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Book Review-I
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hmad Faruqui’s work Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: the price of strategic myopia is a critical review of security problems of Pakistan. He analyses policies concerning defence, foreign affairs, nuclearisation, Kashmir and disarmament and has mainly relied on published sources. He correctly asserts that besides military’s combat-effectiveness, strong political leadership, social cohesion, a viable economic base, and successful foreign policy is essential. The unbridled pursuit of military power neglecting other factors will impair national security.
He compares the security policies of both Pakistan and India. According to him the national security policy of Pakistan is based on the fear of India, optimism regarding the support from the Allies and reliance on its own military prowess. The fear of India emanates from its expansionist policies in Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad (1947-48), Goa (1961), Sikkim (1975), and Siachin (1984). Pakistan’s reliance on the United States (US) for help never materialised in its wars against India. The war of 1971 shattered the illusion of military superiority of Pakistan.
He identifies three major shortcomings of Pakistan’s Armed Forces, that are namely, failure in higher direction of war, failure to coordinate infantry-armour operations as in 1965, and failure to have combined army-air force operations as in 1971. He also justifies his assertion by referring to ill-planned tribal incursion in Kashmir in 1947, the launching of Gibraltar Force without diplomatic and military planning and lack of preparedness for a full-fledged war with India in 1965, and finally losing half of the country in 1971 due to the blunders of its leadership.
India, till 1990s appeared to have a “passive and reactive strategic culture.” Thereafter a definite change took place. He refers to the Indira Doctrine to make India the “security manager” of the subcontinent, and with the advent of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, India is determined to become a great power. He recounts four challenges to India’s security. These are the concerns for national unity, the rivalry with Pakistan, a perceived threat from China, and finally, visualisation of a global threat from the US. He refers to Indian military success in 1971 due to higher direction of war, which made sure that it was well-planned, well-timed and superbly executed. According to him the Indians were able to pull off a “guerilla-cum-regular force strategy” in East Pakistan and the Pakistanis had failed to do the same in 1947-48 and 1965 wars. He gives credit to Indians to surprise Pakistan by capturing Siachin in 1984, and he correctly brings out that Pakistan retaliated for the loss of Siachen by capturing Kargil in 1999, though it had to withdraw under US pressure.
He points out India had the advantage of greater territory, demography, economy and industry vis-à-vis Pakistan and a defence pact with the USSR concluded in August 1971 named “Treaty of Peace and Friendship.” He does not spare India for its military failures in various campaigns in West Pakistan during both 1965 and 1971 wars as well as the debacle of the Indian military in Sri Lanka in 1987-90, but surprisingly he fails to cite the Indian military defeat against China in 1962.
He refers to the latest pragmatism in China’s policy. It has initiated a dialogue with India for rapprochement and strategic accommodation. It is engaged in a balancing act with the US and is giving priority to economic development over defence. He feels that although Pakistan is likely to remain China’s ally, it cannot take China for granted.
According to him the concept of nuclear deterrence is a fallacy. He fears that both countries have compromised national security because they are diverting funds from essential economic development to weaponisation. He fails to take into account that there has been virtually no increase in defence expenditure in Pakistan since nuclearisation. His Western inspired theory that by exploding nuclear device Pakistan lost the chance to seize the high moral ground against India is also controversial.
While dealing with Kashmir problem, he advises to follow Jiang Zemin who, in his address to Pakistani Senate on December 2, 1996, said that if some issues cannot be resolved, then they should be temporarily shelved so that they do not have adverse repercussion on inter-state relations.
He is against military rule because it adversely affects the professionalism of the armed forces; it is incompatible with Islamic law; and is against the demands of world culture. But he supports a military role in the politics of Pakistan and thinks that the creation of National Security Council, consisting of military and civilian elements, would break the vicious cycle of political failure and military rule.
Referring to the US Central Agency Report of 2000, which after reviewing the macroeconomic performance of the previous decade, had predicted a grim future for Pakistan and a bright future for India by the year 2015, he rightly points out that one of the main cause for slow growth in Pakistan during 1990s was corruption and recommends its elimination through stringent measures.
He proposes fifty percent cut in the defence budget so that a sizeable portion of resources could be made available for economic development. One of the ways to do this would be to emulate countries like Israel who maintain lesser forces but can mobilise a large force at short notice during an emergency.
Finally referring to the global disarmament process pursued after the end of the cold war and citing experiences of the US, Russia, China, Germany and UK, he gives a worthwhile advice to both India and Pakistan to rethink their approach to national security.
Noor ul Haq
Research Fellow, IPRI
Copyright
- IPRI 2000-2003
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