
Eamon Murphy (Adjunct Professor of History and International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia) focuses on the origins and nature of terrorism in Pakistan and examines the social, political and economic factors that have contributed to the rise of political violence in the country. He has tried to relate the historical narrative of the development of Pakistani state to the various questions related to terrorism, such as why Pakistan is considered as the centre of terrorism in the world and is there a role that Islam as a religion plays in the rise of terrorism?

Discussing the genesis of Pakistan, he brings out that the rise of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to power in the 1930s changed both the direction and the fortune of the All-India Muslim League (p.33). The electoral success of the Indian National Congress acted as a catalyst for Jinnah and others who were concerned about the fate of Muslims under a Hindu-dominated government (p.36). The author has erred demographically when he said that in 1947 Muslims comprised about 50,000,000 people approximately 20 per cent of the total population of British India (p.31). As per official 1941 census, Muslims numbered 92,058,096 i.e. about 24 per cent of the total population of India, which was 383,643,745.

He is not very wrong in his view that religious ideology had played little role in the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan was intended to be a secular state to protect the economic, political and religious rights of Muslims living in the subcontinent (p.5). As a matter of fact Muslim society was largely tolerant in respect of religion under the influence of Sufism. They had little interest in the doctrinal differences between Sunnis and Shias. There was little influence of a more intolerant Wahhabi Islam and the tradition of jihad was confined to the Pashtun tribal areas. But to put, as he does, that initially many Pakistanis were irreligious would not be correct (p.29).

He correctly disagrees with the finding of justification for violence in the teachings of Islam (p.164) because Pakistan has Sufi schools which reject violence, and mainstream Barelvis are generally tolerant. But, according to the author, the most dangerous is the Wahhabi school of Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia which is accused of waging a proxy war with ideological rival Iran (p.164). He rejects the assertion of the US government’s 9/11 Commission Report, which said that madrassahs were the “incubators for violent extremism” (p.165). However, the relationship between Islam and state and the unending dispute between India and
Pakistan over the state of Kashmir have heightened religious intolerance and sectarianism (p. 64).

He has relied on a US State Department report of April 2000 which had identified Pakistani support for Kashmiri extremist groups during 1999 (p.122) in asserting that Pakistan supported jihadi groups in Kashmir valley who used terrorist tactics against Indian security forces and civilians which led to the Indian government using state terrorism to crush the uprising. He has failed to appreciate that Pakistan only supported the freedom struggle of the Kashmiris against forcible Indian occupation of Kashmir which is very similar to the Afghan jihadis who are fighting against foreign occupation of their homeland. He thus exonerates Indian state terrorism in Kashmir. He does not seem to be fully in picture when he says that Pakistan’s support for jihadi groups in Kashmir has turned on Pakistan itself (p.128).

Weak governance is another factor in sustaining terrorism. Ayub Khan’s authoritarian military government and Bhutto’s populist government failed to address Pakistan’s structural, political, social and economic problems. Pakistan Peoples’ Party never became a democratic institution but was “essentially the property of the Bhutto family” (p.83). Due to weak governance both civil and military rulers failed to abolish feudalism, which has continued to dominate political decision-making and is responsible for “blocking land reform” and other “necessary structural changes to Pakistani society”.

He blames weak governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (1988-1999) for the steady growth of sectarianism and terrorism (pp.117-122). They had a poor record in combating sectarian violence and terrorism. “A corrupt judiciary, ill-trained and underpaid police force and protection from politicians have all enabled terrorists to flaunt the law” (p.161). The absence of a strong and effective government and weakness of democracy were “important preconditions for the rise of terrorism and the emergence of sectarian violence in modern times” because weak governments were more interested in their survival rather than in making “tough political decisions” against terrorists (p.47).

Many factors would explain the causes for the failure of democracy. For instance, Pakistan did not have nationwide general elections till 1970. The authoritarian nature of governance under governor-generals and later presidents weakened democratic values. There was no nationwide popular political party including the Muslim League. Politics was dominated by factionalism and self-interest. He agrees with Ayesha Jalal that “the institutional balance of power [had] shifted in favour of the military and the bureaucracy” (p.51). Also, to an extent, incompetence and corruption of politicians did not allow democracy to take roots (p.48).
During the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, the US provided “cyber weapons, anti-tank missiles, highly accurate mortars, satellite data of Soviet targets, communication networks and plastic explosives” to the Mujahideen (p.106) and the US won the war at a low cost. Saudi Arabia funded madrassahs especially in the tribal areas along Pak-Afghan border and thus increased “Wahabi-flavoured Islam”. Pakistan had initially been successful in its involvement with radical jihadi groups which, it was thought, would protect its interest in Afghanistan, but Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for creating a “Frankenstein monster” which has turned on Pakistani state itself. The “escalation of terrorism” and the “growth of sectarian violence” have been a “terrible legacy” of Afghan jihad (p.116).

He has given a generalized statement that the heightened authority of the military bureaucracy also strengthened the extreme form of Islam. He is correct that President Zia-ul-Haq had greatly strengthened the influence of Deobandi and Wahhabi Islam supported by Saudi Arabia. The alienated Shias looked towards Iran and thus a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran was fought during the Afghanistan jihad. He asserts that the combination of “Zia’s Islamisation and the Afghan jihad” were the “most important catalysts” responsible for the “emergence of terrorism and sectarian violence” in Pakistan (p.100). Later, the invasion of Afghanistan by the US-led NATO forces greatly increased the influence of Afghan Taliban and their allies in Pakistan (p.142). He thinks that the US policy to withdraw from Afghanistan is a “disastrous foreign policy blunder” which has weakened the ability of the US and its allies to fight against the Taliban (p.143).

The military action against Lal Masjid had further outraged the militants (p.148). In September 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a public statement, warned that al Qaeda would take revenge for Lal Masjid. And on December 14, 2007, a meeting of some 40 militant tribal leaders, who commanded 40,000 fighters, gathered in South Waziristan and formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (p.148). In April 2009, the Pakistani Talibans occupied Swat valley, where they killed hundreds of security and government officials (p.149). The US drone killings in tribal areas also created unity amongst the tribesmen (p.149).

Explaining the origin of al Qaeda’s introduction of a highly effective terrorist tactic of suicide bombing in Pakistan, he refers to an Egyptian terrorist who, in 1995, drove his explosive loaded truck into the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan killing 14 persons (p.150). Later, the suicide bombers attacked security forces and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi attacked Shia, Christian and Ahmadiyya groups. During the year 2010, as many as 52 suicide attacks took place killing a total of 1224 persons and injuring 2,157 (p.151).
Finally, he concludes that there are three main factors for the rise of terrorism in Pakistan. First is the decision of 1846 when the English East India Company sold the Muslim dominated Kashmir Valley to the Hindu ruler of Jammu whose successor acceded to India. Kashmir struggle promoted terrorism. Second, was the “fatal blunder” of Prime Minister Bhutto who appointed Zia-ul-Haq as Chief of Army Staff in preference to more competent secular-minded generals. Third was the decision of the Soviet Politburo to invade Afghanistan which led to the rise of several jihadi groups supported by outside powers and also the US invasion of Afghanistan which strengthened jihadi groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which turned against the Pakistan state, as well as against the US and its allies. These factors according to the author had nothing to do with religion (p.166). His work is interesting and useful for the students of history and governance and those interested in studying the causes of sectarianism and terrorism in Pakistan.

Dr. Noor ul Haq, Senior Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad.

Dr. Kamal Hossain’s long association with the politics of former East Pakistan and the key positions and appointments he held in the government of Bangladesh make this book truly an insider’s account of the emergence of independent Bangladesh. The book comprises of 14 chapters, a prologue, an epilogue and three appendices. Kamal’s personal association with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman dates back to 1959. His deference for Sheikh Mujib gives the impression the author regarded him as his political mentor. Yet he differed with his leader on the way Mujib moved Bangladesh from a multi-party parliamentary democracy to a single party rule. Kamal felt the country was abandoning the ideals he and other colleagues had strived for.

The book gives a first-hand account of his involvement in different phases of the political struggle. He was a part of Mujib’s defence team in the Agartala Conspiracy case (p.29). He was also part of the Awami League’s negotiating teams at President Ayub’s Round Table Conference (p.47) and political negotiations with President Yahya Khan in 1971. Chapters 4, 5 & 6 record the history of these important events, the environment of political intrigue leading to the war of independence.

The book’s appraisal of post-independence challenges is a valuable source of information on different aspects of Bangladesh’s struggle for state building. Kamal was Minister of Law, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee (1972) and later served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and of Petroleum and Minerals (1973-1975). He analyses how a country ravaged by war and deprived of resources gave itself a secular, democratic constitution, won respect of the international community and gained membership of the United Nations. But this phase was short-lived ending in military rule. Like its parent country, Pakistan, Bangladesh has also jockeyed between military rule, government by technocrats, quasi democratic presidential dispensations and parliamentary democracy.

Bangladesh could not find psychological or emotional ‘closure’ on its violent birth in 1971. Pakistan had tendered regrets for the excesses that might have been committed, as documented in the tripartite agreement signed on April 9, 1974. It reads: “The Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan said that his Government condemned and deeply regretted any crimes that may have been committed”. It further stated that: “In the light of the foregoing and, in particular, having regard to the appeal of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated that the Government of Bangladesh
had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency”. Later, President Pervez Musharraf, while visiting Bangladesh in 2002, once again expressed regrets for the ‘1971 events’ during the war. However, Bangladesh has been rekindling the issue on what may be called ‘as required’ basis. There was an initial effort to establish a process of accountability, when within six weeks of independence; the government issued the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order. This was followed in July 1973 by the passing of the War Crimes Tribunal Act to try individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Several thousand individuals were arrested. But in November 1973, amid fears of turmoil if the issue was pursued, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced amnesty for most alleged collaborators and made no further provision for pursuing accountability. The decision to permit the re-entry of the Jamaat-i-Islami into Bangladesh’s mainstream politics was an additional indicator that Bangladesh had decided to follow the path of reconciliation.

Chapter 8 ponders over the impact of the war on the country’s social structure in which the hard core of the freedom fighters emerged as a force to reckon with (p.123). Chapter 9 describes the constitution making process. The Awami League had always been committed to a parliamentary form of government in which the prime minister would be the chief executive; this had been a part of the six-point agenda. Kamal chaired the 34-member “Constitution drafting Committee”, which drafted the constitution in Bangla. Kamal says the ‘dreams that were woven into the constitutional provisions, were those of a democratic political order in which power would truly belong to the people, to be exercised by a sovereign parliament elected on the basis of adult franchise’ (p.141). Secularism and nationalism were the other two fundamental pillars of the constitution. The constitution came into force on December 16, 1972.

Chapters 10 to 14 deal with the foreign policy. Bangladesh decided to follow an independent and non-aligned foreign policy, there was a repudiation of the military pacts that Bangladesh had inherited from Pakistan. Bangladesh resolved to seek good relations with all major powers and avoiding getting drawn into global or regional power competition. The goal was peace and stability in South Asia (p.169).

Kamal argues that geography and history alike demanded that a sound basis was laid for good relations with India. Liberation war bore witness to the massive support extended by India and its government to Bangladesh’s liberation struggle. India also favoured the development of a sound basis of good relations with Bangladesh though there were some discernible elements who had not favoured the creation of a sovereign Bangladesh. They thought that Indian interests would be better served by
dealing with united Pakistan. Some of these elements began to act as a ‘Pakistan lobby’ in India (p.200).

With regard to relations with Pakistan, Kamal refers to Sheikh Mujib’s address at a public meeting on January 10, 1972. Mujib declared that there could be no possibility of any relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan other than as between two sovereign states. With the passage of time issues like recognition and return of prisoners of war were settled. Tripartite agreement was signed between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, that brought to rest the point about trial of so-called war criminals. Repatriation of stranded Pakistanis took an arduous route of one step forward and two backwards. The last chapter of the book describes Bangladesh’s journey toward membership of the United Nations and how hurdles like the Chinese opposition were tackled through intense diplomacy.

Ever since its independence, Bangladesh has been facing serious challenges of identity. It’s renaming as Islamic republic and then back to democratic republic indicates the societal polarization.

Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice as a political memoir offers critical insights into the processes of state formation in the initial years. By employing the cut off date of 1974, the writer has cleverly bypassed the need to go into the consequences of the policy decisions made by the first Awami League government. Keeping in view the writer’s close association with Awami League and the government of Bangladesh, the treatise could be taken as an ‘almost official’ version of the government of Bangladesh while retaining the luxury of denial. Kamal Hossain has indeed done a good service by sharing this knowledge with the academia at large.

Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Consultant, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad.
Lisa Harrison and Theresa Callan, *Key Research Concepts in Politics and International Relations*  

The book by Lisa Harrison and Theresa Callan entitled *Key Research Concepts in Politics and International Relations*, is part of the Sage Key Concepts series. The book focuses on commonly employed concepts that students and researchers often struggle to understand and, at times, misuse. This book provides a clear, balanced and accessible introduction to a broad range of methodological concepts and techniques. It is an invaluable guide on a variety of core research concepts in both political science and international relations. Some key elements that make this book unique are:

a. The concepts are consistently structured, providing: a clear definition, a focused explanation, a summary of current debates and areas of research, further reading, and references to other related concepts;

b. Explains how and why particular research methods are used and highlights alternative research concepts and strategies; and

c. Presents supportive examples how theory is applied to the 'real world' of political analysis.

The book begins with a comparison of various methods of research such as Action Research, Conventional Process, Autobiographical Research, Case Studies and Comparative Research. Action Research operates at the social level and involves modifications in the process as per needs throughout the research project instead of occurring at the end. It is different from Case Study and Conventional Research since researchers in this process test and refine principles, tools and methodologies to address real world problems. The aim of this research is to review a particular situation, policy or scenario in order to change or improve it. Further, this research encourages the researchers to collaborate with experts and practitioners for their input to help in overcoming problems and limitation of research design and implementation process.

In contrast, Autobiographical and Biographical Research are interpretive and qualitative methods usually cited in the narrative research tradition. This research is found in different academic disciplines such as history, sociology and literary studies. Political researchers can use life documents to uncover and explain why leaders acted as they did and why certain policies were chosen over others.
Another important method of research is Case Study which generally involves proceeding from general to more specific. Methods often employed in Case Studies research the context, do sampling and analyse data. The context provides the background and contemporary information about the case. Bringing together more than one perspective can enhance the validity of research results. There is no single way to conduct a Case Study and as a result a combination of research methods can be used.

The relationship between variables is an important aspect of research. There is a need to understand the difference between Causality and Correlation. The authors have drawn distinction between the two concepts through examples. Causality implies a level of predictive power between independent and dependent variables whereas Correlation implies an association between variables but not necessarily a relationship of causality. Correlation does not imply causation. Correlation refers to how closely two sets of information or data are related whereas Causality is “the act or process of causing the act or agency which produces an effect”. This is often referred to as “cause and effect”. Another important aspect to consider regarding causality is the direction of the cause and effect. Logically, for one event to cause another, it must occur first in time. In many cases, the reverse of a causal relationship is not true. A correlation can be positive (meaning that the variables tend to move in the same direction) or negative (meaning the variables tend to move in opposite directions).

The book also discusses various forms of analyses such as relating to content, discourse, documentary and empirical. These approaches are used for examination and interpretation of text, images and speeches. For example, Content analysis is a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specific characteristics of messages. Basically, it is a qualitative research method that is used to find the significance of an issue by measuring and examining the salience given in the communications through decoding and uncovering the meaning and intent therein (p.25). It can also be used to identify and quantify bias in reporting in press and electronic media. Discourse analysis is different as in this approach researchers analyse the language of political actors to reveal the actors’ perceptions of the world and their role in it. Language is not seen as a medium of communication, rather, it represents and is affected by cultural and social institutions and structures. When certain discourses become embedded, they become hegemonic, crowding out contending interpretations. They triumph by selling their own ‘truth’ and dismissing the claims of other ‘illegitimate’ accounts (p.32).

Content analysis can demonstrate how an issue is covered and analyse that coverage but it is less good at explaining the “why” question. Whereas
empirical analysis focuses on explaining not only what happened but also explain why. Documentary analysis focuses on two aspects of research: first what is being said or shown and second, the contexts in which such documents were actually created. Documentary sources include books, journal articles, newspapers and official reports.

The book also discusses methods of data collection. It is indeed a toolkit of skills to assist researchers in answering ‘Who?’, ‘What’, ‘Where?’, ‘Why’ and ‘When?’ questions without which a researcher would hardly be able to explain the analysis and the findings of a research project.

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Khadiim Hussain, *The Militant Discourse*  
(Islamabad: Narratives, 2013), 110.

The book under review, *The Militant Discourse* by Professor Khadiim Hussain, is an attempt to explore and analyse the indigenous narrative about religious militancy and extremism in Pakistan in general and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in particular. According to the author, the book discusses the intertwining intricacies of a discourse that has been mistaken as an indigenous narrative. The theoretical framework of the book is supported by fieldwork done by the author over the past several years. Khadiim Hussain is a known academician associated with Bacha Khan Trust Educational Foundation and a think tank, Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy, Peshawar.

The writer explores the socio-cultural and strategic/political levels of the prevalent militant discourse in Pakistan spot-lighting the case of Swat (1989-2009). The fear factor created by the militants, according to the author, has gripped the people right from Waziristan to the southwest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This has resulted in “confusion, insecurity and frustration” which has “penetrated the very fabric of society” (p.27) and this tactic of the militants has helped them to get power in Swat and Waziristan from the local elite and has passed on control from civilian administration to the military. The writer believes that the extremist movement of Sufi Muhammad and Mulla Fazlullah was joined by marginalised landless families which gave them some say in the area.

The book also highlights the fact that the Pushtun intelligentsia still seems divided as to whether this conflict has been created by the US, or the militants who have appeared from nowhere, “out of the blue.” The writer thinks that the militant discourse uses Aristotelian logic in which language is manipulated to sound esoteric. This kind of figurative expression is usually employed to subvert reality. Through the use of this logic, the concept of Jihad has been reduced to mere Qital (slaughter) and offered as the only way left for enforcing the dominance of Islam — the Taliban variety. And finally, Jihad has been sanctioned as a private enterprise (p.13). The writer links the Lal Masjid operation to Swat. He considers drone attacks as counter-productive to tackling militancy in Pakistan.

In section three of the book, the writer sheds light on the background of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-i-Muhammad (TNSM) and reasons behind its popularity. The movement started in the 1990s, developing and gathering strength over the years. It was flourishing when Lal Masjid occurred and military operations were being carried out in the tribal areas.
The movement was able to enlist the support of those classes of the area whose interests government had neglected. The religious groups had always been waiting for such an opportunity. The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations and other similar laws had created a gap between the state and society.

The writer describes the history and significance of Swat. He holds that Swat was never so radicalized since the days of the sub-continent’s partition. The literacy rate of women was much higher than of other areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Also the religious class was not that much influential and did not interfere in the daily life of the people. Music, games, western dress, television were all part of the people’s culture. But it was during the early 1990s that the situation changed and the religious class started to grow stronger day by day. They started to object to people’s way of life. According to the writer, the only organization which stood strong during the hard days of militancy was the Private Schools Association. But the religious militants not only demolished schools but also shrines of the Saints. These activities of the militants were naturally resented by the general populace. The writer mentions Rehman Baba in this context whom the people of Swat regard as a symbol of peace and harmony.

The book is a useful addition to the existing literature on religious militancy and extremism in Pakistan. He offers no definite solution to the problem but he believes that the direct sufferers of the militancy should be consulted for a sustainable solution of the problem. His contribution to the militancy discourse is essentially in the sphere of socio-cultural and strategic/political aspects.

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Zia Ur Rehman, *Karachi in Turmoil*  

The book *Karachi in Turmoil* by Zia Ur Rehman is the latest in literature on the city’s security situation. It helps to understand the key factors behind violence in Karachi and provides insights into how the issue can be addressed. The author bases his study mainly on the present state of affairs in the city.

The study finds that violence, in Karachi is essentially sectarian and ethno-political in nature which criminal gangs, and terror syndicates of the Taliban and other religious extremists exploit for their agendas. The common belief that control of Karachi means control of Pakistan has turned Karachi into a battleground for ethnic and political parties which undesirable elements join complicating the strife.

The book has 11 chapters. The first is devoted to geostrategic location of Karachi as a hub of inter-regional transportation, trade, industry and commerce as a result the city contributes the lion’s share to Pakistan’s gross domestic product generating about 60 per cent of the national revenue.

The second chapter discusses the changing ethnic demography and politics of the city. The influx of migrants from inside the country and abroad has turned the indigenous Balochi and Sindhi communities into minorities. Migrants from India, mostly Urdu-speaking, evolved into a political force with varying concentration in other cities of southern Sindh. The work uncovers this ethnic imbalance in the city’s political landscape creating an atmosphere of tension among the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), Sindh nationalist groups (Karachi Sindhi Shehri Ittehad) and People’s Aman Committee (dominated by Baloch community).

Chapter three traces the history of ethno-political violence in the city. The ethnic conflicts between Muhajirs and Sindhis started soon after the first wave of migration from India, featuring settlement problems and competition over securing influential positions. By 1988 urban violence in Sindh had spread and transformed into a political battle between the MQM, Sindhi nationalists and the PPP.

Chapter four studies Pashtun politics in Karachi. Pashtun migration mostly began during President Ayub Khan’s regime influenced by the industrial-economic boom of his era. This made the Mohajirs uneasy as the Pashtuns then made their claim on the city’s resources. Despite being the second largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns feel under-represented in government jobs. Rejecting the allegations, MQM claims there is no Mohajir-Pashtun economic clash. But a new sore point in Pashtun politics is
the infiltration of the Taliban elements which the ANP claims is an MQM bogey. The fact is that the Taliban are threatening both ANP and MQM and trying to destabilize Karachi.

Focusing on Sindhi politics, chapter five highlights the growing influence of Sindhi nationalist parties in the wake of decline of PPP politics. These groups have gained strength since MQM’s call for creating more provinces through a bill in the National Assembly in 2011 which is deemed as a ploy to divide Sindh on ethnic lines. The author attributes the Sindhi grievances to problems created by overpopulation, and development strategy based on urban-rural divide. The huge influx of rural Sindhi following the devastating floods of 2010 has changed the political realities as the Urdu-speaking population of Karachi can no more be refurbished through migration unlike other ethnic groups. The vote bank and street power of MQM will decline in the coming years.

Chapter six deals with the global Jihadi outfits in Karachi. To escape the ongoing operation in the tribal areas and US drone strikes the militants have started relocating to Karachi, making alliances with local terror outfits, recruiting new people and, generating funds through robberies, kidnappings for ransom, etc. Karachi is increasingly becoming the most attractive hideout and haven for Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda and other extremists elements because of its diverse ethno-lingual societal fabric.

Chapter seven discusses the sectarian aspect of violence in Karachi. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Lashker-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jundullah are the banned Sunni Deobandi outfits linked with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al Qaeda. Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) and Mehdi Force (MF) are the banned Shia outfits. These banned sectarian outfits are busy in the killing of each other’s sympathisers. Describing Karachi as the battleground for Saudi-Iranian proxy war, the author fears that the fight in Bahrain is shifting to Pakistan and could further fuel the Sunni-Shia violence. It is suspected that Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries have funded hard-line Sunni militants in Pakistan, while Iran has channelled money to Shiite groups.

Chapter eight explores the activities of underground criminal groups involved in money extortion, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, etc. Chapter nine identifies the criminal syndicates in Karachi, with Lyari as the epicentre of gang warfare, clashes among drug pushers and between sundry criminal groups. Lyari is also politically important as it has two constituencies of National Assembly and three of the Provincial Assembly. Political parties of Karachi are well aware of the importance of Lyari and have always supported criminal groups.
Chapter ten focuses on the complex situation of Sindh, especially Karachi regarding local government system that remains a bone of contention as the province is divided into rural-urban ethnic fault-lines with uneasy and fragile alliance between PPP and MQM.

Discussing de-weaponisation of Karachi, chapter eleven states that all stakeholders believe that indiscriminate de-weaponisation is imperative to eradicate recurring violence. Past governments have taken several steps to disarm Karachi but failed because those campaigns were politically motivated or targeted only rival political or ethnic groups. The author notes that the three political parties namely MQM, ANP and PPP have politicised the issue, urging them not to protect criminals within their ranks.

The nature of threats in Karachi is as much a problem of law enforcement as it is of a political solution. Therefore, the author suggests that apart from political initiatives, the government needs to develop a comprehensive security policy for Karachi based on inter-agency cooperation, better policing and street-level scrutiny in particular localities. Compared to army or paramilitary forces, it is the best long-term answer to Karachi’s security problem.

Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

The rise of China as a regional power and as the world’s second largest economy is seen as a major development of the new century. Scholars all around the world are analysing the factors behind China’s rise and how that contributes towards changing the global environment. China through its soft power has expanded its trade and external relations to as far as Africa and its growth in all directions continues. The foreign policy of China is changing with its development and its rising stature in the world. Who makes Chinese foreign policy, what are its main components and what are its main features as of today? These are some of the questions Marc Lanteigne discusses in his book, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*. This is the revised and updated second edition of the book.

The book has eight chapters and a conclusion. The author begins the discussion with the question what kind of global power China would be if it became a super power parallel to the United State (p.1)? He says that China’s foreign policy has been changing with its growing global interests and due to involvement in its making of an increased number of stakeholders within the country whose contacts with the outside world have been on the increase and their interests must be reflected in the national approach to foreign affairs. Yet the process of policy formulation remains centralized in the hands of the Communist Party, and “the circle of decision makers has become more diversified” (p.24). While it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for making the foreign policy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and certain ministries such as the Ministry of Information Industries (MII) are essential government organisations which provide important input in this process.

In chapter three, the different facets of Chinese economy and its growth are discussed. The Chinese economic model has also been discussed. Marc says “estimates suggest that China will overtake the US as world’s largest economy by the year 2020” (p.40). There is a discussion on the transformation of Chinese economy from a closed and government-controlled economy to a modern and reformed trading system.

Chapter four and five are about Deng Xiaoping’s policy of opening up of China to the external world and its cooperation with regional and security organizations like APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the ASEAN and the SCO.

Discussing the structure of China and its armed forces, he mentions the interesting debate on the strategic culture of China and the role of
military in strategic policy-making, Marc says that unlike Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping the new Chinese leadership cannot claim personal ties with the military. Hence they have to cultivate their relations in that sphere to maintain their position (p. 85). China’s nuclear and space programmes are discussed as well as the country’s policy toward non-traditional security threats such as from terrorism.

Chapter six focuses on China’s views about the US and vice-versa. The bilateral relations are analysed from the Cold War period to the modern times. Marc acknowledges that given the growing power of China the US is concerned about its ability to promote its long standing interests in the Asia-Pacific region. (p. 119).

The remaining two chapters provide an insight into China’s relations with its neighbouring countries and its relations with Middle East, Oceania, Europe, Africa and Latin America.

Marc concludes that Chinese foreign policy can be divided into three phases. The first phase when China sought rapprochement with the West; the second phase when it developed relations with neighbouring states and addressed border conflicts, and the third phase of its rise as a great power and the role it has to play in world affairs. The present foreign policy focuses on traditional strategic concerns including border security, nuclear weapons proliferation, development of global military power, the Taiwan issue, energy security, economy and non-traditional security concerns.

The book is designed in the form of a text book for students of International Relations and provides basic information about China’s political system, its government structure, important ministries and the foreign policy formulation process.

Aftab Hussain, Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

Stephen Philip Cohen is regarded as an expert on the affairs of the subcontinent. He has authored a number of books on this region. Unlike the book he previously edited, *The Future of Pakistan* which gave Pakistan some years to “muddle through” the book under review as its title suggests forecasts a century of unending strife for the subcontinent — 1947 to 2047.

Cohen notes several reasons for this gloomy forecast: cultural and civilizational clash; clash of state identities; territorial disputes; realist behaviour; psychological abnormalities; and the role of external powers. He identifies four major issues between Pakistan and India — trade, water, Kashmir and Siachen. Counting trade among conflicts looks odd but he views it as a problem that has a better chance of resolution. Water and Kashmir are the least amenable to a solution. Siachen can be easily resolved but will not be. Cohen sees little hope.

Cohen makes the conundrum triangular by introducing China whether it is the resolution of Kashmir, river waters or Siachen is going to figure. “China is, in fact, a real component of South Asia’s hardcore security conundrum.” (p. 127) Cohen asserts that it may seem a little far-fetched at this stage but this dimension was going to matter in future.

Though generally his analysis seems to lean towards India he does not fail to notice the growing role the Indian Army has been allowed in policy making while citing Pakistan military’s fixation on the Indian-threat and Pakistan’s security orientation. “India has allowed the armed forces to enter into security matters, notably border issues, and intelligence services still have a heavy but veiled role.” (164) At another place he cites, “India’s Ministry of External Affairs is not unlike Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate … both are capable, influential, and hard-line when it comes to regional normalization.” (p. 172)

Cohen is very critical of the way Pakistan treats its part of Kashmir “… with an iron fist” (p. 46). And cites a lone report on human rights violations in Azad Kashmir ignoring important reports on human rights abuses in Indian Occupied Kashmir (by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) though he concedes “Indian record in Kashmir is one of long, dismal, and well-documented military occupation, human rights abuses, and the detention and arrest of Kashmiri leaders.” (p.126)

One is surprised to notice a number of factual errors in the book: SAARC was created in 2004 (p. 19); Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims in 1984 (p. 109); on another page (p.122) it is cited as 1970; the (alleged)
beheading of an Indian soldier is dated 2012 (p. 177) though the charge was made in 2013. Such errors in a Cohen study are disappointing.

Cohen also highlights the failure of long pursued Track II diplomacy. This he attributes to absence of resolve by the two governments in addressing the fundamentals. The participants, often former government officials cling on to the respective stands of their governments and no new ground is broken to report to the governments for progress towards resolution. Government’s iron grip on the dialogue process leaves scant space for manoeuver by the participants. Situation could improve if the two states gave more latitude to their think tanks and strategists and new blood was infused in the talking teams to replace old wood.

Cohen hopes the stalemate to persist for another ten years or so though tensions may subside with improvement in trade. Pakistan is not likely to win and India is highly unlikely to lose to Pakistan. However, a worse case scenario lies in a failed Pakistan due to a toxic mix of Islamic extremism, nuclear weapons and a poor economy. The ongoing Indo-Pak rivalry in Afghanistan is also an extremely dangerous trend that may continue as both see it as an area of strategic competition. The worst may come if both states embarked upon expansion of their nuclear arsenal or perceived a nuclear threat from the other. The time factor may prove critical if either side perceived that it was running out of time and resorted to some risky misadventure.

Mulling other dark scenarios, he notes that many Americans and some Pakistanis and Indians believe that there is nothing that can be done to alter the situation. Some Americans and Indians think that normalization is useless as Pakistan, faced with mounting challenges, will collapse in a few years or so. However, a third view holds that a failed Pakistan poses more danger to India and the international community and must, therefore, be helped to survive.

The only glimmer of hope he shines lies in what he sees as the possibility of a change in mindset of senior officials in respect of the normalization process, “a qualified optimism is emerging on both sides (and enthusiasm among Pakistanis).” (p.160) However, he downplays this optimism by saying that a major breakthrough seems highly unlikely by these officials. He notes at various places that Pakistani youth is eager for normalization of relations with India.

Cohen makes a number of recommendations for the US, the most powerful external player holding sway over Pakistan and India both. The US must develop organizational structure to develop a comprehensive policy framework toward South Asia. Kashmir must not occupy a central place in US policy towards Pakistan and India. His best advice for
“Kashmir is a bypass surgery i.e., go around it, approach it after other disputes are settled, but don’t ignore it.” (p.187) Cohen’s other suggestion is promoting integrative and collaborative ventures between the two states. The US must find ways to encourage Pakistan-India strategic cooperation in Afghanistan. Dehyphenation must be reconsidered at times so as to pave way for engagement of the two on selective regional issues. For the US, normalization of relations between Pakistan and India should be the most important priority in the region.

Does the book bring something new to the literature already produced on the subject? The answer would be, hardly. The volume recounts old events and builds its pessimism on the current malaise afflicting Pakistan that all agree is not beyond control and repair.

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**Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back**  

Review of American diplomacy in South Asia for the last seven decades shows that the United States has been unable to achieve most of its objectives in the region. This is the main thesis of Bruce Reidel’s book, *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back*. The author is a former CIA analyst and an expert on South Asia currently working with Brookings Institute. He attributes this failure to the troubled relationship between India and Pakistan.

The book begins with a detailed analysis of the Mumbai terrorist attacks which Riedel bases on the Indian version of the story. He believes the attacks were launched by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and al Qaeda to disrupt the peace process between India and Pakistan and to provoke a war in South Asia and thus disrupt the global counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan (p.13). He flaunts the oft repeated story of Pakistan Army’s ties with these terrorist outfits (p.24) to show the differences between United States and Pakistan on the issue of terrorism.

Riedel discusses the impact of British legacy on post-partition foreign policies of India and Pakistan. Rejecting the Cold War dynamics, post-partition India became a staunch supporter of the non-aligned movement while a relatively weaker Pakistan sought security against India by aligning with the United States. United States’ South Asian policy remained dominated by the Cold War thinking. Though ostensibly a Cold War ally Pakistan’s relations with the United States remained troubled as the latter’s desire to have good relations with both India and Pakistan could not materialize. In his discussion of Cold War politics he highlights the changing policies of the various US administrations such as the phase of Indo-US military cooperation in 1962 during the India-China war as the Kennedy Administration viewed India’s non-aligned stance approvingly. He states that Prime Minister Nehru even asked for direct US military intervention in this conflict (p.61). The strain in US-Pakistan relations caused by President Carter’s tilt towards India similarly figures in this discussion.

The author touches upon post-Cold War American nuclear diplomacy in South Asia, and observes that it failed to stop India and Pakistan from testing their nuclear devices but succeeded in preventing them from their use during subsequent crises. Pakistan and America have been at odds over the nuclear issue, Afghanistan and reimbursement of F-16 deal. The bombing of American embassies in East Africa changed Clinton
administration’s priority in relations with Pakistan from counter-proliferation to counter-terrorism. (p.126). American diplomacy underwent critical change during Kargil when for the first time the United States openly sided with India and criticized Pakistan for initiating this conflict. Kargil provided an opportunity for India and America to end their estrangement and transform their relationship. He terms the US-India civilian nuclear deal as a harbinger of a new era of Indo-US bilateral relations but he ignores the impact of this deal on South Asian strategic stability and the mutual deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan. President Obama went a step further to strengthen relations with India, and unlike previous governments, openly announced American support for India’s permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council during his visit to India.

Reidel considers India-Pakistan rapprochement a real game changer in South Asia. He recognises Pakistan’s vulnerability and dissatisfaction with the status quo that drives it towards a national security stance and leads it to support terrorism (p.188). On Indo-Afghan cooperation which Pakistan suspects, he thinks measures like cross-border trade and transit can help in removing distrust.

He accepts Kashmir as a central issue between the two states, and describes American efforts, from Truman to Kennedy, for its solution. But Americans soon learnt it was a hard nut to crack “and therefore best ignored” (p.80). With the end of the Cold War Kashmir fell off the American agenda and became a forgotten conflict. The Indian refusal for third party mediation prevents United States from engaging in this dispute but Indo-US strategic partnership and removal of the nuclear irritant in their bilateral relations does enable Washington to try to persuade Delhi ‘to be more flexible on Kashmir.’ He regards the resolution of Kashmir in American interest as well but his assessment that Kashmir has generated global terrorism looks far fetched.

In the ‘war on terror’, he considers al Qaeda a real threat to America and underlines Pakistan as a key instrument in achieving American national security interests but shows complete disregard to Pakistan’s sensitivities and terms drone attacks and Abbottabad raid as essential means of self-defence (p.176). He suggests that America should try to change Pakistani behaviour but should not hesitate to act unilaterally for its interests.

He favours American military presence in Afghanistan to back up Afghan army for at least another ten years and to use Afghan bases for counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He says that the US needs Afghanistan bases to continue its drone strikes and raids like Abbottabad (p.193) and brushes aside the concerns of Pakistan in this
regard. It seems as if a durable and sustainable relationship between America and Pakistan is of no interest to Mr. Reidel.

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