Ahmed Ijaz Malik*

he continuation of Indo-Russian defence cooperation in the changing strategic milieu of South Asia has raised collective concerns in the region. During the Cold War, the sole foreign policy objective of the USSR was to create a conducive international environment. The purpose was not only to avoid war and maintain its sphere of influence in order to ensure a balance of power, but also to establish mutually beneficial relations between itself and the external world.[1] However, in the current situation, Russia has inducted a new concept of liberalism[2] into its foreign policy, with the objective of overcoming its economic problems by asserting itself diplomatically, diversifying its pattern of alliances, and forging military coalitions with traditional allies like India.

            Russia sees the renewal of these military alliances as a continuation of President Putin’s “rose garden” strategy[3] of protecting his position and popularity by reaping credit, merited or otherwise, for improving Russia’s economic condition. Russia is keen to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and has volunteered to assist the fight against international terrorism.[4] The cash-starved Russian defence industry depends significantly on foreign buyers. These sales of military hardware are a source of ambivalence in Moscow for two reasons. First, China is the leading market for Russian conventional arms exports although many decision-makers in Moscow still consider Beijing as the primary source of potential aggression against Russian Siberia and the Far East. Second, arms sales generate only an estimated $3 billion per year, clearly insufficient for maintaining and converting the fast-decaying remains of the Soviet military industrial complex. Russia’s defence industry cannot survive on domestic procurement that, over the last decade, provided for the purchase of armoured vehicles, aircraft and helicopters.[5]

            Indian motives for such a military alliance are global, regional and geo-political. Globally, India would want an eminent status in the region and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC). Regionally, India aspires to be dominant in South Asia and match the military power of China. Geo-politically, India seeks to have a share in the energy resources of the Caspian region[6] and has a strategic aspiration of United States-Indian joint patrolling in the Indian Ocean.

            Russian motives, on the other hand, as conceptualised by certain analysts, include the utilization of military capability for achieving foreign policy objectives. This policy is termed as deliberate procrastination similar to ‘wait and see.’ Historically, this has been called the Russian patience of dialectical advance.[7] The order of priorities of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy in January 1993 was: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), arms control and international security, economic reform, the United States, Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, West and South Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin America. Thus, in the list of ten priorities, India and South Asia ranked seventh, “but this time Russia is aware of the fact that strategic alliance not combined with an economic trade relationship will not last long.”[8]

            Russia also needs to overcome the crisis of national and political identity. Russia needs strong allies to neutralise the US monopoly in a unipolar world. It is also important for Russia to maintain its image of a true Eurasian power.  Russia sees the US as the sole surviving major power in the world and thus feels a need of portraying itself as a powerful country, at least in the Central and South Asian region. The Russian Defence Minister, Marshall Igor D. Sergeyev, clearly and explicitly expressed Russia’s aversion to US dominance by saying that a new re-division of the world through the use of force related factors – economic, political and military was being enacted. Furthermore, he blamed the US for unilaterally altering international security structures.[9] Russia’s re-alliance with India is also due to certain developments in Central Asia, the Caspian region and Afghanistan. With India having ambitions of dominance in the Caspian region and trying to gain influence in Afghanistan and Russia seeking to regain and consolidate its influence in Afghanistan, the two countries foresee their alignment as being helpful for the achievement of their common goals in the Caspian region. Recently, there has been a greater convergence in the Russian and Indian interests in the region. As India does not have direct borders with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), it has no significant influence in the threat perception of Russia and the CAR.[10] India plans to overcome this lack of influence through its alliance with Russia. 

            The recent determinants of Russian foreign policy revealed two different schools of thought with divergent opinions regarding the policy towards India and South Asia. One opinion favoured that India should be given priority in Russian policy in South Asia, while at the same time developing good relations with other South Asian countries, including Pakistan. The other school of thought was associated with Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Foreign Ministry and they did not favour a special relationship with India because they perceive that, by using this option, Russia would be looking at the developments in the region through Indian spectacles. The first view was prevalent among the academic community and the parliamentary circles based on the reality that Russia needed to overcome its economic problems by selling its military products to a country whose military was acquainted with the Russian military technology.[11]

            Pakistan is a country significantly affected by these developments. Moscow appreciates the fact that India and Russia share an understanding on various irritants in South Asia. On the contrary, Pakistan is interested in changing the political map of the region because of its aspiration of seeking a just and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN resolutions. Pakistan also desires a friendly and favourable government in Kabul. Russia is allied to India and has strategic interests in Afghanistan; thus Russia is in one way or another, involved in both the issues. Considering the recent events in Kabul after the Loya Jirgah and the establishment of the government of President Karzai, it is apparent that Afghanistan is on the road to political reconstruction and India would want its influence in the new government. However, India, apart from having a small following among the Tajiks, does not have any significant following among the Afghans. Russia, on the other hand, still has influence over some Afghan political factions. The re-emerging Indo-Russian alignment does not only raise security concerns but also affects the domestic politics of the neighbouring and extra-regional countries. 

            Russia and Pakistan have not enjoyed very cordial relations since the visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to the United States (US) instead of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), even though the latter had extended an invitation before the former. That was considered a deliberate disregard for international norms.[12] The relations worsened during the Cold War, with the U2 episode[13] and the incident where General Zia-ul-Haq was warned by Russian leadership to cut aid and support to the Afghan insurgents or face a new Soviet campaign to goad the disgruntled Baloch minority into breaking away from Pakistan.[14] After the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with India, the Soviet Union acknowledged that, henceforth, its policy in Asia would no longer aim at maintaining the balance between India and Pakistan. India became Moscow’s formal ally, and qualified for special attention on that basis.[15] Pakistan was a rival of Russia and India during the Cold War years when it was allied to the United States. Relations between Islamabad and Moscow came under severe strain once again, notably as the Taliban and religious parties in Pakistan began sympathising with the Chechen movement for autonomy.[16]

            The tempo of Indo-Russian cooperation accelerated after the two countries signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership in October 2001. The strategic partnership included enhanced cooperation in the fields of defence and military-technical cooperation in a long-term perspective, and deepening service-to-service cooperation.[17] India has made its most substantial foreign investment to date in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 project, as well as cooperating in atomic energy, space and defence.[18]  India is wedded to the idea of maintaining the kind of weaponry its army is trained to use, and seeks to maintain it, overlooking the fact that some of the military hardware is now obsolete.

            In the current strategic scenario, Russia could have some motivations other than its ‘foreign policy intentions’, which are influenced by its military capability.[19] This could be the new idea of ‘openness’[20] in the Russian foreign policy, where it is extending a network of its alliances to overcome its isolation after the Cold War. This is an entirely different approach from the Cold War era. Russia has accepted the need to alter its security perceptions in accordance with the changed international environment, which is different from the rigid alliance system of the Cold War. This is seen as a ‘discovery syndrome’[21] by certain analysts, where Russia has discovered new avenues in alignments, which were not possible at the time of the Cold War. This new policy can be a motivation for Pakistan to improve its relations with Russia. Admittedly, Pakistan’s military bellicosity with India and the prospects of Russian transfer of defence technology to it could impede efforts towards the improvement of Pak-Russian relations. [22] Nevertheless, considering the transformation in Russia’s foreign policy, Pakistan must avail whatever opportunities come its way to cultivate its ties with one of the most important players in the region.

Russian-Indian Agreements

            President Vladimir Putin, in order to give preference to India, decided to allow India to deal directly with Russian arms manufacturers. Consequently, Rosboronexport, a government owned marketing agency was by-passed, even though it is unlawful to overlook Rosboronexport for defence-related deals. Under the defence protocol signed in June 2000, Russia delivered $10 billion worth of arms and other military hardware and technologies to India during the 10-year period.[23] The deal concluded on February 15, 2001, includes 310 sophisticated T-90S tanks worth $700 million.[24] The Indian market has provided rich pickings for Russian tank manufacturers.[25] In the conventional weapons include 125 mm gun, refleks anti-tank guided missiles system with range of up to 5 km, 7.62 mm machine guns, 12.7 mm air defence machine gun, infra red jammers, laser warning systems and grenade discharge system.[26]

Aircraft

            India purchased a Russian upgrade package developed by the Sukhoi Aircraft Plant in Nizhny Novgorod, the MIG Design Bureau and the former Phazotron radar manufacturer to modernize its fleet of 125 MIG-21 fighters. India has introduced Su-30MK1 (NATO reporting name ‘Flanker’ multi-role fighter) into service with 20 Squadron in Pune. An additional 24 aircraft will be added by December 2003.[27] India is planning to build 140-150 Sukhoi Su-30MK1 strike fighters, under license from Russia, which would cost $ 3 billion. Other aircraft programmes include upgrades for India’s aging Il-38 and Tu-142 maritime-patrol aircraft, an avionics upgrade for Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters and the lease of four Beriev A.50 airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS) and four Tupolev Tu-22 long-range strike aircraft. A possible upgrade for India’s MIG-29 fighters has also been suggested.[28]  Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Krishnaswamy opines that Su-30 capability will be “significantly augmented” with the introduction of six IL-78 (Midas) tanker aircrafts that India bought from Uzbekistan and which will be delivered by January 2003.[29] The joint development of a "fifth-generation" fighter aircraft, S-37 Berkut (Golden Eagle), is also in the offing and will be manufactured at the Sukhoi Construction Bureau.[30] It would be the most ambitious and sophisticated defence project undertaken by the two countries so far. The new aircraft should be ready by 2008 and would replace the SU-30 and MIG-29 fourth-generation jets. It would rival the joint strike force fighter to be built in the US by Lockheed-Martin.[31] India is also currently negotiating with Britain to purchase as many as 66 Hawk trainer aircraft, and it is exploring options for airborne early-warning and aerial-refuelling aircraft and anti-aircraft systems. A 13.8 percent increase in the defence budget early this year helped pave the way for India's latest weapons procurement spree.[32]

            During the past 40 years, India purchased  $30 billion worth of armaments from Russia. The Indian Defence Ministry is considering the possibility of purchasing the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier on condition that the Russian side will refurbish it and equip it with carrier-borne MIG-29K fighter planes.[33] In addition, India may reportedly lease up to four Tu-22M Backfire bombers from Russia. The Backfire, which first entered serial production in the early 1970s, is a long-range, low-level penetration bomber designed to carry out conventional or nuclear strikes against surface targets.[34] The Tu-22M can be equipped with cruise missile, with some modifications. This development can have great implications for Pakistan, as its present defence capability cannot guarantee a credible defence against cruise missiles.

Missile Systems

            The Prithivi missile is based on the Russian SA-2 missile technology[35], and another version of this missile is being developed and improved for installation on Indian navy surface vessels. The missile called Dhanush, with a reported range of 350 km has already undergone two tests.[36] India has purchased a range of systems, including short-range Tunguska missiles for air defense and the mid-range TOR surface-to-air missiles. Recently, India has also negotiated the purchase of the sophisticated long-range S-300 system, which can also be used as an anti-ballistic-missile defense. Indian ships, submarines and aircraft are to be fitted with the Novator 3M-54E Klub cruise missile, a high-speed weapon that can attack ships and ground targets within a range of 300 km. Perhaps the most formidable weapon under joint development is the Brahmos PJ-10 supersonic cruise missile, developed jointly by India and Russian manufacturer NPO Mashino-stroyeniye.

            India and Russia tested a jointly developed supersonic cruise missile in the eastern Indian state of Orissa. This missile known as Brahmos PJ-10 has a range of 280 kilometres and can carry a 200-kilogram conventional warhead. The three-tonne, eight-metre long missile can be launched from a variety of platforms, including ships and aircraft. When launched from a ship, the missile can fly at a height of up to 14 kilometres at twice the speed of sound. Brahmos has a sensor on its head that detects the target and can change course and has the capability to strike from a distance of 20 kilometres, if the target changes its path. It can also fly closer to earth or sea surface, but that results in a shortening of its range to 120 kilometres. It can be guided to its target mainly with the help of an on-board computer. “The propulsion system of the missile was provided by the Russians – in clear violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category II guidelines – while the Indians contributed in the guidance system, which is claimed by them to be indigenously developed.”[37] Besides the Russian navy, the Indian navy is the only one to be equipped with the Klub missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and have land-attack variants.[38] In view of the fact that the missile has a motor engine to give high velocity, it would not have a constant heat signature and could escape being targeted by an interceptor heat-seeking missile.

Ships and Submarines

            Foremost among the Indian Navy’s purchases is the modified aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. This carrier will cost India Rs. 9,138 crore (Rs. 91.380 billion), 14 per cent of its budget. Though India is buying the ship itself at scrap cost, it is paying around $600 million for upgrades, as well as 20 MIG-29K naval fighters and six Kamov Ka-31 helicopters for a total of about $1.5 billion. The MIG-29 K is likely to cost India an additional Rs. 6,000 crore (Rs. 60.00 billion).[39] Severnoye Machine-Building Enterprise production association (Sevmash)[40] is a major shipbuilding complex in Russia and Europe. It builds ships of all classes as well as special marine equipment. Sevmash has already delivered a frigate to India, with a second Project 11356-class ship[41] launched at the Baltiisky Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Another such ship is under construction. India has also bought advanced Russian submarines, including nine 877EKM Kilo-Class submarines. The Naval warship INS Insushastra has been launched. These ships, designed by the Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau, were built at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg and fitted with Novator 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles.[42]

            Russia has agreed to provide 90 R anti-sub missiles to India for its Russian designed 17 Stealth warships, which would be built by India’s Mazagon Dock at a cost of $170 million each by the year 2007.[43] The Indian navy plans to induct 877 EKM kilo class submarines built at St. Petersburg, Russia. These are likely to cost Rs. 1,250 crore (12.50 billion). By 2008 the advanced technology vessel, a Rs. 3,750 crore (Rs. 37.50 billion) nuclear submarine jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Atomic Energy Commission, will be in service.[44]

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

            Moscow is presently pressuring New Delhi to shun the Western arms bazaars and instead pick up Russian hardware, such as the MIG-AT advanced jet trainer and an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).[45] The AWACS project, with a Russian platform and Israeli avionics, is in a very advanced stage. These AWACS will have Israeli radar and communication systems, like the Phalcon, mounted on the Russian Ilyushin-76 heavy transport military aircraft, with PS-90A engines.[46]

New Delhi intends to buy at least 30 anti-stealth 2-D 5576-3 radar systems for about $133 million in the next two years, and produce another 50 under licence for $167 million. India plans to use the radar systems in about 80 air defence systems based on the 250-km Prithvi surface-to-air missile by 2007. India also plans, by 2010, to use the radar systems in about a dozen systems similar to the 2,500-km Agni surface-to-air missile.[47]

Russian Light-Water Reactors (LWRs)

            Russian and Indian officials signed a new contract to begin engineering studies for the construction of two Russian Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in Koodankulam.[48] Russia has offered India a soft loan of $ 2.6 billion for building this nuclear power plant in the state of Tamil Nadu. It maintains that the two 1,000-megawatt VVER-1000 reactors, which would be fuelled with low-enriched uranium, would be operated under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and would not, therefore, pose any proliferation threat.

            As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Russia is obligated not to sell nuclear materials or technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state that does not have IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities (full-scope safeguards), as required by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a non-signatory of the NPT, only a few facilities in India’s large nuclear infrastructure are under IAEA safeguards. Moscow insists that an agreement on nuclear assistance with New Delhi, which is reportedly worth $2.6 billion and is part of the NSG’s 1992 full-scope-safeguards condition for supply, to build the reactors. As the agreement was reached in 1988 therefore, deserved to be implemented in its entirety. Moreover, according “to Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, to have held-off on the nuclear deal would have looked too much like imposing sanctions, which is not Russia’s stand.”[49] Despite foreign pressures and criticism by the US, Russia is continuing its support in nuclear technology to India.

The Cryogenic Deal, GSLV (Geo-Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle)

            The Indian designers plan launching at least one satellite a year. The GSLV is a three-stage vehicle. The first stage is a 129 tonne solid propellant core motor with four liquid propellant strap-ons, each with 40 tonne propellant. The second stage is a liquid propulsion system with 37.5 tonnes of propellant. The cryogenic upper stage has 12 tonnes of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

            The US objected to the deal on the ground that it involved the transfer of dual-use technology, which could be used for civil as well as military purposes in spite of the fact that India and Russia had expressed their full commitment not to use the technology for the development of ballistic missiles. It was widely felt that the US pressure on Russia, to shelve the deal, was also partly dictated by the US commercial interests.

Cementing Diplomatic Ties

            To facilitate and upgrade future defence cooperation, the two countries agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation. Along with China, India is already one of Russia’s top arms customers, but some Indian officials have expressed concern about Moscow’s reliability as a supplier of spare parts, technology, and services. On arms control issues, the two leaders noted in a joint statement that both countries would work toward the “early commencement” of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament and stressed the need for full implementation of arms control treaties, specifically the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.[50]

Implications

            The common interpretation of Russian resurgence would be similar to the Cold War interpretation, where the Soviet Union seemed to be moving towards India and Afghanistan with a view to countering the presence of the US in Pakistan and Iran.[51] The present Russian leadership, however, foresees some new directions in their policy towards India. A strategic partnership between Russia, India and China could be one of the determinants of Russian foreign policy. Russia seeks to have a qualitatively new level of relations with India, “signifying at the same time that this alliance is not anti-West.”[52] It is a reality that the US has kept a low profile in South Asia as far as forming a strategic alliance is concerned. The Russian-Indian alliance is bound to have some effects on the domestic and foreign affairs of the South Asian countries themselves, and in the countries where US has some interest. 

China

            In view of a thaw in Sino-Russian relations after a strategic partnership and the belligerent tendencies between India and China, the Russian-Indian defence deals are going to have multiple implications for China. While studying the implications for China, the Russian alliance with China needs to be considered, as it had a significant effect on China’s pattern of alliances and foreign policy decisions. In April 1996, after over half a century of border disputes and deep-seated hostility, Russia and China entered into a strategic partnership.[53] Russia and China signed a ‘Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation’ in Moscow the same year. The treaty should signal to the Western world that a major geopolitical shift might be taking place in the Eurasian balance of power, with serious implications for the US and its alliances. The 2001 Russia-China treaty covers important areas of cooperation like joint actions to offset a perceived US hegemonism, demarcation of the two countries long-disputed 4,300 km border and arms sales and technology transfers. Russia has also supplied China with Su-30MKI aircraft.[54] On June 14, 2001, Russia, China, and four Central Asian states announced the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Together, the agreements portend an important evolving geopolitical transformation for Russia and China, two regional giants who are positioning themselves to define the rules under which the US, the European Union (EU), Iran, and Turkey will be allowed to participate in the strategically important Central Asian region.[55]

            In South Asia, the next step after this strategic partnership was to be the ‘strategic triangle,’[56] an Indo-Russia-China nexus. The growing US presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan could motivate these countries to consider this possibility of a triangular nexus.[57] Indian insecurity towards China in a strategic triangle is a dividing point in the probable Indo-Russia-China nexus. It is clear that India would demand more concessions with regards to armaments and its missile defence programme, and would also want China to reduce its support for Pakistan. These terms could not be acceptable to China and the possibility of a consistent military strategic triangle between these countries might not be easy, despite Russia’s efforts.

            China has economic, military and strategic interests in Pakistan. These have their individual and collective importance for both the countries. Economically, China has helped Pakistan develop Gawadar port and plans to establish trade relations between the western province of Xinjiang and Pakistan. Strategically, Pakistan might be the only country with which China does not have a border dispute. In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan and the formation of a new government, it is in China’s interests to ally with Pakistan in the formation of a China-friendly government in Afghanistan in order to address the issue of disturbance in Xinjiang.

            The troubles between India and China are not all over, so in the case of a crisis, China could benefit more from a secure and allied Pakistan. Militarily, Pakistan has been a recipient of Chinese technology and support not to mention that Pakistan and China face a collective military threat from India and it is not rational for them to give up their defence cooperation especially in the circumstances of recent tension between India and Pakistan, and the declarations made by the Indian defence minister after their nuclear test in May 1998, about China being India’s primary adversary. Moreover, India justifies its enormous defence spending as a way to achieve parity with China. The recent missile test of Brahmos also has implications for China, as Brahmos has ‘secondary proliferation potential’[58] due to the possibility of increase in its range.

            India would demand China to show its sincerity by ending its support to Pakistan in defence technology. The claim of any illegality of foreign support to Pakistan cannot be justified in view of Britain receiving Polaris and Trident missiles from the US and Israel receiving Lance and Arrow missiles from the US and Jericho-1 missile technology from France.[59] Indian objections to China-Pakistan cooperation are not justified when it is receiving military support from Russia, the US, the UK and Israel.  India might have some concerns, based on its own priorities and objectives, in being a partner in a probable alliance with China. India does not want to give any kind of signal to the West that it is a party to any anti-West alliance. It would be difficult for India to ally with China strategically and thus China will still have security concerns vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan

            In the recent missile technology transfer, there is a significant balance shift in the military affairs and capability. The greatest of these shifts is due to the introduction of Brahmos missile. Russia and India have made sure that this missile does not come under the MTCR domain. This has serious implications for Pakistan, as it will give the Indian Navy a comparative superiority and leave Pakistan’s coastal cities vulnerable. The Russian nuclear submarines did not provide the required edge to the Indian Navy, so they have decided to halt the development of SLBMs like Sagarika and are concentrating more on the development of Brahmos. Although it is still being experimented to launch cruise missiles form diesel-operated submarines, yet it can be tried with certain modifications.[60] The greatest negative impact that this development had was the renewal of the missile testing competition between India and Pakistan, where Pakistan was obliged to conduct two missile tests to address its security concerns.[61] Moreover, New Delhi has boasted of this missile, which is an improved version of Russia’s Yakhont missile as a manifestation of Indo-Russian relationship. Brahmos gives India a standoff capability and strategic reach, which can be extended beyond the present range of 280 km. Major General (Retired) Ashok Mehta claimed that “Brahmos exposes Pakistan’s coastline and soft underbelly,” he also pointed out that “India is gradually moving away from a mere buyer-seller relationship to one of joint production, technology transfer, and exchange with the Russian defence industry.”[62] 

            India has tested its GLSV Geo-Synchronous Launch Vehicle in April 2001. It is widely accepted that a GSLV is readily convertible to an ICBM with requisite modifications,[63] thus extending its sphere far beyond Pakistan.   

          The nuclear submarine deal between India and Russia has not been a success in qualitative terms. The Russian submarines have not been serving the defence purpose of India and had to be returned. Pakistan should not, and need not, try to match India ship for ship or submarine for submarine. Instead, it should go for acquiring the latest technologies. In future, there is an added responsibility of defending Gwadar and Ormara, along with the Karachi Complex. Moreover, the upgraded Agosta submarines must be made capable of preventing a naval blockade of Karachi by the Indian Navy. This spate of Indian arms purchases, which Pakistan criticized as destabilizing, follows another deal with France to buy 10 Mirage 2000H fighter aircraft and 40 MI-17 combat transport helicopters from Russia. In addition the fifth generation fighter Su-30MKl that has been added to the Indian Air Force[64] will compel Pakistan to upgrade its fighter aircrafts.

            Due to the proximity of the Indian Air Force airfields and the availability of an aircraft carrier, which India plans to acquire from Russia, the Pakistani surface units, especially destroyers/frigates, would remain vulnerable to anti-ship missile attacks from Indian aircraft. Therefore, to ensure their defence, adequate air protection would have to be provided to them by the Pakistan Air Force during critical phases of transition/battle. This would require very close coordination between the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy.[65] This could be the counter measure the Pakistan Navy can take in response to the probability of the Indian Navy acquiring the carrier-borne MIG-29K fighter planes. Pakistan has been working on the K8 aircraft, which will help in improving its air power. India has felt the need to acquire a new naval destroyer as the naval destroyers given by Russia have become obsolete. The main problem India faces is of the time required to equip the latest naval destroyers with air power. The acquisition of MIG-29K is an effort to keep the required standard of the Navy although this could probably cost India more than acquiring a new naval vessel.

            The T-90S tanks are an advanced form of T-72 and they have ‘Reflecks’ and laser guided missiles. To counter them, Pakistan has Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Green Arrow technology, TA-80UD, T-852AD, and Al-Khalid (MBT-2000). T-90S is still under trial, even in Russia. Pakistan Armoured Corps will have 125 mm calibre guns on the tanks by 2012. Moreover, the ATGM technology comprises a wire-guided remote controlled system. India plans to deploy the T90S tanks in the southern region where the military tactics of Pakistan army match the Indian arsenal and magnitude of deployment. These tanks do not have great manoeuvrability in the cultivable land, due to inherent restrictions. It might not be very favourable for the Indian army to deploy them in the upper Punjab sectors of Pakistan. The balance between the Pakistan and Indian army would thus remain reasonably maintained.

The Russian-Indian influence in Afghanistan is another factor that came to light after the transport of the Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners of war from Panjsher to Tashkent, and then to Delhi.[66] It is quite obvious that this development or similar developments could have negative implications for Pakistan. Considering India’s extreme propaganda against Pakistan, these prisoners could be used to defame Pakistan. India’s refusal to provide the identity of the perpetrators of the December 13, 2001, attack, on the Indian parliament shows that India does not provide proof while making accusations. India is quite liable to use these prisoners to frame them in any future terrorist event. In the internal political situation of India, there is a relative negative development where the Indian extremist political parties have formed a government and have committed genocide of Muslims.

            In a reversal of Cold War roles, Washington was making up with New Delhi. US arms supply to Pakistan was stopped in 1990 in view of the latter’s nuclear programme. On the other hand, Moscow appeared to be improving ties with Pakistan. In November 1991, just before the Soviet collapse, Moscow, for the first time, voted in the UNO for a Pakistan-sponsored proposal for creating a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, much to the consternation of New Delhi. Taken positively, this can be a ground for converting Pakistan’s foreign policy failures to its advantages. This can be a point to engage with Russia and offer support on the areas where the Pakistani and Russian interests converge. Moreover, Russia and the US called on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiations and become original signatories to the treaty banning nuclear weapons test explosions and the proposed convention to ban production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other’s territories. The Clinton-Yeltsin joint statement evoked strong media comment in India. It was pointed out that while calling on India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, the two had made no mention of Israel, which was also a nuclear-weapon threshold country.[67] It is thus imperative for Pakistan to support a balanced policy on nuclear disarmament and control, as it is a security requirement of Pakistan to have strategic weapons as long as the irritant issues are not resolved.

            Undoubtedly, Russia has been wary of the Iranian and Pakistani propensity to mix economic and political diplomacy with religion. Russia fears that the spread of Islamic militancy in Central Asia could threaten the Russia’s southern flank, which has a substantial Muslim population. The Muslim-majority Caucasian republic of Chechnya is already striving to break away from Russia. The terrorist acts in Tajikistan and the opposition by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) have motivated Russia to ally with Tajikistan in curbing the threat of fanaticism and militancy over there. At the same time, Moscow would not like to antagonise the Muslim countries in the south, viz., Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, if only to preclude the possibility of a Muslim bloc emerging in the region on an anti-Russian platform. Russian policy towards these countries is both flexible and realistic. Russia would like to maintain normal cooperative relations with these Muslim countries.[68]  As an ally in the war against terrorism __ and having itself been a victim of the violence perpetrated by some misled organizations promoting bigotry and extremism __ Pakistan can actually cooperate with Russia in countering terrorism, rather than becoming an antagonistic party in the conflict that effects all the countries in the region.

Afghanistan

            The primary area of convergence of interests between India and Russia in Afghanistan is the access to the Caspian oil and gas resources by exploiting the Indian and Russian sympathetic factions in the present government of Afghanistan.[69] The Russian influence has always been there in Afghanistan and, after the fall of the Taliban, Russia is engaging with its allies again. ‘Near Abroad’ is the recent idea of making the Caspian region a zone of influence for Russia. This has been promulgated in the  “North Russian Plan.”[70] In its final stages, an oil pipeline will run from the Tengiz oilfields to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk in southern Russia where oil tankers will be loaded for the world market. For Kazakhstan, this is the most efficient and convenient route for oil export. “Besides the Tengiz oilfield, the Karachaganak and Aktyubinsk oilfields in the North can also use this pipeline to export oil. According to a Russian analysis, Turkmenistan has 6.5 million tonnes of oil and 5.5 trillion cubic metres of gas fourth in number of the world’s reserves. In terms of explored gas reserves, Kazakhstan has 6 billion tonnes of oil and 2 trillion cubic metres of gas and Azerbaijan has 3.5-5.0 billion tonnes of oil and 600 billion cubic metres of gas.”[71]

            Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have already signed a trilateral gas accord at Ashkabad on the December 26, 2002.[72] Moreover, the prospects of an oil pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan have created economic and security concerns in India.  Iran resents one of the pipeline’s intended objectives, its marginalisation in Caspian Sea energy transportation. However, Russia and India are particularly concerned about its impact on Pakistan. If constructed, revenues from the pipeline will be a significant boost to the Pakistani economy. In the Indian perception, as an emerging power with regional ambitions, a stronger Pakistan could be a threat to India. Pakistan would likely become more assertive in pursuing its regional goals, in particular towards India and the Kashmir issue.[73] In such a situation Pakistan’s interests have to be safeguarded and there is a need for Pakistan to collaborate with Afghanistan in the achievement of the objective of this pipeline for the mutual benefit of the two countries. The gas pipeline accord signed on December 26, 2002, between Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, would definitely improve Pakistan’s economy condition and enhance Pakistan’s strategic standing in the Caspian region.

            A military base recently set up in Farkhor, Tajikistan, close to the Afghan border, is also in competition for access to the oil and gas rich Caspian region. India, Tajikistan, Russia and Iran had backed the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance and still have their influence in the government in Afghanistan.[74] India can favour the Afghan Tajiks through its influence in Tajikistan and can use them for the achievements of its own motives. With a following among the Tajiks, Russia and India would not consider it favourable that the Pashtuns have a majority in government. This might have a serious backlash leading to violence as a result of intervention by either of the two countries in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. As a result of favouring the non-Pakhtuns in the government, there can be a possibility of the revival of a Pakhtun movement in Afghanistan. This could increase Pakistan’s security concerns and allow India to exploit the situation by reigniting the Pakhtunistan issue. As long as Pakistan has an adversarial relationship with India, the possibility of India using the anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan for its own motives cannot be ruled out. 

Iran

            In the recent past, efforts were made to engage New Delhi in the emerging strategic triangle, Moscow-Teheran-Beijing, with the major objective of weakening American influence in this region. Fighting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and criticism of the Western military intervention in Kosovo provided Russia, China, India and Iran with motives to create a common axis. Until recently, despite the traditional and historical ties, India and Iran remained strategic adversaries. India viewed Iran through the Pakistan prism. Iran, claiming a special role as leader of Islamic states, was one of the strongest critics of Hindu-dominated India. In view of the possibility of a strategic triangle and the passage of oil pipelines through Iran, India would be willing to improve relations with Iran. 

            By developing close ties with Iran, India hopes to neutralize Pakistan’s quest for influence in Iran. Iran hopes to break its international isolation by befriending India. Iran, one of the world’s biggest producers of natural gas, can find a ready market in India. Iran seeks close cooperation in the sphere of defence with India in order to meet the requirements of its armed forces and with the intention of forming a bloc against Western interests in the region. Teheran is considering a 5-year military modernization plan and, therefore, wants to build up its defence capabilities by using the potential of regional states, including India.

            However, there still exists a lot of mistrust between the leaders of the two countries, as the majority of the Iranian leadership is still wary of a strong Hindu-dominated India, while New Delhi views an influential Islamic Iran as a potential adversary in the long run. This is the main reason why many of the agreements previously signed have not been implemented.[75] Pakistan does not need an adversarial Iran as its neighbour, when the major irritant like the extremist Taliban regime has been removed. Recent visit by President Khatami in December 2002 to Pakistan has opened up many avenues for mutual cooperation and would certainly go a long way in improving bilateral relations. Pakistan and Iran have signed three agreements on trade, plant quarantine and science and technology. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has also been signed. The MoU puts emphasis on improvement in trade and economic relations, joint ventures in areas of oil and gas, education, trade, software technology, agriculture, building up of free trade zones, railway systems, fibre links and improvement communication and transportation between the two countries.[76]

            President Bush identifies Iran as one of the biggest sponsors of terrorism in the world and one of the three states which, according to him, jointly constitute an ‘axis of evil.’ Putin, on the other hand, regards neighbouring Iran as an important strategic as well as trading partner. Bush was extremely critical of Russian support to Iran in development of a nuclear power plant, which, according to him, might be used in future to develop nuclear weapons. Nearly 1,000 Russians are assisting the Iranians in the project, which would fetch 500 million pounds sterling for the ailing Russian economy.[77] Economically, Iran is one of the countries that can serve as a market for Russian industry, including the machine-building industry. This is a country rich in oil resources. The prospect of the creation of transportation routes across Iran and the economic role of co-operation within the Caspian Sea is of immense importance. Some experts in Russia believe that there exists a certain attraction within the triangle: Russia-India-Iran. Russian public opinion as a whole is positive to a more profound development of Russian-Iranian relations.[78]

            Pakistan has to improve its relations with Iran using its geographic proximity to its advantage; extending trade ties and offering support in the building of the oil pipelines. This has to be a first step to counter any possibility of isolation due to Russian-Indian cooperation in Iran without Pakistan. This is the time for Iran to engage with the countries of South Asia to end its isolation due to the antagonism by US.

Conclusion

            In view of Pakistan’s adversarial relations with India, the Russian-Indian military cooperation is likely to increase the security concerns of Pakistan and shift the military balance in India’s favour. Rationality demands that Pakistan must keep a balanced approach in developing ties with Russia. The greatest factor that has hindered Pakistan’s alignment with Russia has been the diplomatic irresponsibility and indifference shown by the political leaders in the past. This has been due to some hindrances like the internal political instability, Pakistan’s syndrome of dependency on the US and the lack of intellectuals and analytical studies on Soviet Union.[79] The social structure of Pakistan also played a negative role where the religious clergy did not favour any alliance with an atheistic state like the Soviet Union. In the present situation, it is only prudent that Pakistan makes its foreign policy more proactive and dynamic, and makes itself a progressive Islamic state where religion does not prevent the people and the state to look for better options in achieving their objectives.

            There can be prospects of Pak-Russian cooperation. The comments by Russian Presidential spokesman Sergei Yasterzhembskiya, who came to Pakistan in 2000, can be a starting point for the initiation of defence and strategic cooperation. The probable fields of cooperation in this proposal were the economic projects, MI-17 helicopters and curtailment of terrorist activities.[80] Pakistan and Russia are already working on a Consultative Group on Strategic Stability.[81] Pakistan must engage with Russia first in the fields of economic development and trade, which can then have a spill-over effect to strategic cooperation. “Russia needs a market for is goods and Pakistan can provide a lucrative market. Geographically, Pakistan might not be a neighbor but through proximity of CIS and ECO, Pakistan can engage with Russia, as Pakistan is a member of ECO. Russia has probably for the first time felt the brunt of the IMF and is in a better position to understand Pakistan’s position in fighting debt problems to address the economic and security concerns.”[82] Pakistan and Russia are linked in trade and economic accords under which, so far, the trade between them is estimated at around $ 26 million.[83] Russia has helped Pakistan develop the Karachi Steel Mills through a grant of $ 5230 million.[84]

            Pakistan can try to overcome the stagnation and dissonance in its relations with Russia. On the count of terrorism, it was alleged by the Russians that Pakistan has been supportive of the Chechen movement and the Talibanisation of Central Asia. In the current situation, it is clear that Pakistan and Russia face similar threats from the extremists. It is, thus, in the mutual interests of both countries to make a new start in the common fight against all kinds of terrorism, not to mention the war against drugs, where again both countries have similar stands.[85]  This can be possible as the mind set of the Russian Federation is different from the Soviet Republic and the new federation desires cordial relations with the rest of the world and favours resolving all the irritant issues between the nations.[86]

            Russia can play a positive role in South Asia by acting as a mediator between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent conference and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) can be the starting points. It seems friendship with large Asian countries like India and China fits well with the new policy in Moscow. In this way, Russia can project itself as a true Eurasian power.[87] President Putin’s initiative at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) at Almaty Kazakhstan on June 4, 2002, attracted special attention for several reasons. A notable aspect was that it appeared to reflect a readiness on the part of Russia to play the role of an honest broker.

            The newly formed NATO-Russia Council has initiated efforts to cool standoff between India and Pakistan. The Presidents and Prime Ministers strongly urged both sides to de-escalate and to resume talking together so that their problems could be resolved peacefully.[88] This in turn implied that Moscow would show sensitivity to the concerns of both parties, and thus modify the traditional pro-India stance it had maintained since the 1950s when Pakistan had joined the Western pacts. President Putin's initiative to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India has been launched with the support and motivation of President Bush. A possibility of gain from the present situation of engagement could be, that both Pakistan and India join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that was set up last year[89] and the ASEAN forum.

            Pakistan must consolidate a military alliance and strategic relations with China. China can help in improving relations between Pakistan and Russia by using its strategic alliance with Russia. Security is one of the great motivations in the formation of alliances. Pakistan has gained enough from the Chinese and Russian assistance than from its most allied ally of the past years. The obvious impediments in improving relations with Russia are India and terrorism. Terrorism has effects on Russian and Pakistani policies. Whereas Russian leadership still has some reservations about the religious fanatics in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani religious political parties and their leaders still have the memories of the Russian war in Afghanistan. The recent hostage taking by Chechens in a theatre at Moscow in October 2002 has brought this concern in the open. Pakistan has to take strong foreign policy decisions keeping in view its national interests with due consideration to new objectives that include gaining diplomatic support from regional countries and ridding itself of the label of terrorists’ supporters. Pakistan can adopt a foreign policy that is different from a value-free realism and still achieve the objectives of its national policy. Objectivity is essential in the seemingly unchangeable game of international power politics. Power politics require states to be inherently strong to gain a reasonable status and bargaining power. For Pakistan, mending diplomatic fences with Russia and forging a defence and strategic cooperation is going to be a tall order, as it will invoke Indian displeasure. In view of the fact that Russia understands the need for following a balanced policy of alliances in South Asia, it would be in its own interest to follow an indiscriminatory[90] approach towards India and Pakistan. It would be advantageous for Pakistan, if Pakistan and China were in a strategic partnership, thus making it compelling for Russia to consider them resilient actors in the region. It is time Pakistan puts its national interest above all and seeks alliance with the nations that are capable of delivering.