Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*

 

Introduction

 

he era in which we are living has challenges of its own. Economic growth has made all of us dependent on access to international markets and resources. Fusion between expanding international commerce and peace is inevitable for the prosperity of mankind. In such a scenario, the peace and free flow of trade through Indian Ocean is not only in the interest of its littoral and hinterland states, but also in the entire world. Unfortunately, the concept Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has failed to materialize. Moreover, the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan and subsequent developments appear to have a destabilizing effect on the Indian Ocean’s strategic environment. In addition, since the last decade India’s blue water navy has been on the rise and will have a major influence on the Indian Ocean region’s political, strategic and economic environments.

India has been developing its sea-based nuclear assets. Pakistan’s force inventories and weapons acquisition policies indicate that its Navy does not possess nuclear capability at present. But one cannot rule out the possibility that in the future Pakistan would equip its Navy with nuclear weapons. This policy shift would be because of Pakistan’s primary concern with India’s improved nuclear arsenal and Pakistan’s deterrence need to reciprocate by reducing asymmetry. Like Indians, Pakistanis are well aware that the nuclear powered, missile-carrying submarines provide assured second-strike capability in the nuclear age. To be precise, a nuclear accident or nuclear battle in the Indian Ocean region is not beyond the realm of possibility. The nuclear accident or war would have perilous repercussions for the international community in general and Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states in particular. It is because the Indian Ocean provides major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. It carries heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia.

Realist international relations theories have been dominating policy-makers mindset in New Delhi and Islamabad. Like cold war era realists, they derive their national interest from the international balance of power, and assess the utility of both military and economic instruments of statecraft. Nevertheless, in real terms, India and Pakistan discount the concept of regional unification and overlook the deeper set of connections between economic prosperity and mutual cooperation within the South Asian regional context. In simple words, both India and Pakistan define their respective security in military terms. What are the repercussions of defining security in military terms? How does the nuclear weaponization of the sub-continent affect Indian Ocean region’s strategic environment? What could be the processes by which we could cope with the evolving challenges?

The following study seeks to examine the anticipated impacts of India-Pakistan’s nuclear strategies on the geo-political and geo-economic environment of the Indian Ocean. The repercussions of South Asian nuclearization sound straightforward, yet it is a very complex issue. Therefore, the following discussion begins with a brief overview of the strategic positioning and strategic environment of the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, followed by the discussion about nuclear dimension of India and Pakistan’s maritime strategies, this discussion takes into consideration both the theoretical assertions and practical developments which would adversely affect the security environment of the Indian Ocean region. This is followed by the anticipated repercussions of the nuclear weaponization of the sub-continent and recommendations for tackling and decreasing the evolving danger to the regional security arrangements.

 

Geo-Strategic positioning of the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's five oceans (after the Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean, but larger than the Southern Ocean and Arctic Ocean). Unlike the Atlantic or the Pacific, however, four continents—Africa, Asia, Australia, and the frozen Antarctica—surround it.  Four critically important access waterways or choke points of the Ocean are the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeb (Djibouti-Yemen), Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). Moreover it includes Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Strait of Malacca, and other tributary water bodies.

The Indian Ocean includes forty-four littoral states and eleven hinterland states. The United States, United Kingdom, China, Japan, France and New Zealand are the user countries of the Indian Ocean.[1] For an analysis the Ocean can be divided into six distinct areas of study—South Africa, the Red Sea region, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, South East Asia and Australia. Notably, these divisions of the region around the periphery of the Indian Ocean should not be viewed as watertight compartments.

 

Strategic Environment of the Indian Ocean Region

The British withdrawal from Diego Garcia and subsequent sale of the island to the United States, in the heart of the Indian Ocean in 1968, brought a fundamental shift in the strategic environment of the Ocean.[2] The deep involvement of the Super powers as a consequence of cold war rivalry and instability in the region because of local disputes and regional conflicts between the littoral states resulted in the militarization of the Ocean. The non-regional powers justify their military involvement by asserting that the littoral states were unable to ensure the safety of the sea-lanes of communication. Michael Klare opined, “…. An interruption in the supply of natural resources would portend severe economic consequences, the major importing countries now consider the protection of this flow a significant national concern…. Large energy importers, such as China, Japan, and the major European powers, have made ensuring the stability of their supplies a top priority.”[3]   Significantly, the Western states are dependent on the import of 50 different strategic materials such as manganese, cobalt, titanium, chromium, platinum, tin, nickel, iron, lead, copper from the Indian Ocean region. European, Japanese, and the United States economies import 70 percent, 76 percent, 25 percent of their crude oil requirements respectively from the Indian Ocean. Beside crude oil, the West imports agricultural produce such as tea, coffee, rubber, and sesame in large quantities from littoral states of the Indian Ocean.[4] To be precise, this dependency element has necessitated the emergence of a new Europe-United States-Japan centric alliance or consensus of approach about controlling and managing the natural resources of the Indian Ocean.

The fear among the smaller regional states of the enduring dominance over them by the big local/neighboring power(s) has often been the cause of inviting non-regional powers into Indian Ocean affairs; for example, the concerns of smaller South Asian states about India, Singapore about Indonesia and Israel about its Arab neighbors. J. N. Dixit, stated that “the tensions of the region are resulting in the presence of foreign military forces of every category in the region, either under the UN umbrella, or under direct bilateral arrangements.”[5] Parallel to it, the Australia’s best defense strategy is taking shelter under the United States military umbrella and India is seeking strategic partnership with the United States. India and Australia are regional powers, but they want to enhance their political and strategic significance by such arrangements with the sole super power.         

The military presence of the super powers in the Ocean brought a sense of insecurity among the littoral states. The military presence of the non-regional powers and the local disputes led the littoral states to address their insecurity by strengthening their individual military muscles as well as seeking support of the major powers through alliance arrangements. Consequently, the United States and France had openly established military pacts and bases, whereas, the former Soviet Union had denied setting up bases, but found it necessary to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Ocean.[6] This further generated suspicion and mistrust among the littoral states and unleashed an unending arms race among them. Consequently, the region has seen considerable militarization, including the introduction of latest weaponry in the last two decades. Almost every littoral state has missile firing ships and craft. Despite the end of the cold war, the littoral states have failed to address their security dilemma. For instance, none of the seven Gulf Emirates has been able to settle its maritime boundaries.

Importantly, during the Cold war and in the aftermath of it, the overwhelming majority of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean advocated Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from intrusion of foreign navies and a  Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. These cherished objectives, however, have not been realized due to the multiple interests of the non-regional powers,[7] and the divergent regional political aspirations. The United States war against terrorism and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction ushered a new era of non-regional interference and military presence in the Indian Ocean. USA is continuously enhancing military presence in the region by renewed security links with Pakistan, and through its growing relationship with India. Consequently, the Indian Ocean remains strategically an area of multi-polarization, multi-rivalry and volatility.

The security dilemma is more acute in South Asia. The situation remains complex because of demographic, geographical and economic disequilibrium between India and its South Asian neighbors. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to peaceful coexistence in South Asia has been the ongoing tension between India and Pakistan, especially over Kashmir. This tension between India and Pakistan continues to pose the most likely risk of a nuclear exchange. For instance, India mobilized from December 2001 to October 2002 over 700,000 troops on its Western border to dissuade Pakistan from its stance on Kashmir. In summer 1999, India and Pakistan fought a limited war in Kargil along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

It is generally viewed that an escalation from the freedom movement in Indian held Kashmir to conventional war and to nuclear exchanges is a possibility as Kashmir is recognized internationally as a flash point between two nuclear neighbors in South Asia. Chris Gange argues that “the risk of an accident leading to nuclear war would be particularly great in South Asia, where there would be almost no time to distinguish between a deliberate launch, an accident, or a false alarm”.[8] In addition the spectre of nuke of fissile materials falling into the hands of non-state actors or an odd problem in command & control system etc remain a security concern.

The possession of nuclear weapons might have prevented escalation of limited border war into total war, but it has not brought any significant change in the military postures of India and Pakistan. Both states have continued a military build-up. They not only have tested nuclear capable short and medium range missiles, but also handed these over to their armed forces. The surface to surface Ghauri-I medium range and Shaheen-I short-range ballistic missiles were handed over to Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command for induction on 8 January 2003 and 6 March 2003, respectively.[9] India had already handed over her surface to surface Prithvi-I, nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles to its Army in May/June1997,[10] which deployed them at some distance from the Pakistan border. Furthermore, India is expected to deploy Agni-I within a year.[11] These developments indicate a drift towards launch-on-warning posture between India and Pakistan.

Sri Lanka is a strategically located island state, that is neither militarily powerful nor economically strong. Its Armed Forces are designed primarily for internal security and coastal defence. Britain maintained a large naval base at Trincomalee harbour on the East Coast, which lost its military character since the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Recently, India has acquired  some rights for the use of Trincomalee on lease from Sri Lanka. This lease will have strategic repercussions for the Indian Ocean region once the Indian plans are fully operational.

A number of littoral states are in the process of developing their sea power and have attained varying degrees of achievement. Geoffrey Till states that “many Indian Ocean states are steadily developing their amphibious forces too. Although this is part of a global trend, such forces seem likely to be of particular utility in South Asia because of the variety of their possible use.”[12] Admittedly, the general trend among a majority of the states is one of concern for their self-defence and safeguarding their maritime interests.

 

India-Pakistan Blue Water Navies: Role of Nuclear Weapons

A nation that has any sort of link with the sea can be termed as a maritime nation. Significantly, any strategic assessment independent of maritime security for a maritime state contradicts the very concept of national security.[13] In the following discussion, however, the term maritime strategy would not be aimed at maritime security, but exclusively associated with naval strategy and war at sea. Ashley J. Tellis states: “All observations pertaining to any tactical balance must be situated within the relevant nation’s grand strategy, and in the Indo-Pakistani case in particular, it is geography that plays a pivotal role in determining strategic postures and, in turn, forces inventories and weapons acquisition policies.”[14] India and Pakistan have been building up their maritime strike capabilities in the Indian Ocean. It is in this context that the inquiry becomes relevant about India and Pakistan maritime strategies in general and naval strategies in particular.

India and Pakistan’s official statements increasingly envisage that both belligerent neighbors would establish a triad based nuclear deterrence. Honore M. Catudal stated: “In fact, there is a growing body of evidence that would indicate that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence serves as a convenient rationalization for the development and deployment of the weapons made available by military technology.”[15]

Many Indian and Pakistani strategic analysts argue that sea based nuclear assets are very important for their credible nuclear deterrence. J. N. Dixit, former Indian Foreign Secretary argued: “The Navy is conceived of as not just, but perhaps the most effective triad of platforms on which nuclear weapons are/can be deployed. Both surface and submarine deployments of nuclear warheads endow a nuclear defense posture, with the virtue of surprise of mobility and survival in case of a first strike by an opponent.”[16] In fact, they believe that the submarine's mobility and its invisibility under water not only protect it from a first strike, but also from theft. In the case of a physical accident (as happened to a Soviet ballistic missile submarines), the vessel simply sinks into deep water, with minimal environmental effects.

 

India

India has maritime boundaries with as many as seven countries. India’s interests are inextricably linked with the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it has deep and enduring interests in the strategic environment of the Ocean. In the post cold war international order, New Delhi seems comfortable with the emergence of the United States as the sole super power and a dominating Indian Ocean player. P. S. Das, the former Indian Commander-in Chief, Eastern Naval Command stated: “However, there is no basic conflict between core American interests and Indian concerns, and in fact there are several areas of convergence. It is, therefore, possible to evolve strategies, which further our interests in the new global environment.”[17] At the same time, the Indians consider another non-littoral Indian Ocean User State, China, a potential adversary. China’s relations with Myanmar and Pakistan[18], its facilities in the Coco Islands off the Andaman and its ability to influence political postures in many Indian Ocean littoral states figure prominently in India’s security calculus. In the evolution of India’s nuclear policy, which Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee submitted to the Indian Parliament on 27 May 1998, he stated that “the decades of the 80s and 90s witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighborhood, nuclear weapons increased and more sophisticated delivery systems were inducted. It is a Pakistan specific allegation and can be deleted.[19]       

Many Indian analysts believe that build up of India’s own navy would ultimately neutralize the naval power of foreigners in the Indian Ocean region and ensure its own impressive status. The motto of the Indian Navy is “Sanh-No-Varunah,” which means let the Lord of the Seas Neptune be our Companion, our Protector. Implicit in the motto is the concept that the navy is a major factor in the sustenance of Indian security, as are the navies of other countries in relation to their security.[20] This professed concern for security in the Indian Ocean region is not a recent development. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru summed up India’s concerns regarding the Indian Ocean region in 1958 when he stated. “History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s sea-borne trade at her mercy, and in the second India’s very independence itself.”[21]

Though the Indian Navy remains the most powerful in the Central and South Asian region, the Indian Naval Doctrine 2000 stressed the need to have a fleet capable of operating in both Eastern and Western Indian Ocean by having two operational aircraft carriers and highly capable submarines.[22] On August 17, 1999 an officially constituted advisory panel to the Indian National Security Council released the draft of its nuclear doctrine which awaits a formal approval of the Indian parliament. Nevertheless the Draft of Nuclear Doctrine is an important document, which discloses India’s nuclear policy. According to it, India’s nuclear policy appears to be too ambitious in the sense that an upper limit of nuclear capability is not clearly delineated. According to Bharat Karnad, “the deterrent in the Indian definition is, therefore, minimum, relative only to the existing American and Russian inventories, each numbering in tens of thousands of nuclear armaments.”[23]

Moreover, a reference to a nuclear triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets was made in the Draft. The notable point here is that the Indian government and the strategic community have always made a pretext of “threat of China” for India’s nuclear weapons program. But its maritime strategy reveals its ambitious agenda, which it desires to accomplish by its overt nuclearization, i.e. to deny Chinese and the United States presence in the Indian Ocean. In December 1998, the Standing Committee on Defense in the Lok Sabha recommended that the government “review and accelerate its nuclear policy for fabricating or acquiring nuclear submarines to add to the deterrent potential of the Indian Navy in the face of the presence of the subsurface nuclear submarines and subsurface ballistic nuclear submarines of China and the United States in the Indian Ocean.”[24]

In 1998, India set out to introduce nuclear reactor technologies by acquiring on lease a Charlie-1-class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine from the Russian Federation. It is estimated that the construction of a prototype will be completed around 2006 and the vessel will be ready for missile loading in 2010.[25] Raja Menon argues that a nuclear submarine is undetectable “... An Indian nuclear submarine could possibly be on either side of the peninsula without anyone knowing about it. Its undetectability makes the command system confident that retribution can be made unhurriedly after careful evaluation, and that the effect on the enemy would be catastrophic.”[26]    

India is placing extensive resources towards the development of submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). An India SLCM—Sagarika—is likely to be nuclear capable and would be carried by a Russian Kilo-class submarine. In April 2000 India had tested Dhanush, a naval version of its short range Prithvi SSM, from a launch pad in the Bay of Bengal.[27] It was reported in the Indian Defence Yearbook 2002 that Dhanush will soon be integrated into the Indian Navy.[28]  It was also reported that India has a plan to equip some of its principle surface combatants with the Brahmos supersonic nuclear capable missiles. The decks have been cleared for the induction of French made Scorpene submarines in the Indian Navy.[29] Significantly, there is a strong pro-nuclear submarine lobby in India. Matin Zuberi, former member, National Security Advisory Board, argued: “The nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines, protected by mobility and by the shroud of concealment provided by the waters surrounding it, will continue to ensure second strike survivability in the nuclear age.”[30]

Pakistan

Despite the recent thaw, Islamabad does not expect a major strategic change in India’s hostile posturing in a long term perspective. In the aftermath of nuclear weaponization of subcontinent, in pure military terms, most of Pakistani analysts believe that India cannot impose total war against Pakistan. They argue that any such military misadventure would lead to its own detriment including a possible nuclear Armageddon. The conclusion, however, is inescapable that New Delhi has a Grand Design for political, military and economic dominance over peoples and territories extending from South Asia to the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. To be precise, a massive, and sudden Indian attack on the LoC and a subsequent total war is the threat that has driven Pakistani strategic planning since Independence, may have lessened due to nuclear weapons but has not ceased to exit.

The strategic mindset in Pakistan has heretofore perceived the balance of power between India and Pakistan mainly as strenuous interactions between land and air force. The clearest evidence of this pervasive land oriented mindset is the defensive strategies developed since 1947 by Pakistan. Though the continental concept of strategy has been a determining factor in the making of Pakistan defense strategy, the situation is bound to change in the post-May 1998 strategic environment, particularly since 2002 eye-ball to eyeball confrontation and realization that the United States has been taking a more pro-India policy.[31]  In fact, during April-May 2002, the Indian Navy was reportedly ready to impose a naval blockade against Karachi, having transferred five principal surface combatants from the Eastern to the Western Indian Ocean for this purpose.[32]

Importantly, the bulk of Pakistan’s foreign trade moves by sea. Unlike India’s grand strategic designs, Pakistan has set a very modest role for its naval forces. The first and foremost responsibility of the Pakistan Navy is defence of the 830- Kilometer coastline. This includes securing Karachi harbour and the smaller ports of Gwader, Jiwani, Rasormarah, and Pasni.[33] The Indian naval build-up fuels suspicions, fears and causes apprehensions in Pakistan because of historical antagonism and proximity. Therefore, majority of analysts believes that for the credibility of its sea denial strategy, Pakistan must start strengthening its navy now. Otherwise, it is likely to face block obsolescence in times to come.

Notwithstanding various constraints, Pakistan has not only continued to induct modern weapons like the modified Agosta-class submarines, it has also initiated a modest shipbuilding project. Admittedly, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons force posture indicates that it lacks sea-based nuclear assets. It has nuclear capable aircraft and mobile land-based missiles. Nevertheless, the Pakistani Navy is seen as becoming nuclear capable in the near future. This assertion is based on the following facts:

·         Pakistan lacks strategic depth, which means that the core of its striking air and armored forces are within easy reach of the international border. Thus, geography dictates that a nuclear capable navy is the best form of deterrence, which in practical terms means to enhance survivability of retaliatory forces. Submarines, loaded with nuclear capable submarine launched missiles, cruising in Ocean waters can easily save themselves from the adversary’s preemptive strikes.  

·         Interstate violence becomes more frequent when vast asymmetries develop in weapons capabilities of nations and there is no balance of power. Therefore, Pakistan cannot separate the implications of nuclearization of Indian Navy from its overall military capability. In both war and peace, India would mobilize its combined military power to achieve its political and strategic objectives. Hence, Pakistan is forced to revise its maritime strategy.[34] In brief, the nuclear capable Pakistan Navy would ensure that there is no gross asymmetry in weapons capabilities between India and Pakistan.

 

Impact on Strategic Environment of Indian Ocean

Though it is always difficult to predict the course of world events, there is no doubt that India and Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization would increase the security dilemma of the Indian Ocean’s littoral states, especially in a situation when the peace zone concept is a matter of speculation.[35] India’s nuclear strategy has also discarded the concept of making Indian Ocean a nuclear weapons free zone. Each littoral or hinterland or User State interprets India and Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization according to its own strategic environment and its relations with them.

It is unfair to blame India and Pakistan alone for nuclearizing the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean had already been converted into a launching base, as well as a target base for nuclear weapons since the British withdrawal from Diego Garcia and subsequent sale of the island to the United States in 1968. Donald L. Berlin observes that “Diego Garcia has been developed from a small communications station to track submarines to a multipurpose base. The development of Diego Garcia is continuing.”[36] The development and maintenance of the American Naval base at Diego Garcia indicated that during the cold war they were not ignoring the increasing influence of the former Soviet Union in the region.

It is not a misleading assessment that the United States and the former Soviet Union’s competition for military superiority in the Indian Ocean served as a catalyst for India to develop nuclear weapons. Notably, the United States Navy maintained the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on its vessels. In 1974, retired Vice Admiral Gene R. La Rocque stated: “My experience has been that any ship that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, carries nuclear weapons. They do not off-load them when they go into foreign ports such as Japan or other countries.”[37]  On 23 March 1963, Ram Chandra Bade, Jan Sangh Parliamentarian, said in the Lok Sabha (Indian Lower House of the parliament), “only those who wish to see Russians or Chinese ruling India will oppose the development of nuclear weapons”.[38] K. Subrahmanyam stated: “The ability of three nuclear weapons states, the United States, Britain, and France to devastate a non-nuclear weapon state, Yugoslavia, while the other two nuclear weapons states, Russia and China, could do nothing to stop it, reinforces the Indian case for pushing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent.”[39] Similarly, the objective of Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was to neutralize both India’s conventional superiority and nuclear capability.  

The perilous nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has been undermining regional security. It is increasing the likelihood of a nuclear showdown both by accident or by design. India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategies suggest that they may wage nuclear war not solely along their continental frontier. Their naval forces may also conduct nuclear related offensive and defensive operations, in a future total war. Any war between these belligerent neighbors would be extremely destructive for them, but one in which the Indian Ocean is a theatre of the war could be equally destructive for the littoral states. The increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons, is a reflection of what has been called the “deadly trinity” in which weapons are gaining in range, becoming more precise and more deadly.

The following are some of the important areas of impact;

 

Regional Hegemony

Naval forces can be used to compel an adversary to do something he doesn’t want to do, or to deter him from doing something he wants to. The recent Gulf war illustrates the various ways in which naval forces can be used. The Coalition naval forces also played an important role in military victory in Iraq. A strong blue water navy of India increases the security dilemma of the neighboring littoral states. Geoffrey Till argues: “ In the Indian Ocean area the inevitable disparity between the maritime forces of India and everyone else naturally raises concerns and tensions (especially when there are other things in dispute as well).”[40]

India has maritime boundaries with seven countries. In addition, more than a thousand miles from the Indian mainland, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, the second busiest sea-lane in the world. Vice Admiral Arun Prakash stated: “They (Andaman and Nicobar) could be lucrative objects of desire for any country, which may harbour ambitions of dominating the Bay of Bengal and holding to ransom, vital sea lanes of communications. At the same time, they form a springboard from where India can reach out and project power, exert influence or strike bonds of friendship in [with] our eastern neighbors.”[41] In brief, nuclear weaponization of the Indian Navy ensures India’s emergence as a dominating power in the Indian Ocean region at the cost of endangering the security of other states. Consequently, in times of crisis, the Indian Navy could opt for a blockade strategy for dictating its own terms and conditions.

A militarily strong Pakistan can counter any outside threat to the continuous flow of oil and gas supplies from the Gulf. Pakistan sits astride the sea-lanes out of the Persian Gulf and that fact of geography allows it adequate opportunity to neutralise any attempt at naval blockade of the oil tanker sea lanes from the Gulf easily from its bases on the Makran Coast.  However, Pakistan has no designs for domination, nor should its neighbors feel uncomfortable with its nuclear capable Navy, which has purely defensive portents. Yet India also showed its uneasiness over Pakistan’s efforts for correcting the naval balance of power between the two countries. While commenting on India about a stronger Pakistan Mohan Malik wrote: “India also worries that a stronger Pakistan, aided by the United States, Europe, Japan, and international financial institutions, would not only be better able to contain India, but also continue its hostile policies.”[42]        

 

Freedom of Navigation

The safety and security of Indian Ocean shipping is a vital concern of many countries around the world. The major east-west sea-lanes, from the Indian Ocean pass through two choke points, the Straits of Malacca in the east and the Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal in the west. More than half of the oil exported through the Gulf of Hormuz, passes through the Straits of Malacca. Kenneth M. Pollack argues: “America’s primary interest in the Persian Gulf lies in ensuring the free and stable flow of oil from the region to the world at large.”[43]  

It seems possible for a power exercising control of these choke points to seriously interfere with the interests of others.[44]  India’s feverish arms buildup and its hegemonic ambitions may disrupt the freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. In fact, India lies within striking distance of these choke points. Any future conflict between India and Pakistan could threaten the Indian Ocean’s freedom of navigation because they would use their naval power for their military objectives and the seabed for their nuclear submarine’s strategic manoeuvres. In addition, here one cannot ignore India’s desire to free the Indian Ocean from Western colonialism and dominate it by itself. The pursuit of this objective would have serious repercussions for the navigating states of the Indian Ocean.

 

Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Proliferation begets proliferation. This is understandable, because any new political entity endowed with additional military capacities disturbs the security and strategic status quo. The point to remember, however, is that several Indian Ocean rim states such as Israel, South Africa[45] and Iran have harbored a desire to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time the potentialities of Japan could not be underestimated.[46] The May 1998 nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan and their intention to disburse their nuclear deterrence among the three military forces have a nuclear weapons’ proliferating impact on the strategic policies of these states. Thus, there are ample chances that in the near future they would employ the Indian Ocean as a patrol zone for submarine or surface warships equipped with nuclear-armed missiles.

 

Nuclear  Weapon States’ Competition

The United States, Russian Federation, European countries, Japan and China have vital interests in the Indian Ocean region. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and expansion of Indian naval strength would worry these user states. While analyzing India’s nuclear deterrence objectives Raju G. C. Thomas states:  “These ballistic missile and space rocket programs suggest the intention to create a global nuclear deterrent that goes beyond India’s regional rivals, China and Pakistan, to the other major nuclear powers.”[47]  The nuclear weapons, certainly, enhance the military potential and political influence of India and Pakistan. Being adjacent to choke points India more than Pakistan could impose stricter regulations on passing ships and oil tankers than those generally accepted by the international maritime community for the sake of political, strategic and economic benefits. While examining the salience of the Indian Ocean, Donald Berlin wrote “…. New Delhi’s interest in the affairs of this Ocean will grow, and this will be accompanied by a growing interest of others—especially major states—in these waters, either to check India or to ally with it.”[48]  

There is, at present, nuclear naval presence of the United States and China in the Indian Ocean. Though it is not quite clear about similar Russian Federation naval presence, its possibility cannot be denied. The United States and China would further strengthen their naval presence in the Ocean with all types of weapons in order to meet challenges posed by the newly emergent nuclear weapon states of South Asia. The United States strategic partnership with India indicates that Western states and Japan would protect their interest in Indian Ocean by allying with India, instead of checking it. Beijing’s course of action, however, would be strengthening its strategic posture in the area. China has been enhancing its strategic relations with its Indian Ocean littoral allies—Pakistan and Burma—by developing the port at Gwadar in Pakistan and building a naval base near Kyaukpyu and naval and air base near Kawthaung off the Tenasserim Coast, in Burma.[49]

The Naval build-up of China would instigate the United States to increase its naval forces in the Indian Ocean region. In fact, the primary strategic objective of the United States in the post cold war era is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival similar to its cold war competitor the former Soviet Union.[50] Joseph S. Nye Jr. opined that “ George W. Bush entered office committed to a realist foreign policy that would focus on great powers such as China and Russia…. China was to be a strategic competitor not the strategic partner of Bill Clinton’s era, and the United States was to take a tougher stance with Russia.”[51] The strategic competition between India and China, and China and the United States would produce a new geography of conflict in the Indian Ocean, that would negatively influence the peace and prosperity of the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states.

           

Ecological Impact
 

India and Pakistan’s nuclear programes have serious ecological implications for the Indian ocean region.  Nuclear waste dumping in the Indian ocean pollutes the ocean. In addition, both India and Pakistan’s offensive and defensive strategies indicate that they would operationalize their sea-based arms of their nuclear triad during the war. Any nuclear related mishap at sea or authorized or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons would not only harm the maritime life at the ocean,  it would also have long term backlash for maritime states.

The ocean environment governs climate conditions. Geoffrey Till writes: “Even more fundamentally, and although we do not fully understand the way it works, the ocean is not just a barometer but also a regulator of the world climate to the extent that the physical health of the planet may depend on that of the ocean.”[52] In brief, a nuclear accident would negatively affect the

fisheries industry, which is already facing catastrophic depletion in many areas.

 

Recommendations

That India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapon states is a reality people cannot just ignore. Therefore, the nuclearization of their navies would be a matter of vital and continuing concern. The Indian Ocean’s security and peace requires the promotion of existing peace initiatives coupled with innovative approaches to reduce and finally exclude the prospects of micro-level and macro-level conflicts and destructive competition between India and Pakistan, so that the Indian Ocean littoral states exploit the Ocean’s economic resources for their economic prosperity. Following are a few recommendations for achieving such objectives. 

 

·            Despite the end of the cold war, the creation of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is not an exercise in futility, as the western nations concluded in 1989. All the states of the Indian Ocean would support the concept of a Zone of Peace. It would not only serve as a bulwark against non-regional intruders, it would also reduce the arms race among the Indian Ocean’s littoral states. 

·            India and Pakistan must define their security paradigms in economic, not just military, terms. They should opt for a way to alter their military competition into economic competition by institutionalizing bilateral, regional, and international economic cooperation. The two sides should conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircrafts belonging to the two sides.

·            The proper approach to tackle nuclear dangers in the Indian Ocean is to seek to create an equitable global regime that actively devalues nuclear weapons and creates conditions for their eventual elimination. The first step in this regard could be the creation of the Indian Ocean as a nuclear weapon free zone and the implementation of the February 1999 Lahore summit’s Memorandum of Understanding between India and Pakistan.

·            India and Pakistan should exercise restraint in using their naval power lest they prove counter-productive. Their non-provocative attitude and positive interaction could make a constructive contribution to arms control, reduction of arms and defense expenditure, and perhaps ultimately, to the process of genuine disarmament in the region.

·            Pakistan and India must exploit the commonality of interests within the region, which includes oil/ gas pipelines laid from Iran, Persian Gulf and Central Asia to India across Pakistan. Jasjit Singh opines that “the best techno-economic method of supply of natural gas from the huge reserves of these areas is by an overland pipeline. The other options, of offshore transportation of natural gas, whether by surface ships, by sub-surface pipeline in shallow waters or those laid in deep sea, would be costlier to build by 30 per cent or more, and to maintain and repair.”[53] These pipelines could also be outlets for Japan, to be picked up from the Indian ports. Such an arrangement could not only facilitate the supply, but also build confidence and trust among the conflicting parties resulting in conflict reduction.  

 

Conclusion

India and Pakistan’s preoccupation with the military dimension of statecraft and the deadly rivalry between them has not only endangered their own strategic environment, but also jeopardized that of the Indian Ocean region. India is determined to strengthen and equip its blue-water navy with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the end of the cold war terminated super power confrontation in the Indian Ocean, but it has not minimized the regional conflicts and major powers’ military presence in the Indian Ocean. In this scenario, we are likely to see increasing nuclearization of the Indian Ocean and perpetual threat to the economic security of the Indian Ocean rim states. Consequently, it could hinder the free flow of international trade through the Indian Ocean in the future.

Anticipatory and timely actions are essential for the Indian Ocean region’s peace and security. It is imperative that India and Pakistan opt for an ahistorical, apolitical method(s) of articulating the right answers to their nuclear weapons related problems. They should settle their mutual differences by peaceful means and avoid mating of their nuclear warheads with delivery systems and deployment of these lethal weapons. At the same time, they should try and build mutual interdependence. A mutual interdependence approach would start to build stakeholders on both sides to exert pressure for co-operative peace rather than looking for ways to bleed each other to death. This is also where the international community could play a constructive role.

In sum, the great powers also take into account the economic prospects of creating Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and relinquish their struggle for power and military postures in the Indian Ocean. It is timely for users and littoral states to step up discussions on the concepts of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.