Zulfqar Khan* 

 

General Background

ince the start of the nuclear age, the spread of nuclear weapons to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) was termed 'horizontal proliferation'.  While the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the five de jure Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) was classified as 'vertical proliferation'.[1]  This awareness and the increasing threat to international peace and security had led to the establishment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968.  The Treaty came into force in 1970 for the initial period of 25 years.  It had three primary objectives: 

1.    Non-proliferation.  It intended to debar the NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons, and provision of safeguard regimes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

2.    Nuclear Disarmament.  The de jure NWS had promised to follow a nuclear disarmament policy under Article VI of the Treaty in a bid to realise the goal of general and complement disarmament.

3.    Nuclear cooperation for peaceful objectives. The NPT realised the significance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the NNWS.[2] 

The NPT had created two sets of states: five de jure NWS -- who had tested their nuclear weapons before the cut-off date of January 1, 1967; and the NNWS – who could not test their nuclear capabilities before the cut-off date.  After the lapse of twenty-five years period, the NPT member states had to decide -- “by a majority of the parties to the Treaty… whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.”[3]  Therefore, in 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference without a majority vote made the Treaty permanent.[4]  In addition, attached a resolution outlining the “principles and objectives” to assess the progress and expansion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.[5]  But, in 1998, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, both premised on the rationale of security, regional instability, and their nuclear aspirations, posed a new problem for the Treaty to tackle its primary objectives: non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.  The then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, in a letter addressed to then US President Clinton, had cited the threat of China to justify India’s nuclear tests of May 1998.[6]  Now, the NPT had to confront the challenge of legitimising or de-legitimising the overt nuclear weapons status of India and Pakistan.  On the other hand, the NWS continued to defy the Article VI that called for complete nuclear disarmament.  Moreover, since 9/11, the United States shifted its policy of non-proliferation - that was enshrined in the NPT, to counter-proliferation by conceiving the “pre-emptive attack as a new element in America’s strategic” planning.[7]

The Post-Cold War Period

It would be appropriate to comment on the threat of proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons technologies since the demise of the Cold War.[8]  The fact remains that in spite of the end of the Cold War, according to Robert McNamara and Helen Caldicott, both Russia and US still possessed “96 per cent of the global nuclear arsenal of 30,000 nuclear weapons.”[9]  In addition, in 2001, the US conceived a Nuclear Posture Review programme to develop the thermonuclear gravity weapons systems to penetrate and destroy underneath the earth nuclear bunkers and tunnel complexes.[10]  Besides, the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) was conceived in February 2003.  The NSCWMD outlines a new strategy for US homeland security, and a fundamental diversion from the traditional concept of deterrence with a view to combat the WMD threat.  The Bush Administration spelt-out that, its enemies were seeking the WMD, and that the NSCWMD would proactively bolster, interdiction-oriented approach to reduce the WMD threats.  Prima facie, the document plans to target the non-state actors and ‘rogue states’ like Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya.  However, it also did not rule out action against the other states as well.  This strategy is apparently premised on three-linked instruments: counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and WMD consequence management.[11]  The US policymakers, including its experts and the neo-conservative elements has defended this strategy.  It plans to pre-empt attack as a new element in America’s strategic planning to neutralise terrorist organisations’ designs, writes Daniel Moran of the US Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Defense.[12] 

In April 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference was convened, which in May indefinitely extended the Treaty without a vote.[13]  The most important article of the Treaty — Article VI related to cessation of the nuclear arms race “at an early date” with a view to effect general and complete nuclear disarmament, was not adequately settled.  The NPT’s clause envisaging nuclear disarmament has since generated a lot of controversy between the NWS and the NNWS.  However, in spite of controversy between the NWS and the NNWS over the rights and the obligations, the majority of the states have since signed and ratified the NPT, except by India, Israel, and Pakistan.  Moreover, in 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, and became declared NWS.  Both countries had cited the geostrategic and security reasons to rationalise their nuclear tests.  Pakistan had cited India as the threat to justify its nuclear tests in response to the Indian overt declaration of nuclear weapons capability.  On the other hand, earlier India had portrayed China as the threat to rationalise its testing.  A leading expert of the security affairs, John H. Herz, writes that the “feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels” the states to “compete for ever more power in order to find more security.”[14]  This is a fair description of states’ motivation to acquire nuclear potentials for security purposes.[15]

 

South Asia and the Nuclear Disarmament Issue

Though, Pakistan is not formally committed to the Treaty, but it has consistently reiterated its resolve not to transfer nuclear weapons-related technology to other countries. Pakistan’s record of accomplishment concerning the proliferation issue has been quite consistent and in line with its larger national strategic objectives.  Pakistan signed the PTBT (1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty), BWC (1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction), Enmod Convention (1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques), and the CWC (1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) in 1988, 1974, 1986, and 1997 respectively.  While, President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf as late as May 4, 2003, stated that South Asia could be bilaterally denuclearised by India and Pakistan, provided if the Kashmir dispute is resolved.  He further reiterated, “if there is no problem to our security, Pakistan and India can move to mutual reduction of forces and have a no-war pact.”  In response, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee addressing the Lok Sabha on May 8, 2003 rejected the Pakistani proposal of nuclear disarmament of South Asia.  He remarked that: “Pakistan’s nuclear programme is India-specific, but our own nuclear programme goes beyond that.  Our concern is about other nations as well”, which of course was a reference to the five de jure NWS.  On the other hand, India’s Defence Minister, George Fernandes, addressing the National Defence University of Beijing in April 22, 2003, also remarked that the international community on the basis of the NPT’s Article VI should tackle the nuclear disarmament issue.  He also urged the de jure NWS to announce a timeframe for a general and complete nuclear disarmament.  This is clearly a reiteration of India’s traditional stance on the NPT calling for the universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover, according to hindsight, New Delhi consistently endeavoured to develop and deploy a robust strategic force with a view to realise its strategic objectives.

Lately, the issue of proliferation has surfaced about the alleged nuclear weapons oriented programmes of North Korea, Libya, and Iran.  The nuclear controversy on the Korean Peninsula has led to withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT on January 10, 2003.  While the IAEA in its report of August 26, 2003, concerning Iran’s nuclear programme did not accuse any specific country of transferring nuclear-related materials and centrifuges to Tehran.  However, the Western mass media and US took it for granted that the country that was allegedly transferring nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, was only Pakistan.  This was obviously with intent to protect the actual sources of proliferation – the European countries, which also probably had sold materials and centrifuge technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and to other countries. 

Pakistan’s nuclear programme was principally influenced by security considerations. Pakistan had indigenously built its nuclear capability to neutralise its conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis India, and not to transfer nuclear technology to other states.  Hence, the proliferation of nuclear technologies, that too to the ‘axis of evil’ states like Iran and North Korea, is obviously not the policy objective of Pakistan.  Rather, it is against the national interests of Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is inherently security-centric with the perception of a dominant security threat emanating from India’s conventional and nuclear programmes.  Pakistan’s nuclear potential is fundamentally designed to erect a credible minimum deterrent against aggression and to safeguard the country’s independence and sovereignty; and, not to use nuclear weapons, or to threaten to employ them, against any NNWS.   

South Asia And Non-Proliferation

Since 1974, Pakistan has been consistently offering India different proposals to establish a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, if not to completely realise the goal of nuclear disarmament.  This vindicates Islamabad’s non-proliferation credentials. The delicate conventional balance between India and Pakistan received a serious setback in May 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test. John Herz writes, “If mutual suspicion and the security dilemma thus constitute the basic underlying condition in a system of separate, independent power units, one would assume that history must consist of one continual race for power and armaments, an unadulterated rush into unending wars, indeed, a chain of ‘preventive wars’.”[16]  This is probably true for the South Asian situation where “serious misperceptions…miscalculations” are quite high.[17]  Because, since 1974, different Pakistani governments had floated the idea of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ).  India not only opposed these proposals but also even refused to talk to Pakistan on the subject.  In addition to the NWFZ concept, Pakistan had also floated other proposals in various national and international platforms with a view to check the horizontal nuclear proliferation from India and Pakistan to the other NNWS.  Some of these proposals were:  

·         Setting up of a NWFZ, in 1974.  Pakistan repeated the NWFZ proposals to India in 1976, 1979, 1987, 1990, and May 4, 2003.

·         Pakistan asked India to jointly sign the NPT; and bilateral/joint agreements to full-scope safeguards or inspections, in November-December 1984, June 1985, and July 1987.  India rejected all these overtures and continued to call for a universal general and complete nuclear disarmament and non-discriminatory NPT. 

·         Renunciation of acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, in 1978.

·         Accession by both India and Pakistan to the NPT, in 1979.

·         Bilateral acceptance of full IAEA safeguards, in 1979.

·         A mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities, in 1979.

·         In 1981, Pakistan offered a No War Pact to India that was not accepted by New Delhi.

·         Bilateral signing of a treaty banning all types of nuclear tests, in 1987.[18]

·         Pakistan proposed to India to not manufacture and to explode nuclear weapons, in 1987 and 1991. India did not reply to Pakistan’s proposals.

·         Convening of a conference on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, which should be attended by Russia, USA, China, India and Pakistan, in June 1991.

·         An idea of South Asian Zero-Missile Zone was again suggested in 1993. 

Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Riaz Khokhar, while addressing the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on May 23, 2003, stated, “Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation was a result of its own conviction and manifest in its actions.” He further reiterated that Pakistan was stringently adhering to the BWC and CWC obligations, and was following the ideals of the NPT as well.  Khokhar further added that the country’s nuclear assets and technological expertise, including sensitive materials, equipment, technology and information, were under firm physical protection.  Moreover, Khokhar claimed that: “With a blanket prohibition against any exports whatsoever, our exports controls go even beyond the standards of supplier control regimes.”  In addition, the Foreign Secretary outlined Pakistan’s willingness to formalise the confidence-building measures, including the moratorium on nuclear testing by both the countries, which were envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lahore in February 1999. 

On April 28, 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of WMD to the non-state actors and terrorist groups.[19]  Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, during deliberations on the issue reiterated that, Historically, the proliferation of WMD had occurred when states sought to obtain them. But non-state actors had often been the instruments used for proliferation by states seeking WMD.  Recently, Pakistan had dismantled such a proliferation network involving its own nationals and others…. Pakistan, a nuclear weapon state, had established effective command and control of its assets, sites and materials.[20]   

The Pakistani envoy also rightly apprehended that the Resolution might overpower the national legislatures. “The concerns that arose from the resolution were with regard to the role of the Security Council, to the ability of the Security Council to legislate for other states, and the fear that the council wished to impose measures on states that they had not freely accepted.”  Munir Akram had further dilated that Pakistan would “not accept any demand for access, much less inspections, of our nuclear and strategic assets, materials and facilities.”[21]   

Pakistan’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy

It would not be out of context to mention here the cardinal principles of Pakistan's nuclear policy.  They are premised on the following rules:  

·         Deterrence against all forms of external aggression, which could otherwise jeopardise our national security interests.

·         Deterrence to be achieved through the development and maintenance of an effective combination of conventional and strategic forces at adequate levels in accordance with the country's resources.

·         Deter our adversaries from endeavouring a counter-force strategy against our strategic assets by effectively securing our strategic assets.

·         Bilateral stabilisation of strategic deterrence on the subcontinent.

·         Pakistan as a matter of policy would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any NNWS.

·         Pakistan would continue to refrain from entering into any arms race.

·         Pakistan would not transfer nuclear weapons or weapon-related material or technology to any other entities or states, which of course also include the Muslim states as well.

·         Pakistan would endeavour to realise the ideal of a strategic restraint regime in co-operation with India, and adopt other nuclear risk reduction measures in the region.

·         Pakistan would constantly support the international arms control and disarmament initiatives, if they were universal and non- discriminatory in character.  

Furthermore, the command and control of nuclear forces of Pakistan is vested in the President, and it functions through a robust National Command Authority (NCA).  The NCA is assisted in its functioning by the Strategic Plans Division as its Secretariat, and the other Strategic Commands within the Armed Forces to maintain a dynamic command and control system of its strategic forces.  Therefore, the Government of Pakistan has not been involved in any proliferation activity and legally forbids transfer of any sensitive material or technology to any other state. Following factors need to be viewed objectively: 

·         Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state; hence, it would not authorize proliferation in accordance with its national strategic interests.

·         The general perception in some media reports that Dr. AQ Khan had proliferated with the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan is absolutely false and fabricated. The instances of proliferation had taken place on the direct orders and under supervision of Dr. A. Q. Khan.[22] The proliferation had probably taken place from the late 1980s right until Dr. AQ Khan’s retirement from the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 2001.  As Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri, while interacting with the delegates participating in the security conference in Munich on 8 February 2004, stated that, “I know the names.  I don’t want to spill them…names given to us by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), by Iran.  There are lots of Europeans involved, but there seems to be a focus on Pakistan…. Yes our programme was covert.  Because it was covert there was a danger of this sort of thing.”[23]  It clearly indicates that the Western media had intentionally tried to implicate the state of Pakistan in nuclear proliferation scandal, which was beyond an iota of doubt was the individual act of few scientists working under Dr. AQ Khan, for personal gains.  Surely, the state of Pakistan had no “interests” or “motives…none whatsoever”, as reiterated by Kasuri, to gain from such scandals.[24]

·         The “debriefing” and investigation sessions of the scientists were comprehensive, and so far, no evidence has surfaced which could substantiate that any civilian, military personality, or government institution or entity was ever involved or even indirectly associated with the proliferation.[25]

·         The Government of Pakistan and the NCA, in accordance with the law of the land, had decided the cases of the scientists and administrators who were investigated in this connection.[26]
 

Recent Controversy about Nuclear Proliferation

Recently, the involvement of Dr. AQ Khan and his associates in the proliferation of nuclear technology to Iran, N. Korea, and Libya had surfaced.  For their individual acts, all the scientists were thoroughly investigated, punished, and put under detention for further investigations.[27]  On the other hand, it is on record that N. Korea, Russia, India, and other countries also had been providing scientists and nuclear technology to Iran.  In spite of stringent measures against the scientists, Pakistan is still being exclusively focused as a proliferator.  Secondly, it probably has an inherent design to deflect the attention away from the actual sources of proliferation.[28] Thirdly, to link Pakistan’s security-oriented nuclear programme with the religious alignment revolving around the so-called ‘Islamic Bomb’ theory of the 1970s, when Pakistan had started its nuclear weapons plan. Since the commencement of nuclear research in Pakistan, there has not been a single incident of proliferation of sensitive technology by the Government of Pakistan in spite of West’s clamour and portrayal of Pakistan’s nuclear programme with a religious bias.

The Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, during his visit to Islamabad on 29 August 2003, categorically stated that Iran’s nuclear programme was “totally indigenous and open to IAEA”.  He denied that Pakistan had ever established any nuclear collaboration with Iran.[29]  However, Dr. AQ Khan and his associates were involved in proliferation activities in contravention to Government of Pakistan’s non-proliferation policy.  For this, they were thoroughly investigated, and subsequently Dr. Khan was unceremoniously removed from even from a ceremonious official position on 31 January 2004.

Pakistan had been consistently under economic and technological sanctions and consequently suffered a lot since India’s nuclear test in 1974, and again after the tests of 1998. The following facts would further clarify Pakistan’s position on the proliferation issue: 

1.       Strategically, it is not in the interest of Pakistan to create a nuclear competitor in its neighbourhood — in addition to India; especially a country like Iran that has a budding strategic cooperation with India.

2.       Pakistan has no interest to create another Muslim country as a nuclear capable state in its neighbourhood.

3.       Since the 1980s, Pakistan did not enjoy good diplomatic relations with Iran due to a variety of factors, including the Afghan situation.  Therefore, existence of any nuclear cooperation was simply out of question. On the other hand, Iran had developed a wider ambit of cooperation with India and Russia, which have culminated into a trilateral strategic partnership. For that reason, transfer of sensitive technology or expertise to Iran was against the larger national interests of Pakistan. 

4.       Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations were also strained over the issues of trade route to the Central Asian States, sectarian incidents in Pakistan, and an expanding defence arrangement between India and Iran.  In such a scenario, it would have been strategically impossible for Pakistan to forge a nuclear collaboration with Iran, which was clearly pursuing a policy unfavourable to the larger interests of Islamabad.

5.       In addition to India, Russia is also assisting Iran in completing the Bushehr nuclear plant. Russia and India being strategic partners of Iran, rationally had a role in latter’s nuclear programme.

6.       More significantly, IAEA’s report released to the Board of Governors on 26 August 2003 has indicated that the centrifuge design, which Iran may have used, was of European origin.[30]  In the past, Iran had enjoyed friendly diplomatic ties with the EU (European Union) member states, and had access to their technology, which Tehran might have quite conveniently acquired.

7.       Pakistan’s enrichment technology design is not known to anyone, and it is merely a presumption that Islamabad had copied the URENCO (of Netherlands) design.  Besides, why would Pakistan transfer and reveal its equipment along with design, which will surely lead to compromising of its vital security interests, including nuclear programme. Therefore, transferring of contaminated centrifuges with a weapons-grade uranium to another country would obviously:-

 

a.        Disclose the degree of expertise acquired by Pakistan in this particular technology, which would certainly compromise its security and nuclear programme. 

b.       Pakistan has a much bigger nuclear competitor – India.  Logically Pakistan would prefer to utilise all the available resources to sustain its credible minimum deterrence vis-à-vis New Delhi instead of transferring technology to the ‘axis of evil’ states.

c.        Therefore, only countries with surplus supplies of fissile material would tend to transfer spares, or old centrifuges to non-nuclear weapon states like Iran and N. Korea.

d.      The URENCO design is an old one, which is also known to many other EU states. These EU countries would have quite conveniently transferred the centrifuges to Iran or N. Korea, while continuing the spate of propaganda against Pakistan.[31]
 

Different reports appearing in the international media are consistently alleging that Iran probably had acquired the design plans for its centrifuge in 1987 from Pakistan, when the latter had just crossed the nuclear Rubicon.  Logically there was no question of Pakistan supplying the uranium-enrichment technology to another country at that critical juncture when it was already under strict sanctions from the US. In addition, at that time, Pakistan had not yet acquired a sufficient expertise even to make its own nuclear programme fully functional.

Following statements of the Pakistani, North Korean, Iranian, and US leadership regarding the alleged transfer of nuclear technology, would further explain Pakistan’s non-proliferation policy:

 

·         President Pervez Musharraf on 18 October 2002 reiterated: “Pakistan has categorically stated time and again that Islamabad does not believe in proliferation of nuclear technology and it continues to firmly stand by this commitment.”

·         President Pervez Musharraf (12 January 2003) in an interview to a Dubai-based Arabic television channel MBC said: “I guarantee 400 percent that nothing has taken place between North Korea and Pakistan.  No transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea has taken place in the past and it will not happen in the future.”

·         Foreign Office spokesman, Aziz Ahmed Khan, in news briefing on 30 December 2002 said, “Pakistan’s record as far as safety of our nuclear programme and transfer of technology is concerned- is totally impeccable.”  He said this while answering a question about a news report in the Japanese media was alleging that Pakistan had transferred nuclear material in a coffin to N. Korea.

 

The North Korean and Pakistani leadership, including some eminent analysts have also made several statements concerning the alleged transfer of centrifuge technology by Pakistan to Pyongyang: -

 

·         The Embassy of North Korea, New Delhi, in a statement on 5 December 2002, denied any nuclear and ballistic weapons cooperation with Pakistan. The statement further said: “such reports could greatly effect friendly relations between North Korea and India on the so-called nuclear and missile cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea.”

·         Foreign Office spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan denying the alleged Pakistan-North Korean nuclear connection on 14 November 2002, said: “It is totally baseless, fictitious and tendentious.”

·         The Editor of the Jane’s Intelligence Digest, Eric Margolis, in a CNN programmes on 25 January 2003, said: “The reports regarding trading of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea are incredible and biased. I have followed this nuclear story for a long time. I find the story not credible. I have seen no evidence of Pakistan sharing its nuclear technology with North Korea.” Asked if it had ever happened in the past, he said, “No I do not believe it ever did.”

·         Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri in a statement on 20 January 2003 termed the alleged Pakistan’s nuclear technology transfer to North Korea as “utter rubbish and totally without foundation.”  Even Prime Minister Jamali said, “Pakistan at no cost would allow irresponsible scientists to run its nuclear programme.”[32]

 

Following statements in connection with Pakistan’s alleged transfer of nuclear-related technology and materials in contravention to the non-proliferation principles, were issued by the US and the UK officials as well:

 

·         On 26 November 2002, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said that he had “no new information to suggest that Pakistan was still helping Pyongyang build it’s nuclear programme.”  Powell also reiterated that he has been “assured by President Musharraf on more than one occasion that there were no contacts between the two countries.”

·         US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, after meeting President Pervez Musharraf on 16 December 2002, said: “Pakistan is not helping North Korea in its nuclear programme.”

·         On 13 November 2002, a senior US official in a statement to the press said, “The US administration had no conclusive proof of Pakistan’s involvement with North Korea.” He further stated, “North Korea could have acquired its expertise and material from other sources and left open the possibility that the culprit might be Pakistani individuals or entities rather than the Government itself.”

·         On 7 April 2004, the UK State Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, informed the House of Lords that, “There is no proof that President Pervez Musharraf allowed those things to happen.  He says that he was ignorant of what was going on.  Dr. AQ Khan has also said the government did not know what was going on.”[33]

·         On 30 March 2004, US Undersecretary of State, John Bolton, in a statement before the Congressional hearing stated that President Musharraf and other government officials were not “complicit in or approved of (Dr. Khan’s) proliferation activities.”[34]

·         On 28 March 2004, US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that, “I do not believe that there’s any evidence or any suggestion that President Musharraf was involved” in the proliferation activities.[35]

 

International Dimension of Proliferation

Iran was under intense pressure from the IAEA’s 35-nation Governing Board, which on 12 September 2003 issued a deadline for Tehran to clarify its position by 31 October 2003.[36]  The IAEA had asked Iran to declare that it was not secretly developing nuclear weapons programme in violation of the NPT, to which it is one of the signatories. Interestingly, IAEA had adopted this resolution without a vote, which is an “unusual” procedure in the IAEA - the agency’s spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming, also confessed in a statement on 12 September 2003. Earlier, Iran had expressed its willingness to sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT, which it signed in December 2003 that would permit the IAEA to carry out unannounced intrusive inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. 

India had close nuclear cooperation with Iran, but remained ambivalent and even during the governing board’s deliberations over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons plan, India took a middle course. The adoption of 12 September 2003, resolution had saved India’s close strategic partnership with Iran, which otherwise would have seriously undermined New Delhi’s ties with the West, the US and Israel. 

US believes that Iran has a secret weapons programme and has breached the UN Safeguards Agreement, which is an essential part of the NPT.[37]  On the other hand, Israel has a strategic interest in preventing Iran from materialising its alleged nuclear weapons programme with the cooperation of other countries, including India and Russia. For that reason, during Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to India in 2003, reportedly conveyed Israel’s reservations concerning the Indo-Iranian nuclear and strategic cooperation, including the exchange of expertise relating to other sensitive technologies.  This, in Tel Aviv’s perspective was a threat to its security. This further authenticates the involvement of India in the Iranian nuclear programme.

The US Under-secretary of State, John Bolton, on 17 September 2003, called on his Russian counterpart in Moscow, with a view to urge Russia to dump the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant.[38]  This was otherwise emerging as an irritant in bilateral relations of the two countries.  However, reportedly, the Russian had maintained that it was formalising a protocol with Iran for the return of spent reactor fuel in a bid to ensure that spent fuel is not misused by Tehran. Apparently, the different reports appearing in the media suggest that Russia was not forthcoming regarding its support to any US-sponsored resolution at the UNSC, if this issue is ever raised by the IAEA.

 

Criminalisation of Nuclear Proliferation

The US President, George Bush, on 31 May 2003, in an address at the Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow (Poland) before the G-8 Summit launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[39] Apparently, the PSI scheme is in line with the US NSCWMD.  It intended to tackle the global proliferation problem by allowing ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-related technologies, materials to and from states of “proliferation concern” to be thoroughly searched and detained as soon as they enter member states’ territory, territorial waters, or airspace.[40] Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and Sudan (and the non-state actors and the terrorists groups) have been identified as the states of concern due to their alleged proliferation activities.[41]  However, in fact, PSI mandate is much broader and is not exclusively targeted against one or two countries. Proliferation Security Initiative’s emphasis would be on the countries that are key flag, coastal or transit states, as well as states that are used by proliferators in their WMD and missile trafficking purposes.

The PSI member states include USA, the UK, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.  It plans to be primarily based on the “inventive use of national laws” instead of endeavouring to re-write the existing International Law, which strictly prohibits interception of vessels on the high seas or grounding aircraft in international airspace.[42]  In other words, apparently it would be a parallel regime to the NPT, and beyond the purview of the existing International Law.  China and Russia have also expressed their reservations concerning Proliferation Security Initiative’s spirit in apparent contravention to International Law, which obviously required reconciliation - if ever PSI is destined to achieve its objectives and wider acceptance by the NNWS.  For instance, after India’s 1974 nuclear detonation, the developed countries had set up scores of informal regimes. These included the 1977 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (also called  ‘London Club’), and other multilateral weapon and technology export control regimes like the Zangger Committee, Australia Group, MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), and Wassenaar Arrangement, which outlines that the suppliers must exercise control over the transfer of ‘trigger list’ items to the NNWS.  But, since 9/11, the G-8 countries have again initiated a multilateral regime – PSI, to implement the Statement of Interdiction Principles (IP), which was evolved in the Paris summit of September 2003.  The IP, in US perspective would lead to development of a system to “work together within domestic and International Law to enhance and expand efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related technologies to and from countries of concern” reiterated the US State Department’s spokesman on 2 September 2003.[43]

After President Bush’s speech of 11 February 2004, concerning the proliferation of WMD,[44] the IAEA’s Director-General, Dr. Mohammad El Baradei, in an article published in The New York Times on 12 February too endorsed US non-proliferation policy.  He stated that “the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21^st century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the Non-Proliferation regime. The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear non-proliferation.”[45]

President Bush in his speech had categorically stated that the US intends to expand the orbit of PSI, which includes “direct action against proliferation networks.”  Most significantly, Bush had also expressed his plan to follow the proliferation issue through the UNSC “resolution requiring all states to criminalise” the transfer of nuclear technology to the non-nuclear weapon states.  Besides, US would introduce the Additional Protocol related legislation in the Senate, which would mandate and formalise civilian nuclear cooperation only with those states that have signed, ratified and implemented the Additional Protocol to the NPT.[46] 

On 28 April 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540, which mandates all the states to punish individuals dealing in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons technology or components.[47]  The Resolution intends to close a loophole in the existing weapons treaties and conventions, which applied to states, but not to the non-state actors and groups or black marketers that might endeavour to acquire such weapons. As this Resolution falls under  Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the UNSC the power to enforce certain decisions through tribunals, embargoes, or military force after all peaceful means of persuading the non-compliant member states have been exhausted. A Committee would be established to monitor for the next two years the implementation of the Resolution, and it would expect all the member states to present reports on their efforts to implement the provisions within six months.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, during deliberations on the UNSC Resolution 1540 stated Pakistan’s “concerns that arose from the resolution were with regard to the role of the Security Council, to the ability of the Security Council to legislate for other states, and the fear that the council wished to impose measures on states that they had not freely accepted.”[48]  He further reiterated that “Although it was designed to address proliferation by non-state actors, it sought to impose obligations on states…. There were grave implications for efforts to impose obligations on states that their legislatures had not accepted, especially as they related to national security and self-defence.”  Akram also remarked “there was no justification for adopting the text under Chapter VII…. That fear was exacerbated by the open-ended nature of the draft, providing for further decisions.  Thus, the scope of the resolution could be enlarged beyond non-state actors, among other things.”  The envoy too pointed out that “the creation of the Council Committee mentioned in operative paragraph 9 was unnecessary.”[49]  

Similarly, the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN, Vijay K. Nambiar, also reiterated some pertinent and valid observations concerning the Resolution 1540: 

That issue should ideally have been addressed through existing international instruments and by building on them. The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, as the only two non-discriminatory disarmament treaties, provided for international co-operative efforts for assistance and protection against those mass destruction weapons. India had also supported addressing the issue of radiological weapons at the Conference on Disarmament, in view of the growing concern about radiation dispersal devices. 

Moreover, exclusive focus on non-proliferation did a disservice to the essential principle of the mutually reinforcing linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation.  Also, export controls are not an issue on which the Council should prescribe norms.  The flip side of export controls was indiscriminate technology, or denial to states with legitimate socio-economic needs.  India had noted the observations of the co-sponsors that the text did not prescribe adherence to treaties to which a state was not a party.  India would not accept any interpretation of the resolution that imposed obligations arising from treaties that it had not signed or ratified. 

In addition, as action was being taken under Chapter VII, the resolution should steer clear of any coercive or punitive approach or follow-up mechanism, which would defeat its very purpose. India had noted the sponsors’ assurance that the use of force was not envisaged or authorised by the text.[50] 

Pakistan-China Nuclear Co-operation

It would not be out of step to briefly mention here about the nature of Pakistan-China nuclear, scientific and technological co-operation, which dates back to the mid-1970s.  It was in 1976, when both the countries had formalised nuclear, science and technology agreement.  This accord had nothing to do with the supply of centrifuge uranium enrichment technology. On the contrary, it was purely for peaceful application of science and technology, including for research and development.[51]  Their Nuclear Cooperation Accord of 15 September 1986 was covered under the IAEA safeguards.[52]  The 1986 deal came at a time when Pakistan had already crossed the nuclear Rubicon.  However, China in the 1990s, and in May 2004, under the IAEA safeguards assisted Pakistan in establishing the Chashma Nuclear Power Plants — CHANUP-1 & 2 respectively, for the generation of electricity. Chashma-1 became operational in 1999, while Chashma-2 is expected to be completed in six years by the China National Nuclear Corporation. It “will increase economic activity, employment opportunities for thousands of engineers and scientists” and generate 300-megawatts of electricity.[53] Although, since the late 1980s, Pakistan had an indigenous ballistic missiles development programme, as it had then just crossed the nuclear threshold and obviously required a delivery system for its strategic arsenal.[54] 

Conclusions

Although Pakistan has not signed the NPT, yet it has always respected the non-proliferation principles of this treaty.  It was India in 1974 and again in 1998 that had compelled Pakistan to respond to its nuclear tests due to security reasons. Since Pakistan is a declared nuclear power, therefore, its nuclear policy has been that of restraint and responsibility.  Our export control mechanisms are judiciously conceived and are under tight institutional control.

Lately, a number of laws too have been institutionalised and strengthened in Pakistan to address some of the international concerns.  In this connection, the Federal Cabinet of Pakistan on 5 May 2004, approved a draft bill that would impose maximum prison term on those individuals involved in the transfer of “material, equipment and technologies related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems.”[55] Therefore, concerns to the contrary are unfounded, and there is no question of Pakistan sharing its hard-earned expertise and technology with any country, which of course also included Muslims as well as the non-Muslim countries. “The draft bill manifests Pakistan’s strong commitments to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons,” remarked Prime Minister Jamali.[56]  The subject bill is expected to be deliberated in the National Assembly in the near future for its adoption.  In addition, as far as the safety and control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was concerned, it is already under the elaborate command and control mechanism of the National Command Authority (NCA), which is in place since February 2000 – three years ahead of India. At the same time, Pakistan remains fully committed to the “universal non-proliferation” objectives of the NPT, as President Pervez Musharraf had remarked after the meeting of NCA on 3 September 2003.  Therefore, it would be a rational policy to bring the declared NWS – India and Pakistan, and a de facto NWS – Israel, into the legal framework of the international non-proliferation regime. The Foreign Minister and the National Security Advisor of Pakistan and India have also reiterated this fact during the 40^th Security Conference in Munich in February 2004.

[57] Apparently, the US is not inclined to accept India and Pakistan “as nuclear weapon states” by restructuring the NPT’s framework particularly during the 2005 NPT Review Conference.[58] 

In September 1998, the US had refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It also withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty; and in 2002, conceived the Nuclear Posture Review policy to prepare itself for a pre-emptive doctrine with the tactical nuclear weapons, including Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators (RNEPs).  This US policy, according to a non-proliferation expert, George Perkovich, is “destined to reduce international co-operation in enforcing non-proliferation commitments rather than to enhance it.”[59]  In addition, in May 2003, the US Senate Armed Services Committee too lifted the ban on the Spratt-Furse Amendments to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).[60]  Reportedly, since November 2003, the US has started research and development work on the RNEPs and the TNWs.  While, the de jure NWS have also not implemented one of the “13 practical steps” envisaged in the 2000 NPT Review Conference to “achieve nuclear disarmament,” writes Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister.[61] This obviously has given US an “offensive deterrence”[62] capability as conceived in its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy - in clear contravention to the three basic non-proliferation ideals of the NPT.

The NPT was inherently discriminatory, but it was being supported by the NNWS because the NWS had promised to negotiate “in good faith” to realise the objective of complete nuclear disarmament.[63] The nuclear disarmament as envisaged in the Article VII, was one of the main pillars upon which the entire edifice of the Treaty rested.  In a nutshell, the NNWS had promised to stay non-nuclear primarily due to NWS’ pledge to pursue disarmament goal in good faith.  Now, since the NWS had developed a pattern of consistently violating their pledge of “good faith” embedded in the Article VII; then, the NNWS, which had no nuclear umbrella in the shape of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and the Warsaw Pact (during the Cold War period) type alliance systems – had systematically resorted to clandestine ways and means to acquire nuclear capabilities in order to bridge their “feeling of insecurity.”[64]  The “faith” factor has to be rekindled and revalidated if the problem of nuclear proliferation is to be settled once and for all. This obviously is the bedrock of the Treaty, on which the NWS have now shifted their focus from nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to counter-proliferation and pre-emption in the 21^st century.  This dichotomy needs to be rationalised if at all the non-proliferation ideal is to be made achievable in the near future. 

The other factor that can play a major contributory role is the matter of respecting the sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of NNWS.  Unless the sense of security is thoroughly well established in the hearts and minds of the states perceiving threats, the goal of achieving complete check on proliferation would remain as elusive as ever. In the world of insecurities, the NNWS would continue to have sufficient rationale and the motivation - to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to safeguard their independence and sovereignty.  Secondly, Article VII of the Treaty provides a sound basis to pursue the objective of nuclear non-proliferation in the 21^st century.  Therefore, the unilateral and coercive policies based on the strategies of “pre-emption” and “counter-proliferation” toward the weak and developing countries has to end.[65]  As most of the theorists of the coercive diplomacy too believe that these coercive policies are not only hard to execute, but are often prone to failure.[66]  Therefore, multilateral approach within the ambit of International Law would be the best strategy to forge a “Grand Alliance” against nuclear proliferation.[67]  But, at the same time the de jure NWS also should not resort to “bullying” tactics to induce the other nations while enforcing the “necessary steps” to check the trafficking of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological, and ballistic missile technologies to the NNWS.[68]  Finally, the “Grand Alliance” against nuclear proliferation must categorically say “no new nuclear weapon states” beyond the existing number of eight nuclear countries, which include – five de jure, two declared, and one de facto.[69]