Zafar Nawaz Jaspal*

 

ndia’s long cherished dream of acquiring the status of “Big Power” has figured in the South East Asian (SEA) region as an important determinant of her post Cold War foreign policy. On April 9, 2002, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, at the Annual Singapore Lecture 2002, stated, “This region is one of the focal points of India’s foreign policy, strategic concerns and economic interests.”[1]

            With a long-term perspective, India wants to reap the benefits of the economic potential of SEA and establish herself as a dominant power in this region. In the 1990s, India signed bilateral and multilateral agreements in the sectors of trade, investment, tourism, defence, science and technology, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the SEA states. Consequently, in December 1995, India became a full dialogue partner of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in July 1996, she succeeded in securing her membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).[2]  The entry into ARF put India at par with the Western nations and China vis-à-vis SEA regional security, and economic and political arrangements.  

            The expansion of the Indian Navy, establishment of Indian Far Eastern Command (Andaman-Nicobar Islands), and its warming relations with the SEA states proves that she desires to balance China and act as a local leviathan with the collaboration of the United States (US) in SEA. Significantly, nothing has elevated India’s strategic profile in SEA more than the new relationship she has built with the US. At the heart of the new security convergence between the US and India is the prospective co-operation in maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indian Ocean/Pacific regions; to be precise, for countering emerging Chinese power.

            The Indo-US strategic partnership would make it easier for India to establish security links with the American allies in Asia and the Pacific, i.e., Australia, South Korea and Japan. These relations would increase India’s diplomatic leverage in international politics and provide her an opportunity to accomplish her goals with the support of the international community. At the same time, these developments would present serious diplomatic and economic challenges to Pakistan, in particular, and other South Asian states, in general. For understanding the consequences of India’s Look-East policy, one needs to carefully study the seriousness of the Indian leadership in pursuing this policy and response of the SEA states to India’s eastward initiatives. Therefore, before examining the challenge posed by India’s Look-East policy to Pakistan, a brief review of India’s activities in SEA states will be undertaken.  

 

Determinants of India’s Look-East Policy

            The durability and sustainability of India’s Look-East policy depend on the SEA’s political, economic and strategic potential in the changing international environment. What are the political, economic and strategic temptations, at present and in the foreseeable future for India in the SEA? The following factors are responsible for India’s Look-East policy. 

Political Objectives

            The demise of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had discarded India’s foreign policy framework of non-alignment that matured during the Cold War. But in the post Cold War scenario, the Indian ruling elite has enthusiastically started projecting its desire for a big power status. This desire of India is evident from her demand for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the nuclear and long-range missile tests in the 1990s, and its posture at the international forums.

            Issues such as India’s failure to establish her political hegemony in South Asia; decline in the role of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in the international politics; fragmentation of the former Soviet Union; emergence of the US as the sole superpower; mustering support for her permanent seat at the UNSC and reforms in the Indian economic policies, by and large guided India’s policy makers to search more like-minded friends in the international community, particularly in SEA states. Consequently, India adopted Look-East policy in its foreign policy. 

            While pursuing her international agenda, India has been receiving support from SEA states. Some of them had supported her move for a permanent seat at the UNSC. For example, in January 2001 during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Hanoi, Vietnamese President Tran De Luong, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and the all-powerful Communist Party president, Le Khai Phieu backed India’s stand on Kashmir as well as its effort for a seat at the UNSC.[3]

Economic Objectives   

            The Uruguay Round of agreements, multilateral trade negotiations and rising regionalism are the three major developments in the global trading environment in the past decade. These are interrelated in a substantive sense.[4] These trends in the global economy have motivated states to take greater interest in forming regional groupings that facilitate larger market access. Since July 1991, India has been introducing new reforms in its economic sector. According to P. C. Jogdand, “The much cherished principles of growth with justice, social responsibility and accountability, equity and self-reliance have been rendered obsolete by the new slogans of liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation, efficiency and competitiveness.”[5] Economic reforms initiated by Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh had abandoned the Nehruvian model of self-reliant development and accepted the economic globalisation.    

            At the end of the Cold War, India was not a member of any major trade bloc other than the SAARC. The SAARC has yet to make a significant impact on the regional economic scene or on global trade. The purposelessness of the NAM[6] in the post Cold War environment and unsatisfactory progress of SAARC motivated India to promote closer bilateral economic ties with the states (especially SEA), other than South Asians.

            Among the developing states during the last decade, some of the SEA states have an impressive record in the economic field and India has been promoting stronger economic ties with the SEA states. This would enable her in the longer run to benefit from the dynamism of the larger economic bloc. This might also help India in securing membership to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), for which it has already submitted an application.[7]     

 

Strategic Objectives

            The increase in sea trade, coupled with the increasing dependence of regional countries on it for their economic growth, has naturally focused attention on the security of the sea-lanes which service this trade. Indian naval developments in the Indian Ocean not only affect the Indian Ocean states, but also tend to impact on the Pacific-rim, as some of the Pacific Ocean states have coastlines and interests in the Indian Ocean. For example, Japan and some other Pacific-rim countries are dependent on Indian Ocean trade routes for their oil supplies.

            India’s strategic concerns in the Indian Ocean are well known. She desires to influence the trade activities in the Indian Ocean by policing the seashores along the Malacca Straits. The linkages with SEA states would be utilised by India to strengthen its military role in the Indian Ocean and increase her influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

 

Indo-US Convergence of Interests

            President George W. Bush and his closest advisers (most of whom happen to be remnants of the Cold War days) are on the move to assert their military superiority in the world. Asia is a key area of concentration for President Bush’s national security team. According to the Quadrennial Defence Review issued in September 2001 by the Pentagon, Asia has replaced Europe as the prime focus of the US defence community. The report states that it is now a critical region that contains a volatile mix of rising and declining powers.[8]  China and North Korea figure prominently in a report on ballistic missile threats to the US issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in early January 2002.[9] Bush administration officials, as a group, tend to advocate strengthening relations with friends and allies of the US in East Asia, and a lesser emphasis on cultivating ties with China.[10] 

            The basic elements of the Americans East Asian strategy are deterring attack on allies and friends; maintaining East Asian bases for global power projection; and preventing spirals of tension among regional actors whose relations are plagued by both historical legacies of mistrust and contemporary sovereignty disputes.[11] According to Thomas J. Christen’s assessment, “...with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretence of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power or technology.” He added, “I firmly agree with those who are sceptical about China’s prospects in significantly closing the gap with the US.”[12] Andrew Scobell argued, “It is the enduring fundamental ideological differences they (President Bush’s official team) see between Washington and Beijing and growing capabilities of the Chinese military that raise daunting questions in their minds about the future.”[13] Some US observers and many Chinese insist that the real justification for missile defence efforts, both National Missile Defence and Theater Missile Defence, is not Pyongyang but China.

            The differences between the US and China on international and regional strategic issues, such as Iraq, Kosovo, the US-Japan strategic alliance, the US and Taiwan military co-operation, US-India military relations and missile defence systems, prove that China would be an equal competitor. When the two countries differ in so many strategic issues, it is imperative for the Americans to adopt a containment policy against China. China’s warming relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian States and Pakistan leaves the US to cultivate its strategic partnership with India, besides its East Asian and Far Eastern allies to contain China, regionally. Simultaneously, India also views China as an enemy. In May 1998, the main reason cited by the Indian Government for carrying out nuclear explosions was a threat to its security from nuclear China. India has realised that it can no longer play “Soviet Card” in the post Cold War environment. With this background, India had endorsed the US missile defence policy. On May 11, 2001, the then Indian Defence and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, said after an extended hour‑long meeting with the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, “We are endeavouring to work‑out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe.”[14] The US policy to contain China improved India’s role, not only in the US foreign policy but also in East Asia.

 

India’s Eastward Moves

            India had formulated her Look-East policy as a definitive innovation about a decade ago, and the logic then was that New Delhi should engage the economically vibrant polities of the ASEAN. The first phase of the Look East policy saw India establishing institutional linkages with the regional organizations. Although New Delhi could not become a member of the larger APEC forum but it joined the ASEAN as a full dialogue partner and a member of its political and security wing, the ARF.[15] In addition, in the first half of the 1990s, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore took initiatives to establish security relationships with India on a reciprocal basis. Defence officials from these countries undertook visits to New Delhi for discussions on security matters.[16]

 

ASEAN

            The potential of ASEAN as a collective market and a gateway to the rest of SEA and the Pacific is an important factor in India’s Look-East policy. India became a sectoral partner of ASEAN in late 1991 in the core sectors of trade, investment and tourism. She was upgraded as a full dialogue partner from status of a sectoral partner, in the fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok in December 1995. Since 1991, Indo-ASEAN trade and investment ties have grown rapidly. The investments from ASEAN countries steadily rose to nearly 15 per cent of the total approved investments in India in 1995.  In 1997, two-way trade was valued at over $ 7 billion.  According to India investment centre statistics, Indian joint ventures in ASEAN in 1996 were 118 (Indonesia 18, Malaysia 39, Singapore 37, and Thailand 24), with 9 more under implementation.[17]

            On April 9, 2002 PM Vajpayee said, “Reflective of India's interest in intensifying its engagement with ASEAN, we are in the process of jointly developing an India-ASEAN Vision 2020, as a roadmap to our mutually desired objectives.”[18] In a press briefing prior to PM Vajpayee’s visit to Singapore and Cambodia, the external affairs spokesperson said, “our intention was to enhance our level of dialogue, our economic interaction and political interaction with each of the ASEAN country and to have a credible and respectable portfolio of activities that were going on.”[19] 

            The first ASEAN-India summit took place in Cambodia on November 5, 2002. In which ASEAN and India committed themselves to jointly contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, and respond positively to the challenges of the dynamic regional and international environment.[20]

 

ASEAN+3

            In the Manila informal summit of ASEAN in November 99, it was agreed that leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea would meet regularly (every year) and this group was named as ASEAN+3. The Chinese thwarted India’s entry into ASEAN+3 in November 2000.

 

Bangladesh - India - Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC)         

            On June 6, 1997, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand came together to form an economic association called BIMST-EC linking the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal. BIMST-EC represents the reinforcement of India’s relations with two of its South Asian neighbours (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), and of its link with ASEAN (Myanmar and Thailand). This economic grouping aims at promoting rapid economic co-operation between members in key areas like trade, investment, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, transportation and human resources development.[21]

Mekong Ganga Cooperation Project

            The foreign ministers of the six nations involved in the project at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) at Bangkok in July 2000 announced Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Project. The six nations involved were India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.  Except for India, the rest were member nations of ASEAN. The purpose of the MGC is to define regions in the new global economy, while keeping their native identity and character intact. The six countries also undertook to develop transportation networks including the East-West Corridor project and the trans-Asian highway.[22] The MGC ministerial level meetings would be held every year in July along with the ASEAN ministerial meetings and post ministerial conferences. After BIMST-EC, this was India’s next major co-operative venture in the SEA region.

 

India’s Co-operative Measure with SEA States and Vietnam

            Vietnamese Vice President Nygen Thi Binh visited India on March 17, 2002. India and Vietnam have been co-operating in the following areas:

a.       Peaceful use of nuclear energy; India to train 30 Vietnamese scientists.

b.      India will give Rs. 100 million to set up a software and training centre.

c.       Equipment for nuclear science laboratory in South Vietnam.

d.      The Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) to invest Rs. 238 million for oil and gas exploration in Vietnam.

e.       Tatas to supply 300 truck chassis.

f.        India to supply ten locomotives.

g.       Ranbaxy to start new project.

 

Indonesia

            President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia arrived in India on April 1, 2002, on the last leg of a four-nation tour. The main focus of the tour was to strengthen the economic ties between the two nations and, towards this end, she was accompanied by a high-powered 73-member business delegation. India and Indonesia have been co-operating in the following areas:

a.       Co-operation in defence training; India to provide technical assistance and equipment.

b.      Joint commission to co-ordinate defence activities.

c.       Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in science and technology, and agriculture.

d.      A sugar mill in Indonesia.

e.       Offshore oil rigs in India.    

f.        Co-operation in oil and gas drilling projects.

 

Cambodia

            PM Vajpayee visited Cambodia from 9-11 April 2002. During this visit, agreements were signed as under:

a.       Co-operation in air services, visa exemptions for certain categories.

b.      Restoration of Ta Prom temple. The restoration work on Ta Prom temple (a part of the Angkor Wat complex) is expected to cost about US $ 5 million over a period of 10 to 12 years.

 

Myanmar

            On April 6, 2002, India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Myanmar to launch a trilateral highway project linking Thailand and Myanmar with India. The highway from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand through Bagan in Myanmar is expected to be completed in two years. This will enhance trade, investment and tourism. 

            There is a proposal for “Trans-Myanmar-Bangladesh Gas Pipeline” over Bangladesh, connecting Myanmar with the Indian States of Tripura and West Bengal.  The pipeline is being constructed from the offshore gas field of Myanmar recently formed in the Bay of Bengal off the west coast of Myanmar near Cheduba Islands. 

 

Singapore 

            PM Vajpayee visited Singapore from 7 to 9 April 2002. During the visit, the two prime ministers discussed strengthening economic ties and agreed to study the possibility of a free trade deal. It was also decided to set up a Joint Study Group to look into the possibilities of establishing an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Singapore and India. A MoU was signed for mutual co-operation between enterprises and economic entities in the telecom sector.  

 

Apprehensions about India’s Look-East Policy

            While assessing the Indian Look-East policy’s impact on Pakistan, it is imperative to be aware of those issues which undermine Pakistan’s interest, directly or indirectly. India’s warming relations with SEA states pose economic and diplomatic challenges to Pakistan. Of course, its naval build-up in the Indian Ocean is a threat, which has progressively been increasing and continues to affect Pakistan’s naval security arrangements. But it would be a serious cause of concern for the SEA states as well, since their economic survival depend equally on the safety and security of the Indian Ocean trade routes and may not favour their control by a hegemonic power.  Indian naval exercises with Japan, SEA states and the US in the Indian Ocean pose greater military challenge to the Chinese. Similarly, India’s Far Eastern Command has implications for the East Asian states and its indirect threat to their national interest could not go unnoticed. Rationally, these developments do not threaten Pakistan’s national security. However, their obvious economic and diplomatic challenges require Pakistan to gear up to face them with a well thought out political strategy. The following are a few important anticipated end results of India’s Look-East policy:

a.       India’s strategic concerns in the Indian Ocean are well known. The linkages with ASEAN and ARF could be utilised by India to strength its military role in the Indian Ocean thereby increasing her political influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This would negatively influence Pakistan’s diplomatic and economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

b.      India may be able to put herself at par with the Western nations and China vis-à-vis SEA security arrangements, which would boost her regional and international stature. Consequently, India may try to establish herself as a dominant sea power and institutionalise her hegemony in the region. However, this may not be easily allowed by other major powers such as the US and China, and may be resisted by the regional states. This will impose certain limitations on the Indian game plan.

c.       Being a member of SEA forums, she would be in a position to misguide the SEA states against Pakistan. This may affect Pakistan’s position and undermine her interests in the region.

d.      India, as a part of the SEA region’s forums, would be in a better position to mobilise support for various political issues in South Asia from the regional states.

e.       India’s increasing political influence would gain her SEA states’ support for her candidature for permanent membership at the UNSC. Already, some of these states are supporting India on this issue.

 

Pakistan’s Strategy to Face the Challenges

India’s permanent antagonism against Pakistan frequently makes Pakistanis assess her moves with suspicion and certain apprehensions, and with some element of threat to national security. India’s Look-East policy had been in position for quite sometime and more serious developments have already taken place, without making many stirs in the Pakistan’s foreign office. India’s policy to develop her economic relationship in SEA seems quite rational and with substantive political gains as well. A relative shift from west to east was inevitable in view of the direct involvement of powerful contenders in this turbulent region. India’s Look-East policy does not pose any serious threat to Pakistan’s security, not any more than she has already done by her expanding naval power in the Indian Ocean. Yet, the effects generated in the economic and, consequently, in the political fields, could not be favourable to Pakistan’s national interests. It requires a comprehensive policy to be evolved and vigorously followed to protect and enhance Pakistan’s economic interests in SEA.

 

Suggested Policy Guidelines for Pakistan

            Pakistan’s policy should be based on a politico-economic strategy aimed at protecting and promoting her own political and economic interests in SEA. These efforts should not be competitive or obstructive against India. Pakistan may not be able to join the SEA bloc, but under the international laws, she cannot be denied her rights to develop and promote strong bilateral relationships in economic and other fields. Pakistan had good bilateral relations with Indonesia and Malaysia which, over the years have declined. These ties need to be revived and strengthened, which could serve as a good spring board for further expansion. In 2002 two important South East Asian leaders, PM of Thailand and Malaysia visited Pakistan, which was a favourable development.

In South Asia, every state shares its boundaries with India and none shares a common border with any of the other. It gives highly favourable strategic position to India. This exclusive advantage has also created frictions with India, which have multiplied under India’s increasingly arrogant and domineering attitude. Her direct interference in the internal affairs of Nepal and Sri Lanka is constantly viewed with concern. Apprehension and ill-will already exist in the SAARC states against India, which has rendered SAARC ineffective. This is an area that should receive Pakistan’s best attention for developing strong bilateral relations in the economic field.

Many South Asian and SEA states are facing energy-related problems. Pakistan may offer to assist them in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Significantly, these states are parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. Their nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Therefore, the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful use will not harm Pakistan’s policy of non-transfer of nuclear weapons to the other state or states. 

In a globalised world, no state could keep the other states out of South Asia. As each of the South Asian nations seeks co-operation with the rest of the world, Pakistan should try to play a facilitator’s role in this regard, especially between China and the smaller nations of South Asia.

Taking into account the new global and regional realities, Pakistan should support – politically, morally, diplomatically and, if possible, materially – moves like the Norwegian peace initiative in Sri Lanka, in South Asia and SEA.

In the present international environment, the convergence of strategic interests of New Delhi and Washington is a reality. Pakistan’s future course of action with the Americans should take into account this reality. Therefore, it is time that Pakistan should diversify her strategic dependence, gain more freedom of options, and get out of the US-West syndrome.

Pakistan should realistically re-assess her relations with the Muslim world, while giving utmost important to her national interest. This obsession with the Ummah has led no where and has only added new difficulties, internally and externally.

India’s ultimate objective to emerge as the dominant power in the region from Mekong to the Kabul River would inevitably arouse suspicion and apprehensions amongst the SEA states. India’s propaganda and friendly co-operation help in minimising these anxieties but these would continue to persist. Pakistan’s effort should be to enhance these fears with a well thought-out diplomatic plan.

Pakistan is a member of SAARC and ECO. Both have yet to make any significant impact on the regional economic ties. Pakistan should be vigilant and look for emerging venues and chalk out a strategy, which should facilitate her entry.

Pakistan has considerable stakes in the security and stability of the Indian Ocean. All rim-land states should have similar concerns. This is an opportunity to work in close co-operation with other regional states, at least to share their concern on Indian ambitions to establish her hegemony over the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan’s strategy to frustrate Indian ambitions for permanent seat at the UNSC needs to be reviewed. Instead of trying to block Indian entry, her effort should now focus on filling the new seats with countries who are expected to be more impartial and just, such as Germany and Japan, and a seat to collectively represent the Muslim world.

Pakistan should consider increasing her cultural and academic activities in the SEA states. Indian intellectuals are contributing in to the activities of think-tanks in the SEA states. They are propagating their own national agenda. Pakistan needs to balance it by developing its research and universities linkages with the SEA states and encouraging its intelligentsia to focus on this region.

 

Conclusion

            The political flux after military disengagement of the former Soviet Union from the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia and considerable reduction in the American military presence in the Asia Pacific in the early 1990s provided an opportunity to India to penetrate into SEA affairs. As a consequence, India has developed strong defence and economic links with the region. The Indian Look-East policy’s primary objective was economic. But this pan-Asian approach also had a political colouring, which was obvious in the ARF.

Despite India’s growing relations in this region; it has not yet become a major determinant of regional security. At the same time one could not ignore the factor that in 1996, India became a member of the ARF. The inclusion of India, the only South Asian power, undoubtedly has a strategic dimension. India’s vast economic market potential, nuclear capabilities and conventional military capabilities are prominent in the Asia Pacific calculations. India was also identified as the only country to counter-balance China.

            Pakistan’s future course of action should take into account the natural economic complementariness and geo-strategic realities. Instead of merely lobbying against India, it is pertinent that she should establish her own economic, cultural and political relations with the SEA states. Simply relying on the diplomatic course of action is not a pragmatic approach. Thus, Pakistan’s South East Asian strategy should be multi-dimensional. 

            To be precise, Pakistan requires in-depth assessment, re-evaluation of present policy and its replacement with a more effective strategy to face the new challenges. It is emphasised that Pakistan must try to get out of this confrontational and competitive mindset against India and pursue her policy purely in its own national interest, independent of this serious limitation.