
The work of Ahmad Rashid Malik, *Pakistan-Japan Relations: Continuity and Change in Economic Relations and Security Interests* fulfils a major gap that exists in research discourses on Pakistan’s foreign and economic relations. The author studies the development of Pakistan-Japan relations in the interplay of the economic and security interests of the two countries in the larger perspective of the international political economy. This unique approach adds to the usefulness of the study.

The study provides a basic guideline to how Asian economic systems started integrating with each other after World War II, paving the way for political normalization in Asia and bringing back Japan to the Asian fold. The study reveals many unique aspects of Pakistan-Japan relations.

The discussion on how and why Pakistan and Japan separately became treaty-based military allies of the United States and thus part of a U.S.-anchored security complex against the spread of communism in this part of Asia is thought provoking. The author quotes U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who remarked that ‘Pakistan was the tower of strength on the Japanese peace treaty’ signed on September 8 1951 at San Francisco that ended the U.S. Occupation of Japan and restored its sovereignty and revived its economy.

The development of post-treaty bilateral diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Japan reveals some less known facts like the visit of Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy in 1957 which paved the way for the Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s tour of Asian countries which had hitherto remained blocked since World War II.

The author shows the complementary nature of economic ties between the two countries with Japan’s textile industry getting supplies of raw materials such as cotton and jute in the 1950s from Pakistan. He argues that Pakistan played a leading role in the recovery of Japanese economy in the 1950s (pp. 25-30).

Towards the later years, the narrative becomes critical of Japan and the United States on their stance on the Indo Pak war and Pakistan’s growing ties with China. The author also discusses the East Pakistan debacle of 1971 and Japan’s decision to provide economic assistance to Bengali nationalists and the resulting tension in Japan-Pakistan relations in the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its implications for Pakistan-Japan
relations is critically examined. The discussion stretches to the present time that finds Pakistan embroiled in the war against terrorism and Japan’s contribution in the form of the Operation Enduring Freedom – Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO).

In the later parts of the study the author makes a critical appraisal of Japan’s anti-terrorism and anti-nuclear policy in its relations with Pakistan. The author points out that Japanese strategic aid to Pakistan was converted into aid for strengthening democratic values. Pakistan’s nuclear programme, nevertheless, became a stumbling bloc for the advancement of economic relations during 1998-2005. He then critically reviews the change in Japanese anti-nuclear policy, and criticizes Japan’s lukewarm and indecisive response to the U.S.-India nuclear deal. The author holds the Western countries and Japan responsible for not providing guarantees to Pakistan against India’s nuclear threat which forced Pakistan to go nuclear. The author deplores that ‘a security drift has also taken place in Pakistan-Japan relations (p.137) as Japan did not effectively respond against the change of rules of the nuclear game at the international fora vis-à-vis U.S.-India nuclear deal.

The study points out that the future course of economic and diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Japan would continue to be influenced by the U.S. factor as both countries would be having little choice to go independent in cultivating their bilateral ties. The author, nevertheless, looks at the so-called ‘value-added’ Arc of Freedom and Prosperity as expounded by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso (now Prime Minister) somewhat as a wartime doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of Imperial Japan (p.156). The author fears that this would change the peaceful role of Japan and its economic superiority in world affairs.

The study heavily draws upon the interplay of economic forces between the two countries from the colonial time to the present one and gives a thorough account of their trading, investment, and aid relations. The author argues that economic considerations necessitated a strong strategic partnership between the two countries right after the creation of Pakistan. Embedded in the information-rich narrative is also the strong influence of the United States in the formulation and prioritization of Japan’s economic and security policies toward Pakistan. This subject deserves special attention but has not received adequate academic and policy attention, certainly not any book-length treatment, which makes this work valuable.

The work is based on primary documents, first-hand information, and a large number of literary sources. The author’s long association with Japan and his studies in Japan and Australia enrich the contents and themes of the study. The work is well-documented and draws usefully on the existing literature on international political economy and sources on Pakistan and Japan foreign and economic relations. It would be a recommended reading in
academia and some of its findings might provide the lead for related further research.

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**Bhumitra Chakma, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons* (London: Routledge, 2009), 187.**

Bhumitra Chakma could possibly originally be from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh and presently is lecturing in the University of Hull, UK, in the Department of War and Security Studies. He specializes on South Asian Security issues. Besides authoring the present book, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons*, he has published a book on Strategic Dynamics in South Asia (2004), and is contributing in international journals of repute.

The book under review is a fairly well-researched study on the nuclear status of Pakistan discussed in a developmental sequence covering events from 1954 to 2007. The study suffers from lack of objectivity as the author bases his contentions mainly on articles and published materials of those writers “who do not have authentic knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear programme” and those belonging to the anti-nuclear weapons lobby. Hence the fundamental thrust of the arguments looks rather predetermined. It is a fine mixture of both objective and subjective realities in support of the tirade against Pakistan spearheaded by the Jewish–American and the Indian lobbies, as if Pakistan has committed a nuclear sin, and that its de facto nuclear status is all based on surreptitious measures, whereas India and Israel are nuclear saints and they have acquired the capabilities, purely based on their indigenous technology and resources and that India had a right to initiate the second generation of nuclear bombs and Pakistan should have remained a passive spectator at the cost of its security.

Chakma employs double standards in the context of Indo-Pak relations. For a meaningful study and evaluation of a subject as this, the author should have interviewed many persons in Pakistan, who were/are connected with Pakistan’s nuclear programme, directly or indirectly, and also persons in India and USA. General Arif, for instance was incharge of the nuclear programme, so was General Mirza Aslam Beg, when they were serving as Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), besides there were a number of nuclear scientists from the civil side who could have given a more accurate picture of Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power. Some of the glaring misrepresentations in the book are mentioned below:

- Pakistan’s declaration to be a nuclear state was not covert, but a very bold and declared proclamation to achieve this capability.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, openly exposed the contention that Pakistan in order to maintain the balance of power in South Asia must go nuclear. It is the only state in the world to have declared its intention in very clear words. Otherwise, it could go nuclear, covertly as well.

- There were five persons who may be called the promoters and facilitators of the nuclear programme. Z.A. Bhutto pronounced his policy definition and set the goals; General Ziaul Haq provided unflinching support from 1977 to 1988; Ms. Benazir Bhutto provided a doctrine of restraint (known as Benazir doctrine) that Pakistan will have only minimal deterrence and would not go for further enrichment. This idea was the most sensible one to control proliferation of nuclear weapons, which the world ought to have appreciated. Dr. A.Q.Khan, was undoubtedly the ‘technical guru’ to have achieved weapons making capability within a span of 10 years. Mian Nawaz Sharif picked up the courage to provide a credible manifestation of Pakistan achieving the nuclear capability and gave a very convincing demonstration by responding to India’s atomic tests in 1998. (Five tests were made on 28th May at Chaghi and a sixth one on May 30 at Kharan).

- It is indeed a great irony that all the five contributors to Pakistan’s nuclear programme were either physically eliminated or were subjected to psychological torture of great magnitude. Z.A. Bhutto was hanged through judicial murder, in which Ziaul Haq played a major role, and he himself was physically eliminated in a mysterious air crash. Nixon in his book ‘In the Arena’, has made an insinuation that it was dangerous to be friends to USA, as they were eliminated through CIA. Ms. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and till today one doesn’t know who were the killers. Dr. A.Q. Khan is suffering great agony as a prisoner in his own house after his humiliation at the hands of former president General ® Pervez Musharraf. God only knows what revelations he will make of the ‘real story’ after he is released. The former Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif not only lost his government but had to remain in exile for eight long years.

- The contention that Dr. A.Q.Khan created a network of nuclear proliferation is patently wrong. When Pakistan was denied all access to procuring the requisite materials for uranium enrichment and the agreements made with France to supply nuclear reactor was cancelled at the behest of USA, Dr. A.Q. Khan only contacted the under world comprising the developed
countries of the world, who were supplying the requisite nuclear material through covert trading. Anybody could get anything on payment. Iran, Libya could also bargain for whatever they required. It is wrong to call that an A.Q.Khan network. When all options for Pakistan were closed, what else it could do to safeguard its security. Therefore “beg, barrow or steal” was not entirely true, as every thing was paid for. The difference is that Pakistan has not maintained surveillance of India, Israel, France or Great Britain, as to how much they cooperated with each other to achieve nuclear power status. USA was nosy about Dr. A.Q.Khan, as to where he went, whom he contacted and so on. If Pakistan for argument’s sake provided all the know-how of making nuclear weapons to Iran, it looks ridiculous that it has not been able to produce one single weapon. North Korea has also developed weapons through the Plutonium process, in which Pakistan had no expertise. About the missiles that Pakistan is said to have acquired through transactions with North Korea, it is interesting to note that some of the cruise missiles which were fired at Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, during Clinton’s administration, had fallen in the territory of Pakistan which were used to acquire the technology through reverse engineering.

As far as the Command and Control System is concerned, the author is victim of the propaganda against Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan has the most effective system of Nuclear Command and Control System. General Mirza Aslam Beg, who was privy to the nuclear programme in March 1987, has written extensively on the subject and he is of the opinion that no terrorist can have access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In fact India’s nuclear weapons are more susceptible to such threats. The recent Mumbai mayhem and the Bhopal chemical disaster expose the ineptness of the Indian intelligence and security system.

The Machiavellian approach of USA is evident from the fact that Pakistan had developed the nuclear weapons in 1987 along with the delivery system. Richard Boucher, who was keeping an eye on Pakistan’s nuclear programme informed Washington that Pakistan had crossed the ‘Red Light’. He was snubbed and asked to keep quiet as Pakistan was needed to defeat the ‘Soviet invasion in Afghanistan along with the Mujahideen, which comprised a vast number of Pashtuns including the Taliban. Only when the Red Army had left the soil of Afghanistan, Pakistan became victim of all kinds of pressures like cutting off military and economic aid etc. The U.S. President continued telling lies to the Congress from 1987 to 1989 that Pakistan was still away from acquiring nuclear capability. USA, to a great extent, is responsible for creating the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, for its selfish ends, and once these were
achieved, the Mujahideen were left to fight among themselves, with the result that the menace of terrorism has multiplied. The attack on Afghanistan, for altogether different reasons was a strategic ploy to soften up Afghanistan by eliminating the Mujahideen to be able to stay in the territory to contain China, Iran and Russia, besides having control over the oil and gas reserves of Central Asian Republics, valued at around 500 trillion dollars. The Mujahideen could not be humbled and the pressure is now being diverted towards Pakistan so that the threat of terrorism could be used by the U.S. to acquire control over its nuclear weapons. This can never happen. But USA can make efforts to make South Asia a nuclear free zone in which case Pakistan would be willing to cooperate despite being at a disadvantage of not having conventional weapons parity with India.

The real threat emanates from the missing nuclear bombs, nearly 50 of them, according to Benjamin Maack: “upto 50 nuclear warheads are believed to have gone missing during the Cold War and not all of them are in unpopulated areas. (Daily Times, Nov 18, 2008). What if terrorists get hold of any of those missing ones? Moreover, the Central Asian Republic’s nuclear devices were available for sale due to the poor state of economy after these states were liberated from the former USSR. The bogus threat is being exaggerated in the case of Pakistan and the author in his final conclusion, seems to support the propaganda. It is also not appreciated why Pakistan went nuclear. It was not for status, but to avoid the danger in case Pakistan maintained ‘ambiguity’. India would have read it only as “bluff”, which could lead to a colossal tragedy in South Asia. Pakistan had no option but to react and ensure nuclear balance.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme is not “ premised” as deterrence against conventional weapons, as the author contends. It is to deter India’s nuclear aggression. Moreover, Z.A. Bhutto, established National Nuclear Command Authority (NNCA), not on account of fear of India, but it was imperative for any nation acquiring this capability. It was always meant to be under civilian control. The interventions by the Army were due to USA’s own strategic ambitions. Pakistan’s NNCA was a robust system from the very start.

The book, on the whole, is well written and supported by numerous references.

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This anthology consists of essays dealing with conflicts in South Asia during 2006 and 2007. It is patterned on annual collections like the *Strategic Survey*
published by International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London and Yearbooks on Armament, Disarmament and International Security by Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden. It is a useful reference book for researchers interested in conflicts in different countries of South Asia.

In order to standardize the different articles, each writer has been asked to follow a format: first, brief history of the conflict; secondly, major actors involved in the conflict; thirdly, conflict mitigation/management measures undertaken and fourthly, the main policy measures by way of conclusion. This structure is generally adopted in the SIPRI Yearbooks.

The book has been divided into various chapters covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir dispute, Naxalite issue, insurgencies in northeastern India, religious militancy in Bangladesh, Maoist movement in Nepal and the Sri Lankan civil war. Bhutan and Maldives are omitted perhaps because they are not as such afflicted by internal conflicts as other countries.

Here, South Asia is meant to be all SAARC countries with its new entrant — Afghanistan — which happens to be the most conflict-ridden state and from where terrorism and violence is radiating into Pakistan and India. As the survey reveals, South Asia has inherited a colonial tradition where succeeding political leaderships of all hues have failed to deliver good governance and management of their societies. A plethora of issues, such as poverty, militancy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and drugs, rise of non-state and stateless actors, rise in ethnicity and religious revivalism, together with lack of disaster management, have cumulatively made the region more and more conflict prone. Although the phenomenon of globalisation has tended to highlight the virtues of cooperation, ironically, its negative effects seem to overshadow the positive aspects.

China geographically belongs to East Asia, albeit it borders on South Asia like Myanmar. In any case, tight regional compartmentalisation is somehow getting redundant these days as different regions’ geographical lines are getting blurred through frequent interaction. South Asia as a regional entity, for example, cannot remain immune to what happens in the Middle East or Central Asia and vice versa.

The book under review examines armed conflicts in which the state’s writ is challenged in conflict zones by elements with fissiparous agenda’s. Sometimes conflicts are between two or more non-state actors or different militant groups such as those who figure in Hindu-Muslim communal riots, Shia-Sunni sectarian violence, Sinhala-Tamil armed clashes, Pushtun – Uzbek clashes in FATA regions. On the other hand, armed conflicts take place between different national armies’ government and insurgents, rebels or dissident armed groups. The after effects of the armed conflict are not confined to battle-related deaths only, but also to losses of life and casualties from landmines and other explosive devices; in making people refugees,
displacing them internally, exposing the affected populace to vagaries of weather and lack of shelter, food and medicines.

As gleaned from the book, there are certain defining characteristics of armed conflicts in South Asia: First, the overarching perceptions by smaller neighbours of India (Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh) that the former is pursuing hegemonic policies in South Asia and beyond. While Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked, the other neighbours (Sri Lanka and Maldives) do not have land borders but are separated by sea from India. In fact, nearly all countries border India whereas none of the smaller countries have land border with one another — thus making them fearful of India’s geographical size, population and its military.

At this point in time, most of the South Asian countries face internal problems and threats: Jihadi forces in Pakistan and the Naxalites in India. These can be funded by outside parties. Rising poverty, poor governance, ethnic and religious primordialism and lack of education are the staple characteristics of most of these countries. India and Pakistan are, moreover, weighed down by the burden of past history and kept alive in their historical narratives by the press and educational curricula. That is one reason why the peace process that was started in 2004 has faced occasional hurdles.

Secondly, the two nuclear powers viz., India and Pakistan and their continuing conflict over Kashmir for the last 60 years has cast its dark shadow over smaller countries. Although they have fought four wars and faced many crises they are still using “proxy wars” for advancing their influence under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. In fact, contrary to expectations, this phenomenon has gone on despite the peace process.

Thirdly, ethno-lingual and Islamist issues also feature in the conflicts. The 21st century is sometimes called as the “age of rage”, where, after the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the broad socialist ideology has been usurped by ethnic cum religious forces that act as identity markers. There is a concern that new states based on ethnicity could come about in South Asia if some communities’ socio-economic plight and acute sense of deprivation do not register any tangible improvement in the near future.

Fourthly, in endemic conflicts that have prolonged for decades (Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Northeast) the resulting human cost has been colossal. As ongoing conflicts, they do not attract much focus of attention as, for example, a terrorist or suicide attack. Extremism comes from Muslim radicals, armed Shia and Sunni extremist groups, Hindu extremist organisations such as RSS and Shiv Sena who want to set up state structures in line with their ideologies. LTTE cadres in Sri Lanka want to secede and create an independent Tamil Eelam; Naxalites, Maoists and Al-Qaeda supported Taliban groups desire restructuring societies in line with their ideological predilections after capturing state power. (The Maoists have already assumed power in Nepal but moderated their ideological stance). It is feared that these
extremist groups, unless controlled, could pose a threat to nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapon states.

Fifthly, while the peace processes between certain nations is moving along, the peace dialogue with dissidents/terrorists within nations is not making meaningful progress in most of South Asia. The peace process between India and Pakistan has eventuated because of deterrence exercised by nuclear weapons in both countries and the legacy of last wars that has taken a toll in economic and human terms. Moreover, the U.S. intervention has always played a key role in the peace process and as recently as November last prevented the terrorist attack in Mumbai from escalating into a full fledged war between India and Pakistan.

To conclude, future seeds of conflicts remain embedded in each country of South Asia. They are e.g., FATA in Pakistan, south and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan, Jaffna Peninsula in Sri Lanka, Chittagong Hill tracts in Bangladesh and Kashmir, NEFA and resurgent Maoism in India. Moreover, communal divides could cause existing hostilities to flare up. All states are trying to neutralize militant groups by following policies of “divide and conquer”. However these stratagems, if not properly conceived and executed might as well boomerang. Taliban and Sri Lankan Tamils are illustrative examples.

In the absence of proper coordination and continuance of poor and shoddy governance of states the danger of violence and militancy will keep on emanating more from within South Asian nation states than without. Hence there is a dire need for conflict-management and then serious efforts towards conflict-resolution. Indeed, it is a challenging task but not entirely impossible—provided there is adequate political will and conjoint efforts of all those affected. After all, there are examples where some countries have successfully tackled the menace through national prioritisation, regional coordination and political determination.

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Sikandar Hayat’s work is based on his PhD dissertation. It is a political biography of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), and a detailed discussion on the political and constitutional developments leading to the emergence of Pakistan. Several writers on Jinnah have brought out various aspects of his leadership, such as his integrity, talent, constitutional strategy, etc. Very few have given due credit to his charisma. Sikandar has built up his thesis around the “concept of charisma” and the “charismatic leadership”
while analysing Jinnah’s role as the President of All-India Muslim League. Apart from charisma, the author acknowledges, Jinnah also had “necessary qualities” to lead Muslims of India from a “distressful situation” to a secure future. This became possible when he decided to quit the Indian National Congress, which was dominated by Gandhi with a Hindu philosophy, and abandoned his life-long passion for Hindu-Muslim unity (pp. 2-6). His charisma worked because his followers respected and trusted him. The author is right. Already, in 1944, Beverley Nichols had acknowledged: “The most important man in Asia is [Jinnah] … He can sway the battle this way or that as he chooses. His 100 million Muslims will march to the left, to the right, to the front, to the rear at his bidding and at nobody else’s …” (Economist, April 15, 1944).

The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the conceptual framework of charisma. He derives his inspiration from Max Weber, one of the founders of modern sociology. Chapter 2 analyses Jinnah’s early life and political career covering a period of about 60 years from his birth in 1876 till 1937. Chapter 3 briefly discusses the changing Hindu-Muslim relations during several phases, commencing from 1858 till 1940. According to the author, Jinnah worked for Hindu-Muslim settlement till 1937 (p. 101). The fateful phase in these relations was during 1937-1940 when the Congress rejected the League’s offer of a coalition government and pursued pro-Hindu policies, such as, Vidyamandir scheme, etc. (p. 102). The author is of the opinion that the British system of government based on majority rule encouraged communalism (p. 94). He brings out that during the 1930s Muslims were in a “distressful situation”, as they were facing the prospect of a permanent Hindu majority rule in India after the British had withdrawn.

Chapter 4 highlights the leadership crisis. The traditional political leadership consisted of the nobility, titled gentry and big landowners. The author calls them “social elites” and their failure to offer a viable solution to Muslims’ problems pushed them into the background. Jinnah, who had fought for Muslim interest for almost three decades during the united struggle of all Indians for independence of the subcontinent, came in the limelight as an undisputed leader and the sole spokesman of Muslims. They looked upon him as a person who could lead them out of their predicament.

Chapter 5 discusses Jinnah’s various proposals, such as Lucknow Pact (1916) and the Fourteen Points (1929) for alleviation of Muslim grievances and, finally, in 1940, he gave “a practical and realizable formula” of a separate homeland for Muslims in their majority areas in the northwest and northeast of the subcontinent. The Hindu majority, realizing that in a democratic form of government they would always be in power, were “indifferent” and “unwilling to accommodate” the special interests and demands of the Muslims. They failed to recognise the fact that Muslims, who formed about 25 percent of the total population of India, were also in majority in certain
provinces in the northeast and northwest of India. The next chapter focuses on the most difficult task of mobilizing Muslims for the achievement of Pakistan. Jinnah organized the League from grassroot level and expanded it to enlist students, women, ulemas and the provincial political leaders, such as the Unionist Sikandar Hayat Khan in the Punjab and Fazlul Haq in Bengal. Although the demand for Pakistan was a unifying factor (p. 229), Jinnah’s charisma had played a significant role in his success.

Chapter 7 deals with Jinnah’s intense political and constitutional struggle against the British rulers and the Congress. During the Second World War (1939-45), due to critical circumstances, the British had no option but to conciliate Jinnah (p. 271). Sir Stafford Cripps’ proposals, which had tacitly accepted the principle of division, but not the demand for Pakistan, were rejected by Jinnah (pp. 275-276). After the Simla Conference of June-July 1945, where all major political parties were represented, Pakistan became the main issue for the British and the Congress. The British made a last attempt to keep India united when they presented the Cabinet Mission Plan in June 1946. The three-tiered constitutional structure forced Jinnah to choose between a “smaller sovereign Pakistan” restricted to Muslim majority areas only and a “larger Pakistan” in a federal nexus (p. 282). Jinnah accepted the Plan with certain reservations. As a constitutionalist, he may have realized that the Plan was unworkable. When Congress President, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected the “larger autonomous Pakistan”, Jinnah called the meeting of the League Council and rejected the Plan. As an alternative, Jinnah called for “Direct Action” to achieve Pakistan, asked Muslims to conduct themselves in a peaceful manner, and join the Interim Government, as “sentinels” to watch Muslim interests in the administration of Government (pp. 298-301). In short, the author successfully brings out how Jinnah piloted the movement for Pakistan in face of intense opposition from the British, the Congress, the ulemas of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and the “nationalist” Muslims, and achieved an independent country for Muslims on August 14, 1947. The author should also have referred to an important fact that the final Mountbatten Plan for transfer of power was redrafted by V.P. Menon, as desired by Nehru, in complete secrecy at the Viceregal Lodge in Simla, without any consultation with Jinnah, and that was sent to London and was approved (Pamela Mountbatten, India Remembered, 2007, pp. 88-92).

The author is right when he says that “unless the conditions necessary for the emergence of a charismatic leader are ripe, the potential leader, no matter how gifted and how potent his cause, remains without a following”. He brings out that the necessary conditions that help the emergence of a charismatic leader were present and Jinnah had “all the extraordinary personal qualities necessary in a charismatic leader” (p. 341). The author makes a convincing case to prove the charisma and charismatic leadership of Jinnah. Finally, the author compares Jinnah to certain successful and charismatic
world leaders, like Ataturk, the founder of a state, Nkrumah, an architect of a political movement and Lenin, a proponent of revolutionary change, and concludes that in reality “the creation of Pakistan was essentially the work of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s charisma and charismatic leadership” (p. 336-345).

The work is based on authentic primary and secondary sources and is a useful addition to studies on Jinnah. Readers interested in the personality of Jinnah, in the struggle for independence of the South Asian Subcontinent and its partition into independent states of Bharat and Pakistan, will find it both engaging and informative.

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N. S. Sisodia and Sreeradha Datta, ed., Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia

South East Asian economic dynamism is attracting the attention of the leading global players for their security interests in the region. United States has been dominating the region since the Cold War while Soviet influence had largely dwindled by the late 1970s. Australia has a natural presence in South East Asia. Japan as a U.S. security partner has enhanced its stakes in the region through its large trading, investment, and aid policies coupled with the ASEAN-Plus Three (APT) partnership. Likewise, South Korea and China also followed Japan’s example and enhanced their economic and security linkages in South East Asia through APT and other diplomatic initiatives. India is a late starter in this new regional grouping in spite of its historical linkages in the region. The main cause behind India’s low profile in the region has been its Cold War considerations. However, since the adoption of the Look East policy by Prime Minister Nirsimha Rao in 1991, India has been struggling hard to enhance its status in the region as a major power.

With the rise of the Asian economies and the miracle that first occurred in Japan and later in South Korea, coupled with the rise of the Asian Tigers in South East Asia, the domination of Western scholarship in international affairs has been diminishing. Now the contemporary thought on international relationships is under the influence of the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, and Indian scholars. Chinese scholars are also now making headways in this discipline. Arab scholars being on the other side of the Orient, the coming international relations discipline will largely be influenced by Asian scholars.

The present work, based on the proceedings of a conference held at New Delhi in February 2007, under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), addresses a large range of issues such as
terrorism, religious fundamentalism, energy, emerging regionalism, role of external powers, and India’s choices and challenges in South East Asia. With contributions made by twenty-eight writers with diverse backgrounds -- from India, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Korea and Japan -- the book highlights mainly an Indian perspective on security related matters in South East Asia. The dominant theme of the book revolves around the question how the Indian leadership, business community and the public would take effective steps to consolidate ties with the ASEAN miraculous economies when in the next four decades, especially by 2050, three among the world’s largest economies, will be Asian, namely; China, India, and Japan with the United States from the West standing second to China. This will bring the peripheral “South East Asia on the centre of world history”, as argued by Kishore Mahbubani, and Dennii Jayme, both from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, in their convincing case of ASEAN as diplomatic superpower (pp. 27-36). By making a candid comparison between ASEAN and EU, the writers claim that “ASEAN has performed much better than the European Union” (p. 27) and “in many ways outperformed the EU” (p. 28). They are of the opinion that “we are moving towards a new historical era where we are witnessing the end of Western domination of world history and the rise of the Asian century” (p. 27).

Against this backdrop, India has been cultivating and deepening ties with South East Asia within the organizational framework of ASEAN as dialogue partner in ASEAN-Regional Forum (ARF) and as member of the East Asia Summit (EAS), aiming at the creation of an Asian Community and Asian Security Community. Sudhir Devare, a former Indian Foreign Secretary, suggests that ASEAN, EAS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) “need to complement each other in order to succeed in a community building process across Asia” (p. 51).

Regional security in South East Asia has been hard hit by the 9/11 events. Al-Qaeda and radical Islam in the shape of the Jemmah Islamiah in Indonesia and Malaysia and with the deteriorating security situation in the Philippines and Thailand in addition to sea lane safety, are matters of serious security concern in the region as highlighted by Devare (pp. 37-52). He argues that India’s wide-ranging engagement with South East Asia has been positively viewed by ASEAN countries as they view it as an opportunity to have “a balance between China and Japan on their east and India on the west” (p.50). Zhai Kun, Director of Southeast Asian and the Oceanian Studies of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations at Beijing, China, argues that “ASEAN is becoming the centre of East Asian power” (p.53) and its power base rests on its organizational structure, cooperation, balancing role
among big powers, and the Asian norms and values advocated by Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahatir Mohamed (pp. 56 & 61).

Three essays dealing with terrorism throw light on the root causes of old and new terrorism facing South East Asian countries particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, from the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, brings up that “terrorism, insurgency, and religious fundamentalism are not new or emerging issues in South East Asia” (p.97). While Andrew T. H. Tan, Associate Professor in International Studies at the University of New South Wales Campus in Singapore, makes the point that South East Asia is the “second front in global war on terrorism” (p. 69). He points out that there is a possibility of the Malay Archipelago becoming a sanctuary for Al Qaeda terrorists fleeing the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan (p. 69). He says that ‘there have been increasing fears of a maritime 9/11 occurring within the environs of the Straits of Malacca” (p. 72). Finding the U.S.-led counter-terrorism strategy as counter-productive, Tan suggests a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in South East Asia because the root causes are within the region and they are “so deep-seated that they defy easy resolution” (p. 83). Azyumardi Azra, Professor, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia, says that a number of internal and external factors are responsible for terrorism in Indonesia and suggests “to formulate a more contextual kind of Jihad” (p. 94) to combat terrorism.

Contributors have examined energy security in South East Asia from the Indian perspective, situation in the Straits of Malacca, and the efforts made by Indian naval forces in the Indian Ocean in collaboration with other neighbouring countries. Candid analyses have been made on regionalism and India’s ties with East Asian countries. The contribution made by C. Raja Mohan, Professor, S. Rajaratnum, School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, comprehensively looks at India’s security and maritime policies and their links with ensuring energy security in South East Asia. Dwelling on the same subject, Gurpreet S. Khurana, Research Fellow at IDSA, much closely analyses India’s maritime policy in the world’s most vital waterway, Straits of Malacca, in an historical perspective. Abd Rahim Hussin, Director, Maritime Security Policy Directorate, Malaysia, discusses contemporary maritime security issues with a particular emphasis on piracy and terrorism as well as cooperation in South East Asia. Rahul Roy - Chaudhury, Senior Fellow, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, further throws light on India’s maritime cooperation in the region in a multiple manner. China as a competitor in the ASEAN region has been discussed by Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, Asian Centre at the University of the Philippines, who maintains that competition over resources “is fuelled by territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes” (p. 181). A thrilling tale of South East Asian regionalism with focus on India has
been explained by five experts. To them, India has been actively pushing the engine of regionalism in South East Asia along with other leading players. ASEAN and EAS provide ample opportunities to India to share various diverse security, economic, and cultural understandings with the South East Asian neighbourhood (pp.187-259). Four essays (pp. 263-325) throwing light on the role of external powers especially China, United States, and Russia in South East Asia, look at the interests of these powers and see how they influence the regional politics of South East Asian countries. In short, India has been deepening its ties with South East Asia through regional integration and multilateralism in economic affairs, security, and defence cooperation as explained in six essays (pp. 329-405).

By and large, the work under review presents fresh insights on many diverse aspects of security in South East Asia with choices and challenges available for the Indian leadership to mould its policy in order to effectively pursue its interests in that region. Anyone interested in such matters should undertake a reading of this valuable account presented by experts with different shades of opinion. Ample references add to the book’s usefulness.

Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik, Research Fellow (East Asia), IPRI.

Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia

Ahmad Rashid is a seasoned journalist of Pakistan and is regarded as an expert on Central Asia. He has written extensively on the problems the troubled region of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries of Central Asia have been facing since the 9/11 attacks in New York in the wake of the so called war on terror that the United States of America has unleashed in the region. Rashid’s new book, “Descent into Chaos the United States and Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia” discusses the failure of the US-led coalition in ending the rising insurgency in Afghanistan and ensuring prospects of durable peace in the region. Rashid has travelled and covered developments in the region for the last quarter of a century. He has authored three books of which Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (March 2000) is widely recognised as a definitive account. He has been associated as a scholar with Davos World Economic Forum and worked as a consultant for the Human Rights Watch, and is currently on the Board of Advisors to the International Committee of Red Cross. In 2002 he established Open Media Fund for Afghanistan (OMFA), which supports independent print media in Afghanistan. His other works include: The Resurgence of Central

Rashid attempts to answer why the world was more insecure after nearly a decade of fight against terrorism and what went wrong with the strategy. But the major question, how to clean up this mess, remains unanswered. The book in fact is an “onlooker’s” account of the events as they have been unfolding over the past eight years. The title of the book itself tells the story in a nutshell. The writer admits that the book is an attempt to define history in the making and does not present a reappraisal of the events. His earlier books reported the rise of Islamic extremism while the book under review deals with the result or consequence of the war on terrorism and how the U.S.-lead coalition has failed in its objectives in the region. It is an alarmist account about the coming anarchy and the threat that disorder would pose to world peace.

The book has been divided into four parts. The first part, “9/11 and war,” explains the reasons that prompted the war on terror and the strategy failures that created disaffection for the campaign and failed to win the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan. The coalition lacked knowledge about the culture, history, geography, traditional values and language of the people.

“The policy of post 9/11 world”, the book’s second part, documents with precision and brings into focus the role of many local players like the warlords who were supported by U.S. and the government and who became part of the Loya Jirga and governance structures dealt a major blow to pacification efforts as eighty percent of the crimes are being committed by local commanders, police and that Talibans could not be blamed for every ill in Afghanistan.

The third part “The failure of nation-building” describes issues pertaining to social stagnation and state failure in Afghanistan which has remained vital in fueling the rise of extremism. The writer skillfully examines how the U.S. refused to commit the forces and money needed to rebuild Afghanistan and made corrupt alliances. The book builds up a case for seriously revamping the policy towards nation building in the region. In this section Rashid explains Pakistan’s role in the war on terror in the chapter “Double dealing with Islamic extremism”. He explains how Pakistan followed the dictum of “hunting with the hounds and running with the hare”.

The final and fourth part of the book “Descent into Chaos” reflects the emerging regional and international security threats. The FATA region has become, “Al-Qaida’s bolt hole” with recent Taliban resurgence in these tribal regions of Pakistan and the alleged role of agencies like the ISI in this but he does not fail to mention human rights violations by the CIA and MI16 and the authoritarian nature of regimes like Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and the
linkage between Islamic extremism and the politics of opposition in Central Asia.

In the concluding section, the writer explains that solutions do not come easily in a region that was traumatized well before 9/11. He suggests formation of “a contact group of the countries or stakeholders in this deadly game of conflict, authorized by the UNSC, to put an end to increasingly destructive dynamics of the conflict that can spread to entire region and beyond”. But he is of the view that people and regimes of this region need to understand that unless they themselves move their nations toward greater democracy, the chaos that presently surrounds them will, in time, overwhelm them. One of the principal faults of the book is that it lacks analysis and writer does not give any tangible recommendation to remedy the situation. Over all the book’s compelling narrative is a valuable contribution to the existing literature and can be instrumental in inspiring more research on the subject.

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