Book Review-II

Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future 

Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis
Washington: RAND, 2000.
Pages: 283.

n the post-Mao period (1978 onwards), the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping introduced drastic changes in Chinese foreign policy, de-radicalizing it and opening it up towards the West. It also liberalized its economy, both internally and externally, and adopted a fresh role in international politics. The United States, which was engaged in its confrontation with the USSR at that time, could not respond to China’s emerging role in the international arena. No sooner did the Cold War end than Beijing appeared as the new obsession of policy-makers in Washington who viewed its phenomenal economic growth, increasing military power and expanding political role as significant portents for the international power structure. Reacting to predictions that China would continue its ascent as a world power, the US government re-emphasized the need to develop strategic and successful policies toward China.

            Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future certainly addresses that need and proposes certain recommendations for the US government to counter China’s contemporary strategic options. RAND scholars, Michael Swaine (Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy), and his fellow analyst, Ashley Tellis, have conducted the study; it should, therefore, not take anybody by surprise that the book presents American perceptions, or, more appropriately, its China obsession. The authors term the defensive mindset of the Chinese–followed by China for centuries–a ‘grand strategy’, with the ambition of gaining global supremacy. It does not appear a sound argument, primarily because the goals of all nations are modified with the passage of time and it is difficult, if not impossible, for any nation to adhere to goals which were set centuries ago.

            Tracing the roots of China’s grand strategy (China’s basic approach to political and military security), the authors identify them as the achievement of interrelated objectives such as preservation of internal order, the wellbeing of its people, defence against external threats, and, eventually, the attainment of geo-political influence as a major–perhaps primary–state in international politics. The ruling authorities in China have used all available methods to achieve these objectives. In contemporary times, the achievement of these objectives has continued to be the focal point of China’s security strategy. It is interesting to note that no Chinese ruler has ever presented the concept of this ‘grand strategy’ in a comprehensive manner. This terminology is that of Swaine and Tellis, and they apply to the evolving comprehensive national strength China has been acquiring.

            In the modern era (from 1850 to the present times), colonial powers reached the periphery of China, changing its threat perception. To meet the new challenges, China first devised a hybrid ‘weak-strong’ security strategy and later modified it to a ‘calculative’ strategy. The former contained the characteristics of both a weak and a strong state; the latter was based on a shift from strict adherence to an ideology to the liberalization of the economy, both internally and externally, opening up towards the West and taking greater interest in international fora. The ‘calculative strategy’ also emphasized increasing efforts to modernize China’s military for asymmetric gains. The authors suspect that, in the current phase, China might well conflict with the United States and its allies on certain issues, the most important of them being Beijing’s concern over interference in its domestic affairs.

Assuming that the present trends in China’s long-term economic, military and domestic political development continue, by the period 2015–2020 –the minimum time-frame in which the Chinese economy and military might can develop sufficiently to allow China to become globally pre-eminent–it might begin an extended transition phase to a new security strategy that would last for another couple of decades. However, attainment of this goal, according to the authors, would largely depend on how China consolidates its power capabilities vis-á-vis the other great powers, particularly the US. At this stage, China could be reasonably expected to demonstrate some, if not all, of the core elements the grand strategies pursued by the major powers in the past: strengthening of military powers; formation of alliances; redefining of the existing international system to protect national interests; and, in the most extreme policy choice imaginable, readiness to thwart pre-emptive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes.

            The authors present a comprehensive plan of strategic options for the US to contain China in either scenario: it rises to power and acquires the associated assertiveness or it fails in doing so. Should China acquire pre-eminent power, the authors recommend that the United States should adopt a policy of realistic engagement, combining efforts at co-operation where possible; to prevent by force, if necessary, the acquisition by China of capabilities that would threaten America’s core national security interests; and to remain prepared to cope with the consequences of a more assertive China. If China does not acquire that status, owing to whatever impediments may exist, and consequently remains unable to challenge the US, then Washington’s strategy should be to neither create preconditions for such a scenario nor retreat in the expectation that China’s rise to power is inevitable.

            Swaine and Tellis have undoubtedly made a major contribution to the understanding of China’s current strategic behaviour at an appropriate time, as Beijing is currently expanding its role in international politics. It is not necessary that one agree with the policy recommendations of the authors, but the book will certainly lead to wider discussion, bringing new ideas and perspectives to the subject. It also eliminates a certain level of obscurity regarding China’s role in the future global politics. The book is worthwhile reading for the researchers, students of international relations, political scientists and policy-makers.

Ghulam Ali

Assistant Research Officer, IPRI