Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri*

 

he nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998 created a feeling of euphoria in India and Pakistan. Domestically, and especially in the Muslim world, Pakistan was able to attain the unique distinction of being the first Islamic country to go nuclear and seventh nation of the world nation to join the coveted nuclear club. The general public felt that Pakistan’s decision to openly demonstrate its nuclear capability was urgently needed in view of India’s deep-rooted animosity and the tests it had conducted earlier. 

However, within a year or so sober realities started sinking in and the pros and cons of nuclearisation began to be earnestly debated, both internally and externally. A deteriorating economy, the Kargil Crises of July-August 1999 and Pakistan’s growing alienation in the comity of nations were some of the events that ignited this debate.

The Gulf region, proximate to Pakistan, immediately felt the impact of the nuclearisation of South Asia. Both South Asia and the Gulf region are interdependent geographical entities, with erstwhile connections that go back to British colonial rule. Although the British had decided to leave their colonial possessions east of Suez by 1967, the region was part of the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), which later led to the military pact of the Cold War days,  the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Pakistan formed part of this defence arrangement, which was initially named the Baghdad Pact. After Iraq decided to opt out following the anti-royalist revolution in 1961, it was renamed CENTO.

The South Asia and Gulf regions are “penetrated sub-systems” in the US-dominated world system. During the Cold War, their alignments with the superpowers were strong. This was epitomized in the “twin pillars” policy of the US in supporting both Iran and Saudi Arabia as “anchors of stability” in the volatile Arab Middle East.

Although the Gulf region faces its own security dilemmas, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia in the late 1990s has sent tremors of fresh disquiet in their region. This is understandable due to proximity and bondage that exists between the two regions. For instance Pakistan’s closest Arab neighbour Oman, a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), borders the Pakistani province of Baluchistan where Pakistani nuclear tests were conducted in May 1998. These counter-tests were carried out in reaction to India’s detonations conducted only a few weeks earlier.  

Dynamics of Nuclear and Missile Proliferation

Generally, the world community has not been appreciative of the nuclearisation of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Anti-nuclear sentiment against South Asia was rife, sponsored and spewed mostly from Israel, the US, the European Union (EU) and Japan. Islamic Pakistan, which was also closely associated with then Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, came under greater scrutiny and even under limited US sanctions. India, a bigger country with a semblance of democracy, however chaotic and faltering it might have been, was nonetheless perceived as potentially enormous market for the West. Therefore, its admission into the nuclear club did not raise too many eyebrows; in fact its entry was seen in a more benign light than that of Islamic Pakistan.

As a result of this gate crashing into the nuclear club by the two South Asian rivals, the US-sponsored non-nuclear proliferation regime received a big setback. Now, the consequent horizontal spread of nuclear weapons was seen as a new challenge. It was thought that this could provide impetus to some nuclear aspirants, such as Iran and Iraq, and even to Libya, Syria or North Korea, to go the same way for their perceived “national security.”

After all, becoming a nuclear power is considered a “currency of power” and prestige for which the developed nations have themselves set a trend. In fact, nuclear proliferation reveals a peculiar dynamic and a pattern of its own. For instance, after the ex-Soviet Union detonated its nuclear device, the domino effect led China to acquire the same capability. This, in turn, led India to detonate the so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in May 1974, which was euphemistically named “Smiling Buddha,” and to further develop its nuclear programme. Later, after nearly a quarter of a century, India carried out full-fledged nuclear blasts in May 1998. As an action-reaction syndrome, Pakistan followed suit. Although the latter’s nuclear programme had picked up momentum after 1974, it was, in a way, forced to go nuclear in May 1998 in response to India.

Iraq is contiguous to Pakistan’s eastern neighbour Iran, with whom it fought an eight-year war in the 1980s. Iran and Iraq have allegedly been building weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) for quite some time. Their historical animosities, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), their increased isolation in the US-led world system and the impulse for regional rivalry in the Gulf, may propel them in the long term, to acquire WMDs on the grounds of national security.

More importantly, their population, size, messianic ideologies, and nuclear and technical expertise, together with the linkages with some major nuclear powers give them added incentives to join the nuclear club. “If Pakistan could do it why can’t we,” was mentioned with some degree of pride by some of these countries’ diplomats.

Unfortunately, US plans to establish nuclear missile defence (NMD) will potentially have a deleterious chain-effect on the security perceptions of China, India and Pakistan. The US is following a “go- alone” policy and its advocacy of the NPT and the CTBT seem hypothetical in light of its massive defence build-up a la Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), commonly known as the Star Wars Programme.[1]

This not only evokes the concerns of Russia, China and other major powers, but also conveys a wrong message to other regional powers such as India and Israel. In other words, despite all the pious talk about arms control and disarmament by the US and other big powers, the possession of nuclear weapons is a sine qua non and a currency of power and prestige.

Countries that are presently facing the ire of the major powers and have been isolated by the world community are all infused with radical ideologies (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). Thus they may be eager to acquire these weapons in order to regain their national self-esteem which has been badly wounded as a result of the attitude and behaviour of the superpowers and the unjust world system.

Iran has unresolved differences with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa in the Gulf.[2] Iraq’s unrepentant aggression [Iraq has recently apologised to Kuwait] against its immediate, small but wealthy neighbour, Kuwait in 1999, and earlier, Iran, could hardly be considered Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the region.

Technological diffusion has become a global phenomenon. As a substitute for the rapidly depleting resources of fossil fuels, many nations are turning to nuclear energy. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there are nearly 438 nuclear power stations in operation around the world supplying almost 16 per cent of the world’s electricity.[3] Out of this total, the European countries have 150 reactors; North America 118; Middle East and Asia 94; and nearly 31 nuclear power plants are under construction.[4] Some anti-status quo states, given their drive for domination and pre-eminent status in the world, may not hesitate to circumvent obstacles and acquire crude nuclear weapon technology for blackmailing their neighbours or even the major powers.

After all despite all odds, Pakistan has been able to attain nuclear-weapons status. According to Shahram Chubin, an Iranian scholar on strategic matters, Iran is pursuing a full range of nuclear and missile weapons programme while Iraq is pursuing nuclear, chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons programmes. Iran’s nuclear programme is both indigenous and covert through acquisition of fissile material from such countries as Russia, North Korea and China.[5]

While some analysts are sceptical about the US about over- dramatising threats from the “rogue states,” others do not discount the possibility that if Iran and Iraq basically remained hostile to the US and Western interests for the next 10 to 15 years, they could constitute major potential threats to the Gulf region. For instance, Steven Simon, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, defends the US NMD programme against the potential threats. Yet he suggests some delay in its deployment after assessing the technical viability and impact on other states. Apart from five official nuclear powers, he adds, there is a “real and growing” threat from nearly 25 countries that either have or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles.[6]

Iran’s national security strategy is manifold. First, as a regional power it desires to increase its influence and presence in the Gulf region, the Middle East and the Muslim world at large; second, it wants to deter its unfriendly neighbour and rival, Iraq; thirdly, it desires to curtail US influence in the region; and fourthly, it needs to sort out border or island disputes with Abu Dhabi. Knowing fully well that it cannot match the US military presence and clout in the region, it wants to rely on asymmetric means to challenge the US. Its regional ambitions are rationalised on the plea of its “vulnerabilities” as an “isolated state” in the world system that is subjected to sanctions. Therefore, it wants to enhance its conventional and missile capability by getting assistance from countries that are willing to sell technology, viz., Russia, North Korea and China.[7]

As an illustration, Iran displayed the testing of the 1,300-km medium range Shahab-3 in July and September 2000 to reflect its intentions of power projection. It has acknowledged the development of Shahab-4 (later categorised as space launch vehicle) and plans are afoot for Shahab-5, an IRBM or special launch vehicle. It can also deploy a limited number of these MRBMs in an operational mode in any perceived crisis. Its ambitions are set on acquiring ICBMs in the next 15 years or so. Besides, it has reportedly purchased land, sea and air-launched short-range cruise missiles from China ­­­– many of these deployed as anti-ship weapons in or near the Gulf.

There are some concerns that it could export some weapon- related technology to other countries such as Syria or Libya. However, any future Iranian defence posture will depend upon economic, demographic and ideological factors. Its spending on defence was, for example, $6 billion for the financial year 2000 and some experts predict that it will remain at 3 per cent of GDP for the next few years.[8]

 

External Linkages

            All GCC countries maintain external military linkages. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar have defence relationship with the US and Britain, whereas Syria, Iran and Iraq have security linkages with Russia and China. In fact, Russia, whose arms exports total up to $4 billion a year, is currently the fourth biggest arms exporter in the world. This is after the US $ 26bn, Britain $ 10bn and France $ 6.6bn.[9]

In the opinion of General Boris Kuzyk, head of industrial group nuclear programme and concepts, Russia, in the near future, could emerge as the second largest exporter of weapons.[10]

There is a fine line between nuclear development for peaceful purposes and graduation into a nuclear weapons programme. After all, India detonated its nuclear device in May 1974 as PNE. Britain and France had previously supported the Iraqi nuclear programme. In addition, there is some evidence of North Korea having entered the arms market as a missile supplier in the region.[11]  The ripple effect is worrisome to the security of the Gulf countries and this may step up the arms race in the region.

 

Spill-over of Indo-Pakistan Tensions in the Gulf

As if the internal tensions from within the Gulf, accruing from some powerful neighbours were not enough, the continued rivalry between India and Pakistan compounds the security scenario. Not only dark shadows cast on the smaller countries (Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives), but also towards the west, i.e., the neighbouring Gulf region.

The ten-month military stand off between India and Pakistan (2001-2002) was viewed quite seriously by most of the Gulf countries for its dangerous implications. Simmering tension over the Kashmir dispute puts undue pressures and politically embarrasses many Gulf regimes. The reason is that they are reluctant to take sides openly in a dispute between the two South Asian arch-rivals (India and Pakistan), with whom they enjoy reasonably lucrative economic and political ties.

According to an Indian diplomat-turned scholar, while the world’s energy consumption is growing around one per cent annually, India’s demands could well grow by 8 per cent in the near future.[12] Crude oil imports to India rose from 27.35 million tonnes in 1994-95 to around 53.5 million tonnes in 2000.[13] If this trend continues, he argues, India will be importing nearly 80 per cent of its crude oil within a decade and over two-third of these imports come from the Gulf region.

In the event of a conventional Indo-Pak war on Kashmir, and subsequent escalation into a nuclear exchange, the impact on the Gulf region is going to be concussive. Large guest workers of Indian and Pakistani origin are residing in these countries. If tensions escalate, these residents will not be able to keep themselves immune from violent and jingoistic national sentiments, degenerating into law and order problems for the Gulf governments. These will be clearly non-conducive to their national harmony, which has been their strong point so far.

Nuclear threats and counter-threats (made by political and military leadership of India and Pakistan since the 1998 nuclear tests) are fraught with acute dangers. That not only engenders fear and uncertainty in South Asia but also sends shock waves to the Gulf neighbourhood. The intemperate and flippant nuclear statements made by some leaders in both countries reverse confidence building and, at the same time; take an economic toll, insofar as they scare away trade, business and investment.

Saudi Arabia, a GCC member and a close friend of Pakistan, e.g., finds itself vulnerable on many counts. It has a long coastline, a large territory to defend, lack of open sea naval bases, a narrow seaboard and a concentration of oil terminals in the east.[14] The UAE also faces more or less similar problems. If perchance, the security situation deteriorates in South Asia, erupted hostilities could affect the free passage of oil and trade in the region as well.

Prudently enough, the Gulf leadership has so far been able to maintain a balance of good relations with both India and Pakistan and their traditional western partners. Yet any major escalation of tensions in South Asia or in their neighbourhood in the event of any US attack on Iraq, could pose painful dilemmas for them.

  

Indo-Israel Nexus

The political fallout of nuclearisation in South Asia has brought India and Israel closer than ever before. Although India had recognised Israel in 1948, for a variety of reasons, it had refrained from establishing diplomatic links with that country.[15]  Nevertheless, in the 1960s, defence and economic collaboration between the two countries existed in a clandestine fashion. It gained momentum after 1992 when India formally established diplomatic links with Israel.[16] India’s burgeoning ambitions to attain a global power status and its partnership with Russia, China and Israel pose potential threats to the Arab world and the Gulf region. Presently, the Indian navy may not be posing an immediate or major challenge in the Gulf. Nevertheless, given its aspirations of becoming a “blue water” navy and expanding its reach from Aden to Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean as an Asia-Pacific power, India could, at some stage, come into conflict with the US, Britain, other western powers or even China in the region.[17]

Currently, however, this possibility seems remote and may take many years to materialise.  More crucial is the fact that India and Israel are collaborating in nuclear technology, weapon up-gradation programmes, surveillance and sharing of intelligence and counter-insurgency techniques. President Ezer Weizaman of Israel while visiting India in late December 1996 told the then Indian prime minister Deve Gowda that defence could be one field where “India will be happy hunting ground for us.” [18]

This Indo-Israel nexus and the pros and cons of procurement of different defence systems are occasionally reported in the Indian media. Meaningful military interaction with frequent visits by different defence contingents from both sides[19] has evoked security concerns amongst the neighbours of Israel and the Muslim world at large.[20]

Concerns over the Indo-Israeli military collusion and possible pre-emptive surgical strikes against Pakistani nuclear installations surface whenever there is a spike in India-Pakistan tensions. This was especially so at the time of the 1999 Kargil Crisis and then during the recent military stand-off from December 2001 – June 2002.

Often, this Indo-Israel security collaboration, which admittedly has limitations of its own, is sometimes overplayed in Pakistan. The Indians assert that defence collaboration is only a part of other forms of co-operation.[21]

Regardless of this, if any nuclear strike against Pakistani nuclear installations becomes a reality, the nuclear fallout will not only adversely affect Pakistan and India but also contaminate the adjoining areas, including the Gulf. Furthermore, it will jeopardise shipping and cause nuclear pollution in the coastal regions.

In addition, any transportation and disposal of nuclear waste in the seabed or underground or radiological contamination resulting from further nuclear tests will be an ecological hazard for the adjoining region. In the absence of foolproof nuclear safety mechanisms and given the earthquake-prone nature of South Asia, storage of nuclear hardware and weaponry poses potential dangers. 

The above scenario of attack on nuclear facilities may seem improbable given the stringent security and control measures adopted by the Pakistan government. Yet it is not entirely impossible, given the fact that Pakistan is the only Muslim country having acquired nuclear weapons, an anathema to Israel and India. After all, Israel had conducted surgical strikes at the Iraqi nuclear installation under construction at Osirak in 1984.

A minority view is emerging that advises Pakistan to make a pragmatic shift in its foreign policy. According to Amber Kalyal, if countries such as India (with a sizeable Muslim population), Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Tunisia and some other Arab nations could forge contacts with Israel and have developed limited economic intercourse, Pakistan, too, should do so, without compromising on the Palestinian issue.[22]

Some Israelis do not perceive the Pakistani nuclear programme as a direct threat, as they do, for instance, the incipient nuclear programmes of Iraq and Iran. The Indian connections with Iraq and, now, Iran, stir anxiety of many regional countries. As an illustration, Iraq was among those West Asian countries with which India had always very good relations; the economic ties, including oil exports, were substantial. Moreover, Iraq has a secular Baathist Party in power, which had then distanced itself from the OIC and was not supportive of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.[23]

Also, it needs to be pointed out that during the 1991 Gulf War, India’s role was rather ambiguous, amoral and generally went against world opinion.[24] Previously in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and then in Iraq-Kuwait War (1991-92), Iraq twice let down its neighbours, the OIC, Arab League and the non-aligned community of nations by committing military aggression against its immediate neighbours.

While talking to some Indian journalists, the visiting Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Salaem al-Sabah complained that India had acted “hurriedly” in closing down its embassy after the Iraqi occupation. “India did not support Kuwait. We had expected you to support us,” he said. “Pakistan’s position was very clear.” He added, “we are grateful to it that it supported us.”[25] However, Indo-Kuwait relations soon regained their warmth after India extended some help in the economic rehabilitation of their war-shattered economy.

Strategically and economically, Iran has lately started getting closer to India. The motivations may be mostly economic and geo-strategic but they do raise concerns for some GCC Arab members and Pakistan. While India reassures its neighbours that its Iran policy is not directed against any other country, it is the extended neighbourhood policy in tandem with Iran’s military ambitions that pose long-term concerns for the Gulf region. 

There is no gainsaying that India, as a regional and aspiring global power, has still not been able to win the goodwill and trust of its smaller neighbours in South Asia. On many occasions, it has hardly hesitated to act as a regional hegemon and relied on its size and military muscle. It wanted to be a peace broker in Afghanistan, but ironically, was also one of those countries that did not openly criticise the December 1979 Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan.

Presently, a constellation of factors has brought diverse actors together: India, Iran, Russia and China and the CARs. All of these are generally supportive of the Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan and were earlier relieved to see the ouster of the Taliban regime. They all acquiesced in extending all possible military and economic aid to the US in its war against the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.

 

South Asia: Beyond Being Nuclear

While nuclearisation in South Asia has created its own dynamics and vulnerabilities, the ten-month long military stalemate between India and Pakistan has opened new windows of opportunities for the leadership in both countries. But both countries have to look out, open the window, and make bold paradigm shifts. This means evaluating their weaknesses and strengths and arriving at critical decisions of war and peace with imagination and foresight.

The nuclear factor in South Asia can be transmuted into a factor of stability and maturity and greater urge for co-operation. Conversely, if proper lessons are not learnt, it may well result into a recipe for horrific self-destruction.

India and Pakistan have to make efforts to tread a path of maturity that should be the hallmark of nuclear powers. No wonder, South Asia is seen as a nuclear flash point and abiding cause for concern.

Nuclearisation of South Asia is a fait accompli. The technology cannot be unlearnt and the weapons cannot go into mothballs. However, the dire need is to face the post-nuclear transition in a bold and imaginative way as other nuclear powers had done.

The Cold War may have ended in parts of the globe but its hot and gusty winds are still blowing across South Asia. Religious hatred, historical memories, the lingering Kashmir dispute and the recent acquisition of nuclear weapons, all make a lethal brew. It is, therefore, urgent for both India and Pakistan to enter into serious dialogue, abjure the use of force in Kashmir, formulate and clarify nuclear doctrines and faithfully implement the already agreed military and non-military CBMs.

Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons on both sides have provided some degree of deterrence and induced restraint and caution, but this factor cannot be overplayed. That we have been able to ward off nuclear conflagrations is no cause for smug complacency. The nuclear arsenals cannot substitute for problems created by poverty, disease and misery of the region, which constitutes nearly one-fifth of mankind. Gross underdevelopment and extreme impoverishment has turned the region into a virtual poverty bowl, despite being endowed with excellent human material and resources. Ironically, the level of insecurity has increased despite the attainment of nuclear status by both the countries.

Nuclear weapons cannot halt or even slow down the conventional arms race. Neither is nuclear technology cost-effective as continuous research in sophistication, up-gradation, testing, development of infrastructure and training of scientific work force is required to keep pace with rapid changes. While they may act as deterrent, conventional military build-up will continue apace due to the pull and push factors of internal and external forces. Besides, new forms of unconventional threats such as rampant terrorism have underscored the need for a special kind of defence methodologies, training and weaponry.

According to a US Congressional Report, Pakistan and some other countries, despite their nuclear programmes, are amongst the top ten conventional arms purchasers in the world. They are Saudi Arabia $66.1bn, Taiwan $20.6bn, Egypt $9.7bn, South Korea $8.8bn, United Arab Emirates $7.8bn, Israel $7.2bn, Iran $4.7bn, China 5.95bn and Pakistan $4.4bn.[26]

In the last few years, seminars and academic fora have endlessly debated the implications of nuclearisation in South Asia.  Specifically, fears about any breakout of nuclear war through accident, panic or the independent decision of a zealous commander occasionally crop up. Fragility and non-reliability of deterrence is highlighted because of the volatile political situation in South Asia.

It is moreover contended that the situation in South Asia is much different from what prevailed in Europe, where territorial disputes have been resolved.  However, the threat of pre-emptive strike by Pakistan or India in crises situation lurks on the horizon. This is notwithstanding the fact that India has pledged a No-First-Use nuclear doctrine whereas Pakistan has strenuously maintained that it will not subscribe to that, and may be forced to use nuclear weapons if there is a dire threat to its territorial integrity.

In the post-nuclear phase, there is a lack of doctrinal clarity and a spate of jingoistic statements have emanated from both sides from political as well as military leaders. This has led to natural apprehensions. As a result, Pakistan had to expound the “nuclear restraint regime” and instituted a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to allay any domestic and foreign fears about misuse of nuclear weapons through accident, malfunction, wilful use or default. Following the troops withdrawal starting from September 2002, India’s hawkish Deputy Premier Mr. L. K. Advani, in December 2002 belligerently challenged Pakistan to a “fourth war.”

Kenneth Waltz’s thesis of greater number of nuclear powers in the world contributing to stability and ‘the more the merrier’ concept is now becoming suspect. This thesis could have grave implications in this semi-anarchic world order of today, where more fingers will be on nuclear triggers and where many issues for conflict remain.

Waltz was probably relying too much on the ‘rational actor model’ – a theoretical construct, which may not be applicable in the South Asian or in many Third World settings.

With the diffusion of scientific know how and the availability of technology, globalisation and movement of people across borders, there are probabilities (though no certainties) that nuclear devices could pass into unauthorised hands. Some highly motivated and organised terrorist groups could, either by stealth, or business transactions, acquire these deadly devices. After all, many disgruntled and radical/fundamentalist groups exist in East and West adhering to millenarian/utopian ideologies. These individuals/groups are not in control of any territory, are not tightly organised or highly funded and are difficult to detect.[27]

While nuclear weapons do purportedly confer recognition and international status, presently, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan are perceived as “states of concern” in the international system. In fact, the first two are part the Bush designated “axis of evil.” Consequently, all are facing varying degrees of international opprobrium although, Pakistan since 9/11 has come out of that isolation and is considered an ally of the US in fight against international terrorism. The Gulf countries, surrounded by the regions, now armed with nuclear weapons, are quite concerned.

 

Iraq and Iran: Impact on The Gulf

Presently, the US and some neighbouring states view Iraq and Iran’s military and nuclear plans with concern. In the world of realpolitik, cooperation and conflict tends to move along parallel tracks. A lot will depend on the future policies of Iran and Iraq in the Gulf region, as they remain anti-status quo powers. For instance, if the UN nuclear inspectors reports of December 2002 confirm that Iraq is not manufacturing nuclear or other WMD, the US could be restrained from undertaking military invasion of Iraq. As of now, the US military strike seems apparently inevitable to affect a regime change. It is speculated that the magnitude of Iraq’s post-Saddam reconstruction will require massive funding from the West and its wealthy Arab neighbours, which may not be easily forthcoming. Decades of sanctions against Iraq in the last ten years or so have exacted a heavy toll on Iraqi society. 

While there is no love lost between Iraq and its Gulf neighbours on account of the formers previous aggressive behaviour, latter may not welcome any dramatic change in Iraq that might severely destabilise the region.

For one thing, an overthrown or assassinated Saddam Hussain may develop a martyr’s image of his own and draw immense sympathy from the Arab masses. Secondly, the ire of the people against US military policies in Afghanistan or military repression in Palestine may then be directed against their very own pro-Western rulers, leading to likely pro-Islamic/radical regimes. Third, a stream of refugees from Iraq into the neighbouring Arab countries may be difficult to contain. Disruption in sea trade, low oil prices, risky capital investment, reluctance of donors to invest, and unpredictable response from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and oil rich Sheikhdoms may be additional problems.

Since the mid-1990s, Iran is slowly opening up to the West and its Arab neighbours, especially after President Khatami’s ascent into power in May 1997. His visits to Saudi Arabia are positive trends.  Some observers opine that the West needs to prop up Iran as a counter to Iraq. Iran’s dialogue with the GCC, building of some bridges of understanding with Iraq (e.g. release of Iranian POWs and muting of criticism), and the signing of Iranian-Saudi security treaties on drugs, and terrorism surveillance, are all purportedly moderating trends in its foreign policy.

The recent visit of Indian Prime Minister to Iran after nearly 25 years shows some convergence in their economic and security outlook.[28] Whether this posture of mellowing down is because Iran needs some breathing space by opening up to the West and eastern Asia or to overcome its isolation and regain its energy security remains to be seen.[29] The previous ideological thrust of Iranian foreign policy is no longer operative through export of the Iranian revolution, as in the 1980s. The new policy, according to an observer “is now overwhelmingly framed in classical terms of regional-power assertiveness, rather than ideology.”[30] All the same, its military and nuclear programme,[31] that began started under the late Shah of Iran, is by now institutionalised and moving ahead.[32]

Normally states with a history of religious or ideological thrusts in foreign policy do not easily shed away their ideological baggage. Iran, for one, cannot easily break away from the Islamic revolution; religion provided distractions from the economic woes of daily life and the conservatives are too entrenched to let liberal trends take over easily in society.[33]  Iraq has had a history of bloody internal strife; its Baathist ideology is basically anti-status quo, and is secular and radical for many conservative Arab states.

For now, global interests of the US provide adequate security guarantees to GCC states. On the basis of present trends, its presence will remain there in the foreseeable future. Pending any new regional security mechanism, the GCC will have to rely on a mix of regional self-reliance and extra-regional support. In the meantime, they will also have to expedite the establishment of healthy civil societies and diversified economies.

In the Middle East, the failure of the Oslo peace process and the rise of the Intifada, following the rupture in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the consequent repression unleashed by Israel, has raised the political temperature in the region. The Iranian and Syrian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas are confronting Israeli security forces. This creates further problems for the GCC countries. It provides not only greater political space to certain militant groups in some radical states e.g. Syria, Iraq and Iran, but also within the wider Arab and Muslim world, including the GCC group of countries.

In this context, it is notable to mention that in the two-day Tehran meeting of April 27, 2001, nearly 32 Muslim states and religious parties participated. In this meeting strident condemnation of Israel was carried out.  From the Iranian perspective, the meeting carried a strong yet subtle subtext. First, that it was Iran that represents Muslim interests not only in the Middle East but also in the entire Islamic World. And secondly, it alone echoes the sentiments of the common Muslim and Arab masses as against their rulers, who are pro-West and lack firmness in condemnation of US and Israel.[34]

In fact, Iran and Iraq’s policy of exploiting emotional support from the Muslim masses is ostensibly aimed at undermining the ruling Arab leadership of some conservative states in the eyes of their own public. At the same time, the rhetoric is meant to gain further domestic legitimacy.

  

Pakistan and Gulf Security

Pakistan shares historical, cultural and ideological linkages with the GCC countries and the Arab world at large. A sizeable Pakistani expatriate population works and resides in neighbouring GCC countries, especially Oman, whose armed forces also comprise the Baluch people.

In   April 2001, Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman paid a four-day visit to Pakistan, the first after 1974. During his visit, both countries signed various bilateral agreements to boost trade, business and joint investment.[35] Pakistanis in the GCC countries are employed in skilled and semi-skilled labour force. However, as of today, their military links with the smaller GCC states are not as extensive as they were in, for instance, in the 1970s and 1980s.[36]

First, Pakistanis were mostly in advisory capacity and were stationed in many Middle Eastern countries for protection of vital defence and security installations because of political reliability and professionalism. Furthermore, Pakistan followed a strict policy of non-interference in inter-Arab disputes. Besides, unlike Cuban in Africa, who had a militant ideology of socialist revolution, Pakistani forces supported the status quo and provided ballast to the incumbent governments. Another difference was that in the case of Cuba, it was sometimes claimed that their presence in Africa was at the behest of a patron superpower, the former Soviet Union, which supplied them military arms and equipment. Contrarily, the Pakistanis were mostly on their own, although their presence and role was bolstered by the US and other Western nations. Most importantly, Pakistan’s presence in host countries, whether in the Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East, was premised on the principle that in case of war between two Arab nations, Pakistani troops would not take sides.

Today, Pakistan is bedevilled with a weak economy and multifarious internal and external challenges. It had exaggerated and somewhat unrealistic expectations that after going nuclear, its Arab friends would bail it out of economic difficulties. Its ongoing economic travails make it inward looking and prevent it from following an assertive foreign policy. This situation was to a great extent reversed after the events of 9/11 as Pakistan became a “frontline state” in the US-led war against international terrorism. There was even some talk of “extended deterrence” through providing a nuclear umbrella to Gulf friends. Realistically speaking, this is not feasible under existing regional and international circumstances.

First, since the early 1990s, there is already a sizable and effective US and Western presence in the region to cater to Gulf security. Currently, some of the GCC countries do not see direct and immediate threats emanating from Israel (although it is a permanent threat to the Muslim World) as they do from Iraq and Iran, two anti status quo powers allegedly harbouring plans for domination of the Gulf.  Any intrusion by Pakistan will cause anxiety to Iran and Iraq and thus aggravate the security concerns of GCC states.

Secondly, Pakistani armed forces, despite handing over power to a civilian government will share power and remain involved at home with the onerous task of overseeing the running of the government.

Thirdly, Pakistan’s quest for the so-called ‘strategic depth’[37] – by having a friendly and peaceful Afghanistan and Central Asia – has not materialised, particularly with the ouster of Taliban and the induction of the Northern Alliance dominant transitional government. Moreover, the civil war lingers on in Afghanistan. With Iran, Pakistan’s relations are on the mend and coming out of the strains imposed by support to opposing groups in Afghanistan, rivalry over Central Asian trade routes and sectarian killings by some terrorist groups in Pakistan.

Finally, the GCC countries are gradually reducing their dependence on outside powers and are trying to become more self-reliant. Already, there are major strains in Saudi-US relations, caused by the humiliating treatment of Saudi nationals in the US after the events of 9/11. Saudis are now realising the need for diversifying their intake of guest workers from other countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Central Asia and some East Asian countries.

Yet Pakistan’s linkages with the GCC are still cordial and strong. Geographically, Pakistan is at the geographical tri-junction of South, South-West and Central Asia that gives it a unique geopolitical advantage. Given Pakistan’s military strength, it can provide, some psychological assurances to Arab countries by securing their strategic rear against Israel. Its army can be utilised at some nodal points after mutual agreements with Arab friends. This will be for the protection of critical economic and military assets. Besides, it could help in assisting Gulf countries with peaceful nuclear programmes, power generation, health, agriculture, mining, irrigation canals, roads and tunnels.

However, it may be pointed out that this option, which was feasible a few years ago, is becoming increasingly unlikely in view of the Bush administration’s suspicions of even peaceful collaboration in the nuclear field.

In the quest for peace in South Asia, the GCC member states could play a more pro-active role by economically pressurizing/inducing India and Pakistan to initiate a serious search for peaceful settlement of issues and normalisation of relations. It could use its economic lever to induce healthy changes in the mindsets of the two neighbours whose hostility has reached almost morbid levels. For the Gulf region has nearly 35 per cent of the world reserves of oil and an equivalent percentage of gas reserves. Projected new discoveries could make this figure rise up to nearly 50 per cent.[38] This makes both India and Pakistan heavily dependent upon them.

 

Conclusion and some Reflections

Today, geo-economics is the new buzzword that is superseding geo-strategy. Ultimate security, strength and viability of nations depend upon human resource development. In other words, it means building of civic societies and attaining economic vibrancy and internal cohesion through a fair and just system. The meltdown of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, despite its mammoth security structure (conventional and nuclear) is a vivid reminder that mere military hardware and panoply of arms cannot ensure security and survival of nation states, be they great or small.

For durable peace in South Asia, nations have no alternative but to forsake the path of belligerence and move towards normalisation. This is easier said than done, as it demands political will, ingenuity and statesmanship. After all, there are many examples of nations that were once historical foes, eventually discarding the “baggage of history” and normalising relations. Notable examples are North and South Korea, North and South Yemen, East and West Germany, China and Russia, and China and India.

India has as much a stake as Pakistan in the well being and prosperity of the Gulf region. South Asia has a significant number of expatriate workers who live and work there and contribute to the economies of their host states. There is great scope for businesses and markets.

Both US and India have a vested interest in promoting stability in the region but certain divergences on matters such as Indo-Israel, Indo-Iraq, and Indo-Iran links may cause problems in their collaboration.

Pakistani security managers should see the early January 2001 visit of India’s former Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman in a positive light.[39] Pakistan should know that Indo-Arab commercial and trade links existed even in undivided India.

In addition, given the sizeable resident Indian population in these countries, any renewed contacts with India need not cause any erosion of the traditional and time-tested Pakistan-Saudi or Pakistan-UAE friendship. In fact, globalisation, marketisation and the modern art of diplomacy mean diversifying of contacts with as many nations as possible and partaking in a “win-win” rather than a “zero-sum” game.

Through a web of relationships and networking, the Saudis and other Gulf kingdoms could help restrain India’s hegemonic impulses and exercise moderating influence over its policy with immediate neighbours like Pakistan.

Likewise, the Indian prime minister’s 4-day visit to Iran in mid-April 2002 should be seen in the same light. The Iran-Saudi Security Agreement[40] on April 15, 2001 bears positive connotations and tends to release tensions in the region. It is a positive CBM and needs to be backed up with further steps of similar nature.

Every sovereign nation has a right to enter into interaction with another state if it deems it to be in its national interest. Emotionalism based on religion and ideology, cannot be a substitute for pragmatic interests that nations have always pursued for their well being and security. This has become more pronounced after the end of the Cold War.

The GCC leadership will have to master the art of balancing the interests of competitive actors in the region. While their own security needs are fulfilled through strategic partnership with the US and Britain, it is important that they should have broad-based security arrangements with other European powers, including Japan and East Asian countries.

With the installation of a democratic government under Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Pakistan’s economy will hopefully improve and if that happens, Pakistan could again become involved in defence and other economic partnership with the Gulf as before.

To sum up, while the nuclearisation of South Asia may not pose immediate threats to the Gulf region, the continued Indo-Pak tensions make the Gulf states uneasy. This is because nuclearisation has, in many ways, drastically altered the security picture of South Asia as well as the adjacent Gulf region by adding new complications to the security calculus. The GCC countries are now sandwiched between a hostile and nuclear Israel on its east and a nuclearised and tense South Asia on its west.

In addition, crossing the “nuclear Rubicon” by South Asians (India and Pakistan) could induce nuclear nationalism in neighbouring states. In other words, it could whet the political aspirations of certain anti-status quo powers in the Gulf region who may now see the acquisition of WMD and missile systems not only as a guarantee of security but also as a sign of national prestige.

The nuclear rivalry and policies of one-upmanship by India and Pakistan accentuate the existing state of tensions for the GCC countries. The clash of identities between the Arab states and Iran, national rivalries on inter-state border conflicts – are inherited from colonial times and this meshes with internal political problems.

The wealth, progress and prosperity of the Gulf countries makes them vulnerable; their relatively small sizes and internal weaknesses, could pose a security risk for them as it excites the envy of some less fortunate neighbours with predatory instincts. Hence, with the discovery of oil in the 20th century, the zone has become “one of the most turbulent and politically unstable areas in the world.”[41] 

South Asia has compounded its security through stockpiling of nuclear weapons and missiles in spite of abysmal poverty.[42] 

According to a notable observer, India is not immune from disintegrative trends in the next decade or so because of its myriad problems, that include grinding poverty. Currently, it faces nearly sixteen ongoing separatist movements, the threat of nuclear theft, terrorism and the growing militarism of the fundamentalist BJP ruling party.[43]

The above scenario may seem alarmist but other South Asian and neighbouring Gulf countries cannot afford to be blasé about the undercurrents developing in India.

Therefore, it is imperative that the GCC states in concert with India and Pakistan should candidly discuss their security concerns and defence dilemmas. Perhaps, it is high time that the GCC, with its leadership and economic clout, should bring to bear some healthy pressures on both India and Pakistan to moderate their rigid stances and help them settle their differences. The GCC countries need to emphasize on “human security” rather than military security.

Needless to say, a politically and economically stable South Asia is in everybody’s interest, including the Gulf region. Likewise, a stable Persian Gulf is reciprocally a source of strength and stability for South Asia. Since the two regions are inextricably linked through common bonds of culture and geography, the security and well being of one will directly impinge upon the other.