Book Review-IV
 

US National Defense Strategy for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy

by Edward A. Olsen,
FRANK CASS Publishers, London, 2002. Pages 210.

dward A. Olsen, who is a professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, specialises in East Asian security issues. This book explains the recent trends in the international strategy of the United States of America. The United States (US) is apparently the only great power in the world since the end of the Cold War. A country with such a status has certain tangible and intangible determinants guiding its grand strategy. In the past decade, the US has maintained a low profile policy towards some of its past allies and some regions of interests. This policy has recently been termed as the ‘Grand Exit Strategy’. This book explains this concept and gives propositions of following a non-interventionist policy in the times when the unilateral action of waging a pre-emptive war for a presumably ‘just’ cause seems to be the only logical policy of the US. In the last decade, the US has experienced a visible metamorphosis in its grand strategy due to three significant factors. Firstly, this change is because of some vitally professed objectives regarding security; secondly, it is because of some requirements of national economic policy; and thirdly, there exists an urge to achieve a higher level of international recognition and status. The guiding motivations behind the US strategy are quite diverse, yet domestic compulsions, idiosyncrasies of the leaders, international commitments and the emerging problems of security are some of the main factors that seem to be causing a change in the US strategy during the 1990s.

This book comprises six chapters, with an introduction to its concept, the impediments in the formulation of sound strategies, the idea of non-intervention in dynamic nature of international relations and a new strategic vision. However, the main crux of the book is to be found in the fifth and the sixth chapters that explain the need for disentanglement from permanent alliances, and propositions are given for the US to follow a policy of disentanglement in future. In the author’s perspective, non-intervention as a policy became a feature of the US strategy as an unconscious reaction to the Vietnam War and the miscalculation and decision-making blunders, made before and during the war. This non-interventionist grand strategy continued in the US strategy and attained new heights during Clinton’s administration. The other factor that went along with this strategy was the quest to find a peacetime role for the US, but at the same time, it has not been able to change the pattern of alliances that had been formulated at the time of the Cold War. The US thus has been clinging to the status quo, especially in Europe. The strength of the US strategy has been that, despite the differences in the policies of the two major political parties in domestic politics, the leaders have always had a basic understanding of the US grand vision and have supported it with all sincerity. The basic objective of the US strategy has always been preservation of its core national interests and the anti-isolationist ideas, which the author explains giving the example of the Munich syndrome, that motivated the US policy-makers to strengthen alliances with European nations for the preservation of their own national interests.

The author has comprehensively studied the logic behind the presumed ‘quest for enemies’ by the US to justify its defence expenditure. This quest for enemies has been allowing the US to broaden its sphere of influence in the regions where it did not directly need to intervene. This policy left some grievances among the intervened states and, later on, the US had to face the antagonism of these states. The motivation behind this quest for absolute control was the feeling of being on the right track and the perception that only by being on top could the US implement its agenda. The US is not the unanimously agreed leader of the world and since there are international organisations like the United Nations, it becomes their job to implement international agendas. Keeping in perspective the modern day crises, where unilateral use of force against unseen and unidentifiable enemies in the form of international terrorists has increased the confusion and uncertainty regarding the implementation of international agendas of peace; it is time to contemplate not only the costs and the gains of following an interventionist policy, but also the probable situation where the US can follow an exit strategy. At this juncture, the author has quoted the idea of building a ‘Fortress America’, where the US military could defend the territorial integrity of the nation and not expect the allies to offer any military assistance. Writers like Robert Tucker have already debated upon such ideas. These writers emphasises that by following a non-interventionist policy the US will not be isolated; instead, it will find greater resources to improve its economy that needs a boost. Moreover, the US fixation with war as a means of pursuing policy needs to be rethought and re-evaluated. There cannot be a quick fix solution, so the author gives a complete explanation of how the allies and the client states would reorient themselves in the new situation if the US chooses to change its policy. In the ideal situation this policy of non-intervention would change the priorities from excelling in military might to attaining economic ascendancy. An economically strong US would thus serve the interests of national strategy better than a militarily strong US that cannot prevent itself from getting involved in wars that promise no long lasting solutions. The undeniable reality is that the US needs to regain its economic might. This can be observed from the fact that the US has now become the greatest debtor after having once been the largest creditor.

            The author has also addressed the rise of many uncertainties that could lead to a nuclear war and has tried to question the rationality behind plans like Theatre Missile Defence. These themes imply a need to rethink the concepts of strategy, to redefine and implement them in consonance with the new threats to security. In the last two chapters, the author has made a comprehensive litany of how the US can follow a disentanglement policy vis-à-vis North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS), the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and, above all, Israel. It takes courage for an American writer to say that neither the US nor Israel need each other for their defence, so it is rational that the US disengage itself from Israel and minimise the hatred that the Muslim states have harboured against it for following the Zionist agenda. In these last two chapters, there are some propositions for revamping the decision-making at the highest levels of the US establishment, through extensive national debates and wider participation.

            The book is lucidly written and thoroughly researched. It provides an alternative mode of thinking to students of international relations and is of great value to a reader who does not posses an extensive knowledge of international relations and strategy. The most laudable feature, however, is that the writer has refuted the highly prescribed values dominant among the international decision makers, and has made an effort to break new ground in the study of international relations. Moreover, the author has challenged the existing values of realism and analysed their moral validity, which is a notable and worthwhile contribution to the existing literature.

Ahmed Ijaz Malik
 

Assistant Research Officer, IPRI