Book Review-2

 The Armed Forces of Pakistan 

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, Australia, 2002.

Pages 220, Price Australian $49.95

 

T

here are more than one reasons why a book on Pakistan’s armed forces should attract the attention of students, scholars, researchers and even general readers interested in the evolution of the country’s internal politics and its external relations. For more than half of its history since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been under direct or indirect military rule. Externally, whether it was the post-World War II global strategic environment, the neo-Cold War era marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 or the post-9/11 scenario with a focus on war against terrorism, the armed forces of Pakistan have been overtly or covertly behind the prominent role played by Pakistan in all these situations. Since the military’s input in the decision making process at all these crucial junctures has been significant, it would be interesting and useful to know how this powerful, highly disciplined and best organized institution in Pakistan has developed and evolved since independence. Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema’s book, The Armed Forces of Pakistan fulfils this requirement to a considerable extent.

            The author discusses the development and evolution of Pakistan’s armed forces (army, navy and air force) in the context of the changing patterns of Pakistan’s geo-strategic environment and security (internal as well as external) imperatives. The elements of the context within which, Professor Cheema has tried to trace the history and development of Pakistan’s armed forces include the travails of Partition and the Indian efforts to deny Pakistan’s due share in the arms, ammunition and equipment of the armed forces of undivided India, the costs and benefits of the Cold War alliance with the United States (US); three wars with India, the challenge of the Afghan crisis caused by the Soviet occupation of the country in 1979; the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974; and, the Gulf War of 1991. Pakistan’s response to these developments has been an important factor in determining the growth of its armed forces.

Since the armed forces of Pakistan are an integral component of its political system, their evolution and development cannot be understood without reference to the genesis of the country. This is why Professor Cheema, in his book, has discussed and analysed all those circumstances that necessitated the establishment of a separate and independent homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. The author has given a brief account of the conflicting ways of life of Hindus and Muslims and the unbridgeable differences between the All India Muslim League and the Congress on the future shape of the constitution of India that ultimately culminated into the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. The author also discusses the evolving strategic environment after the World War II, including the establishment of the United Nations (UN) collective security system, the beginning of the Cold War and consequent East-West rivalry, the rolling back of European colonialism, the emergence of the Third World and the formulation of Pakistan’s threat perception due to unresolved disputes with India.

            The author identifies various sources of insecurity as the major factor influencing Pakistan’s efforts to maximize is military power. These sources are both internal as well as external. Internally, Pakistan has faced threats to its national security from ethnic conflict, sectarianism and religious extremism, parochial nationalism and the forces of regionalism. Externally, an adversarial relationship with India and hostility from Afghanistan during the 1950s and 1960s and then under the Soviet occupation, have been major sources of insecurity for Pakistan. Combined together, both internal and external factors, forced Pakistan to enhance the level of its security by strengthening its armed forces, and also by joining the US-sponsored military alliance systems. Describing Pakistan’s security dilemma, Professor Cheema identifies five major areas of concern that the country had to attend to during the early phase. These were: lack of strategic depth; the absence of a well trained, well equipped, well knit and numerically sufficient army; the lack of an arms industry; a large border with India (2,250 km); a geographical distance of 1,600 km passing through hostile India between the two parts of the country i.e. East Pakistan and West Pakistan; and unresolved issues and problems with India like Kashmir, Junagarh, distribution of river waters and division of financial and military assets on the eve of partition. Subsequently, the author has elaborately dealt with each of the areas of concern, focusing on Pakistan’s response and impact on the development of its three services.

            While discussing defence administration, the author highlights how a serious need was felt to institutionalise decision-making in the armed forces and set up a mechanism for coordinated planning among the three services. There is a detailed account of the defence hierarchy of Pakistan with the Prime Minister as the head and the organizational plan and structure of such bodies as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), Defence Council (DC) and Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC). The issue of increased allocations for the defence sector is also discussed, where the author has rightly observed that it is “ritually approved by the Parliament without tangible debate.” Although Professor Cheema has candidly underlined the imperative for a frank and open debate on the issue of high defence spending in view of its social and economic costs to other sectors of national life, it would have been better if the issue was discussed in a more detailed manner, especially in the context of repeated demands for cut in the defence expenditure emanating from both foreign and domestic quarters.

            The evolution of Pakistan’s three defence services is discussed in the context of Pakistan’s threat perception, particularly from India with whom the country fought three wars, and serious financial constraints resulting from an impoverished economic and social infrastructure inherited at the time of independence. These factors, as the author correctly points out, drove Pakistan to seek foreign links to obtain economic and military assistance in order to build a credible defence structure to protect national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. While going through the account of various stages of the evolution of Pakistan’s three defence services, one cannot fail to note the neglect with which the navy had been treated in the past by our defence planners. One could say that in view of Pakistan’s long border with India, it was but inevitable that the army would get priority in the allocation of funds. However, there should have been an increase in the allocation of funds for our navy in view of the enhanced strategic significance of the western part of the Indian Ocean since 1970s, especially the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

            While discussing the role of the military in the politics of Pakistan, Professor Cheema mentions four things that facilitated the process of military takeover in Pakistan; first, the superiority of military discipline and organizational skill, together with the willingness to play an active role in the developmental tasks of Pakistani society; second, the weakness of political institutions and almost continuous wrangling among various groups of politicians seeking to gain power; third, the inability of the civilian regimes to keep a firm control over both the civil and military bureaucracies; fourth, the overwhelming illiteracy of the general public, which precluded the constructive evolution of public opinion and allowed the public to fall easy prey to organized divisive manoeuvres.

            While each of the four reasons given above for repeated military interventions in Pakistan may be true, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the Cold War environment and Pakistan’s entry into the US sponsored military pacts qualifying it to become the recipient of large scale military and economic assistance, directly contributed to the ascendancy of military and civilian bureaucracy in the politics of Pakistan. This phenomenon undermined the civilian supremacy and impeded the growth of political institutions in the country that ultimately paved the way for recurrent military takeovers in Pakistan.

             “ This book” as Professor Des Ball has said in his foreword, “will have its critics because the subject is extremely controversial.” But it cannot be denied that Professor Cheema has given an informed account of the evolution of Pakistan’s armed forces in a succinct and, as far as possible, objective manner.

 

Rashid Ahmad Khan

Senior Research Fellow, IPRI

 

 

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