Muntzra Nazir* 

 

he security of a state, especially that of a militarily weak state, largely depends on active diplomacy, management of geo-strategic factors to its advantage and an ability to respond to the changing environment. The foreign policy of a state reflects its expectations, capabilities, goals and fears. These factors impact not only on the foreign policy choices of individual states but the foreign patterns of other states with whom they interact.[1] A state pursues numerous goals, but all cannot be achieved at the same time.[2] The goals have to be prioritized with an emphasis on requirements of security and territorial integrity of the state.[3]
         Numerous factors shape a state’s foreign policy. These include ‘the relatively permanent material elements (geography and national resources), less permanent material elements (industrial establishment and military establishment), quantitative and qualitative (population, leadership, ideology and information).[4] Moreover, threat perceptions conditioned by geography, circumstances, historical experiences and ideological moorings, play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy of a state.
        Since the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979, Islam dominates its national and foreign policies. Three additional trends could also be identified in its foreign policy outlook. These include ‘anti-west especially anti-US disposition, non-aligned rather isolationism and excessive nationalism’.[5] These trends, particularly the anti-US posture, were motivated by Iran’s threat perception, i.e., the US is out to undermine the Islamic revolution in Iran. It apprehended US support to anti-Islamic revolution elements and conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf. The geo-strategic environment of Iran also had an impact on its foreign policy and security, as it is situated in a region characterized by a host of problems. Furthermore, the issue of oil intertwined With the above-mentioned factors complicated the scene.[6]

In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Iran entertained a strong distrust of, and hostility towards the United States. The close association of the ousted Shah regime with the US was the major factor behind this policy.  Since then the hostility and mutual antagonism between the US and Iran have been a persistent feature of Iran’s foreign policy. This was the major contributory factor to shaping Iran’s security threat. Furthermore, Iran’s strong desire in the initial years of the revolution to export its Islamic revolutionary ideology to the neighbouring Gulf States created mistrust and antipathy between Iran and regional states.

The end of cold war era did not bring about any significant change in Iran’s foreign policy, as it had not aligned itself with any super power. It had pursued a policy of equal distance from the two super powers, although Iran was more critical of the US.  However, the end of bipolarity in International relations left the US in ‘an unbalanced super power position.’ The US was no longer restrained from pursuing its interests. This enhanced the security risks for Tehran, forcing it to change its foreign policy from an assertive to a defensive one and turning more isolationist in character. The issues and conflicts in the region also contributed to its security problems while their relations remained tense. Following the occupation of Iraq by the US led allied forces in 2003; Iran perceived more threats from the changed regional situation especially the US military presence in the neighbourbood.  This paper attempts to analyze the issues and problems of Iranian security with reference to the changing regional and international environment. It will also examine Iran’s foreign policy and security perceptions, and how have these changed over time.

The Middle East and Iran

The Gulf region, in which Iran is situated, is characterized by a number of inter-related factors. The states in the region have unresolved border disputes, ethnic conflicts and internal power struggles. Religion plays a significant role in their politics and society.  Nevertheless, three main ‘sets of conflicts or security complexes’ have long been playing a major role in threatening the stability of the region. They are: the ‘Arab-Israel conflict, the Arab-Iran conflict and intra-Arab conflict.’[7] These conflicts coupled with poor socio-economic and political conditions of the region cause serious threats to stability in the region.

In the initial years of Islamic revolution, Tehran’s zeal for export of the Islamic revolution in the Gulf region adversely affected relations with the Gulf States. This had implications for regional security. However, the situation improved considerably after the revolutionary zeal cooled off in the early 1990s, starting soon after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeni in June 1989.

‘Islam’ was the main determinant of Tehran’s foreign policy in the early years of the revolution. The Iranian leaders sought to ‘export’ their Islamic revolution by openly questioning the political order in the neighbouring Muslim states, which they described as ‘un-Islamic’. They supported various anti-government organizations and insurgencies in the region. Accordingly, Iran supported a coup attempt by ‘Islamic Front’ in Bahrain in 1981. The Gulf states held the pro-Iranian revolutionary elements responsible for the bombings of Americans and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983. The incidents were interpreted as Iran’s efforts to export the ideology of Islamic revolution to other countries of the region.[8] The demonstrations staged by Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia during the holy occasion of ‘Haj’ in mid-1980s against the Saudi rulers and western interests in the region were meant to challenge the conservative Arab regimes in the region. The demonstrations led to violent clashes between the demonstrators and security guards in 1987. It is said that 400 people were killed in the incidents, straining relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and exacerbating tension in the region.

Iran-Iraq relations deteriorated after the Islamic revolution in Iran on the question of sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab. The situation worsened when the Iranian media encouraged revolt among the Iraqi Shias against the Saddam regime. These developments contributed to undermining Iran-Iraq relations and significantly influencing Iraq’s decision to start the eight- year Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988). The war caused Tehran the loss of thousands of its citizens due to Iraqi chemical-weapon attacks. Several Arab states supported Iraq in the name of Arab nationalism, despite its atrocities against the Iranian civil population. Their main objective was to contain Iran’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence in the region. The war sharpened the political conflicts between the neighbouring Arab states and Iran because the former played up Arab nationalism vs. Iranian Islamic Revolution. This resulted in the further loss of trust between Iran and the Gulf States. Iran’s troubled relations with the US also contributed to straining relations with pro-US Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait.[9]

However, the situation improved markedly after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989. The Iranian political leadership decided to move away from the policy of ‘confrontation’ to a policy of ‘engagement’ and cooperation. It made concrete efforts to patch up its differences with the Arab world. Its efforts were aimed at pulling Iran out of  ‘isolation’. The international environment also facilitated Iran’s overtures towards rapprochement, as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 made the international community view Iran as a more stable and responsible state.[10]

Iran’s policy of reconciliation and engagement helped to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait. In February 1998, Iranian President while paying an official visit to Riyadh stated that ‘we look to Saudi Arabia as the qibla (prayer direction) for all Muslims and as the cradle of Islam.’ The statement was to accept the Saudi position as sole guardian of Islamic holy shrines of Makkah and Medina. Iran sought to establish economic and military ties with these countries to rebuild its economic and military power in the aftermath of the devastating Iran-Iraq war. It, also attempted to cultivate strategic ties in the region. The security agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Iran in April 2001 was an indication that both states sought active cooperation towards developing bilateral relations and on issues related to security and stability of the region.[11] Though Iran continued to make an issue of US military ties with Saudi Arabia, it worked towards improving its relations with the pro-US Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.  Iran adopted a moderate and pragmatic approach by not insisting on the withdrawal of US forces. However, the rapprochement policy had been far less effective towards Egypt as no formal diplomatic links between the two counties were established. Iran did not approve Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel that extended recognition of Israel by Egypt. Apart from Israel-Egypt peace agreement, Egypt’s desire to play a leading role in the region was also questioned by Iran given its pro-US and pro-Israel disposition. Iran’s relations with the UAE also showed some improvement and the two states increased their trade. However, the dispute between the UAE and Iran on the sovereignty of three small islands is not yet settled.[12] On the whole, the relations between Iran and Arab countries improved considerably.

Iran and Big Powers

In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Iran’s main foreign policy slogan  “neither west nor east” shaped its policy towards the major powers. It emphasized staying at a distance from the two super powers and opposition to their global policies. Iran’s foreign policy assumed an ‘isolationist’ character, although the anti-US streak was very conspicuous. Various factors contributed towards Iran’s anti-US disposition.

It may be recalled that Iran’s cordial and intimate relations with the US had come to an abrupt end with the fall of the Pehlavi regime in 1979. Since then relations between the two countries have been marred by mutual distrust, suspicion and open hostility. The fall of Shah, a key US ally in the region, was a severe setback to the United States, which had opposed the Islamic revolution in Iran. It supported the efforts to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran ‘as exemplified by the large amount given to the CIA to support for anti-regime activities.’[13] It provided support to the anti-Islamic revolution elements in Iran and conservative Arab states which resisted Iran’s efforts to export Islamic revolution. In its bid to contain Tehran, the US administration froze Iranian assets in the United States, including the amount paid by Shah for weapons procurement.[14] It actively pursued the policy of isolating Iran internationally especially after the seizure of the American Embassy by the Iranian Islamic guards in November 1979. The hostage crisis was resolved in January 1981. This incident, however, left an indelible negative impact on US-Iran relations. These relations further deteriorated when the US decided to support Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war for understandable reasons. The US Administration wanted Saddam Hussein to inflict a heavy blow on the incipient Iranian revolution.   In 1984, the US placed Iran on the list of states sponsoring terrorism.

In 1990-91, with the end of cold war, the bipolar International system gave way to a unipolar world with the US at the top. In the new international context, the US emerged as the unilateral, military-political super power. Though the end of the bipolarity did not directly weaken or improve Iran’s international position, the ‘unbalanced great power position’ of the US, led Iranian policy makers to review their policies in the changed international context. The leaders continued to reject official dialogues with the US, but began to realize the impending need of engaging US economically. Rafsanjani acknowledged that ‘Iran has never banned economic cooperation with the US’.[15] However, the Clinton administration continued to insist on an official dialogue with Iran ‘as a prelude to progress on a range of bilateral issues.’[16]

            The focus of the US criticism of Iran was mainly on (a) Iran’s alleged support for terrorism, (b) the nuclear programme, (c) its opposition to the Middle East peace process. These issues contributed much to the US perception of Iran as the ‘strongest of the potentially hostile powers’ in the Gulf region, which threatens its interests in the region and elsewhere.[17]

Terrorism

The US charges that “Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism.” Until 1993, Iran had been frequently blamed for assassinating political foes. It was blamed for the killing of Kurdish opposition leader in Germany in 1992 and a former Iranian diplomat and opposition leader in Rome in March 1993. Although Iran denied responsibility of these killings, the International community held Iran responsible for these incidents.  The Iranian government was also accused of harassing the members of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a Marxist oriented organization that supported the Islamic revolution but developed serious differences with the post-revolution Islamic government in Iran. Its activists fled to Iraq, France and some other countries.  The organization organized armed actions in Iran for overthrowing the Iranian government but did not succeed.  The US government accused the Iranian government of persecuting the supporters of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq still left in Iran. However, some activists of this organization also targeted US interests. In October 1997 the US administration declared it as a terrorist organization. 

          The US also accused Iran of being involved in ‘planning, financing or controlling acts of terror’ in the other countries. It was charged with being associated with the bombing of the US personnel’s quarters in Riyadh and Dhahran in November 1995 and June 1996 respectively. It was also maintained that rebellion in Bahrain had Iran’s backing. Another charge against Iran encompassed its support for a number of ‘violent opposition organizations such as Hamas and Hizbullah.[18] Iran, however, repeatedly denied these allegations. Former Iranian president Rafsanjani in his weekly public address complained that “everywhere there is a movement, the name of Iran and Islam is mentioned. The enemies even mention Iran’s name where Iran is not present.”[19]

The issue took a serious turn when in 1996, the US Congress gave the US citizens the right to sue foreign governments for civil damages in the US courts, if the concerned government was classified as the supporter of terrorism. In October 1998, another law passed by the Congress required the state and treasury departments ‘to assist victims of terrorism to locate money for judgment’.[20] Consequently, from 1998-2000, the US had ordered Iranian government to pay more than $1.3 billion to affectees of Iranian terrorism. Iran, however, did not responded to any of these demands.[21]    

In the recent past, Iran attempted to reform its political image by trying to control ‘intelligence operations, foundations and private revolutionary network’. But the US continued to pursue a policy of hostility and containment towards Iran, which strengthened the conservative elements who saw such efforts as ‘futile and humiliating’.[22]

Weapons of Mass Destruction

In the post-cold war era, the US has been constantly expressing increasing concerns over the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear, biological, and chemical and missile technology having the capability to carry these weapons. WMDs have been perceived as a potential threat to US and global security. The US accused Iran of making secret efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

           Iran initiated its nuclear programme with the US backing in the pre-revolution period. Both countries signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation as part of their atoms of peace programme. Their cooperation in the nuclear field came to an end with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979. Initially the post-revolution Iranian leadership decided to abandon the nuclear programme. Khomeini’s verdict that possession of such ‘indiscriminate weapons were against the spirit of Islamic injunctions’ was a decisive factor in this regard.  This position was maintained during the Iran-Iraq war.[23] After Khomeini’s death, the policy was reviewed in the face of Iraq’s continuing efforts to have WMDs, which were viewed as a threat to Iran’s security. The Iranian government decided to revive the nuclear programme. But the US pressure thwarted Iran’s efforts to build nuclear power under US relentless pressure: 

“Germany repeatedly refused Iranian requests, starting in 1984, to complete the Bushehar nuclear power plant begun by the Shah; 

Argentina refused to supply Iran with nuclear-fuel fabrication and reprocessing technology and a 20-30 (MWt) research reactor in 1987

 

China refused to supply Iran with a 30 (MWt) reactor in 1990 and a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant in 1998;             

India refused to supply Iran with 10 (MWt) nuclear research reactor in 1991; Russia declined to transfer a gas centrifuge-enrichment facility or a 30 (MWt) research reactor in 1995 that it had previously promised to Iran.”[24] 

However, Russia later in October in October 2001, agreed to deliver a research reactor for Bushehr nuclear power plant. It also made $7 billion arms deal with Iran, strengthening Iran-Russia military ties.[25] Meanwhile, Iran developed its capability to build missile technology. It successfully tested Shehab missiles in 2000 and subsequently in May 2002.[26] Furthermore, Iran was alleged to be seeking ‘production technology, expertise and precursor chemicals from China and Russia ‘entities’ to build the chemical warfare infrastructure.[27] But Iran had consistently denied that it had any interest to build nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It was signatory of the NPT, and it pointed out on many occasions that inspectors of IAEA had never found any clue that Iran was developing non-conventional weapons. But US continued to claim that Iran was ‘clandestinely’ pursuing efforts to achieve nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capability. In 1990, the placed various sanctions on Iran to press it to abandon its nuclear policies and also sought to convince other countries to follow the suit. Consequently, it succeeded in pressing the European allies and different multilateral lending institutions, not to lend soft loans or credits to Iran.[28] It also sought to penalize the ‘entities’ allegedly providing support to Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1999, it imposed sanctions on seven Russian companies, which it believed, were supporting Iran’s nuclear intentions. This large gap of mistrust between the US and Iran in regard to WMDs contributed much to undermine the efforts to improve relations between the two countries, threatening regional stability.       

The Palestinian Issue

Iran actively supported the Palestine cause against Israel. Iran’s support to the Palestinian cause is based on ideological and humanitarian considerations. The Iranian leadership viewed the Palestinian conflict as a conflict between Islam and Zionism.[29] Therefore, Iran perceived the support for Palestinians and opposition to the Zionist entity as its ‘Islamic obligation’. Moreover, it views Israel as ‘usurper’, occupying Palestinian land and inflicting atrocities on Palestinians. In addition, Iran’s animosity towards the US influenced its approach towards the issue. Israel and the US were considered strategic allies in the region and it perceived Israel as an instrument for establishing American hegemony in the region. Any peace process facilitated by the US was seen as a ploy to safeguard the American and Israeli  interests in the  region. Iran’s hostile attitude towards the Middle East peace process and support to Palestinian guerrilla groups, which attacked Israeli civilian and military targets drew sharp criticism from the US.

          Iran initially extended active support to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However, PLO’s support of Iraq during Iran-Iraq war and its emphasis on ‘Arab nationalism’ led to Iran withdrawing its active support.[30] Since then, Iran though continuing to support the cause of Palestinians, sought to maintain its links with radical Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Lebanese Shia group like the Hizbullah, which fought Israel for almost two decades had special relations with the Iranian leadership. Iran strengthened them with the aim of counteracting Israel. It also made an alliance with Syria, a frontline state against Israel.[31]

Initially, Israel attempted to maintain secret relations with moderate elements in the Iranian government. It even facilitated an arms deal between the US and Iran (Iran-Contra affairs) aimed at resolving the ‘Lebanese hostage crisis’ in 1983. Israel’s strategy of seeking ways to mend relations with Iran was based on Ben Gurion’s doctrine against Arabs that envisaged the total peace with Arab countries ‘impossible’. Hence, Israel sought a strategic partnership with Iran in the region to secure its interests. But the initiation of the peace process in the Middle East in 1991 and the Madrid peace talks changed the scenario. The peace with Arabs was no longer an impossibility. Iran opposed the ‘peace process’, describing it as a futile attempt, which could not provide a just solution of the conflict. Iran believed that as a result of the peace talks, peace in the region would remain an illusion as these efforts were motivated by ‘western interests’ in the region.

Given Iran’s persistent opposition to US sponsored peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel describes Iran as a state that sponsors terrorism and uses the powerful Jewish lobby in the US to block any effort for the improvement of Iran-US relations. It extensively blamed Iran for the ‘proxy war’ against Israel through the Lebanon based Hizbullah organization (an organization fighting against Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory). Iran refused to accept any of these accusations, though it never denied having relations with the Lebanese Shia community. Israel also expressed deep concern over Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programme.

            Following the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, Israel accelerated its campaign against Iran, implicating it as the main supporter of ‘terrorism’. In January 2002, Israeli commandos seized a boat allegedly carrying 50 tons of Iranian arms, enroute to the Palestinian authority. Israel readily condemned Iran for it. It blamed Iran for trying to escalate the Middle East conflict to a new level. The incident seemed to have a significant role in convincing Bush administration that Iran was an agent behind the terrorist activities in the region. In his first state of union address (January-March, 02) the US President placed Iran in the ‘axis of evil’ along with Iraq and North Korea. Israel kept urging the US for the regime change in Iran, even if it required the employment of coercive measures.

South Asia and Afghanistan

The South Asian region with India and Pakistan as the principal actors has always attracted Iran’s attention. Iran has traditionally maintained good relations with India and Pakistan; the latter has generally enjoyed precedence in Iran’s South Asia policy.  Pakistan was the first Islamic country to recognize the Islamic Revolutionary government in February 1979.

           Iran shares with Pakistan historical, religious, and cultural affinities. They shared a common view on various International issues including Palestine and Kashmir (a source of conflict between India and Pakistan). On the issue of Kashmir, Iran supported Pakistan to the extent of canceling a visit of Indian foreign minister in 1993 as protest against Indian’s Kashmir policy. However, Iran and Pakistan diverged in their policies towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had some negative implications on their bilateral relations. On the other hand Indo-Iranian relations took an upward swing with increased economic and strategic cooperation.  Since Iranian President Hashmi Rafsanjani’s visit to India in 1996, there has been marked improvement in Indo-Iranian relations, causing concerns among certain circles in Pakistan. Moreover, the sectarian conflict in Pakistan (Shia-Sunni), resulting in killings of many people including several Iranian personnel, became a source of conflict between the two countries.

Afghanistan shares a 900 km long border with Iran. Despite historical and cultural linkages, the two countries faced ethno-sectarian differences. These differences intensified during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996-2001). It brought Iran into conflict not only with the Taliban regime but with Pakistan also.

        Iran and Pakistan, keen to have a friendly government in Kabul, worked on divergent lines. Iran supported Tajik and Hazara communities, whereas Pakistan backed the Pushtuns in the power struggle following the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.  In 1994 Taliban emerged on the political scene and rapidly assumed control of a major part of Afghanistan. They had the backing of Islamabad but did not develop friendly relations with Tehran. Iran continued to support Tajik and Hazara groups. The divergent approaches caused further deterioration in Iran’s relations with Pakistan as well as with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  In 1998, the Taliban, following the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, killed a number of Iranian diplomats, allegedly supporting the Northern Alliance. Though Pakistan denied its involvement in the incident, it became a contentious issue between Iran and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran moved its troops to the Afghan border to apply pressure on Afghanistan in context of killings of its diplomats. A near war situation was averted but the relations between Iran and Afghanistan remained strained, with a negative fallout on Pakistan-Iran relations because Iran viewed Pakistan as the main supporter of the Taliban regime in Kabul.

           With the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 it was expected that relations between Pakistan and Iran would improve. But, Pakistan’s decision to join coalition forces against the Al Qaeda organization based in Afghanistan (an organization led by Osama Bin Laden, widely blamed for attacks on the US) under relentless US pressure did not get a favourable response from Tehran. As American presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia seemed to be a long-term possibility, Iran’s anxiety regarding its security increased. Iran continued with its involvement in Afghanistan by using its linkages with the Northern Alliance leadership. It also took keen interest in rebuilding of Afghanistan. However its growing interest in Afghanistan caused apprehensions in the US, which did not favour Iran’s active involvement in Afghanistan.

          The Central Asian states have been facing a host of problems including religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking emanating from an unstable Afghanistan.[32] Iran, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, worked hard to expand its relations with these states, but Iran’s Shia character stood in the way of establishing cordial relations with these states, especially with Turkmenistan which shares a border with Iran. As an analyst stated “Iran’s Persian-Shia character and influence of Iranian civilization in the region are resented by some of these countries”[33] Moreover, the US military presence in the Central Asian region coupled with its efforts to minimize the influence of Tehran in the region generated serious security concerns in Iran.

Current Scenario

The US led war on Iraq (March-April 2003) was a turning point in the conduct of International relations. After 9/11 the Americans developed a ‘security paranoia’ and pursued a policy of  preemptive  strike to counter  the  sources of paranoia’ and pursued a policy of preemptive strike to counter the sources of perceived threats to their security. The US launched a military action against Afghanistan in October-November 2001 which had support of the international community. The success in Afghanistan encouraged it to use the same strategy in Iraq, but this did not have the support of the UN. The US pursued the unilateral action against Iraq due mainly to the absence of a countervailing power and cleavages and divisions in the Middle East and dependence of most of the regional states on the US.[34]  

        The Iranian government condemned the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. Iran’s Special Forces provided useful intelligence against Taliban and Al Qaeda (an organization blamed for attacks) members to the Americans. It also used its influence over SCIRI (supreme council for Islamic revolution in Iraq) an opposition group working against the Saddam regime to join hands with other groups who had patronage of the US against Saddam Hussein. It even did not make an issue of American violation of Iranian airspace and coastal waters. However, with the occupation of Iraq by the US military, the Iranian government expressed serious concern about the expected long-term stay of US and other allied troops in Iraq. The US on the other hand, began to apply pressure on Iran with reference to three major issues: 

·         Iran was fomenting trouble in Iraq (post US invasion) by supporting the dissident elements that were challenging the presence of US and other troops in Iraq.

·         Iran was accused of giving refuge to Al Qaeda operators, responsible for a series of bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia in which 34 people were killed including nine Americans. It was also alleged that Iranian government was deliberately not taking effective actions against terrorists within its borders.

·         ‘’They accused Iran of pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme.’[35] 

The US deputy defense secretary, John Wolf asserted that “Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq.”[36] With the demise of perceived threat from Iraq, Israel also accelerated its campaign against Iran. Israel believed that Iran’s nuclear ambitions were mainly aimed at hurting Israel’s interests in the region. It insisted that Iran was much closer to producing nuclear weapons than the US intelligence believed, and urged the US to take direct action to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. The EU also expressed serious concern over Iran’s nuclear programme. A joint declaration issued by the foreign ministers of EU demanded Iran’s “urgent and unconditional protocol under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to provide for surprise inspections of its nuclear sites.”[37] Russia also shared a similar view with the US and other powers on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme as it considered Iran’s nuclear weapons capability not in the interests of the regional security. On the conclusion of Camp David talks between the US and Russia on September 27, 2003, Mr. Putin declared that Russia had no intention of contributing in any way to the creation of weapons of mass destruction.[38] He indicated cancellation of a deal with Iran regarding the sale of a nuclear power plant to Tehran. Iran on the other hand continues to deny its ambitions to develop nuclear-weapons capability. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi asserted “we do not find the development of nuclear weapons increase security. Contrary to that, we find it to be a threat to national security.”[39] Nevertheless, the International community did not buy the argument.

Western pressure on Iran mounted with IAEA inspectors’ statement that they have found traces of weapons grade uranium on the nuclear equipment. The UN Security Council and the IAEA fixed October 31, 2003, as the deadline for Iran to prove that it was not working on a nuclear weapons programme. They also demanded that Iran cease all uranium enrichment activity; also sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol for non-proliferation and inspections. Iran fiercely denied allegations of nuclear weapons and argued that the traces of enriched uranium came on imported equipments. However, Iran agreed to sign an additional protocol for providing information on its nuclear programme. It also agreed to a comprehensive inspection of its nuclear installations. Three European countries -- Britain, Germany and France played an active role in convincing Iran to accept international inspections and fold back its nuclear programme.  They also promised to cooperate with Tehran to work for strengthening its security. 

Iran has provided information about its nuclear programme to the IAEA, including information how it was setting up a nuclear enrichment facility. It named the people from the international underworld who helped Iran to acquire uranium enrichment know-how. They named some Pakistani nuclear scientists. When Libya decided to abandon its nuclear programme in December 2003 and also disclosed the sources of procurement of nuclear technology, which included some Pakistani names.

The information from the nuclear programmes of Iran and Libya put Pakistan on the spot for the role of some of its scientists in the alleged proliferation of nuclear technology. This led Pakistan to institute an inquiry into the nuclear transfers from Pakistan by some nuclear scientists in their personal capacity. Pakistan also reiterated its commitment to the safety and security of its nuclear weapons programme and no transfer of nuclear technology.

Conclusions

Iran’s foreign policy is shaped by ideological and other factors and   Islamic norms and ideals have had a profound impact on its foreign policy choices. However, with the passage of time, especially after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini, ideological considerations were softened to accommodate other considerations like the geostrategic considerations and the changing character of the international system. The perceptions of insecurity as cultivated by the ruling elite had a strong impact on its foreign policy. Though Iran advocated a non-aligned foreign policy, it was greatly influenced by its troubled relations with the United States. It perceived the US as its greatest adversary that wanted to destroy the Islamic revolution and establish its hegemony in the region.  Israel was viewed as an extension of US hegemonic drive in the region and a usurper of Palestinians’ land and their rights. Iran thus supported the Palestinian cause and adopted a hard line towards Israel.

Iran sought to build close relations with the European states, which had a better understanding of Iranian concerns and interests. Given the geostrategic realities, Iran also attempted to build close relations with India, Russia and China and attached great importance to building its nuclear and missile technology programme. It has developed 1500 to 3000 km range missiles, which caused much concern in the western world and Israel.  Iran has generally maintained cordial relations with Pakistan and supported its position on Kashmir. However, Pakistan-Iran relations ran into difficulties as they competed for influence in Afghanistan in the 1990s; they supported opposing groups in Afghanistan.  With the end of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s relations with Iran have shown some improvement, although they continue to be inclined towards different groups in that country.

            The rise of the US as the sole super power after the end of the Cold War created much apprehension in Iran because of  its strained relations with that country. Though Iran condemned the terrorist attack in the US in September 2001, it took exception to unilateralism in US policy that manifested in a stark manner in Iraq in 2003. Iran was happy that Saddam Hussein was dislodged from power but US military presence next door was an undesirable development. However, it has worked seriously for improving its relations with the neighbouring Gulf States in the 1990s. From a relationship of mutual distrust due to the revolutionary zeal of Iran in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution and the pro-US policies of the Gulf States, the sides adopted a negative, if not an hostile attitude towards each other. Now, Iran and the Gulf kingdom have adopted an accommodative disposition towards each other, which has reduced tension in the region and improved economic and diplomatic interaction between Iran and the Gulf states, although Iran continues to oppose the monarchical form of government and US military presence in the Gulf  region. 
         Iran’s decision to open its nuclear programme to international inspections and give information about the sources of procurement of nuclear technology shows the acceptance of the power realities in the present day international system when the US and other major powers are much concerned about weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. This decision has put Pakistan in a difficult diplomatic situation because Iran has named some Pakistani personnel as sources of procurement of nuclear technical know how.