Assessing the Role of Confidence Building Measures in the India Pakistan Tangle

 

Pervaiz lqbal Cheema*

 

he future of peace in South Asia rests heavily upon the Indo-Pak equation.  Jointly they can shoulder the responsibility of ensuring security and stability of the region. Persistence in adversarial pursuits can continue to damage the collective interest of the region. For years India and Pakistan concentrated on strengthening their defences against each other. Admittedly, during the initial stages problems emanating from the hasty partition of the Indian subcontinent compelled them to adopt hostile posture. However, experience of the past 56 years indicates that a continuation of the antagonism can only result in further violence and destruction. It is time for both India and Pakistan to realize how much by way of resources is being squandered on maintaining large military establishments, while poverty continues to grow. This paper initially attempts to identify the outstanding issues, and then concentrates on assessing the role of confidence building measures.

 

The Issues

While it is not possible to analyze all the issues and disputes effectively impeding the process of normalization, an attempt is made here to highlight the major issues in this long-standing confrontation. These issues include the past which haunts both nations, minorities, communalism, issues emerging at the time of partition such as the Kashmir dispute, nuclear developments, domestic factors, superpower involvement in the region, and the shadow of post 9/11 developments along with the US led Afghan war and its aftermath.

 

Historical factors

The Indo-Pakistan conflict assumed its modern character after the partition of the subcontinent, but the roots of this antagonism lie deep in history. Hindus and Muslims clashed for the first time when Mohammad Bin Qasim defeated Raja Dahir of Sind in 712. Since then the subcontinent has witnessed a continuous struggle between the two communities for the domination of this part of the world. Despite conciliatory efforts of saints like Data Ganj Bux (Sheikh Ali Hajveri), Baba Farid Shakarganj, Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti. Nizamuddin Aulia and their Hindu counterparts, who did their best to check Hindu-Muslim antagonism, the acrimony continued to manifest itself, some times overtly and at other times covertly, but always simmering and smouldering because of the basic irreconcilability of the two religions. Throughout the Muslim rule, the Hindus, inspired by stories of their own golden age, continued to express their discontentment and bitterness against Muslim domination in one form or the other, and waited for a favorable turn of destiny. The long awaited opportunity came when the British emerged as the successors to the Mughals after the war of independence in 1857. The Hindus seized this opportunity with religious zeal and began to extend unlimited cooperation to the British, which enabled them to firmly establish their hold over the subcontinent. Realizing the significance of existing Hindu-Muslim friction, the British shrewdly exploited this to their advantage. It is not surprising that the intensity of communal riots increased significantly during the 90 years (1857-1947) of the British Raj.

During the freedom movement, Hindu-Muslim antagonism was transformed into Congress-League rivalry with differing interpretations of the 'Two Nation Theory," and the friction intensified. Even an acknowledged pacifist like Gandhi, who had a great talent for controlling the instinctive urge to express indignation, could not suppress his feelings when he realized that the Muslims of India were likely to obtain a separate homeland on the basis of the two nation theory. During the first few years following partition, Indo-Pak relations were influenced not only by the legacy of the past but also by the unresolved issues that were the product of partition. These issues included communal slaughter, mass migration, refugees, evacuee property problems, the division of financial and military assets, the Indus waters, minority problems and the struggle over the accession of princely states with special focus on Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir etc. While most of these problems were resolved in one form or the other, communalism and the Kashmir dispute defied all efforts at conciliation.

 

Minorities and Communalism

Despite a long history of living together in the same area the Hindu and Muslim communities of India have yet to develop a measure of mutual tolerance and harmony. Perhaps the inherent incompatibilities of the two religions (Islam and Hinduism) impeded and prevented such a development on important matters, yet there are not many examples of interference in each other’s respective religious spheres. Irrespective of the religious inclinations of the rulers, both communities learned to live with the situation with apparent ease. The result was that religious antagonism remained dormant until the arrival of the British. The British utilized this underlying religious cleavage to their own advantage. The colonial strategy of 'divide and rule' effectively encouraged Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Communal riots rarely occurred under the Mughals or their predecessors, but there were innumerable clashes between Hindu and Muslim communities under the British. The establishment of the British Raj widened the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims of India, while its departure raised the existing antagonism to the point of hatred for each other. One of the more significant legacies of the hasty British departure was the problem of religious minorities.

While the creation of Pakistan satisfied the Muslims of the majority areas, it also made the large number of Muslims, who had opted to remain in India, somewhat inadvertently an unreliable minority. For several years after partition they were not only regularly blamed for the division of the subcontinent, they were also 'regarded as representatives of anti-India, hostile, divisive and subversive influence which had shattered the aspiration for national unity'.[1] Prompt
 protest notes from Pakistan over communal riots further confirmed the negative beliefs of extremist Hindus. What is surprising is the fact that even secular minded Hindus, who linked the Kashmir question with professed Indian secularism, became ambivalent about measures to safeguard cultural distinctions of the Muslim minority. Even Nehru was unable to persuade states with sizeable Muslim populations to implement the safeguards and recommendations of the
 Language Statement of 1958.[2] 

It was not until the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 that the situation began to improve for the Muslims in India and the prejudices shaped by the events of the past began to be gradually eroded. The Muslim community in India no longer looked at Pakistan as the guardian of its interests and welfare, and its increasing identification with India also began to minimize the apprehensions of extremist Hindus. The dismemberment of Pakistan provided great satisfaction to those opposed to the two-nation theory and eased considerably the fears and apprehensions which were responsible for the negative attitude of important sections of the Hindus towards the Muslim minority. However, this gradual change in the attitude of the Hindus towards the Muslim minority in India did not produce the expected harmonious juxtaposition of the two communities in India. It would take some time to attain that goal even if the normalization process were allowed to proceed at a steady pace. The erosion of the bitterness and hatred accumulated over the centuries requires patience and a long-term programme coupled with stern measures to control communal riots, if and when they occur. The negative forces will certainly continue to try to thrive on this hatred as long as it fits into their overall strategic objectives.

The recent Gujarat anti-Muslim riots, alleged to be the product of a planned conspiracy of militant Hindu organizations with the connivance of the state government, are just the latest examples of the workings of these negative forces. The objectives involved in these recent riots appeared to be the eviction of relatively prosperous Muslims from the state of Gujrat. Despite severe criticism by many international human rights watch organizations, the Gujrat riots were not brought under control. Whenever anti-Muslim riots take place in India, Muslims in Pakistan instantly express their concern. Extremist Hindus of course always resent this and tend to misinterpret all expressions of sympathy emanating from Pakistan.

The past has been a frequent victim of negativism manifested in the form of communal riots. Riots were invariably sparked off by simple matters such as the decision to declare Urdu as the second official language of Uttar Pradesh. Many major northern states like U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Bihar experienced communal violence that resulted in innumerable deaths of Muslims. While there is no doubt that communal minded parties and forces deliberately exacerbated communal tension, the Bhagalpur and the Gujarat riots clearly indicate the active involvement of local police on the side of the communalists. For several months the Ramjanmabhoomi - Babri Masjid controversy was used to whip up Hindu intolerance of the Muslim community under the banner of Hindu revivalism. The delayed court verdict regarding the fate of the disputed land of the demolished Babri mosque and the vacillating attitudes of most Indian governments have not really helped in resolving the controversy.

 

The Kashmir Dispute

No other issue has generated so much ill will between India and Pakistan as has been done by the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Although the dispute originated in 1947 along with many other complex problems generated by a hasty and badly planned partition, the Kashmir dispute is perhaps one of the few important disputes that have survived over the years in somewhat original form. Even the end of the Cold War has not dampened this issue. While India is known to have made innumerable efforts to bury the issue, Pakistan is still pursuing efforts for a peaceful and lasting solution. Disappointed by the world community's apathetic attitude, the Kashmiris seem to have opted since 1990, for a more violent course of action. Most Pakistanis, 55 years after partition, have forgotten what happened to Junagadh and Hyderabad, but Kashmir is still viewed as a constant reminder of India's duplicity and highhandedness. Pakistan claims that her stand on Kashmir is not motivated by any kind of territorial ambition, and that she asks for nothing more than the extension to Kashmir of the principle of self determination.  Pakistan stresses that India should allow the people of Kashmir to decide their future through an internationally supervised plebiscite. To the holding of such a plebiscite, Pakistan argues, India is officially committed through the Indian Government's repeated pledges to Pakistan as well as to the United Nations. Both India and Pakistan accepted the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 pledging to the world to hold a plebiscite as stipulated in these resolutions.

While recognizing that a vast majority of the Kashmiri people are followers of Islam, India justifies her possession of Kashmir on the basis of the Maharaja's instrument of accession, the legality and validity of which have been frequently questioned.  As regards her undertaking to ascertain the Kashmiris' will through a plebiscite, India claims that she promised to do so “long before” the dispute was referred to the Security Council. Hence it was a promise to the people of Jammu and Kashmir and not to Pakistan or the United Nations, and as such it does not involve any international commitment as far as the validity of accession is concerned. Still, although India was prepared to fulfill her promise to the people of Kashmir, the holding of a plebiscite was constantly obstructed by Pakistan's refusal to withdraw her troops from parts of the State which were under her “illegal' occupation. In these circumstances, India had no alternative but to let the Kashmiris decide their future through a "duly elected representative body", the Constituent Assembly, which in a meeting on 17 November 1956, confirmed the State's permanent accession to India. This being its people's voluntary verdict, Kashmir's accession to India "is therefore final,
 complete, perfect and irrevocable.”[3] Pakistan of course, does not accept the arguments
 advanced by India, and her attitude thereon is generally shared by most other members of the
 United Nations. It was not until the advent of the 1971 Indo-Pak War and the consequent dismemberment of Pakistan that the spotlight shifted away from Kashmir. At Simla in 1972, it was mutually decided to transform the UN arranged cease-fire line into a line of control. Not only was the accommodation shown at Simla hailed as a positive step, but the Simla Accord also initiated an era of Indo-Pak normalization.

Undoubtedly, a major source of Indo-Pak antagonism is the continuing dispute over Kashmir, despite the existence of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's frustrations stem from the increasing realization that she has not been able to influence India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir in the past despite all inducements, and that the future does not hold much promise in this regard. India has become extremely sensitive over any reference to Kashmir. Such references depict an ugly picture of broken promises and commitments, which in turn hurt her pride. An injured Indian ego often reacts strongly and sometimes even punitive measures are seriously contemplated. The recent Indian reactions to the current eruption in Kashmir reveal India's continuous efforts to cover up its broken pledges and to justify its unceremonious and unilateral withdrawal from its commitments.

While the Indian government has consistently attempted not to recognize the Kashmir problem, the Kashmiris have gradually been rallying around the notion that they will have to do something tangible to keep the issue alive. Rejecting the ideas, approaches and efforts of their elders, the new generation of Kashmiris decided to opt for a violent course of action in order to secure independence from India. The indigenous uprising demonstrated the fury of angry young Kashmiris taking up arms to free Kashmir from the Indian stranglehold. Having experienced ruthless suppression by the Indian security forces, the younger generation of Kashmiris decided to match Indian brutalities with violence. Since January 1990 the violent eruption in the valley and Indian efforts to crush the independence movement by force have already taken a heavy toll. According to Kashmiri sources more than 90,000 Kashmiris have already been killed in their quest for freedom.

Unable to contain the unrest, India began to employ age-old tactics of shifting the focus from the real issue. Soon after the advent of the Kashmir crisis, India began to accuse Pakistan of fomenting trouble in Kashmir and initiated the process of escalating tension levels between India and Pakistan. The objective of such a strategy is to divert world attention from the Kashmir dispute to a likely war between India and Pakistan. For obvious reasons not only would world attention be shifted from the real crisis but efforts would be made to prevent war. This, of course, implies that India needs to regularly accuse Pakistan and consistently issue threats to teach the Pakistanis a lesson. In contrast, Pakistan has made many efforts to defuse the situation, including peace missions to India, offering dialogue, allowing the international press to monitor the situation and vociferously asserting that it does not want war with India. Even in the current situation the Indians have been accusing Pakistan of encouraging “cross border” terrorism in occupied Kashmir, whereas the Pakistanis have not only been denying such allegations, they have also repeatedly advanced suggestions to station international observers on the LoC in order to monitor infiltrations. India, of course, has consistently refused  permission to international monitors to man the LoC.

Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent participation of both India and Pakistan in the international coalition against terrorism, thousands of innocent Kashmiris have been indiscriminately slaughtered by the Indian forces under the excuse of combating terrorism. The real objective of the Indian forces is to break the back of the Kashmiri freedom movement. While India is seeking a military solution of the Kashmir problem, history has taught many nations that a political problem can best be resolved through political means. Unable to read the clear lessons of history India continues to rely heavily upon military means. Such an approach not only tarnishes India's self projected pacifist image, it also reveals its real hegemonic intentions coupled with its inability to hide the intensity of reaction generated by the guilt of broken pledges and promises.

Linked Issues-1) Siachin Glacier

The Siachin glacier is located in an area where both the cease-fire line and the line of control are ill-defined. Climatic hostilities of the region prevented both India and Pakistan to go in for a detailed demarcation of the line. The Indian attempt to obtain physical occupation of the glacier resulted in several violent clashes.

For years the Siachin glacier was not an issue of discord between the two nations. Many reasons account for this. Not only did innumerable mountaineering expeditions to the region seek permission from the Pakistani authorities, but also most maps and atlases, published inside as
 well as outside Pakistan, showed the region as a part of Pakistan.[4] These maps published by
 American and British publishers depicted the ceasefire line in the northern extremity of Kashmir
 as stretching far eastward and ending right at the Karakoram Pass. India has never challenged these maps. Even the description of the northern extremity given by the Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh soon after the signing of the Simla Accord, was generally in congruence with these western published maps and was totally different from what was later published in the
 Indian maps of August 1984.[5] Secondly, both the Karachi Agreement of 1949 and the preamble
 of the Pakistan-China Boundary Agreement of 1963, in many ways, indicate that the control of
 the region was with Pakistan.[6] Since 1947 Pakistan’s administrative control of the region was
 also widely recognized by both insiders and outsiders. Thirdly, the people inhabiting the Siachin
 region use Pakistani currency and speak Balti language, a language of the Baltistan district, which
 is part of Pakistan’s Northern Area, and buy almost all their goods from Pakistan. The Indian argument primarily dwells upon the fact that since the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the instrument of accession in favour of India and India claims that the Northern areas are part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, therefore these regions also fall within the jurisdiction of India.

Despite Pakistan’s generally acknowledged control over the area since 1947,the early 1980s witnessed Indian efforts to establish its territorial rights using somewhat novel means of
 mountaineering.[7] Soon India established military posts in the area. However, it was not until
 November 1984 when India airlifted a full battalion to the snowy heights of Karakoram that the glacier began to witness frequent, but inconclusive border clashes. Since then both sides have been consistently arguing that the glacier belongs to their area of control. A close scrutiny of various arguments and counter arguments indicates that Pakistan's claim is stronger than that advanced by the Indians. Neither the cease-fire line nor the line of control attempted to physically demarcate the border in a climatically hostile region of the glacier. The absence of a clear demarcation of the line in the area caused cartographic confusion, which, in turn, gave birth to many misrepresentations and misinterpretations. Setting the glacier on fire is one unfortunate by-product of the unsettled larger issue of Kashmir.
 

Linked Issue-2) Wuller Lake Barrage

Another irritant linked directly with Kashmir is the Wuller Lake Project. The Wuller Lake Project on the River Jhelum comprising a barrage with a width of 439 feet is being constructed apparently to improve navigation during the winter months between Wuller Lake and Baramullah. From the Pakistani perspective, the strategic importance of the site lies in the fact that through this storage work, India could pose a threat to the vast tracts of agricultural lands in Punjab. Thousands of acres of fertile land in Pakistan are fed by the river Jhelum and its canal system. The successful completion of the project will provide India the necessary control to release or stop the flow of water at any time. Not only would Mangla Dam, which is fed by the river Jhelum, be endangered, the possession of such a massive reservoir of water would equip India with a strategic weapon to flood the lower riparian area especially during times of war. Additionally, a severe shortage of electricity could be artificially created should India decide to withhold water over an extended period, especially during the dry season.

Pakistan's objection to the proposed barrage is based on Article. III of the Indus Waters Treaty, which forbids India from storing any water or constructing any storage works exceeding 10,000 acre-feet. The proposed barrage would have a capacity of 300,000 acre-feet. Being thirty times more than the permitted capacity, it is clearly in violation of the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan's fears about India's intentions grow deeper with the realization that India has been most reluctant to supply the relevant information, which she has the obligation to do under the terms of the Treaty. It appears that through dilatory tactics India wants to present Pakistan with a fait accompli.

Since April 1986, the matter has been dealt with between the two Governments at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission but without much success. During the last meeting of the two Commissioners, held in the spring of 1987 it was decided to refer the matter to the two Governments for resolution at the political level. Representatives of the two governments met in October 1987, in which India agreed to suspend all construction work. Following this meeting five rounds of talks have taken place without any tangible result. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the talks (which hopefully like the Salal Dam would be positive), the present dispute shows how India is even reluctant to abide by its conventional obligations.  This, in turn, exacerbates the existing atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. Recently another irritant, known as Baghiliar, dealing with the overall water issue has emerged. The two sides have already initiated the process of discussion over the issue.
 

Linked Issue-3) Kargil

The third linked issue that caused further complications revolves around the Kargil clashes in May 1999. A couple of months after Vajpayee’ s historic visit to Lahore and the subsequent signing of the Lahore Declaration, fighting broke out in the Kargil sector. It is a well-known fact that both India and Pakistan hardly miss an opportunity to undermine each other’s position.  In early May, a few hundred freedom fighters along with their sympathizers consisting mostly of warriors of the Afghan jihad who had not left the area, some members of the militant wings of the religious parties based in Pakistan, Kashmiri mujahideen and members of NLI (Northern Light Infantry), went up to the Kargil heights and occupied the posts which are normally vacated by the Indian soldiers during the winter and reoccupied in the early summer. The Indian intelligence failed to detect the occupation. Even the media were unable to ascertain the identity of the occupants.[8] Various versions were published describing the occupants as freedom fighters, mujahideen, holy warriors of the Afghan war, Pakistan based Lashkars of religious parties and the NLI which later became part of Pakistan army. By the end of May India had not only deployed troops but also used the air force to evict the freedom fighters. The Pakistanis shot down three Indian aircraft. Unable to evict the occupants, the Indians then began a comprehensive diplomatic onslaught. In this connection the Indian media also fully supported the Indian government. What the Indians lost in the battlefield was adequately made up by the efforts of the Indian media. With the crucial support of the media, India was able to garner sufficient international diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of the occupants of the Kargil heights.

Pakistan took three major steps to defuse the situation. First, it decided to send its Foreign Minister to initiate a dialogue with his Indian counterpart, who refused to discuss the issue. Second, the Pakistani Prime Minister visited China and US for consultations. Third, the Prime Minister appealed to the freedom fighters and other occupants to withdraw. Soon they withdrew, but in the process of withdrawal many of them were killed. The Indians interpreted the withdrawal of the freedom fighter as an Indian victory. The Indian media managed to project the Indian defeat as an Indian victory. Not much was said in the Indian media regarding the inability of such a large Indian force to dislodge a few hundred infiltrators, consisting of unconventional irregulars and NLI for more than eight weeks.

Regarding the intelligence failure, most Indians initially refrained from discussing it publicly, but later, when the world began to view the Indian interpretation of events sympathetically and the pressure against Pakistan intensified, some section of the Indian public began to acknowledge it. However, it needs to be asserted here that later this failure was openly recognized in the Kargil Committee report. The only redeeming feature from the mujahideen’s and Pakistan’s points of view was that the clash at Kargil once again internationalized the significance of the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Since this clash occurred after the acquisition of nuclear weapon status by both India and Pakistan, the international community was extremely anxious to contain it.
 

Nuclear Developments

On May 11 and 13 India conducted series of nuclear tests that were followed on 28^th May by Pakistan’s nuclear tests. By the end of May, both India and Pakistan had acquired the status of nuclear weapon states. India had many reasons for developing nuclear weapons. First, India’s vision of itself as a great power. It is the quest for the attainment of this vision, which has caused and continues to influence Indian decision makers to build a militarily strong India. Second, Indian perceptions of a deteriorating security environment. The Chinese tactical position in Tibet, as well as what they call Sino-Pakistan nuclear collaboration are often quoted reasons for India’s nuclearisation. Third, the commitment of the BJP government to make India a nuclear weapon state. Fourth, India’s disapproval of the existing nuclear world order. Why should the nuclear haves be allowed to retain nuclear weapons while others are denied their possession? India also demanded the nuclear haves to give a timetable to destroy their nuclear weapons. Fifth, India also constantly accuses Pakistan for causing major developments in Kashmir. 

The factors influencing Pakistan to opt for nuclear weapon status include Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, muted reaction to Indian tests, and the non availability of a nuclear umbrella. Not much persuasion in terms of monetary incentives was undertaken, increasing domestic pressures in the wake of the Indian nuclear tests and the threatening posture of India’s home affairs minister regarding the Kashmir dispute. Although the BJP government argued that Pakistan was already preparing to conduct nuclear tests, this argument was viewed by many (including Indians) as fallacious. The responsibility for making the two leading states of South Asia nuclear weapon states rests upon the shoulders of India’s BJP government.

India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974 asserting publicly that it was a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Apart from the Canadians whose reactor CIRUS was instrumental in producing the nuclear device, not many nations attempted to discourage Indian nuclear pursuits. On the contrary, the French not only congratulated the Indians but also offered help to build a fast
 breeder reactor.[9] Similarly, the Americans readily accepted India's explanation that it was a PNE
 despite the fact that they themselves had concluded, after running a series of tests, that there
 was no significant difference between peaceful and military nuclear devices. The American's quick acceptance of the Indian interpretation of the Rajasthan nuclear explosion code-named 'Smiling Buddha' was heavily dependent on the hope that the acceptance would make it easier for the Indians to stop there and not embark upon the path leading to nuclear weapons. At the time many Americans did not overreact primarily because they thought that one explosion did not necessarily make India a nuclear state and in order to become one it would need to acquire and develop a delivery system. Today India has not only acquired nuclear weapons but has also perfected delivery systems including heavy bombers and missiles, and is feverishly engaged in acquiring a nuclear submarine.
 

Domestic Factors

Domestic pressures and compulsions are known to have contributed substantially towards major policy shifts in most countries of the world. To divert attention from pressing internal political, economic, social and even security crises, external diversion is not uncommon in Third World Countries. Hostile external responses of course, make it relatively easy to enhance cohesion by employing emotional and sentimental jargon. One does not have to look too closely behind the scenes to realize the existence of strong pressures generated by varied types of internal crises in India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are blessed with a fair share of internal problems. Being locked in a conflict - relationships, both India and Pakistan have consistently exploited each other's internal turmoil and tensions through propaganda and other available means. India's overt support for the East Pakistani separatists, unconcealed sympathies for the advocates of separate Pakhtoonistan and Sindudesh, public support gestures for the MRD (Movement for Restoration of Democracy) activities, injecting seeds of ethnic strife and causing political disturbances in Sindh are just a few well known examples that need not be elaborated here. Similarly, the Pakistanis' excessive interest in India's internal trouble spots like Punjab, Assam and Kashmir, and their concealed sympathies for movements like Khalistan, Gorkhaland, and several other movements in eastern India often tended to cause undesired misunderstandings. Just as the Pakistanis accused the Indians of interfering in Sind's political disturbances, Indians blamed the Pakistanis for training and aiding the militants in Kashmir. In the recent times the Indians have been accusing Pakistan for encouraging what they call “cross border terrorism”. Both invariably deny the alleged involvements. Accusations and counter accusations constitute the norm within the Indo-Pak framework of relationships.

 

Superpower Linkage

The prospect of a fresh Indo-Pak start is also, in many ways, affected by the posture of the superpowers. Both the Americans and the Soviets were introduced to the area by Pakistan and
 India respectively, each seeking to satisfy its perceived security requirements.[10] The
 Pakistanis’ sense of insecurity brought the Americans to South Asia and a quick Indian reaction to this introduced the Soviets to the region. Both the superpowers got quickly enmeshed in the South Asian cobweb believing to be serving their own global objectives. Neither gave much attention to the incumbent level of conflictual relationships between India and Pakistan. That is how the Cold War came to South Asia. In 1954 and 1955 Pakistan joined the Western SEATO alliance and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO). Pakistan perceived a threat from India and joined the above-mentioned alliance in order to procure much-needed weapons and to equip its forces for what seemed to be a certain conflict. The Indians, of course, interpreted Pakistan's bid to enhance its security as an attempt to upset the existing power equation and to challenge its overriding authority in sub-continental affairs. India had assigned for itself a central role not only in South Asian affairs but also in Asian affairs in general. Consequently, enraged over Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO, India invited the Soviet leaders in 1955 to visit the area. The Soviets, who were also annoyed over Pakistan's participation in Western defence alliances that were directed against them, were in a punitive mood, and in utter disregard of Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir dispute and Pakhtoonistan, the Soviets immediately committed themselves to support both India on Kashmir and Afghanistan on Pakhtoonistan.

This state of affairs continued until the early 1960’s when the thaw in the Cold War, the introduction of intercontinental missiles and the Sino-Indian War of 1962 caused dramatic changes. Despite the warnings and protests of Pakistani leaders, the West rushed arms aid in response to an Indian request following the Sino-Indian border war. Pakistan, disenchanted with the West, began to drift away and started searching for new friends in order to maintain the balance vis-a-vis India. China responded positively to Pakistan's search and readily lent its support. The Soviet Union, realizing that Pakistan's sense of insecurity might push it too deeply into the Chinese lap, began to seek ways to impede Pakistan's growing friendship with China and at the same time to weaken its pro-Western policy. The Soviets began to smile at Pakistan. The
 smile vanished in 1969 when President Yahya firmly rejected Brezhnev's proposal of an Asian
 collective security system and Kosygin's idea of a regional economic grouping.[11] In the
 meantime, Pakistan's relations with China continued to grow while those with America continued
to deteriorate, especially because of the American arms embargo after the 1965 Indo-Pak War.
 

After the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the Pakistani leaders, realizing the crucial role the Soviets could play in future South Asian affairs, carefully avoided criticizing the Soviet role in the separation of East Pakistan and began to mend fences with the Soviets. Initially, the Soviets were somewhat cool towards Pakistani overtures, but gradually through the efforts of Bhutto, the Soviets began to open up. Disenchanted with the West and desirous of pleasing the Soviets, coupled with some other considerations Pakistan withdrew first from SEATO and later from CENTO. By the late 1970s relations with the Soviets had vastly improved.

Not only did American policy towards the area change with the passage of time, in general, it has been less consistent than the policies of the Soviet Union and China. It fluctuated from decade to decade. During the 1950s the emphasis was upon the containment of perceived Communist expansionism in the area. Pakistan, with its two wings, was regarded as a useful instrument to serve American strategic interests in the area. The western wing could play an important role in the containment of Soviet expansionism and the eastern wing could prove to be useful in its strategy vis-a-vis China. Although the Americans would have preferred India to Pakistan, Nehru's strong opposition to the Cold War alliance system and Dulles' contempt for non-alignment more or less forced the India policy makers to opt for the second best. However, the Kennedy administration not only de-emphasized the Soviet threat but also recognized non-alignment as a valid approach to international relations. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 provided the long-awaited opportunity to win back Indian friendship and consequently India emerged as a useful instrument in America's containment of China policy of the 1960s. Improvement in Sino-American relations again caused a fundamental change in the American policy towards the area. The earlier part of the decade witnessed improved relations with Pakistan and a slight deterioration of Indo-American relations. However, the latter half of the 1970s registered a marked improvement in Indo-American relations, especially during the Desai regime. Again with the Afghanistan crisis and consequential aid to Pakistan, Indo-American relations registered a slump initially, but the ascendancy of Rajiv Gandhi to power once again pushed them upwards.

Chinese relations with Pakistan were further strengthened especially after the Sino
-American normalization.[12] As long as Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations continued to be
 cool, China could not afford not to help Pakistan and counter-balance Soviet influence in the area. However, the decade of the 1970s witnessed efforts, though painfully slow, towards the normalization of Sino-Indian relations. In 1976 ambassadors were exchanged, and in 1979 the Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee visited China. The major outcome of the visit was that the Chinese acknowledged the need to resolve the longstanding border dispute as a precondition for complete normalization of relations. Since then many rounds of talks have taken place in order to resolve their mutual disputes. The recent visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee has certainly caused the much-desired thaw in Sino-Indian relations. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the Vajpayee visit clearly reflected an improved comprehension of the complex issues involved, and indicated that India had recognized Tibet as part of China. The two sides also came close to
 resolving the issue of Sikkim – another major irritant between the two nations.[13] The
 Pakistanis welcomed the outcome of the Sino-Indian talks and stressed that it augured well for the peace and stability of South Asia. They hoped that it would end India’s pretext for further development of weapons of mass destruction, or its unbridled shopping spree for sophisticated
 conventional weapons.[14]

The difference in Indian and Pakistani perceptions of each other's threats, coupled with the superpowers' active involvement in pursuit of their regional and global objectives continued and still continues to exacerbate tensions and conflicts in South Asia. When the situation begins to register improvement some extra-regional development takes place and undermines the fragile harmony brought about after lengthy and complex negotiations. The late 70s witnessed an improvement in Indo-Pak relations but then came the Afghanistan crisis and its undesired repercussions. However, towards the end of the 80s, the global situation began to change radically. The ascent of Gorbachev, followed by his introduction of perestroika and glasnost, coupled with a positive western response brought an end to the perennial cold war and initiated a new era of cautious cooperation between Russia (previously Soviet Union) and the West. The threat of joint pressure or denial by both superpowers could act as an effective deterrent.

The death of the cold war, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the US as the sole super power transformed the existing world order. The new world order witnessed the rapid ascendancy of economic imperatives and the relegation of political imperatives to a secondary position. The previous equations no longer remained viable. In the emerging world scenario India and US drifted closer towards each other.  The Americans   viewed India as a useful counterpoise to China, while India also went out of its way to befriend the Americans.

The situation changed after the tragic event of 9 September. As a consequence of this development an international coalition against terrorism came into existence. The Americans launched an invasion of Afghanistan with the objective of apprehending Osama bin Laden who was regarded as the mastermind of the 9/11 tragedy, and to punish the Afghan Taliban regime, which had given him refuge. Again the relations between Pakistan and US began to improve as Pakistan joined the international coalition and agreed to help the Americans in the prosecution of their Afghan war. Almost all the sanctions to which Pakistan was subjected were gradually removed, and the US also extended some economic incentives. Another development of great significance was the American invasion of Iraq, bypassing the United Nations. The invasion itself did not go down well with either the Pakistanis or the Indians. Based on a newly evolved doctrine of pre-emptive defence, the Americans launched a massive invasion of Iraq and soon removed Saddam and occupied the country. Currently they are engaged in running the country with the help of a newly installed governing council that consists of various factions of the Iraqi society.

While both India and Pakistan are members of the international coalition against terrorism, they do not get along because of the ongoing Kashmir dispute. The Indians continuously accuse Pakistan of encouraging cross border terrorism, which Pakistan consistently denies. Acts of terrorism have taken place in both countries resulting in heightened levels of tension. The Americans have initiated a relatively low-key role in resolving the main dispute between India and Pakistan. So far they have not met much success, but it needs to be mentioned that they are consistently applying pressures to influence both to subject the dispute to a bilateral process of negotiations.
 

The Shadow of the Afghan Crises

Relations between India and Pakistan are also under continuous strain because of two Afghanistan crises. The first crisis dealt with the Soviet invasion and the consequent American participation on the side of the freedom fighters, whereas the second crisis was the product of developments of 9/11. While a vast majority of countries condemned the Soviet invasion of small, nonaligned
 Afghanistan, India, though at the time Chairman of the nonaligned movement, was unable to
 condemn the Soviets.[15] Tied by the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which provided massive
economic, technological and military aid vital for India's economic development and security requirements, India decided not to condemn the Soviet invasion. Being heavily indebted to Soviet support and being the only reliable and powerful non-communist friend of the Soviets, it was confronted with unpleasant choices; to condemn the Soviet aggression would invoke Russian anger and weaken its profitable links, while to condone the Soviet action would tarnish its own image. India chose not to condemn the Soviets and tried to repay its massive debt, incurred over the years, by accepting the Soviet version of the Afghanistan situation. It is also alleged by some quarters in India that it concentrated on the diplomatic front to defuse the situation and
 reportedly conveyed even to the Soviets its uneasiness over the situation.[16] However, once the
 urgency and tension generated by the invasion subsided, India became milder towards the Afghan
 situation and even went so far as to revive the India-Afghanistan Joint Commission that had
 been put on the shelf after the Marxist takeover in 1978.[17] Having enjoyed so many benefits
 by its close association with the Soviets, it was unrealistic to expect that India would be critical
 of their moves in Afghanistan. Had the Janata Government remained in power, one might assume that India's Afghan policy would have been slightly different. But with Mrs. Gandhi’s ardent advocacy of 'realpolitik' that frequently compromised principle for expedience, it was an altogether different story.

Perhaps the most painful aspect of the first Afghan crisis for the Indians was the American decision to agree to a military sales-cum-economic assistance package with Pakistan in order to cater for the enhanced security responsibilities of the Pakistanis. Instead of making a realistic assessment of Pakistan's threat, India opted to project a scenario that magnified out of all proportions the effects of US aid to Pakistan on the military balance between the two. It seems that the underlying purpose was to overplay the US role in the region to induce the Soviets to substantially increase their contributions. Badly requiring Indian support over its Afghan policy, the Soviet Union had no choice but to comply.

The first Afghan crisis not only brought the US and Pakistan closer to each other but also linked them with a military sales and economic assistance programme - which, in turn, edged the Indians even closer towards the Soviets. The Indian acceptance of the Soviet interpretation of the Afghanistan situation eroded India's credibility. Unable to gauge the intensity of approaching danger, India continued to view the whole game from its own version of developments. Irritated by the Pak-American linkage, India seemed intent on solidifying the Soviets in the region. With the signing of the 1988 Geneva Accords, the situation slightly changed. Although the Soviets and the Americans continued to back their respective clients, the Geneva Accords demonstrated a certain level of cooperation among them that strengthened hopes for a resolution of the Afghan crisis.

The second Afghan crisis started with the destruction of the twin towers of New York. The Americans blamed Osama bin Laden, who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers refused to hand him over to the Americans.  This started the US led war against Afghanistan. Pakistan decided to opt for the international coalition and to help the Americans in the prosecution of their Afghan war. As a consequence the US and Pakistan once again improved their relations. However, it needs to be mentioned that this is characterized by a great deal of caution on either side. The Americans are particularly concerned not to undertake any action that could annoy the newly befriended Indians. They are trying to maintain a balance between the Indians and the Pakistanis. They do not want to lose the Indians and they need the Pakistanis at least as long as the Afghan crisis continues. To undertake effective operations against the al-Quaida members, the Americans require the help of the Pakistanis. But they also recognize the dire need to resolve the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. For the first time the Americans are indeed making efforts to solve this dispute. Whether or not these efforts are short, lived as in the past, or sustained over time remains to be seen. However, one thing is certain that policies and strategies change in accordance with domestic, regional and global dynamics.

 

Recent Initiatives

The process of normalization initiated by the Simla Agreement did not receive any serious setback during the 70s, but developments in the 80s and 90s did affect the pace somewhat inadvertently, even though both SAARC and the Indo-Pak Joint Commission had already become operational during the 80s. The Sikh crisis in the early 80s, the intensification of Kashmir’s freedom struggle in the late 80s in India and Pakistan's quest for a viable democratic system are just a few events that had and continue to have a direct bearing on foreign relations. A further complication was injected when both decided to acquire nuclear weapons in 1998. Since BJP’s ascendancy to power Indo-Pak relations have seen rather pronounced ups and downs. While the year 1999 saw two major developments, the Lahore declaration and the Kargil clashes, two ceasefires marked the year 2000 including the one announcement by the Hizb ul Mujahideen in late July, and Vajpayee’s Ramazan ceasefire which invoked positive responses from Pakistan, leading to the holding of the Agra Summit in July 2001. The failure of this summit coupled with the tragedy of 9/11 created a rather loaded atmosphere, which was effectively exploited by the Indians who accused Pakistan- based militant outfits of attempting to destroy the Indian democracy by launching an attack on the Indian parliament on 13^th December 2001. This accusation was used by the ruling Hindu militant parties to mobilize troops on the border, eliciting a similar response from Pakistan. Until the middle of October the two countries’ forces faced each other.
      
        Realizing the ineffectiveness of a policy of coercive diplomacy, Vajpayee once again decided to extend the carrot and announced on 18 April 2003 his willingness to talk to Pakistan. At the time of his announcement he did not mention any conditions, but two days later he made the offer of talks conditional by asserting that Pakistan must first stop cross border terrorism. The Pakistani authorities on the other hand continuously stressed that no infiltration was/is taking place across the LoC. The Pakistani Prime Minister responded to the Indian gesture positively and telephoned his counterpart. Since then many positive developments have taken place including the exchange of High Commissioners, goodwill visits of parliamentarians, women, students, labour leaders, journalists and businessmen from both sides, fixation of a date for the next SAARC summit, and the resumption of the Lahore-Delhi Bus contact etc. India suggested many useful steps in order to secure desired normalcy of relationships to which Pakistan not only
 responded positively but even suggest some more CBMs including ordering unilateral ceasefire on
 LoC.[18]  Though the current peace process is moving forward at a much slower pace than what
 is desired by many, some tangible steps have been taken to re-establish communication linkages. Not only the High Commissions have become fully operational and the Bus began to ply again from
 New Delhi to Lahore, but agreements to restarted air links from 1^st Jan 2004 and rail links from
 15^th Jan 2004 have also been signed by the respective representatives of the two governments.

 

Track II:  and CBMs

Definition and Characteristics

Track II diplomacy is often defined as a process of unofficial dialogue among non-official representatives of the parties locked in a dispute. Influential persons or opinion makers, who have the ability to influence both the government and the public, undertake the process. Track II diplomacy may involve a third party either for observation purposes or for the initial push. This is particularly relevant when there is a backlog of suspicion along with institutionalised intolerance, hatred and distrust. In such situations the participation of government officials is prone to a wide range of misinterpretations, which policy and decision makers can hardly afford. Thus, influential, non-governmental individuals on both sides, who are seen to be balanced in their approach are brought together to discuss the issues. The basic objective of Track II is to prevent conflict and to facilitate the conflict resolution process. Being influential persons most of the members of the Track II concept have either direct access to their governments or are in a position to effectively influence the public. The governments are informed either directly or by suggestions through the media.

A scrutiny of the groups engaged in Track II diplomacy reveals two dominant characteristics; a) all members of these groups are often fully cognizant of the need to resolve the disputes as quickly as possible, b) and all have the ability to make constructive contributions towards the desired resolution of ongoing conflicts in one form or the other. Many of these individuals are already engaged in their individual capacities, to improve conflictual regional situations either through their writings (both general and research) or through teaching, seminars, conferences, travel etc.

A Track II group is often formed in two ways. First, it might be the product of a local initiative of an individual or an institution like a university or research institute or a newspaper group etc. Second, it might be formed by the encouragement and efforts of interested outsiders. However, it needs to be clarified that groups formed because of the efforts of outsiders invariably emphasise a scrupulous avoidance of external interference. It is indeed up to the participants to jointly agree to have an outsider as their chairman who is known for his knowledge of the area and whose balanced and impartial treatment of the issues has already earned him the respect of many insiders.

 

Objectives

The major objectives of the Track II diplomacy are threefold; a) to make attempts to resolve ongoing disputes; b) to discourage and prevent the emergence of new disputes; and c) to make efforts with a view to bringing the two estranged countries and societies closer by introducing confidence building measures (CBMs). Indeed, it is the most difficult objective to attain, especially if the dispute has lasted for more than a decade. The passage of time not only adds new dimensions, it also invariably converts a simple dispute into an extremely complex one. However, this does not mean that the dispute be allowed to carry on with its unchartered flight. Old disputes are not easy to resolve but then again efforts must always be directed to find a way out. An old unresolved dispute always contaminates the atmosphere and may impede constructive developments. Recent events, both inside and outside the disputed territories of Kashmir, clearly highlight the fact that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is resolved. The nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan had made it imperative that the world community begin to focus its attention on this neglected and potentially dangerous issue. Many members of the international community view the Kashmir dispute as a potential nuclear flashpoint.

The first two objectives imply that Track II diplomacy should not only explore and provide feasible alternatives for complex issues to their respective governments, but should also suggest arresting mechanisms if it is realised that the situation is rapidly deteriorating. In both pursuits, Track II diplomacy is expected to provide positively orientated alternatives facilitating and enabling the governments to arrest the adverse drift and advance towards positive goals. The introduction of CBMs will not only ease the situation, but may even help in securing a better comprehension of each other’s perceptions. Indeed, CBMs can facilitate communication among the disputants, and can also help in maintaining some kind of contact even though it may not appear very useful.

 

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

CBMs imply the existence of a situation that requires measures for confidence building. The main purpose of CBMs is to arrest the dangerous drift towards war and reverse the trend, if possible, by introducing transparency, which may reduce tensions and make the atmosphere conducive to some form of cooperative behaviour. Openness can introduce qualitative improvement in the climate of distrust and apprehension, enhance understanding of the adversary’s perceptions and help establish working relationships between antagonistic states. Simply defined the term itself reflects a process of building confidence between adversaries. To generate confidence in an atmosphere of distrust is not an easy task. Even to begin negotiations in such a situation requires political will and recognition of the dictates of the time. Since it is easier to negotiate a CBM than an agreement or a formal arms control treaty, not only the popularity and efficacy of CBMs have been on the rise but they are emerging as essential means of preventing unintended escalation and minimising the dangers of accidental war.

 

CBMs and South Asia

Confidence building is not really a new phenomenon in South Asia in general and between India and Pakistan in particular. Since the partition of the subcontinent, both India and Pakistan have
 signed many agreements aimed at generating confidence and reducing tensions.[19] Among them
 perhaps the most notable are the Liaquat Nehru Pact -1951 (Dealing with minorities), the Indus Waters Treaty-1960, the Tashkent Agreement-1966, the Rann of Kutch Agreement-1968, the Simla Accord-1972, the Salal Dam Agreement-1978, the Joint Commission-1983, and the Lahore Declaration-1999. With the exception of the Joint Commission and Lahore Declaration, all of them were the product of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments.

 

Existing CBMs

The main conflict between India and Pakistan revolves around the Kashmir dispute. Despite the advent of so many CBMs, normalisation still seems an illusive pursuit. Since the end of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, many CBMs have been adopted with a pronounced emphasis upon military CBMs. The earliest one came immediately after the 1971 war. A ‘hotline’ between the DGMOs (Director Generals of Military Operations) was established in 1971. The existing CBMs can be grouped in the following categories;

 

A.         Communication Measures

1.    A direct communication link (DCL) known as ‘hotline’ between DGMOs was established in 1971. Following the 1990 crisis it was decided to use this line on weekly basis.

2.    DCLs are also in place between sector commanders.

          3.    Establishment of a hotline between the Indian and Pakistan
                        AirForces(1993).
          4.    Communication between the naval vessels and aircrafts of the two navies when in 
                   each other’s vicinity (May 1993).

          5.    Establishment of a hotline between the Prime Ministers in 1997 after the Male  
              summit.
         6.    People to people contacts, Track II diplomacy, NGOs, and dialogues between various
                non-governmental groups like the Neemrana Initiative or the India- Pakistan Forum  
                 started in 1991.

 

B.         Transparency and Notification Measures

1.    Inviting observers to watch military exercises (Zerb-e-Momin in 1989 and 1990 Indian exercise and the US observers).

2.    Publication of Annual Defence Report- India publishes it regularly.

3.    Public negotiations for arms procurement by both India and Pakistan.       

4.    Advance notification regarding military exercise or major troop movements (1991).

5.   Joint declaration on prohibition of chemical weapons (1992). Despite the declaration, it was revealed in 1997 that India had a very large chemical weapons programme.

6.   Advance notification of ballistic missile tests (1999)-a product of the Lahore meeting.

 

C.         Consultation Measures

1.   India - Pakistan Joint Commission (1982).

           2.    Foreign Secretary Level Talks- periodically interrupted- resumed after Sharif-Vajpayee
                  talks in New York 1998.  

 

D.        Goodwill Measures

1.    Various military goodwill measures (1993).    

        i)    Participation of senior military and civilian officials in various seminars in each other’s country (1993).

       ii)    Inviting Guest Speakers at each other’s national defence colleges.

      iii)   Participation and visits of various sports teams (which received a set back when BJP decided to disallow sporting contact but it has now been allowed in late 2003).

2.    Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel (1992).

3.    Visits of Parliamentarians.

4.       Visits of businessmen.

 

Despite the above-mentioned impressive list of CBMs, tensions between the two countries have not really subsided in a meaningful way. Does this mean that the CMBs have failed to deliver the expected dividends? Indeed, the track record of the CBMs has not been very impressive. But this does not mean that they have failed to contribute towards the desired amelioration of the prevalent atmosphere. Different opinions have been expressed regarding the efficacy of the CBMs. While some attributed limited success, there were others who viewed the CBMs as complete failure. Those expecting that the CBMs would resolve all the complex problems of South Asia would indeed be disappointed, but those viewing them as means of improving the atmosphere in order to open channels of communication and various private options to their respective governments, would appear to be somewhat satisfied. Whatever one may say, the indisputable fact is that since 1972 India-Pakistan have not really fought a full-fledged war. During 1986-87 1990, and 2002 the two countries came close to blows but war was averted. A contribution was indeed made by the existing CBMs. However, the two countries did experience a large border clash at Kargil in 1999.

The inability of the CBMs to effectively contribute towards the desired peace in South Asia is the product of many factors. First, and perhaps the most important, is the ongoing
 Kashmir dispute.[20] Many Pakistanis view Kashmir as part of the unfinished agenda of partition
 and a symbol of Indian highhandedness and clever manoeuvring. They feel that they have been outwitted and cheated by India. India took over states of Hyderabad and Junagadh on the grounds of overwhelming non-Muslim population and their geographical position, whereas in the case of Kashmir India employed the principle of the ruler's right to accede. The ruler of Junagadh opted to join Pakistan and the Nizam of Hyderababd wanted an independent status yet India invaded those states and occupied them on the grounds of their geographical locations and the overwhelming majority of Hindu population. By employing delaying tactics, India bought sufficient time to complicate the dispute and systematically projected various arguments for justifying its occupation of Kashmir. India dislikes beings reminded of its application of different principles to different states and asserts that it is an integral part of India. Many Indian writers also link the retention of Kashmir as extremely important for its secular polity.

Second, to accord maximum respect to agreed principles and agreement does not seem to be very common in South Asia. Different interpretations of agreements often exacerbate non-compliance and non-adherence. It is often stressed, in some quarters, that honouring the spirit of an agreement is not as sacrosanct in South Asia as it is in the Europe, Middle East and Latin
 America.[21] Not only does South Asia lack the cordial spirit deemed so essential for the proper
 implementation of agreements, it lacks respects for the prerequisites for CBMs as codified in the Helsinki Final Act and Stockholm Documents, namely, the inviolability of frontiers, the non-use of force, and non-interference in internal affairs. Perhaps, that is what has led to less than desired level of what is called a 'sense of ownership’ for the existing CBMs.

The Third factor revolves around perceptions and negative images.[22] Both India and
 Pakistan continue to entertain negative images of each other. The most attractive view of India
 among the Pakistani elite and decision makers is that of a hegemonic bully. The Indian view of Pakistan is that of a theocratic and militaristic state. An objective view probably disagrees with both of them. While there are many factors and developments that assist the formation of both perceptions and misperceptions, as well as self and adversary's images, three factors have reinforced these negative images; history, media, and weak and irrational leadership. A historian has to be mercilessly accurate with his facts. Unless the histories are written accurately, the lessons derived from them would be distorted, encouraging inaccurate images. Ample evidence is available confirming that the histories are not written properly, while both print and electronic media have contributed heavily towards adversarial images rather than reflecting an existing situation accurately. Being in the selling business, most newspapers tend to publish what they think is newsworthy and it is well known that negative developments attract more attention than positive ones. The government controls the electronic media in both countries. Though many new independent channels have also come into existence during the last two decades, even they seem to be toeing the government line rather than demonstrating complete independence. The Pakistani independent channels seem to be far more critical of policies than their counterparts in India. In general, one finds the media highlighting negativity much more than even extending deserving coverage to positive developments.

Finally, weak and irrational politicians, whose main preoccupation is to get power, somehow or the other have also made a sustained but somewhat inadvertent contribution towards adversarial images and misperceptions. One has to recognise that most politicians have their own agenda and they have generally demonstrated an inability to rise above the anticipated gains. They have consistently pushed aside long-term positive regional gains for others to pursue. Lack of political will in both countries to ensure the smooth working of the established CBMs has impeded efforts to resolve conflicts.

Given the less than expected performances of the CBMs in South Asia, what recipe can be pursued in order to make them work? At the outset it needs to be recognised that the CBM is not a device to resolve conflict, it is just one piece in the process-an important piece that needs to be
 promoted.[23] With the nuclearisation of South Asia, it is imperative for both India and Pakistan
 to demonstrate rational qualities. Both sides should not only encourage a balanced approach to history writing and positive image making in the media, their political leaders should also demonstrate a determination to resolve outstanding issues. The media in both countries should prepare and educate the people about the need to resolve the incumbent disputes. In recent times both the Indian and Pakistani PMs have been demonstrating rational behaviour. PM Vajpayee's tough stand against Shiv Sena's threats to the Pakistani sports teams’ Indian visits was matched by Nawaz Sharif’s equally strong measures against the disruptive activities of the Jamat during Vajpayee's Lahore visit. Similarly Vajpayee’s offer of April 18, 2003 was quickly and positively responded by Pakistani Prime Minister Jamali, who in fact, picked up the telephone and talked to his Indian counterpart. Such pursuits could and indeed would resuscitate the effectiveness of CBMs as well. Besides, there exists a need to introduce more CBMs in economic and social areas. This is not to suggest that military CBMs are not necessary. In fact, there should be more and more CBMs. The following suggested CBMs could further facilitate and improve the atmosphere, enabling the two governments to address the contentious issues with patience and perseverance.

 

A.         Military CBMs

1.    More transparency in defence budgets.

2.    Publication of annual calender of exercises.

3.    Increasing the number of observers, including international observers for military exercises.

4.    Allowing participation from across the border in Defence Colleges' courses.

5.    Exchanges of military instructors at various levels.

6.    Registration of weapons sales and procurement agreements with SAARC.

7.    Joint security studies.

8.    No War Pact in some acceptable form

9.    An agreement, in principle, for reduction of forces without going into details initially.

10.  Proposal for collaborative arrangement for nuclear waste disposal.

11.  Withdrawal of troops from border areas and creating a ten mile, (on both sides) troop free security zone.

12. Proposal to freeze defence budgets for at least two years initially.

13. Keeping nuclear warheads and delivery systems apart.

14. Establishing centres of risk reduction.

15. De-alerting missiles and removal from deployment areas or launch sites.

 

B.         Economic CBMs

1.    Encouraging Chambers of Trade and Commerce contacts-exchange of regular visits.

2.  Energising and strengthening SAARC, revamping and improving the Charter, promoting SAPTA and SAFTA.

3.    Joint Ventures-may be initially in a third country.

4.    Joint Commission on Agriculture.

5.    Promoting increased trade- mutually agreed increase in trading items.

6.    Collaborative schemes tackling both countries’ energy problems.

 

C.         Cultural and Social CBMs

1.    Joint archaeological excavation and monument preservation

2.    Visa relaxation – country visa should be introduced instead of continuing with city visa – drop police reporting.

3.    Visits and tours to historical and religious places to be encouraged and facilitated.

4.    Cultural agreements to be finalised.

5.    Flow of books, journals and newspapers to be encouraged – start with allowing selected papers and journals (Sport).

6.    Contacts between medical and scientific institutes.

7.    Joint educational projects, exchange of student and teachers, initially for a short period but later could be extended.

8.    People to people contacts must be encouraged, track 11 diplomacy, NGOs work.

9.    Joint research projects, regarding minimising the adverse effects of religious intolerance.

10.  Establishing contacts between professional associations.

11.  Creating SAARC Chairs at various leading Universities of SAARC countries.

 

D.         Political CBMs

1.    Inviting election observers from across the border.

2.    Encouraging contacts between parties and parliamentarians.

3.    Holding speakers’ conferences.

4.    Curbing propaganda.

5.    Adherence to non-interference in each other’s internal affairs

6.    Creating institutional linkages,like judiciary etc.

 

While one can think of many CBMs, it needs to be kept in mind that progress in core areas, as well as regarding the outstanding disputes, is absolutely imperative. While a core dispute like Kashmir remains unresolved and no progress towards its resolution is registered, achievements in less significant areas would soon be eroded. Thus it is important that the two sides clearly recognise what they consider to be the core issue.

 

Track II and Pakistan’s Experience

Pakistan’s experience with the Track II process has been a mixed one. Those who are keen to see peace in the region have viewed it as a useful exercise. They feel that it can encourage much-desired interactions and highlight new approaches with fresh ideas. They are convinced that at the minimum Track II can facilitate the advent of realistic perceptions. But there are those who dismiss it as a western concept and therefore regard it as irrelevant. Most right wing extremists view it as a foreign inspired conspiracy aimed to promote US goals in the region. Just as in India, the bureaucracy in Pakistan looks at all non-governmental dialogues with barely controlled suspicion.

The advent of the Track II process seems to have caused four positive developments. First, it has started a debate within the country regarding normalisation with India. The advantages and disadvantages of reconciliation with India has been subjected to serious academic as well as general discussions. Second, the existing stereotyped enemy images have also undergone changes. Much more realistic assessments have been put forward. Third, growing recognition that in the absence of normalisation both India and Pakistan would suffer in the long run. Fourth, the need to have increased economic interaction, as well as people to people contacts is gaining widespread recognition.

On the negative side, the militants and many religious parties view the process as an American device, which is meant to safeguard American interests in the region. They tend to link the process with developments both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The view that normalisation with the Indians amounts to a betrayal of the Kashmiris’ freedom struggle is quite popular. The American policies towards Afghanistan (especially the Afghan war and the accompanying quest to arrest Osama Bin Laden and to destroy al-Quaida network) are viewed as part of America’s anti-Islamic pursuits by many. They regard Americans responsible for what is happening in both Afghanistan and Israel. After all, it is indeed difficult to deny that the Americans are not responsible for the current mess in Afghanistan. The ousted Talibans were the same group, which were once praised and welcomed as great Islamic warriors by the Americans to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. Second, hardliner politicians on both sides invariably dislike the process. India’s hegemonic pursuits, coupled with its regular modification of original commitments or even outright reversal, make the task rather easy for such politicians. Third, the government in Pakistan is just as ambivalent and distrustful of the process as the Indian government, but it also is aware of the useful aspect of the process. While it quietly endorsed the process linked with the presence of a third party, it remained somewhat sceptical of direct people-to-people contacts.  On the other hand, the Indians were not keen to initiate a dialogue with the government unless the environment became conducive. The excessive emphasis on cross border terrorism was and is a device to buy time. However, with the realisation that the policy of coercive diplomacy had not yielded a reasonable dividend, the Indian policy underwent a carefully calculated change and in consequence the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee offered to talk to the Pakistanis. Not only did the Pakistani authorities respond to the move positively but the Prime Minister of Pakistan even announced a unilateral ceasefire on the LoC. Almost all recent reports, published in both countries, clearly indicate that no cross border infiltration is taking place. While the Pakistani authorities have repeatedly and consistently stressed that no activities around LoC are taking place, some BJP leaders still continue to harp on cross border infiltration even after the publication of reports denying such infiltrations.  

To improve and to increase the effectiveness of Track II efforts some more measures need to be subjected to serious thinking. These measures include the promotion of economic dialogues among the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, convincing the vernacular press to be associated more with the Track II processes, making Track II more balanced and representative in terms of gender and younger participants, encouraging more contacts among parliamentarians, promoting regular contacts between educational and research institutions, institutionalising contacts between sports bodies, establishing regular cultural interaction, bringing SAARC into such pursuits etc.

 

Concluding Remarks

Peace in South Asia hinges on the normalized state of relationships between India and Pakistan which is, in turn, directly linked with the resolution of the ongoing Kashmir dispute and the political will of the leaders in both countries. The Kashmir dispute continues to take a very heavy toll of all peace efforts, as well as those developments that can even remotely contribute towards peace orientated building blocks. Undoubtedly, the most appropriate approach would be political rather than military. Both need to, and seem to, have recognized the fact that militarily the Kashmir dispute is unlikely to be settled. Temporarily the situation in Kashmir has been frequently controlled but it soon rebounds with the passage of time. To secure a lasting solution the two countries need to initiate a dialogue. Indulgence in mutual recriminations and accusations would not lead anywhere. India’s allergic reaction to the involvement of a third party is somewhat incomprehensible. Since both parties are prone to interpret and misinterpret the situation according to their own policy pursuits, it would be useful to consider seriously allowing independent observers in Indo-Pak talks.

While the need to initiate dialogue on the ongoing Kashmir dispute is undoubtedly recognized by many powers, the existence of political will among the regional leaders is still questionable, even though the two Prime Ministers have demonstrated the requisite will in recent times. Minority governments or coalition governments are inherently handicapped to take quick and firm decisions, even if they recognize the need to do so. Such governments often adversely influence the effectiveness of CBMs and Track II diplomacy. Nevertheless, the process of confidence building has its own utility which cannot be brushed aside. Efforts aimed at the reduction of tensions and acceleration of any process moving towards conflict resolution should always be encouraged and supported. The recently undertaken visits of parliamentarians, businessmen, labour leaders, women, students and journalists have vastly improved the atmosphere. The fact that businessmen and industrialists of both countries seriously considered projects, and the possibility of joint ventures by itself is reflective of the contributions of Track II and CBMs.

      As mentioned above CBMs are expected to arrest a dangerous drift towards undesired armed conflict, to reverse the trend, reduce tension, initiate a process of confidence and trust building which, in turn, could and may facilitate the birth of a process aimed towards the initiation of negotiations. The negotiation itself may or may not result in the resolution of conflict. The CBMs must be viewed as a means and not an end. A review of the past couple of decades clearly reveal that the introduction of the CBMs have alleviated the situation and reduced tensions. A close scrutiny of crises like Brasstack (1987), Crisis of 90 (1990), Kargil clashes (1999) and troops confrontation (2002) clearly under scores the varied contributions made by the CBMs. The most recent manifestation of CBMs’ contributions is the vastly improved atmosphere that has facilitated the resumption of communication and transportation links. If the trend continues, there is no doubt that the negotiations regarding the continuous issue and disputes will soon start. The usefulness of CBMs cannot be either denied or even undermined. Perhaps the India-Pakistan tangle needs more and more CBMs. Admittedly, some may not pay the desired level of dividends, but even an extremely limited contribution would certainly make a difference in the overall prevailing situation as has been experienced during the last three decades.n