this new threat of nuclear terrorism is felt? the ultimate terrorist or the one, who first
introduced and used these weapons of mass annihilation, be they nuclear, chemical or biological. However, the book is valuable in the context that it agitates the mind to contemplate on these pressing questions.
Book Review-IV

International Conflict Resolution


by
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At a time when conflicts at the turn of the century are occurring in new and vexing forms, when scholars are trying to analyse their origins and predicting outcomes, Charles Hauss has very succinctly provided a lively introduction to both theory and practice. After his major works on various aspects of international relations and comparative politics, International Conflict Resolution provides the reader with an understanding of the theoretical and practical aspects of the conflicts since the end of Cold War and those which are likely to come in the future.

The book is divided into two parts, the first devoted to theories and concepts and the second, examining case studies of South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Bosnia and Iraq. The case studies facilitate and deepen the understanding of theoretical issues concerning conflict resolution. He has very eloquently traced the three stages in most typologies of international conflict; origins, ending the fighting and reconciliation. He pays a great deal of emphasis on the analytical rather than the normative aspect of international disputes.

The first part of the book starts with theory, where in the first chapter the author gives a brief insight to the fact that one cannot ignore either their own values or emotions in trying to come to grips with international conflict and its resolution. He emphasizes on the fact that conflict is an inescapable part of our life from our personal level to the international level. He further elaborates on the solutions for win-win outcomes, reconciliation and stable peace consideration. He further explains the two main theories, Empirical and Normative. While Empirical theory seeks to explain as why certain phenomena occurs, with the focus on cause and effect relationship, Normative theory on the other hand prescribes as to what should be done in swift resolution while dealing with the phenomena.

In order to understand conflict, the author stresses on the need to understand the nature of conflict - protracted violence, where the international dimension of the conflict should not be ignored. At times the actions of other states are consciously intended to provoke or sustain conflict as was the case with Soviet aid to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and African National Congress (ANC) for much of the Cold War and American support to Iraq during its war with Iran.

The writer has very prolifically blended the theories in the first part of the book. He explains how conflicts are influenced by two main sets of motivation, one’s own perceived self-interest and concern for the impact of what happens on the other side. The first stage of conflict, where tensions deepen to the point that violence becomes a possibility, should be avoided through preventive diplomacy. States and other actors should assist in peace building process when a conflict has outgrown its size, by allowing time and encouraging restrain, which may be difficult
in most of the cases. He further elaborates on the reason as to why new theories on win-win conflict resolution and stable peace are at least possible.

Highlighting the views of the pluralists who differ with the realists on the premise that win-win agreement to end conflict is difficult, due to the obstacles and opportunities. Further elaborating on the views of the pluralists, he states that long standing disputes are most often resolved only after they have reached a hurting stalemate, at which point the parties realize that the costs of continuing the fighting outweighs any potential benefits.

In the second part of the book, Hauss starts with the case study of South Africa. He gives a vivid description of how theory has interplayed with its implementation. How the case of conflict resolution in the post apartheid South Africa has been smoother and different from the others. How the post apartheid government in general and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in particular, have tried to weaken the image of the enemy and other psychological barriers to reconciliation, and the role, leaders of the both sides played from the start of negotiations.

The author has very carefully chosen the example of the Northern Ireland conflict, which has a mix of strong cultural and economic roots along with religion. The slow and incremental progress of Northern Ireland demonstrates how widening are the international implications. How third party mediation affects the resolution process, how George Mitchell along with international team headed the negotiations and gained trust of the leading politicians. He stresses on the fact that one needs good political leadership for good politics.

On the other hand, when Hauss takes the case study of Israel and Palestine, he highlights the origins of the centuries old conflict, the place having holy significance to three religions. He does not undermine the importance of the third party mediators but shows the difficulty they face in finding an effective resolution. In this case, he gives an example of the weakness of the international community when interest of major parties is involved, the way domestic politics in general and leadership in particular can both be a source of progress and obstacle to peace. How the continued role of ‘rejectionist’ groups and more widespread images of the enemy between both states has been an impediment.

The author has very carefully examined the dialectics of conflict resolution in the Bosnian case study, as how it offers empirical support both for those who are optimist and those who are pessimist about the prospects for win-win conflict resolution and reconciliation, depending how one factor has played itself out. How the Bosnian conflict reflects on the rationale that why it is that international conflict resolution is difficult to achieve. How the changes of the post Cold War world helped cause the conflict initially, delayed the international response and finally made Dayton Agreement possible. He highlights the fact as to how political leaders and domestic policies in general can intensify a dispute.

In the final case study of the book, Charles Hauss gives the example of Iraq, as to how difficult it is to achieve a win-win situation, and suggests need to find better ways of settling disputes. How conflict resolution was never a goal of leaders on either side.

This book gives a good understanding of general trends in the field of international conflict resolution by considering theories and case studies together.