There is little point for a state to make large and varied troop commitments to UN peacekeeping without being a ‘reliable’ ground force and having the capacity to sustain the commitment over prolonged periods in mission areas. The present study examines the issue of reliability in UN peacekeeping, with a particular focus on Pakistan’s experience in Somalia. The study shows that Pakistan’s commitment to the peace mission in Somalia was positive and long lasting in spite of severe human costs. To this end the paper raises the following questions: What factors shaped Pakistan's commitment to Somalia? To what extent has Pakistan learnt its lessons from its Somalia experience? What factors are likely to shape Pakistani peacekeeping in the future?    

Peacekeepers’ Reliability in UN Peace Missions  

In March 2000 the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened an expert panel, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, to conduct a new major study on peacekeeping. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi report was that peacekeepers in post-Cold War peace operations must be willing to take risks and have ‘staying power’.1 There is no point in making large and varied troop commitments without being a ‘reliable’ ground force. That is, reliable troop-contributors in terms of their willingness to take risks and capacity to sustain their commitment in dangerous operations over prolonged periods are most needed, especially in managing intrastate peacekeeping operations of the post-Cold War era. The days when peacekeepers were deployed in relatively calm and predictable environments are well over. Post-Cold War international security has been predominantly threatened not by wars between nations but by pockets of increasing episodes of escalating violence within national boundaries. Thus the deployment of uniformed blue helmets in unmapped labyrinths of guerrilla warfare and intrastate conflicts, where there are no clear cease-fire lines and no peace to ‘keep’, has become a common sight today. In such environments, peacekeepers can be exposed to high levels of danger and even possible attack from heavily armed and un-identified belligerents.

The question arises as to whether troop-contributing states are willing to take the risk and deploy their soldiers in such harsh operational environments? The delay in the deployment of the peacekeeping force in Rwanda was primarily due to hesitation on the part of the member states to place their soldiers in the wake of genocide. Although 19 governments pledged to keep 31000 troops on stand-by, it took the UN more than six months to deploy the authorised strength of 5000 troops.2 In 1994 despite the desperate attempts to deter the Serbian attacks on the UN 'safe havens' in Bosnia-Hezergovina, member states only contributed 7600 instead of the authorised strength of 35000 troops. The whole mission suffered significantly as the UN fell short of troop numbers due to the lack of commitment of member states. Another example relates to the reluctance of the US to contribute troops in the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in 1999. At that time the UN had been facing significant problems in mobilising ground forces for Sierra Leone and the negative response from the West created some uproar in the international community and in the diplomatic circles at the United Nations. ‘Washington will not put an American Officer on the ground [in Sierra Leone]’,3 stated the UN Chief Kofi Annan, who was disappointed by the reluctance of the superpower to share the burden of ground level participation in UN peacekeeping. 

               While member states may be motivated by their own set of national interests to undertake peacekeeping responsibilities they also have the liberty to decide the size of troop commitment and the duration of deployment. Often the UN is faced with a dilemma in meeting the dual requirement of securing the willingness of troop contributing states and in fulfilling its fundamental role in maintaining international peace and security. One cause for this dilemma is that there is no proper legal framework or arrangement under which member states contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. Article 43 of the UN Charter, which provides the UN with the right to request support in terms of personnel and material assistance from its member states, specifically calls for the earmarking of national contingents and for them to be placed on standby for the use and direction of the Security Council under a collective security arrangement.4 The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is responsible for organising and the strategic planning of the national armies. It includes a panel of military experts who are placed at the disposal of the Security Council to advice and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the latter’s requirements to act in an event of a breach of peace. However, during the Cold War Article 43 or the MSC were neither activated nor became a practical reality. The already existing division in the Security Council was further deepened by the opposing views over the magnitude and size of the armed forces of each Member State. The Soviet Union demanded an equal contribution among all Member States, while the other four permanent members were satisfied with comparable contributions relative to the differing size and composition of national armies. Since no conclusions were reached, Article 43 of the UN Charter never came into effect and the MSC has largely remained dormant. However, in recent years following the end of the Cold War analysts have suggested reviving the MSC to constructively serve the maintenance of global peace and security.5

Subsequently, the UN has also established a Standby Arrangement, which involves earmarking troops and placing them in a reserve pool of soldiers for rapid deployment in peace operations. The purpose of a standby arrangement is intended to make peacekeeping forces readily available for the management of conflicts. Up till February 2000, 87 member states have consented to participate in standby arrangements, but in different forms. Many have signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN; some have completed the Planning Data Sheet which provides detailed technical information on their contribution; and others have only expressed official willingness. Sixty-five countries have provided information on the specific capabilities they are prepared to offer. Sixty per cent of the confirmed standby participants have consented to a response time of up to 30 days; twenty per cent have a response time of between 30 and 60 days; fifteen per cent could respond between 60 and 90 days and the remaining five per cent could take more than 90 days.  

While these steps are taken to enhance the UN’s capacity to rapidly deploy troops, the reliability of peacekeepers in mission areas could vary across participating states. Not all states are active troop contributors to UN peacekeeping and not all troop contributing nations are reliable peacekeepers. However, Pakistan is an exception to this. In Somalia Pakistan not only emerged as the single largest troop contributor but also sustained its commitment over a prolonged period despite its bitter experiences and harsh realities. To this end, the study makes two key points. First, Pakistan’s strong and prolonged commitment to the peacekeeping operation in Somalia is motivated by a combination of political interests. Second, that Pakistan has learnt some invaluable lessons from its Somalia experience is demonstrated by Pakistan’s selective troop deployment and the development and implementation of a new peacekeeping doctrine in post-Somalia peacekeeping operations.   

Pakistan’s Commitment to Somalia

The peace mission to Somalia was one of the most humanly costly, dangerous and complex operations in which Pakistan ever participated in the twentieth century, but its prolonged commitment and presence in the war ravaged country arguably qualifies Pakistan as one of UN’s most reliable peacekeepers. Pakistan is one of the few troop-contributing nations that participated in various phases of the peace mission and under different authorities in Somalia. The first of which was under the aegis of the UN where Pakistan made significant troop contributions as part of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In July 1992 Islamabad dispatched Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen to the role as the chief military observer to monitor the cease-fire between key warring parties and also to seek consent for the deployment of a peacekeeping security force in Central Mogadishu. After almost a month of intense and difficult negotiations Aideed reluctantly consented to a peacekeeping presence and subsequently the deployment of a peacekeeping force of 500 troops occurred in September 1992. Pakistan responded positively and quickly by being the first nation to provide ground forces as part of UNOSOM to facilitate the provision and delivery of humanitarian relief aid to the local population caught between internecine wars and widespread famine and drought.

However, the Pakistani peacekeepers, drawn from Frontier Force Regiment and deployed in Mogadishu airport, had initially some difficult time controlling Aideed’s forces and the violent and disruptive activities of looters in Central Mogadishu. At one point Pakistani soldiers came under intense attack from Aideed’s forces, although the Mogadishu warlord had initially agreed to cooperate and allow the UN peacekeepers to carry out their security role at the airport. Although the local press had reported the loss of two Pakistani soldiers in this incident, Islamabad was quick to deny it.6 The deteriorating security environment in Mogadishu, the country’s major port and unloading dissemination of food supply, not only became a major problem but also prevented the distribution of relief aid to other parts of the country. Hence, the Security Council under resolution 794 authorised the establishment of the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to enforce peace for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance within the country. Following the take over of the UNOSOM by the UNITAF in December 1992, Pakistan not only expressed its willingness to work under the US-command but also agreed to provide more ground troops. At one point the former President George Bush phoned Nawaz Sharif to request for additional manpower support.7 Islamabad responded very positively to the demand and deployed another contingent of 880 troops and in subsequent months the size of the Pakistani contingent reached a total of 5000 troops.

This commitment continued even after the 5 June tragedy which lingers in public memory as one of UN’s biggest peacekeeping debacle. This unfortunate incident happened when the Pakistani contingent was asked to carry out a weapons inspection check and subsequently, to neutralise Aideed’s ammunition dump in accordance with the Addis Abbaba accord signed by all parties including the Mogadishu warlord. Despite this Aideed’s forces launched an unprovoked attack and fired on Pakistani soldiers during the weapons inspection. Aideed justified this attack based on an assumption that the Pakistani peacekeepers were carrying out the inspection with a view to eventually capture a nearby radio station.8 Islamabad not only denied the allegations but also criticised the delay of some contingents, namely the Italian force, in providing cover for the Pakistani troops during the ambush.9 The Italian contingent, although operating under the auspices of the UN, had waited for instructions from Rome before it offered help to the Pakistani troops. Consequently, Pakistan suffered a severe loss of 24 soldiers.

However, the 5 June tragedy did not move Islamabad to terminate its participation in the Somalia operation. In a press conference following the killing of the Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu Pakistan's foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan rejected the option of a withdrawal. He said, ‘we remained committed to UN peacekeeping efforts. We were the first country to enter Somalia wearing UN blue helmet and we believe in UN’s peacekeeping role. We believe this role must be played effectively’.10 Concomitantly Pakistan presented a resolution, which was adopted by the UN Security Council, calling for punitive actions against Aideed and his forces. By this time the UN had taken over from UNITAF and renamed the peace operation as UNOSOM II, but the mission was still largely under the control and direction of the US. Some of the key influential policy makers advising the American Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) T. Howe were from the US State Department.11

Pakistan not only continued to function as part of UNOSOM II but also became more active and joined forces with the US Army Rangers in hunting down Aideed and seeking justice for the death of the UN peacekeepers. This took several forms. First, the SRSG announced a reward worth $25,000 to $50,000 for Aideed’s head. Second, Pakistan became part of the US plan for a full-blown ground assault aimed at capturing Aideed who was reported to have slipped away minutes before the raid started on 17 June 1993. It is alleged the US surveillance network has more than once caught Italian UN peacekeepers warning Aideed about the US plans to launch an attack against him.12 The ‘revenge’ mission turned out to be a debacle resulting only in the capture of the US Rangers by Aideed’s men. Pakistan played an important role in a joint operation with the US and Malaysian troops to rescue the American Rangers. 

Meanwhile, policy-makers in Islamabad came under enormous pressure and were severely criticised for taking the American line which had turned the mission from a humanitarian-peacekeeping operation to a revenge-oriented mission. Senator Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, Naib Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami, criticised Pakistan for not limiting itself to a humanitarian role. He said, ‘Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the UAE, and even India, have taken that position. It is however unfortunate that American and Pakistani troops are the only major troops which are presently engaged in fighting, and there too, Pakistani forces were suffering major loses’.13 He also accused Nawaz Sharif's government of being ‘part of the US objective of imposing imperialist hegemony on the world and also subverting “committed Muslims” like Farah Aideed’.14 The party also warned that Pakistan's policy in Somalia might go against a number of Muslim states and cause a rift in the Islamic bloc.

However, these criticisms did not stop Islamabad from further supporting the US-led operation in Somalia. To some extent, Islamabad's pro-US stance on the peacekeeping operation in Somalia won the admiration and interest of policy-makers in Washington. Consequently this resulted in the visit by top US officials, in particular the US President's Special Envoy and co-ordinator for Somalia, Ambassador James Dobbins, Rear Admiral Charles Abdoll and Ambassador Walter Stadler of the US State Department to Pakistan in December 1993. The main theme of this visit was to discuss the prevailing situation in Somalia and matters pertaining to the provision of more Pakistani troops. Consequently, in December 1993 Pakistan offered an additional 2500 troops to join the 5000 Pakistani soldiers already deployed in Somalia.

However, Pakistan's decision to commit more troops and respond positively to the US request raised further concerns at home, especially when Washington announced its decision to withdraw its troops by early 1994, following the loss of 18 American soldiers in the 3 October incident. This also triggered other troop contributing nations to withdraw. By March 1994 Italy, Belgium, France, Sweden, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates had withdrawn their contingents, thereby reducing the force level from 28 000 to 15 000 troops. This caused greater pressure within Pakistan as the government came under attack for mis-using its soldiers in external missions. The Pakistani press published articles indicating that Pakistan had merely fallen into ‘America's peacekeeping trap’ and that it has given in to the treatment of its soldiers as cannon fodder or ‘America’s footsoldiers’.15 Despite such domestic pressures Islamabad and the military remained committed to the peace operation in Somalia until the mission was shut down in March 1995.  

Sources of Motivation  

Islamabad justified its troop commitment and prolonged peacekeeping presence in Somalia on the grounds that it was a strong supporter of the UN and its cause for global peace and security.16 It also pointed out that Pakistan was committed to supporting Somalia, with which it shares historical relationships and special cultural and religious bonds as Muslim nations.17 However, beyond these pious platitudes of goodwill a combination of several political interests played a primary role in motivating Islamabad to participate and commit itself to the peace mission in Somalia. These interests are identified here.

First, Pakistan's readiness to be part of the US-led multinational force and to subsequently increase the size of its troop contribution can be singled out as part of Islamabad’s aggressive diplomacy to re-establish strategic co-operation with the US in the early nineties. The Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulting in the end of the Cold War and the Gulf war of 1990-91 all significantly altered Pakistan’s geo-strategic environment. In the early nineties the US suddenly started to become concerned about Pakistan's nuclear programme, an issue that was conveniently ignored throughout the 1980s when Pakistan became the ‘front-line’ state for the US pro-Mujahideen and anti-Soviet activities in Afghanistan. So important was Pakistan to the US at the time that ‘Washington [even] undermined moves by US congressman to scuttle the aid relationship and forces through the Pressler Amendment in 1984’.18 However, the Pressler Amendment was revived in the early nineties when Washington received confirmation that Pakistan had already converted enriched uranium gas into material for a nuclear bomb and Islamabad was adamant not to give in to Washington’s demands for ‘capping’ its nuclear program. This resulted in the suspension of all aid packages including the incomplete F-16 aircraft deal on 1 October 1990.

The change in Pakistan's geo-strategic environment became clearer when the US started to aggressively pursue a policy of engaging with Pakistan’s major threat and adversary, India, in the early 1990s.19 Following its economic liberalisation in 1991, India started to attract large-scale foreign investment from sources such as IBM and Coca-Cola who were once embittered by India’s closed-door economic policies. This investment has made a huge impact on the newly structured Indian economy. Moreover, India's emergence as a world leader in information technology (IT) has not gone unnoticed by Washington which has been forging closer ties with New Delhi as the latter has been producing IT powerhouses staffed by world class computer engineers and funded by foreign investors. It is against the backdrop of this changing geo-strategic environment that Pakistan sought an opportunity to aggressively revive its relations with Washington in the early 1990s. Islamabad saw its involvement in UNITAF and continuous support for US requests for more ground troops as an opportunity to re-establish friendly relations with the US and at the same time persuade Washington to re-consider lifting the aid ban and the unsettled business of the F-16 aircraft deal.

A second source of motivation for Pakistan’s prolonged peacekeeping commitment in Somalia stems from Pakistan’s desire to demonstrate its credibility as an active and reliable peacekeeper and also to alter the growing negative images of Pakistan. The allegations against the government for its linkage with terrorist acts within its borders and also in Kashmir and Punjab in India, had not only strained Indo-Pakistan relations but had been a major factor adversely affecting Pakistan’s international image. Participation in the Somalia peace operation provided an opportunity for Pakistan to alter this image. Pakistan saw Aideed’s acts in Somalia as acts of terror which resulted not only in the critical loss of its soldiers but also in the massacre of almost 50000 local Somalis. The use of terror tactics such as rape, extortion and physical brutality were routine in Somalia. Women were the worst victims having undergone severe physical abuse and torture. Some incidents include: the rape of a nine-year old girl; a woman, eight month pregnant, gang-raped by 17 men who then killed the unborn child; and a woman shot in the head when she resisted gang rape.20 While these incidents and violations of human rights impacted heavily on the locals, Pakistan was quick to justify its actions and continued its peacekeeping presence in Somalia on the grounds that it was fighting against terrorism. Subsequently, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not only dismissed terrorism allegations against Pakistan as ‘baseless’ but also made it clear that Pakistan does not support international terrorism. ‘Now it is evident to the world community that Pakistan not only condemned the terrorism in every part of the world but also believed in fighting against it’, said the Pakistani leader.21

Thirdly, Pakistan’s active participation in Somalia could also be viewed as part of the intra-regional competition between India and Pakistan in UN peacekeeping. Like Pakistan, India is a traditional peacekeeper, but the latter has participated in more peace operations than the former. For instance during the Cold War India participated in fourteen peace operations, beginning with its repatriation role in Korea in 1950. It also contributed almost 12000 troops to the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Sinai in 1956. In contrast Pakistan’s Cold War participation in peace missions was limited and brief. It participated in only four peace operations and made a large-scale troop commitment only in West Irian in 1962.22 However, the early nineties started to see some changes in Islamabad’s attitude towards peacekeeping. While peacekeeping gained an important place in its post-Cold War foreign policy agenda, Pakistan was also keen to compete with India’s role in peace maintenance. This was demonstrated in Somalia where Pakistan not only emerged as the single largest peacekeeping contingent but its troop contribution (7500 troops) was bigger than that of India (5000 troops). Moreover, India did not deploy its troops until March 1993 because it refused to be part of the US-led mission.23 This was an advantage for Pakistan given the changing geo-strategic environment in the early 1990s and its desire to re-establish ties with the US.  

Lessons Learnt  

While Pakistan’s strong and prolonged peacekeeping commitment in Somalia highlight one of its major peacekeeping strengths as a reliable peacekeeper, two key lessons could be drawn from Pakistan’s peacekeeping experience in Somalia. Arguably, these lessons have also shaped the nature of Pakistan’s participation in post-Somalia peace missions.  

Selective Deployment  

The first lesson that Pakistan has learnt from its experience in Somalia is to deploy its troops subject to the provision and availability of adequate logistical support in mission areas. One of the major causes for Pakistan’s initial setbacks in Somalia was the lack of firepower. According to Shaharyar Khan, Pakistan's foreign Secretary, Pakistani troops in Somalia ‘did not have sufficient firepower or equipment to defend themselves against the [5 June] attack’.24 This was due to failure of the UN to provide logistical support to some of its peacekeepers in Somalia. Indeed not all governments can provide their military with the necessary equipment for operating in UN peacekeeping operations abroad. In fact this is a problem for most third world peacekeepers that lack the resources to support themselves. Although the UN has no standing stock of such equipment, it is responsible for the procurement of logistical support and the provision of such assistance to under-equipped units.25 However, this often results in several problems such as delays in the arrival of logistical support to mission areas and lack of standardisation of military equipment. Although Pakistan has demonstrated its capacity to readily provide troops, its ability to function in Somalia was greatly weakened by the lack of adequate logistical support and assistance, which should have been provided by the UN.26

               Although the UN took conscious efforts to quickly provide heavy weaponry to Pakistani forces following the 5 June tragedy, the death of its soldiers in Somalia resulted in Pakistan becoming more cautious and selective in despatching its soldiers in future peace operations. For instance although Pakistan had expressed its desire to participate in the peace mission to Bosnia-Hezergovina, Islamabad declined to contribute troops due to a lack of logistical support. In August 1993 Germany, in spite of its initial agreement, suddenly refused to provide heavy weaponry assistance to Pakistan. Although plans were underway to train and familiarise Pakistani soldiers to handle the new weapons system in Germany, Berlin passed a new law which denied the provision of its military equipment to troops belonging to another country unless Pakistan was willing to buy the equipment at low rates.27 After intense renegotiations with the UN, Pakistan then reconsidered its decision and deployed 3000 troops as part of the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

In 1996 Pakistan was once again approached by the UN to contribute troops in Bosnia, but as part of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). Although Pakistan was one of the 14 non-NATO countries that had consented to participate, Islamabad later declined to contribute troops due to differences with the UN. Pakistan’s foreign office voiced its disappointment openly indicating that this was the second time that UN has caused a blunder in the provision of military support to Pakistani troops in Bosnia and it was not prepared to incur the additional equipment costs.28 By November 1995 all the Pakistani troops who operated as part of UNPROFOR returned home. It was only when NATO agreed to bear part of the expenditure of the Pakistani troop deployment that Islamabad deployed another contingent of 3,000 troops in IFOR in early 1996.   

Peacekeeping Doctrine and Approach  

The second lesson that Pakistan has learnt from its peacekeeping experience in Somalia relates to the development of a new peacekeeping doctrine for and approach to managing intrastate peacekeeping operations.  Indeed, one of Pakistan’s major weaknesses in Somalia was the lack of a clear and independent peacekeeping agenda which resulted in developing an approach that increasingly focused on targeting individual elements. For instance, instead of engaging in humanitarian activities Pakistan joined forces with the US to track down Aideed and his warring factions for killing the UN peacekeepers on 5 June 1993. But this shifting from the general to a particular target was costly to Pakistan.29 That is, it later resulted in seriously jeopardising Pakistan's security movement and its ability to carry out its duty effectively. The targeting of Aideed meant a loss of the impartiality and credibility of the peacekeeping force which transformed the UN peacekeepers to be increasingly seen as the new ‘warlords’ in Somalia.30 Thus on several occasions Pakistani forces faced enormous difficulty in operating at the local community levels to implement humanitarian and peace building projects.31

Consequently, the Somalia experience played a critical role in shaping Pakistan military’s peacekeeping doctrine, in which building community relations in mission areas also became a priority.32 In most peace operations of today the use of force is imminent and fighting impartially to establish a secure environment for peacekeeping operations becomes a major challenge. However, using force, against ‘rogue’ elements in mission areas, with the backing and broad support of local communities could help peacekeepers to reduce the risk of jeopardising their peacekeeping presence in the field.33 In line with its peacekeeping philosophy, Pakistan took efforts to reshape its methods of preparing soldiers for peacekeeping operations. Firstly, the military has consciously taken steps to ensure that it deploys suitable military personnel who are able to operate at the community level and build popular support. This is important because of the need for an attitudinal change by soldiers. The Pakistani army has developed a rigid selection process that places emphasis on personal qualities such as patience, sensitivity to gender and differing cultures, understanding, calmness, and self-discipline.34 Moreover, the Pakistani army has also developed a policy whereby soldiers are only given one UN assignment over the course of their military career.35 This ensures that soldiers do not see peacekeeping as a career which could make them less committed in the long term. Immediate and appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that Pakistani soldiers and other personnel are well disciplined in the field. While such efforts have been taken to maintain high discipline standards in mission areas, Pakistan’s approach to managing intrastate peacekeeping operations has changed significantly since its involvement in Somalia. A central focus in most of the peace missions has been to build a strong support base and increase interaction at the local level through community-oriented peacekeeping activities. Pakistan’s role in some of the post-Somalia peace operations points to this.

One example relates to Pakistan’s involvement in Bosnia-Hezergovina where the Pakistan Battalion (PAKBAT) deployed in the city of Tuzla focused on changing the attitudes of the locals so as to seek cooperation for the implementation of UN mandates. The Pakistani contingent launched some major civil affairs programmes including the establishement of two hospitals, called ‘The Healers’ in the towns of Vares and Dardevik.36 These two 25-bed hospitals provided medical assistance to people in a 200km radius. The Pakistani Army’s mobile medical team was also established to serve people who lived in the countryside and lacked mobility. Every ten days this team would travel to distant locations to provide medical treatment. The Pakistani government made a huge contribution by donating more than 1.7 tonnes of medicine to the Mayor of Tuzla.37 Pakistan’s civil affairs projects were quite successful and in fact won the praises of several individuals and organisations across the globe. The editor of the Bosnian News Magazine, Djanana Islamovic, wrote that: ‘PAKBAT in Bosnia has not only protected us from the brutal assault of Serb Offensive but also has infused a new spirit into our lives. They have given us all sorts of humanitarian help, taught us the values of Islam and above all have given us a constant medical care in form of their hospital.’38 In a letter to the Pakistan Ambassador in London, a Member of the British Parliament, Mr John who was on a month long visit as a volunteer driver on a convoy to Bosnia, wrote that the ‘Pakistani battalion involved in UNPROFOR in Bosnia are doing a commendable job and that there is plenty of evidence of the hard work being done by Pakistani soldiers to repair roads and to help the people of that part of Bosnia’.39

Another example is Pakistan’s community peacekeeping in Haiti where PAKBAT engaged in civil affairs works such as building schools, installing new water pumps and constructing various recreational facilities for the public. The Pakistani contingent carried out its own food distribution programmes from the rations provided to the Pakistani troops for their own daily consumption. The Pakistan contingent's role in Haiti received high level praise from various foreign military officers and force commanders. For example, the force commander to Haiti, Brigadier General JR Pierre, commended the Pakistani contingent for its social skills which secured strong relations with the local population. He said, ‘when you brought me through Cap Haitian, I was quite impressed by friendships the Pakistani troops have struck with the locals and their reaction at their arrival on all sites. It expresses their solidarity to the Haitians and their relentless determination to improve their quality of life. I would have been proud to serve with soldiers of such calibre’.40 In recognition of the growing popularity of Pakistani troops in Cape Haitian both the SRSG and the Force Commander in Haiti, Brigadier General Pierre Daigle, recommended to the UN Secretary-General that Pakistan should be requested to stay on and be part of a new mission, the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which was established under the UN Security Council Resolution 1063 of 1996. But UNSMIH had a smaller military component and its force level was reduced from three battalions to two. Pakistani troops not only made up one of these battalions, along with the Canadians, but also replaced the Bangladeshi contingent in Port Au Prince where it continued with its humanitarian work till November 1996.  

Conclusion: The Future of Pakistani Peacekeeping  

Since the early nineties Pakistan’s participation in external peace operations has increased significantly in line with Islamabad's identification of UN peacekeeping as a top priority in its foreign policy agenda. Speaking in the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping in 1992, Pakistani delegate Mateen-ur-Rehman Murtaza pledged Islamabad's increased support to United Nations activities in the area of peacekeeping around the world.41 In 1994, President Farooq Leghari pointed out that ‘Pakistan not only values peacekeeping operations for the maintenance of general peace and security but has a commitment towards the role that Pakistan plays’.42 Pakistan’s military which enjoys considerable influence in the country also expressed support. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Abdul Wahid Kakar asserted that ‘Pakistan's contributions to the United Nations peacekeeping operations will continue in keeping with its time honoured traditions of supporting right over wrong and freedom over oppression’.43

In line with its new policy Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations abroad has gained significant momentum in the post-Cold War era. Up to December 2000 Pakistan has participated in 30 UN peace missions abroad and in total has contributed approximately 20000 troops and other ground personnel. Moreover, Pakistan has also adopted a policy of ‘supporting peacekeeping operations without regards to the region or people involved’.44 Subsequently, Pakistani soldiers have donned blue helmets in different parts of the world: the Middle-East, (Iraq-Kuwait); Asia (Cambodia and East Timor); Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo and Somalia); Europe (Georgia, Macedonia, Prevlaka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia); and the Americas (Haiti). Pakistan has also made simultaneous troop contributions in peacekeeping operations. For instance in the early 1990s Pakistan deployed an average of 1000 troops in each of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia-Hezergovina all at the same time. The Pakistan military has also established a permanent peacekeeping wing in its armed forces solely for the purpose of preparing and training soldiers for external assignments and duties. Pakistan has not only expressed a willingness but has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN for participation in the UN standby arrangements.

While these efforts have taken shape as part of Pakistan’s proactive UN peacekeeping policy, Pakistan’s future commitment to external peace operations is likely to vary in light of the growing security needs on both its borders in recent times. The ongoing hunt for Osama bin Ladin and the US-led anti-Taliban operation in Afghanistan, supported by the Musharraf regime, have resulted in Pakistan lining up its ground troops on the western border with a view to monitoring Al-Qaeda terrorist movements. Meanwhile the 13 December terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament have aggravated already tense Pakistan relationship with neighbouring India. New Delhi has accused Pakistan of supporting cross-border terrorism and  terrorists movements in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which  significantly has altered security situation on the borders. Islamabad’s refusal to give in to India’s demand (s) has pushed the two countries to the brink of a major conventional war. This resulted in Pakistan not only putting its military on the highest alert but also withdrawing its 4,000 troops from the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). ‘We cannot participate in a peacekeeping mission at a time when we are facing a threat of war,’45 said a Pakistani official.n