War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective

 

Syed Rifaat Hussain*

 

 

his paper[1] is divided into five distinct but interrelated sections. It begins by noting the significance of the Pakistani perspective on the global war on terror. The second section deals with the most salient features of this perspective. The third section highlights the key elements of Islamabad’s response to the events of September 11, including some of its action strategies as a frontline state in the war against terror. The fourth section outlines some of the challenges faced by Islamabad as a pivotal coalition partner in the ongoing global campaign against terrorism. The paper concludes with some observations concerning what needs to be done by way of next steps to help Pakistan successfully cope with some of these challenges. 

 

1.                   Significance of the Pakistani Perspective

The significance of the Pakistani perspective derives from four factors.

The first and foremost is its geography. Pakistan’s location at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia and Southwest Asia makes the country a pivotal state.[2]  Pivotal states include those countries that have the potential to work significant or harmful effects on their regions. According to Robert Chase et al., “these are not desperately poor… all of them are large, populous states with a growing middle class, considerable infrastructural and educational investments, and an “emerging markets” potential that involves increasing integration into the global economy…Each pivotal state…influences its neighbours through extensive economic and/or political linkages. These linkages suggest that if a pivotal state grows smoothly and equitably, its success would nurture other states in the region. Conversely, chaos in a pivotal state…would generate transboundary mayhem in the form of severed trade links, increased migration, communal violence, pollution, disease and so on.”[3]

The second factor imparting significance to the Pakistani perspective pertains to its “Muslim Episteme” – its creation as an ideological state. Pakistan’s Muslim essence is reinforced by the fact that the country is surrounded either by Muslim states (Afghanistan and Iran) or by states with large Muslim populations such as Russia, China and India.

Pakistan’s demography as the 6^th most populous country with rapidly growing population also makes it an important regional player.

The fourth reason lending importance to the Pakistani perspective on the war on terror relates to its crisis-prone rivalry with neighbouring India, which has acquired a deadly dimension following India-Pakistan overt nuclearization in May 1998.

Because of these reasons, the former national security adviser Sandy Berger has aptly described Pakistan along with Egypt as the “twin towers” of the Western support in the Muslim world which the terrorists would like to bring down to promote a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West.

It should be noted here that while imparting geostrategic significance to it, geography is also Pakistan’s enemy in one critical respect, namely, its lack of “strategic depth”.

The absence of geographical depth makes it impossible for Pakistan to purse a defensive strategy by trading away geographic space for reaction time.

As often pointed out by Pakistani strategic planners, India’s capture of just 140 kilometers would wipe out Pakistan because its communication, irrigation, industry and population are all together within that depth.

This lack of geographical depth[4] has not only constrained Pakistan to embrace the doctrine of  “offensive defense” in a conventional war with India but also created the compulsion for it to look for a friendly regime in Kabul to secure the western frontier.

II.        Salient Features of the Pakistani Perspective on the war on terrorism

The Pakistani perspective on the ongoing war on terrorism has five noteworthy features:

First, there is no single unified Pakistani perspective on the war on terror. Rather, there are multiple views and perspectives.

This multiplicity reflects the diverse nature of Pakistani public opinion, the differential impact of the war on terror on Pakistani society and economy and the deeply contested nature of the role of Islam and religion in Pakistani politics and its relationship to the country’s foreign policy.

Second, Pakistani views on the war against terrorism are inextricably linked to prevailing attitudes towards the United States. Those opposed to the war on terror regard this war as unjust largely because of their deeply ingrained ideological and political opposition to the United States as a global hegemon.

Those who support the war on terror are also favorably disposed toward the United States.

Third, while the ruling military-bureaucratic-political elite has tended to be supportive of the war on terror, the communicative elite in Pakistan has tended to be somewhat critical of the official policy of “unstinted cooperation” with the United States. This is mainly due to reasons of national sovereignty and deep-seated distrust of the United States.

Four, the most vocal societal opposition to the war on terror has emanated from the extreme elements of the religious right in Pakistan especially those who had long supported the Taliban regime in Kabul for ideological, political and economic reasons. The JUI controlled Madrassas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are the hotbed of this religiously motivated “Islamic” opposition to the United States.

Fifth, despite many recent surveys including the 2002 PEW Study, which depict overwhelming majority of the Pakistanis opposing the war on terror, the reality on ground is different and more complex.

For example, when asked whether they supported the US-led war on terror, majority of the Pakistanis (as indeed majorities in many other Muslim countries) said no.

But when asked whether terrorist attack on the WTC were morally justified 61% of Pakistanis (as indeed majorities in many other Muslim countries) said no. This clearly shows that while expressing their opposition to the US-led war on terror, most Pakistanis are also strongly opposed to the killing of the innocent civilians by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the name of Islam.[5]

It is pertinent to mention here that the total number of people who took part in the pro-Taliban demonstrations in Pakistan after the start of the US military campaign on October 7, 2001 did not exceed 240,000. This is a tiny number in a country of 140 million people.

The largest single rally that was organized by the Pakistan-Afghan Defence Council – an umbrella organization of more than dozen pro-Taliban religious groups and parties – in November 2001 in the biggest city of Pakistan, Karachi, where 14 million people live, managed to attract only 40,000 people.

The results of the October 2002 national elections in Pakistan, which many have mistakenly seen as a clear indication of the gathering religious storm on Pakistan’s electoral horizon, also corroborate this trend.

The Mutahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a political alliance of six religious parties, namely, the Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul Haq), Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan and the Markazi Jamia Al-Hadith (Sajid Mir Group), did not get more than 20 per cent of the popular vote, the same percentage they received during the 1970 national elections.

The bulk of their electoral support came from the North Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan, which are contiguous with Afghanistan.

It would be erroneous to think that MMA’s electoral victory in these provinces was purely a vote for their Islamic agenda. The economic dislocation caused by the decimation of the illicit trade economy of $2.1 billions[6] due to the war in Afghanistan was as potent a reason for MMA’s success in these elections as was the inability of the mainstream political parties to field strong candidates against those put up by the MMA.

 

III.      Musharraf Government response to the 9/11 attack

Pakistan became a pivotal coalition partner of the U.S-led global war against terrorism after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

A day after the attack the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage met with the head of the ISI, General Mehmood, who was visiting Washington and told him in the presence of Pakistan’s Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi to make a choice: “You are either 100 per cent with us or 100 per cent against us. There is no grey area.”[7]

The Pakistani officials promptly called General Musharraf in Islamabad to convey the stark choice facing Pakistan. In a “snap decision” General Musharraf told them to let Washington know that it would get “what it wanted.”

Two days later US conveyed a set of seven  “non-negotiable” demands to Islamabad.[8]

On September 14, Secretary of State Colin Powell called General Musharraf in Islamabad and bluntly told him: “the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in this fight with the United States.” [9] General Musharraf, much to Mr. Powell’s “surprise”, readily agreed to “support the United States with each of the seven actions.”[10]

Having said an unqualified yes to American demands, General Musharraf then convened a meeting of his corps commanders, members of the National Security Council and top political aides to seek their endorsement of his “personal” decision.

After a marathon debate lasting six hours, General Musharraf got the backing of his corps commanders. 

Following his assurance of “unstinted cooperation” to Washington in the fight against terrorism, Pakistan closed its airspace for several hours to enable the United States to “prepare to deploy a small group of forces at northern military bases in Pakistan.”  It seems pertinent here to ask why did Islamabad jettison Taliban-controlled Afghanistan so swiftly?  Was it a tactical adjustment or a maneuver or a strategic choice?

In his 19 September, 2001 address to the nation, President Musharraf proffered five reasons for offering unstinted cooperation to the US:

 

1.    Secure Pakistan’s strategic assets;

2.    Safeguard the cause of Kashmir;

3.    Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state;

4.    Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul;

5.    Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation.[11]

 

One can make a strong case that General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to abandon the Taliban was not only a rational policy response to the cataclysmic events of 9/11 but also a logical outgrowth of his pre- 9/11 reformist agenda. In his address to the nation on 17 October 1999, a week after the military coup, General Pervez Musharraf identified the following seven aims and objectives of his regime:

One:     Rebuild national confidence and morale

Two:    Strengthen federation, remove provincial disharmony

Three:   Revive economy and restore investor confidence

Four:    Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice

Five:     Depoliticise state institutions

Six:       Devolution of power to the grass root level

Seven:   Ensure swift and across the board accountability.[12]

The military regime of General Musharraf faced three sets of challenges prior to 9/11. These ranged from issues relating to a faltering economy, to difficulties resulting from Islamabad’s international isolation, to problems spawned by the rising tide of sectarian violence. It seems pertinent to discuss each of these challenges briefly.
 

Pakistan’s Economic Crisis

General Pervez Musharraf inherited a vulnerable and sick economy, which needed urgent attention to avoid economic collapse.

A third of the Pakistani population is living below the poverty threshold, defined by the World Bank as income of less than a dollar a day.

Pakistan’s external debts add up to $38 billion, half the size of the country’s GDP of 76 billion. Servicing the external and internal debt consumes more than half of the national budget.[13] 

By 2000, more than three quarters of the federal budget was going to defense and debt servicing, with very little remaining for spending on social programs.

According to a World Bank assessment, Pakistan needed international financial assistance to the tune of 6 billion dollars until the year 2004 in order to get out of the debt trap.

He took some painful and unpopular measures to put the economy back on track.

He brought in an oil-price mechanism which led to significant price rises of 7.5 to 22.5 percent; imposed a General Sales Tax on electricity; abolished some wheat subsides and announced curtailing public sector jobs by 12 per cent.

In November 2000, a National Accountability Bureau was set up to oversee the recovery of $5 billions from loan defaulters, mostly corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen.

General Pervez Musharraf also tried to tackle the problem of tax evasion in agriculture, in service industries and in business.

The number of taxpayers is put at 1.2 million out of a population of 140 million. He brought in a tax on agricultural income and a Sales Tax on services.[14]

Most significantly, the Musharraf regime decided to reduce the defence budget by 5% as part of its economic recovery plan.

Pakistan’s Diplomatic Isolation

Prior to 11 September Pakistan also stood isolated on the international front. At least, five factors combined to produce this disagreeable situation. The first factor related to the shift in American geopolitical focus after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. During four decades of its hegemonic competition with the Soviet Union, Washington cultivated strategic ties with Pakistan and enabled it to assume the role of a “frontline” state in the East-West cold war. Out of deference to its strategic compulsions of fighting the "evil empire" during the Afghan war, Washington not only bolstered Pakistan's conventional military capabilities but also turned a blind eye to Islamabad’s nuclear pursuits which had occasioned the use of American anti-proliferation laws against Pakistan in the late 1970s. However, following the Soviet military defeat in Afghanistan in 1988 and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Washington no longer felt compelled to continue to accord Pakistan the same kind of geo-strategic primacy which it had enjoyed during the heyday of the Cold War. Pakistan's active nuclear programme once again became the focus of American punitive action. In October 1990, all American aid to Pakistan was suspended and in 1993 Washington demanded that Islamabad should "roll back" its nuclear programme. Islamabad's refusal to submit itself to American non-proliferation goals also evoked the specter of Pakistan being put on the list of those countries whom Washington accused of sponsoring "terrorism".

             The second factor which compounded Pakistan's diplomatic difficulties in the post-cold war period and put it squarely on the wrong side of "history" was Islamabad's decision to embrace overt nuclearization by conducting tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. Having carried out its nuclear tests against the collective will of the international community, including repeated entreaties by Washington for "restraint", Pakistan was made to pay a heavy diplomatic and economic price by the world for this act of defiance. Led by the United States, fourteen countries, including Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden, suspended bilateral aid programs as a sanction against Pakistan. They also suspended all loans to Pakistan, which totaled $231 million in 1997-98, and canceled grant aid of approximately $55 million. The United States and other shareholders in the IMF also formed a coalition to block disbursement of the IMF credit and the parallel adjustment loan from the World Bank to Pakistan. These punitive international measures coupled with bad economic policy decisions, such as the freezing of all foreign currency accounts by the Nawaz Sharif government, contributed significantly to the crisis of international confidence in Pakistan and also resulted in the loss of vitally needed foreign exchange by the country.

            The third factor, which contributed to Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation, was the total mismanagement of the Kargil operation by the Nawaz government. Unable to defend and project the Kargil incursion as a logical outcome of Indian policy of territorial aggression against Pakistani-administered part of Siachin, the Nawaz Sharif government let the Indian media distort Islamabad's limited involvement in Kargil as a paradigm case of military invasion of “Indian” territory by Pakistan. Additionally, by keeping its "back-channel" links with New Delhi open and active during the entire Kargil episode,  the Nawaz government gave credence to the malicious Indian propaganda that Kargil was a “rogue” military operation, which had been carried out to sabotage the great “Lahore spirit”, unleashed by Vajpayee’s “peace journey” to Pakistan in February 1999.

Buying the Indian line on Kargil, the international community led by United States exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights and also to commit itself to observing the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Frightened by the specter of an internationally supported full-scale Indian military retaliation, Nawaz Sharif sued for peace essentially on Indian terms. The July 4 joint statement which he signed with President Bill Clinton in Washington not only called for “concrete steps” aimed at the “restoration of the (LoC)” but also clearly stated that India-Pakistan dialogue would get underway after “the sanctity of the LoC has been fully restored.” India and the world have taken this to mean a unilateral undertaking by Pakistan not to stoke further the fires of armed struggle in the Indian-held part of Kashmir. The extent of Islamabad’s international isolation during the Kargil episode was dramatically illustrated by the studied indifference with which China dealt with the whole issue. During their June 1999 visits to China, Beijing told the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that Islamabad should not expect China to “take sides” in an armed conflict between India and Pakistan and that escalation of their tensions had ill-served the cause of regional peace and security.

             The fourth factor, which reinforced Pakistan’s drift toward diplomatic isolation, was the 12 October military coup and Pakistan’s visible retreat from democracy. Although necessitated by multiple crises of governance, economic collapse, social segmentation and political discord facing the country, the bloodless military coup by General Musharraf was seen by the world community as a step in the wrong direction. As a consequence, additional American sanctions were imposed on Pakistan and Islamabad’s membership of the British Commonwealth was suspended.

            The fifth and perhaps the most significant factor underlying Islamabad’s diplomatic isolation prior to 9/11 was its increasingly failing pro-Taliban Afghan policy. Having played a key role in their rise to power in Kabul in September 1996, Islamabad began to suffer from the syndrome of “guilt by association.” As the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan faced international criticism and sanctions on account of Mullah Muhammed Omar’s harsh internal rule and his insistence to treat Osama bin Laden as his “honored guest” and not as a terrorist, who should face an international trial, Islamabad found itself in the unenviable position of being the “sole spokesman” for the world community’s “constructive” engagement with the Taliban. Additionally, Pakistan faced sustained international diplomatic pressure to seek Taliban’s compliance with international demands for the closure of terrorist camps and the handover of Osama bin Laden.[15] Islamabad’s repeated but failed attempts to influence the fundamentalist Taliban regime not only put Pakistan at risk to face adverse consequences of supporting the Taliban but also made Islamabad realize the limits of its influence over its client regime in Kabul. This was graphically illustrated in March 2001 when despite a personal appeal from General Pervez Musharraf, the Taliban under the direct orders of Mullah Muhammed Omer, destroyed the pre-Islamic Bamiyan Buddhas.

Deteriorating Law and Order

This is graphically illustrated by the accelerating rate of sectarian killings in the country.[16] In 1989 there were only ten incidents of sectarian violence and by year 2001 there were 261 such incidents occurring mostly in the largest province of Pakistan, Punjab.

Between his coup on 12 October 1999 and August 2001, sectarian violence left 220 dead and 2,000 wounded.

In April 2000, nineteen Shia worshippers were killed and thirty-seven were injured when Lashkar-i-Jhangavi assaulted a Shia mosque in Rawalpindi.

These outbreaks of violence were fomented mainly by two Sunni organizations: the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and their nemesis Sipah-i-Mohammed Pakistan – a Shia movement.

To bring this worsening law and order situation under control, General Musharraf unequivocally condemned Islamic extremism in his June 2001 speech to the Seerat Conference in Islamabad and on 14 August 2001 announced a ban on Lashkar-i-Jhangavi and Sipah-e-Mohammed.

In his address to the 25^th National Seerat Conference on 5 June 2001 in Islamabad, General Musharraf urged the religious leaders to lend him their support to promote religious and sectarian harmony in the country.

He told them that as opposed to our claim that  “lslam is vibrant and forward looking…and most tolerant of faiths,” the outside world  “looks upon us as terrorists”. This is simply because  “we have been killing each other. And now we want to spread violence and terror abroad. Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists. Our claim of tolerance is phony in its eyes…. For our internal strife, the outside world is asked to declare us terrorists. Some say we are primitive. Others say we are a failed state. It hurts badly. We are one hundred and forty million, we are a nuclear power, and yet somebody gets up and tells us we are a failed state.”  To counter this view “religious and sectarian harmony” had become an inescapable necessity in Pakistan.”

On 18 June 2001, General Pervez Musharraf took the decision to promulgate the Pakistan Madrasas Education Board Ordinance 2001 under which over 10,000 religious seminaries – Madrasas – were to be brought into the public education system through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit.

These observations clearly indicate that by the time 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred General Musharraf was fully engaged in a multi-pronged effort aimed at the revival of economy, improvement of law and order situation and to help Pakistan reposition itself internationally. The events of 9/11 offered his regime the opportunity to accelerate the pace of this ongoing effort.

Pakistan’s participation in the US-led global coalition against terrorism was thus driven by several interlinked objectives. These include:

 

·         Diminishing the threat from the extremist Islamist movement inside Pakistan;

·         Avoiding the disintegration of Afghanistan, which would aggravate the serious refugee problems for Pakistan and potentially engulf the Western section of the country;

·         Preventing the emergence in Kabul of a successor government hostile to Pakistan;

·         Improving ties with the West, particularly the United States, to prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis against Pakistan;

·         Seeking international help and assistance to enhances Pakistan’s institutional capacity to effectively cope with the rising menace of  “homegrown” sectarian terrorism;

·         Rehabilitating Pakistan’s image as a moderate, liberal, Muslim state. Avoid becoming part of the “axis of evil”.

In pursuit of these goals the Musharraf government took a number of steps. 

 

IV.       Actions Taken by Pakistan (post 9/11)

·         Sharing of intelligence on terrorist activity with the United States and its allies.

·         Ban on Jihadi organizations such as LAT, JEM, TNFJM, SSP, TNSM;

·         Strengthening of an anti-terrorist law and  setting up of anti-terrorist courts with military’s participation;

·         Condemnation at the highest level of acts of international terrorism performed by groups with societal links and roots in Pakistan.

·         Ban on display and carrying of weapons.

·         Freezing of financial assets of the banned Jihadi groups.

·         Freezing of bank accounts of more than 50 organizations suspected of links with sectarianism or international terrorism.

·         The decision to incorporate the anti-terrorism recommendations of the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in Pakistani banking laws.[17]

·         Arrest and trial of those involved in terrorist activities.

·         Hunting down and arrest of remnants of “Al-Qaida” network in Pakistan. According to official Pakistani figures more 443 Al-Qaeda suspects belonging to 18 different nationalities have been handed over to the US authorities[18].

·         Ban on “hate speech” during Friday prayers.

·         Setting up of a special anti-terrorist task force.

·         In March 2002, Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around Tora Bora to block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into the Pakistani territory.[19] Deployment of over 70,000 regular troops along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to prevent the Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing the border into Pakistan.

·         According to a Department of Defense fact sheet released on 28 May 2002, “Pakistan has provided bases and over flight permissions for all US and coalition forces, deployed a large number of troops along the Afghanistan border, has spent a large portion of its logistical reserves to support the coalition, a very significant contribution in light of the country’s current economic difficulties and self-defence support requirements, and ISI has helped in various phases of the operation.”[20]

 

V.        Challenges facing Pakistan

The most serious challenge facing Pakistan is the threat from religious Islamic militancy. Scott Sagan calls it the “Jihadi Boomerang”. This threat of homegrown militancy has been compounded by the spill-over effects of the ongoing war against terrorism in Afghanistan. As a consequence, Pakistan has been transformed into, to use Steve Metz’s terminology, a “Category II sanctuary” for terrorist activity. Category II states, according to Metz, tolerate terrorist activity not as a deliberate policy but “because of fear, weakness, or sympathy.”[21] The fight against terrorism has now become an existential issue for Pakistan. This means that unless the terrorist threat is brought under control, the coherence and viability of the Pakistani society cannot be fully guaranteed.

            The second security challenge that Islamabad faces is the rising possibility of war with India on account of Islamabad’s perceived unwillingness to discourage “cross border terrorism” in the Indian-held Kashmir. The relations between India and Pakistan reached their lowest ebb after the December 13 incident of terrorist attack on India's parliament in which over a dozen people, including five security guards, were killed. Despite Islamabad's swift and strong condemnation of the attack, Prime Minister Vajpayee accused Islamabad of supporting Kashmiri militant outfits such as Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, whom he blamed for carrying out the attack.

            Islamabad denied these allegations and accused New Delhi of “stage-managing” the attack to discredit the Kashmiri struggle for freedom and also to give a bad name to Pakistan as a state supporting terrorism. Having warned Islamabad of dire consequences if it failed to address New Delhi’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism, especially the arrest and handing over to India of Maulana Masood Azhar, head of Jaish-i-Mohammed, who was released from Indian prison as a swap for a hijacked Indian Airliner in late December 1998, India announced that it had begun deploying troops along its border with Pakistan and that its short-range missile had been put “in position.” New Delhi also rejected Islamabad’s call for an independent investigation of the December 13 attack on Indian Parliament and described as “cosmetic” Islamabad's decision to freeze the financial assets of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed and to detain the latter's leader.

            Worried that a shooting war between India and Pakistan would derail its ongoing military campaign against Al-Qaeda network of terrorism in Afghanistan, Washington repeatedly called on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint. Following New Delhi’s decision to recall its envoy from Pakistan and announcement of tit-for-tat economic and diplomatic sanctions by both sides, the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan called on Islamabad and New Delhi to “avoid escalating actions and further statements that could aggravate the situation between both countries.”

            Despite these calls for restraint, relations between India and Pakistan remained explosively volatile. With warlike noises emanating from New Delhi, on 12 January 2002, President Musharraf in his address to the nation announced a sweeping reform agenda. Condemning the radical Islamists who had set up a “state within a state” unequivocally, he declared his determination to rid the Pakistani society of their pernicious influence. He announced a ban on all sectarian-related activity and set up speedy trial courts to punish those involved in it. Most significantly, he banned six extremist Islamic groups involved in sectarian campaigns in the country including Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed that had already been designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department. Signaling a qualitative shift in Pakistan’s involvement in the Islamic militancy in Kashmir, President Musharraf said, “No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir.”

            Two days before President Musharraf’s landmark speech, Islamabad announced the setting up of National Kashmir Committee, under the presidency of the moderate Sardar Muhammed Abdul Qayyum Khan, former President of Azad Kashmir. The purpose of this Kashmir Committee was to continue the struggle for the rights of the Kashmiri people by new means. Islamabad’s sweeping measures to curb Islamic militancy in Pakistan and to end armed support to the insurgents in Kashmir, however, failed to dissipate the war clouds.

            Fearing that war with India was imminent, Pakistan withdrew more than 50,000 troops it had deployed along its border with Afghanistan to prevent the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces from entering into its territory.  Islamabad also informed Washington that in the event of an India-Pakistan war, it would have to reclaim some of its airfields, which had been loaned to the United States for its military operations in Afghanistan.

            To prevent looming India-Pakistan war playing havoc with its military campaign against Al-Qaeda forces, Washington launched a frantic diplomatic campaign to defuse the crisis. Following Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage’s visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in June 2002, both countries agreed to pull themselves back from the brink of a catastrophic war. In response to President Pervez Musharraf’s pledge that he would “permanently” end his country’s support for armed militancy in Indian-held Kashmir, New Delhi lifted some of the diplomatic and economic curbs imposed on Islamabad in the wake of the 13 December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament.

            President Musharraf’s decision to limit Islamabad’s strategic support for the militancy in Kashmir, while being greeted with howls of “sell out” by Islamic hard-liners in the country, evoked a positive response from New Delhi in May 2003.  

            India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the Indian Parliament on 2 May 2003 that he was willing to make his “third and final” effort at peace by agreeing to hold “decisive talks” with Pakistan to resolve the India-Pakistan dispute. Two weeks earlier, during a visit to Kashmir he had said that he wanted to extend the “hand of friendship” to Pakistan, its archenemy with whom India nearly went to war last summer.

            Taking advantage of this peace offer, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, called Mr. Vajpayee on 28 April 2003 and thus broke the ice between the two feuding neighbors.

            Following their telephonic conversation in which the two prime ministers discussed ways of improving bilateral ties, both sides announced the return of diplomats to each other’s capitals and also agreed to re-establish communication and sports links between them.

            Islamabad also extended an invitation to Mr. Vajpayee to visit Pakistan and proposed that both sides should “begin talks from where they were left off at Agra and work out an agenda for a tiered dialogue, including summit-interaction.” Pakistan also offered to discuss trade issues and measures relating to building confidence and security of both countries nuclear arsenals.

            While agreeing to examine these Pakistani proposals “in due course”, New Delhi has added the standard caveat that real peace between the two countries is possible only “when there is evidence of Pakistan taking firm and credible action against cross-border terrorism and to dismantle the infrastructure of support to terrorism.” 

            Changing course on Kashmir is a very difficult task for Musharraf, especially under the coercive Indian military pressure.  In this context, questions are being raised about the ultimate purpose, strategic intent and future use of American military power in the region. Many in Pakistan believe that Islamabad’s post 9/11 alignment with the United States has not only made the Musharraf regime totally “servile” to Washington, but also has made Pakistan vulnerable to a US pre-emptive strike against its nuclear assets.

            The MMA has publicly and repeatedly called for the removal of American forces from the Pakistani soil and has vowed to pursue this goal as a matter of “national sovereignty, dignity and security.” Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, has publicly described General Musharraf as a “security risk” and there have been at least three reported attempts by the banned Jihadi groups on General Musharraf’s life. There is a historical context to these anti-American feelings in Pakistan. Washington’s frequent resort to sanctions against Pakistan on nuclear and missile technology issues, perceived American apathy towards Muslim issues, especially with regard to the question of Palestine and perceived lack of balance in American stance on Kashmir, are some of the historical causes underpinning this societal hostility. As a consequence of this, there has been a string of terrorist attacks in Pakistan against American and Western targets. The recent attacks on the Northern Sui Gas Pipeline in Baluchistan have also been linked to the activities of these banned Jihadi groups.

            The third challenge posed by the ongoing war on terrorism for Pakistan relates to its substantial financial and economic cost. Pakistan’s pivotal role in this war has been a costly affair. Besides turning away the foreign investors and slowing down the domestic economic activity due to political uncertainty, the global war on terror had an adverse impact on the flow of direct foreign investment into the country, Islamabad is estimated to have lost about $2 billion in export earnings due to cancellation of orders. Pakistan’s average annual export earnings are estimated to be 8 billion dollars during the current financial year as against the annual average of 10.2 billion dollars.

            As the foregoing suggests, Islamabad’s participation in the US-led global war on terrorism has enormously complicated the internal and regional security environment of the country. Despite this myriad of challenges, the Musharraf government has shown great resolve and commitment to be on the “right” side of history. While playing the role of a frontline state in the global war on terrorism, Islamabad has insisted that its position on the question of international terrorism is governed by a strategic framework in which a distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists is clearly drawn on the one hand and the need for global efforts to address and eliminate the root causes of terrorism recognized on the other.[22] In his speech to students at the Beijing University on 4 November 2003, President Musharraf described the ongoing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Hamas and Hezbollah as “short-term” and of limited “tactical value” and emphasized that “long-term strategy lies in addressing the root causes of terrorism.” He proposed a five-pronged strategy to help create a terrorism-free environment in the world.[23]

            As Islamabad tries to cope with the multiple strains of its convulsive security environment, there are a number of things that Washington can do to help Pakistan overcome the heavy odds. 

            First and foremost, the US should not treat Pakistan in instrumental terms – “merely as a means to a larger end, once containing Communism, now destroying Islamic terrorism.” Many Pakistanis feel that US gives short shrift to Pakistan’s legitimate security needs, apparently at the behest of influential lobbies.

            Second, as a corollary, the US must stay positively engaged with Pakistan over the long haul. The US must commit itself to a long-term programme of economic and political support to help Pakistan stabilize its struggling economy and stagnating social development.

            Washington should play a lead role in finding a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which remains at the core of India-Pakistan confrontation. Islamabad’s quest for “strategic depth” in its conflict with India was the primary reason for its support for the odious Taliban and the militancy in Kashmir.

            Finally, one area in which the international community and the United States can make a big difference in Pakistan is the realm of education. 57% of Pakistani population is totally illiterate, 18% is literate up to the primary level, just 9% reaches middle school, and only 3.7% holds graduate and post-graduate level degrees. The gender disparity in this educational profile of the country is simply dismal: 80% of the female population is illiterate, 7.1% is literate up to the primary level, only 1.5% reaches Middle School. Pakistan’s future hinges on reversing this appalling situation in the field of education. In responding to the threat of terrorism we must not forget that terrorism feeds off the parasitic dialectics of Jihad and poverty. And poverty as a human condition cannot be ameliorated unless people are empowered through education. There are as many Pakistani children going to Madrassas in the country as there are in public schools. The number and the quality of the latter must improve if this alarming trend is to be reversed. Reacting to the anti-American hatred fostered by 10,000 Madrassas in Pakistan, the former American Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin had very wisely said: “the future of American security depends on the quality of education in Pakistan.” One could only add that the future of nuclear Pakistan also depends on the quality of education in Pakistan.