

BOOK REVIEWS

Carey Schofield, *Inside the Pakistan Army*

(London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), 232 pages.

Carey Schofield, the author of *Inside the Pakistan Army*, is a visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford. She spent five years (2006-11) with the Pakistan Army to study its working, its character and to observe it in action during its campaigns against the terrorists in the tribal areas. It is a vivid account of that experience.

The Pakistan Army with its “strong British roots, is institutionally powerful”, “honour means a lot to military people,” she writes. As for the place of the Army in Pakistan she says: “The Army may be flawed, but it is the best there is. Despite its failings it works better than anything else in Pakistan;” and it “functions better than the civil sector”(207-9). She cites an extract from the speech of Quaid-i-Azam to the Guard Commanders in Peshawar in March 1948 when he said:

Pakistan has been created and its security and defence is now your responsibility. I want them to be the best soldiers in the world, so that no one can cast an evil eye on Pakistan, and if he does we shall fight him to the end until either he throws us into the Arabian Sea or we drown in the Indian Ocean.

She describes in detail the life of the soldiers and Army officers. There is a “ruthless examination of character and striving for excellence” in Pakistan Military Academy, she says (81). She refers to class-composition in regiments, which is changing to give weightage to those areas which were less represented earlier in the army like Sindh and Balochistan.

She feels no hesitation in saying that “the civilizing values of Islam permeate the Army. The presence of the faith is tangible, manifest in the language that people use even when they are not talking about religion. The qualities that Army officers seem to admire – honesty, loyalty, frugality, modesty, contentment, dignity, respect – are characteristically Islamic ideals” (22). In her opinion, Pakistan has evolved into “a unique organism, partly indigenous and partly Western.” The Corps Commanders commanding the nine geographically based corps are “public figures”, because the outcome of their conference is reported in the media.

Discussing the structure of the much maligned Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) she refers to the misconceived perception about its role. The

Director General ISI told her that the ISI did not cover everything as believed. The ISI is an “intelligence agency, not an enforcement agency” (109). She shares the western perception that the ISI has been supporting “its long-term allies amongst the Taliban with or without the tacit consent of the head of state?” (1-3). However, she rightly thinks that the Army is aware of the threat of extremism, and “ensures that the soldiers are inoculated against radicalism” (23). She credits the ISI with providing “useful information that contributed to the arrest of the 21 July London bomb plotters” (114).

To study the Army in action she gives considerable space to discuss the military operations against terrorists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. It was for the first time that Pakistan Army had entered into the tribal areas. The foreign militants who moved from Afghanistan into Pakistan to escape US aerial bombing, included Uzbeks, Chechens, Tajiks, Sudanese, Arabs, and even an Albanian. They were well armed, and well trained in guerilla warfare as a result the Pakistan Army lacking experience in this field suffered some early setbacks in engagements like the Operation Kazha Punga in June 2002, and Operation Kalosha in Shakai Valley (152-55) in which peace had to be sought with militant leader Nek Mohammad. Another reason for the setbacks was that the Army had no local support and depended solely on the technical information provided by the US (144). The Army realized its vulnerabilities and the SSG teams began to train infantry battalions that were being sent to Waziristan (138-41). Later the Army did well in Shakai Valley with the help of helicopters (156-60).

Other successful major campaigns of the Army that she discusses in some detail are those in Miramshah, South Waziristan (170-71), Bajaur and Swat (172-3). Operation Rah-e-Haq (Nov-Dec 2007), Operation Sherdil and Operation Rah-e-Rast have been narrated to throw light on the army’s adaptability to engagements against an irregular force of terrorists in a difficult mountain terrain in the thick of local population that was exposed to both the Taliban vengeance and the danger of collateral damage . The last operation resulted in the exodus of two million people from their homes in Swat (182-3) but creditably for the Army, within a short period (May-August 2009), almost all of them had been enabled to return.

She presents an interesting study of General Musharraf and defines his “vision” for Pakistan as a “moderate, modern Islamic state.” In his dealing with the militant Taliban, he applied a “three-pronged approach – military, political and socio-economic” (123-124).

Referring to Indo-Pak relations, she says “Pakistan wanted a peace deal with India, but the ball was in India’s court”. As for militants in Kashmir, the military commanders told her that they would like to “give the political process a chance” (111-2).

She has also brought out the anger and frustration of the Pakistan Army against the allied forces engaged in Afghanistan. The Army was “irritated that

the US failed to coordinate with Pakistan on crucial issues” (133). For instance, the Army learnt about Tora Bora invasion in December 2001 from the television report. Secondly, Pakistan Army asked for deployment of NATO and Afghan troops on the Afghan side on known routes through the mountains but this was not done. Third, The constant complaint from NATO officials that Pakistan is “not doing enough” to tackle the militants has angered the Army. “Pakistan Army’s losses have mounted over the last few years but the accusing refrain has grown louder” (210). Centcom blames the CIA for the mess in Afghanistan and the CIA [in turn] blames Pakistan (166-68). Finally, the May 2, 2011 incident, when Osama bin Laden was killed by the US forces in Pakistan, the Army was not taken into confidence. Lastly, the November 26 incident of NATO bombing of border check posts in Mohmand had further strained the relations between the US and Pakistan but this event had not occurred when she wrote the book.

Schofield’s account of Pakistan Army based on her personal interaction with army personnel during which she conducted extensive interviews with serving/retired officers and other ranks, is fairly authentic, objective as well as critical. It, however, runs counter to the negative perception being propagated in the West.

She could have avoided political history not directly connected with the Pakistan Army. The map of Pakistan depicted in the beginning fails to show Kashmir as disputed territory and the Line of Control between Azad Kashmir and the Indian occupied territories.

The work is important for those who want to know about Pakistan Army and its vital role in the war on terror in tribal areas adjacent to the borders of Afghanistan. The book will help in correcting the perception, especially in foreign countries, about the role of the Pakistan Army. ■

Dr Noor ul Haq, Senior Research Fellow, IPRI.

Birthe Hansen, *Unipolarity and World Politics*

(London and New York: Routledge Press, 2011), 144 pages.

In the book titled *Unipolarity and World Politics*, Birthe Hansen suggests a theoretical model for unipolarity and in its light examines the various trends and patterns in interstate relations in the post-Cold War period in which the USA, being the sole superpower, has been trying to sustain the existing unipolar system. The author explains the advantages and negative aspects of the system particularly those that result from the policies of the present superpower. She discusses the various options that other states may exercise to conduct their domestic and foreign policies to safeguard and advance their national interests.

Birthe Hansen defines unipolarity as an international system which is dominated by a single great power which is so placed by virtue of having a qualitative edge over other states in respect of the size of its territory, population, economy, military, resource endowment, political stability and competence. The concept of a 'world order' is particularly important in a unipolar system, where it is defined in terms of the polarity set up and its content in terms of the single super power's political project and its superior position to advance that enterprise in the world. Here Hansen gives the example of the current US political project of globalizing democracy and market economy.

The theoretical model projected in the book attempts to provide an understanding of the dynamics of international politics in a unipolar world system and highlights the challenges confronted by other states in formulating and conducting their national policies. In the unipolar world, states adjust their policies to the policies of the super power; there is little else they can do as the latter uses its superior diplomacy, economic capacity and military capabilities to bend their policies in its favour, to oppose the formation of any hostile alliances and to isolate those states which resist its agenda.

Chapters 2 and 3 of the book dilate on the operational dynamics of the balance of power in unipolarity and define the limitations of balancing in comparison with the operational dynamics in bipolar, tri-polar and multi-polar world systems. It is argued that since asymmetrical balancing in a unipolarity is a risky matter, lesser states are constrained to choose 'flocking' (following the superpower) or 'free riding' (strengthening their own capabilities). Here the free riding states carry the risk of facing hard actions of the superpower if they fail to cooperate in critical circumstances. It has been highlighted that the unipolar system is too dangerous for smaller states since the balance of power theory is not operative in the real sense.

Chapter 4 covers the management role of the superpower which manages world affairs with comparative ease, though in this business it has to shoulder numerous responsibilities and make all kinds of efforts while dealing with serious international crisis situations. The author compares management strategies adopted in the unipolar world system with those prevalent in multi polarities. International management by the superpower comprises measures required to be taken mainly concerning security issues between the superpower and other states. In the unipolar system although the superpower's management responsibilities are vast, it has more room for manoeuvring in the absence of a symmetrical great power. However, in this case the superpower has to pay more attention to balancing of its own resources between domestic matters and international tasks.

Chapter 5 dwells on international challenges to a unipolar system which influence the functioning of the system because of having the potential to bring in systemic change, and these challenges adversely affect the

superpower's management efforts. Some of such challenges mentioned in the book concern nuclear weapons and terrorism. If a state tries to become a nuclear power, the superpower will enforce its nuclear nonproliferation agenda by imposing economic sanctions. Due to these sanctions the concerned state might collapse and disintegrate and create management problems. On the other hand if a state, like Iran, can withstand economic sanctions, the superpower might resort to use of force and thus disturb world peace with the threat of war. The incidence of terrorism increases in a unipolar world than in other systems because terrorists do not find alternatives to turn to. Although the superpower has to take the lead in fighting terrorism, it is also better equipped to do that with its vast resources and having freedom from symmetrical rivalry.

Chapter 6 focuses on characteristics of the current unipolar world system which favours the spread of democracy and faces small though radical opposition. In this system, the single superpower has been seen to assert its leadership even though it has no control over the international system. In this endeavour, the superpower tries to spread its world project through management effort while at the same time trying to prevent the emergence of an alternative system. Hansen mentions that in the post Cold War era political Islam has emerged as a coherent alternative to the present world order although its success is a farfetched possibility.

In Chapter 7 Hansen highlights the significant peculiarities of unipolarity. She says that in the absence of a symmetrical great power, unipolarity assumes distinction in five ways. The main dynamics of the system is adoption of flocking or free riding by other states; the system is robust but not really durable; in management the superpower faces challenges of exhaustion and under management; the main challenge is horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; though terrorism cannot change the system, it requires management. The superpower's political project assumes great importance as there are few restraints and it provides leadership and guidance. Although the superpower's dominant position may create incentives for creating alternative world order projects, but these are mostly radical in nature and tend to either get absorbed or marginalized.

The book introduces some fresh aspects of the unipolar world order and discusses the trends and patterns in world politics in the post Cold War era. Hansen draws attention to the inherent dangers of management in respect of those smaller states whose policies are not in line with the wishes of the sole superpower. The book enriches the field of study in areas of international relations, security and foreign policy. ■

Col. Muhammad Hanif (ret'd), Consultant, IPRI.

Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*

(Lahore/Karachi/Islamabad: Vanguard, 2011), 199 pages.

The book under review entitled *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* is about the decision making in Pakistan and its overall foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States. Comprising of nine chapters it guides the US policy makers by keeping other factors in mind, such as culture while dealing with Pakistan. The authors have touched the “key elements of Pakistani society” in understanding the problem as to why the relationship between the two states have often seen fluctuations inspite of having lot of cooperation in place. Ambassadors Howard and Teresita provide detailed accounts of ups and downs in the bilateral relations between Pakistan and US. They talk of sensitivities of both the states involved in negotiating with each other in historical perspective. “Schaffers offer rich insights into the political culture, authority structures, and personalities that have shaped Pakistan’s negotiating style.”

If we look at the pages of history, we would find Pak-US relations fluctuating many times. Both the countries have their own justifications of being right. On the one hand the US often contends that Pakistan is not doing that maximum which it ought to, and on the other hand Pakistan thinks of being betrayed by the US. It is also very right to say that both the states did enjoy some sort of cordial relations in the past. The US did support economically and in defence during the initial years of Pakistan. This is laudable. But one often thinks then what went wrong throughout the history that many irritants just pop up. This is a difficult question to answer as both the states argue being right, but not impossible if some research is done in that direction. Both the states have to understand the sensitivities involved in the bi-lateral relations. And this book is an eye-opener in this regard.

The China factor influencing Pakistan’s negotiation with the US is also discussed. According to the authors, Pakistanis see their friendship with China as a hedge against a new rupture with the United States and a protection against US unwillingness to provide both symbolic and material support on the international scene (24). The writers seem bold in admitting that it was not only Pakistan that needed US but also former did need Pakistan during the cold war era. “It is fair to say that if Pakistan had been located somewhere else during the cold war...it would not have been as great a focus for American attention” (4). They highlight the fact that the negotiations between the two countries at the top level were different in approaches as civilians in Pakistan held somewhat different approach unlike the military regimes in Pakistan. And the periods from Ayub Khan to Musharraf have been touched upon analytically which is worth reading.

The authors contend that Pakistan's English press is widely accessible to Americans and it is remarkably free to publish which reflects openness as compared to Urdu media (Print and Electronic). The writers are wrong here when they say that English press is "less free to criticize the military" (41), because, it is not the matter of who is displaying information in what manner does not make any sense or appeal but the thing that matters is the level of the issue to give priority to. It's not only the case in Pakistan that military is less criticized but since military is an important institution in every state it is less criticized around the world. Though it is again the fact that Urdu media does sometime sensationalize the issues. But this does not mean that it is pro-American in its narrations.

The writers are appreciative of Pakistan's foreign policy towards US and hold the opinion that "Pakistan's basic foreign policy priorities have remained remarkably stable since the country became independent. This contributes to a longer-term perspective about their dealings with the United States...Pakistani officials have been trying for six decades to line up reliable outside supporters to balance India [and] any given negotiation with the United States fits into this long-term goal" (41). The United States' involvement in Indo-Pakistan diplomacy has been crisis management since 1990s, the writers further opine. But if we look at the present state of affairs and the role of US in Indo-Pak equation, United States' role is much more tilted towards India than Pakistan and this clearly reflects that US is not facilitating in managing the crisis that exists between Pakistan and India, because, Pakistan does have serious concerns on this new equation of accommodating one at the cost of other.

Overall, the book provides new insights and is an outcome of timely and "enormous value to future American negotiators" especially when both the states are engaged closely in fighting war on terror (WoT) where irritants do exist between the two. ■

Khalid Chandio, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Maleeha Lodhi, ed., *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'*
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 378 pages.

The theme of the book, "*Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'*", edited and contributed by Maleeha Lodhi is that Pakistan is a weak state and a strong society whose problems and challenges can be overcome if the impetus for change and renewal comes from within.

Comprising as many as 17 chapters, an introduction and a concluding note, the collection addresses issues of security, economics, foreign policy, governance and human development.

In the introduction, Ms Lodhi discusses the present crisis in the country arguing that the "prism of terror and extremism has deflected attention away

from the strength and stability of its underlying social structure which have enabled the country to weather national and regional storms and rebound from disasters - natural and manmade” (2). She thinks that poor governance, rule without law and the short-sighted leadership are the reasons for the retardation of country’s progress and development.

Ayesha Jalal in “The Past as Present” deals with Pakistan’s image which in recent years has become quite an issue. The country’s international image is not very favorable indeed but it does not represent the majority. She believes that since independence people have been provided with selected facts, as a result the historical picture remains incomplete. She argues that “Perceptions [about Pakistan] matter but devoid of historical grounding can fall short of providing a balanced perspective” (7).

“Why Jinnah Matters” by Dr. Akbar S. Ahmed is a discourse on the vision and leadership of the country’s founder. The people are divided on the question whether he wanted a theocratic state or a modern liberal democracy. Dr Akbar quotes from the speeches of Mr Jinnah to prove that he did not want a theocratic state but otherwise based on the spirit of equity, tolerance, compassion and justice enshrined in the philosophy of Islam (28).

Mohsin Ahmed in his article, “Why Pakistan Will Survive” presents an optimistic picture of the country. He believes that the diversity of culture, language, and religion are the binding forces that teach the people to coexist. Acts of terrorism are aberrations and not the norm; a large part of the society rejects them. He asserts that “Too much centralization has been stifling in a country as diverse as Pakistan” (33).

The editor in her essay, “Beyond the ‘Crisis State’,” has tried to answer several questions related to politics, economy, and governance of Pakistan. She believes most of the problems faced by Pakistan are due to external factors and the inefficiency at the government level. The regional problems and their spillover effects had worsened the situation. Interestingly she calls the country’s geo-strategic location as more of a challenge than an asset as it is generally projected, often quite thoughtlessly (46).

Shuja Nawaz in “Army and Politics” explains that Pakistani military intervenes in decision making only where foreign and defence policies are involved due to bitter relations with India. It intervenes in politics when there is a political vacuum (80). The army’s great challenges today are the counterinsurgency operations and relations with India. Saeed Shafqat, in the following essay, also deals with the same subject and thinks that the military’s hegemony will persist in Pakistan’s politics.

Zaid Hyder in “Ideologically Adrift” focuses on the role of religion at multiple levels that mostly belong in the area of nation building and national security. He emphasizes the need to develop a more progressive narrative of Islam as “the Islamic narrative in Pakistan has been hijacked by an array of groups who use religion as means to diverse ends” (130).

Zahid Hussain in “Battling Militancy” recommends a holistic approach to the problem. He thinks that the public opinion now is against the militant groups, including the Taliban.

The next three articles, “Retooling institutions,” by Dr. Ishrat Hussain, “An Economic Crisis State,” by Meekal Ahmed and “Boosting Competitiveness,” by Muddassar Mazhar Malik deal with the socio-economic situation of Pakistan. The three economists have discussed several issues ranging from governance, structure of institutions, ownership of reforms, and the aid economy of the country to Pakistan’s potential to compete in the international market. Dr. Ishrat suggests several reforms in Civil Services that alone can put the country on the path of progress. Meekal and Malik also discuss the institutional weaknesses that hamper progress.

Zaid Alahdad in “Turning Energy Around” recommends integrated energy planning (IEP) as the basic tool in addressing Pakistan’s energy crisis. Shanza Khan and Moeed Yusuf in “Education as a Strategic Imperative” have addressed the obvious that Pakistan’s uneducated leadership does not understand.

Feroz Hassan Khan in “Pakistan as a Nuclear State,” and Munir Akram in “Reversing Strategic ‘Shrinkage’” discuss issues relating to the country’s strategic situation. Why the bomb was necessary covers much of Feroz Hassan Khan’s discussion while Munir Akram suggests a new strategic paradigm in which he sees a broader and influential role for Pakistan. The need to defeat the Pakistani Taliban as part of a comprehensive strategy is discussed by Ahmed Rashid in his article on “The Afghan Conundrum”.

Dr. Syed Riffat Hussain in “The India Factor” repeats the oft repeated argument that Kashmir has been the stumbling block in Indo-Pak relations but India’s growing strategic dependence on the US is the new hurdle.

In the concluding notes Maleeha Lodhi sums up the policy recommendations given in the book. The most important factor which can push the country beyond the ‘crisis state’ is of political will which the available leadership busy in its own foibles lacks (352).

The 17 essays produce a combined effect of hope for the country which desperately seeks urgent solutions to its many problems that look unmanageable in the short term. The scholars who have contributed to this volume all seem to agree on the poor quality of Pakistan’s leadership. ■

Aftab Hussain, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity*

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 385 pages.

Literature giving Pakistan's perspective on the conflict in Afghanistan is hard to come by in the plethora of studies that line bookshelves. Riaz Mohammad Khan's book, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity* is valuable in this regard. A diplomat who has served as foreign secretary of Pakistan, Khan has first hand knowledge of events and policies which he interweaves into the larger narrative of the geopolitics of the region for over two decades since 1989. It covers a large canvas of history and politics combining several themes into a very readable account of domestic, regional and global developments that have both caused and resulted from the Afghan conflict, noticeably for Pakistan in the shape of extremism and religious militancy.

Analyzing the interplay of competing interests of external powers on the chessboard of Afghanistan, Khan recounts the missed opportunities and the string of failures of the international community after the departure of Soviet troops in 1989 till 2009 and presents his central thesis as how conflict in Afghanistan and militancy in Pakistan have been mutually reinforcing. The writer doesn't claim to have found conclusive answers to the larger questions of extremism and conflict in the region but in a modest tone, he attempts to participate in the intellectual debate on the consequences of more than 30 years of conflict in Afghanistan and the confusion in public discourse on issues of modernity, and the effects of religious militancy and extremism on society, polity, and governance within Pakistan.

The book has been arranged into three parts, history of the Afghan conflict in the first, the intellectual crisis gripping Pakistan in the second and the author's recipe for resolution of the issue in the region in the third part.

Chapter one of the study recounts the major developments in Afghanistan relating to the final years of the Najibullah government and the Mujahedin rule over a fragmented Afghanistan. Chapter two describes the emergence of the Taliban as a result of the ten-year Afghan-Soviet war and the later five years of civil war among the Afghan groups. The very powers that had supported the Mujahiden resistance abandoned the country as a dark hole once they had achieved their strategic objective of winning the Cold War. The West, the region, Afghanistan and Pakistan have paid a heavy price for that historic blunder. The first two chapters are not just a narrative of intra-Afghan strife involving the Afghan Mujaheddin and the Taliban. These chapters also bring out the failure of radical Islamist movements to provide political governance.

Chapter three focuses on post-9/11 developments, US military intervention in Afghanistan to decimate al-Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban, the consequences of diversion of the US campaign to Iraq while the objectives in Afghanistan were yet to be achieved; and the friction and mistrust that characterized the post-9/11 cooperation between the US and Pakistan. The US action spread the conflict to the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan, obliging Pakistan to act militarily in an area it had never before entered. Chapter four examines the interest and concerns of Afghanistan's neighbours and other external powers in the region, with respect to its prospects for stability and peace.

The next part of the book analyzes the situation in Pakistan. Chapter five discusses the circumstances and factors that have spawned religious militancy and led to the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban. These factors include the unique traditions of the autonomous tribal areas, the transmutation of militant groups meant to support the Afghan jihad, the influence of the Saudi Salafi and Deobandi thinking, the proliferation of madrassas, the depressed socio-economic conditions, and growing administrative and judicial malfunctioning. The author analyses these complex issues with objectivity and candour. Most insightful is the author's discussion of what he rightly identifies as an 'intellectual crisis' in Pakistan. Chapter six takes up a major theme of the study by tracing the roots and growth of intellectual confusion pervasive in a range of attitudes and conduct that characterize public discourse in Pakistan on issues of modernity and religious extremism and the challenges relating to the country's orientation, outlook and identity. The Iranian revolution of 1979, the spread of Saudi Salafi dogma in response facilitated by Saudi oil fortunes, the separation of East Pakistan and Afghan jihad combined with the dysfunctional governance inhibiting Pakistan's socio-economic progress, all had exerted powerful influences on the thinking and outlook of the expanding Pakistani urban and middle classes. This contributed to fostering an environment that tolerated extremist tendencies and weakened the capacity of society to gather intellectual strength and courage to check or rectify obvious wrongs simply because they had the dubious sanction of hastily conceived and politically motivated Islamisation policies. It is at the core of society's resistance to adjusting to contemporary modernising trends.

The third part of the book's concluding chapter lays out three major challenges moving forward: stabilizing Afghanistan, building bridges with Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and improving US-Pakistan relations. Two points are essential for stabilizing Afghanistan and reforming US strategy for that purpose. First, it is the long-term international and US politico-economic engagement rather than the current US military presence, which is part of the problem and source of instability. Second, reconciliation is central to achieve Afghan-led peace in Afghanistan. The military failure in Afghanistan crystallizes the importance of a political solution. Consequently, the book

recommends a gradual drawdown of international forces. Pakistan has an indispensable role in helping reconciliation, but it must be played prudently and only in response to expressed interest by Kabul and the coalition, which should welcome Pakistani help in bringing any Afghan Taliban elements into the fold of reconciliation. Instead of looking for friends and adversaries in Afghanistan, Pakistan ought to pursue state-to-state relations of trust that cut across the ethnic divide. The work insists that Pakistan and Afghanistan must share the main responsibility for stabilization. One opportunity lies in settling the issue of the Durand Line. The Afghan government should respect Pakistan's sound proposals for fencing and for designating crossing points for movement, under easement rights and issuance of biometric identification cards. The author worries that reconciliation could be jeopardized by the troubled state of US-Pakistan ties. The US should avoid actions and statements that could impinge on Pakistani sensitivities. Pakistan-US relations must be broad-based and long-term and not follow the episodic pattern of reacting to single events.

The key point suggests overcoming fear and distrust by the three players i.e., Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. Better understanding of one another's expectations, genuine interests, and limitations can help. The American and international strategy needs to move beyond war as a primary instrument of policy. What is more important is being realistic in the pursuit of ambitions and not going back to the old power games, regional rivalries and interventionist policies. ■

Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Dr Zulfqar Khan, *Nuclear Pakistan Strategic Dimensions*

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 275 pages.

Nuclear Pakistan Strategic Dimensions edited and contributed by Dr Zulfqar Khan is a collection of seven essays that deal with different aspects of Pakistan's security in the light of the existing and emerging threats since the early 1980s, the era of emergence of India and Pakistan on the nuclear scene.

In his essay on "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Pakistan's Option of Offensive-Deterrence," Dr. Zulfqar Khan discusses the relative imbalance in the military and economic capabilities of India and Pakistan and identifies the emerging regional as well as global trends that are further enhancing India's nuclear and conventional potential vis-à-vis Pakistan. He particularly refers to Indo-US strategic partnership and the resultant technological gap between India and Pakistan. Such developments are exerting pressure on Pakistan's Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD) posture giving rise to the need for reformulating it to Offensive Deterrence Posture (2). This would require the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to the country's strategic assets that

will provide it with deterrence sustainability and nuclear stability while denying India the advantages of preemptive strike, escalation dominance and compellence during any future crises (29). The employment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons will also provide Pakistan an alternative to the early use of nuclear weapons and enhance the credibility of its nuclear forces (31).

Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema also discusses MCD posture in his essay which he thinks has served its purpose so far highlighting the different views of opponents and proponents of minimum deterrence. He identifies the non-Indian threats particularly in the aftermath of the 'war on terror' and suggests MCD be reviewed in response to the additional threats.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal's article, "India's Ballistic Missile Defence System Development and Pakistan's Countermeasures: Catalyst for Deterrence Instability in South Asia," analyzes the military security dilemma of India and Pakistan and states that South Asian deterrence depends on mutual vulnerability while building and deploying defences undermines deterrence by adding the element of uncertainty (89). He gives a detailed account of the controversy on India's Ballistic Missile Defence system and its implications for Pakistan's missile based deterrence. He argues that the BMD system as a war winning strategy serves to minimize India's vulnerabilities (96) and undermines Pakistan's retaliatory capability. He also touches upon Pakistan's three pronged strategy of Diplomacy (reliance on arms control); Deterrence and Defence (104).

In her essay, "Kashmir Conflict, International Community, and Deterrence Stability in South Asia," Shaheen Akhtar focuses on the Kashmir factor in deterrence stability. Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint since 1998 has drawn the international community's attention and the United States diplomatic involvement during the crises of Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 and Mumbai in 2008. She states that in the post-9/11 scenario, India tried to give Kashmir freedom movement a terrorist colour. Although United States has not openly linked Kashmiri struggle to terrorism, it has been pressurizing Pakistan to end its alleged support to Kashmiri militancy.

"The Evolution of Pakistan's Approach to Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime" by James Revill and Malcolm Dando identifies the concerns of the arms control community that are aroused by advancements in biotechnology and the changed perceptions of security in the post-9/11 era. The authors focus on Pakistan's pursuance of biosafety and biosecurity measures and the enforcement of the relevant laws that in the unique geostrategic realities of Pakistan can be quite problematic. Highlighting Pakistan's role in the 'war on terror' they mention the 'massive amount of economic and military assistance' but make no mention of the cost Pakistan has had to pay in terms of loss of life and damage to its economy (164). On the whole the authors appreciate Pakistan's approach to biological weapons and in this respect praise the role played by Pakistan's Ambassador Masood

Khan in the success of the 6th Review Conference of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

A.Z. Hilali, in the sixth essay, “Strategic Dimensions of Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme and its Command and Control System,” underlines the political relevance of nuclear weapons and views them as a stabilizing factor in the security calculus of small and weaker states. Tracing the history of the conflict between India and Pakistan he hopes nuclear weapons will continue to deter external aggression and conflict escalation. He suggests that policy makers should continue to make explicit security guarantees through various diplomatic methods (220).

The last essay “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010: Emerging Trends and Policy Options for Pakistan,” by Muhammad Khurshid Khan discusses the challenges that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) faces in maintaining peace. He highlights the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states in the implementation of Article 6 of NPT that proposes disarmament. He argues that if P-5 states are not ready to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons then non-NPT nuclear states cannot be made to sign NPT. He says that in the fragile environment of the subcontinent Pakistan is unlikely to sign the NPT. Pakistan should link its signing of NPT to: resolution of outstanding issues with India including Kashmir; positive change in discriminatory attitude of the US towards Pakistan over the nuclear issue; acceptance of Pakistan as nuclear weapons state at par with India; and provision of economic assistance to rebuild Swat and FATA and making up of the economic losses in the ‘war on terror’ (256).■

Saman Zulfqar, Assistant Research Officer, IPRI.

Karen Armstrong, *A Letter to Pakistan*

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 95 pages.

Karen Armstrong is among those few western scholars who have studied Islam with the objective of understanding its universal message. During the last few years she has visited Pakistan a number of times and delivered lectures here which have aroused a lot of interest in her published work on the religion and the Prophet (PBUH). In her latest book, ‘A Letter to Pakistan’ based on an earlier work ‘Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life’ she addresses some of the problems that Pakistani society faces at a deeper behavioural level and how these can be solved through learning and practice of attributes that Islam expounds.

Why this ‘Letter’? Karen explains her concern for Pakistan as the country is going through difficult times and she can feel the pain and suffering of its people. At the bottom of the social malaise and communal disharmony is intolerance. The Golden Rule of “never do to others what you would not like

them to do to you” has been forgotten. Compassion is Karen’s keyword. She declares “jihad for a more compassionate world”. She believes that a decision has to be made between compassion and exclusion.

She delineates twelve steps to create a compassionate society. The first step is learning compassion from Qur’an. The Arabic term for compassion is ‘*Rahman*’ that one recites at the beginning praising Allah as ‘*Al-Rahman*’ the Compassionate and ‘*Al-Rahim*’ the Merciful. “The fundamental message of the Qur’an is a call to practical compassion and social justice”. Karen points to the life of the Prophet (PBUH) which is a practical manifestation of compassion. There is a need to introduce the study of compassion in the school curriculum. The second step requires taking a critical view of our own society and finding signs of ‘*jabiliyyah*’ – arrogance, conceit. The third step involves having compassion for oneself. The experience of pain and suffering should not result in self-pity but should be employed for a better cause. Surrendering the self and the ego leads to a new and better life that the Sufis describe as ‘*baqa*’. This spirit of surrender is symbolised in the physical attitudes of prayer in Islam. Fourthly, Karen calls for empathy, followed closely by mindfulness as the fifth step. The Qur’an prescribes ‘*dhikr*’ i.e., “remembrance, a reminder of realities that are ultimate” for achieving this state of awareness or mindfulness. By promising reward in the afterlife for actions or deeds done in this worldly life, the Qur’an emphasizes self-examination and awareness of our actions.

Karen’s sixth step is action. In Islam, faith is to be translated into meaningful actions. Karen suggests making a gradual and conscious transition by performing one act of kindness in the beginning while consciously refraining from acts of unkindness. To her, the deep divisions in this world have been caused by ignorance about each other. Therefore, we must make a deliberate effort to get to know each other as the next step. The eighth step explains how a dialogue is conducted. It should be a gentle exchange in which the two sides learn from each other and try to accept each other’s point of view. The ninth step is cultivating concern for others – by accepting the religious diversity created by Allah, by surrendering the collective ego, by committing ourselves more deeply to Islam through this altruism.

Next, Karen elaborates on the kind of knowledge we have these days i.e. a snapshot view of others which may be biased or based on misinformation. To put things in an objective perspective we must learn about other cultures, religions and nations. The eleventh step is recognition – being aware of our kinship with people far and away. The last step proposes loving our enemies. The chief characteristic of a Muslim is peace and forbearance. Violent retaliation as prescribed in the *jabili* code is forbidden, Allah alone is the best Avenger.

The book also contains four brief chapters from other authors complementing Karen’s call for compassion. However, one commentator stresses the Qur’an must be understood in its totality; that is not overlooking

its sterner side which balances the compassionate side. The extremist fringe in Pakistan defines Islam in terms of that sterner side and totally overlooks the larger area of compassion exemplified in the life of the Prophet (PBUH). Allah Himself has promised “My Mercy encompasses all things”; everyone should hope that His Mercy will overcome His Wrath (84).

Karen does not say anything controversial about Islam, and strongly believes in what it stands for, which is a far cry from anything we get to hear these days. Being a scholar of major religions of the world and a believer in inter-faith harmony, Karen also cites from Bible, Confucius and Buddha, just to prove that there is a lot in common than most people think there is. Karen’s book is a call from a well-wisher who wants to undo the wrong impressions about Islam and Pakistan. The word Islam means “to enter into peace” and this is what Karen is asking Pakistanis to do, to understand the true spirit of Islam and embrace it.

An impartial search for finding signs of *jahiliyyah* in Pakistani society reveals that women are still treated with disrespect and suffer from domestic violence and social inequality; the divisions along ethnicities, sects and castes run deep and Pakistanis still take pride in their distinctive collective egos. Pakistanis must rise above these divisions, must make use of the useful tips provided by Karen in this book and take collective action. Currently, Pakistan is one of the biggest charity giving nations in the world implying that Pakistanis are not indifferent to the pain and sufferings of others. There is much more to Pakistan than what is portrayed in international media.

On the global level, the divisions mentioned by Karen hold true. Since 9/11, the notion of ‘Clash of Civilization’ seems to be thriving; ignorance, misunderstandings, and misconceptions define the global arena. Global issues such as terrorism, global warming transcend national boundaries and cannot be addressed by any single nation alone; thus highlighting the importance of interdependence and the need for overcoming these trust-deficits. The future of the world can only be secured by accepting the diversity of cultures and religions and working together.

The book may be criticised in some sections for its didactic nature and may not please the scholarly mind but for the people of Pakistan who suffer from much confusion and have little guidance even from the pulpit, Karen’s book is highly useful. It also shows the way to the policy makers on the education side to reform the school curriculum in the light of her views. Good advice must be accepted no matter if it comes from any quarter. Its time to act. ■

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Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace – Pakistan, America, and the future of the Global Jihad*

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 180 pages.

It would be difficult to fully understand Pakistan's policy toward global jihadism without understanding the ambivalent nature of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and an expert on South Asia, currently working in Brookings Institute discusses this issue in his book intriguingly titled *Deadly Embrace – Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*. The journey through history with Riedel shows that all along it has been the short-term interest of the US which has guided its policies toward Pakistan. All the good phases in the relationship were guided by the US need to have Pakistan's support for its policy objectives. For example, Riedel notes that Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, after his first visit to South Asia, told "the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Pakistan would fight communists with its 'bare hands'—that its 'lancers were 6 feet 2 inches' tall and sat on 'great big horses and were out of this world'." Pakistan has since occupied a prominent position on the US foreign policy agenda given the latter's strategic needs during its long drawn Cold War with the USSR. However, "for the past sixty years, American policy toward Pakistan has oscillated wildly", notes Riedel. It was once the only Asian ally that was simultaneously part of SEATO and CENTO; truly termed as the most allied ally. At other times, the US aid to Pakistan has been cut off a number of times at critical junctures like the 1965 war with India; and on account of various reasons like political instability, military coups, going nuclear, and now the alleged 'dual policy' on the issue of fighting terrorism. On the other end of the relationship have been good times when the US needed Pakistan to fight the communists in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and later in the post 9/11 'war on terror', a spring period of its own good and bad spells. Indeed what the US had to bear in the form of 9/11 and the consequent insurgency spreading globally was the consequence of its own policy during the 1980s against the Soviets. Riedel notes "according to one estimate, some 35,000 Muslims from forty-three countries received their baptism-of-fire training with the mujahedin...."

Riedel has been candid in accepting the highly negative role of the US in the domestic political context of Pakistan. "America endorsed every Pakistani military dictator." Riedel notes that Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador to Islamabad during Musharraf era "told the press that 'there is no dictatorship in Pakistan' and the country was fast heading forward to 'true democracy' under Musharraf." Ironically all civilian governments had to grapple with the odds

of US imposed sanctions. Inadvertently though, the U.S. has been responsible for the poor record of democracy in the country.

The most important part of *Deadly Embrace* is the future of relationship between the two countries. In the chapter “thinking the unthinkable”, Riedel contemplates the possibility of a nuclear Pakistan falling in the hands of radical mullahs or a jihadi faction of the army. However such a scenario could only materialize if ever the country’s mainstream political parties and the moderate civil and military establishment somehow became irrelevant — a possibility that the general masses of Pakistan have repeatedly rejected at the polls. But provocations from the US side such as the Raymond Davis episode, the Abbottabad Operation, and the recent Salala check-post tragedy, are strengthening the jihadi elements that do not believe in the electoral process and are out to undermine democracy. It is not therefore surprising to read Riedel’s suggestion: “the United States may have been making it harder for Pakistanis to develop a healthy democracy that can effectively fight terror.” The resurgence of anti-America Islamists in the wake of Salala can be seen in the ‘Difa-i-Pakistan’ (Defence of Pakistan) rallies. Such knee jerk responses should be noticed by observers like Riedel, particularly as he notes that “suspicion of American motives pervades the army and the government alike”. Further, in popular perception Pakistan’s ailing economy is related to the ‘war on terror’ and people tend to believe government claims that the country has suffered US\$ 100 billion losses on its account. In a situation like this it becomes hard to rebut the extremists’ propaganda. In an environment filled with grievances, “the network of terror is obviously attracting some of the best and brightest in the country and the diaspora” testifies Riedel.

But Riedel cannot forget that while this menace was brewing, the guys associated with the phenomenon were called the ‘moral equivalents of America’s forefathers’, by no less a person than President Ronald Reagan. Riedel himself acknowledges that Abdullah Azzam’s *The Defence of Muslim Territories* “became as important to the Afghan Jihad as Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense* was to the American Revolution”. Now it is unjust on the part of American decision makers to overlook Pakistan’s limitations when the US and NATO themselves have failed to control such forces in Afghanistan. Riedel acknowledges that “NATO’s defeat in Afghanistan would be seen across the Muslim world as al-Qaeda’s and jihad’s victory.” He regards such a possibility as “a global game changer.”

Therefore, what Riedel calls the ‘deadly embrace’ is a result of the ill conceived policies of the US. Only a fair review of its policies by Washington D.C., can transform this relationship into a love lock.

Riedel is quite right in pointing out that Kashmir problem is important in Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Similarly his advocacy for modifying American “trade policy to allow more Pakistani-made textiles to be sold in the United

States” is noteworthy. But if the US does not change its approach, the periods of friendship in the past could become history. ■

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Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India*

(New York: Routledge, 2011), 256 pages.

A lot has been written about Pakistan’s foreign policy since 1947. *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India* is an intriguing study touching upon some of the basic issues that the country’s foreign policy makers have tried to address in relation to its objectives in the South Asian region. But since it is essentially an extrapolation of Pakistan’s foreign policy from an Indian perspective it helps more in understanding the Indian outlook than Pakistan’s fundamental interests in respect of its security and well being. Aparna Pande’s study, though insightful and broad-based, remains by far an India-centric commentary.

The book has seven chapters that take up the different variables of Pakistan’s foreign policy ranging from the country’s earlier endeavours for national identity, its search for security, its policy of alignment with the western and the Muslim world, and its on-and-off shifts in the Cold War period for balance between the two blocs. The empirical evidence produced in support of the analysis reflects its Indian-specificity. The central theme in sum appears to be Pakistan’s struggle for “seeking parity” with India and “escaping” from an Indian South Asian identity. It examines how Pakistan’s relations with the western countries, China, the Muslim world can be described as efforts to counter its adversary in the South Asian region.

The first four chapters (1-113) examine the origin of Pakistan as an independent state in the region, its unresolved issues with India, the then Soviet-backed Pashtoonistan bogey, and the country’s quest for defence alliances with the west. This key part of the discussion tries to establish how the Pakistani elite constructed the country’s political identity on the idea of the ‘other’. The country’s Islamic identity was emphasised at its inception to differentiate it from ‘others’ in the neighbourhood. Fear of re-absorption by its immediate and larger neighbour, India, and the latter’s hegemony in the South Asian region, remained the motivating force behind the evolution of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

These key chapters (2, 3 & 4) (28-113) can be said to offer the therapy to Pakistan’s fear which motivates it to look for friends, both in the western and eastern world, for its security and survival as an independent state. The author identifies Pakistan’s main concerns as referred to in notions such as the “unfinished business of partition” in the shape of Kashmir (p. 31), the Soviet-

backed “Pashtoonistan issue” (63-65) and its “disenchantment with the American ally” (p. 100) for failing to come to its help in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, which lead to its withdrawal from western security pacts, SEATO and CENTO (101 & 113).

Pakistan’s friendship with China as its “all weather friend” (114-135), a “trustworthy ally” (133) - a friendship that is “higher than the Himalayas” (126) is discussed at length in terms of political, economic and military support. Pande examines the reasons why China did not turn up by Pakistan’s side as was expected during the 1971 crisis. Despite this frustrating experience, Pakistan did not abandon China’s friendship. However, this expectation indeed was a misconception and misreading of China’s policy on Pakistan’s part that China would help Pakistan safeguard its western or eastern wings (124).

In chapter six, Pande examines what she calls Pakistan’s “virtual relocation” to the Muslim world for both economic and military assistance once it had become disenchanted with its western allies: “Pakistan’s rulers hoped that the numerous alliances and pacts with the US would provide an ally who would be a counter-weight to India. When the US did not prove as “dependable” an ally as Pakistan had hoped for, Pakistan looked to ideologically similar allies in the Muslim world to shore up balance (162).” However, the “leader of Muslim Ummah” (147) could not realise all of the goals that it thought were its due (136).

The concluding chapter (165-174) states that the views of most of the Indian leaders about prospects of Pakistan’s survival as an independent state have significantly changed. Now they want a stable and stronger Pakistan (170). However, the author argues, that “as long as a nation’s leaders feel that its fundamental identity is in question, it will continue to feel that it has a legitimate reason to worry about the intentions and capabilities of a much larger neighbour (174).” This self assurance as to its identity may be achieved, when “Pakistanis could positively affirm their territorial national identity instead of remaining focused on defining a religious-based national *raison d’être* (174).”

Pande has accumulated an exhaustive range of both primary and secondary sources, but does not give an independent view point. What were the factors that caused Pakistan’s fears with regard to its neighbour, the difficulties and complications that the country as a smaller and weaker state faced in designing a strategy of survival in the midst of perceived or real threats. There is no theoretical assessment to test the empirical data against. Moreover, the Pakistani quest for acquiring nuclear weapons doesn’t receive the attention it deserved nor does the author examine how this development was adjusted in the foreign policy structure to bolster Pakistan’s security. Also, it could be interesting if Pakistan’s foreign policy in both pre and post nuclear

periods had been compared in the fluid context of the changing paradigm of international relationship.

Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Aparna Pande's book is an exhaustive work of research, though not a comprehensive and objective study of Pakistan's foreign policy. Its utility lies in showing the Indians' if not the Indian take on Pakistan's foreign policy concerns. This volume is expected to make a contribution to South Asian Studies as well as the studies of international relations and foreign policy with special reference to a state's security and survival policies.■

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