North Korea: Brinkmanship to Nuclear Threshold

Ahmed Ijaz Malik¨ 

he inclusion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the ‘axis of evil’, in President Bush’s declaration of January 2002,[1] accompanied by the pre-emption in Iraq has complicated the fragile US-DPRK negotiation process. This has in turn increased the fear of conflict in the Korean peninsula and providing DPRK incentives to nuclearise itself. The state’s continuing adherence to national mythology reinforced by a dynastic succession from father, Kim IL Sung to son Kim Yong Il; and DPRK being the sole surviving Stalinist state, with an undiminished cult of personality surrounding Kim Yong Il[2], the regime overall being engulfed in a contrived mystique and a closed political system; leaves little room for strategic analysts to predict its intentions or estimate the element of threat in the current crisis. Thus the whole process of negotiations revolves around certain motivations and factors. Writers like Philip Saunders, however, consider that the basic motivation of DPRK for pursuing a nuclear programme, other than using it as a deterrent are, firstly using it as a means to forcibly reunify the Korean Peninsula; secondly, treating it as a bargaining chip to be later given-up during negotiations at the right price; thirdly, the belief that nuclear weapons are the only credible means for the regime’s survival[3]; and finally, the motivations from newly nuclearised states like India and Pakistan being ultimately benignly accepted by the international community.

In addition there are certain emergent factors and new strategic determinants in the region that are guiding the negotiation process and also compelling the concerned parties to re-evaluate the manner of their bargaining and negotiations. China is emerging as a new economic power and Japan sees it as a major market. China and South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) are active trade partners because the latter is evolving into a robust economy.[4] A nuclear crisis does not augur well in such economic dynamics, especially if Japan feels threatened from DPRK and contemplates going nuclear, shifting attention from economic growth to nuclear safety. The challenges in the Korean Peninsula are both economic and security oriented. On a larger scale, the United States (US) is confronted by unidentifiable enemies in the form of terrorists. The US administration also seems to consider that a point of no return will be reached if DPRK leader Kim Jong Il sells nuclear weapons-grade plutonium that could end up in the hands of terrorists.[5] In view of these factors and an unsuccessful unilateralist approach towards DPRK, there is a slight change in the US policy where President Bush Jr. has shown an inclination towards multilateralism in engaging DPRK.

In the primary analysis of the current crisis, DPRK seems to be approaching the nuclear threshold since it has gradually detached itself from the agreed framework of 1993-4, declared its withdrawal from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, continued the enrichment of uranium and plutonium and has conducted missile tests. If the crisis escalates any further, the DPRK missiles, chemical and biological weapons combined with conventional weapons can pose a strong threat to the US troops based primarily in ROK and in Okinawa (Japan). The US missile interceptor system is the primary line of defence against the DPRK missiles, which are as lethal as Scud missiles. The greatest concern is the apparent frailty of the US Patriot interceptor systems that have not been very effective against low altitude Scud missiles. This factor would be of primary importance because the US would not want to utilise its military option unless it is fully confident of its Patriot defence system’s credibility. In the meantime DPRK could secretly pursue its nuclear and missile programmes. On the other hand, the peaceful resolution of the dispute could mainly come about when DPRK categorically declares that the issue is resolved after negotiations. This could mean that the US is giving enough concessions in the form of economic help, sovereignty and pulling out its bases from the Korean peninsula.

This paper includes a study of the missile threat emerging from DPRK and the deficiencies of the US missile defence system as a whole, as the basis for the future security and threat perception by both the contenders in the Korean peninsula. It will conduct a comparative study of the brinkmanship in the crisis of 1993-4 and the negotiations in the current crisis, in order to highlight their similarities or differences. It will also examine whether brinkmanship in the current crisis is leading DPRK to the nuclear threshold and the flaws in the negotiating tactics are worsening the situation. Finally, an effort will be made to study the regional dynamics and how the strategic environment will change in case the nuclear crisis prolongs.  

The Missile Threat

The Patriot defence system may have saved hundreds of lives on ground during the Second Gulf War but its credibility against high-speed Scud type missiles is still uncertain. The US Army’s Test and Evaluation Command, Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, has reported that the Patriot has not been developed enough to warrant its full-rate production. The Patriot missile defence system itself was involved in three friendly-fire incidents resulting in the deaths of one US and two British pilots. According to the media reports there were 16 Iraqi missiles launched at coalition forces and Kuwait in March and April 2003. In reply 20 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-2) interceptors were launched, the majority of which were Guided Enhanced Munition (GEM). The US Army also launched four more modernised Patriot PAC-3 interceptors. There are reports of 10 Iraqi missiles engaged by Patriots: six by the US batteries and four by Kuwaiti Patriot batteries. The Patriots were targeting short-range ballistic missiles, the Ababil-100 and Al-Samoud 2. However, Iraq had not launched any of its Scud missiles that had a range of more than 400 miles.[6]  Apparently the US and Kuwaiti missile defences and warning systems failed to detect or intercept four or five of Iraqi low-flying missiles.[7]

To understand the system of interception it is essential to study the missile systems and the Patriot interceptor system, its capabilities and limitations. The PAC-3 utilises hit-to-kill technology where the warhead strives to directly intercept the enemy missile.[8] On the other hand, in trying to escape a missile interceptor system, the attacking missiles can be up-graded after some alterations. The navigation for land-attack cruise missiles requires only relatively cheap Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) integrated with Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers,[9] both of which are readily available -- separately or already integrated -- as commercial off-the-shelf items. If rudimentary autopilots that crudely guided the HY-2 seersucker (Scud) missiles are replaced with modern land-attack navigation, the missile can, not only avoid detection and interception but also inflict significant damage. Considering this evidence, the idea of conversion and upgradation of the land-attack missiles to the level of invulnerability against Patriot interceptors might seem attractive to the missiles owning countries. The task of conversion, however, is not very easy. Although the component technologies and subsystems are available off-the-shelf, it is not easy to integrate individually complex subsystems into a working whole, which achieves consistently precise results demanded of a precision delivery system. Similarly, Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) can also be acquired for the same purpose, but the guarantee of compatibility of the “system integration” software tools that can be attached to the UAV; cannot be ascertained. The other less formidable barrier in missile conversion is the incorporation of a suitable jet engine to replace the liquid fuelled rocket engine in the HY-2.[10] The conversion of missile systems to make them more robust would be the major problem that the US missile scientists are likely to confront.

The pertinent question, however, is the function and credibility of the Patriot interceptor systems in identifying and destroying an incoming ballistic missile. During the Second Gulf War a US Air Force jet F-16 CJ flying a suppression of enemy air defence mission thought it was being targeted by a forward deployed radar and consequently launched a high-speed anti-radiation missile against it. The Patriot radar was slightly damaged. After another similar incidents, the Air Force decided to revamp its rules of engagement and announced that its pilots were to double-check before launching missiles against what appeared to be enemy air defence. The Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) which, beacons very well, may not have worked at all, since the Iraqi Air Force jets were not flying. Similarly the Patriot missile should have been able to identify a friendly aircraft with the help of the computer programmes for identification and verification attached with them. Due to the extremely cluttered environment that the Patriots were operating in; and the resulting electronic interference that may have been generated by the radars deployed in close proximity; the radar system simply failed to recognise the allied aircraft and mistook them for something of a threat. Indeed it is plausible that the blue aircraft were deemed by the Patriot’s radar to be missiles. A substantial portion of the $ 3 billion spent on upgrading the Patriot was used to make its radar much more discriminatory. Patriot is supposed to be capable of handling a much more cluttered air picture with objects of much smaller radar cross-section than the earlier radar could have done. If this problem persists the Pentagon will be limited to deploy the Patriots systems only in the theatres where there will be no US aircrafts, meaning no theatre of war.[11] During the engagement with Iraqis the only two missiles which got through the Patriot’s radar unnoticed; were the CSSC-3 Seersucker Cruise missiles both of which landed in Kuwait.[12]  Seersuckers are designed for use against ships at sea but can be employed over land to attack large targets that have primitive radar guidance systems.[13] The Patriot missile system had shown that it is lethal against aircrafts and ineffective against cruise missiles.

            The 9 Iraqi missiles that were not destroyed by the Patriot landed harmlessly in the desert, but this does not change the fact that they were not intercepted. The engagement time had also shrunk from 4.5 minutes in 1991 to 1.5 minutes in 2003 because the shorter-range missiles like Russian type, Frog-7 were used. Manoeuvrability of the Patriot’s launching bases is another factor. The launching vehicles of the Patriots are mobile and it was difficult to move them in the sandy terrain[14], thus showing that the manoeuvrability systems also needed to be upgraded.       

DPRK has gradually developed its missile technology from the earliest R-17 E type to Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6, later to be modified into Nodong and Taepodong missiles. The most modern of its missiles that it is working on is Daepodong Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).[15] DPRK leadership views the possession of nuclear arms and delivery systems as the ultimate guarantee that the US will not entertain any ideas about invading or bringing about a regime change in Pyongyang, which has emerged as a remote but a lingering concern, considering the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq. In their perception, DPRK’s nuclear capability is likely to warn the US that there will be a very heavy price to pay if it were to attack DPRK. The price could well be the destruction of US bases in ROK and Japan, or attacks on Seoul and Tokyo, or even Los Angeles and San Francisco – if Pyongyang succeeds in developing a fully intercontinental ballistic missile. DPRK’s current longest-range missile Taepodong 2 can “only” reach Alaska.[16] Moreover, DPRK seems to have opted for a three-tiered strategy that involves using weapons of mass destruction to catastrophically damage ROK and the US forces to the point where the outdated DPRK conventional arsenal might still be effective. One battery of DPRK 240-mm multiple rocket launchers fired at Seoul can deliver roughly a ton of chemical weapons, which, according to various accounts, could kill or injure thousands.[17]

The missile programme is one of the finest investments of the DPRK. It has also been a major source of employment and income. The missile development, production, deployment and exports generates four benefits to the Korean Workers Party (KWP) elite and the National Defence Commission (NDC) -- security from external threats, foreign exchange earnings, domestic employment and national prestige.[18] Thus it is obvious that DPRK would like to maintain and upgrade its missile technology upon which it has invested over the years.   

The US Policy and Negotiation Process

Prior to the signing of the agreed framework, there was a latent hostility in the DPRK leadership camp, which came out full-blown during the crisis of 1993-94. Kim Jong Il, on March 9, 1993, had asked all the people to switch to a ‘state of readiness for war’. The DPRK leadership however, for the first time declared its intention to resume talks with the US at bilateral level. The package solution to the crisis presented by the US, included DPRK’s acceptance of ad hoc inspection by the IAEA as well as the resumption of the DPRK-ROK talks. In the second phase DPRK was required to accept the IAEA special inspections of two suspected waste sites in Nyongbyon in return for US recognition for DPRK and trade investment concessions from the US, ROK and Japan. In early 1994, the situation again became hostile. It was widely rumoured that Patriot surface-to-air missiles had been deployed in ROK. The ROK defence ministry talked of conducting ‘Team Spirit 1994’ exercises unless DPRK agreed to nuclear inspection.

During the crisis DPRK took another step of brinkmanship to increase tension. It shut down the 5-megawatt reactor in Nyongbyon on April 1, 1994, and informed the IAEA that it would begin removing the spent fuel rods soon, and that it is willing to allow inspection but at the same time DPRK conducted joint naval-air force-military exercises with unusual vigour. Later in May and June 1994, DPRK test-fired Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile in the Sea of Japan. The crisis ended with an agreement between DPRK and US as a result of ex-President Jimmy Carter’s shuttle diplomacy. Carter reached an understanding with President Kim on June 17, that DPRK will freeze its nuclear weapons development programme until the third round of the US-DPRK talks, and US would provide heavy fuel supply for the LWR reactors. In the period leading up to the final settlement, the US and DPRK were engaged in psychological warfare with the threat to use force and harsh rhetoric with DPRK’s deterrent capability playing an indispensable role in the conduct of nuclear diplomacy.

However, there existed some flaws in the implementation of the previously agreed framework. Firstly, the reactor construction projects at Yongbyon and Taechon were to be dismantled prior to the completion of the second LWR. Secondly, DPRK was obligated to be in ‘full compliance’ with IAEA safeguards when a significant portion of the LWR project was completed, but before the delivery of key nuclear components. Thirdly, DPRK was required to disclose the location and allow inspection of all declared nuclear sites but not until a significant portion of the first LWR had been completed. Finally, DPRK was required to can the eight thousand spent fuel rods and place them in a cooling pond, with all the spent fuel to be removed from the DPRK once the nuclear components for the first LWR began to arrive and that DPRK was judged to be in full compliance with the IAEA safeguards.[19] However, both DPRK and the US accused each other for not reciprocating to ensure the success of the agreed framework. 

While exercising nuclear coercion against ROK, DPRK had to deter possible preventive attacks by the US to take out its nuclear facilities. DPRK had to avoid getting counter-coerced into abandoning its nuclear weapon development programme without obtaining meaningful ‘compensation’. It had enhanced its military offensive capability including the strategic arsenal, chemical weapons and missiles. General Gary Luck, commander-in-chief, US-ROK Combined Forces Command while assessing that DPRK did not have the arsenal required for winning a war; it was quite capable of retaliating. General Luck estimated that in a full-scale war, one million people could be killed, and the US would have to spend $100 billion. The damage incurred to property and business activity would amount to more than $I trillion.[20]

The extent of this perceived threat and the stagnation in the negotiation process had made it imperative to review the negotiation tactics. The basic preconditions of an effective foreign policy’s accurate information about politics, economics and society of foreign countries, and a clear understanding of the interests, perceptions and objectives of their governments needed to be reviewed. DPRK’s closed society has always presented particular challenges for obtaining information and developing an understanding necessary for an effective foreign policy.[21] During the current crisis the debate has been revolving around the question, whether Washington should demand DPRK to both dismantle nuclear arms, if any; and shutdown its nuclear programme, or just threaten with dire consequences if Pyongyang tries to sell its nuclear arms. To rely simply on pressure and containment is unlikely to keep DPRK from getting more weapons. To prevent this, Washington has only two options: military strikes and negotiations. At the moment, the administration seems inclined to do neither.[22] The lack of information remains the main barrier. The US government relies too much on second-hand information from countries that have diplomatic relations or direct contact with DPRK. This lack of clear and first-hand information combined with the secretive nature of the DPRK regime had led some people to conclude that Kim Jong Il is irrational and that his policy of brinkmanship could backfire and extinguish any hope for a peaceful resolution of the current nuclear crisis.[23] On the other hand, the stance of the US seems rigid too. The US continues to demand a Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantling (CVID) of DPRK’s nuclear programme. In return of the CVID, DPRK wants the US to sign a formal non-aggression treaty, establish full bilateral diplomatic relations, and provide Pyongyang with billions of dollars worth of economic and energy assistance.[24] Apparently, this strategy of confrontation is not helping in the resolution of the crisis.

The other strategy is that of non-violent and coercive mechanisms in the form of embargo. As the US plans an international embargo to choke off DPRK’s trade in missiles and nuclear materials, along with its lucrative traffic in drugs and counterfeit currency, the terminology has become highly charged especially with the proposition of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of May 31, 2003.[25] In resolving the nuclear crisis Japan and Australia are expected to play key roles in implementing the US-engineered policy, which also has the active support of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain. The plan is for the coalition members to intercept and search ships or aircrafts suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction, or their components, on Pyongyang’s behalf. Pentagon estimates that missile sales earned DPRK about $ 60 million in 2001, a figure that is thought to represent a major proportion of the country’s overall trade. German authorities in April 2003 seized 22 tonnes of aluminum tubes in Hamburg. The tubes, essential for making enriched uranium, were destined for DPRK. In May, the French and German authorities intercepted a shipment of sodium cyanide that they believed was bound for DPRK for use in the manufacture of chemical weapons, according to news weekly Der Spiegel. [26] With the DPRK’s economy in dire straits, this measure is calculated to increase pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in return for international aid.

The US administration rejects offering a comprehensive settlement proposal. Its strategy is to not negotiate, just wait: Kim’s provocations will reach a point where they will alienate all concerned governments and turn them into allies of the US in isolating DPRK. In addition the US administration believes that it is time to apply coercive but non-violent measures. The key dilemma is that even the interdiction is unlikely to prevent DPRK from transferring nuclear materials, given the extreme difficulties in detecting such shipments. Thus the view within the administration is that only an end to Pyongyang regime will eliminate such a risk. Thus PSI is also directed at constricting DPRK’s missile sales and other key sources of Pyongyang’s foreign exchange. On the contrary if Pyongyang rescinded its unwise threat to proliferate nuclear materials, the US administration would come under greater pressure. A second obstacle is to gain support of ROK, China and Russia to join the US plan. DPRK’s nuclear-fuel reprocessing would provide such a trigger. The credibility of such a report of DPRK’s intentions to start nuclear reprocessing is not going to be an easy task since the controversy over the US intelligence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, adds to such doubts.[27]

            In a broader perspective, it seems the US lacks a coherent policy of engagement with DPRK, because of disagreements among the US decision makers. The arguments go beyond the traditional State Department-Pentagon split, frequently leading to intra-agency disputes. On one side of the debate are those who think that DPRK can be persuaded to abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for eventual aid, guarantees of security and other diplomatic incentives. Their opponents profoundly mistrust the DPRK and want to use political and economic pressures to force the Pyongyang government to capitulate or collapse.[28] The Bush administration is considered to be suffering from a bipolar disorder. The administration’s erratic swings from limited diplomatic engagement one day to “personal” statements by the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton prefiguring the collapse of DPRK the next, and then back to engagement the day after; reveals a real lack of strategic coherence on the Bush administration’s part.[29] 

            This lack of coherence goes further down to the very basic levels. The greatest impediments in the negotiation process are the linguistic barriers, ideological barriers that distort interpretations of development in DPRK, intellectual constructs that conceal important information, the reluctance to acquire a deeper comprehension of the mindset of the DPRK’s leadership, and a deliberate misrepresentation for political or policy convenience.[30] Moreover it seems that whenever there seems to be an agreement to talk; the US administration decides to make changes in the agenda or the conditions of the dialogue. This attitude has been termed ‘amateurish’ by a senior US negotiator.[31] To make matters worse, the DPRK leadership does not soften its stance. The vitriolic and apocalyptic tone routinely employed by the DPRK government and media discourages efforts to take them seriously. The US administration’s rejection of these statements as propaganda implies discarding one of the few sources of information on the DPRK leadership. DPRK has been insisting that the message in many meetings had been misinterpreted by the US. The meeting held in October 2002 with the US Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly leading the US team, came to have two different versions; one of the US and the other of the DPRK, ironically both dissimilar. Pyongyang alleged to have categorically denied having any uranium enrichment programme and saying later that Kelly ‘dreamed up a fiction’.[32]

            Another barrier to understanding DPRK is a tendency to view the country through ideological blinder. The DPRK economy has been in serious economic trouble since the end of the Cold War due to structural economic problems, severe energy shortage and loss of foreign assistance. Famines in the mid-1990s killed at least one million. The DPRK system bears primary responsibility for these economic failures, but the distaste for the regime in Pyongyang and a predilection for moral clarity run the risk of over-simplification. Pyongyang’s inability to produce exportable items to earn foreign exchange has been its long troubling problem. However, the regime has recently signaled the desire to open its economy and increase its exports not just of missiles but also of other products like textiles, minerals and metallurgical products. Most observers expected DPRK to implode quickly after the end of Cold War and following famines in the mid-1990s, but the regime has managed to survive. Another problem is that this ideological perspective underestimates the possibility of internal economic changes that could sustain the regime without fundamental changes.[33]

            Given the US administration’s interpretation of their own motives as good, they have difficulty in understanding how any reasonable state could view US power or actions as threatening. The lack of serious efforts to understand the security perspectives of other states has been a major source of misperception. Rogue states are assumed to produce WMD to support illegitimate ambitions such as territorial conquest or regional dominance rather than legitimate security concerns that might be satisfied by security assurances. In the same perspective, DPRK’s situation can be understood through the prism of security dilemma, where US efforts to enhance its security are viewed by Pyongyang as highly threatening actions that require efforts to enhance Pyongyang’s military capability. A number of analysts have expressed concerns that US military threats designed to reinforce deterrence may have the unwanted effect of persuading DPRK that nuclear weapons are necessary to ensure regime survival. For lack of a better word, empathy on the US’ part is required.[34] Pyongyang saw similar ominous moves in the year 2003 when the US was pressing ahead with the redeployment of its troops in ROK away from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). Fuelling Pyongyang’s paranoia as well as legitimate fear, in July 2003, US news and World Report magazine carried a story outlining a new US military plan, known as Operational Plan 5030, whereby Washington could try to bring about a regime change in Pyongyang by carrying extensive military exercises. Former US Central Intelligence Agency director R James Woolsey and retired Lieutenant-General Thomas Mclnerney, the former vice chief of the staff of the US Air Force, penned an article in the Wall Street Journal advocating the viability of a military attack on DPRK. They suggested that the country could be bombed at 4,000 sorties a day, compared with 800 a day in the “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. They stated that the US Marines could capture Pyongyang itself and defeat DPRK decisively in 30-60 days.[35] Considering the current state, it is obvious that the re-evaluation of the US policy and strategic posture vis-à-vis DPRK is essential to effectively engage in viable negotiations.

            Moreover the concepts like the ‘rogue state’ initially popularised by the Clinton administration as part of an effort to identify threats to US in a post-Cold War era; have had negative impact on the US debate on DPRK. The rogue state construct also implies that force and threats are the only appropriate ways to deal with fundamentally unreasonable countries. This discourages any attempts to understand, much less address; the security needs of countries such as Iran, Iraq and DPRK. Some US analysts believe that DPRK has an undeniable history of terrorist activities, some of which were reportedly approved personally by Kim Jong Il.[36] In January 1968, 31 DPRK commandos crossed the demilitarised zone in an attempt to assassinate the ROK President Park Chung Hee, which ended in a gun battle near the Presidential residence, in which all but one of the commandos were killed. In October 1983, DPRK attempted to assassinate President Chun Du Hwan. This attack was carried out in Burma with a remote-controlled bomb that killed 21 people including four ROK cabinet ministers. In November 1987, two DPRK agents planted a bomb in a Korean Airline jet that caused the aircraft to crash over Andaman Sea. Despite this past deplorable record, the DPRK government has not engaged in any terrorist attacks for more than 15 years neither has any contacts with any terrorist organisation been proven. The most credible evidence of support for terrorists, in the view of the US, is the presence of certain Japanese Red Army terrorists wanted by the Japanese government.[37] Moreover, this the newly coined term ‘rogue state’ is still ambiguous because it does not apply to some other states that pose similar resistance and opposition to the US.[38]

A final barrier to better DPRK policy involves deliberate distortion or misrepresentation for political or policy convenience. The Bush administration’s apparent tendentious use of intelligence to establish the imminence of Iraq’s WMD threat is a prominent recent example, and the US administration’s efforts to label DPRK a ‘terrorist state actively engaged in terrorism’ also falls into this category. Labeling DPRK as a terrorist supporter or in the axis of evil is a misrepresentation. The ambiguities about DPRK’s intentions and motivations – sometimes deliberately created by the DPRK leaders to increase their bargaining power – means that plausible competing (and sometimes contradictory) assessments of DPRK motivations and behaviour coexist among policymakers. The cognitive shortcuts make it difficult for policy makers to maintain an open mind, colouring their interpretations of new information. ‘Cognitive consistency’ can cause policy makers to be especially receptive to information that confirms their pre-existing beliefs and to ignore or downplay information that contradicts those beliefs.[39] The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an interesting by-product of a divided US administration, unable to decide on a coherent DPRK policy.  

DPRK’s Nuclear Option

On January 10, 2003, DPRK announced its withdrawal from the treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The DPRK announcement that it will withdraw from NPT took the new US administration by surprise and enabled the DPRK to take the initiative in the affair and gave it plenty of time for crisis bargaining. Considering the systematic conduct of the military-diplomatic campaigns during the 1993-94 period, it seems DPRK had already prepared a more or less concrete plan for the nuclear diplomacy by the time it announced its plan to withdraw from NPT. In a planned strategy a special team named ‘Haeg Sangmu Jo’ or nuclear permanent team was organised as early as 1991 with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Korean Workers Party (WPK) officials as its members. This team played a critical policy-making role concerning the nuclear issue.[40]

This emergence of the nuclear posture of DPRK is a result of some changing patterns of alliances during the past two decades. Events that shook Pyongyang’s confidence in its allies include the normalisation of US–China relations, the collapse of USSR and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the normalisation of relations between Moscow and Seoul and Beijing and Seoul. In sum, these events led DPRK leaders to question the credibility of its alliance partners, while also increasing Pyongyang’s perceived utility of nuclear weapons.[41]  The term Chuch’e meaning self-reliance, first appeared in DPRK politics in 1995 and from then onwards, the ultimate aim of the regime seemed to be the development of a self-sustaining nuclear and missile capability.[42] DPRK’s motivations to nuclearise could firstly be the element of prestige. Though a relatively unimportant motivation but in the current security situation in the Asia Pacific, DPRK without nuclear weapons would probably be another Myanmar, routinely condemned for its human rights record, but generally isolated and ignored in the region and by the wider world. Secondly, there is the objective of gaining security and the extension of the regime of Kim Jong Il.[43] There can be another motivation to have nuclear weapons. Following the example of India and Pakistan in South Asia, where these countries after bearing the brunt of sanctions ultimately got acceptance of the great powers, however, unwilling it might have been. This example can be followed, but would DPRK be willing to cooperate with the US in the similar fashion that India and especially Pakistan have been cooperating in the US’ war against terror; remains an open question.

A summary of four scenarios is given by specific names for situations, in case DPRK decides to go nuclear. In Green Flash, DPRK has admitted and tested its nuclear weapons but a precarious peace prevails. In Boom Boom scenario the DPRK has gone nuclear but the situation is spiraling out of control towards war. In Eagle Stands Alone, the US has confronted a DPRK that for reasons of its own has gone nuclear. The US has failed to force a regime change in Pyongyang and is preoccupied by security challenges outside of Korea. Finally, in Embrace Tiger, Retreat to Mountain, the US has engaged the DPRK as part of a broad coalition of states willing to facilitate its economic recovery and transition while the DPRK is moving incrementally back to non-nuclear status, yet the DMZ remains tense.[44] Pushed hard enough, the DPRK may conduct an underground low-yield subcritical test that would keep everyone guessing and increase the ambiguity created by their nuclear weapons. In this green flash scenario, DPRK would walk free with nuclear weapons while the US-led PSI chases their exports.[45] However, whether DPRK has, or will be able to acquire the detonation facility for nuclear weapons still remains to be clearly answered.

The DPRK economic situation has transformed it into a different type of culture. Many rural, provincial and border communities have moved to a local makeshift economy from whatever resources they can mobilise. The cities, the national leadership and the military rely on extracting a surplus from these local makeshift economies and on external support mainly from China. These players also charge rent on trade, investment and financial arrangements with third parties such as Taiwanese and South Korean firms, labour exports to Russia, and subvention from overseas Koreans in Japan etc. The Bush administration’s proliferation security initiative can chase missile-carrying airplanes or ships around the world, but it cannot make a dent in these fundamental dynamics.[46] 

Military Option and the Regional Dynamics

The military option by the US could be a result of DPRK continuing its missile programme and uranium and plutonium reprocessing. The first step towards nuclearisation; starting from reprocessing plutonium might be an appealing option for Kim. After looking at the example of Iraq, he might see nuclear weapons as his only defence. In the current crisis, to make matters worse, President Bush has fuelled fears of such a worst-case scenario when he said North Korea’s refusal to surrender its plutonium and uranium-based weapons programmes would have to be solved “militarily” if not diplomatically.[47] Such an option can have some unpredictable and antagonistic reactions from the other states in the region. For instance there are signs that China, on which DPRK relies heavily for oil and military supplies, in view of such a situation is already putting pressure on its neighbours to pull away from the confrontation. To build support for more coercive measures, Washington may, agree to another round of talks, perhaps, hosted by China, but winning support for a harder line could prove very difficult. During the talks toning down the military option and calling for sanctions, could also act like a red rag to a bull, since Pyongyang would consider moves to impose sanctions a green light for war.

 The US military bases in Okinawa remain the main strike force for dealing with the DPRK nuclear threat. Of course, the biggest burden in any military stand-off would fall on South Korea’s half million troops and the 37,000 US soldiers stationed in the Korean peninsula. DPRK, however, remains the focus of US wider network bases in the region. The linchpin is Okinawa, a strategically located island just 1400 kilometers from Pyongyang. DPRK is also on the mind of Okinawa’s Marines. The 3^rd Marines Expeditionary Force is a fast-response infantry with its own transport and maintenance units, attack jets and helicopters and enough food, ammunition supplies and fuel to fight for 30 days without resupply. This blend of speed and flexibility means that it would likely be among the first reinforcements to the Korean peninsula in a war. In Okinawa, in early March 2003 four DPRK fighters intercepted an unmanned US air force surveillance aircraft. Such incidents raised the concern in DPRK that they could be the next on the list after Iraq. Similarly in the US, the distrust over DPRK runs deep, where the struggle is under way between the moderates who support negotiations and the hawks that say Kim Jong Il responds only to force. Both approaches rely on massive US military presence in the region as their trump card, even if it is played only to keep Pyongyang on the bargaining table.[48] The alleged plutonium reprocessing and uranium facilities cannot be targeted effectively because they are clandestine and reliable information is scarce.[49]

If it comes to an armed conflict, the US estimates that DPRK’s mammoth ground, naval and air force with 3,700 tanks, 13,000 artillery pieces, Russian fighter aircraft, submarines and frigates will pose serious resistance. The country has 200-300 long-range guns and multiple rocket launchers positioned to deliver a barrage against Seoul. Pyongyang could use hundreds of its Scud missiles to pound airfields and seaports to disrupt air operations and efforts by the US to send reinforcements.[50] Pyongyang has reasonably capable air defence, including Mig-29 fighters, SA-2 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, and a large quantity of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA). It had some 500 to 600 Scud missiles that could target throughout ROK with conventional warheads or chemical weapons, and can also hit Japan by 100 Nodong missiles.[51] A pre-emptive strike by DPRK, though not unthinkable given the unpredictability of Pyongyang regime, however, is unlikely because Kim must know that it would signal the end of his regime. He is, after all, using brinkmanship to try and get Washington to the negotiating table to sign a peace treaty and supply his country with vital aid and trade.[52] On the flip side, the world community is more united over the DPRK issue than it was over Iraq. The specialists on DPRK believe that there is room for negotiations. The DPRK regime is neither irrational nor crazy, but rather has a distorted worldview and warped expectations about how countries respond to its actions.[53]

            The stalemate, on the other hand, could lead to both the parties, DPRK and US, drawing similar conclusions; that the other is not serious in negotiating. At this stage it is worth looking at the psychological aspect and the relative perceptions of the two sides. The US never accepted the idea of allowing DPRK to possess nuclear weapons, fearing that this would encourage it to invade ROK playing the nuclear card to deter US intervention. DPRK’s ultimate fear is a US invasion or aerial attack designed to overthrow the regime of Kim Jong Il and the ruling Korean Workers Party (KWP).[54] The DPRK leaders foster insecurity towards the US and are offensive to any kind of coercive manoeuvres. In an unusual letter to the UN on July 1, 2003 the DPRK army said that any sanctions or blockade orchestrated by the US would be a “complete breach” of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War. It warned of immediate “merciless retaliatory measures” and horrible disaster for the people of ROK. The existing international law can help tackle Pyongyang’s activities but the major problem is that intercepting ships and aircrafts in international waters or airspace is prohibited.[55]

In the meeting between a US team led by James Kelly and DPRK negotiators in October 2002, the DPRK delegation reportedly told the US team that they had something even ‘stronger than nuclear weapons’. According to the perception of the US analysts they were alluding to the chemical and biological weapons. Although the analysts had their doubts about the likely meaning of the statement yet despite the potential significance of a possible veiled DPRK threat to use chemical and biological weapons it took US officials weeks or months to clarify the meaning of the DPRK delegation’s statement by speaking with foreign envoys and the ROK government. This misunderstanding is likely what damaged the credibility of Washington’s threat assessment in Seoul.[56]

Beijing worries that DPRK nuclear weapons would create a security context in which Japan or Taiwan might be able to justify pursuing their own nuclear deterrents. Though rejecting the US democratisation agenda and the use of US military power to effect change, China sees the nature of the current regime in Pyongyang as part of the problem. China like the US believes that an economically developing and more open DPRK would shed its confrontational posture and lose the appetite for nuclear weapons. Yet this broad based support for an agreement still does not seem enough to enable DRK to sign an agreement. Worse still, allowing the negotiations to collapse because these goals prove unattainable may foreclose an agreement that would in fact serve the US interests, indeed one that would serve what should arguably be the top US priority -- reducing the risk that DPRK can become a facilitator on nuclear terrorism. The chief danger from the DPRK nuclear programme is the prospect that it might yield a large enough surplus of radioactive materials, which might be passed on to any terrorist or rogue elements, undetected by the DPRK.[57]

The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, head of the Chinese delegation, said the nuclear issue must be resolved peacefully. He noted that the conclusion of the non-aggression treaty should be settled through the DPRK-US talks and the issue of denuclearisation of Korean peninsula and security concerns raised by DPRK should be resolved simultaneously.[58] Although China might initially support a policy of economic pressure, Beijing is afraid that it will face a massive influx of refugees across Yalu river should DPRK collapse. To prevent such an eventuality Beijing will ultimately allow fuel and food sanctioned or unsanctioned to move across its border with the North. Similarly, ROK, which also wants to avoid a massive influx of refugees, is unlikely to support a sustained, infinite policy of squeezing the DPRK.[59] The trust towards US decision-making is decreasing in ROK and they consider US President Bush as a greater threat to peninsular security than Kim Jong Il.[60]

Japan would prefer a gradual diplomatic approach that avoids a military confrontation. There can be no normalisation of relations between Japan and DPRK until DPRK itself resolves the many problems that it has caused, for instance the abduction of Japanese, development of nuclear weapons and missiles, spy boats, narcotics smuggling etc. There is a common consensus in Japan that the DPRK nuclear issue must be multilateralised, however, Japan is concerned about the UN sponsored sanction on DPRK because it could lead to an irrational response from DPRK. Japan also wishes to join the “Five Plus Two” mechanism to discuss DPRK nuclear-related issues along with South Korea and the UN Security Council’s Permanent five member countries. This is a shift from the previous thinking of initiating a combined missile programme with the US, as a reaction to the Taepodong missile test by DPRK in 1998. [61] Though it may be domestically controversial, Japan joining the missile race by acquiring two-stage missile system, Standard Missile (SM-3), for first-stage interception or the PAC-3, second-stage interceptor systems would have serious implications on the Chinese security perceptions. This would be irrespective of the fact that the DPRK’s Nodong missile would take approximately 10 minutes to hit Japan, whereas the interceptor systems could take more than 30 minutes for the Japanese Security Council to authorise the defence mobilisation.[62] A possible crisis of such a magnitude, leading to a missile imbroglio would leave less bargaining time for actors like US, China and Russia to act rationally.

One advantage of multilateral format is that a package deal that includes other parties would make it easier for the US to disguise any concessions that might otherwise appear to reward DPRK. North Korea might settle for an agreement acceptable to China and ROK but unacceptable to the US causing tension and disunity among other parties. Seoul seeks a negotiated settlement that would remove the DPRK nuclear threat, but is reluctant to pressure Pyongyang to the point where regime might collapse or lash out militarily. China would consider a negotiated settlement that encourages DPRK to adopt economic reforms and improve relations with its neighbours.[63] 

Options for Missile Control

Another option to engage with DPRK could be the reinvigoration and implementation of the missile control regimes. Both the existence and limits of international regimes seems to have helped DPRK’s nuclear diplomacy. The NPT gave DPRK two unique opportunities to exercise time pressure on the US. The Article X of the treaty was of importance, which allowed its signatories to withdraw from the treaty three months after notice of such withdrawal, and provided that conference should be convened in 1995 to decide whether the treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or should be extended for an additional fixed period.[64] During the crisis DPRK seemed to have been exercising the ‘rationality of irrationality’ in crisis bargaining. Denny Roy, an analyst on DPRK bargaining tactics suggested that DPRK leaders seemed to have used ‘madman’ tactics in that they depicted themselves as irrational and dangerous in order to keep the other side on the defensive and put themselves in an advantageous position.[65]

If the ultimate goal of working through missile non-proliferation regimes to finally develop the agreed international norms and mechanism covering missile production, transfer, testing and deployment, the ultimate diplomatic means would presumably be full-fledged legally binding treaty. A number of general factors would first need to be reviewed, relating to the scope of any measures either comprehensive or partial. The three areas that would require attention are geographic coverage, functional coverage and technological coverage. The geographic coverage would be an assessment of the new member country to be included. The functional coverage would require the definition and delineation of the activities that are to be prohibited, and the technological coverage would describe the technologies to be excluded.[66] However, a comprehensive and universally applicable strategic approach is needed in addressing the missile proliferation problem. Consideration can be given to approaches that have featured in various combinations in the previous non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) arrangements including non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament, norm building measures, verifying and monitoring incentives, security assurances, consultative mechanisms and negotiation mechanisms[67].           

The Way Forward

A prolonged confrontation will sap the US and global appetite for another battle. Sitting tight while bracing for possible conflict -- increases Kim’s chances of forcing the US into a deal.[68] Philip Saunders, considers that DPRK may be ready to cap its nuclear programme while keeping a couple of bombs as an assurance policy, but that might not be good enough for the Bush administration.[69] Successful reforms and integration into international economy will give DPRK a greater stake in the international system and might facilitate the gradual unification process, as hoped by the ROK. Economic integration with the outside world could also be a binding mechanism to help ensure Pyongyang’s commitment to any future arms-control agreements.[70] In the joint communiqué, in the year 2000, the DPRK government renounced terrorism and agreed that ‘terrorism should be opposed in all its forms, including terrorist acts involving chemical, biological or nuclear devices or materials. In November 2001, DPRK signed two UN anti-terrorism conventions, and subsequently expressed a willingness to sign five additional conventions. Although DPRK’s economic problems give the regime strong economic incentives to sell nuclear materials and technologies, no one has produced evidence to suggest that Pyongyang has ever attempted to sell nuclear materials to terrorist groups. The rogue state construct and ‘axis of evil’ formulation have proved useful to the Bush administration in mobilising domestic public support for aggressive efforts to attack terrorist groups and to improve US defences. This strategy, however, has the potential to arouse international opposition and cause the US to miss potential opportunities such as the DPRK’s efforts to reposition itself in the war on terror.[71]

            Several strategies that could work together and help negotiations have been brought forward. The ‘Ice-breaker’ proposes a series of small but important steps forward, mutually reinforcing efforts to make further negotiations possible. As a confidence building measure an unofficial emissary like General Davis could initiate a Joint Recovery Operation for missing-in-action US-DPRK, congressional delegation, which has been discussing issues like the recovery of USS Pueblo. Similarly, the key steps to follow could be the renewal of humanitarian aid, introduction of a high level, bipartisan point person with direct access to the US President to develop and articulate the policy towards DPRK, de-listing of the DPRK from the ‘terrorist state’ status and bringing in developmental aid through multilateral channels. If DPRK is willing to engage with the US on a multilateral forum, countries like Australia, Great Britain and even Sweden that had a neutral role in the Korean Armistice can move along with the plan of negotiations. In the initial phase of such negotiations the focus could be on the energy and economic assistance supply to DPRK and later on the talks could focus on critical issues like plutonium processing, since this issue will have to be dealt with at some point. The Precision Guided Markets take an economic approach, whereby the economic costs of DPRK pursuing its confrontational policies would be highlighted and the benefits of engaging to gain economic assistance would be presented. This policy emphasises the need to de-politicise humanitarian assistance. Basic aid to DPRK should be expanded even before it decides to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Global Overreach looks to DPRK crisis as a key stepping stone for the further development of a global ‘Civil Society’ response to international conflict. The concerns in such a strategy are that the current US administration needs to tone down their demand of DPRK completely backing down from its demands, and the second consideration of China as a significant strategic challenge facing the US and the fact that the solution of US-DPRK crisis is likely to reflect the strategic concerns regarding this bigger issue. There is also a need to address the issue of plutonium for the use of dirt bombs or ‘plutonium pineapples’ as they are termed. Before the DPRK exports or is suspected to have exported plutonium -- the US would be in a position to make a unilateral declaration, that if DPRK exports plutonium, then it will act decisively. Accordingly the US would then work with partners especially China and Russia to seek alignment. The next step would be to work with the UN to develop a general policy about exports.[72]

            The alternate coercive option for the US if it decides to abandon negotiations and escalates, is the imposition of a strict set of sanctions against Pyongyang that includes economic and political isolation combined with military quarantine tightly controlling what flows in and out of DPRK. Although less provocative than preventive military attack, effective sanctions would bite deeply and raise the risk of an unpredictable reaction from DPRK. While it seems even more unlikely that Pyongyang will opt for suicidal military action as a response to sanctions than to attack, the small possibility of spiraling tensions that produces an unlikely outburst remains a concern. Another possible outcome of the current crisis could be a negotiated agreement. To serve the US interests, such a deal could not simply be a reprise of the 1994 agreed framework.  Technical solutions like challenge inspections, as have been suggested, can increase confidence about compliance. However, the US demand of unfettered free access to any facility might not be acceptable to DPRK.[73] 

            In addition to the resumption of talks with the US and Japan, the DPRK has since 2003 taken some positive measures to reduce tensions. Reestablishing the road and rail links with ROK, demining the DMZ, resuming confidence with ROK by sending 600 athletes to Pusan for the Asian Games, enacting a series of marketing reforms are some of the confidence building measures. Equally important, Pyongyang seems to have abandoned its policy of playing off Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, against one another, by addressing the concerns of one while ignoring those of the other two. To those who think they can outwait Pyongyang by isolating it or pressuring it economically, are likely to be proven wrong. It would be a mistake to underestimate the loyalty of the North Koreans to their leader Kim Yong Il, since they are fiercely independent people and have endured many economic hardships in the past. Their ideology is not only political it is quasi-religious.[74] When provoked they would resort to extreme measures. If the DPRK leaders expect external threats in future, missiles would be their guarantee of security. On the contrary a reduction in the intensity of the external threat would decrease the utility of the ballistic missiles. Similarly, expanding the missile development programme in a threat environment would reduce the domestic political costs for leadership even though it would require greater resources.[75]

            There has also been the proposal of the Ukrainian solution, where it gave up some 1900 former Soviet warheads in exchange for security assurances, economic support and energy assistance.[76]  Voluntarily giving up its nuclear, chemical and missile programmes and by providing exhaustive access to information, facilities and personnel is something that cannot be expected from DPRK, although after Libya it would be the minimum that the US would be expecting.[77] In a realistic perspective, the US basically has four options: using military force to attack DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure, mobilising international pressure, waiting DPRK out and negotiating.[78] If DPRK has decided that nuclear weapons are essential to its security then it might not be possible to achieve an agreed settlement. To be able to agree on a settlement which ensures DPRK’s security and sovereignty; it would be essential for the US to give adequate credence to DPRK’s nuclear capability and delivery systems and negotiate accordingly. On the other hand if DPRK wishes to keep its nuclear weapons and still desire peaceful relations with the US, Japan and ROK it would mean moving back to square one; so a settlement essentially has to be a result of both parties, which implies, moving ahead in view of new strategic realities.

Trying to topple the Kim regime has been proposed. This is seen as imposing sanction through the UN in a joint effort with China, South Korea Japan and Russia. Asking China, which has been DPRK’s top ally, to go further, would likely prove difficult. Similarly, even if the objective is regime change, President of ROK, Roh Moo Hyun, before his impeachment, showed his apprehensions about the idea of a regime change. He considered that even if it was feasible, the costs and sacrifices that might be entailed must also be considered. President Hyun felt that he could convince President Kim about maintaining US troops in the ROK since Mr. Kim had agreed to the fact that we need US troops on the Korean peninsula, even after unification. Resorting to pressure tactics may have a spill-over effect to military action, which does not erode the moral principles or dignity of the US. But resorting to force or using the military options can result in a very dangerous situation for those who live on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand the ROK President felt that the current belligerent attitude of DPRK was hard to understand but it will not stick to it forever.[79] The biggest obstacle to imposing sanctions would most likely come from South Korea and China, who have been reluctant to endorse moves that would destabalise DPRK. The task of enforcing sanctions would fall disproportionately on China, which shares a land border with DPRK and is one of the two transit countries for all the air and land travel to and from DPRK, and is also the largest supplier of food in addition to fuel to DPRK.[80]

The pending problems included the handling of diplomatic pouches, agreements for supplying and supporting the US office in Pyongyang, and DPRK’s inability to find an appropriate office in Washington DC. After the US-DPRK joint declaration was issued the US-ROK relations started to deteriorate. Although ROK was seeking a negotiated settlement of nuclear issue, it was reluctant to see improvement in the relations between the US and DPRK with Seoul on the sidelines. In the current crisis, so far there is no indication that DPRK’s political objectives have changed significantly since 1994. Regime survival by means of normalising relations with the US and obtaining economic assistance from abroad is still its primary goal. In its October 2002 proposal to conclude a ‘non-aggression treaty’ with the US, the DPRK government announced that it was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue if the US recognised its sovereignty, assured DPRK of non-aggression, and did not ‘hinder the economic development of DPRK’. DPRK’s bargaining position has become stronger in some aspects but weaker in others. On the one hand, weaponisation of its nuclear materials seems to have advanced; the uranium enrichment programme has added to the plutonium-based programme; Nodong missiles have been deployed in large numbers; and Taepodong missile has been flight-tested. Uranium enrichment is also a very technical process. Autoclaves are used to turn uranium hexafloride into gaseous form before being injected into the centrifuge. After the uranium is enriched in the centrifuge, desublimers convert the gaseous form back into a solid for further processing. It is unclear whether DPRK received such equipment from alleged Swiss firms clandestinely in 1986.[81] On the other hand, the size of the DPRK economy has shrunk significantly; the country has become more dependent on economic and humanitarian aid from abroad, and its conventional military forces have weakened. DPRK’s position is much weaker now than it was ten years ago. The economy has not improved and the conventional military arsenal is gradually becoming obsolete. The structural factors do not show a positive picture.[82] Any concession by the US in negotiations would be a great confidence builder for DPRK and will help in avoiding the nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. 

Conclusion

If the resolution of the crisis through negotiations were in sight, the major countries in the region would be willing to play their parts. China and Russia would agree to support DPRK economically via investment. All other parties to the deal, US, ROK, Japan, would continue compensation to DPRK in return for ending its long-range missile programme. Finally, five years after the accord is signed, a Northeast Asian Security Forum, consisting of four major powers plus ROK and DPRK, is proposed to ensure long-term peace and stability throughout the region.[83] The US should insist on a verifiable freeze on DPRK’s nuclear reprocessing during the negotiations in return; pledging not to attack DPRK. The negotiations would ease the growing split between the US and its allies and reduce DPRK’s ability to escalate the crisis.[84] These have to be accompanied with reciprocal commitment by the US to be a part of the nuclear non-proliferation and missile control regimes.

            As far as the nuclear programme of DPRK is concerned, it seems that it might not be ready to dismantle it and would most likely use it as a bargaining chip as long as its economy does not reach a sustainable condition. Obviously it is not only the job of the developed countries to fulfill the economic needs of DPRK but this cannot be denied that all the great powers that have been involved in South East Asia since the last fifty years, disassociated themselves from the intervention, war and economic sanctions that the Koreans collectively have had to bear. It seems that DPRK has learnt the lesson that it is only through building credible nuisance value, that the resolution of the crisis can be achieved. Considering this mind-set it is quite likely that if the crisis lingers on for a considerable period of time DPRK will move a step further and go for a limited nuclear option.