9/11 and the Changing Paradigm of Conflict Resolution

 

Moonis Ahmar*

  

 wo different perceptions continue to shape the thinking and approach determining global politics in the post September 11, 2001, period. For a while, it seemed that the massive destruction caused by the suicide bombers in New York and Washington on September 11 would result into a large-scale retaliation by the United States (US) against the “invisible enemy.” But the subsequent developments taking place after such tragic attacks exposed the contradictions in American foreign policy, particularly those pertaining to the issue of terrorism. The Bush administration did venture into its war against terrorism by ousting the Taliban regime from Afghanistan and launching a sustained campaign against the Al-Qaida terrorist network, but instead of dealing with the causes, which promote terrorism, it focussed on eliminating some individuals and groups from the scene.

            First, the 9/11 developments and the subsequent US led war against terrorism changed the global complexion of power because for the first time after the end of the Second World War, Washington decided to use all available resources at its disposal to protect American lives and interests. With the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and other like-minded countries, the US made it clear that the evil of terrorism would be met with full force. Hence, “the coalition against terrorism is remarkable not only because of large number of countries involved from all around the world, but also the apparent recognition to the fact that the fight against terrorism will be a prolonged one. That one can see the involvement of diplomatic pressure and financial sanctions, as well as military force against the specified enemy targets. Never in world history have so many countries combined together against a common threat in this manner.”[1] Yet, it is a matter of debate that to what extent is America following an even handed policy in combating terrorism unleashed by individuals, groups and states and how is it reacting to the state sponsored terrorism in different parts of the world. President George W. Bush’s assertion about America’s first war of the 21st century, and his subsequent reference to the “Axis of Evil” during his State of the Union address in January 2002 indicated a shift in the US approach on dealing with the post-9/11 developments.

During the bi-polar system, it was quite evident that the power competition was between the Western/capitalist World led by the US and the Communist/socialist Bloc headed by the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the bi-polar system and the Soviet Bloc in 1990-91, the world saw the emergence of a strange coalition of non-conformist forces, composed of individuals and groups who tried to get their share of power but were unable to do so because of their incompatibility with the dominant global forces led by the US. The events of 9/11 proved the hypothesis that it would be dangerous to give the US-led international system a free hand and, unlike the situation during the inter-war period, a non-conformist approach in today’s world is primarily held by the non-state actors, primarily those belonging to the Muslim extremist groups. America’s policy of unilateralism, as perceived in the post-9/11 scenario, is another source of chagrin among the non-conformist people. Second, the arrogance and ignorance pursued by Washington in dealing with critical issues, particularly the one related to the new phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, proved the fragility of American-dominated world order. The events of 9/11 cannot be de-linked from unjust and imprudent handling of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the failure of Washington to restrain its strategic ally from constantly refusing to adhere to the fundamental principles of the peace process. If the phenomenon of terrorism has challenged the American way of life and the Western dominated global power system, the underlying reasons for the prevailing insecurity and instability can be found in the contradictory policies pursued by those who have been shaping the paradigms of global order since 1990 but are unwilling to establish a just and fair international system.

            The nature of global conflicts at various levels also needs to be examined in the light of post 9/11 developments, because one can see the emergence of new conflicts and the complication of old ones. If old conflicts, particularly those in the Middle East and South Asia are still unresolved, the new conflicts, which have emerged in the last few years, are also related to the failure of the international community to play an effective role in this regard.

            This paper will argue the linkage between 9/11 developments and the paradigms of conflict and conflict resolution with a focus on South Asia by examining the following questions:

 

1. To what extent have the post 9/11 developments influenced the process of conflicts and conflict resolution?
2. How have the non-conformist state and non-state actors influenced the nature and shape of conflicts?
3. Why are the conformist state actors unable to deal with new conflicts emerging after 9/11, particularly on the issue of terrorism, and how can the world be saved from future waves of terrorism?
4. How have the post 9/11 developments affected Indo-Pak conflicts and to what extent has the international community played a role in preventing the outbreak of hostilities between the two warring neighbours?

 

9/11 and the Process of Conflict Resolution

            There cannot be two opinions about serious instability and crisis, which erupted in the world after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11. But one needs to venture into an in depth study of how such attacks changed the nature and shape of conflicts at various levels. Or whether they brought about any change at all. Two things need to be taken into account as far as the linkage between 9/11 and the nature and shape of conflicts and conflict resolution is concerned. First, some of the traditional conflicts, which since the outbreak of the Cold War, have adversely affected global peace and security and should have been resolved in the post-Cold War era, are still far from settlement. On the contrary, the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts, which are the two major flash points in the world today, have been overshadowed by the events taking place after September 11. Second, a new type of conflict has emerged after 9/11, which is related to terrorism. Stretched over different types, such as religious, sectarian and ethnic terrorism tends to dominate the prevailing paradigm of conflicts in the world today. Unlike territorial, political, economic and ethnic conflicts, terrorism has a capacity to cause widespread destruction without the direct involvement of any state actor. On this account, the single most important implication of the post 9/11 events is the emergence of terrorism as a major destabilizing factor in the prevailing world order.

The South Asian countries decided to join the US-led war against terrorism because of their own interests. For instance, India was prompt in offering its support for a global coalition, expecting that such a configuration of nations would have natural implications for improving the security situation in South Asia. Pakistan decided to join the US-led war against terrorism against Al-Qaida and the Taliban because of predictable economic incentives, the need to save its strategic assets, escaping from the American threat that failing to join them would take Pakistan to he stone age, and salvaging its Kashmir policy from total destruction. Nepal joined the alliance hoping that it would end up in flushing out the Maoist insurgency from the country. Sri Lanka hoped that it would be able to garner more support for its fight against Tamil militancy.[2] On this account, more than a commitment against eliminating terrorism, those who joined the US led campaign against terrorism had in mind the accomplishment of their own variety of interests. This approach is also shared by an Indian security analyst, who argues that:

9/11 also reinforces the centrality of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in South Asia. The global war on terror has admittedly had differential impact on the various states of South Asia. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the new emerging international norm against terrorism has had an extremely positive impact. Although undefeated on the ground (and at sea) by the Sri Lankan forces, the LTTE seems nevertheless to have recognized that with the change in the international context its days as a terrorist (as opposed to guerrilla) force are numbered. In Nepal, on the other hand, the increase in terrorist violence by the Maoists does not seem to have been affected in any tangible way by 9/11 and its aftermath. It is yet uncertain whether substantial US military assistance to Nepal is likely, and whether it will prove decisive should it be forthcoming. It is also worth noting that the differential impact of 9/11 on Nepal and Sri Lanka, an issue of some importance, has been subordinated in salience to the India-Pakistan military brinkmanship.[3]

 

            The question which emanates from the debate on terrorism as a major implication of conflicts is: why has no coherent strategy been formulated by the international community to effectively deal with terrorism and how can those conflicts which encourage terrorism be managed and resolved? Unlike other conflicts, terrorism is an amalgamation of different conflicts, particularly those which are related to the socio-economic conditions of people and the denial of justice by the powerful to the weak. Given the complexities of terrorism and its identification as an implication of conflict, it has been difficult to figure out techniques, which could deal with its resolution. If the suicide bombers in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel are involved in terrorist acts, such a situation has been the outcome of the failure of the peace process and the refusal of Israel to comply with the Oslo Accords. Any terrorist act, whether it takes place in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Israel, Russia, India or Pakistan, leads to the intensification of conflict and violence.

            What has happened after 9/11 is the identification of terrorism as “The Issue” destabilizing the world order.[4] If this is true, then not only the US but numerous other countries are facing the menace of terrorism, whether state sponsored or carried out by some individuals or groups. The real source of terrorism, as a major implication of conflict, is again the grievances of those people who are unable to seek justice through normal procedures. When all their efforts to seek justice ended in vain, they resorted to various violent methods, thereby leading to major instability in the world order. Even before the destruction of the World Trade Center by the suicide bombers on September 11, hundreds of terrorist acts had taken place in different parts of the world, but the colossal loss of lives in just two incidents at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shattered the myth of America’s power and compelled the US to retaliate by launching a war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Such a policy was formulated despite the fact that the terrorists who hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not Afghans but of Middle Eastern origin. From the US point of view, those states harbouring terrorists were also to be taken to task. For that matter, the Taliban regime, which provided support and bases to the Saudi born multi-millionaire Osama Bin Laden in carrying out terrorist activities against the US, had to be removed. When the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the US, the coalition-led attack was launched against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.

The phenomenon of suicide bombers and the killing of innocent people even for a just cause, have been widely condemned. But those who take pride in giving their lives against injustices and tyranny forget the fact that, by targeting civilians, they not only strengthen the hands of hard line state actors but also discredit their cause before the international community.

            Some of the arguments which are given to justify linkages between 9/11 and the emergence of terrorism as a major implication of conflicts and a de-stabilizing factor in global order, are as follows:

 

1. America’s war against terrorism is a myth, which only aims to curb those conflicts which tend to expose the double standards of the Western world. That terrorism is an effect of unresolved conflicts, which could not get the priority of the international community, thus encouraging disgruntled elements to express their anger by various terrorist acts.
2. Terrorism after 9/11 is responsible for delaying the resolution of the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts because no one can sympathize with acts of violence against innocent people. Suicide attacks against civilians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and killing of innocent people in Kashmir, caused serious damage to the liberation struggle in these two areas.
3. As long as terrorism, whether state-sponsored or carried by individuals or groups, is not analysed by the global powers as the dominant paradigm of the present world order, it will not be possible to successfully implement a methodology for the management and resolutions of conflicts. The events of 9/11 have given an opportunity to strive for fair and just resolution of conflicts so that all such elements who tend to justify violent methods for the accomplishment of their objectives are exposed and denied the conduct of various terrorist methods.
4. As far as South Asia is concerned, the 9/11 events further worsened the security environment of the region. After the collapse of the Agra summit in July 2001, Indo-Pak relations were back to square one, with each side blaming the other for wrecking the opportunity available at Agra for a peaceful resolution of their conflicts. But after 9/11, Indo-Pak conflicts took a new turn when New Delhi offered full support to America’s war against terrorism and tried its level best to establish a linkage between Pakistan’s support to the Muslim insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and the terrorist elements in Afghanistan. However, having failed to stop Pakistan from joining the US-led coalition against terrorism, India ventured on other measures like propagating against the Jihadi culture in Pakistan and deploying hundreds of thousands of troops along its Western borders. According to a Nepali scholar:

The September event didn’t create conditions for changing the status of relations of the two antagonistic actors – India and Pakistan. On the contrary, only a forced handshake between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan was witnessed during the SAARC summit held in Kathamdu. Instead of improving relations in the post-September scenario, the two leaders even could not meet at the retreat, a usual SAARC phenomenon arranged for the Heads of State and Government during the summit. This standoff was more transparent at the Almaty Summit where President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee even failed to handshake. Though the post-9/11 developments have shown an unprecedented engagement of the US in regional affairs that have restrained the two sides for not precipitating the crisis, relations continue to be strained between India and Pakistan. Given the burgeoning relations between the US, the European countries and Russia, with China not playing the role of a fixer, the future security scenario of the region may move towards the positive direction.[5]

 

As far as the “handshake” between President Musharraf and Prime Vajpayee on the occasion of 11th SAARC summit in Katmandu is concerned, it was something unprecedented. “Musharraf walked over to Indian Prime Minister thrusting his hand into his. To the applause of the crowd, Musharraf said, “he was extending a hand of genuine, sincere friendship. Let us together commence a journey of peace, harmony and progress in South Asia.” Vajpayee smiled and held Musharraf’s hand as he rose in his chair. Vajpayee said, “he was glad Musharraf extended his hand of friendship to me. Now President Musharraf must follow this gesture by not permitting any activity in Pakistan or any territory in its control today that allows terrorists to perpetrate mindless violence in India. I say this because of our past experience. I went to Lahore with a hand of friendship. We were rewarded by aggression in Kargil and the hijacking of an India Airlines aircraft from Katmandu. I invited President Musharraf to Agra. We were rewarded with a terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir assembly and in the parliament of India.”[6] But there was no follow-up to the historic handshake and Musharraf’s gesture was not reciprocated by India.

In other South Asian countries also, the issue of terrorism became a major factor in violent conflicts, like the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka and the Maoist movement in Nepal. The US-led war against terror gave substantial leverage to the Nepali and Sri Lankan governments to take on various militant groups, curb insurgency and prove to the outside world that both the Maoists and the Tamil Tigers were terrorists. In Bangladesh, extremist Islamic groups were blamed for having links with the Al-Qaida network, and the country, despite its democratic credentials and a moderate Islamic society, is identified as a potential hub of Islamic extremists. In all these cases, American support to weed out so-called terrorist elements was requested but no proper strategy was formulated to deal with the causes of violence and insurgency. Most important, after 9/11, the state actors in South Asia and outside tried to deal with conflicts according to their own standards, and with a feeling that they did not need to take into account the interests and feelings of insurgency or autonomous movements.

 

Conformist and Non-Conformist Actors

            Conflicts take place when non-conformist elements challenge the state of conformism and attempt to change the status quo. If one tries to understand why the battle between conformist and non-conformist elements results in systematic disorder, two things come into the picture. First, after the end of the Cold War, at the superpower level, the void which resulted from that situation encouraged extremist elements to play their role. Various ethnic and religious extremist groups, from the former Yugoslavia to Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir, began to assert their position, thus causing a great threat to the territorial status quo in these areas. These groups were against the prevailing order and came in direct conflict with the West, particularly the US. The events of 9/11 were a direct result of the frustration and anger expressed by these non-conformist groups. One can identify these groups with terrorism but, in its essence, their main purpose has been to show their resentment against the US-dominated world order and fight for their rights. Does it mean that non-conformist groups without any state backing can destabilize the entire world, or has there been a great deal of exaggeration about their strength?

            Washington feels that with the support of its coalition members in NATO, it can effectively deal with these non-conformist groups, but at the same time, it is not ready to minimize their importance. One individual like Osama Bin Laden has been depicted as the most dangerous person on earth, capable of creating havoc and terror. The non-conformist approach of Osama Bin Laden and his drive against American policies, regardless of his past affiliation with the CIA during the Afghan War, tend to unite conformist forces in the post-September 11 period. It is a strange situation because never before in modern history has one person caused so much insecurity and panic among powerful states.

            Some of the reasons given by the non-conformist elements to justify their acts of violence are:

 

1. The present international system is unjust and unfair because it doesn’t protect the interests of the weak. After the end of the Cold War, the unipolar world has resulted into more exploitation from the US-backed states and America has failed to restrain those elements who have tried to suppress freedom movements.
2. Since Washington has not listened to the grievances of non-conformist groups, particularly those related to Israel’s suppression of the rights of Palestinians, they have no option but to resort to violent methods against all such forces who symbolize American power. Such an approach led to the attack on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, American military installations in Saudi Arabia and the destruction of the World Trade Center.

 
            Contrary to the arguments of non-conformist elements, conformist forces hold the view that those trying to undermine the global order are resorting to terrorist methods. The list of non-conformist groups is growing day by day because of dissatisfaction arising from the policies of the dominant power actors. But the conformists argue that if the non-conformist elements are against American policies then it does not mean that they should undertake terrorist activities and target innocent lives.

            As long as terrorism is the weapon used by the non-conformists, they cannot have any moral ground to justify their cause. It seems the battle between conformists and non-conformists will continue unless one or the other party relents. Unfortunately, those who are non-conformists to the policies of the West, particularly the US, have been identified as terrorists. This may not be true because not all the critics of American policies believe in the inadvertent use of force, but the impression given by the world media is different. After 9/11, the images of non-conformists tend to depict a different impression about those who resent and oppose US policies.

 

Dealing With the New Wave of Terrorism

            The failure of conformist elements to neutralize non-conformist terrorist elements has been counter-productive, because day by day, one can hear more and more reports about the spread of violence under the cover of terrorist acts launched by various individuals and groups. With the complicated situation emanating from terrorism at the state and non-state levels, it is difficult to understand why the issue of terrorism has been misunderstood and how a better understanding could be created to find out the factors which promote the rise in violence.

            The new wave of terrorism has two important dimensions. First, the failure of the world order emanating after the end of the Cold War at the superpower level in 1991 to justly deal with issues. The vacuum left as a result of the Soviet disintegration raised a number of questions about stability and order in the New World. The US emerged as the most significant world power after the Soviet collapse, but failed to provide a direction and play a leadership role to resolve pending conflicts. As a result, those elements which were dissatisfied with the norms of the post-Cold War era decided to express their resentment by resorting to various violent means, particularly against the US and the West. The US called that wave of violence ‘terrorism,’ while others described it in terms of movements for national emancipation. Second, the marginalization of the United Nations (UN) and other international institutions and their inability to provide leadership and justice to those who had suffered from a deliberate policy of aggression and exploitation, also encouraged forces who had no option but to take the law into their own hands. While the mystery about the event of 9/11 is still unresolved, the blame for committing that shameful act has been put on few individuals and organizations. Suddenly, the world began to learn about the Al-Qaida network and the role of Osama Bin Laden in masterminding various terrorist acts, including the one which took place on September 11, 2001. When international institutions were bypassed while combating terrorism, and one country, with the support of some like-minded states, decided to wage a war against terrorism, the success and credibility of such an approach was doubted by those who disagreed with Washington’s approach to deal with the issue of terrorism. It was questioned that why was the UN, which should have played a leadership role in combating terrorism, not given that responsibility in the first place?

            Fighting against the new wave of terrorism would require the just resolution of conflicts. Till the time the powerful states, particularly America, fail to understand the need to address issues of a critical nature – particularly those in the Middle East, Kashmir and Afghanistan – the issue of terrorism would remain unresolved. If those controlling the instruments of global power attempt to deal with conflicts according to their own standards, the world will plunge even further into an endless state of violence and terror. But this perception is not shared by a Western author who says that:

Some believe that political solutions must be given priority over military solutions for the global campaign against terrorism to be successful. The only thing that can undercut bin Laden’s brand of global terrorism is a sustained political effort to address the issues that have fuelled extremism. The problem is that this approach to the immediate demands of decision-making is unrealistic, particularly when the United States has suffered such a devastating terrorist attack on its homeland. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be resolved in the longer term. Asking the United States to desist from military action and concentrate on the long-term and well-nigh impossible task of solving the underlying grievances in the Middle East is not a practical course in the shorter term. It leads to the entirely unacceptable view of moral equivalence between what bin Laden did ad the defects that may or may not exist in US Middle East policy.[7]

             Another major issue in dealing with the challenge of terrorism is its religious dimension. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the only superpower, much has been said about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and the linkage between various Islamic extremist groups and terrorism. The events of 9/11 were also debated in such terms without taking into account the basic fact that those terrorist groups who claim that they are fighting for a religious cause are, in fact, violating the basic norms of their religion. There is no justification for suicide bombers in Islam and those Muslims who target innocent people through such acts, in fact do a great disservice to their religion. Therefore, a great deal of misunderstanding and obscurity exists in the West about the issues which create bitterness among the Muslims and the acts of a handful of terrorists who are discrediting their religion. After 9/11, the conflict between Islamic extremist groups and the West, particularly the US, has reached a new phase in which the former is trying to depict various emancipation movements as terrorist organizations while the latter has failed to seek a peaceful and proper way to get their rights.
             

9/11 and Indo-Pak Conflicts

            The implications of 9/11 have been far and wide but, as argued, “both India and Pakistan are winners in this new situation in a way that before would have been inconceivable. Sanctions applied against Pakistan and India because of their nuclear weapons’ programme have been lifted. But the question is, can the United States use its new found leverage with India and Pakistan to broker a resolution to their dangerous military confrontation in Kashmir?”[8] The terrorist attacks which took place in New York and Washington also had a direct impact on the troubled relations between India and Pakistan because of New Delhi’s attempt to exploit the situation and seek Washington’s help in declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. Therefore:

….perhaps the greatest concern for Pakistan in post 9/11 has been the manner in which India has reacted to developments in the region. As Pakistan saw it, India attempted to try and use the War on Terrorism as an opportunity to draw Kashmir into the terrorist ambit. When it failed to do so in the early months, it viewed with concern the growing US-Pakistan military cooperation, especially when the attack on occupied Jammu and Kashmir failed to get a US condemnation of the Kashmir freedom struggle.[9]

 

Before 9/11, Indo-Pak relations were overshadowed as a result of the failure of the Agra summit, but, still, the channels of dialogue between the two countries remained open. Ironically, for Pakistan, the manner in which India reacted to the terrorist acts of 9/11 was contrary to basic norms of decency. Without even being asked, New Delhi offered all assistance to the US in its war against terrorism, particularly against the Taliban and the Al-Qaida network. It also tried to implicate Pakistan in the 9/11 terrorist acts by arguing that by supporting the Taliban regime, the Pakistani state and various non-governmental extremist religious organizations were, in fact, encouraging such groups to strike at American people and interests. It was a matter of great surprise for the analysts of international affairs that India became so desperate to hurt Pakistan that it did not even hesitate to exploit the events of 9/11. Such an approach, pursued by the right wing Hindu fundamentalist regime under Prime Minister Vajpayee, was counter-productive, because the outcome was the escalation of Indo-Pak tension. However, according to a Pakistani writer:

India’s apparent irritation at Pakistan’s new strategic position is pleasing to many in Islamabad. This is again short sighted. It is surprising that 54 years of relations with India has not enabled Pakistanis to realize that Indian leadership, unlike their own, is not emotional. Indian leaders are carefully calculating, with a five to ten years policy direction in mind. India is orchestrating its campaign against terrorism in Kashmir, where the recent bomb blast outside the Legislative Assembly provided opportunities to the Vajpayee government to mobilize US support against “Pakistan sponsored” terrorism. Once the United States has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan (and Pakistan has received payment for services rendered) it may well resume its long-term strategy in South Asia, and strengthen its military relations with India.[10]

 

            Like the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who followed the policy of liquidating the Palestinians by calling them terrorists, the Indian Government also tried to take advantage of the situation and blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorist elements in Jammu and Kashmir. The turning point was on December 13, when the Indian Parliament came under a terrorist attack, resulting into prompt charges by New Delhi that Pakistan was involved in that act. India put pressure on the US to ask Pakistan to take stern action against various Jihadi groups involved in what it called terrorist activities in Kashmir and other parts of India. After the end of his week long visit to the US in February 2002, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said that, “groups like Lashkar and Jaish have assumed as the agents of Jihad in many countries and had become active participants in international politics. It is because of this reason that Pakistan is being accused of promoting terrorism all over the world. Such organizations were banned in our national interest. After my January 12 speech they (India) should have withdrawn from our borders themselves. They did not. The have political reasons too.”[11]

It seems that the Kashmir dispute, which is a major source of tension between India and Pakistan, also assumed a different dimension after 9/11 because of two reasons. First, New Delhi did its best after September 11 to prove that the Kashmiri liberation struggle was in fact sponsored by the terrorist network in Pakistan and the international community, particularly the US, should do something to take action against Islamabad. India’s objective in following such a policy was to discredit the Kashmiri freedom movement and declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Second, Pakistan responded to Indian allegations by initiating measures to launch a crackdown on terrorist elements, particularly those having connections with Taliban and Al-Qaida. President Musharraf’s speech of January 12, 2002 in which he announced stern measures to stop what India calls “cross border terrorism,” also indicated a change in Islamabad’s approach on supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle. However, such measures did not result in de-escalation of Indo-Pak tension because India refused to reciprocate and revoke certain unilateral measures which it had taken against Pakistan after December 13, like banning Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flights flying over India, suspending rail and road links, recalling its High Commissioner from Islamabad and deploying more than half a million troops along its Western borders.

Following the intense American pressure, the Musharraf regime was compelled to stop the support which it was rendering to some militant Kashmiri organizations, but it reiterated its pledge to sustain moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri movement for emancipation.  After the May 14 terrorist attack at an army camp in Jammu and the killing of around 30 people, India intensified its campaign against Pakistan and threatened severe action if Islamabad continued “cross border terrorism.” As remarked by an Indian writer, “Musharraf should have realized by now that the September 11 carnage in New York and Washington has changed international opinion on terrorism. Violence has ceased to be a solution to any problem because it has become much too terrible and destructive.”[12] It was only after the diplomatic and political intervention of the international community that the Indo-Pak war was averted. Still, the two countries are far from resuming a dialogue. India has made it clear that unless Pakistan hands over 20 alleged terrorists and takes concrete measures to stop cross border terrorism, it cannot resume the normalization process. On the other hand, Islamabad has urged the international community to force India to de-escalate tension along its borders and resume talks for the resolution of outstanding conflicts.

 

9/11 and Hope of Conflict Management

            A totally different perception related to the implications of 9/11 on the Indo-Pak conflict holds that, as a result of the American war against terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, Washington, in no way wants the escalation of Islamabad-New Delhi tensions. For that purpose, right from December 13, when a terrorist attack took place at the Indian Parliament, till May 14, when another terrorist attack struck at an army camp in Jammu, the US tried its best to de-escalate the situation by sending high emissaries, ranging from Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield to the Secretary of State Colin Powell, to New Delhi and Islamabad. “While American led efforts have clearly averted any immediate threat of war, it is also obvious that the US is now an established major player in the sub-continent.”[13] As pointed out by a US security analyst, “the US today has more influence and leverage in the subcontinent than perhaps at any time previously. Less, positive, the US is confronted with the management of India-Pakistan tensions that detract from broader objectives.”[14] Similarly, according to a Bangladeshi security expert:

Since 9/11 there are indications that the US has quietly encouraged cooperation even though, because of the strained relations between India and Pakistan, the SAARC process has slowed down considerably. The US through its South Asian Regional Initiative (SARI) program is actively promoting regional cooperation in energy sector. The US would also welcome the establishment of a free trade area in the region and the development of infrastructure on a regional basis. Peace and stability in South Asia has become a matter of paramount importance to the US because of Afghanistan, because of the threat of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan and because of the warming of relations with India and a host of other reasons.[15]

 

            From a pragmatic point of view, it is not in the interest of the US and its allies involved in the war against terrorism to see the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan because such a situation will badly hurt their campaign against terrorism, particularly against the remnants of Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. During the height of Indo-Pak tension at the end of May, the Pakistan government had indicated that it could not commit its forces on the Western front because of heightened tension on the Eastern front. Pakistan’s involvement in war with India would have meant a serious setback to the US-led war against terrorism. In order to pre-empt such an eventuality, the US did its utmost by appealing to India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their conflict over Kashmir. On this account, “Musharraf was clever enough to understand that the US would not want a sub-continental war that would derail its Afghan campaign. Any diversion of Pakistani forces in a war with India would only endanger the security of the US strategy in Afghanistan.”[16] It does not mean that American policy after 9/11 will help resolve Indo-Pak conflicts, because history shows that no outside pressure or mediation since 1971 has helped in compelling the two countries to take steps for the resolution of the conflict unless there is willingness on their part.

On July 28, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to India and Pakistan, clearly called for restraint by the two countries and the resumption of the process of dialogue. After meeting Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, he hoped that, “the recent reduction in tensions and preliminary de-escalatory steps would bring the rivals to the bargaining table.” Substantiating his optimism, he said that, “I think the possibility of dialogue in the near future is something that can be achieved.”[17] Talking to Reuters in Sigonella, Italy, on July 27, Powell said that, “ultimately we have to get to dialogue or else we will just be stuck on the plateau which would not serve our interests. We don’t want to be back where we were few months ago.”[18] Basically, the gist of Powell’s urge for dialogue between India and Pakistan centres around Kashmir and during his visit to India and Pakistan, he categorically called Kashmir as a conflict impeding the process of normalization between the two South Asian rivals. In early January 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited India and Pakistan to reduce tension and ease the military standoff between them. The US and Britain expressed deep concern at the war moves and urged India to show restraint while pushing Pakistan into crackdown on militant outfits.[19] International pressure on India and Pakistan to see reason and restrain from further deteriorating the security situation along the borders increased when the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese President Jiang Ziamen held separate talks with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the occasion of the Almaty Conference held in June 2002. What has happened after 9/11 is that, because of the external involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan for their war against terrorism, it is in the interest of major powers to de-escalate Indo-Pak tension and help the process of conflict management. Nevertheless, Lok Raj Baral gives an optimistic note on the American role in South Asia after 9/11 when he argues that:

The US role in South Asia is more active than ever before and is expected that the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan would not turn into a full-scale war. The dramatic decision taken by India towards de-escalation of tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations following the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage’s visit to India and Pakistan in June 2002, has not only demonstrated the increased American influence in the region but has also underplayed the regional initiative, if there were any, for disengaging the two belligerents. Developments taking in South Asia have further put pressure on the US and other powers not to be ambivalent or selective on the issue of terrorism. The entente between Russia and US is also likely to restrain both belligerents.[20]

            The assumption of Pakistan that, because of the US led war against terrorism, the Kashmir dispute will be resolved, is again wishful thinking. While at the international level there is some concern about the plight of the Kashmiris, there is certainly no evidence to prove that there is a tilt in favour of Pakistan. On the contrary, India, after September 11, succeeded in drawing world attention to the acts of violence in Jammu and Kashmir and linked it to the acts of terror unleashed by some Pakistan-based Islamic extremist groups. The Indian assertion about cross-border terrorism became so intense that Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf, in his speech of January 12, 2002, was forced to take stern measures against terrorist groups operating inside Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir.

            Pakistan has tried to exploit the US/Western war against terrorism in Afghanistan for putting their pressure on India to de-escalate tension along the borders and resume the process of dialogue for the resolution of pending issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. But New Delhi is trying to sidetrack from any international influence to initiate dialogue with Pakistan for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. On these grounds, one can argue that both India and Pakistan, for totally different reasons and interests, have tried to take advantage of the 9/11 events but neither side has tried to cool down the temperature and initiate the process of dialogue. Pakistan has asked India to de-escalate tension along the borders by withdrawing forces from its Western front but India has linked it to the handover of 20 suspected terrorists and stopping, what New Delhi says, is cross border terrorism. As a result, there is a stalemate in Indo-Pak relations and the international community has only succeeded in preventing a predictable showdown but has not been able to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. As far as the impact of 9/11 on the issue of conflict management between India and Pakistan is concerned, there is not much headway because of the rigid positions taken by the two countries. But certainly, the international intervention has been able to put some pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad to avail the opportunity and resume the process of dialogue on resolving pending issues.

 

Conclusion

            As the US-led war against terrorism continues, the nature and shape of conflicts, particularly in South Asia, would also be influenced, but with the accomplishment of American objectives from that war, fundamental changes in the regional security paradigm are possible. Till the time the US and the coalition forces are involved in tracking down and combating the Al-Qaida and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan, Washington will have a paramount interest in preventing any overt showdown between the two neighbours, India and Pakistan. Be that as it may, it should be the South Asian leaders who should be concerned about their region and seriously work out a strategy to resolve unsettled issues.

            Three important realities have questioned the overall approach of South Asian governments to deal with alarming issues, particularly those concerning human security and the implications of various conflicts. First, the marginalization of South Asia in global affairs, particularly in economy, technology, politics and sports. Because of the focus of South Asian governing elites on squandering energies and resources on non-issues, the region is far behind in the area of human development. The events of 9/11 tend to reinforce the truth that the people of South Asia, because of their ignorance and powerlessness, are unable to force their leaders to follow an approach which is more rational and concerns the welfare and development of the majority. As South Asia continues to sink in to a sea of poverty and underdevelopment, the gap between it and other developed regions has risen significantly. Second, on major issues which required a better sense of understanding and consensus among the South Asian countries, particularly between India and Pakistan, the reality is totally different. During the Cold War days, India and Pakistan followed different paths. When the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, again the two countries were at odds and refused to formulate a consensus on that issue. When Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait in August 1990, resulting in the exodus of hundreds and thousands of South Asians from the two countries, New Delhi and Islamabad failed to take a joint stand to deal with that problem. Finally, the events of 9/11 again exposed bitter hostility between India and Pakistan as the two countries, while supporting the US-led war against terrorism, embarked on the escalation of their conflict over Kashmir. A new phase of the Indo-Pak cold war began after September 11, resulting in the mobilization of around 1 million troops along the borders, and the suspension of air, road and train links.

            Third, the civil societies of South Asia, particularly of India and Pakistan, are incapable of restraining their governments from sustaining the politics of confrontation. Taking advantage of the meek and docile nature of opinion leaders, power circles in New Delhi and Islamabad do not feel the need to seriously unleash the process of conflict management or resolution. Most important, their vital interests are not related to the security of their people but to their own privileges and benefits. Had a consensual approach been followed by the civil society groups of South Asia on issues deepening the security predicament of the region, it would have been possible to prevent another cold war between India and Pakistan after the events of September 11.

            Nevertheless, the task of conflict resolution in South Asia cannot be accomplished without indigenous efforts backed by clear strategies and dynamic leadership. Extra-regional facilitation can help, but the initiative in this regard must come from the leaders of South Asia. Particularly after September 11, 2001, it has become a great necessity for South Asia to resolve conflicts through a process of negotiations rather than by involving extra-regional players.