Syed Minhaj ul Hassan*

Introduction:

he war on Iraq is the beginning of the implementation of the “Bush Doctrine”, predicated on two basic principles, namely preemption and hegemony. This means, first, the right to take preemptive military action against supposedly hostile countries (or elements within those countries), and second, maintaining military superiority at a level beyond the possibility of challenge by any other country or party. The doctrine was originally presented during the elder Bush’s administration in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, the then Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. But it was shelved at that time because of strong reactions from other policy makers. After the 9/11 events, the proponents of this doctrine once again were revived, this time rather more assertively, and pleaded for a strong and aggressive policy on the part of USA. President George W. Bush also got closer to the neo-conservatives, the supporters of this policy. These hawks particularly became more assertive and aggressive after the successful military attack on Afghanistan. Emboldened by their success in Afghanistan the US administration of G.W.Bush decided to take on Iraq.

However, Iraq was different from Afghanistan. At that time the latter was considered by a significant majority of the international polity as harbouring terrorists, and the US was considered the aggrieved party after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Nearly all nations extended support to the US for its action in Afghanistan. But in the case of Iraq the international community preferred that difficulties with that country be resolved through peaceful negotiations instead of using military power. Some NATO allies of the US, such as France, Germany and Belgium, played an active role in opposing the war on Iraq. The US tried her best to win over majority support in the United Nations Security Council as well as amongst other UN members, but failed. However, the US decided to go it alone if necessary. Apart from some tangible support and contributions to the war effort from Britain, Spain and Australia, and a little lip service from a few relatively unimportant allies, there was a general atmosphere of disapproval all round the world.

The US wanted overall international support for the war against Saddam Hussain, but she was particularly interested in winning over the support of Turkey because of her contiguous boundaries with Iraq, and because of the NATO and American military facilities available there. For example 50 fighter jets of the Allied forces were stationed at Turkey’s southern airbase, Incirlik, which could be used in the war on Iraq. The Americans had planned a two-pronged attack on Iraq, one from Kuwait and the other from Turkey. However, like most people all over the world, the common people of Turkey did not support the war. The Government of Turkey was inclined to join hands with the Americans, but they had to bow to the will of the people, expressed through a series of massive demonstrations held across Turkey. These demonstrations compelled the deputies of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) to side with the masses and, in a historic vote, denied permission to the US forces to use Turkish soil for their war on Iraq. The Parliament’s ‘no’ was a big shock to the US because it not only damaged the prestige of the sole superpower, it also frustrated the whole war strategy. The Americans tried to use carrot-and-stick policy to get the desired results, but without success.

The Turkish Parliament’s refusal was not a hasty and emotional decision, it was made on sound grounds. It was believed that the Turkish refusal was influenced by many reasons, including the Kurdish problem, a possible influx of refugees from Iraq, and economic losses that might accrue as a result of the war. It was also believed that the refusal was based on the hope of averting the war. However, when this hope remained unrealised, Turkey wanted to facilitate a quick end to the war, and opened her air space for the Allied military aircrafts, agreed to allow emergency landings and gave permission for civil supplies to pass through her soil.

The war on Iraq affected US-Turkey relations. Some American hawks even started demanding an aggressive posture towards Turkey, but the moderates were cautious and pleaded a conciliatory policy. It seemed that the moderates prevailed to some extent, as the US economic aid to Turkey did not stop. In fact, there were talks of new levels of cooperation.

The moderate policy was more pragmatic, because, though Turkey did not cooperate in the war, she could prove to be useful on other fronts, like helping in the war on terrorism, sending trained contingents to Iraq to improve the law and order situation, and facilitating the rapprochement of the US with a largely sceptical, alienated Muslim world and the Middle East in general, and with Syria and Iran in particular. Thus the moderates understood the importance of Turkey in the overall foreign policy of the US, and expected her support on different fronts.

As a consequence of the war, new thinking and planning started about the Middle East in both the US and Turkey. Since Turkey was not sure about the future US policy towards the Kurds, she started patching up her differences with Syria and Iran, two states with whom her relations were strained. There were even talks about forming a regional block between Turkey, Iran, Syria and Egypt.[1]

After the anticipated quick end of the war, it was now expected, contrary to earlier predictions, that Turkey would be able to reap economic benefits by engaging in the reconstruction of Iraq. Turkey already had a lot of first-hand experience in the development of Iraq, as most of the infrastructure in that country had been built by Turkish firms. On top of that, trade activities between Turkey and Iraq would also start picking up and yield economic dividends in the fullness of time. Above all, since Turkey had not joined hands with the Allies in the war, the people of Iraq would have no ill-feelings about Turks, and this could prove more beneficial than anything else in the long run.      

The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine and the War On Iraq

The attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 was a pivotal event in the history of the world. Shockwaves spread across America and the world. The sole superpower had been attacked, thousands of innocent people had died, and US prestige had been damaged. The US reaction was characterized by aggression and bluster. Addressing the joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, the US President declared: 

We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.[2] 

Osama bin Laden and his organisation, known as al-Qaida, were blamed for these attacks. The Americans demanded that he and his associates be handed over to them by the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which had given them sanctuary. The Taliban refused to comply, and when diplomatic efforts failed to secure the desired results, the US and the coalition against terrorism attacked Afghanistan to dislodge the regime, dismantle the terror network and arrest Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida operatives. The coalition succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime, but failed to catch Osama bin Laden or the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. However, emboldened by the general success of operations in Afghanistan, the US became more aggressive and assertive in her policies. George W. Bush now declared that the US government would take preemptive measures against any country considered dangerous to American interests. Paul Wolfowitz originally presented this strategy in 1992 when he was Under Secretary of Defence for Policy (the Pentagon’s third-highest ranking civilian) in the senior Bush administration. At that time he had argued that with the end of the Cold War, America needed a new military and political strategy:  

Containment…is a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use its military power to preempt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And if America has to act alone, so be it.[3]  

When this draft was leaked to the press, controversy started, and the White House ordered the Defense Secretary (at that time Dick Cheney) to re-write it. The policy of preemption was dropped in the new draft.[4]

When Bill Clinton became the President he adopted the old policy of containment. However the neo-conservatives, the hawks, in an open letter addressed to the President, urged a more aggressive policy towards Iraq. They urged even the removal of Saddam Hussain, the President of Iraq, through military action. The signatories of the letter included Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, William Kristol, and other members of George W. Bush’s current administration, including Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and John Boltan, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control.[5]

After the events of 9/11, Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence, once again urged that the US should adopt preemptive measures and even called for “ending states who sponsor terrorism.”[6] Though Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, still pleaded caution, George W. Bush came increasingly under the influence of the neo-conservatives. Addressing the graduation ceremony at West Point in June 2002 he stated that it was time to move from containment to preemption. He stated, “Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”[7] While declaring his intention of making American hegemony supreme, he said, “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.” By these announcements he declared the strategic aims of American policy: preemption and hegemony– henceforth known as the “Bush Doctrine.” It was an echo of Wolfowitz’s strategic plan, enunciated back in 1992 in his contentious Defense Planning Guidance draft.[8]

The Bush Administration formally issued in September 2002 the key objectives of its foreign policy in a document known as “National Security Strategy.” Chapter 5 of this document is entitled, “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction”[9] and explains the Bush Doctrine, which is based on speeches delivered to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001, to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on 6 November, his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, his remarks before the student body of the Virginia Military Institute on 17 April 2002, year and his address to the graduating class at the US Military Academy at West Point on 1 June.[10] 

Under this preemptive doctrine the US started talking about disarming Iraq of WMD. Initially the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was given the task of finding and destroying Iraq’s WMD. However, the US administration was not satisfied with the progress of the Weapons Inspection Team. Though Dr. Hans Blix, the Swedish Chief Executive of the Commission, reported that they were making progress and that the Saddam Hussain government was cooperating, the Bush administration was not ready to give them more time. In spite of the fact that the majority of the UN Security Council members and other nations opposed an attack on Iraq, the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of Britain decided to act by themselves. The support of Turkey, which shares around 218 miles of border with Iraq, was crucial to the effort, but Turkey did not agree. The refusal was not a decision made in haste. Turkish leaders had already expressed their opposition to any such adventure several times.[11]
 

Turkish Refusal: Background and Causes

The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, visited the United States from the 14th to the 20^th of January, 2003. He was given a red carpet welcome. Some analysts believed that by lavishing so much attention the Americans hoped to soften him and make him receptive to the idea of an attack on Iraq. But Ecevit made no secret of his opposition to the ‘Wolfowitz-Perle cabal’ and the policy of launching a ‘preemptive’ military action against neighboring Iraq.[12] He rejected all plans for war on Iraq on the plea that Turkey had suffered a lot in the previous Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War. He stated that particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq was virtually divided into two parts, one major part adjoining Turkey (the Kurds’ self-rule territories in Northern Iraq) was declared a no-fly zone for Saddam’s regime by the Allies. This resulted in considerable losses to Turkey both in men and material. He stated firmly, “we don’t want the same thing to happen again.”[13]

However under American pressure and economic inducements, the Justice and Development Party (JDP/AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Ardogan’s Government, supported by the powerful National Security Council, introduced a bill in the Grand National Assembly in February 2003 to allow 60,000 US troops to use Turkish soil and bases for the war on Iraq. The motion was also aimed at permitting Turkish troops to take part in the war. It was strongly resented and opposed by the common masses. According to polls 94 per cent of Turks opposed the war. In order to exert pressure on their representatives, massive demonstrations were held all over Turkey opposing the motion as well as the war. During the demonstrations slogans were raised to show their anger. Common amongst these were: “No to War in Iraq”, “The Peoples of the Middle East Are Not Alone”, “US Assassins, DJP Collaborators”, “We Will Not Become US Soldiers” and “Down with US Imperialism.”[14] 

Under mounting public pressure, in an historic voting session on 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament disallowed the US troops to use Turkish bases for their war on Iraq. Though the motion was supported by the majority (264 vs. 250 with 19 abstentions), it fell 4 votes short of the required majority of deputies present. It was a serious blow to the Bush administration’s war efforts and it reacted sharply.[15] Commenting on the rejection, Paul Wolfowitz observed that Turkey “didn’t quite know what it was doing”. Further he stated that they had made a “big, big mistake.”[16] American anger was not only a reaction to the damage done to their honour, it was also because their war scheme had been questioned and their initial plans stymied. The refusal meant that the US would not be able to open a northern war front, which would deny them “roughly 25% of the heavy armor …(and) reinforcement of some 225 combat aircraft and 57 helicopters.”[17]

In this context, a former US American Ambassador to Turkey’s remarks are worth mentioning. In a policy paper in April 2003 Mark Pariss opined that the  

…refusal was a setback at personal level to the American Administration, from President down to lowest level, which was pro-Turkish throughout, the refusal was a bitter defeat to them. Though the administration generally refrained from showing anger publicly, in private deep anger and resentment was reported. They felt further harmed by Abdullah Gul and other Turkish official statements that US officials did not understand the difficulties of JDP government in seeking parliament approval…diplomatically it played a decisive role in the Security Council where American-British-Spanish diplomats were trying to win over undecided votes in favor of a resolution; it also had a profound effect on the war strategy of America. The Turkish parliament ‘No’ came at the moment when Americans were finalizing their war planning, the refusal denied them the northern war front and they were forced to re-plan the whole strategy.[18] 

A question may be asked why a long-term NATO ally like Turkey refused to cooperate. To answer the question one needs to understand the history and politics of Turkey. The Turkish Parliament refusal was deep rooted in their political instinct. Turkey believed that their security interests were better served in the status quo. Therefore a large political segment was suspicious of Bush’s grandiose programme for reshaping the Middle East. Igor Torbakov while quoting Burak Bekdil, a political analyst, wrote that the refusal was mostly  

The product of Washington’s failure to convince the Turkish military, which traditionally has an upper hand in deciding on security matters, that its war plans … did not contain a hidden agenda that might pose a security threat to Turkey.[19] 

It is also observed that till very recently Turkey was the friendliest neighbour of Iraq, whose other neighbours were generally unfriendly.[20] Further, most of the JDP deputies belonged to the southeast of Turkey with Kurdish and Arab blood relations across the borders with Iraq and Syria.[21] Opposition to the motion could be judged by the fact that almost 100 JDP deputies voted against the motion. It was because of this that Prime Minister Erdogan did not dare present the motion for a second vote in spite of enormous US pressure and the promise of an economic package of $30 billion, as he was not sure about the fate of the motion and feared that it might split up the party itself. The only thing the government was able to do in favour of the US was permission to use Turkish airspace under certain conditions.[22] 

Other factors responsible for the Turkish refusal were as follows:

Independent Kurdish State

The war on Iraq had raised the issue of the future status of northern Iraq where a considerable population of Kurds lived. Turkey was particularly worried and concerned about the future status of the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussain.[23] Actually Turkey had already suffered because of the 1991 Gulf War, when the Allies had established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq and expelled the Iraqi Central authorities from the area. This had had a profoundly negative effect on Turkey. Anti-Turkish militant activities by the Kurds had escalated and resulted in more than 30,000 Turkish deaths. It was only after a long struggle that the Turkish army was able to bring the situation under control.[24] The fragile peace established after 16 years of civil war between Turkish forces and Kurds hangs in the balance. In spite of the fact that in the recent past Turkey lifted the emergency rule, allowed the teaching of the Kurdish language, promoted Kurdish television broadcasts, newspapers and magazines and even tolerated pro-Kurdish political parties, the clouds of war over Iraq threaten the hard won peace.[25]

To properly understand the Kurdish problem, it would be relevant to know their brief history. Kurds live in the contiguous mountainous areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Armenia and Syria. Their territories are located in Asia Minor and generally known as Kurdistan (Land of the Kurds). They have their distinct culture and language and are mostly Sunni Muslims by religion. Before World War 1 (WW1) they freely moved in the Mesopotamian plains and the Turkish and Iranian highlands, and lived a nomadic life. However, after the war new nation-states were created (but not for the Kurds, who wanted their cherished Kurdistan) which hampered their free movement. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres created Iraq, Syria and Kuwait, and mentioned the possibility of a separate, independent Kurdish state. But it was never implemented and when Kemal Ataturk overthrew the Khilafat, Turkey, Iran and Iraq agreed not to allow the creation of an independent Kurdistan.[26]

The late Turgut Ozal, Turkey’s former Prime Minster and President, once toyed with the idea of integrating Kurdish territories with Turkey as a federated unit, which, in his opinion, would solve the Turkey’s Kurdish problem.[27] Turkish claims are based on early 1920s arrangements made between Britain and the Turkish Republic, according to which Turkey would receive 10 per cent of all Iraqi oil revenues for a 25-year period in exchange for renouncing her claims over Mosul and Kirkuk. However, as a goodwill gesture towards Iraq in 1958 the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, suspended the treaty. Later Turkish governments tried to revive it.[28]

              To counter Kurdish claims, Turkey planned to lay claim to the oil rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul
in Northern Iraq. A former Turkish Foreign Minister, Yasar Yakis, raised the issue in comments published in
Hurriyet newspaper.He stated that he was examining the treaties signed in the early 20^th century in order

to have solid proof for his claim. These comments created a stir in the power corridors of the USA
and Arab countries, as they wanted Iraq to remain united. The issue was further complicated by claims
and counter claims by Turkey and Kurdish groups. The Kurds believed that Kirkuk and Mosul were both
Kurdish populated cities, while Turkey believed that they were dominated by a Turkish ethnic group,
the Turcomans,[29]which accounted for 65 per cent of the population of Kirkuk, while Arabs formed 25 per cent and Kurds and Assyrians only 10 per cent of the 60,000 residents of the city. However, the Kurds contested these figures and claimed that they were in the majority.[30]
 
            In the latest crisis some Turkish government officials once again raised the claims of Turkey on the basis of the 1920s agreements. However, at this juncture, it seemed that the Turkish government wanted to use these claims to counter the Kurdish demand for an independent state. This was evident from the fact that the top Turkish generals had threatened to invade northern Iraq if Kurds tried to break away from Baghdad.[31] There were also some analysts who believed that the independent Kurdistan could bring Turkey and Iran together in order to thwart any such move. Dr. Hooman Peimani, a consultant in International Relations, believed,  

Should the Iraqi Kurds incorporate Kirkuk and /or Mosul into their self-ruled region, fear of the feasibility of creating an independent Iraqi Kurdish state will likely push Iran and Turkey into the conflict. Concern about the impact of such a scenario on their Kurdish minorities could push Ankara and Tehran to follow the lead of Washington in preemption, with a much stronger case to justify their action.[32]  

In spite of the fact that there are 20 million Kurds living in different countries and sharing the same vision of an independent state, they are hardly unified. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, fought a bloody war with each other from 1994 to 1998 for power over northern Iraq; while Abdullah Ocalan’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), involved in a guerrilla war against Turkey, did not accept the decision of Iraqi Kurds to have local self-government within the federation of Iraq, as they looked towards an independent state of Kurds. Further, there were tensions between PKK and KDP over the former’s establishment of military bases inside Iraqi Kurd territory to launch attacks within Turkey.[33]

After the Turkish refusal to allow American troops passage through Turkish territory, the Americans increased their cooperation with the Kurds. This development made the Turks nervous. Dr. Sarah D. Shields, a historian at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, observed, “Kurds promise that they will not tolerate a Turkish invasion. Turks promise they will not tolerate Kurds taking over northern Iraq.”[34] Turkey fears close relations between Iraqi Kurds and USA. After the 1991 Gulf War the Iraqi Kurds enjoyed self-rule in northern Iraq as the Allies had declared their territories off-limits for the Saddam regime in Iraq. Turkey fears that this experience of self-rule could be used for a take-off point for an independent Kurdish state. However, the US government has declared that it would not allow this to happen.[35] Other geo-strategic indicators also show that the US-British coalition wants the Kurds to remain part of the Iraqi set-up, and to forget about their demand for an independent state.[36] As part of this plan 5 Kurds are included in the US backed 25-member Governing Council in Iraq.[37] The Kurd leadership also understands the new situation and they have publicly stated that they do not wish to secede from Iraq permanently. This is obvious from their slogan: “democracy for all of Iraq, and autonomy for Kurdistan.”[38]  

Turkish concerns about these territories had another aspect as well. Turkey traditionally espouses the cause of the Turkish-speaking, Turcoman minority in northern Iraq. So when KDP and PUK proposed on September 25, 2002 the constitution of a “federal Iraq” with Kirkuk as the capital of Kurdish areas, it rang alarm bells in Turkey, as they thought this could lead to the suppression of Turcomans in Kikuk.[39] After the fall of the Iraqi regime some of the Turkish fears gained credibility. When the Iraqi troops left the city of Kirkuk under heavy US bombardments, the forces of PUK and KDP entered the city in spite of their earlier promises not to do so. This alarmed Turkey, as it feared the impact of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan on her own Kurdish population. Turkey threatened to take action against Kurdish forces, which compelled the US forces to ask the Kurds to leave the city. However, the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) alleged that later on the Kurds had re-entered the city and had once again started harassing and threatening Turcomans and Arabs. While the Turcomans suspected the intentions of the Kurds, the latter blamed the Turcomans for atrocities on Kurds and for having a pan-Turkish agenda backed by Ankara.[40] The ITF further alleged that the PUK and KDP had launched a systematic campaign to force the Turcomans and Arabs out of oil-rich Kirkuk and Mosul, which they believed, were to be incorporated by the Kurds in their self-ruled territory.[41]

The Turks are so suspicious of the Kurds that when the war on Iraq started they immediately moved thousands of their troops into northern Iraq without coordinating with the US.[42] Though publicly they stated that they had taken control to monitor the movements of refugees towards Turkey, privately they confided that their main purpose was to thwart the political ambitions of the Kurds.[43] This alarmed the US as it raised the possibility of an open war between the Turkish army and US-allied Kurdish groups. Using their influence, the US was finally able to prevail upon the Turkish government not to send more troops to northern Iraq.[44] However it is important to note that there was and is a basic mistrust of the US in Turkish quarters. They believed that even if the US understood the security concerns of Turkey, at a later stage, in the process of replacing Saddam Hussain, they could trade off Turkey’s interest.[45]

After the quick toppling of Saddam Hussain the geo-strategic situation of the Middle East has changed. Since Turkey refused to take part in the war on Iraq, it has also lost the opportunity of determining the future of Iraqi Kurdish areas. Had Turkey participated in the war, she might now have been able to station her troops in northern Iraq.
 

Refugees

Another reason for Turkish opposition to war on Iraq was their fears of a new influx of Iraqi refugees. They had the experience of the 1991 Gulf War when over 500,000 refugees streamed into Turkey. This time they expected that around 200,000 refugees might seek asylum in Turkey. Since the Turkish economy was in a slump and it was feared that it could further deteriorate due to war, the Turkish government could ill-afford another heavy burden of refugees.[46]

Besides the economic implications, Turkey was also worried about its security, which could be aggravated by a large exodus of Kurdish refugees to Turkey. It was believed that an influx of Iraqi Kurds could heighten feelings of solidarity with their Kurdish counterparts in Turkey who shared tribal and blood ties with them.[47] Further it was feared that Kurdish separatists might penetrate into Turkey in the garb of refugees.[48] These concerns were not without foundation as during the 1991 Gulf War many Kurdish guerrillas smuggled arms and fighters into Turkey. Turkey is wary of Iraqi Kurds for political reasons as well; they are considered politically more active and could influence Turkish Kurds.[49]
 

Economic Losses

Another reason for Turkey’s opposition to war on Iraq was based on her fears that it would result in enormous economic losses to Turkey. The 1991 Gulf War caused Turkey an economic loss of $44 billion due to its impact on trade, tourism, and other revenues.[50] Over all the Turkish economic growth had dropped from 5 percent to 1 percent.[51] This time Turkey expected that the war would cause them $14 billion losses.[52] Thus a Turkey with an economy in recession that had not yet fully recovered from the economic losses of the 1991 Gulf War, could not afford to see another war on her borders.[53] The immediate fall out of the war on Turkish economy could be analysed by the fact that when the Turkish Parliament refused to allow American troops pass through their country, the stock market plunged and currency fell to a new low.[54] The JDP government was looking forward to American aid for Turkish support in the war to plug the deficit in the troubled Turkish economy, but the Parliament’s refusal dashed all such hopes to the ground. The result was the introduction of $2 billion tax hikes and cuts in Turkey. Further the delay in release of $1.6 billion instalment by IMF added 10 per cent to real interest rates as well. It was also feared that if the same trend continued Turkey might face default in domestic debt servicing, with all sorts of social and political ramifications.[55]

A pro-government business group TOBB estimated that a short war would cause Turkey a minimum economic loss of $16 billion, while the tourist business could drop to half- $5 billion. There was also the possibility of high oil prices, falling trade and rising debt services, which could cost the government a further $11 billion. And all this would ultimately affect the poor masses of Turkey.[56]
 

International Sanctions on Iraq and their effects on Turkey

The 1990 UN economic sanctions on Iraq had serious negative impacts on Turkey. Before the sanctions, Iraq was Turkey’s principal trading partner.[57] According to former American Ambassador to Turkey, Mark Parris, “The impact of these sanctions was on the order of what Americans would experience if the U.S.-Canadian border were sealed indefinitely.” A conservative estimate put the economic losses to Turkey from these sanctions around $40 to $80 billion.[58]

Before the sanctions, Turkey-Iraqi traders did a bustling business. The Iraqis used the Turkish ports of Iskendrun and Mersin for importing goods from Europe, and then carried them in hundreds of trucks over the modern west-east highway. They not only ferried goods from Europe, they also transported goods to Iraq and other countries in the Middle East from Turkey. The Turkish economy benefited tremendously from these business activities.[59]

As part of the economic sanctions imposed by UN on Iraq the pipeline taking oil from Iraq through Turkish territories was sealed. For six years it remained closed and Turkey suffered economically due to a loss of revenues. It was reopened in 1996 as part of the UN oil-for-food programme for Iraq. The new war once again endangered the smooth supply of oil through this pipeline.[60]
 

Tourism

Turkey suffered losses of billions of dollars in tourism during the 1991 Gulf War.[61] Before the new war on Iraq (2003), when the Turkish economy was passing through recession, many believed that the war would hamper Turkish efforts to reduce their massive debt burden, which was being jacked up by a IMF $16 billion loan.[62] In 2002 Turkey earned around $12 billion from tourism but with the start of the new war on Iraq the Turkish nightmare proved real. Flights were cancelled, hotels remained empty, rooms were vacant and the hustle and bustle of tourists was non-existent. Tourism was a major engine of the Turkish economy, and its failure adversely affected the Turkish people. This was worrisome to the US as well, because the already existing anti-American feelings could grow even stronger. This kind of situation was hardly welcome for the US, as Turkey had been a longstanding strategic ally.[63]  

Security Concerns

Last but not least Turkey was also afraid that if she joined the war on Iraq, she could face missile attacks from Iraq. Turkey wanted a guarantee from NATO allies for her defence but the latter refused to extend any such commitment.[64]

 
Positive Effects

The Iraq War has some positive impact on Turkey as well. When the possibility of war loomed large on Iraq, the Turks launched large-scale protests against Turkey’s joining the war on the side of US and allowing the US troops to use Turkish soil. Under pressure from these demonstrations the powerful Turkish army and the National Security Council (MGK - the army-dominated highest decision-making body), abstained from recommending permission for US troops. Thus it gave a free hand to the Parliament to decide. Sensing the mood of the people the Parliament did not grant the required permission to US troops.[65] This gave confidence to the deputies of the GNA to take bold decisions. The emboldened Parliament passed another landmark legislation on 30 July 2003 curbing the political influence of its powerful military. The new legislation curtailed the powers of MGK, which would no more enjoy executive powers and would work only as an advisory body. It also abolished some anti-terror laws, which had curtailed freedom of thought and expression.[66]

Some observers believed that the GNA’s refusal to grant permission to American troops had two aspects: one group was sharply disappointed, while the other group believed that for the first time the Turkish Parliament had lived up to the expectations of people and heard their voices.[67] This change of Parliament’s attitude could be termed as the dawn of a new democratic era in Turkey. It is believed that if the Turkish military generals did not step in, as they did in 1997, to restore the previous order of things, for the first time in the history of their young republic the Turks would enjoy real democracy.[68]

World-renowned scholar Noam Chomsky believed that Turkey had taught a lesson of democracy to USA and hailed the Turkish Parliament’s decision. In an interview with Global Aware he stated:

“The criticism of Turkey in the US is indeed bitter, and extremely revealing. The Turkish government took the position of over 90 per cent of the population. That reveals that the government lacks ‘democratic credentials,’ according to former Ambassador Morris Abramowitz, now a distinguished elder statesman. The government is ‘following the people,’ he wrote, instead of following orders from Washington and Crawford, Texas. That is plainly unacceptable. The view he articulates is standard. Turkey taught the US a lesson in democracy. That is regarded as criminal…. I do not recall ever having seen such demonstration of intense hatred for democracy on the part of elite opinion in the US (and to some extent Britain).[69]  

            After the war on Iraq is over and there are talks of reconstruction in Iraq, Turkey finds herself the best-placed country to contribute to its reconstruction. Turkey is a neighboring country, with its Mediterranean ports of Mersin and Iskendrun linked to the Iraqi border through a sophisticated highway. With a great deal of experience in the construction and energy sectors, and in telecommunications and food industries, it is hoped by local officials that Turkey may get 20 per cent of the reconstruction projects with a price tag of $600 billion over the coming decade.[70]
 

The Future of Turkey – US Relations

After the end of the Cold War in the nineties both Turkey and the US decided that they had become more important to each other than earlier. It was under the perceptions of this realisation that they declared themselves to be “strategic partners.” However it started changing even before Bush declared War on Iraq. The post war situation has brought new realities to the forefront and Turkish-US relations would be determined by these realities.[71]

The Turkish Parliament’s ‘no’ has endangered the previous close Turkey-US economic relations. It carries many consequences for Turkey. The refusal has put a question mark on the future attitude of America towards Turkish textiles. The US has remained a long-time trading partner of Turkey. In the backdrop of the war on Iraq and the Turkish policy, it is uncertain whether US would adopt any preferential policy towards Turkish textiles or not, particularly on imports to the United States after the WTO phase-out of quotas in 2005. Further, the Parliament’s refusal left Turkey unprotected from the effects of the war, as the attitude of the Congress hardened towards Turkey. Mark Parris opines, “This in turn, reinforced Turkish concerns that Congress would not come through on Administration aid promises, even if Parliament turned its decision around.” He further observed that the Turkish Parliament’s ‘no’ and later efforts to ‘sweeten the deal’ created a negative image of Turkey amongst the American people. It was thought that the Turks were bargaining for a better economic deal. And in Turkey it was supposed that Americans were using strong arms tactics, which increased anti-American feelings.[72]

Overall, at the end of war on Iraq there were mixed feelings about Turkey in Washington. One group was cautious while the neo-conservatives were critical and vocal. The first critical comments came from the American Deputy Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, who in an interview with CNN-Turk television stated that the beginning of a new chapter in relations with US depended on Turkey. He also referred to Turkey’s policy towards Syria and Iran, which in his opinion was not to the liking the US. He also recalled the Parliament’s refusal and stated,  

Let’s have a Turkey that steps up and says, ‘we made a mistake, we should have known how bad things were in Iraq, but we know now. Let’s figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to the Americans.’ I’d like to see a different sort of attitude than I have yet detected. 

These remarks received sharp rebuttals from Turkish leaders. Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan, while commenting on this remark, stated, “Turkey, from the very beginning, never made any mistakes, and has taken all the necessary steps in all sincerity.” The Turkish Government spokesman, Cemil Cicek was even more vocal and critical, he said that actually USA had made mistakes, which they should accept. Turkey co-operated in the first Gulf War but USA did not keep her promises and Turkey suffered billions of dollars in economic losses. Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition in Turkish Parliament observed, “Turkey is a democratic country and everybody that appreciates the functioning of the true democracy should respect this.”[73]

In spite of these critical statements by hawks, efforts were made even during the war by moderate elements in both countries to put the relations back on track. It was part of this effort that once the war started the Turkish government allowed the Allies to use its airspace unconditionally. Then on 2 April 2003, it was announced that Turkey agreed to allow military supplies to pass through her territory earmarked for US and Allied forces in northern Iraq. This was made possible after US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul brokered an agreement in Ankara. After the meeting Powell declared Turkey “an important member of the coalition that is now aligned against the regime of Saddam Hussein.”[74]

The efforts to rebuild the damaged relations were made by moderates in both Ankara and Washington. From the Turkish side most of the conciliatory statements were issued by moderate Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, some weakened secular political parties and the establishment and media, but the proud Turkish armed forces kept quiet. From the US side, the moderate and conciliatory group was led by Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who hastily arranged a trip to Ankara in early April 2003. Later George W. Bush and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held two telephonic conversations to ward off further damage. From Turkey, too, many senior JDP officials visited Washington as part of the efforts to normalize the strained relations. The statement from the Turkish Prime Minister that his country was “part of the coalition” was also considered an endeavour to warm up the relations. The relations got a further boost when the US government included $1 billion grant to Turkey in the Supplemental US war budget. The most recent conciliatory statements were issued by the US National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, who stated that though they had had some difficult moments with Turkey in the recent past, their relationship was long and strong and would continue to be so. Both countries had strategic interests in a united Iraq and they could work together in this area. She further stated that actually they had already worked in this area together. She also hoped that Turkey could be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq as it would be in her interest. She also observed that Turkish democracy could be a model for other Muslim countries, as it was a proof that democracy and Islam could go together. She further affirmed that overall they had strong relationship with Turkey and would continue so in the future.[75]

           Condoleeza Rice’s statement could be supported by the fact that both the US and Turkey were
cooperating with each other to settle the thorny issue. For example, in order to settle the Kurdish
problem, Washington and Ankara started negotiations on how to get rid of Kurdish militants holed up
in northern Iraq.[76] The BBC reported on 17 July 2003 that negotiations were held between General John
Abiziad, the new head of US Central Command and General Hilmo Ozkok, the Turkish Armed Forces Chief,
on the possibility of cooperating with each other in ousting Kurdish militants from northern Iraq.
Both generals also discussed the possibility of setting up an international peacekeeping force for Iraq.[77]
Later in an interview Maj. Gen. David Petraus, the head of the 101^st Airborne Division and the top

US commander in northern Iraq, stated that joint military exercises had been going on between Turkish
and US forces along the Turkish-Iraqi border. He further stated that the staging ground
of these exercises was previously used by PKK/KADEK terrorist groups to launch attacks on Turkey.[78]

The war on Iraq has also affected Turkey-European Union relations on the Kurdish question. During the war the Kurdish issue came to the limelight, creating a dilemma for Turkey’s Kurd policy. If Turkey adopted a lenient policy, they feared a free Kurdistan, but if they came down hard on the Kurds, it endangered Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union (which they wanted so dearly), because the European Union opposed the sending of Turkish troops into northern Iraq. For this reason when the Iraqi Kurds increased their militant activities in the wake of the war and Turkey sent her troops to forestall a possible Kurdish insurgency, the European Union warned Turkey against sending troops to Iraq.[79] The Turkish action also alarmed her NATO allies, particularly anti-war nations like Germany and Belgium, who threatened that the Turkish involvement in the war could lead to the withdrawal of support for defensive NATO measures for Turkey.[80]

In July 2003 Abdullah Gul, the Turkish Foreign Minister, went on a four-day official visit to Washington. Speaking to journalists on his return, he stated that Turkey’s offer of cooperation in post-war Iraq was positively received.[81]

            An important indicator of American efforts to improve relations with Turkey was her continued economic aid to Turkey in spite of tension between these two NATO allies. Turkey remained one of the beneficiaries of regular 2004 foreign aid. The regular military aid request for Turkey increased from $17.5 million in fiscal year 2003 to $50 million in First Year 2004, ostensibly to help its armed forces modernize and operate alongside other NATO members. The Administration also requested $200 million in new economic aid for Turkey ‘to mitigate the economic stress Turkey is experiencing as a result of its support for combating international terrorism.’ The Export-Import bank approved another $324 million loan guarantee for the purchase of S-70B Sea Hawk and UH-60 Black Hawk attack helicopters on 16 January 2003.[82] Further, the USA did not try to hamper loans to Turkey in IMF and World Bank, where American influence was considered crucial; the IMF announced on 1 August 2003 the release of delayed payments of $ 476 million to Turkey. It also rescheduled some of the loan payments due in 2004-05, to 2005-06.[83]

To rebuild strained relations and re-establish the strategic partnership, the General Staff Headquarters Secretariat General at Ankara announced on 30 July 2003, that Turkey, Israel and the United States would hold joint naval exercises named ‘Reliant Mermaid-VI’ in the international waters of the eastern Mediterranean in August 2003.[84]
 

Importance of Turkey for the USA

In spite of recent tensions in US-Turkey relations, the former cannot ignore Turkey. The USA understands very well the importance of Turkey in her overall foreign policy. Some analysts believe that the Brzezinski faction wants to use “the war on terrorism” against Russia by stationing the US forces in Central Asia. They also believe that in this effort Turkey could be very useful in using her influence in the Turkish speaking Central Asian states.[85]

Americans also understand Turkey’s importance in reducing anti-American sentiment in the Islamic World. Turkey, which takes pride in being a secular, liberal and democratic Muslim country, could help to bridge the gap between the USA and hostile Muslim countries. The present JDP government could play a particularly important role, as the party is considered to be an Islamic religious party.[86] Dr. Murat Mercan, Vice Chairman of JDP, in an interview with the Washington based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlighted this aspect and stated that Turkey could become a role model for the Muslim world in general and the Middle East in particular. Turkey could inspire these countries to follow the principles of secularism, liberalism and democracy, and if these principles were adopted by a Muslim country, that country would not be considered a threat to the free world anymore.[87]

Turkey’s relations with Israel are also considered very important by the Wolfowitz-Perle faction, as both work very closely with the “Mega” networks comprising the extreme right wing of the Israeli political scene.[88]  Dr. Murat Mercan while pointing towards this relationship stated that Turkey could play the role of facilitator in the Middle East Peace Process or the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[89]

Another area where the US needs Turkey’s cooperation is in the deteriorating law and order situation in Iraq. The Americans would like the Turkish government to send troops to help in the restoration of normalcy. The New York Times reported in July 2003 that the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had received President Bush’s request for Turkish troops in Iraq.[90] The news was later confirmed by the Pentagon and Capitol Hill when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Air Force General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in separate statements that the US was negotiating with Pakistan, India and Turkey to send thousands of troops to help in Iraq.[91] According to the Ankara-based Hurriyet newspaper the American administration was lobbying with Ankara to send 10,000 troops to war battered Iraq where Americans were facing mounting resistance and a daily death toll amongst its soldiers.[92]

Dr. Murat Mercan, the Vice Chairman of the ruling party in Turkey, observed during a meeting with CSIS that both America and Turkey should forget about the past (referring to tensions created by the refusal of the Turkish Parliament). He stated that Turkey had contributed whatever it could to the war effort, even though this was not exactly what the US expected. Turkey had contributed in permitting overflights, and in giving logistical and humanitarian support. He further observed that in the coming days Turkey could contribute yet more, as it was expected that situations would arise in which Turkey could play a major role.[93]  

As part of American plan to restructure the Middle East she also needs Turkish help in dealing with Iran and Syria. These two countries are considered hurdles in the American plan. However, Turkey’s assistance cannot be taken for granted, because if there is a military confrontation with either Syria or Iran, Turkey might find herself in a situation similar to the one she faced in the build up to the war on Iraq.[94] This is clear from the Turkish policy towards these countries as well. Even before the war Turkey had started improving relations with Syria, inviting the Syrian Chief of Staff to visit Ankara and signing agreements for joint military training and defence production. After the fall of Baghdad relations further strengthened through increased trade activities, and Turkish trucks were allowed to pass through Syrian borders.[95]

In order to reinforce Turkish-Syrian relations the Syrian Prime Minister, Mustapha Miro, visited Turkey in July, 2003.  This was the first visit by a Syrian Prime Minister since 1986. While the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Ankara considered the visit to be very important, the US expressed concern and stated that Ankara should be careful about upgrading its relationship with Syria. On the eve of his visit, the Syrian Prime Minister stated that Syria, Turkey and Iran should forge closer relations to safeguard their interests in the Middle East and thwart US designs to restructure the area.[96]  

            In the recent past, Turkish-Iranian relations soured mainly because of Iran’s refusal to declare Kadek-the political successor to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)- as a terrorist organisation. However, in April 2003, both countries decided to improve their relations, and created a trade zone where customs duties were reduced on many products. The Turkish-Iranian Business Council also held meetings in Istanbul to discuss plans for the improvement of roads and transportation facilities. They also discussed the possibility of exporting Iranian gas via Turkey to Europe.[97]

Another significant development is the proposal for a gas pipeline from al-Arish in Egypt through Syria to Turkey. Thus the increasing ties between Turkey, Iran, Syria and Egypt could fill the gap on the eastern front of the Arab world created by the fall of Iraq.[98]
 

Conclusion

The American War on Terrorism (especially her military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq) has opened a new chapter in world history. As the famous American writer Gore Vidal remarked, ‘it’s the end of American republicanism and the beginning of American imperialism.’[99] In an international poll conducted through Internet by TIMEeurope.com before the start of the war on Iraq, a question was asked of Internet users, “Which country really poses the greatest danger to world peace in 2003?” 706842 people responded, and nearly 87 per cent believed that the USA posed the greatest danger to world peace, while 6.7 per cent voted for North Korea and only 6.3 per cent for Iraq.[100] Bush and his junta have actually put in danger the peace of the whole world. Their policy of preemption and hegemony has no limits; if other regional powers use it as an excuse for aggression the whole world will soon be in flames. The war on Iraq has opened the eyes of the world community. It must rise to the occasion and think of ways and means to counter the dangers that have arisen because of the Bush Doctrine.

The war has also awakened the Turks, compelling them to think more realistically about their own national interests rather than deferring endlessly to the interests of the USA. It was this realisation that led the GNA to refuse the use of Turkish soil to US troops. In the beginning this caused some problems for the economy. In the long run, however, the Turkish people will be the beneficiaries, because they will learn to stand on their own feet instead of looking for crutches. Politically too, the Turks will benefit from the climate of change. For the first time in the history of the republic the public representatives have, in line with the wishes of the people, taken a firm stand against the dominant army presence in the government. It can be called the beginning of true democracy in Turkey. This has already started to happen as the Turkish Parliament in the aftermath of the war has taken steps to strip the army of some of its executive powers. One example is the new legislation that has deprived the army of the right to appoint a general as the head of the powerful National Security Council. Though this legislation is also the result of a strong Turkish desire to join the European Union, the historic ‘no’ to US forces also gave strength to the GNA to take such decisions against the army.

Externally, too, Turkey is bound to benefit because now Turkey will be looking towards regional countries for economic and military cooperation rather than depending wholly on the USA. She has already taken steps to improve her relations with neighboring Muslim countries such as Syria and Iran, with whom she did not have good relations in the past.

Last but not least, the USA cannot ignore Turkey for any length of time because Turkey is a powerful regional country whose support the Americans need on a variety of regional and international issues. It is said that the only things that are permanent in a country’s foreign policy are her national interests, and that there is no permanent enemy or friend in international relations. Therefore, if America considers Turkey to be of any benefit for her national interest, she is bound to improve her relations with Turkey and this is exactly what has started happening. For example, the USA, Turkey and Israel are conducting joint military exercises in the aftermath of war on Iraq, the USA has sanctioned economic aid for Turkey for the year 2004 and the Bush administration has issued many statements reaffirming Turkey’s status as an important ally. Besides that, many high profile visits have taken place to each other country.