Introduction  

Pakistan has demonstrated reasonableness and restraint in chalking out its nuclear policy since the very beginning of its nuclear programme. It has adopted an effective mechanism for the security of nuclear facilities, fissile material storage and production facilities. No illicit traffic of Pakistan’s nuclear material and nuclear accident have occurred so far. Therefore, Pakistani nuclear weapons and fissile materials are claimed to be under secure control. After May 1998 nuclear explosions, it deferred conversion of its tested nuclear weapons into deployment, observed moratorium on further nuclear testing and censured transfer of nuclear weapons know-how to any party. In January 2001, the government of Pakistan promulgated Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) Ordinance. This authority has been entrusted with the control, regulation and supervision of all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection measures in Pakistan.  

Nuclear facilities—power stations, research reactors and laboratories—are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and blatant terrorist attacks that could cause the release of dangerous amounts of radioactive materials. There is also a danger of theft of nuclear weapons and radioactive material. The problem is not confined to Pakistan. This is a global problem requiring intensive international cooperation. But many academics, activists, military experts and politicians consider the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals inadequate and are calling for substantial changes in its nuclear policy. Some of them even recommend complete elimination of its nuclear programme. They argue without taking into account Pakistan’s economic needs and threat perceptions. Interestingly, their apprehensions are due to vicious propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. They do not even try to know the actual facts. To them, the nuclear accidents or fissile material’s illicit trafficking in India or Russian Federation1, is enough to conclude that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are insecure and easily accessible to the non-state actors or unauthorized users.

In the official and non-official circles in Pakistan there is a serious realization that there should be a constructive debate for avoiding nuclear risks. But rebuffing Pakistan’s official stance, that “Pakistan’s nuclear assets are 100 percent secure and under multiple custody”, by simply saying that they are untested and lack credibility reflects biases. Prejudiced approach regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal’s security disturbs all factions in its society. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 questions about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons received importance. Could Pakistan’s nuclear weapons fall into the hands of extremists? Is Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology secure? In his address to the nation, President Pervez Musharraf proclaimed that the “safety of nuclear assets” was one of his priorities. He assured that they are absolutely secure.2 Many analysts, however, have misinterpreted these assurances. Objectivity demands that the concerns ought to be based on tangible information rather than on press speculation about 'loose nukes', the smuggling of nuclear materials or even weapons or literature produced by anti-Pakistan lobby. The following study is an attempt to critically analyze the risk associated with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. How effective is the control over Pakistani fissile material storage and production facilities? What is the background of the anxiety about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ safety and security? These issues would be analyzed critically in the following discussion.  

Background of the Problem  

In the post September 11, 2001 terrorists’ attack on the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C., questions about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, fissile material stocks, and nuclear facilities have come to the fore. Hypothetical threat scenarios have been formulated. David Albright, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein argued, “A troubling question in the current situation is that a nuclear weapon or fissile material could fall into the wrong hands. Available information suggests that, despite official statements to the contrary, the Pakistani government may not have full confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal.”3 Mansoor Ijaz and R. James Woolsey wrote in the New York Times “the main nuclear security problem posed by Al Qaeda today is access to radioactive materials in Pakistan.”4 Paul Richter opined, “While the nuclear programme was conceived to protect Pakistan from the perceived nuclear threat from India, some groups in the region view its nuclear arsenal as the Islamic bomb that could be used to defend the broader interests of the Muslim world.”5 Praful Bidwai wrote:  

“The grim truth stares us all in the face: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is neither safe nor secure amidst the unrest, turmoil and insecurity which now convulse that country. There is a finite, definite, chance that these weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of extremists within Pakistan’s politicized army, or even pro-Taliban terrorists, who will have no hesitation in using them, or threatening the world with them.”6  

The significant factor in the ongoing debate is to question Pakistan’s ability to maintain control of the nuclear weapons or radioactive material and prevent their unintended use. Interestingly, it’s not a new discussion. 

Since 1970s identical suspicions and fears regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme have been expressed. One cannot miss similar antagonism and malicious propaganda in the writings of Steve Weisman and Herbert Krosney in The Islamic Bomb and William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem in Critical Mass- The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World. These writers criticized Pakistan’s nuclear programme and stated that it is working for Islamic Bomb. “The CIA knew that cores were then stored near the other components needed to make a complete weapon, the Pakistani Bomb- the long feared, Islamic Bomb”, argued William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem.7 In 1993, Seymour M. Hersh, an American Journalist published a fake article in the New Yorker. In it he claimed that US satellites detected a convoy of trucks moving out of Kahuta, Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment facility, toward an air base where F-16 fighter jets stood ready.8 The sole purpose of such stories was to legitimize the American’s nuclear related sanctions against Pakistan. Prior to September 11, 2001 the concerns were that Pakistan would transfer nuclear weapons technology to the Muslim states. At this time, they began to perceive that in addition to rogue states, terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda and Islamic radical groups would get hold of these weapons.  

Facts for Constructive Debate  

The United States and other Western powers, while ignoring India, which is the initiator of nuclear arms race in South Asia, have always been pressurizing Pakistan to end its nuclear programme.9 Within the context of South Asia, India’s nuclear facilities are perhaps the most vulnerable to nuclear terrorism, given India’s extensive nuclear programme, much of it not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, there have been reported cases of theft of fissile material from the Indian nuclear facilities. On August 27, 2001, the police in West Bengal (India) disclosed that it had arrested two men with more than 200 grams of semi-processed uranium.10 On July 23, 1998 India’s Central Bureau of Intelligence seized six kilograms of uranium from GR Arun, a city engineer, and S Murthy, his associate in Tamil Nadu. The scientists at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at Kalpakkam, stated that the seized uranium was capable of radiation emission, having energy corresponding to natural Uranium-238 and U-235.11 There is a long (reported) list of the illicit nuclear trade in India. It proves that a nuclear mafia is operating in India.

The Indian nuclear facilities are vulnerable to a high probability of accidents. According to an Indian parliamentary report, 147 mishaps or safety-related unusual occurrences were reported between 1995-1998 in Indian atomic energy plants.12 On January 4, 2001 the Milan missile—an anti-tank weapon, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, accidentally fired in the presence of the then Defense Secretary, Mr. Yogendra Narain, at the Bharat Dynamics Limited. It left one quality control officer for the Milan missile programme dead and injured five others at the unit. This unit is located in a thickly populated part of the Hyderabad city. T. Lalith Singh commented, “Even as the accidental missile firing at the Bharat Dynamics Limited here continues to be shrouded in mystery, several questions are raised over the safety procedures adopted at the country's premier missile production unit.”13

Pakistan has always been sensitive to international nuclear-related concerns. This is evident in its decisions to join certain nuclear related treaties and the several proposals made over the years. On September 4, 2000 Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979). Pakistan is also party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Nuclear Safety Convention. The international Convention on Nuclear Safety envisages complete separation between the regulatory and promotional aspects of nuclear energy. Accordingly in January 2001, the government of Pakistan promulgated PNRA Ordinance establishing a complete independent regulatory authority called Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA). This authority has been entrusted with the control, regulation and supervision of all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection measures in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s nuclear non-proliferation proposals, such as Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia, South Asia Zero Missile Zone, mutual inspection by Pakistan and India of each other’s facilities etc,14 have not received any serious consideration by the major powers and have also been ignored by many analysts. In October 1999, Pakistan formally proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime to India. It encompassed prevention of a nuclear and ballistic missile race, establishment of a risk reduction mechanism and a proposition that nuclear deterrence should be pursued at the lowest possible level. India responded negatively. Despite the fact that Pakistan has no defensive pact with any Muslim state and is an active participant in the campaign against terrorism, some analysts criticize Pakistan, question its nuclear policies and malign its intentions. Notably, the unjustified criticism harms or has a negative impact on any objective critique on Pakistan’s nuclear policy.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: Security Versus Insecurity Debate 

 

Pakistan is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, all its nuclear facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards. Moreover, Pakistan retains the “First Use” option of nuclear weapons. “First use” doctrine, “launch on warning” and “launch through attack” strategies require high levels of alerts to be maintained and almost continuous launch site readiness of a selected number of warheads and delivery systems. Hence, there are many possible scenarios in which the security of Pakistan’s nuclear programme could get compromised. Some of these are real and addressed by the Government of Pakistan accordingly. A few of these are imaginary and exaggerated by the anti-Pakistan nuclear programme lobby. The following discussion facilitates us in assessing the security of  Pakistan’s nuclear programme.   

Possibility of Unauthorized Use  

Unauthorized use can happen if those who are tasked with using the weapons under authorized conditions have the ability to use them regardless of whether they are given an authoritative order. The first line of defense against unauthorized activation is a lock on the weapon. The earliest locks were mechanical combination locks, but since the early 1960s a more sophisticated system called a Permissive Action Link (PAL) has been increasingly employed, especially by the US. A PAL is an electronic (originally electro-mechanical) device that prevents arming the weapon unless the correct codes are inserted into it. Two different codes must be inserted, simultaneously or close together. This is the “two-man rule” — which requires it to be impossible to arm any nuclear weapon through the actions of a single individual. The codes are usually changed on a regular schedule.15 

This problem would be acute when Pakistan maintains its nuclear weapons on a hair trigger alert or launch on warning operational stage. Currently, Pakistan is observing nuclear restraint policy. The official stance is that it has not assembled its warheads. They are in component parts, not as assembled warheads. They are kept unassembled at different locations, which make scientific expertise essential for assembly. President Pervez Musharraf stated, “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not ready to be fired, they are not mated, they are geographically apart and they are not in a condition in which a button has to be pressed to fire them.”16 Secondly, in case of deployment, Pakistan knows the ways and means such as dual code or key systems and PAL which are essential for protection against unauthorized use. In the absence of technological expertise for using PAL, other equally safe option of dual-key control systems, presently being used by France and the United Kingdom, are available.17

Pakistan’s armed forces have a strong chain of command and moral code of conduct. Alcohol or other drug abuses are strictly prohibited in the armed forces.  Pakistani Army remains a professional military force and is in no danger of falling prey to the influences of radical Islam. Moreover, the defence forces employ a rigorous clearance procedure. The officers who are appointed at sensitive posts require medical clearance to prove that they have no psychiatric problems. These procedures remove the risk of unstable civilian or military officers getting control of a nuclear weapon.

The disaffected military commander has no acceptability in the armed forces and no accessibility to such weapons. For example, the coup attempt led by Major-General Zahir ul Islam Abbasi in 1995 during Benazir Bhutto's second tenure as prime minister failed.  To be precise, it is mere propaganda by the adversaries of Pakistan, that Pakistan Army contains factions that share al-Qaeda's extremist Islamic views. There is no such faction in Pakistan Army. Thus rogue military commander theory is unjustified. In brief, Pakistan keeps relatively tight, centralized control over its nuclear weapons. They will only be employed if the authorized authority gives appropriate orders.  

_{Irrational Leader}   

_{The possibility exists that the person exercising the highest political authority may himself/herself go insane or behave irrationally. Many famous leaders throughout history were psychotic or experienced psychotic episodes: Caligula, Nero, Ludwig of Bavaria, and probably Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin as well. Woodrow Wilson and Dwight Eisenhower suffered serious strokes while in office, which compromised their ability to perform their duties and think clearly. During his final days before resigning the presidency in 1974, Richard Nixon is said to have acted irrationally under the stress of the Watergate scandal.18 For countering this sort of situation, Pakistan has adopted a very steadfast strategy. Its National Command Authority (NCA) comprises Employment Control Committee and Development Control Committee as well as Strategic Plans Division, which will act as secretariat. The apex Employment Control Committee would be chaired by the head of government and include minister of foreign affairs (deputy chairman), minister of defense, minister of interior, chairman of joint chiefs of staff committee, services chiefs, director-general of Strategic Plans Division and technical advisers and others, as required by the chairman.19 This arrangement thwarts the possibility of any irrational decision by an individual.             Extremists Phenomena   The scenario of an "extremist" takeover in Pakistan is in itself extremely hypothetical. Many Pakistanis feel deeply disturbed by the bombardment of Afghanistan, the reports of civilian casualties and Indian armed buildup on its border. A closer analysis of the prevailing political conditions in Pakistan reveals that the apprehensions about people’s revolt against President Musharraf’s government are unduly alarmist. The Islamic parties and groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan and few others, opposing Pakistan government's support for U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, represent a small minority. The radical Islamic groups and political parties, collectively, do not represent more than ten to fifteen per cent of the population in Pakistan.20 All mainstream political parties in Pakistan such as the Pakistan Peoples Party, the Muslim League (Nawaz faction being the exception), and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement have expressed support for General Musharraf's policies. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar very rightly stated, “Any apprehension that the assets might fall into the hands of extremists is entirely imaginary – perhaps a product of distortion caused by TV images magnifying the sights and sounds of protesters.”21   Accidental Use   How safe and secure is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal are against accidental and unauthorized use? This is an important problem. Nuclear accidents can happen because the design of the nuclear weapon itself is faulty or because the systems and procedures used to launch or drop the weapons lack safeguards. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme has so far been a joint Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) responsibility. Both the organizations have some of the most gifted scientific and technological talent in the country. Their scientists have accomplished wonders in the face of daunting odds such as the international pressure, technology control regimes, and nuclear-related sanctions against Pakistan since mid 1970s. The six nuclear test explosions carried out on May 28 and 30, 1998 were state-of-the-art and after initial skepticism and attempts to denigrate the achievements, the international scientific community has recognized them.22 These explosions provided expertise, data and above all confidence to the Pakistani scientists. Thus by virtue of that experience Pakistani nuclear scientists are capable of resoling any shortcomings in their weapons design, storage, handling, transportation, maintenance, testing, safety and security. Similarly, Pakistan has proper command and control system, which takes care of weapons when they would be deployed.  In addition, Pakistan has not equipped its nuclear delivery systems with its nuclear warheads.}    

Reliability of Command and Control System  

Some security analysts have a pessimistic view that Pakistan would have no reliable command and control systems for years.23 Pakistan has a proper command and control mechanism that takes care of the deployment, employment and technical aspects of its strategic assets. A Strategic Force Command has been established from each of the three armed services. Clear chains of responsibility have been prescribed and enforced to ensure that strategic weapons cannot be deployed without due authorization. In addition, one ought to realize that if a state accomplishes its nuclear programme, manufactures and tests its nuclear devices and short/medium range ballistic missiles, it can very successfully institutionalize its strategic command, control, communication and intelligence systems.  

Theft of Fissile Material from Nuclear Facilities  

The majority of commentators argued that the most likely way in which a terrorist group acquires a nuclear explosive are by stealing a nuclear weapon from a nuclear weapon stockpile, theft of fissile material and hijacking a nuclear warhead when it was being transported.  It is argued that Pakistan lacks technological advancements and expertise for safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials. This material can be transferred to the terrorists groups, particularly from its nuclear facilities that are not subject to IAEA safeguards. Leventhal argued, "If you have someone inside (a nuclear facility) influenced by bribery, extortion or ideology to get stuff out, he probably is going to be able to do it. When you talk about an industry that produces by the ton what nuclear weapons require by the pound, the arithmetic gets very, very scary."24 This observation is irrelevant for Pakistan because it holds very small fissile material stockpiles. Secondly, the locations of the various components of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities are a closely guarded national secret. Thirdly, PAEC has an unblemished record of safety and security of the nuclear power plants and other civilian projects, which are under safeguards and subject to periodic inspection by the IAEA.25 It is therefore highly unlikely that a terrorist group or network of groups could identify the different locations with confidence, or steal the radioactive material, let alone reconstitute the stolen parts into complete weapon systems.26

Some analysts believe that Pakistan needs sophisticated technologies for maintaining the exact data of its fissile material.  Interestingly, computers also mislead and generate problems. For example, the Russian experts at the Kurchatov Institute, the renowned nuclear research center in Moscow, discovered a fatal flaw in the software donated to them by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This same software had been the backbone of America's nuclear materials control system for years. The Russians found that over time, as the computer programme is used, some files become invisible and inaccessible to the nuclear accountants using the system, even though the data still exist in netherworld of the database. Any insider who understood the software could exploit this flaw by tracking the "disappeared" files and then physically diverting, for a profit, the materials themselves.27 Due to its limited quantity of fissile material, a very sophisticated system is not an essential requirement. Pakistan can very easily preserve the record of its nuclear stockpiles through the manual procedures. 

Truck Bomb Threat  

There is a possibility that the terrorists would damage a nuclear plant for radioactive release. They can hit the nuclear facilities with a truck loaded with conventional explosive. Some analysts perceive the vehicular bombing threat real in Pakistan because of the Islamic religious groups. It is argued that nuclear plants and research reactors in Pakistan have little protection against a truck bomb threat. The Pakistani authorities have enforced elaborate security mechanism for the security of nuclear facilities. In addition to material fences, thoroughly trained guard secure plants from sabotage. The nuclear sites in Pakistan are in exclusive zones and are relatively inaccessible. Their areas are large enough so that the main facility (reactor) would withstand a truck bomb exploding at the perimeter fence.  

Conclusion  

As part of a well–considered nuclear policy, Pakistan has implemented stringent measures to ensure that they are never used, either intentionally or by accident, except under properly authorized circumstances. However in the context of South Asian region’s security, there is an urgent need for upgrading physical protection systems at the dozens of nuclear reactors, laboratories, fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants and research institutes scattered across India. Many radioactive material thefts and nuclear facility accidents in India have been reported in the Indian print media. In case of Pakistan, not even a single nuclear related accident has happened. Safeguarding nuclear weapons is a major task for those nuclear-weapon states, which possess the largest number of weapons and a huge amount of nuclear radioactive material. A great deal of nuclear material, equipment, and components for nuclear weapons programmes have been, and are being, smuggled from the United States and Russian Federation. An early example of the illicit acquisition of nuclear material is the smuggling of the enriched uranium to Israel between 1962 and 1965. About 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium disappeared from a factory in Apollo, Pennsylvania, owned by the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation.28 Hundreds of tons of nuclear material, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, are stored at vulnerable sites throughout the former Soviet Union states, guarded only by underpaid, hungry, and disheartened people. At least eight thefts of materials (weapons-usable) that could be used to make nuclear weapons have been confirmed.29 Significantly, nuclear related theft or smuggling has not happened in Pakistan.

The Nunn-Lugar "cooperative threat reduction" programme to improve the security of Russia's nuclear materials, technology and expertise can serve as a valuable precedent in addressing nuclear-related security problems in Pakistan. K. Subrahmanyam has very correctly pointed out that "American concerns and anxiety about South Asia's nuclear situation (are) not reflected in the American denial of technology cooperation with India and Pakistan on safety and security measures—especially those that involve interaction among scientists and sale of equipment related to nuclear safety”.30 United States export restrictions should be waived to transfer the technologies—vaults, sensors, alarms, tamper-proof seals, closed-circuit cameras and labels needed to protect Pakistan's nuclear facilities and materials from thefts, accidents and unauthorized use. Certainly, assistance that improves the safety and security of a nuclear warhead itself may also significantly improve Pakistan's ability to deploy a warhead on a ballistic missile, and may be banned under the Article 1 of the NPT. It may signal other potential nuclear weapon states that the US is not serious about its non-proliferation goals. But assisting Pakistan to improve the security of its nuclear facilities and weapons storage facilities is permissible because this assistance would not contribute to advances in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Physical-protection systems at the Pakistani nuclear facilities are strong. There are custodial safeguards. These facilities are not accessible to unauthorized outsiders and are under constant monitoring through intelligence agencies. Pakistan has resisted any outside attempts to help secure its nuclear materials up to now. There is the risk of nuclear related secrets leaking in receiving assistance for its nuclear programme from outside powers. It is a pragmatic policy. But there is no harm in receiving technological assistance, which would not undermine our secrets.

It is imperative that we should convey the message to our Western friends that there is no possibility of business like Sapphire Operation31, in Pakistan. Secondly, commando operation, such as that referred by journalist Seymour Hersh’s in The New Yorker on October 29, 2001, shall be considered offensive act and shall be countered by all means.  

A realistic and useful option for the US and its allies is to accept that the existence of Pakistan nuclear weapons is an incontrovertible reality. If they are serious in addressing this problem, they must chalk out their policies on the basis of the fact that India’s unwillingness to part with its nuclear arsenal makes it impossible for Pakistan to dismantle its own programme. Within this context, only viable bilateral and multilateral nuclear confidence building and nuclear risk reduction measures can keep the spectre of a nuclear war, and nuclear-related accidents at bay. A well-structured nuclear restraint regime in South Asia would minimize the risks of nuclear accident. The US and other Western governments can play a useful role in helping to constitute such a regime.n