Introduction  

Theoretically SAARC was born in 1985 at the Dhaka Summit of seven regional countries though the work towards its creation had started much earlier. The association came into existence with a baggage of disabilities and constraints. The SAARC charter was devised first at Delhi Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers on August 1, 1983 and was subsequently adopted at the first summit. More than 16 years have passed since its birth and the need for assessing SAARC’s performance seems in order.  Adopting a functional approach the association, during the last 16 years, has not only experienced the regional pressures but has also been able to acclimatise itself with the complexities of operative international political system.  Indeed the record is a mixed one.

In recent times the organization is subjected to somewhat legitimate criticism. Just as the UN Security Council did not live up to the expectations of a vast majority of the member states, SAARC also disappointed many in the region especially in terms of tangible outcomes that could substantively affect the life of ordinary citizens of the member countries. However this does not mean that its existence, in any sense, is disapproved. Hailed as a much awaited panacea for many complex problems confronting the region, its performance remained far below the augured expectations.

This paper initially discusses the evolution of SAARC and then concentrates on the impediments which are slowing down its desired pace of progress followed by an examination of the positive factors that are pushing the region towards collaborative approach. Finally it attempts to answer the question whether or not it is time to re-examine its Charter.  

The Main Evolutionary Features

  The evolution of SAARC has not been all that smooth especially if compared with EEC or ASEAN. Many factors account for this. It continues to suffer from the hangover of the past along with its own structural complexities. Part of the impediments are the product of its own set of uniqueness and regional peculiarities.  South Asia is one of the poorest, most illiterate, heavily over-populated, excessively militarized and incredibly conflict prone region of the world. According to one study the adult literacy rate is about 48%, per capita income around  $309, and has a population that far exceeds a billion mark (roughly 22% of the world population) and has two of the largest military establishments.1 While global military spending has been constantly decreasing in the post-Cold War era, South Asia’s military expenditure is on the rise.2 This trend seems to be continuing. The incumbent BJP government in India has been raising the defence allocations regularly. In addition, three quarters of the total area consists of India which covers almost 70% of the total regional area, two third of its population, and roughly little more than two third of its GNP.  The tyranny of geography has manifested in such a way that almost all the countries are the neighbours of India and none of them are neighbours of each other.  This peculiar geographical factor coupled with the assertive and domineering Indian policies often generate fear and tension among other regional countries. In terms of size, apart from Pakistan, which can be classified as a medium size state, all others are small countries. South Asia accounts for one-fifth of the total population of the world. The quality of life revolves around the word ‘poor’ and ranges from poor to extremely poor.

The second unique feature is that unlike many regional organizations such as EEC or ASEAN where the existence of external threat contributed enormously towards the evolution of a common threat perception and developing a consensus view that a regional organization would prove to be an appropriate and essentially a correct response, the South Asians were not confronted with a common threat and consequently neither felt compelled to evolve a common threat perception nor motivated to respond in somewhat similar manner as was done by the members of EEC or ASEAN. However this does not mean that the South Asians were not facing any kind of threat. Indeed they were confronted with threats, which emanated either from domestic troubles or regional bickering or continuous state of miserable socio-economic conditions. While it is difficult to deny that harmony in strategic perceptions can make environment conducive for accelerated evolution of a regional organization, this does not necessarily mean that the quest for economic and social cooperation cannot be achieved without the existence of a common threat perception. The birth of ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) does not really reflect any compulsions generated by a common threat. On the contrary, the members of ECO seem to have been influenced by their quest for multinational regional cooperation with a view to creating conditions for sustained socio-economic growth.

Bilateral tensions prevented the evolution of desired harmony deemed to be so necessary for adopting a collective politico-strategic approach. Despite the non-existence of strategic harmony, the usefulness of collective approach in other areas was fully recognized by the regional countries and in consequence SAARC came into existence. It seems that South Asia could manage simultaneously both, conflict and cooperation. Unlike NATO, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, and CENTO, which were the product of a desire for collective efforts against perceived threats, SAARC was born as a genuine collective response to a desire for a regional organization that could facilitate the much-awaited cooperation and promote economic interaction among the regional countries. While the members had recognized the existing ugly realities confronting the region, it took almost four decades to accelerate the pace of incumbent march towards collective efforts in order to arrest the continuous deterioration and to attempt its reversal. Admittedly the SAARC came into existence in 1985 but the work towards its evolution had started much earlier. The earlier efforts could indeed be categorized into three stages; the first, consisted of the work put in by Foreign Secretaries and other senior officials, the second phase saw the contributions of the Foreign Ministers and in the third phase Heads of States and Governments met at the First Summit and decided to establish the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

The third significant characteristic of SAARC is that unlike  many regional organizations it was not established by the efforts of the leading countries of the region. It was the result of smaller countries’ concerted efforts.  The initiative came from the late Bangladeshi President Gen Zia-ur-Rahman. It took two years’ continuous efforts to institutionalize the idea of a South Asian regional organization. Cognizant of cultural and ethnic commonalities, the former Bangladeshi President visited most of the South Asian capitals with a view to ascertain the thinking of regional leaders regarding the establishment of a regional organization. After a series of initial discussions and consultations, the first preparatory meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the seven regional countries was held in Colombo that identified four areas (out of total of 11 areas contained in the working paper), which included telecommunication, meteorology, agriculture and rural development for immediate study and also established five study groups.3 The Katmandu meeting in November 1981 discussed the reports of the study groups and endorsed the recommendations.4

The fourth significant factor reflecting uniqueness, revolves around indigenous efforts. Unlike SEATO and CENTO, SAARC was the product of local endeavours. No outsider was involved either directly or indirectly. While many regional organization were born in response to the efforts of the interested superpowers and survived under their patronage, SAARC is not only the product of gradually increasing importance attached to the principle of regionalism but more specifically its realization by the regional states. Despite the existence of complex disputes in the region, the realization of cooperative ventures rapidly gained ground in South Asia. The need to cooperate in various non-political fields was acutely felt, which in turn accelerated the process that gave birth to SAARC.

The fifth unique aspect of the SAARC is that its main focus of emphasis is primarily on socio-economic development. However, the emphasis has to be viewed in the light of ongoing complex disputes that have frequently caused major wars and upheavals in the region. Mutual antagonism consistently trailed by exploitation of others’ difficulties had been the name of the game for both the Indians and the Pakistanis. Neither state missed the opportunities to make things difficult for the other. Yet one finds that the regional countries also felt the acute need of establishing a regional organization.

SAARC is an effort not only to cement ties among South Asian states in diplomatic, social, economic and other fields but also to promote collective self-reliance and to improve the quality of life for the South Asians. To attain these objectives seven South Asian countries decided to launch a cooperative regional organization and soon developed an understanding to apply a step-by-step collaborative approach. Within a span of less than ten years SAARC was able to identify many areas of cooperation including agriculture, forestry, health, population, meteorology, rural development, telecommunication, transport, science and technology, postal services, sports, arts, culture, women, drug trafficking, tourism etc. Admittedly most of these areas belong to peripheral region, but it was expected that successful cooperative march in these areas would influence the members to move into the core areas of cooperation. While cooperative efforts were rapidly being evolved to undertake either promotional strategies or rectifying pursuits (whatever was deemed necessary with regard to identified areas), SAARC’s progress is impeded by not only divergent attitudes of member states but also by operative political and economic constraints.  

Regional/Bilateral Impediments to Growth  

The last 16 years have seen many hurdles that have effectively hampered progress of SAARC including the regional bilateral disputes, internal instabilities, differing security perceptions, Charter’s problematic clauses and India’s self image along with some of its policies.  Perhaps the most important impediment on road to collective self-reliance is not the incumbent asymmetry and the overwhelming stature of India but how other members perceive Indian intentions, attitudes and policies. Most members of SAARC viewed Indian future intentions with reservations and apprehensions. Some are even convinced that India is out to establish its hegemony in the region. South Asia’s structure is such that there exists the overwhelming predominance of India constrained by the presence of Pakistan, which is strong enough to resist domineering attempts of India. The feelings of being subjected to hegemonic system are indeed not conducive to the accelerated evolution of collectivity. With India’s growing military might along with a significant component of nuclear capability and accompanying elaborate missile programme, it is not difficult to see why many in the region are subscribing to hegemonic theory, especially if one analyses the whole scenario within the context of ongoing bilateral disputes. Compared to India’s armed forces of 1,303,000, the total armed forces of other regional countries amount to 905,000.5 Since the region is Indo-centric and India has built up a massive military machine, the responsibility of eroding the impression of perceived Indian hegemonic pursuits devolves upon the Indian leaders. The Indians need to make extra efforts to remove such adverse impression for the greater good of the region. Besides, India must develop a framework in which it can find a style of regional leadership that the smaller regional states find palatable.

The desired level of pace towards collective efforts is also influenced by the lack of common threat perceptions. For both EEC and ASEAN, the existence of common threat perceptions acted as a cementing force. Since there exists no common threat, the security policy of member states have been evolved in congruence with individual country’s own threat perceptions. And as most of them perceive security threat from regional sources, there exist differing security perceptions. To evolve a common South Asian security perception, not only one needs to identify the common threats confronting all the South Asian states but also resolve bilateral disputes and remove the unnecessary irritants.

The idea of South Asian security has evoked as many viewpoints as there are member countries in SAARC. Most security interpretations vary from country to country in congruence with their domestic political developments and geopolitical conflict involvements and neighbourly patterns of relationships. Persistent differing security approaches are not really conducive to attain the desired level of regional cooperation. Besides, visible divergent pursuits are prone to outsiders’ exploitations. What is perhaps extremely disappointing but not surprising is that no effort to narrow down the gap between the security perceptions seems to have been undertaken by member countries. Even the radical global transformations have not been able to adequately impress upon the SAARC members to take cognizance of operative trends causing changes of far-reaching consequences in today’s world and accordingly make allowances in order to adjust to new realities.

India constitutes the core of the region. While many smaller powers are fearful of Indian future designs and want to contain India, India wants to contain the extra-regional intrusions. For its own policy objectives, India has turned to powers like USSR, USA, UK, whenever the need arose, but it has always sought to minimize the role of extra-regional powers if they are in the area because of linkages with other regional countries or if they are perceived to impede Indian policy pursuits. For the smaller countries, SAARC appears not just an association that promotes mutual cooperative ventures in economic field but also a means that could provide an alternative route to security. Concerted and collaborative efforts on the part of smaller SAARC countries may be able to cause a behavioral change in Indian attitudes and policy pursuits paving a way for collective security approach. Even the Prime Minister of India, late Rajiv Gandhi, once observed that ‘SAARC can become an approach to regional security in South Asia’.6 But the subsequent development along with the Indian policy pursuits points towards other directions.

Three Security models have evolved in most developing countries: dependency, autonomy cum partial dependency and autonomous or totally self-reliant. The first implied heavy dependence upon the outsider equalizers that made weapons and financial inputs. The second model tends to reflect a strong desire to be totally self-reliant but because of financial and technical requirements a totally autonomous status remain somewhat elusive. The third model is totally self-reliant. This model can be divided into two categories; self reliance attained through sheer hard work or self-reliance pursued either because of compulsions generated by denials and sanctions. The current thinking in most SAARC countries leads us to believe that the autonomous self-reliant model has been gaining grounds over the years. Perhaps the incumbent’s pace of development is making its desired impact on other areas as well. However, this does not mean that the option to allure the extra-regional powers is totally abandoned. While almost all smaller members of SAARC would like to retain some credible security option to seek help from outsider equalizers, the level of dependence in many ways continues to be linked with the behaviour and policies of the core country, India. This is more visible in the post Cold War era.

Undoubtedly the most important factor hampering SAARC’s progress is the ongoing bilateral disputes between different countries. Can progress be achieved in the areas of regional economic cooperation without progress in political relations?  Two responses are frequently advanced. Generally it is believed that the progress would be either totally halted or be extremely slow if the political relations are not normal. But on the other hand there are some who argue that the increased economic interaction can facilitate the amelioration of political relations. In South Asia it seems that the political relations seem to enjoy ascendancy over economic interactions. Unresolved bilateral disputes and conflicts not only effectively impede economic progress but also continue to cast a heavy shadow on the prospects of regional cooperation. It needs to be mentioned here that almost all the present disputes are India-centered. Not only India occupies 72% of the area but is also inhabited by 77% of the total population of South Asia. Among the disputes that deserve to be pointed out there are Indo-Bangladesh tensions, Indo-Sri Lankan problems, Indo-Nepali discords over transit trade, border issues, smuggling etc. and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Indo-Bangladesh tensions were accumulated over the years because of water-sharing problems, illegal cross-border migration of Bangladeshis into neighbouring Indian states and control of coastal island of Talpatty. Indeed the most complex Indo-Bangladeshi problem revolves around the sharing of Ganges water. The normal flow of Ganges water into Bangladesh has been severely curtailed by India’s construction of the Farakka Barrage and the withdrawn waters are diverted through a man-made channel network to flush the silt afflicting Calcutta (Kolkata) harbour. With rapidly increasing population that is traditionally dependent upon river-based economy, deprivation of waters during lean seasons is indeed a great loss. Another significant development that has acquired prominence recently is periodic border clashes.

Indo-Sri Lankan problems were of recent origin if compared with other Indian neighbours. Indo-Sri Lankan problems are the direct outcome of India’s assertion of self-visualised domineering role in South Asia. Historically, Indo-Sri Lankan relations have remained cordial and tension-free. However, the last two decades have witnessed gradual deterioration of relationships primarily because of  ‘India’s hegemonic interference in the domestic affairs of its weak southern neighbour’. With the covert and overt support to Island’s Tamils by both the Central and State (Tamil Nadu) governments, a situation of armed confrontation developed initially, which was latter transformed into an armed conflict. The conflict managed to survive even with the arrival of the IPKF under the 1987 Accord and its subsequent departure from the Island. Indo-Nepali complications are a product of India’s continuous desire to maintain a tight control over Nepalese trade with other countries. In addition, the presence of large numbers of Indians in the Southern regions of Nepal has also caused periodic frictions.

Finally, the dispute that has dominated the region since India’s independence is the ongoing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. It is neither necessary nor intended to give a detailed history of this dispute here but it needs to be stressed that this dispute can be easily resolved if both parties agree to have sustained negotiations with a resolute determination not to allow it to take any further time-toll. Besides, the negotiations need to employ innovative approaches and come up with rational and feasible options. An honest and concerted effort could produce something that can be regarded as long awaited panacea. The magnitude of the cost involved in denying the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir is indeed enormous for India as well as for the region. The Kashmir dispute embittered relationships between India and Pakistan since partition in 1947 and has caused three major wars (1948, 1965, 1971) and innumerable border clashes. Over the years enormous resources have been allocated to military preparedness primarily because of the impending danger of war stemming from the ongoing dispute over Kashmir. With the advent of intensified indigenous struggle for the exercise of their right of self-determination, the situation in Kashmir has become acutely complex and the tensions between India and Pakistan have also acquired alarming proportion. The tragedy of the situation is that the magnitude of economy-wrecking cost involved is fully realized by both parties, yet a major sustained effort to resolve this dispute appears to remain somewhat elusive. Hopes were raised to unrealistic levels at the time of Agra Summit in July 2001, that substantive progress would be made towards the desired resolution of the dispute but once again the domestic Indian politics took a very heavy toll of anticipated progress. While one had to recognize the fact, that Agra did initiate a positive process which was not allowed to reach its logical crescendo, the future efforts need to be concentrated to involve SAARC also in the desired peace process.  

Limited Benefits Against Unique Potentials  

To deny the existence of the above-mentioned powerful impediments that are hampering progress is indeed an exercise in futility. Many forceful factors exist that are exercising influence to accelerate the desired progress towards collaborative approach. Among the positive factors that are pushing the region towards collective pursuits include quest for accelerated economic development, realization of futility of continuous conflicting relationships and emerging imperatives of the post-Cold War era. First, South Asia is one of the poorest regions of the world where further strains are generated by the rapid population growth. Increased realization of developmental needs have pushed all the seven member countries towards a collective approach. SAARC is probably one regional organization that owes its origin to such realization rather than being a product of political compulsions. Programmes like poverty alleviation or SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement) and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) are indicative of emerging consciousness. With the radical global transformation and shrinking of external funds, efforts are being directed to resolve the major problems such as poverty through local resources or vis-à-vis, the collective regional efforts. Not only is the burden of poverty spread unevenly throughout the world but also almost half of the developing world’s poor live in South Asia. Compared to the total number of poor people in the developing world, 1,214 million, the number of the poor in South Asia in 1998 was 522 million. It was projected to register a marginal decrease by the year 2000 and is likely to be around 511 million.7

All of the South Asian countries are viewed as relatively poor states. South Asia’s average per capita income of $309 is much below the $555 for sub-Saharan Africa and $970 in all developing countries.8 Indeed not only the collective SAARC approach is probably a practical way to deal with such an overwhelming problem but also basic rationale of regional cooperation is an effective strategy to solve common problems and to promote common interests of a given region. One constructive approach to eradicate poverty is to move ahead with a balanced overall development strategy. Indeed this strategy requires walking unambiguously on two legs, two equally strong strategic legs; one, that of modernization; and the other that of poverty alleviation. A critical review of this strategy clearly indicates that it makes sense. The existence of a large section of a society living under poverty conditions is bound to take a heavy toll of developmental processes. Climbing up the mountain with a heavy load attached to the legs makes the progress rather difficult and painfully slow.  Nevertheless concentration in most Third World countries was upon growth-orientated strategies. It was thought fit to accord top priorities to modernization and industrialization and the poor were compelled to wait for trickle-down effects. At some later stages somewhat unsuccessful efforts were made to speed up the trickle-down effects. Various other strategies were also employed periodically but the end-result was once again somewhat frustrating.

The poverty alleviation pursuits of SAARC are indeed commendable and need to be supported whole heartedly. However it needs to be stressed that no poverty alleviation programme is likely to pay desired dividends unless the target sector of society participates and no poor person is likely to be an active participant unless she/he acutely realizes the need to improve her/his lot. Awareness, realization, encouragement and opportunities could transform such efforts into a real success story. In addition attention needs to be also focused on the elimination of corruption and internal violence.

The emerging realities of the post-Cold War era are markedly different from those of the Cold War era. This is the second significant factor. The Cold War era was predominantly influenced by political imperatives in which economic instruments were used as tools to cater for the eventual attainment of political objectives. The ground realities of the post-Cold War era point towards the emergence of economic imperatives. The climate governing international aid and trade has undergone a radical transformation and the emerging change appears to be more detrimental to the interests of Third World countries. Such realities compel not just an increase in the South-South trade but also to accord high priority to trade within the region. Almost all SAARC countries are acutely aware of the restricted financial outflow from developed countries, the reduction of aid, rapidly increasing the debt burden which is taking an unacceptable toll of indigenous resources, adverse terms of trade, the tendency of the rich countries to introduce more and more barriers against the struggling Third World countries.

At the time of SAARC’s birth, it was agreed in the Dhaka Declaration of 7 December, 1985 to liberalize trade as early as possible through a step-by-step approach and to prevent marginalisation of South Asia’s trade in the larger global interest, yet it has taken almost a decade to arrive at a feasible and practical approach to encourage trade within the region. During the Seventh SAARC Summit, SAPTA was signed to facilitate free trading within South Asia. SAPTA allowed member states to import commodities from one another with 10 per cent lower tariff than those imposed on items from non-SAARC countries. The fundamental principles governing the agreement are reciprocity and natural advantages for all member nations taking into account their respective levels of economic and industrial development and other relevant factors. Excessive cautiousness by the regional governmental leaders had somewhat inadvertently slowed the movement towards the preferential trading arrangement. But given the operative protective trading practices over the last few decades and the periodically emerging bilateral disputes, the slow progress in field of economic relations is quite understandable. The draft for SAFTA was also approved in 1999, which was supposed to have been presented to the Heads of Government in 11^th Summit at Katmandu.

The gradual realization of benefits that can accrue from a collective approach is the third important factor. Individual efforts may not produce the desired level of dividends whereas the collective approach may generate benefits much beyond expectations. Collective approach is far more conducive to the optimization of regional resources than individual panaceas. An integrated management of Himalayas water resources could usefully satisfy the needs of many involved countries at a much cheaper cost and without any political toll. Sharing of experiences and technological skills could enormously enrich the member countries. While the shared heritage and geographic proximity generated fear and concerns for smaller regional negihbours, it is also recognized by smaller states that the most productive and constructive path is via SAARC’s collective pursuits. Admittedly, sometimes projected apprehensions are somewhat exaggerated and geared to suit domestic compulsions of the smaller neighbours, but it is equally true that at times India’s inept handling of sensitive issues accentuated their fears.

Growing realization of not to be left behind and miss the race for progress through multilateral efforts is now gripping the region. Quest for joint ventures and emphasis on speedy movement towards a free trade area, customs union and common market is the product of newfound comprehension of emerging realities. Despite the fact that the current levels of trade within the region are minimal and items agreed for preferential tariff are few and somewhat unimportant, the move to introducing the concept of preferential treatment in trading area and the quest for SAFTA are indeed welcome steps.

  Need for Re-examination to Enhance SAARC’s Benefits  

While the underlying notion of regional organization is to foster comprehensive cooperation within the region, the future of any regional organization is heavily dependent upon the goodwill of the participating nations. And goodwill is often the product of incumbent political and economic conditions. What one has to recognize is that regional cooperative organization is a form of multilateral interaction guided by the principle of collective advantage. South Asia must develop a framework in which both the big and small countries of the region can work harmoniously with a vision of collective benefits in the 21st Century. While the obsession with the size and dominance of the larger regional country needs to be shredded, the powerful regional neighbour also needs to opt for a more realistic outlook giving due considerations to smaller regional countries’ sensitivities. Indeed there are problems that are going to adversely affect the pace of cooperation but it must be stressed that the time has come to overcome the shackles of troubled heritage.

India’s request for postponement of 11^th SAARC Summit, which was supposed to have taken place in Katmandu from 26-28 November 1999 because of the advent of a military regime in Pakistan, was indeed unnecessary. It needs to be pointed out here that the first SAARC Summit in Dhaka in 1985 was hosted by General Ershad and attended by military ruler, General Zia ul Haq in which India enthusiastically participated. Besides, India seems to have a dual policy with regard to military regimes. While India has strengthened its trading relations with the military regime of Myanmar, it used the excuse of military regime in Pakistan for securing the undesired postponement of SAARC’s 11^th Summit. Perhaps that is why even some Indians also viewed the postponement of  SAARC Summit on India’s insistence as `South Bloc’s fit of morality’.9

The postponement of  SAARC Summit in 1999 was the second in its 15 years old history. SAARC is not expected to promote any particular kind of political or economic system. It is up to the member state to accept or reject any system they deem fit in their wisdom and in congruence with their own requirements and developments. SAARC is not expected to involve itself in the internal affairs of a member state. Not many SAARC countries shared the Indian view as they thought that the unwanted delay in holding the Summit amounts to undesired setback for regional cooperation generating further strains in Indo-Pakistan relationships.10

Not only the SAARC Charter specifically stresses strict adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and Non Alignment but also it repeatedly asserts the application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs and political independence. Yet India in its wisdom deemed fit to sacrifice the collective interests of the SAARC countries in order to cater for its own interests. While all other members were keen to attend the Summit, India decided to opt for postponement. To pursue its own policy, India appears to be more than willing to impose and override all other considerations in order to secure and advance its own interests. The nature of any regime in any member country can be approved or disapproved on a bilateral basis. Perhaps the underlying principle of Article X that excludes the bilateral contentious issues from the formal deliberations was to avoid the unnecessary impediments that could effectively arrest the progress. If a member is going to seek the postponement of SAARC Summit on the basis that it does not like the colour of a regime’s clothes, perhaps then it is time to seriously ponder over the efficacy of Article X and re-examine and modify it in congruence with the dictates of time.  Article X states that decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity. Decision to postpone the SAARC summit was not taken unanimously. Perhaps there is a need to reformulate the Article X in order to cater for such eventualities in which one state wants the postponement while many other members may desire the holding of the summit on the already agreed dates. 

It is indeed strange that SAARC excludes discussion on bilateral contentious issues whereas most of the problems in South Asia are of bilateral nature.  While the Male summit recognized the usefulness of informal political consultations, ‘there is no formal institutionalized process of discussion of bilateral political disputes among member states within the existing framework of SAARC’.11 Indeed political discussions do take place on a wide variety of matters including contentious bilateral issues. What is lacking is the mechanism for formalizing and regularizing the informal discussions on contentious bilateral issues. The preamble seems to be no more than a decoration of the Charter especially if you read the third clause stressing to enhance cooperation within their respective political and economic system. Nowhere it mentions that a particular form of political or economic system is preferable or more sanctified than the others. Besides seeking unnecessary disruption of a collective endeavor to suit one’s own political taste does not augur well for future development of a regional organization.

The two general provisions that are impeding SAARC’s progress are part of Article X and revolve around the ‘unanimity of decision’ and the exclusion of ‘bilateral and contentious issues’ from its deliberations. Unanimity is deemed to sine qua non for any decision-making in SAARC and indeed it has merits but the ‘dogmatic application of the principle of unanimity has considerably reduced the intra-SAARC cooperation.12 As stated above that almost all of the troubles within South Asia fall within the ambit of bilateral relationships, time has come to re-examine or even amend the Charter. If both provisions that are effectively impeding progress cannot be modified, at least efforts need to be directed to modify provisions relating to discussion on bilateral contentious issues. Unless and until bilateral disputes are allowed to be subjected to some form of regular collective discussions, the chances for improving atmosphere would remain somewhat clouded unnecessarily and periodic setbacks would continue to take a much heavier toll than what the actual situation warrants. It is also possible that allowing the discussion on bilateral issues may generate tensions and give birth to undesired hurdles but then it is still much better than pushing the contentious issues under the carpet. For how long can we opt for evasion and avoid facing the real issues? Continued avoidance of bilateral contentious issues or disputes reflects the weakness of commitment to enhance the strength of a multilateral regional organization. Time has come to re-examine the Charter and revamp the SAARC structure with a view to making it a more effective multilateral regional organization. The challenge of transforming the incumbent conflict situations into one of complementarity of interests require concerted efforts and deserves sincere cooperation of all the governments as well as of the people.

One way to make SAARC more effective is to formalize the informal meetings of leaders prior to formal discussion under Charter obligations. Adversarial relationships can be made less potent by holding meetings on contentious issues. Seminars, Conferences and Press Conferences need to be encouraged and arranged before the Summit with the expressed intentions of providing options to the leaders. Not only the regularizations of informal meetings of heads of adversaries’ governments need to be strengthened but also the options discussed in seminars should be tabled for considerations. 

As far as the principle of unanimity is concerned, time has come to suitably modify it. For the time being the unanimity principle may be retained at the Summit level only but at all other levels (Council of Minister and Standing Committees) the principle of two third majorities may be employed. Alternatively provisions need to be made to cater for such eventualities like the postponement caused by one member’s desire. During the Summit the unanimity principle may continue to be applied for all decisions but to apply the consensus principle even for the holding of the Summit needs to be subjected to a process of re-examination.

Another development that can be extremely useful for future work of SAARC is to consider the expansion and strengthening of the SAARC Secretariat. Increasing realization of the importance and usefulness of collective approaches and cooperation warrants that the Secretariat be made more meaningful and effective. While major policy decisions and guidelines should continue to remain within the domain and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers and Summits, there is a need to invest the Secretariat with more authority and expertise in order to initiate and undertake new projects, research studies and dynamic initiatives.13

Given the internal tensions of the South Asian countries as well as their regional disputes, a regional consensus approach through an institutionalized structure may appear to be desirable but in practical terms this approach is likely to hamper progress rather effectively.  Admittedly each summit contributes, however marginal it may be, towards progress in different areas of SAARC activities, the need of the hour is to accelerate the dividend paying process. To effectively revive and sustain the SAARC process, not only all positive measures need to be enthusiastically supported but negative development should also be subjected to arresting mechanism. Any development that can damage the SAARC spirit should be effectively checked. Time is certainly ripe for rethinking with the objective of improving the SAARC process.n