IPRI :: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

IPRI PAPER 4
PUBLISHED BY ASIA PRINTERS ISLAMABAD, DECEMBER 2002
ISBN 969-8721-03-7

India released Draft Nuclear Doctrine, in August 1999. A nuclear policy by India had long been practised even before it exploded its first nuclear device in 1974. It continued on the path of development of nuclear ballistic missiles and tested its nuclear devices in 1998. Concurrently ballistic missiles were also tested as delivery systems. This naturally resulted in a situation forcing Pakistan to go for the only protection against the threat i.e. nuclear deterrence.

Because of geographical proximity, both India and Pakistan will be forced to develop theatre missile defence systems to meet their strategic needs. The prohibitive cost of developing such a system which includes space based surveillance and monitoring, the ground based command and control facilities, as well as the operational complexities suggest, that the launch notification agreement signed between Pakistan and India in 1999, may have to be further developed to arrest this trend. Being the bigger power, and having unchallenged conventional forces in the region, India needs to take the initiative in this regard.

This presentation briefly covers the technical aspects of the space-based systems, and provides linkages with the ballistic missile programme of India.

Nuclear restraint and risk reduction measures have been practiced by the nuclear powers ever since the dropping of atomic bombs over Japan in 1945. These efforts have led to agreements on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and includes among others, Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972); Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles, (1987); START-I and START-II. The processes served to contain and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in possession of the nuclear‑weapon states. These states, the major nuclear powers, United States and Russia have also initiated some preliminary steps to de‑target and de‑alert their weapons.

The agreements also facilitated placement of systems of Notification of Ballistic Missile launches between Great Britain, Canada, Russia, and Norway. This served as a guideline for India and Pakistan, the two major powers in South Asia having nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, to conclude an agreement, which came into force in 1999. Similarly MOUs have been signed by US and Russia in 2000 for the establishment of a joint Centre for Exchange of Data and on issuing notification of missile launches while DPRK has been persuaded to renounce developing and testing long-range ballistic missiles.

However, despite the above agreements between the major world powers to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, the spectre of nuclear wars continue to hover the world as it has done for the past 40 years or so.

Effective risk reduction measures may be better instituted if the impact of nuclear proliferation and resulting outbreak of nuclear war could be better understood by the humanity. Besides the immediate catastrophic effects of nuclear explosions bringing large scale devastation, there are linked short and long term environmental problems that must be brought to the attention of the general public and the decision makers. Some of the environmental effects which would be intensified significantly by the multiple nuclear explosions include acid rain, Ozone depletion and atmospheric turbidity. This would be especially significant in case of South Asia as the two nuclear powers are immediate neighbours and housing one sixth of humanity. The effects of acid rain or Ozone depletion may become apparent after years or only decades. The initial effect of a nuclear bomb burst would be the injection of large amounts of dust into the atmosphere, through the destruction of soil aggregates, the vaporization of soil and rock and the incorporation of existing surface dust.

The almost instantaneous injection of dust particles into the atmosphere would be augmented by the more prolonged emission of smoke and soot particles from the massive fires, which would follow the initial explosions. This would burn for several weeks in urban areas and in forests producing sufficient smoke to cause sub‑freezing temperatures even in summer. Incorporated into the atmospheric circulation, the soot and smoke will eventually blanket the entire globe. The net result of this rapid increase in atmospheric turbidity would be a severe reduction in the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth's surface.

In addition, there would be changes in the vertical temperature structure of the atmosphere. We may experience acute reduction in precipitation, despite the abundance of water vapour and condensation nuclei following the nuclear explosions and fires. The intensity of the inversion plus the persistence of pollution would also cause major changes in atmospheric circulation patterns. It is estimated that even a relatively small nuclear exchange of 100 Megatons could create a situation making the life on earth almost unbearable.

This reflects current perception of the seriousness of the problem, which I believe has not been sufficiently highlighted. Since a few members of the general public are aware of the issues involved, it is left to the media to interpret the real issues. Due to the dramatic impact of nuclear proliferation and missile deployment issues, the media is often accused of sensationalizing and misinterpreting the facts as supplied by the scientific community. It is, therefore, important that appropriate risk reduction measures are put in place, as Kashmir dispute provides a nuclear flashpoint and the general public in the two countries feel fully involved and are highly sentimental about it.

The underground testing of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan in May 1998 was a matter of considerable concern for the non-proliferation regime and international peace and stability both at the regional and global levels. In the wake of these tests, India again reaffirmed its policy of utmost control on the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and commodities. It also declared that it remained committed to a speedy process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons and underlined its readiness to participate in negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material.

Pakistan stressed that India's test had destabilized the security balance in South Asia and that it was obliged to establish the balance of mutual deterrence by its own tests; it was not seeking nuclear weapons status. Security in South Asia must be dealt within a comprehensive way involving measures to avoid conflict and ease current tensions; steps to promote nuclear stabilization and non‑proliferation; measures to address dangers posed by the imbalance in conventional arms and forces between India and Pakistan; and the resolution of the underlined core dispute of Kashmir. Pakistan underlined its readiness, however, to consider means for mutual restraint and greater balance in and symmetry in conventional arms capability in the region.

Since the testing, both India and Pakistan have announced unilateral moratoriums and agreed to participate in negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. India also offered to enter into discussions on an agreement on the ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan for its part has indicated readiness to formalize the moratorium and to reach agreement with India on a bilateral nuclear test ban or a wider ban involving other countries of the region.

India has the distinction of becoming the only country to acquire nuclear weapons driven less by compulsions of security and more by hunger of ‘prestige’ and ‘status.’ What is more, the western world seems to be stooping to respectfully accept this logic. If this process of acquiescence went along unchecked, its second order consequences can be serious and alarming. There are several countries, which have technological and economic capacity much superior to India’s, but have voluntarily forgone the nuclear option. These countries may be tempted or forced to revise their policy of self-imposed restraint. That would be a most dangerous scenario the world should be prepared to experience.

Pakistan certainly cannot be accused for importing the nuclear monster in the region. Pakistan is faced with the real threat at very close quarters and has to deal with it. The sole impulse behind Pakistan's nuclear program is search for security at the minimum level. By going overtly Pakistan did manage to create a sort of strategic balance, both in perception and reality, in the region – a balance, which was destroyed by the Indian action of May 11, 1998. The world had hardly recovered from the shocking events of May 1998 that India decided to launch its Draft Nuclear Doctrine.

The Draft Nuclear Doctrine of India not only provides doctrinal support to an ambitious and patently provocative nuclear programme, but it also advocates enhanced conventional military capability under the garb of ‘raising Indian threshold of nuclear tolerance.’ This would mean continued development and updating of its delivery systems, which includes missiles, ground, air and submarine launched.

Missiles, especially the ones capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to any place within a few minutes have become a symbol of prestige and national pride. Missile technology, being dual use, has also benefited from developments in satellite launch vehicle technology for space exploration as well as launching of satellites for navigation, communications, surveillance, reconnaissance and scientific missions.

As missile technology developed, the world started to realize more and more clearly the risks and dangers brought about by missiles and their proliferation. These include misallocation of national resources, at the cost and risk of quality of life causing permanent damage to the society, strategic stability and peace in general.

Risk reduction measures, therefore, require to weaken motivation in favour of missile possession and proliferation thereby discouraging wasteful missile and anti‑missile race. There is therefore need to:

b. Develop a mechanism for encouraging and rewarding the states that relinquish possession of missile weapon delivery systems.

The missile launch transparency provides for voluntary submission of information in the form of notifications, concerning launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles that have been effected or are underway. Such a situation would require missile launch technical monitoring systems using ground and space based detection and tracking facilities. Such a framework does exist between India and Pakistan. However, the arrangement is highly simplistic and there is a need to put in place a comprehensive system that would ensure missile and missile technology non‑proliferation, transparency of missile use, and international monitoring.

It is ironic that the rocket technology that has created danger for the modern world, in the form of long range missiles armed with nuclear weapons has also made possible the means for reducing this threat, in the form of satellites for the verification of disarmament and arms limitation agreements limiting and reducing such missile forces. Satellites can be used to acquire information concerning deployment of military resources using imagery or by picking up electronic transmissions (electronic intelligence). Other information acquisition functions include missile launch warning, and nuclear explosion detection. Information transmission services are performed by communication and navigation satellites.

Besides the ground based radar technologies, the above facilities would have to rely on space based detection and tracking systems, communications and monitoring for effective command and control. The problem of a safe command and control system is an almost impossibility largely because of two conflicting, directly contradictory requirements.

One requirement is the need to disperse the missiles and their command as widely as possible, and the other is to exclude unauthorized missile launches. Dispersal is easy to understand: a single bomb on the central command and control facility would knock out Pakistan's retaliatory strike if all launch resources are centralized there. Even if this, or perhaps some other command and control centre, were somehow fortified to survive a nuclear blast in the vicinity, the electromagnetic pulse, which accompanies a nuclear blast, would destroy all normal telecommunications. Hence autonomy of dispersal mobile units is an inescapable requirement. This in turn would necessitate authorisation codes for arming and launching the nuclear weapons in its possession. The dispersal of the authority, while it enhances survivability, correspondingly increases the probability of unauthorised launch.

Strategic Warning Time & Nuclear Posture

Strategic Warning Time is a complex function, which depends on the nuclear posture that incorporates:

a. Policies governing the deployment, targeting and conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.

b. Diplomatic policy governing existing and future international agreements constraining the testing, deployment, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the testing and deployment of missile defences by Pakistan and India.

Risk reduction would be substantially improved by adopting a nuclear posture declaring that the nuclear weapon’s programme is to deter and, if necessary respond to the use of nuclear weapons against it.

For a weaker state such as Pakistan, which cannot match India in even conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence is the only effective deterrence against nuclear threat as well as conventional attack. On the other hand, for India to adopt role beyond deterrence of nuclear attack, is both unnecessary and counter‑productive. Additionally, it would undermine the over riding goal of preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. If India, with established conventional superiority, treat the nuclear weapons as multipurpose, then countries such as Pakistan have no choice but to rely on nuclear weapons to protect themselves. Such a situation makes launch‑on‑warning and launch‑under‑attack plausible proposition and would demand flexibility in deployment practices for the launch of counter attack.

The SWT (Strategic Warning Time) period of a solid fuelled missile of range 100 km ‑ 4000 km lies somewhere between 5 ‑ 20 minutes.

To maintain the above capability it is important to protect launch‑on-warning capability with minimum risk of unauthorized or accidental launch. This would also necessitate a fully secured command and control system and availability of sufficient nuclear weapons on land and on submarines.

Nuclear propelled ballistic missile bearing submarines (SSBN) have established themselves as a potent and a reliable nuclear deterrent. These vessels offer flexibility, non‑provocative presence (when submerged) and the desired deterrence. SSBN, therefore, discounts air superiority and the fear of losing aircraft and men; hence becoming the principle component of future strategic triad. These submarines are deployed for multi-mission roles including information gathering, and land attacking using cruise missiles with conventional warheads etc.

The Indians are determined to acquire nuclear submarine based missile launch capability as they argue that no country having a nuclear capability should be without one. The nuclear submarines not only act as a survivable nuclear deterrent but also add to great power status. Despite the financial implications, which may even overlook acute shortage of resources for health, education and social uplift of the teeming millions, the planners in India seem to fully justify the development of strategic submarines. In the meantime, leasing a nuclear submarine from Russia is actively being pursued to sharpen the skills by operating INS Chakra.

Varied deployment including from the sea would certainly add to Pakistan's difficulties manifold. In the longer term, Pakistan’s security could be enhanced if it worked with India to develop and negotiate verifiable measures to ensure that neither country could launch its missile in a massive surprise attack.

It is true that an effective deterrent system can be conceived as a land based non‑nuclear missile defence system employing silo‑based, hit‑to‑kill interceptors and incorporating both orbiting and terrestrial early warning and battle management systems. In the event of a missile attack, the first notification of a missile launch would come from the network of early warning satellites. The Defence Support Program presently deployed by the US and given a good account of its effectiveness during the Gulf War is scheduled to be phased out by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) over 2001‑2112 period.

Space Based

Infra‑Red System

The SBIRS programme will be made up of satellites in high altitude (SBIRS High) and low altitude (SBIRS Low) orbits. SBIRS High will consist of four satellites in geo-synchronous orbit (36,600 km) and two satellites in a highly elliptical orbit.

As currently envisioned, SBIRS Low is a constellation of 24 low earth orbiting satellites that would track enemy missiles in mid-flight, after motors have burnt out. SBIRS Low will employ two sensors – one acquisition and one tracking sensor, operating in a variety of wavebands including short‑wave infrared, medium‑wave infrared, long‑wave infrared and visible. SBIRS High would be responsible for launch detection and over‑the‑horizon tracking, providing the earliest trajectory estimate to command and control systems.

SBIRS Low would provide mid‑course tracking and discrimination capability in conjunction with the ground based early warning radars currently being upgraded and operated by US at Flying Dales Moor, England, Thule Air Station, Greenland, Beale Air Force Base, California, Cape Cod Air Force Station, Massachusetts and Clear Air Force Station, Alaska. The system is expected to be completed in five years starting 2006.

As a part of augmentation programme hardware replacement would involve the replacement of computers, graphic displays, communication equipment and radar receivers, while the software would be rewritten to allow the acquisition, tracking and classification of small objects near the horizon. There would be no change in power, radar antenna patterns or operating frequencies.

Once the re‑entry vehicles have separated form the missiles, the X‑Band Radar (XBR) would act as the primary fire control radar guiding the interceptor to the target. Receiving cues from SBIRS Low and, the early warning radars, it would employ a narrow radar beam that can detect a typical warhead at a range of 4,000 km, and is likely to detect a reduced‑signature target 2,000 km away. At smaller distances, it is said to be capable of discriminating between warheads, decoys and other debris. The first XBR site is stated to be built at Shemya, Alaska and current plans are to build a total of nine sites in a variety of locations around the world by 2015.

At this point the Ground‑Based Interceptor (GBI) would be launched. The GBI is a fixed land based missile intended to approach an incoming warhead outside the earth’s atmosphere and release its payload, the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which will steer itself to and impact with its target. Although the EKV would be able to discriminate between warheads, decoys and debris, it would receive mid‑flight updates on the target from the ground based radar and satellite sensors to increase the likelihood of a successful intercept. Initial plans are to base twenty interceptors in Alaska (although not at the same site as the XBR), but the system will ultimately consist of 250 interceptors both at the Alaska site and at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota.

Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)

Next in the coverage layer, is Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD). It will serve as the tactical overlay between the space‑based strategic defences and point defences for bases, airfields, command installations and the like. Area defence, in contrast, is expected to protect larger expanses; cities and host country populations.

Elements of the ground‑based Theatre High‑Altitude Area Defence are hypervelocity impact missiles and their launchers, battle management command-control‑communications (C³) and ground‑ based radars. These missile launchers might be controlled by a battle management C³ unit processing surveillance data from THAAD radars on the ground, sensors in space and a variety of external sources such as intelligence.

Launchers, sensors and C³ units need not be co‑located. They can be many kilometres apart. Each element can be moved, as circumstances change, without disturbing the interconnected network. Such elasticity affords greater survivability for the batteries and optimum positioning for operational effectiveness.

The US has been working on a number of other anti‑missile systems as well. Most recently, the Tactical High Energy Laser; developed in cooperation with Israel, successfully shot down its target in a test on June 6, 2000. This system uses a deuterium fluoride chemical laser to shoot down medium to short‑range missiles at a range of up to 5 km.

Also employing directed energy technology is the US Airborne Laser, a high energy, chemical oxygen iodine laser mounted on a modified 747-400F aircraft which will shoot down theatre ballistic missiles in their boost phase while in friendly airspace, hundreds of miles from the launch site. A test aircraft is currently under construction, and a test against a Scud‑type missile is set for 2003. If all goes as planned, a fleet of seven Airborne Lasers will be operated by 2008.

There are several advantages to intercepting missiles during their boost phase. At that time, a missile is a relatively large and vulnerable target; it does not manoeuvre and its exhaust is very obvious to infrared sensors. In addition, the destruction of the missile, with the attendant dispersion of debris and hazardous substances, occurs over enemy territory. As a result, the US is working on the other schemes to shoot down missiles in the boost phase with the missiles either launched from ships, manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles. However, all these ideas suffer from the same flaw –the weapon must be within range of the launch site at the time of the launch to be effective. As a result, either a fleet of these weapons would need to be on station continually, all over the world, or advance warning of several hours or days would be needed before an attack – an unreliable assumption on which to base the nation's defence.

Indian missile developments are the most advanced in South Asia. They have been closely related to the Indian space programme primarily focused on the development and production of satellites, missiles, and space‑launch rockets. The first Indian satellite was launched on a Soviet rocket in 1975. Four years later, in 1979, India put a remote sensing satellite into space, also on a Russian rocket. But by 1980, India was able to launch a 155 lb Rohini spacecraft into low earth orbit on its own SLV‑3 space launch vehicle.

India's second‑generation rocket, the Augmented Space Launch Vehicle (ASLV), was successfully launched in 1992, putting a spacecraft into a 450 km orbit. If the five‑stage solid‑fuel ASLV were used as a ballistic missile, it is estimated that it would have a range of 4,000 km. That is substantially more than India’s Agni ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,500 km.

India had produced two short and medium range ballistic missiles, the short‑range Prithvi that comes in 150 km and 250 km models and the medium range Agni, a two stage solid and liquid fuelled missile with a range of 2,500 km. Prithvi has undergone at least a dozen flight tests in a highly successful development program and is being deployed by the Indian Army against Pakistan.

The Agni program, which began in 1983, has recently enjoyed success. The second flight in 1992 had a successful launch but encountered difficulties on re-entry. The third flight test in 1994 was a complete success and featured a manoeuvring warhead that splashed down on target 1,200 km out in the Bay of Bengal. The Agni can cover all of Pakistan and reach deep into China with twice the throw weight needed to carry a nuclear weapon, according to Indian sources.

India also is developing a series of space launch vehicles that can easily be converted into intercontinental ballistic missiles. India’s ASLV space‑launch vehicle program led to more advanced Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and Geo-synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) programmes. The four stage PSLV is a heavy‑lift launch vehicle that puts India in the company of US, Russia, China, France and Japan, as the nations that can launch heavy satellites into orbit. PSLV has solid fuel first and third stages, liquid fuel second and fourth stages, and six solid‑fuel strap‑on boosters. The 66‑foot long first stage is one of the most powerful solid rocket boosters in the world. In 1994, the PSLV successfully launched a one‑ton earth observing satellite into orbit. On March 21, 1996 the PSLV made its second successful launch placing a 1,770 lb remote sensing satellite into a 900 km polar orbit. It is estimated that if the PSLV were used as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), it would be able to attain a range of at least 8,000 km.

The most advanced launch vehicle is the GSLV, which is an Ariane‑class booster capable of putting a 5,500 lb satellite into geo-stationary orbit. The GSLVI uses the PSLV first stage and four powerful boosters derived from the PSLV second stage. It uses a single cryogenic rocket engine bought from Russia as its upper stage. The British Centre for Defence and International Security Studies estimates that if the GSLV were used as a ballistic missile it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km. The first flight of GSLV was successfully flight tested on April 18, 2001.

In 1991, General Sundarji, the Indian Army Chief of Staff, said that the “Gulf War emphasized once again that nuclear weapons are the ultimate coin of power. In the final analysis the US could go in because it had nuclear weapons and Iraq did not.” India clearly sees nuclear weapons as a source of power and has made a decision to maintain nuclear weapons and to develop ballistic missiles of various ranges to deliver them.

India now is producing and selling satellite imagery on the world market. In 1992, Professor U. R. Rao, Chairman of ISRO said that enormous opportunities were opening for Indian industry to sell satellites, rocket engines and even space launch vehicles for export. Mr. Rao noted that Indian’s version of France’s Viking rocket engine compares with the best but costs much less. India could, therefore, become a major source of ballistic missile technology and components for countries trying to develop a long‑range missile capability.

India whose current generation of imaging satellites can take pictures of the earth with 5.8 metre resolution has recently obtained government’s approval to build and launch a satellite (Cartosat) capable of taking images with 1 metre resolution. It is expected to cost about 2.3 billion rupees ($49.7 million). It will be launched by ISRO’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle in 2003 or 2004. The spacecraft is expected to cost less than its predecessor, Cartosat‑1 that costs around 2.5 billion rupees.

Expected to launch next year, Cartosat-1 will have two panchromatic cameras for taking pictures with 2.5 metre spatial resolution. The cameras will provide stereo imaging useful for creating terrain elevation maps. Cartosat-1 also will carry a solid-state recorder for storing payload data.

The camera optics for both satellites is being developed at ISRO’s Laboratory for Electro‑Optic Systems in Bangalore. Some Cartosat‑2 camera technologies will be tested on India’s Technology Experimental Satellite set to launch in 2001.

It would undoubtedly put India in a position where it would stand not too far behind the US and Russia in satellite based reconnaissance and intelligence gathering activities. Seeing these advancements along with India’s recent deals with France and Russia for joint production of nuclear submarines, submarine launched missiles and cruise missiles leaves no doubt as to how India plans to enhance its capabilities in space‑based warning, identification and tracking in the achievement of its nuclear designs. India has expressed particular interest in the Israeli Arrow-2 of the Russian S‑300. Recently, unconfirmed reports have suggested that India may have entered into a covert arrangement with Israel to obtain technology related to the Arrow-2.

India’s designs to be the dominating power in the region resulted in the development and testing of its nuclear device in 1974. The country has been pursuing a plan to develop an indigenous capability to produce nuclear weapon systems complete with delivery systems based on ballistic missiles deployed from land, air, and sea.

India’s missile development programme is well‑supported and augmented by its space programme, which has already demonstrated its satellite launch capabilities into polar orbits (PSLV), and for geo-synchronous orbit (GSLV). These launch vehicles could be easily converted to deliver nuclear warheads to about 14,000 km. India has also demonstrated its indigenous capability for communication and environment monitoring, reconnaissance (pre-launch monitoring, as well as for early warning (launch alert) satellites. Such systems are not only highly sophisticated and expensive, and play a very important role in the command and control of nuclear ballistic missile systems.

With INSAT series of communication satellites, and high-resolution remote sensing systems, India is in a position to have a comprehensive system to provide almost instantaneous warning of launch indications. The fact that South Asian subcontinent is geographically compact has significantly enhanced the scope for distributed deployment of ballistic missiles from nuclear submarines.

The above situation has put Pakistan in a very difficult situation with regard to its security and is being forced to divert its resources to negate India’s offensive missile program. Fresh acquisitions of the nuclear submarines and missiles has made the matter only worst.

3. “Delhi to integrate nuclear, defence & intelligence setups,” Dawn, May 24, 2001.

4. Tahir Mirza, “Pakistan, India need nuclear safety,” Dawn, June 25, 2001.

5. “India authorized to build Meter Imaging Satellite,” Space News, October 30, 2000.

10. John Pike and Peter Voth, “Current Plans for Missile Defence,” Disarmament Forum, No. 1, 200l.

11. Stephen W. Young, “Pushing the Limits‑The decision on National Missile Defence,” Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, July 2000.

12. Toward True Security ‑ A US Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade, Centre for Defense Information, Federation of American Scientists, National Resources Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 2001.

It is now over two years since India and Pakistan became de‑facto nuclear powers. It is encouraging to note that in the last 30 months they have both shown a great deal of maturity and responsibility in managing the genie, which they let out of the bottle in May 1998. They have now even agreed to find a peaceful solution to their disputes and try to normalize their relations.

India and Pakistan have taken steps to manage their newly acquired nuclear fangs, at the same time avoiding the creation of a balance of terror in the subcontinent. Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has a jittery finger on the nuclear button. Neither of them has been bracketed with the so‑called rogue states. They have engaged in workshops on Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures, in which participants from all the countries of South Asia have taken part with the aim to achieve clarity in Nuclear Command and Control.

Even when they had lifted their nuclear veils and exposed to the world their nuclear faces they had mutually agreed not to attack each other nuclear facilities. They exchanged the list, of their nuclear installations. After Pokhran II and Chagai they decided on a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Both have agreed in principle on signing the CTBT after they have build up the required consensus (read, after they have obtained a good bargain). Both have worked out a nuclear doctrine. Pakistan has also established a Nuclear Regulatory Authority and has proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime. Both realize the necessity of a nuclear dialogue to see that an accidental or un‑authorised nuclear weapons exchange does not take place.

While there are many nuclear related issues between India and Pakistan on which there is convergence they are also some on which they differ. One of them is the No First Use (NFU) policy.

In this paper it will be argued that the policy of NFU or that of a First Use Doctrine depends on factors, which vary from country to country and region to region. NFU cannot be universalised nor can there be an international treaty on NFU. An effort will be made to prove that Pakistan has some genuine reasons for not agreeing to a policy of NFU by explaining its logic. Both, a statistical and a theoretical model, have been used to explain the reasons for a country adopting a certain course of action with regards to its policy on the use of nuclear weapons.

Nations build up their armed forces because of fear or ambition. Militarily weak states will avoid entering into any agreement, which will limit their use of all the weapons at their disposal. Perceived threats to their security compel them to keep open all the alternatives. When the weaker state evaluates the security environment it takes into account not only the use of nuclear weapons against it but also the possibility of a conventional attack, which it may find difficult to halt by conventional means. Militarily more powerful nations have their Achilles heals, which has an impact on the nuclear policy they decide to adopt.

The Paper highlights the important events on the road to a NFU policy and the first use doctrine. The purpose is to compare the security environment between India and Pakistan and bring out the factors highlighting why the two newly emerged nuclear powers have differed on the NFU policy. It will be seen that each country has its own compulsions and takes decisions in keeping with its own special strategic considerations.

The doctrine of First Use of nuclear weapons was adopted by the US during the Cold War, when Washington realized that Moscow had a superiority in conventional weapons. There was a danger that the Warsaw Pact countries, because of the conventional weapons superiority they possessed over NATO nations, would be able to overrun some areas of Western Europe, before being stopped in the tracks. It was then believed that the only way to prevent the Soviet Union and its client states from adopting an adventurous course was to let them know that US would not hesitate in using the nuclear weapon first.

In the 1950s President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, adopted a first use of nuclear weapons policy. The US had then announced that “if the Soviet Union even puts a foot across the East‑West frontier in Europe, a massive American nuclear attack would be the response.”[1] National Security Council (NSC) 68 of April 1950 stated that “a declaration of no first use, when the country is, relatively unprepared in conventional forces would be interpreted by the USSR as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intend to abandon them.”[2]

Washington had not accepted a Soviet no first use proposal in 1982 as it would have given Moscow greater advantage because of the preponderance of conventional weapons in the hands of the Soviets. Today, a debate is presently going on in US on the question of adopting a NFU policy or continuing with the first use doctrine. Those opposed to the NFU argue, “it is foolish to give our adversaries such military or strategic assurances.” According to them “if Washington was to endorse no first use and mean it, it would then be clearly at a disadvantage.”

There are voices in the US, which say “No to Nuclear War.” They are against the US policy of responding to a conventional attack by Russia with tactical nuclear weapons. Those in favour of a no first use argue, “it is the only morally and politically defensible posture and that such a policy would allow the US almost immediately to dismantle much of its nuclear arsenal. In any case there would be no need to strengthen it.” Robert Mc Namara, in a recent interview, now believes that “first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear opponent would be suicidal.”

Advocates of no first use of nuclear weapons in the US like Mc George Bundy, William Crowe and Sidney Drell maintain “that there is no vital interest of the US, except the deterrence of further nuclear attack, that cannot be met by prudent conventional forces. There is no visible case where the US could be forced to chose between defeat and the first use of nuclear weapons.” To ensure its security US is even prepared to use nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon states. [3]

The important points to note in these views of the American strategic thinkers is that:

a. Vital interest of US will not be threatened if Russia advances its forces into Central Europe.

b. US will not be faced with total defeat if it does not carry out a nuclear strike first and,

c. NATO is now conventionally strong enough to withstand a conventional attack from Russia.

Secretary of State Collin Powel is reported to have said that the US has never ruled out using nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed enemy.[4] The Nuclear Posture Review envisages a nuclear strike on a rogue state as well.[5

Britain advocates a policy of sub‑strategic strike. By which is meant that limited and highly selective use of nuclear weapons that will fall short of a strategic strike. But with sufficient level of violence to convince an aggressor, who had miscalculated on Britain’s resolve and attacked Britain, that he should halt his aggression and withdraw or face the devastating strategic strike.

Field Marshal Montgommery was also initially prone to use nuclear weapons even if it was to shatter a conventional attack. However, later when the Soviets had demonstrated its ability to reach out far beyond its borders he questioned the first use doctrine. He reportedly then said “in the event of a minor Russian aggression with conventional forces it was realistic to expect the West would use its nuclear deterrent as weapons against the cities of Russia and receive in return Russian retaliation, which would put the United Kingdom and US out of business.” He termed such a policy as amounting to committing suicide.

Since its very inception NATO was prepared to be the first to use nuclear weapons. After all, its mentor the US did do so, that also against a non nuclear state in order to save American lives in World War II. In December 1954 NATO integrated tactical nuclear weapons in its defensive strategy, which meant that the Alliance was ready to use nuclear weapons against even a conventional attack.

What was the security environment, which called for such a drastic measure in the 50s. The animosity between the two super powers was at its height. The Soviet Union had not yet developed ICBM and the US was not under threat from the Soviet nuclear tipped missiles. Moscow had much larger conventional forces in Europe than those of the Allied nations.

In December 1967 NATO, changed it strategy somewhat and adopted the flexible response theory according to which NATO forces would respond to an attack in proportion to the forces used by the Soviet Union. However, it retained the option to use nuclear weapons first if it was unable to stop the advance of Soviet conventional forces.

While several attempts have been made by various countries in Europe and even by Canada to amend NATO’s strategic concept of first use and to adopt a no first use policy, the US continued to emphasize that there was no need to carry out a review of NATO’s nuclear strategy. Madeleine Albright continued to maintain that the Alliance had the right nuclear strategy. The new NATO strategic concept, adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999 did not adopt a NFU policy. It did, however, accept that with the radical changes in the security situation including reduced conventional forces in Europe and increased reaction times NATO’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means has significantly improved. As a result the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used by the Alliance are extremely remote.”

The case of revising NATO’s strategy of first use is based on the fact that the Alliance now enjoys greater conventional superiority over the Russians.

The Soviet Union had initially adopted a formulation according to which Moscow would use its nuclear weapons only if the very existence of the Soviet Union was threatened. However, the National Security Concept signed by President Boris Yeltsin on December 17, 1997 was altered by new National Security Concept published on January 14, 2000 and signed by President Vladimir Putin differs from the former one substantially.

Russia is now “prepared to use all forces and means at its disposal including nuclear weapons in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.” [6] In other words, nuclear weapons can be used by Russia even if it is not facing total defeat.

Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, first Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, reportedly stated that Russia abandoned the NFU policy of nuclear weapons in 1993. Russia changed its policy because of NATO’s eastward enlargement, expansion of its sphere of influence and deploying its troops on the territory of other countries without the appropriate sanctions from the UNSC. The change has also occurred because Russian conventional forces are no longer as strong as they were in the Cold War era. The bombing of Kosovo by US led forces without the sanction of the UNSC was perhaps another reason for the Russians to have a re‑look at its nuclear policy. The giving up of what had amounted to a NFU policy by Russia is meant to dissuade NATO from using force against Russia.

In the summer 1999 manoeuvres the Russian armed forces painted a picture that the Russian army was unable to hold an important enclave against a major conventional attack by the enemy. To avoid further set back the defending elements of the Russian forces taking part in the exercise used nuclear weapons selectively and was not afraid of escalation. Nuclear weapons in this exercise were used to ‘de‑escalate’ the conflict say Russian military analysts.

Mikhail Gorbachev, while approving Russia’s new military doctrine, however, objects to the nuclear first use provision. His contention rests on the fact that on the one hand Russia is looking for ways and means for cooperation in slowing down the arms race and providing security and on the other it is using a threat that we will use nuclear weapons first if need be.

China was the first nuclear weapon state to declare a NFU policy.[7] It did so immediately on detonating its first nuclear device on October 16, 1964. It is the only recognised nuclear power to continue to follow this policy. It believes that nuclear weapons are not to be used and have mainly a political value. Beijing believes in a minimal use of force and feels that a no first use declaration diminishes the value of nuclear weapons as a currency of power.

Liu Huaqiu, a Chinese scholar at the Henry Stimson Center, advocates a universal treaty for no first use of nuclear weapons. He also points out problems in the implementation of the policy which according to him could be of the nature of verification, early warning and cheating. China initiated the Draft Treaty on NFU of Nuclear Weapons in January 1994, which was circulated to the US, Russia, Britain and France. They, however, did not respond to the Chinese draft. According to Liu, Russia and China did issue a joint statement pledging no first use of nuclear weapons against each other. But if all nuclear powers agree and faithfully implement not to use nuclear weapons first then why have nuclear weapons at all.

China can follow a NFU policy as it is protected by the mighty Himalayas against India, the wide Pacific against the US, the strategic depth against Russia. These geographical features give it enough space to absorb a conventional attack. The peoples war concept also gives it that inherent strength to beat back an aggressor with conventional weapons.

One of the reasons why China has and is continuing to adhere to a NFU policy is because it is presently focusing on economic development and it needs a peaceful international environment. According to the Chinese scholar “China is making all efforts to avoid war and nuclear war in particular.” A no first use in a step in that direction.

The ICJ gave a ruling in July 1996 that “the use of or threatened use of nuclear weapons is illegal in all but one possible circumstance: a threat to the very existence of the state.”

If nations much stronger than Pakistan retain the right to use nuclear weapons first against another nuclear power when confronted with a hostile neighbour, there is no reason for Pakistan, which is militarily weaker than India, not to adopt a similar policy.

Nuclear deterrence has both a physical and a psychological content. The physical requirement is to have such nuclear forces, which if used would cause unacceptable damage to the enemy. The psychological content implies that there should be a willingness and the determination to use it when necessary.

Henry Kissinger rightfully maintains that deterrence will only be effective if the opposition is certain that its adversary will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. He maintains, “a deterrent, which one is afraid to implement when challenged, ceases to be a deterrent.”[8] It is only when the enemy is afraid that his opponent could be the first to strike that deterrence will be achieved.

Micheal Krepon, Chairman of the Henry Stimson Centre in Washington believes that “nations may not always be deterred by the enemy’s nuclear weapons and close calls can lead to a nuclear conflict.”[9] Conventional close calls can be prevented if a first use doctrine is in place as the risk of a nuclear conflict will prevent a situation from getting out of hand.

Core Deterrence implies deterring the use of nuclear weapons against nuclear weapons alone but policies regarding use of nuclear devices for purposes other than a pre‑emptive strike is also a part of a nation’s nuclear policy, which can be subjected to alterations from time to time. Deterrence is not a static phenomenon. In fact nuclear policies must change as new weapon systems are developed and new counter measures are needed to maintain the nuclear deterrent. Introduction of Anti‑Ballistic Missiles, production of tactical nuclear weapons and the development of ammunition demolition munitions and suit case bombs require a change in the nuclear policy by a weaker nation.

It is the threat of total annihilation of armies on, the battlefield and population centres outside the war zone that creates the deterrence. NFU of nuclear weapons commitment takes away that deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence is governed by the two elements of risk and stake[10] If the risk of a first strike by the opponent is removed, then an aggressor can use conventional forces to achieve his political objective, as the damage would be acceptable. If, however, the risk of a first strike by the enemy exists then the risk of initiating even a conventional attack will not be taken whatever the stake.

Both capability and credibility form a part of nuclear deterrence. It is said that the lesser the capability the more there is a need of credibility. The willingness to use nuclear weapons when needed is an important element of nuclear deterrence. It is only when the possibility of mutually assured destruction exists that deterrence in all probability will prevent an all out war.

Types of Deterrence

Deterrence can be offensive or defensive in nature. Those nations following an offensive deterrence policy require a sophisticated nuclear regime. IRBMs, ICBMs and ABMs are needed to support such a policy. Countries which opt for an offensive nuclear doctrine can announce a NFU policy as they have little to fear from a militarily weaker country. Those nations which due to limited resources, or as a deliberate policy adopt a defensive nuclear policy will, in all probability, depend on the threat of not hesitating to use the nuclear weapon first. Minimum nuclear deterrence will usually be accompanied by a first use doctrine.

Security Policy is based on border geography, historical perspective, political aims and objectives, military balance between potential adversaries.

Since the security models of India and Pakistan differ, their policy on the use of nuclear weapons also differs. India’s security model is based on extending its perimeter of security much beyond its geographical boundaries. It has acquired the military‑capability of defending its frontiers with conventional weapons alone and using its nuclear fangs to threaten its neighbours to fall in line. It does not have to depend on the use of its nuclear weapons to protect its territory. The nuclear weapons, are more for building the image of a major power, which cannot be ignored in international fora.

Pakistan’s security model is based on its perception that India will continue to deny it solution of the Kashmir issue, which Pakistan will attempt to solve by all means possible short of an all out war. It also believes that given an opportunity India will not hesitate to dismember Pakistan again.

India did offer a NFU on October 15, 1996, which it has repeated in its Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 2000.[11] However, this offer should be viewed in the following context:

a. Conscious of the fact that it was India who was first to introduce nuclear weapons in the subcontinent.

b. Realizing that it was they (India) who slammed the nuclear non-proliferation regime in South Asia.

c. Having acquired the capability of invulnerability of nuclear devices by planning to have a triad of nuclear capability, including SLBMs.

e. Being geographically so placed so as to ward off a conventional attack much before the enemy reaches its vital areas.

India wants to take the high road and achieve the high moral ground by declaring a NFU Policy.

Even while training his army in nuclear conditions, Indian COAS, General Sunderajan Padhmanabhan did mention that the army was practising a riposte to a nuclear strike. But when military thinkers like K M Paniker believe that active assertion of rights, if necessary through force of arms, should be India's policy then the logic of NFU by India attains a different connotation.

Logic of NFU

The logic of NFU means total reliance on conventional weapons to respond to a conventional attack by the enemy. A country following a NFU policy is depending on conventional deterrence rather than core nuclear deterrence for its territorial integrity. NFU has indeed a great appeal but does not make strategic sense in all cases. It must take into account the conventional and nuclear imbalance between nuclear powers. It should keep in mind the historical adversarial relationship between the states concerned. It cannot overlook the mindset of the peoples of the two countries involved. It should also be mindful of the opportunities and challenges offered in a changing environment. The presence or absence of a collective security system will also influence the decision to carry out a nuclear strike first or wait for the enemy to break the nuclear taboo.

A NFU doctrine retains the option of seeking a political objective by conventional military means. NFU does not prevent the upgrading and increase of existing nuclear arsenals. It does not preclude revitalizing and enlarging conventional forces. It is not a step towards disarmament and arms control. There is no UNSC resolutions which would severely punish a violator of a no first use policy nation. Will the US take an immediate action against India if it violated its pledge not to use nuclear weapons?

Logic of NFU would be meaningful if it is accompanied by non‑weaponisation, non‑deployment and non‑targeting. It will be acceptable if the defence expenditure is not increased day in and day out. It will create no suspicion if anti-ballistic missiles are not introduced in the region. NFU should be backed with evidence of good faith. The Shiv Sena reality in India and the religious extremists in Pakistan reduce the significance of the no first use declaration.

But when the defence budget is increased manifold each year. When India seeks the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system from Israel and supports the US National Missile Defence (NMD). When Amitabh Mattoo of the prestigious Jawahar Lal Nehru University believes that India has a role even beyond South Asia, then suspicions arise whether India is sincere in implementing its no first use policy.

If no first use declaration is accompanied with more and more production of fissile material, ever increasing stock piles of nuclear weapons. Enlarging the ranges of missiles, adding the lethality of atomic devices and working towards a nuclear missile defence programme then the intentions of not being the first to use nuclear weapons despite the declaration of NFU becomes suspicious.

Jaswant Singh is on record to have said that India has not foreclosed not foregone its rights to conduct further nuclear tests. India according to him cannot disregard the security scenario. The same logic applies to Pakistan in not accepting a NFU policy.

Carol Khan of the Hudson Institute in her article Thinking About Nuclear Morality brings out the facts that a NFU policy, no matter how well designed, will not by itself change the military balance, will not relieve the need for a first rate nuclear capability and will not reliably preclude the use of nuclear weapons. It will not eliminate the risk of unlimited escalation. It will not significantly reduce defence budgets. “NFU is not a panacea for American and NATO defence problems” says Carol with some justification. Neither it is a panacea in the Indo Pakistan context.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee did say immediately after the nuclear test in May 1998 that “India does not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country.”[12] But a day later his home minister L K Advani gave a warning to Pakistan that it must realize that the strategic environment has changed as India had become a de‑facto nuclear power and Pakistan must now vacate what India refers to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Bharat Kannard, however, calls NFU a hoax. He is not far wrong when he says that it is one of those restrictions which countries are willing to abide by except in war. Experience shows that nations do not regard all agreements as sacrosanct for all times to come. General Vasantha Raghavan does not want to rely too much on agreements made by Pakistan specially what happened after the Lahore Declaration. Pakistan too has been bitten several times when India went back on agreements made by Indian leaders on vital security issues. President Bush is presently changing the rules of the game as far as the ABM Treaty is concerned as according to him USA’s security is threatened as rogue states are acquiring long range missiles. Russia has modified its nuclear policy because there have been certain developments on its borders, which they believe to be harmful to their security. Russia though a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which forbids the supply of nuclear materials for nuclear plants outside IAEA safeguards, did send nuclear fuel to India for their indigenously design nuclear plants.

To be effective and taken seriously a no first use declaration should have international guarantees, without which it loses its credibility.

Herman Khan maintains that NFU increases the chances of conventional attacks, subversion and Low intensity conflicts. By renouncing the use of all the forces at its disposal a militarily weaker nation is not in a position to avoid submitting to demands for compromises and concessions. “It is a pre‑emptive to surrender” opines some nuclear analysts with some justification.

If the objective of no first use is to avoid a nuclear exchange accidentally or unintentionally then it can be achieved by having virtual nuclear arsenals. By separating the components of nuclear weapons unintentional trigger happy leaders can be prevented from launching nuclear strike at the least provocation. Jonathen Schell of RAND Corporation recommends a delay of 6 weeks between the decision to launch a weapon and its final step.

Unilateral NFU Policy. This does not create a peaceful environment, as the fear of it being used by the opponent still exists.

Bilateral NFU Policy. This will help in eliminating the balance of terror to some extent provided the nations concerned trust each other and the cause of mistrust and suspicion have been removed.

Regional NFU Policy. This will indeed go along way in reducing the possibility of a nuclear exchange between hostile neighbours.

Universal Treaty of NFU. This will indeed be a great step forward towards nuclear disarmament and non proliferation as it will down grade the significance of nuclear weapons. But that stage is today a pipe dream as none of the recognised nuclear powers except China are prepared to adopt a no first use policy.

NFU can be limited to NFU outside ones territory, thus keeping the option of using nuclear weapons within ones territory to break up a massive invasion of enemy forces which the defender has not been able to halt by conventional means.

The growing conventional military imbalance in favour of India; the ever increasing ranges of India’s nuclear capable ballistic missiles; the invulnerability of India’s nuclear weapons and their delivery means due to the strategic depth available to India; the frustration of not being able to suppress the freedom movement in Kashmir; the viability of the limited war concept by India’s new COAS; the preparations for a nuclear war during Exercise Purnarn Vijaya; the rise of Hindu fundamentalism; the unstable political situation in Pakistan; the economic difficulties Islamabad is facing and the perceived impression that Pakistan stands isolated, are some of the reasons, which may tempt extremists and hardliners in India to put pressure on their government to seize, God forbid, a second opportunity of a life time to dismember Pakistan again.

Nuclear self restraint is indeed essential. Nuclear risk reduction measures should be discussed and agreed upon. But when a country has exhausted all other means of preventing a total collapse the use of the weapon of last resort may become necessary. The nuclear weapon is a trump card for the weaker nation. Why throw it away by declaring that it will not be the first to use it.

First use doctrine does not automatically imply that the country adopting such a policy will be the first to use the nuclear weapon. But what it does imply is that it retains the right to do so and that it is determined to use all weapons at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, to defend its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

The first use doctrine is linked with the nuclear threshold. The lower the nuclear threshold the greater the chances of using the nuclear weapon first and in the early stages of the battle. The first use doctrine gets greater importance if a country has the ability to carry out a graduated response to an aggression. If tactical nuclear weapons are available the chances of first use increases.

By declaring a first use doctrine the country so doing is emphasising the fact that a political rather than a military solution of dispute should be preferred. “Make a show of force in order not to use it” is how Andre Beaufre describes the policy of first use doctrine.

Carl Von Weizaecker has rightly said “Bombs fulfil their purpose if they never fall. But if every one is told that they will never fall they do not fulfil that purpose.” Kissinger has the same view. According to him, “A deterrent, which one is afraid to implement when challenged, ceases to be a deterrent. It is only when the enemy is afraid that his opponent will be the first to strike that nuclear deterrent is achieved.” Micheal Krepon of Henry Stimson Center is correct when he says that “the nuclear equation is not a settled one.” Hence the option of first use should be retained by a militarily weaker nation.

An all out war can only be prevented in a nuclear environment if both are prepared to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is only when the enemy knows that his opponent is prepared to gamble away all his assets at the throw of a dice that he will be cautious not to take him on.

Thought must also be given to the possibility of an enemy using chemical and biological weapons. Should a county then be morally justified in being the first to use nuclear weapons. While signing the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANFWZ) Treaty, the US did make it clear that the US signature did not limit options available to it in response to an attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction.

For a nation, which does not have sophisticated means of intelligence gathering, it becomes difficult to find out if an enemy country is making preparations for a nuclear strike. In such cases the logic of NFU puts the weaker nation at great risk. Pakistan does not have the capability of keeping a close watch on India’s nuclear movement. More so because of the size and depth of its potential adversary.

Modem nations will not ride into the valley of death willingly, as it was done by the six hundred at Balaclava. But at the same time they would do so if their very existence is at stake. In his 60 minutes interview, in October 2000, General Parvez Musharraf, in response to a question as to when he would use the nuclear weapon said “I would never like to use it first. But if you ask me a direct question when would I use them, the answer would be, if Pakistan’s security gets jeopardized, then only one would like to think of it.” He is also reported to have assured the international community that Pakistan does not want a nuclear arms race and is committed to a policy of responsibility and restraint.

Accepting a NFU Policy means relinquishing the nuclear deterrence, says Dr Riffat Hussain with justification. The enemy must never know when and where nuclear weapons will be used. Then only deterrence will be effective. A first use doctrine can ensure stability provided a major crisis does not occur. It, however, does increase the risk of an unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons as the state of alertness is greater in the case of a first use doctrine. Dr Riffat’s perception that first use of nuclear weapon will be without central authority cannot be accepted universally. First use could be only under pressure, as the decision to do so would be taken when all other means to safeguard the country’s national independence have failed but it does not mean that it will invariably be used when the command of nuclear weapons is no longer in the hands of the supreme authority.

If the first strike is intended to destroy nuclear opponent’s capability of using its nuclear weapons then it is doubtful if they could avoid a nuclear exchange. During the Cuban missile crisis, US Generals responsible for planning nuclear strikes could not guarantee

that they would be able to take out all of Cuban missiles. The US in Desert Storm could not destroy all of Iraq’s missile capability despite a preponderance of conventional superiority possessed by the US led forces against Iraq.

Ejaz Haider who rights on nuclear issues frequently in the Friday Times, cynically but rightfully observes the “craziness is the essence of deterrence, ‘…Be khatar kood para atish‑Namrood main ishq.(Passion jumped fearlessly into the fire of Nimrod)

Does first use doctrine deter a conventional attack? It may not do so totally as the opponent may even then decide to take the risk as in all probability the enemy would not unleash its nuclear weapons the moment its national frontiers are crossed. Low intensity conflicts could, therefore, still be possible though the aggressor would be careful not to test his opponents determination to use all the weapons at his disposal at any time after an aggression has taken place.

Does first use amount to suicide? Not necessarily there could be a graduated use of nuclear weapons even if the opponent is the first to use it. The conflict can be terminated before the two have totally destroyed each other. Nuclear weapons can help in the termination of a conflict.

It is often said that numbers of nuclear weapons held do not matter in a nuclear environment as even one invulnerable hydrogen bomb is enough to deter the enemy from using his nuclear weapon. This is indeed true but it does influence the decision to use nuclear weapons first or follow a NFU policy. The greater the number of nuclear weapons held and the more safe they are from being detected and destroyed, the greater the possibility of the country demonstrating its maturity by announcing that it will not be the first to use the atomic devices. When a nation acquires the capability of submarine launched nuclear tipped ballistic missiles from nuclear powered submarines, it feels that it can survive a first strike by the enemy and be in a position to retaliate with nuclear weapons.

If a nation possesses very accurate means of delivery systems like the Cruise missile, it may opt for the first use in the hope of destroying the enemy’s nuclear weapons. The acquisition of reliable anti‑ballistic missiles can also give confidence to the enemy of destroying in-coming missiles hence the need for a first strike may not be necessary.

Since Pakistan cannot sustain an arms race with India, it cannot hope to keep the conventional imbalance within tolerable limits hence it will continue to rely on the use of nuclear weapons for its security and, therefore, will not commit itself to a NFU policy.

· Intelligence about enemy nuclear weapons and delivery means should be up to date and accurate.

· A very high accuracy of nuclear weapons delivery systems has to be assured if the object of the first use is to destroy all of the enemy nuclear weapons.

Advantages/Disadvantages of Various Options

· Nuclear weapons lose much of their significance as its role in the defence of the country is de‑emphasised.

· Since it gives a defensive orientation to a nuclear conflict, the size of the nuclear arsenal could be relatively smaller than the adversary.

· It can indirectly have a positive impact on non‑proliferation of nuclear weapons as a universal treaty on NFU could discourage countries to produce nuclear weapons.

· It helps, to some extent, in easing the tension prevailing in a hostile environment.

· It amounts to a total dependence on conventional forces to respond to a conventional attack.

· Second Strike capability can be eliminated by the enemy carrying out a First Strike.

· Verification of the enemy preparing to use nuclear weapons first is difficult.

· It does not take into account the possibility of cheating when there is an environment of mistrust and suspicion between historical adversaries. When assessing the actions of an enemy, the intentions and capabilities have also to be taken into account. As intentions can change overnight.

· Will it be possible to know as to who used it first if the retaliation is a Launch on Warning (LOW) policy by the enemy?

· The reaction of the international community and how harsh will be the punitive actions against a first use country is not known.

· There are some who believe in the maxim “better red than dead.” They may not pick up the courage to press the nuclear button even if faced with total defeat.

· It takes away the flexibility of a graduated nuclear response, as a reciprocal strike would generally depend on the first strike of the enemy, which could be at the highest level to begin with.

· NFU does not give one nuclear strategic stability as that is achieved only when there is no incentive to carryout a nuclear strike.

NFU must have the support of the majority of the population. It will be a hard sell in Pakistan if the core issue of Kashmir is not settled to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

Limited NFU Policy. Not using nuclear weapons against non nuclear states. All recognised and non-recognised, but defacto, nuclear powers agree on this policy.

· Creates an element of uncertainty in the minds of the potential aggressor, which plays and essential role in deterring the enemy.

· Helps in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, as the enemy would be very reluctant to start even a conventional war against a country, which is prepared to commit Hara Kiri.

· Gives an opportunity to an aggressor to carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike against a nuclear armed adversary.

· Limited nuclear war theory can be implemented. Advocates of a limited war concept believe that a nation can survive a limited nuclear strike and such a policy does not mean the arrival of a dooms day or what they refer to as “extinction scenario” nor the end of a country’s very existence. What is, however, not taken into account is the fact that wars have their own momentum and cannot be stopped by merely pushing a few buttons.

· Can make do with an affordable or reduced defence budget, as a race in conventional weapons does not become indispensable for national security.

· Increases the danger of an unintentional or accidental nuclear exchange. Places the nation at a great risk of severe international punitive action.

Limited First Use Policy. It is restricted to a pre‑emptive attack on enemy’s nuclear arsenals.

· Will unleash a nuclear exchange, which will be disastrous for both countries.

· Will need accurate and up to date information about enemy’s nuclear stockpiles, their vulnerability and location of their delivery means, which will not be possible specially in the India‑ Pakistan context.

· No War Pact, Non Aggression Pact, Treaty of Peace and Friendship should be sincerely examined.

· Pakistan should not be the first to use nuclear weapons but it should not rule out that possibility altogether.

· Both countries must institutionalise the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction measures.

NFU is a goal, which all nuclear powers must pursue but they must also apply their minds with all sincerity towards settling their disputes peacefully. Unless that is achieved nations will find ways and means of violating or amending treaties and agreements in order to promote their national interests.

It is not the NFU policy, therefore, which will prevent a war but the peaceful solution of existing disputes. An overall military balance is necessary to avoid a major conflict.

Avoidance of war should remain the chief purpose of the India‑Pakistan dialogue on nuclear risk reduction measures but it should not be the only purpose. Genuine peace and efforts to achieve that should also be part of our discussions. Hylke Tromp, editor of UNESCO Year Book, rightfully maintains that peace can only be assured when no body sees war as realistic alternative to peace.

Nuclear deterrence is not a simple affair, it has many un‑predictable variables. Weapons, opponent’s mind set, risk and stakes, cost and benefit ratio. It is not a law of physics, which will always be true whatever the circumstances.

Border geography has much to do with the decision to use nuclear weapons first or follow a NFU policy. A country, which has considerable depth and can absorb a major conventional attack without the enemy reaching its vital areas can follow NFU policy. On the contrary, a country which has little depth and its main communication network, population centres and industrial might lies very close to the international frontier cannot afford to wait before using its nuclear weapon. More so if the border geography is devoid of natural obstacles and favours the movement of large military offensive formations.

Now that India and Pakistan are both de‑facto nuclear powers, they must realize the deadly arena into which they have entered. A small slip, a misjudgement of events, a hasty decision based on erroneous information or a display of temper could result in a situation where there would be no winners, only losers. Not only would cities vanish altogether and millions die in matters of seconds, but generations to come would suffer the horrible consequences of a nuclear holocaust. But NFU of nuclear weapons alone will not prevent a war, which could lead to a nuclear exchange between the two nations. Each country has its own compulsions and adopts policies, which help in fulfilling its vital security interests. It will not be prudent for Pakistan to commit itself to a NFU policy in the present hostile environment.

Nuclear Ambiguity Versus Transparency

Since the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan of May 1998, much concern has been expressed by many countries regarding the possibility of introducing an effective restraint regime in South Asia. The continuing conflict over the Kashmir dispute was viewed as the possible source that could cause a nuclear exchange. Kashmir itself was cynically often referred as a possible nuclear flashpoint. Unable to convince India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, many western countries began to describe South Asia as an unstable region reflecting the likelihood of first nuclear war. May be this was an important element in the long process of pressurization or part of the efforts designed to scare the Indians and the Pakistanis of the impending doomsday. But to insinuate that both the Indians and the Pakistanis are somewhat irresponsible people is hard to swallow. The end of Kargil clashes along with the recent Agra Summit, clearly depict the maturity level of the decision makers in both the countries.

However, it is indeed difficult to deny the risks involved in acquiring and maintaining the nuclear weapons. Efforts to minimize the risk involved certainly deserve our devoted attention. Many aspects need to be subjected to academic investigations in order to suggest ways and means to reduce the accompanying risks. Among the important aspects that need to be examined, two are, namely the nuclear ambiguity as well as the transparency, which are discussed here. This paper initially discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the nuclear ambiguity in the cold war era as well as in the post cold war period. The second part of the paper concentrates on the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear transparency in both cold war and post cold war situations. Finally it attempts to suggest what could be the best panacea in minimizing the risks involved.

India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974. From then onward until the second set of nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan maintained ambiguous nuclear posture. Neither of them was prepared to give up the nuclear option primarily because of its own set of reasons. Various support arguments were advanced by the respective countries to justify this policy. One common factor that had been repeatedly highlighted was the security requirements. No one ever admits that he wants the other nation to be insecure, yet he always favours the creation of that kind of equilibrium or dis-equilibrium, which extends the maximum security to him. It is all very fine to have fifty-fifty balance but if our side is little bit stronger than the other side, we can all be secure. The current American insistence to scrap the ABM treaty of 1972 and to go ahead with NMD disregarding the massive global opposition including some of its friends adequately reflects this thinking.

Various programmes, often contradictory in nature ranging from absolute deterrence to total disarmament, from complete isolation to world government, from a non alignment to a variety of military alliances, from economic self sufficiency to free trade are put forward in order to be more secure than the others. Security, essentially a negative term, implies the absence of real or perceived threats, whether stemming from external or internal sources or incumbent economic weaknesses, disparities and inequalities, to certain coveted values. To cope with perceived threats nations tend to seek power hoping that power would generate the desired level of security. One nation’s ability to attain an adequate level of security may in turn breed insecurity for the other. Insecurity often compels nations to acquire more power in order to tilt the scale in their favour. Such a process often results in the regional arms race but also invariably introduces extra regional actors into the regional conflict. While the outsiders enter an area in pursuit of their own strategic interests, they could well find themselves drawn into regional conflicts and may find themselves playing the role of an outsider equalizer.

The strategy of ambiguity is either adopted deliberately or reached by the compulsions generated by the then operative circumstantial forces. Prior to the explosions of 1998 both South Asian states seem to have opted for what is often referred as deliberately contrived strategy of ambiguity. India adopted designed ambiguity after the Chinese nuclear tests of 1964 and Pakistan opted for such a strategy in mid 80s.1 For years both India and Pakistan played this game of conceal and reveal with considerable mastery and maintained a strategy of contrived ambiguity.

Deliberately contrived strategy of ambiguity also implies not to release sensitive information or if it had to be released, it should be released in congruence with a well-planned design. For example despite the existence of regular communication channel of DGMOs, the supply of information to the adversary has been frequently faulty and distorted. Perhaps that is why an impression was generated that honouring the spirit of an agreement is not as sacrosanct in South Asia as it is in other parts of the world.2

Perhaps the greatest advantage of opting for contrived ambiguity was the retention of the nuclear option and the ability to keep the adversary uncertain. The ambiguity strategy proved to be very useful in terms of buying time and pacifying both hawks and doves simultaneously within their respective societies. While difference of opinion exists about what influenced the two countries to abandon the ambiguity strategy and go for nuclear explosion in 1998, the adopted strategy enabled both countries to acquire the necessary time in order to master the techniques.

The question that needs to be examined now is whether or not the strategy of ambiguity could or would pay somewhat similar kind or level of dividends as it paid prior to nuclear explosions of 1998. Just as the ambiguity strategy paid dividends prior to the nuclearisation, the strategy could also pay dividends after having acquired nuclear weapons both in terms of buying time and risk reduction and restraint measures.

With the advent of NMD and considerably weakened American resolve on CTBT, time could enable the South Asians to continue perfecting their systems with regard to missiles and improving nuclear arsenal. To keep ambiguity approach rather effective, it might be necessary to keep the warheads away from the missiles sites or silos. If the silos or missile sites are maintained considerably away from the adversary’s border, it would lengthen the flight time. Thus it could inject ambiguity regarding the operational aspects of the nuclear weapons. It might even create doubts in the minds of observers whether or not a clear operational policy exists. While such a policy could make the verification problem rather acute, it would also keep the adversary uncertain.

Another aspect of ambiguity approach is to keep on stressing the defensive aspect of the Nuclear weapons. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee remarked in Lok Sabha on March 15, 1999 that the nuclear weapons are not offensive weapons but are defensive weapons that help in preserving peace.3 To make it credible the deployment of these weapons must also generate the impression that their deployment is of defensive nature. Besides such an approach must also be accompanied by a regularly issued moratoria of limited duration.

Transparency

Etymologically transparency means capable of being seen through. In the context of conflict situation, transparency implies that the chances of misinterpretation, whether deliberate or inadvertent, are reduced to a minimum. The concept of transparency is probably the most attractive from the notion of open diplomacy. Just as open diplomacy managed to remove many apprehensions on the part of the adversaries, the concept of transparency can help lessen the temptations of exaggerated estimates and misinterpretations. Transparency implies systematic release of information covering almost all aspects of the target area. If the focus is on nuclear weapons, then all aspects relating to nuclear and missile developments, deployment, commitments, policies and approaches need to be open and transparent. By making such information public and promoting accessibility to requisite information, transparency measures tend to reduce uncertainties.

Transparency is perhaps the most effective restraint on arms and technology transfer. Under full transparency, both the suppliers and the recipient would have to negotiate in full view of all sides. Transparency also allows nation to accurately assess country’s real security needs and consequently arms development or procurements could be scrutinized in the light of a country’s real security needs. A realistic assessment of security requirements that follow from transparency would not only save resources but also facilitate justifying any threatening production or procurement before the world community.

The choice of which transparency measures to adopt depends on the objectives involved. If the objective is to educate and increase public awareness, all one needs to do is to establish regular channels of information. These channels could be set up at both national and regional levels. If the objective is to strengthen the existing CBMs, the approach has to focus on the visible dividends that have already been paid by these CBMs and highlight the advantages attained over the years.

When the focal point is the dangerous nuclear weapons and accompanying delivery systems, then perhaps the most important need would be to secure a declaration from the involved countries to accurately announce their nuclear arsenal including the warheads and fissile material.4 In addition, they need to convey to the adversary all new additions to the existing arsenal at some agreed time. The agreement on non attack of each other’s nuclear installations between India and Pakistan which was signed in December 1988 and ratified in 1991 along with a stipulation of exchanging updated list on the 1^st January every year is reflective of the basic logic of transparency.5 Declarations could be not only very useful CBMs but would also minimize the room for misinterpretations. All sensitive areas like the development of nuclear weapons, various types and quantities of missiles, test launches and even exercises need to be mentioned in the declaration.

To make risk reduction measures more transparent and more effective, declaration and commitments covering areas like No First Use (both nuclear and conventional weapons), banning production of ballistic missiles of certain range and payload, banning the sea and land deployments of the missiles, separating warheads from the missiles, constructing the missile silos at least 500km away from the borders etc. could be useful. If the intentions are sincere and the requirements are primarily security related, then something can be worked either through bilateral or triangular negotiations but if the acquisition of nuclear arsenal is the product of a desire to play the role of a great power and quest for prestige, then it would be difficult to restrain the efforts of a determined country.

To further enforce the declaration, it might be useful to publish an annual report clearly reflecting the details regarding quantities of the fissile material, nuclear weapons stockpile including warheads deployed or in storage/delivery vehicles. While such a report could facilitate the work of the intelligence agencies, it can go a long way in removing doubts.

Perhaps the most important aspect of transparency is the idea of inspection. An inspection could not only confirm the accuracy of the declaration but may also detect and highlight the undeclared or hidden stockpiles. However, to undertake inspection the involved parties have to agree to allow both routine and periodic challenge or anytime inspection.

Transparency would build confidence and help considerably in reducing the risks even if the parties involved do not allow inspection. Increasing transparency should be a continuous process. From initial exchange of information, efforts should be directed towards attaining comprehensive transparency.

Ambiguity Vs. Transparency

Given the expressed divergent nuclear policy pursuits of India and Pakistan, it is not an easy task to identify, which among the preferred options, ambiguity or transparency, would be adopted. The Indian nuclear doctrine envisages a comprehensive nuclear capability implying the need for the development of all types of known delivery vehicles. In addition, the recent military exercise Poorna Vijay clearly indicated that India is formally training the troops how to undertake tactical measures in a nuclear conflict. While India seems to have opted for deterrence based on tactical nuclear war fighting, the Pakistanis appear to content with what is commonly referred as the ‘minimum deterrence’ capability.

At best it seems, at least in the foreseeable future, that nuclear deterrence strategies in South Asia would be product of mixture of ambiguity and transparency. However, both countries are acutely conscious of the proximity of the targets and extremely limited time available for the missiles to hit the target. Not only India-Pakistan share a border of almost 3000km but they have many assets that are physically located close to their border. It is also a well-known fact that both countries have a very limited response time available to them. Therefore, both have repeatedly expressed desire to exercise restraint and to introduce risk reduction measures.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was signed during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore visit in February 1999 clearly reflected a desire to work towards the risk reduction measures. The MOU categorically stipulated the initiation of consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, the advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, undertaking measures to reduce the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both the sides.6 Despite the persistence of hostile relationship between the two countries, both have informed the other before conducting their missile tests.

Under the existing circumstances, a perceptive analysts stressed that restraint could only apply either at a stage when the nuclear weapons are mated with delivery system or at the envisioned deployment of nuclear armed missiles.7 Taking cognisance of nuclear tests of May 1998, perhaps the most realistic stage is where restraint could be extremely useful is to preventing the dreaded mating of the weapons with the delivery system.

Equally important stage is the storage. Deployment would require the movement of major component of the missiles from the stores to a place where the weapon system is fully assembled. Disassemble components if stored would not generate apprehensions. Storing both the weapons and the delivery systems close to adversary’s territories could be interpreted as offensive deployment. Perhaps that is why the storage of 30 Prithvi missiles at Jallunder was viewed by the Pakistanis as virtually deployed against Pakistan.

Out of range deployment of fully loaded missile could also strengthen confidence. If the target country gets the impression that the missiles deployed by the adversary are beyond the dangerous range, then it would convey a different message. But if the missiles deployed are within the dangerous range, then chances for apprehensive interpretation or misinterpretation are considerably increased.

Generally speaking, transparency can strengthen stability provided certain measures aimed towards greater openness are undertaken. Among these measures, in addition to the above mentioned desired developments, increased symmetry of forces or capabilities, increased warning times, reduced likelihood of misinterpretation of intent and minimized vulnerabilities for either side are indeed important.8 Asymmetries in capabilities (both conventional and nuclear), limited waning time, ambiguous declarations with wide margin for misinterpretation of intents, and existence of wide range of vulnerabilities to important assets could cause instabilities and increase dangers of dreaded eventuality.

Conclusion

Compared to ambiguity, transparency approach seems far more practicable and useful under the existing circumstances. While there seems to be not much doubt that prior to nuclearisation of South Asia, the concept of ambiguity considerably helped the two nations to continue advancing on the forbidden path. It bought sufficient time to enable both to acquire the nuclear weapon status. It also paid dividends in terms of keeping various factions within one’s own society happy. But under the changed circumstance and with the acquisition of dreaded nuclear weapon and the necessary missiles, the concept of transparency seems more attractive than the ambiguity.

Securing Nuclear Stability

in South Asia

Mazhar Hussain Shah*

Since then, two, mutually contradictory, developments took place: one, efforts for improving relations and second, conflicts that obviated them. In former case, Lahore and Agra Summits are prominent; while in latter case numerous incidents are worth mentioning; but Kargil Conflict (1999) and early 2002 stand off overshadow others. It shows a wide communication gap that outsiders try to fill through their diplomatic efforts either to defuse the tension or to facilitate direct dialogue over contentious issues. The existence of this gap of trust results in recurrent crises that pose danger to the peace and stability of the region. Crisis between India and Pakistan, however, tends to testify the apprehensions of ‘nuclear pessimists,’2 who depict appalling scenarios in the context of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to ‘nuclear optimists’3, who sufficiently repose their confidence in the functioning of nuclear deterrence in South Asia.

Crisis instability has emerged as a major problem for South Asia, combined with undesirability on both the sides of seeking solution and resolution of disputes through diplomatic instruments, raise the possibility of use of force to test each other’s limits. On some occasions, both states have exhibited marvellous restraint, but recurrent crises give rise to the possibility of either intended or undesirable use of nuclear weapons. Such an eventuality will be mutually destructive. In this perspective number of potential nuclear dangers have been identified that confront the region. Counter measures to these possible perils have been suggested to ameliorate the apprehensions, with a view, that these will benefit both parties. Win-win strategy, in fact, should be the objective of both states to advance the cause of peace and stability; otherwise any future crisis is likely to spin out of control leading to irrecoverable destruction.

This paper will focus on the question that South Asian nuclear security framework must, in essence, address the fundamental security questions of both states. How can we decipher this problem rests on the objective analysis of the factors that provide the decision-makers rationale to develop and deploy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems? The framework will focus on relative security needs of both states; and taking realistic assessments of either side, will prescribe how both states should develop nuclear-safe-co-existence, under the belief of mutually reinforced trust building measures that gives largely the impression of genuine understanding of futility of conflict with each other. After the identification of contextual dissimilarity and needs of nuclear peaceful co-existence, more than a few measures will seem adequate for their gradual and methodical implementation. The guidelines will not envision the solution of the predicament in a short time, but, rather will seek to suggest such measures to develop a cooling off period, and help initiate the orientation to seek solution of the problems through negotiation and mutual consultation.

The South Asian security setting faces mutually contradicting dilemma that arise out of divergent threats, both India and Pakistan claim that they face. Pakistan’s threat perception is Indo-centric and it has developed its defence infrastructure accordingly. Whereas India faces threats from multiple sources and accordingly it has been developing its defence and security infrastructure to meet the threats to its survival. Since states perceive threats in broader and extended view, and by implication introduction of misperception and exaggerated claims of threat perception cannot be ruled out. Unfounded threats are also projected to justify the expansion of defence infrastructure. Peter Lavoy, a nuclear proliferation expert, argued that, “by nuclear myth I mean a causal and/or normative belief linking a state’s nuclear policy with its quest for security, prosperity, prestige, influence, or related national goals. The underlying assumption is that these causal relationships can be believed but not known; hence the term is myth.”4 It further stimulates the hostility. Divergence in threat perception and responses, to them, reinforced by some inherent ambitions for more power, however, beget the underlying security dilemma of South Asia.

One reason neither India nor Pakistan will give up such assets [nuclear] is the fundamental lack of symmetry between the two countries. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is that country’s key deterrent against India. It plays the same role, as did the western nuclear forces during the Cold War: it deters a potential adversary with a heavy superiority in the conventional forces. India’s development of nuclear weapons, by contrast, was not focused solely on Pakistan. Rather, India was more concerned about its rivalry with China, its own desire to be seen as China’s equal in Asia, and its aspirations to become a great power on the world stage.5

Since partition of sub-continent, Pakistan’s threat acuity remains India-centred,6 as no other state figured in its security calculations. That is why Pakistani “nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India.”7 Apart from many issues related to partition, Kashmir gained such primacy in both states that it soured their relations to the point of no return. Both have fought three major wars and experienced four8 near-war crises. In the aftermath of nuclearisation of South Asia, Kashmir has acquired glare of publicity as a nuclear flashpoint,9 attending the urgent global attention to help facilitate a direct dialogue between two archrivals. Since the advent of Kashmir freedom movement, both states have witnessed the swinging of relations from brief calm period to protracted hostile interaction, characterised by military exercises, acquisition of conventional arms, cross LoC shelling, hectic diplomatic flurry to neutralise other’s growing edge on various international issues, issuance of threats of grave destruction, nuclear and missile testing, castigating media campaigns, building up forces on borders, threatening of impending attack from India especially to importune favours from Pakistan, are some of the key indicators of deepened Indian mistrust towards Pakistan.

The separation of East Pakistan at the hands of India in 1971 and subsequent Indian nuclear explosion in 197410 drove home in Pakistan the realisation, right or wrong, that nuclear weapon will equalise overwhelming Indian conventional superiority. The policy and decision makers in Pakistan consensually concluded that without nuclear weapons, India could and would mount another offensive to reduce Pakistan as its underdog. Moreover, they feared that neither would India negotiate on Kashmir without overwhelming nuclear power, nor would international law provide any mechanism that forces a relatively powerful state to settle the dispute astutely. Besides Kashmir question, nuclear installations/assets of Pakistan provided security against India, but in chorus, it also induced an element of insecurity, as Indian defence planners reflected, more than once, of pre-empting and decapitating Pakistan’s nuclear capability.11 Though they could not materialise their plans, yet they immensely influenced Pakistani decision makers, who in turn, started relying heavily on nuclear first strike against India. However, the early 2002 stand off between India and Pakistan again endorsed Pakistan’s optimism about the role of nuclear weapons against India, as it averted a possible war.12 The level and scope of Pakistan’s defensive and offensive capabilities well illustrate that Pakistan does not look beyond India. Both states at various times, despite their unalleviated rivalry, undertook some bilateral agreements to smoothen their relations, demonstrate that they are not devoid of rationality either.13

The continued development and advancement of Indian military and defence build up is in response to mix of threats and ambitions. At least six considerations figure to answer Indian framework of threat perception.

Firstly, the great power status looms large behind all initiatives that India undertakes at various levels and in various dimensions: foreign policy, defence policy, and economic policy. The Indian policy and decision makers, academics and various informed circles supplicate that India carries inherent credentials of a big power and therefore must be treated accordingly: its geo-strategic situation and importance, population, size, rich culture and traditions, emerging role in science and technology, critical role in international politics, and developing military infrastructure, all point to the ultimate direction of realization of Great Power status.14 The quest for de jure recognition as nuclear weapon state15 and campaign for UNSC seat are consistent with this objective.

Secondly, India followed sustained policy of overwhelming the region in order to make it an exclusive zone for India, as its near abroad. Its relationship with all its small neighbours bear testimony to the fact that it has not reconciled with their status as sovereign states. Its occupation of Sikkam, dismemberment of Pakistan, intervention in Sri Lanka and uninterrupted influence in Nepal, expressly verify its bullying attitude. Moreover, the Indira Doctrine in early 1980s[16] and the Gujral Doctrine[17] in 1997 reflect inherent Indian aspiration to dominate the region and dictate regional political order according to its own values and interests;[18] and Indian intervention in almost all of its neighbouring states affirm the deep interest of India to order regional relationship and all kinds of interactions according to its own interests. Indian policy and decision makers and strategic interest group argue that South Asia is ‘arbitrary construct’ by the outsiders with a view to confining Indian role only in South Asian region.[19] Paradoxically, the Indians view that its role is not confined only to South Asia.[20]

Thirdly, China since 1962 has acquired key position in Indian threat perception calculus providing required stuff for India to project its apprehensions of Chinese nuclear weapons to rationalise its own acquisition of nuclear capability.[21] ‘China-justification’ for the development of its nuclear programme is dubious, because India had started its nuclear programme[22] even before the Chinese revolution in 1949, and as little efforts needed to shift the focus of nuclear programme form peaceful use to military purpose exposes the contradictory claims of the Indian policy makers.

Fourthly, Pakistan has always factored prominently in Indian threat perception framework, especially during and after late 1980s when India came across credible information about Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear capability. Pakistan attained nuclear-capable missile capability after nuclearisation in 1998 and instantaneously gained capability to hit important targets deep inside India. Pakistan almost came at par with India and it amplified Indian sense of losing superiority over Pakistan.

Fifthly, Pakistan’s expanded relations with China set alarm bells ringing in India and as a result, India has projected this bilateral relationship as ‘strategic convergence’against India, where Pakistan is playing proxy of China to counter it in the region.[23] Some unverified and dubious reports provide India some substance to reproach Pakistan for indulging in illicit nuclear and missile trade, and China alike, for its irresponsible behaviour as member of NPT[24] The perceived collusion between Pakistan and China has accelerated its military cooperation with Russia, Israel, and US especially.[25]

Finally, the tri-angular interaction complicate regional peace configuration. India insists on the inclusion of China in the regional arms control and disarmament measures, and also in those measures which seem prudent to maintain regional restraint in the context of development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. Given the complexity involved in such kind of development where China commits itself to regional overtures without attending to its international concerns arising mainly from the US, Indian insistence on the conclusion of such measures is unlikely to bear fruit. Thus, imbalance of threat and consequent quest for corresponding defence and offence infrastructure, unless is corrected, the evolution and development of realisation and implementation of co-operative and peaceful co-existence is a distant possibility.

South Asia presents multiple nuclear dangers in the context of India-Pakistan antagonistic relationship, after both have tested their nuclear devices, and are believed to be developing them in quick-deployment mode. The international community, repeatedly, seeks assurances from Pakistan and India either to roll back their nuclear programmes or desist from fabricating nuclear warheads in assembled form, tipped on nuclear capable missiles.[26]

In this scenario several nuclear dangers merit immediate redress. The first is ‘deliberate use’of nuclear weapons, which can assume two forms: firstly, both Pakistan and India can invoke nuclear weapons as preventive use. Three occasions testify this danger. The Brass Tacks exercise of 1986-87, the 1990 Kashmir crisis, and early 2002 stand off between India and Pakistan, sufficiently, illustrate that if either side had over-stepped its limits then the possibility of invocation of nuclear weapons was at hands. Such an eventuality would be product of misperceived, misconceived, and over-projected conventional superiority of India vis-a-vis Pakistan. Misperceived self-assertion of superiority over Pakistan has helped develop in India the thinking that it can wage limited war with Pakistan. This would be exceedingly perilous happening, pregnant with eventual use of nuclear weapons, as Pakistan has affirmed it many times over.[27] Secondly, the possibility of ‘pre-emptive/decapitating’ nuclear strike by India has haunted Pakistan, which developed use it or lose it nuclear dilemma in Pakistan. Though the chances of pre-emptive strike by India have worn thin, because Pakistan, it is believed, has developed enough nuclear weapons that India can neither fully detect nor destroy them. At least on three occasions India reportedly had planned or seriously considered to launch decapitating strike against Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities: firstly, in early 1980s the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not permit it;[28] secondly, in 1986-87 Brass Tacks exercise, when Pakistan timely communicated India of consequences;[29] and thirdly, in 1998, on the morning of 28 May when Pakistan warned Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad to abstain from misadventure.[30]

Second nuclear danger in South Asia is unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Peter D. Fever contends that nuclear weapons states meet head-on always/never dilemma: always means that nuclear weapons should be so fabricated and deployed that when they are applied, they yield intended result; simultaneously they are never used without orders of competent or designated authority.[31] Thus, always be used when required and never be used unauthorised, are two key issues, which to a large extent neutralise each other in the absence of required elaborate advanced technology and prior experience of undertaking this problematic exercise.[32]

Third nuclear danger is considered to be the use of nuclear weapons out of misperception and miscalculation of actual situation. It implies that actual threat may not exist, but both sides can perceive that threat exists under unusual circumstances. It can result in extra-ordinary alerts of all forces that can result also in accidents within each state. The absence of credible early warning system, uninterrupted flow of credible information, precise and exact analysis and conclusions on the basis of which polices and operational plans are devised, accentuate the problem of misperception, and may ignite crisis situation on both sides. If an atypical activity on or around sensitive installations is spotted, it may send wrong signals to other side, thus triggering rapid preparedness and corresponding pressures on whole team involved in nuclear preparation and decision-making.

Fourth nuclear danger emanates from the development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and their potential operationalisation. In fact, TNWs are meant to fill the gap between conventional weapons and strategic nuclear weapons, which imply that conventional war will not instantly shift to use of strategic nuclear weapons. It is a step forward to conventionalise the unconventional weapons. During early 2002 stand off between India and Pakistan, it is reported[33] and believed that both states moved their TNWs to launching sites. The reports seem dubious and inconsistent with Pakistan’s nuclear use doctrine,[34] as it has declared nuclear weapons, as the weapons of defence and last resort[35] However, the test yields of India[36] and Pakistan[37] illustrate that both states have the ability to manufacture low yield battlefield nuclear weapons. If we carefully analyse Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, it embraces the possibility of use of tactical nuclear weapons, raising the apparition of possible nuclear war in South Asia.

Fifth identified nuclear danger arises from prospective deployment of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) shield by India. Indian efforts in this direction are underway to acquire various components from Russia, Israel and America.[38] Although, operationalisation of TMD will take considerable time combined with doubts about its efficacy vis-a-via contiguous Pakistan, yet its strategic upshots on Pakistan will result in more nuclear build up to secure and stabilise nuclear deterrence.[39] Mutual invulnerability would embolden India to launch aggression against Pakistan, under the illusion of Limited War.[40]

Sixth nuclear danger that concerns the most to the Western security analysts in post 9/11 setting is possible theft by terrorists or access to nuclear weapons by extremist elements[41] in the ruling elite. In Pakistan, political and military rules alternate that can create a problem in transition of nuclear command authority.[42] Time magazine reported that the Indian case presents a new development in command of nuclear weapons, in the context of Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee who is prone to diseases. He is also experiencing problem of forgetfulness. In addition to numerous diseases, he has exhibited transformation from peace loving to war mongering in response to domestic and party politics. It poses many questions about the actual command of nuclear weapons, especially when he feels unable to function in a normal way.[43] Time magazine states: “Although India’s military is compellingly professional, non-political and obedient to civilian control, the country’s nukes are controlled by government scientists, and deployment orders come from the Prime Minister’s office.”[44] These apprehensions are inconclusive, as both states, so far, have not shown any flabbiness in handling of their respective nuclear arsenals. Moreover, Rumsefeld, the US Secretary of Defense, affirmed, “I think the countries that have nuclear weapons have a healthy respect for their power and the lethality of those weapons and the dangers that they pose to the world and take appropriate steps to assure that they are managed and handled in a way that reflects the dangers that weapons pose.”[45] Even then concerns about possible access of unauthorized and undesirable elements cannot be ruled out definitely.

The above-discussed apprehensions about possible use/misuse of nuclear weapons present a depressing picture of South Asia, in the perspective of implacable hostile relationship between India and Pakistan. Since mid-1980s their relations have witnessed swings between brief tranquillity to protracted tension. By implication, decision and policy makers come under constant pressures that may lead to inadvertent use of force, eventually plummeting into nuclear holocaust. Notwithstanding their historical rivalry, both states agreed on some pressing measures[46] to ensure smooth functioning, which also illustrate that they are not blinded by hostility and are fully alive to realities. Same spirit can be carried further in to some new overtures to guarantee that both states do not succumb to undesirable emotions. Following are some of the measures that need immediate attention in this regard.

Immediate threat in the South Asia is the prospects of conventional war, most probably on Kashmir dispute. It is considered to be nuclear flashpoint where the chances of nuclear exchange are quite ripe given the fact that both states are ready to wage war to settle the issue. The recent Indian troop build-up along international borders, in the wake of the attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, once again demonstrated the possibility of war. The way both sides responded to each other’s actions, left no doubt about their intention of eventual use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan repeatedly offered ‘no war pact’ to India to eliminate the possibility of use of force to settle disputes, but each time Pakistan encountered refusal.[47] Perveiz Iqbal Cheema, a renowned Pakistani security expert advocated, “Nothing could be more welcome CBM than a “No War Pact” offered by a military ruler. The conclusion of no war pact will surely prevent the future wars and contribute enormously towards the reduction of tensions.”[48] There is no denying the fact that Pakistan faces overwhelming threat after the dismemberment of East Pakistan at Indian hands in 1971 and subsequent so called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. In addition, asymmetrical conventional balance against India whetted its requirements to acquire ‘strategic equaliser’ to balance Indian threat in future. The No War Pact signifies the undesirability of war and presumes the resolution of the disputes peacefully through negotiation and mutual consultation, solving Pakistan’s dilemma of either no war or full-fledged war.

The declaration of ‘no war’ must accompany the provisions related to the framework of solving the lingering disputes, and such a missing link would only complicate rather than serve the purpose of peace. The Indians have tendered ‘no-first-use’ proposal of nuclear weapons, in fact, oversimplifying the problem. Because the festering Kashmir dispute is the core issue without which Pakistan will never agree to talk to India on any viable peace initiative. The No War Pact must be accompanied by the declaration that they will not deploy their combat and offensive forces with in the range of 300 kilometres of their borders,[49] with a view to giving enough time to prepare for the impending attack. This would help relieve additional pressure on Pakistan under asymmetrical unconventional balance giving it opportunity to help relax its policy of First Use.

The large size integrated military exercises further generate suspicions that other side will abstain from further aggression, though military exercises are needed to test combat worthiness of its forces and familiarise new concepts and weapons system in the forces. The exercises must not assume the form of potential aggression against the other side. The ‘Brass Tacks’ exercise, undoubtedly, embedded the notion to cut Pakistan’s communication lines from its contracted waist near Rahim Yar Khan in the South. The timely preparations by Pakistan and the communication of its intent to go for nuclear war defused the tension. The recent military exercises Poorna Vijay in May 2001, designed to introduce the concepts related to nuclear warfare in the military, only miles away from Pakistan’s borders in Rajastan desert, sent wrong signals, despite the fact that India served prior notification.

Notification, however, stimulate precautionary measures in the other side. The result remains spiral of mistrust leading to further preparations for the potential war. Therefore, it is of overriding importance that India and Pakistan should both suspend their intended integrated military exercises and undertake relatively smaller level exercises. Moreover, the area of their conduct must either not be near the border or if so the direction of their movement must be inward, symbolising a trust building factor expecting that other side will also reciprocate.

The introduction of ballistic missiles in the region have induced urgency because they can be launched on warning and can not be reversed as opposed to nuclear capable jets, which can be either intercepted or reversed. Both states are locked in a race for attaining new versions of ballistic missiles that could cover strategic targets of the adversary. India is developing its missile battery according to threat it has projected and perceived, while Pakistan has developed short and medium range missiles, only to target India. In this connection the development of short-range nuclear capable ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and their deployment especially send shockwaves to other side. These missiles are deployed near borders and take 2-5 minutes to reach their targets. However difference in preparations to launch liquid and solid fuel missiles may give some breathing space for decision-making. The preparation time for the launch of SRBMs differs in solid-fuel and liquid-fuel missiles. The liquid-fuel missiles consume around six hours as compared to solid fuel, which take lesser time.[50] Less decision making time may result in inadvertent launch. In order to fortify this possibility, storage sites of all missiles, short to long range, be built at least over 300 km from the borders.

Both states should also abandon flight tests during crisis and conflict, for they provoke same or higher response from the adversary, leading to possible aggression. For example India tested two different missiles on January 26, 2002[51] and April 28, 2002,[52] and when situation gradually worsened Pakistan launched a series of nuclear capable short and medium range missiles to apprise the Indians that it has technical skill[53] and political will to defend itself.[54] Alex Wagner, defence analyst, writes, “even though the tests came at a time of high tension, the South Asian rival appear to have abandoned their previous tit-for-tat missile-testing cycle. India has yet to respond to this (May series of tests of Pakistan) with missile flight tests of its own, and Pakistan did not conduct tests in response to India’s January 2001 and January 2002 missile tests.”[55] This is an encouraging development. The existing battery of SRBMs should be converted to liquid fuel, so that it could give more time to make decision. Both states should also gradually reach a conclusion that more reliance on missiles would create instability, likely to be uncontrolled. Therefore, they should be convinced to freeze further tests immediately as a step forward towards concerted and cooperative peace.

Simultaneous Talks on Kashmir

No War Pact, without at least initiating talks on Kashmir dispute, will fail to achieve desired results and its ultimate solution on mutually agreed terms and conditions would definitely have positive impact on India-Pakistan relations. Both states have mutually opposing views on Kashmir solution: India has floating standpoint as negotiation-to-integral-part, while Pakistan denied integral part view and demanded its solution according to the resolutions of the UN or on the basis that draw mutual agreement. Indians bicker that solution of Kashmir will evolve over time and instant results would not be forthcoming. They further supplicate that the over a period of time the relationship will improve in areas like economic cooperation, diplomatic interaction, and consultation on various international issues, trade in energy sector, and deepened cultural ties will result in positive understanding of each other. Conversely, Pakistan upholds that all these measures will flow from the solution of Kashmir dispute. Both standpoints are at the opposing ends of the spectrum and convergence of these on a midway point will gear it in the positive direction.

The Lahore and Agra Summits provide admirable starting points despite the fact they failed to devise and develop a continued interaction based on realisation of the dividends of undisrupted communication. Pakistan proposed several times to invite the mediation of third party in order to have quick fixation, but India ruled out such possibility and invoked Simla Agreement, necessitating bilateralism.

The Solution of Minor but Consequential Issues

Sometimes, when larger and more complex issues constitute a bigger hurdle, then smaller issues must be picked up and negotiated. It will work as a feeler of the temperatures and desirability of solution of bigger issues on both sides. Moreover, talks will help draw the potential limit of quid pro quo each party can give to other. The issues of dams, observer groups, Siachin, Sir Creek, Indus water treaty and communication between DGMOs, etc may provide a basis on which both sides can build each other’s confidence and trust in order to apply the same spirit in other complex areas like Kashmir, military build up, missile race, and precarious nuclear issues subsequently.

Whether economic relations must precede or follow the peaceful environment still remains the inconclusive debate in South Asia but dominant thinking that trade with the enemy will backfire in time of severe crisis, and investors and business class will tend to avoid such a situation in which their potential gains may be outweighed by potential losses, obviate peaceful economic relations. If political will prevails here, it will help build confidence on both sides by committing that their peace time business overtures will remain unaffected by regime change or in crisis situation. Construction of gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan will be a confidence building measure and subsequent Pakistani vigilance of pipeline will establish firm basis of political will. Moreover, selling surplus electricity to India will generate adequate confidence.

The adversarial temperature instantly hikes when on each side, various responsible officials issue threatening statements, especially related to limited war and its subsequent transformation into nuclear war. Such statements are enunciated, may be deliberately after careful calculations of their impacts on other side, tend to have even more profound repercussions than envisaged. Though ministerial responsibility dictates them to articulate and favour their government policies but some areas of policy must clearly be exclusive, especially defense matters, and relations with the adversary. Therefore, it is urgently needed that both sides officially abandon the recurrent use of the word ‘war’ or ‘limited war’ against each other. The Indians have, without fail, issued such threats that involved their intention of waging a limited border war modeled on Kargil conflict. Politicians, statesmen, scientists and other official circles must realize the damage that their words cause to their relations with the adversary. It usually so happens that politicians, while catering to their respective constituencies, express their aspirations of edge over their rival that amount to explicit threats to other side. Additionally, they express threats coupled with so-called aspirations of domination over other, receive urgent attention. As a result, mistrust increases without much tangible effort. Consistent with this notion, one example of such senseless statements is as under, when Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee said:

The time has come for a decisive battle and we will have a sure victory in this battle whether Pakistan or the world takes note of it or not, a new chapter of victory and triumph will be written in the history books soon. The enemy has thrown us a challenge by waging a proxy war. We accept it and pledge to give it a crushing defeat.[56]

International factor has become an undeniably defining feature of crisis management process in South Asia. Though India time and again refused the third party intervention but several times accepted it as well. International interventions have already worked between India and Pakistan to stabilise or defuse tension as the track record shows. The acceptance of this reality will draw healthy response and will help evolve a common vocabulary to negotiate and bargain on mutually conflicting issues that both states face. The arbitration of Rann of Kuch, de-escalation of 1990Kashmir Crisis, Kargil Crisis and recent diplomatic flurry in South Asia that drew We stern officials to calm border tension between both states,[57] all point to direction that international pressure and timely involvement will bear fruit in convincing both parties to exercise maximum restraint and take calculated steps in the best interest of their people.

The third party mediation will provide a bridgehead to establish normal communication and to move towards settlement, substituting war as a mechanism of settling disputes. This ability of international community to pressure, however, arises from the interests of the powerful states of the world in maintaining status quo in the region. The US has shown keen interest in Indo-Pak face off as Richard Armitage, US Assistant Secretary of State, stated: “I think the spectrum of nuclear war which seems to have worsened in recent age has been so frightening and so warning that the question of Kashmir is much higher on international agenda than it had been before.”[58] Stephen P. Cohen, a renowned South Asia expert, also argued “the United States is uniquely placed now, as never in history, to do something.”[59]

Verification presumes the existence of higher level of cordial relations, whereby both actors enjoy mutual trust and least friction. What if the actors are mutually hostile and tend to escalate tensions to crises? How will they conjure up efforts to ensure safe co-existence? The first impression one gets that the state that experiences upper hand may give some initial concessions so that apprehensive side may raise some trust and confidence to reciprocate in similar fashion. Such a mechanism presupposes political will on both sides backed by popular assertion of the need to initiate and develop peaceful environment conducive to prosperous future.

Verification of the agreed measures can be an excellent starting point. Policies such as No First Use and ‘de-targeting’ are difficult to verify. In some cases the starting point for cooperation and introduction of CBMs may be unilateral rather than bilateral. For example choosing to share flight test information, even unilaterally, could prevent misinterpretation. Similarly, storing solid-fuelled missiles, or separating warheads from missiles decrease the likelihood of accidents or unauthorized use, whether or not both sides agree to formalise the idea in the shape of an agreement. Therefore, it will help immensely to share information unilaterally to generate trust and confidence. As Kent L. Biringer stated:

Verification might come in the form of manned inspection of production, storage, test, or deployment locations. It might also include ever more capable sensor systems designed to detect and characterize activities of interest. Assessing activity levels, monitoring movement, and providing unique identifiers for equipment are examples of applicable technology tools. Ensuring reliability and integrity of data collected would be essential to establishing confidence in the monitoring systems. There is no single correct way to implement these concepts. Rather, monitoring options would be based on the complex set of criteria that are both technical and political in nature. It is possible to start slowly and increase the extent and sophistication of monitoring as experience dictates.[60]

After India-Pakistan sign No-War Pact and agree to deploy their offensive forces sufficiently away that could not favour the launch of offensive strike against other, the next element is the capability of Indian air force that can launch surprise offensive against Pakistani nuclear assets. As opposed to missiles, which are mobilized usually in crisis time arousing element of urgency in the opponent, the fighter jets undertake usual flight exercise without inducing urgent response form the other side, may deceive and result in a surprise offensive. Such an eventuality dictates caution and raises a desirability to share ‘library movements,’ of fighter jets, to detect unusual movements. Therefore both sides should intimate each other if there is an unusual air force exercises, through high quality hot lines established between the two head of states or governments and military commanders. Sharing such information would furnish a caution of the realization on both sides of potential trust and confidence that can be promoted through mutual efforts. However, if both agree on above-mentioned steps, these will help achieve following goals as well.

Kent L. Biringer, a security analyst, opined, “generally, deployed weapon systems are those that have reached a necessary level of technical maturity and reliability, have been issued to operational military units, are in place in appropriate positions and can thereof, be available on short notice to be used by those units in support of military objectives.”[61] Non-weaponsied nuclear deterrence implies non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the form of readiness. Conversely it means that nuclear warheads and their delivery means are kept and stored separately so that their mating may take considerable time for rational decision-making.

It also means that these components will be stored and controlled by different authorities who will not be able to assemble the weapons and mate them with their delivery means without orders of central competent authorities. The storage sites must also be away from the area of their operational use. This is to eliminate the possibility of instant mating and their mobilization to operational sites[62].

The threat posed by missile and nuclear weapon systems could be reduced if more extensive administrative and ‘technical use control’ measures are implemented. The use controls are those measures, hardware items or software that limit unauthorised access or use of weapons systems. Use control systems could only be effective in preventing not only external threats to unauthorized use also even to control use by those who are authorized. For this purpose, Permissive Action Link (PALs) can be used, because it requires two authorized individuals to work together to gain access to system or enter commands for its use. Since weapon controls are highly classified, therefore, states would unilaterally undertake these measures to ensure deterrence stability.[63] In addition blast proof doors at nuclear facilities, high-tech devices applied to warheads to prevent outsiders from detonating nuclear weapon, improved electronic locks, better software and communication reliability to ensure nuclear weapons are foolproof, are essentials for both states. The US is the only source that can facilitate it as it has already provided to Russia and former states of the USSR since mid-1990s. But laws related to nuclear cooperation outside NPT ambit restrict it.[64] Some amendments in custodial safeguards are needed to ensure nuclear safety in South Asia. Moreover, P-5 can provide them technical information about the safety and security of the weapons provided they somehow compromise some of the principles of NPT, which forbid such cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

The western community has raised voices of concern over possible export of nuclear weapons related components to other states or non-state actors. This concern however sometime becomes valid, because several incidents of seizures of fissionable material have taken place in India.[65] However, there are suspicions about their possible flight from either civilian nuclear power plants or military-dedicated nuclear reactors.[66]

The Indian case also becomes the primary focus, given the ongoing insurgencies in 18 areas of India. Though, the insurgents have not either deliberately or due to inability turned their attention on nuclear installation, yet possible attack and mishap cannot be ruled out over extended period of time. Pakistan has so far faced no export or theft incident and its nuclear assets are strictly under control of its military, which is highly professional and disciplined. Similarly, as earlier noted, the chances of access of fundamentalist elements to nuclear weapons in Pakistan are as good as in any other nuclear weapons state. This is an admitted fact that has also been endorsed by the US.[67]

Kapil Kak describes that “Command and Control would comprise doctrine, training, organizations, chain of succession, secure communication, command posts, and electronically protected computer systems.”[68]According to Scott D. Sagan, a nuclear security expert, “command and control systems are developed by the government to ensure that weapons are used when and only when state leaders decide they should be used.^”[69] Nuclear doctrines, therefore, clearly enunciate the purpose for which they have been developed. In addition, the doctrines are meant to clarify the nuclear break point, so that other side may not cross it unknowingly.

The South Asian nuclear history is still in the making and both states are trying to formulate their nuclear doctrines with precision so that no side could miscalculate the interest of other side. India issued its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 for the purpose of public debate, with a view to adjusting public opinion for its final formulation. However, such a debate will bear no fruit in a state where standard education level is quite low as compared to industrialised nuclear weapon states and the people have never been educated about the fallouts of nuclear warfare. The final shape of Indian Nuclear Doctrine, in all analysis, would be dictated by its ‘Strategic Enclave,’ which is bent upon formulating offensive nuclear posture. Moreover, the draft doctrine contains many ambiguous elements, if classified could remove many apprehensions and doubts of other concerned states. On the other hand, Pakistan has yet to announce its nuclear doctrine in precise form beyond mere a short statement of ‘use of nuclear weapons if our survival is threatened.’

Both states, so far have regarded that nuclear doctrine confines only to proclamation and explanation of nuclear command and control structures. Conversely, nuclear doctrine requires precise enunciation of core interests, the nuclear weapons are supposed to guard. Both India and Pakistan have endorsed their affirmation to Minimum deterrence, which actually serves as their nuclear doctrines. Minimum nuclear deterrence, however, is vague but dynamic concept. It has more political than operational connotations[70] and manifests a commitment to minimum level of nuclear armoury sufficient to inflict unbearable reprisal. Both sides refuse any disclosure of intended numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery means that constitute their minimum level required for nuclear deterrence. The Indians opine that it is relative and is unbounded by time and space, reinforced by continuous technological changes and security dynamism. Both the variables lend Indians excuse to produce, as they can, enough fissile material before the conclusion of FMCT to fabricate higher three digits of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also exhibited its adherence to minimum nuclear deterrence, which is equally ambiguous. Until nuclear doctrines are not enunciated in transparent terms, their sole purpose will seem to ignite conflict than to deter it.

Consistent with this notion and as a step forward, both India and Pakistan have unveiled their command and control systems, which at least remove some pressing doubts about the possible misuse of nuclear weapons by unauthorized elements. Pakistan, in fact, has issued more elaborate nuclear command and control structure[71] than India.[72]

The unilateral measures also involve personnel reliability tests of those who have been designated as the custodians of the nuclear weapons to guarantee the security of the weapons and their unintended use. In order to avoid any negligence, responsible, efficient, rational, dutiful, trustworthy, and stable nuclear personnel should handle nuclear weapons.[73]

The US and Soviet nuclear history shows many blunders committed by its personnel, designated to ensure secure custody of weapons, due to drug addiction, mental instability, the role of double agents, and emotional distress.[74] Keeping in view these dangerous episodes Department of Defense of USA, initiated a ‘Personnel Reliability Programme’ for screening out such individuals. Its objectives were “to ensure that nuclear weapons are not subject to loss, theft, sabotage, unauthorized use, unauthorized destruction, or accidental damage…only those personnel who have demonstrated doubtless loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness, and discretion of the highest order shall be employed in nuclear weapons positions.”[75] The personnel reliability programme is composed of certain screening procedure, which includes background screening through agencies, security clearance, and medical evaluation, reviewing personal files and personnel interviews, periodically.

India and Pakistan can learn lessons from the Cold War experience and can institute similar personnel reliability programmes. The psychological tests are important part of recruitment in the armed forces, which ensure that only rational and mentally fit persons get commissioned. Therefore, custodial problems can be best tackled through disciplined control structure of the units that are in charge of the custody of nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, the control of nuclear weapons is in the hands of its military, which has a distinct system of screening of its personnel. Similarly, the control of nuclear weapons in India is in the hands of the army and has similar procedure of control and custody of nuclear weapons. Similar procedure is pursued in Indian armed forces; and this procedure is equally helpful in assuaging the apprehensions about robustness of caretakers.

The gradual development of common language or common knowledge of nuclear peace between India and Pakistan would constitute a defining feature. It also means nuclear learning process, as how to live with the bomb through a more responsible behaviour. This would certainly help them understand creative developments toward avoidance of nuclear war or crisis that could escalate to war. Common vocabulary/language has been defined by David Holloway, a security analyst, as “something [which] is common language in a group of actors if each one knows it, each one knows that the other knows it, each one knows that each one knows that the others know it and so ad infinitum.”[76]

Pakistan and India could greatly benefit from the USA-USSR experience of common knowledge. David Holloway, a security analyst, says “I merely want to suggest that in drawing lessons from the USA-Soviet experience, the learning process – the accumulation of common knowledge – should not be forgotten…where much of discussion of deterrence focuses on weapons and force structures alone.”[77]

Apart from these steps both states need to initiate unilateral steps to educate people that would promote in the long run, an environment of peaceful co-existence. The unending media campaigns by both the sides further aggravate the hostility, as they focus on non-issues and enliven them as hot issues. They also help create scapegoats, depict threatening images, and create myths, which attract sizeable audience because people do not know about nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use.[78] The unbridled use of media campaign has its immediate impact on audience on both sides, that promote extreme nationalism and obstruct those initiatives that may have positive effects. It must be halted immediately.

Conclusion

South Asian nuclear history is still in the making, and India and Pakistan are learning how to develop and devise their nuclear policies in best-fitted manner that could dissuade the potential aggression by either side. Besides, competition to deter the rival results in conflict spiral that draws both to depend on more weapons and sophisticated nuclear and missile technology. There is no denying the fact that South Asia is stuck up in a classic dilemma: whether arms cause conflict or vice versa? But this region at least has proven that if arms do not breed conflict, yet they inflame it immensely. The contextual dissimilarity of threat perception that exists, between India and Pakistan, needs immediate redress so that miscalculation could not impede the genuine hope and efforts for peace. The mutual interest dictates mutual efforts and to know whether both sides aspire truly for the establishment of peacefully regulated behaviour leaves one presumptuous that the relatively powerful state can initiate that process, believing that in case of suspicion of possible negative response it would be able to retrieve the concessions it has made earlier. In this context India can take the lead to secure diplomatic triumph over Pakistan: it can formalise No War Pact with Pakistan; can deploy (with immediate reciprocity by Pakistan) its offensive conventional forces sufficiently away from its borders; undertake not to hold integrated large size exercises and that too near Pakistani borders. It can serve prior notification of even tactical flight exercises of air force, because it has assumed an air of exigency for its increasing potential and chances as well of first surprise attack against Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

The agreement of no attack against nuclear installations of each other is significant but it could not remove Pakistan’s doubts about Indian intentions. The wee hour red-alert of May 28, 1998 has a telling impact on the worth of their agreements with each other. It is pertinent that India somehow engages Pakistan in positive way and appraises it of its military preparedness in such a way that must not be confused with preparation for attack. But all these measures presume that both states are experiencing very cordial relations whereby they share their individual defence exercises and lessons for the benefits of the other.

The recurrent stand offs, after a brief period of tension-free-relations, necessitate the initiation of sustained communication involving high level official exchange, subsequently instituted in formal shape, stipulating regular meetings. It will found gradually the basis of cooperative security structure; which will function without impacts of regime change in either side. Number of meetings can be increased in tensions. In these meetings officials can pave the way for higher-level meetings between their head of states or governments.

Both states are required to concede some of the genuine demands of the each other. Pakistan should also include, in composite dialogue, some other soft and minor issues that may enhance future cooperation to help India reciprocate by conceding Kashmir as a dispute. Besides, international community is also convinced that peace and stability in the region cannot be achieved without prior solution of Kashmir issue. For example, several times since recent military stand off, India has threatened Pakistan, of its intention to withdraw from Indus Water Treaty, which regulates India-Pakistan water sharing formula. During tensions, the first causality appears to be the past agreements and those, which are under negotiation for future conclusions. The immense distrust, therefore, impedes the efforts that include bilateral measures of mutual cooperation. Therefore, trust between both ardent adversaries is must for any peaceful and sustained interaction that cannot be realised overnight.

* Dr. Abdul Majid is former Chairman of Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).

* Lieutenant General (Retired) Kamal Matinuddin is a former Ambassador and former Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. Presently he is a member of the Board of Governors of Institute of Strategic Studies and member of the Board of Studies of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

[1] Kamal Matinuddin, Nuclearisation of South Asia, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 177.

[2] Section VIII, Atomic Armaments, Military Evaluation of US/USSR Atomic

Capabilities.

[3] Washington Post, March 13, 2002.

[4] Chicago Tribune, March 12, 2002.

[5] Guardian, March 11, 2002.

[6] Yuri Fedrov, “Russia’s Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Pugwash Meeting 279, London, November 15-17, 2002. Also see Nezavisnaya Gazeta, January 14, 2002.

[7] John Lewis Wilson and Xue Litai, China a Strategic Sea Power, 1994, p. 233. Also see China’s Nuclear Doctrine, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monetary Institute of International Relations, 2002.

[8] Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 134.

[9] The News, February 6, 1995.

[10] Andre Baufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 23.

[11] Indo-Pakistan Military Balance, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, May 2002, p. 33.

[12]Statement at Lok Sabha, May 27, 1998.

* Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is President Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

1 For a detailed analysis see Stephen Philip Cohen, “Policy Implications,” Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospect of Arms Control (Westview Press, 1991), pp. 338-358.

2 See Michael Krepon, “A Time of Trouble, A Time of Need,” in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, (ed.), Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconstruction in South Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 1-10.

3 T. Jayaraman, “Deterrence and other myths,” Frontline, Vol.16, May 8-21, 1999.

4 Steve Fetter, “A Comprehensive Transparency Regime for Warheads and Fissile Material,” <http:www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb99/sfjf99.htm>

5 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “CBMs and South Asia,” in Dipankar Banerjee, (ed.) Confidence Building Measures in South Asia (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 29-40.

6 For details of the texts of all three documents: The Lahore Declaration, The Joint Statement and the Memorandum of Understanding, see The News, July 15, 2001.

7 Maleeha Lodhi, “Dealing with South Asia’s Nuclear and Security Issues.”

<http://www.defencejournal.com/jan99/nuc-sec-issues.htm>

8 Kent L. Biringer, “ Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, (ed.) The Stability and Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Stimson Center Report No. 38, June 2001, pp. 59-82.

* Mazhar Hussain Shah is a researcher at Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

1 Satements from both states, India and Pakistan, after the nuclear tests highlighted the built-in security threats to their national survival, in the context of growing hostile geo-political environment, where states are poised to defend themselves by their own means, unlike cold war alliances. The tests also exhibited their well-publicised national sovereignty, as Pakistan especially had conducted the nuclear tests under intense international pressures after it calculated the implications that would have followed the tests. Despite the fact that potential adverse repercussions on Pakistan’s economy had been calculated before hand, Pakistan chose to test its nuclear devices. The Indians also asserted their inherent right to ensure their security through whatever means deemed fit. See the, “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy”, paper laid on the table, XII Lok Sabha Debates, Session II (Budget) acquired from
<http://fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980527-india-pm.htm>

2 The nuclear pessimists advance various possible factors that are likely to
accentuate the danger of the use, transfer and the theft of nuclear weapons by the terrorists and extremists, who might use them against their targets. Therefore, they plead against the development and deployment of these weapons in South Asia, in order to avoid the risks of their inadvertent use between India and Pakistan. Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia”, a paper presented in a workshop on Nuclear Risks Reduction in South Asia, held at IPRI on March 21-22, 2001. Ref. No. 4-5.

3 Ibid. Ref. No. 2-3.

4 Peter R. Lavoy, “South Asian Military Programs: Charactristics, Trends, Implications,” paper presented in a conference on The Impact on South Asian Nuclear Crisis on the Nonproliferation Regime, held by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1998.

5 Antol Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No.1, (January/February 2002), pp. 22-42.

6 See Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Imperative of National Security: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Asian Defence Journal, (November1983), pp. 53-55.

7 Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, a concise report of a visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta, January 2002.

8 These crises have been briefly discussed in the later part of the paper.

9 Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and US Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, No.1, (January/February 1996), pp. 48-49.

10 Brahma Challeny, “India’s Nuclear Planning, Force Posture, Doctrine and Arms-control Posture,” paper presented at the Forum of UNSECO International School of Science for Peace on Nuclear Disarmament, Safe Disposal of Nuclear Materials, or New Weapons Developments? Where are the National Laboratories Going? Villa, Cernobbio-Como, Italy, July 2-4, 1998.

11 W.P.S. Sidhu, “Indian Nuclear Doctrine Development,” a paper presented to the International Conference on Peace and Security in South Asia After the Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan, organized by the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad on December 2-3, 1998.

12 Mushahid Hussain, “South Asia’s stability hinges on nuclear rules of the game,” Khaleej Times, June 24, 2002. Also see Dr. Abdul Kalam’s statement regarding efficacy of nuclear deterrence in South Asia in the context of 2001-2002 Crisis. The Hindu, June 19, 2002.

13 Since the independence, both states concluded various agreements to advance

smooth co-existence, for instance Karachi CFL Agreement 1950, Indus Water Treaty 1960, Runn of Kutch Arbitration, Tashkant Agreement 1966, Simla Agreement 1972 and No-attack on Nuclear Facilities Agreement of 1991, Railway and Bus Service, Lahore Declaration 1999, and though failed but significant Agra Summit of 2001, are some of the examples that testify the mutual realisation of the need of peaceful co-existence on both sides, despite the fact that both states waged three wars against each other.

14 Ibid. See Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affair, Vol.77,

No.5, (September-October1998), pp. 41-52. Also see Rodney Jones, Summit Ganguly, “Correspondence: Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” International Security, Vol.24, No.4, (Spring 2000), p. 182.

15 Manish, “India’s Policy Towards CTBT and FMCT,” in Amitabh Mattoo, (ed.),

India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran and Beyond, (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd. 1999), p. 328. Also see T.T. Populose, “Indian Nuclear Option and National Security,” in P.R. Chari et. al, Nuclear Proliferation in India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Manhor Publishers, 1996), p. 32.

[16] Subrata K. Mitra, “From Divergence to Convergence and Back Again: Some Structural Constraints on Stability on India-Pakistan Relations,” IPRI Journal, Vol.I, No.1, (Summer/ 2001), pp. 64-65

[17] Ibid.

[18] Indira Ghandi Doctrine and Gujral Doctrine were issued in early 1980s and 1997 respectively. Both, in one way or the other, were directed to ensure regional hegemony, whereby no regional state could challenge Indian authority of ordering the regional political configuration.

[19] Dilip Lahiri, “Formalising Restraint: The Case of South Asia,” paper presented at the Ninth International Arms Control Conference on Entering the New Milinnium: Dilemmas in Arms Control held at Albuquerque, New Mexico in April 1999 organised by Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

[20] Ibid.

[21] The Indo-China rivalry gave West an opportunity to warm relations with India and India gained favours from West. West deliberately overlooked Indian nuclear programme, having in sight long-term benefits from India, relative to China.

[22] Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in the Indian Sub-continent (Hong Kong: MacMillan Academic & Professional Ltd., 1991), p. 31.

[23] Ibid. pp. 192-193. See also Raja Menon, “Nuclear Stability in an Adversarial Scenario,” paper presented to workshop conducted by DPG-IPRI in Islamabad, on January 13-15, 2001.

[24] A majority of Indian security analysts hold Sino-Pak relations as collusion against India whereby Pakistan plays the role of proxy of China to counter Indian hegemony in the region. In this regard they refer alleged military-cum-nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan as the immediate threat to their security. Jasjit Singh, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), pp. 10-11. See also Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 39-78. Conversely, Rodney Jones contended otherwise, see Rodney Jones, Summit Ganguly, “Correspondence: Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” International Security, Vol.24, No.4, (Spring 2000), p. 182.

[25] Ahmed Ijaz Malik, “US-India Convergence of Interests: Challenges for

Pakistan,” National Development and National Security, Vol.X, No.38 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 73-74.

[26] The US, Japan, Britain and UN along with other states demand from both sides not to deploy nuclear tipped missiles and sign CTBT – a restraint that would halt their visible capability of testing weapons of advanced generation. See “Britain urges India, Pakistan to show restraint”, The News, May 21, 2002. Humayun Akhtar, “India has no good options: WP,” The Nation, June 21, 2002.

[27] Since Brasstacks Exercises in 1986-87, Pakistan stated First-Use of nuclear

weapons in its official nuclear policy in order to ward off the possibility of conventional war with India, which heavily favours India as it enjoys asymmetrical conventional balance in its favour. For this purpose, Pakistan has time and again tried to convey the message unambiguously that it will retaliate with unacceptable consequences if its national survival is in danger. Usually crisis situation tempts and provokes similar statements from Pakistan.

[28] W. P. S. Sidhu, op. cit.

[29] Ibid. See also, Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” op. cit.

[30] The News, May 29, 1998.

[31] Peter D. Fever, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear States,” International Security, No.17, (Winter/ 1992-93), p. 163.

[32] Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control,” in Peter R. Levoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, (London: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 168-171.

[33] Nitina Gokhale, “Small is Scary,” Outlook, June 10, 2002. Also see, Mayed Ali, “Tactical N-Warheads moved along borders,” The News, May 28, 2002.

[34] Ejaz Haider, “Does Pakistan have tactical nuclear weapons?,” The Friday Times, acquired from <http://thefridaytimes.com/ejaz.htm>

[35] Major General Khalid Kidwai, Director General Strategic Plan Division (SPD), outlined the contours of Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine, disagreeing that use of tactical nuclear weapons fits into Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy. He enunciated that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons “if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” See Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, op. cit.

[36] Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 113-114.

[37] Akhtar Ali, Nuclear Politics & the Challenges of Governance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1999), p. 55.

[38] Maria Sultan, “Emerging NMD Technologies & India: Impact and Options for Pakistan,” Strategic Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 2, (Summer 2002), pp. 131-137.

[39] Ibid. pp. 138-145.

[40] Mazhar Hussain Shah, “Challenges to Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” Pakistan Observer, June 14, 2002.

[41] Seymour M. Hersh, “Watching the Warheads,” The New Yorker, October 29,

2001. Also see K. Santhanam & Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The Hindu, November 10, 2001.

[42] Todd Sechser, “Pakistan’s Coup Underscores Nuclear Dimension,” Defence News, November 15, 1999.

[43] Alex Perry, “Asleep at the Wheel?,” Time, June 17, 2002. pp. 14-16.

[44] Ibid.

[45] “Pakistani N-arms are in safe hands: Rumsfeld,” Dawn, November 6, 2001.

[46] See the Foot Note 13.

[47] “Pakistan offers No-War Pact to India,” The News, June 9, 2002.

[48] Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Dismissing the No War Pact,” The News, July 15, 2001.

[49] Salma Malik, “Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures In South Asia: A view from Islamabad,” paper presented in workshop on The Challenge of Confidence- Building in 21^st Century: Problems and Prospects for South Asia, held on February 23-25, 2001, Karachi.

[50] “South Asia’s Hair Trigger,” The New York Times, June 4, 2002.

[51] “R-Day march get 700-Km salute,” The Indian Express, January 26, 2002.

[52] “Pakistan concerned over Indian missile test,” The News, April 29, 2002.

[53] See the statement of Pakistani Information Minister appearing in the local press on May 24, 2002. Pakistan conducted its missile tests on three successive days from May 26, 2002.

[54] Alex Wagner, “Pakistan Tests Three Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles,” Arms Control Today, (June 2002).

[55] Ibid.

[56] “Be ready for decisive battle, PM tells jawans,” The Hindu, May 23, 2002.

[57] Kargil Crisis took place between India and Pakistan in May 1999 that provoked the possible danger of escalation along international borders. The timely intervention of international community, especially US, defused the tension. Pakistan and US issued a joint declaration on July 4, 1999, in Washington announcing the end of conflict. See the newspapers of July 5, 1999. In addition to this, early-2002 stand off between India and Pakistan in the wake of attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December and re-intensified due to Kaluchak (Jammu) incident on May 14, 2002 provoked a serious possibility of war between India and Pakistan. The international community unanimously agreed that such a war would eventually lead to nuclear conflict. Therefore, higher officials and diplomats of influential states timely intervened to extinguish the flames. US Assistant Secretary of State and Defence Secretary visited the region in the 1st and 2nd week of June 2002 and helped defuse tension.

[58] “Kashmir on top of International agenda: Armitage,” The News, June 12, 2002.

[59] Seth Mydans, “Toehold on a long trek to Heal India-Pakistan rift,” The New York Times, June 17, 2002.

[60] Kent L. Biringer, “Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia,” Stimson Centre Paper, p. 20. Acquired from:

<http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMBiringer.pdf>

[61] Kent L. Biringer, op cit., pp. 18-19. Also see “South Asia after the tests: Where Do We Go From Here?,” acquired from,

<http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/south_asia_after.3.html>

[62] Ibid.

[63] “Permissive Action Links”, visit the website:

<http://www.research.att.com/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html>

[64] Bryan Bender, “US Considers Helping Pakistan,” Boston Globe, September

20, 2001.

[65] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Critical Analysis,” IPRI Journal, Vol.II, No.1, (Winter 2002), pp. 84-93. Also see Dr. Shireen M. Mazari and Maria Sultan, “Nuclear Safety and Terrorism: A Case Study of India,” Islamabad Papers, No.19, (2001).

[66] Ibid. pp. 5-9.

[67] “Pakistan N-arms are in safe hands: Rumsfeld,” Dawn, November 6, 2001.

[68] Kapil Kak, “Command and Control of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 270.

[69] Scott D Sagan, “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott. D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, (USA: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 36. Also see, Ahmed Ijaz Malik, “Early Warning Systems: Relevance for India and Pakistan”, Defence Journal, (May 2002), pp. 67-68.

[70] Rajesh M. Basrur, “Nuclear Deterrence: An Indian View,” presented at Consultation on NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defence & Alternative Security Arrangements, organised by Project Ploughshares on September 28-30, 2000, in Ottawa, Canada.

[71] In Pakistan, the command and control of nuclear weapons rests with the Chief Executive. However, recently Pakistan has established command and control mechanism. In accordance with Pakistan's policy of nuclear restraint as reaffirmed by the Chief Executive on several occasions, and “with the objective of creating an institutionalised command and control mechanism, consistent with Pakistan's obligations as a nuclear power, the National Security Council approved the establishment of National Command Authority (NCA), visit: <http://www.acronym.org.uk> The NCA will be responsible for policy formulation, and will exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. It will comprise two committees, i.e. Employment Control Committee and Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division will act as its Secretariat. The apex Employment Control Committee will be chaired by the Head of the Government and include Minister of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Chairman), Minister of Defence, Minister for Interior, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Services Chiefs, Director General Strategic Plans Division (Secretary) and Technical Advisors/others as required by the Chairman. The Development Control Committee will also be chaired by the Head of the Government and include CJCSC (Deputy Chairman), Service Chiefs, Director General Strategic Plans Division and representatives of the scientific community. The Committee will control development of strategic assets. Strategic Plans Division, headed by a senior army officer has been established in the Joint Staff Headquarters under CJCSC. It will act as the secretariat for NCA and will perform the functions of planning and coordination in particular for establishing a reliable command, control, communication, computers, intelligence and information (C⁴I²) network for the NCA.

[72] The Draft Nuclear Doctrine mentions: “Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).” Regarding the survivability of the nuclear weapons, the doctrine mentions: “The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective C⁴I² systems shall be assured.” See the text: <http://www.ipcs.org/>

[73] Herbert L. Abrams, “Weapons in Jeopardy: Human Instability in the Nuclear Forces,” a paper presented at the Conference organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute in March 2001.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] David Holloway, “Nuclear History and the Nuclear Future,” a paper presented at the Conference organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, in March 2001.

[77] Ibid. Also see, Herbert L. Abrams, “Weapons in Jeopardy: Human Instability in the Nuclear Forces,” a paper presented at the Conference organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute in March 2001.

[78] “Who’s afraid of nuclear bombs? Not Pakistanis”, Sify News, June 4, 2002.