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aiting for America; India and US in the New Millennium evaluates the new strategic partnership between India and the US, from a purely Indian perspective and tends to be biased, at times. It overstates the importance of India for the US, especially in terms of Indian role in linking the US with oil. It suggests that the two are dependant on each other to achieve their respective goals. India cannot achieve the economic revolution of the 21st century without the US; similarly, the US needs the support of a vibrant democracy for a stronghold in Asia and needs to legitimise efforts to secure its claims to the fuel-rich Eurasian heartland that holds the key to global power. The author gives credit to Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for the emerging Indo-US relationship, while also acknowledging the earlier contributions made by Indira Gandhi in this regard. He suggests that while India must give the US special status in its economic survival, it should also respond to situations on the basis of independent assessments of its own national interest and that is the essence of non-alignment. No two countries can ideally be natural allies. India and the US have many common objectives and will no doubt take the same path in many matters. But their interests may diverge on many points e.g. relations with Pakistan.
In addition to the geostrategic importance of India with regards to the US interests in Middle East, Central Asia, Indian Ocean and Far East, the economic revolution of India was also a great source of attraction for the US. The economic reforms not only enabled India to adopt a vigorous defence policy and abrupt diplomacy but also made India attractive for the businessmen who influence the US policy makers. While discussing the US interests in extra-regional affairs, one of the major US interests discussed is oil. The US has always protected its oil interests. The US needs Pakistan for strategic reasons, which transcend oil and power politics.
The author criticises the US for its policies on Kashmir and its policies towards the subcontinent soon after independence. A major controversy had been brewing up for some time because of the US' growing concerns over nuclear proliferation. Whereas earlier in 1964 and 1968, India had sought US and Soviet nuclear guarantees and while turning down many US invitations to go nuclear, which was part of the US strategy of containment of USSR. India however refused to sign NPT in 1968, terming it discriminatory. Chinese arms support to Pakistan and 1971 war, led India to embark on its own programme, which resulted in 1974 to the first nuclear test, Pokharan I. When Mrs. Gandhi was holding power in India and the Reagan administration was in the US, the relations worsened between the two states. New Delhi complained that the new Sino-American rapport indicated a hidden US-Pak-China plan to encircle India. The aid directed to Pakistan in the wake of Afghanistan crisis, created uneasiness in India. At the same time, by late 1970s India without turning away from Soviet Union was beginning to look towards West.
India at several instances had chipped at the US’ global hegemony and that was unacceptable to US. India needed more modern technology and intensification of trade and economic relations with other countries and it was looking for reasons that were as much political as they were operational, to diversify its military purchases. Yet economics in US-India relations remained hostage to politics.
The author discusses the tenure of different Indian leaders and their foreign policies, particularly towards the US and Russia. Majority of Indian leaders had been interested in aligning with the US but did not accept the zero sum game thesis and ignored the US reminders that relations with India would not be improved at Pakistan's expense. Relations with the US certainly moved ahead in Rajiv’s time, particularly in specialised technical and scientific fields. The US appreciated his modernising drive and his apolitical politics. He knew that only the US could supply India with its needs and was sympathiser of Western cultural moves. But in the absence of political understanding, many ambitious plans foundered on the rocks of the US's increasingly important non-proliferation commitments. But domestically Rajiv and his cronies had alienated the middle classes. The book while discussing the Indo-US relations also takes into account the domestic political culture and the impact of the respective government’s policies on the domestic front.
The book also discusses how India realised and started working for a strong Indian lobby in Washington. The success of Indian diplomacy became evident when, in 1989 (Kashmir crisis) due to increased tension between India and Pakistan, Washington shifted gears on Kashmir. The US started encouraging discussions on issues such as anti-narcotics cooperation, trade and cultural exchanges so that "Kashmir (is) not the only point on the bilateral agenda." The US thought that the 1972 Simla agreement could be the best framework for a resolution of the disputes, while earlier in 1940s and 1950s the US had advocated for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The US also changed its stance on Pakistan's nuclear issue, and imposed Pressler amendment in 1990. The main reason was that Soviets had evacuated Afghanistan and there was no longer need to pamper Pakistan.
The Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests brought China close to the US, by denouncing Pakistan's nuclear tests. Also due to this, the US extended Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China. Though there were some voices of concern in the US over economic interests in India and soon the USself-interest in India narrowed their differences and repaired some of the damage caused by Pokharan II.
There is also an anti-China tilt in the book. The author at several places has compared the US policies toward China and India, which looked for a way out of the impasse, without abandoning its nuclear concerns or appearing to succumb to pressure. The author is of the opinion that the US officials preferred to deal with Pakistan over Indians and were very compatible with the Army, as it better served the US interests.
The main difference in the US and Indian interest had been difference in perception. The US had been thinking in global terms while India had been unable to extricate itself from local problems. The US and India also had differences on nuclear programme roll back. The report released after Pokharan-II, by a three man commission set up in 1996 by the US Congress, listed India among the countries that might not be directly hostile to the US but could supply technology to nations that were, and might cooperate technically with North Korea, China, Iran and Russia.
The author compares December 13 attacks on Indian parliament with September 11-world trade center incident and criticises the US role in appeasing Pakistan for getting its support for war on terrorism. The author discusses importance of South Asia for US, which according to him has increased much more than the Cold War period. This is because of the US dependence on oil, as well as the challenge of Arab nationalism, which is often termed as Islamic fundamentalism, along with the over billion Indian populations and economic revolution. India and the US have overlapping national interests. In the east, India can be the pivot of an emerging triangular equation with China and Japan, strengthening the democratic consensus, which US regards essential for stability.
Indo-US cooperation has increased incrementally since Bush assumed Presidency. Nevertheless the dialogue still falls short of holistic understanding, particularly on Pakistan. The US mediated and cooled off both sides in 2001 crisis and by summer 2002, Indo-Pak relations had temporarily improved. The author lays down certain steps for the US i.e. to persuade Musharraf to accept the counsel of reason, discourage nuclear adventurism and persuading Pakistan to come to terms with geographical reality. He envisages an important US role in defusing Indo-Pak tensions by disciplining Pakistan to avert the peril of a 4th war.
The author argues that the stage is set for a mature partnership between the world's oldest and biggest democracies, not because they are natural allies but because their strategic interests coincide, reinforced by the oil diplomacy, war on terrorism and the needs of more than a million Indians in the US. Examining the historical background, this book warns that instability will persist until the US and China allow South Asia to settle down to its natural equilibrium.
Sadia Nasir
Assistant Researcher Officer, IPRI
Copyright
- IPRI 2000-2003
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