Aly Zaman*

Introduction

ever before in modern history has a country dominated the earth so totally as the United States does today…America is now the Schwarzenegger of international politics: showing off muscles, obtrusive, intimidating…The Americans, in the absence of limits put to them by anybody or anything, act as if they own a kind of blank check in their ‘Mcworld.’”[1]

America is not simply the most powerful country in the world, or even the most dominant nation in human history. It is, in fact, the most potent and pervasive empire that this world has ever witnessed. Militarily, it is far ahead of its nearest competitors; economically, its capitalist doctrines hold the entire world in their thrall; culturally, its values and ideas have left their mark wherever its media tools have managed to penetrate. For over four decades after the end of the Second World War, however, the worldwide imposition of the Pax Americana was delayed and deterred by the Soviet Union, an empire in its own right, though nowhere near as formidable as America. Thanks to its inherent internal weaknesses and ill-advised foreign adventures–not to mention the relentless pressure placed on it by America–the Soviet empire crumbled in 1991, leaving behind a world dominated by a single superpower.

Some months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a US-led coalition had declared war on Iraq, after the latter invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Iraq was swiftly subdued, but its brutal ruler, Saddam Hussein, was allowed to remain in charge. The rationale behind this decision soon became apparent. During the war, the US had set up military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, and it needed to keep alive the spectre of a psychotic Saddam Hussein breathing down the necks of his nervous neighbours to justify a prolonged military presence in the oil-rich and strategically-located Persian Gulf. Setting up bases has been a regular practice of all empires, and the US has been no different. After every major war in which America has been involved, it has left behind bases to ensure its continued involvement and intervention in the years to come. The Second World War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War provide ample testimony not only of America’s predilection for setting up overseas bases but also of its utmost reluctance to relinquish them, even when the presumed threat has become non-existent.

The establishment of US bases in Central Asia in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 must be viewed in this historical context. Just as America used the Second World War and the Cold War to justify an indefinite military presence in Europe, the Korean War to station over 37000 troops in South Korea, and the Gulf War to maintain men and materials in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, in much the same way, it has used the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington and the consequent “war against terrorism” to establish a long-term presence in Central Asia. The region is blessed with enormous energy reserves, it is rich in minerals, and its geographical location is critical to the success of US efforts in two key areas: the “war against terrorism” and the containment of Russia, China, and Iran.

Throughout the 1990s, US policy towards the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) was characterized by a fair degree of ambivalence, which sometimes created confusion both in Washington as well as the region about America’s real motives in Central Asia. Initially, the primary US concern was the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons left behind in Central Asia. During the mid-1990s, the region’s oil and gas assumed great importance in Washington, so much so that, for some time, the US tacitly supported the hardline Taliban regime’s takeover of Afghanistan, on account of the fact that a strong central government in Kabul would facilitate US oil giant, Unocal, in its attempt to lay a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, and onwards to Pakistan and India, thereby avoiding both Russia and Iran. When that particular plan was shelved due to Afghanistan’s chronic instability, Central Asia’s importance in Washington’s eyes began to dwindle. The authoritarianism of the Central Asian leadership came under criticism, as did human rights violations within the republics. Apart from the disillusionment with the region created by the scrapping of the pipeline plan, another major reason that restrained the US from adopting a more proactive policy in Central Asia was the Clinton administration’s emphasis on engaging Russia; it was not considered politically worthwhile to risk alienating Russia by encroaching into its “near abroad.”

The advent of the second Bush administration heralded a major shift in US foreign policy objectives in Central Asia. Many in the administration, including Bush himself, were closely linked to oil companies in the US and favoured a more aggressive penetration of Central Asia to exploit its oil wealth, regardless of any adverse effects on the relationship with Russia. The Central Asian approach was part of an overall strategy of “full-spectrum dominance,” devised by neo-conservative elements in the administration to ensure American hegemony over the entire world.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington presented a tremendous opportunity to the US to extend its involvement in Central Asia. Alleged terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden, was held responsible for the attacks, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that was providing him refuge was deemed guilty by association. A massive bombing campaign against Afghanistan was planned, to be followed by a ground invasion, aimed at eliminating whatever remained of the Taliban and bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. Three of the CARs–Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan–have borders with Afghanistan, which made them critically important to an effective prosecution of the American campaign. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan provided bases to the Americans in exchange for generous financial assistance, while Turkmenistan granted overflight rights to US warplanes. Subsequently, the US managed to construct a base in Kyrgyzstan as well, even though it does not share a border with Afghanistan. America’s military presence in Central Asia is currently on a scale that it was unimaginable prior to 9/11; it is now the security manager of the region, much to the alarm of its major rivals: Russia, China, and Iran. All three of them already feel sufficiently encircled by American military involvement in other areas (Russia by NATO’s eastward expansion, China by the American support to Taiwan, and Iran by the bases in the Persian Gulf).

As has been the case in the Persian Gulf, the US will maintain a long-term presence in Central Asia, prop up repressive regimes to stem the rising tide of Islamic radicalism, and insinuate its oil companies into the region to develop routes that will bypass Russia and Iran. Considering the region’s volatility, these objectives will not be easily attained, which is why the US administration has made it clear that it intends to remain in Central Asia for a long time to come.

The aim of this paper is to examine the evolution of American policy towards Central Asia, the nature of the present level of its involvement in the region, and the objectives that America intends to attain through that involvement. It also tries to analyse the implications for major regional powers like Russia, China, and Iran, which have their own interests in Central Asia and are deeply concerned about possible US designs to undermine them.

The Evolution of American Policy in Central Asia

Prior to the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US campaign in Afghanistan, the average American citizen, already notoriously ignorant of the world outside America, knew next to nothing about Central Asia. The five CARs–Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan–were amongst the least accessible territories of the erstwhile republics of the Soviet Union, and had been jealously concealed behind the Iron Curtain from the inquisitive gaze of both the capitalist West as well as the Muslim co-religionists of the CARs in their immediate neighbourhood, such as Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. After the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, the CARs became sovereign entities; although independence had finally arrived, it was more a case of freedom being thrust upon the CARs than their having struggled for it. For over 70 years, they had been subjected to total Soviet control. The predominantly Russian leadership of the Soviet Union had, for all intents and purposes, colonized the region. Under Stalin’s collectivization campaigns, there had been massive displacements of the indigenous populations in Central Asia and the march towards rapid industrialization led to an enormous migration of ethnic Russians into the region. With every passing year, Central Asia became increasingly dependent upon those Russians for the conduct of even the most basic activities.[2]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the painful decades of subjugation came to an end and the five CARs unexpectedly found themselves transformed into independent states. Initially, courageous statements emanated from some of the Central Asian leaders, suggesting the charting of a course for the region that would be free from the shackles of Russian hegemony.[3] But such sentiments, although praiseworthy, ignored certain key realities that necessitated continued dependence upon Russia. First, there was a glaring absence of an indigenous officer corps. In 1992, 70 per cent of all officers in Kazakhstan were Russian citizens; in Uzbekistan, an identical percentage of officers spoke only Russian; while in Turkmenistan, as many as 95 per cent of the officers were of Slavic origin.[4] Secondly, the leaders of the CARs felt that their resources were too scarce and their national concerns too pressing for them to form a confederation and make a clean break from Russia.[5] And finally, there was a general acknowledgement on the part of the CARs that they were not equipped to provide for their own security independently. These reasons combined to lead them “back into the arms of Mother Russia”.[6]

The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1992 testified to Russia’s pre-eminent status as the chief guarantor of the security of the newly independent republics. All the CARs joined the CIS and, later that year, four of them also signed the Collective Security Treaty, Turkmenistan being the only exception. As far as the CARs were concerned, the Treaty did meet their basic security requirements. One of its provisions precluded the signatories from joining any security alignment that could undermine the security of any of the others.[7] In this manner, Russia was legally justified in monitoring the foreign relations of the CARs, while the CARs had a security guarantee that they felt would promote stability within the region. Now that the US has a military presence in Central Asia and is making generous financial contributions to bolster the CARs’ impoverished economies, the Collective Security Treaty has lost much of its relevance. But throughout the 1990s, the US found it extremely difficult to break the Russian stranglehold on Central Asian affairs.

At the time the CARs became independent, America’s foremost policy objective in the region was the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The collapse of the Soviet Union had left Kazakhstan in exclusive possession of one of the world’s largest arsenals of nuclear weapons: as many as 104 SS-19 ballistic missiles, with more than a thousand warheads, remained behind.[8] Considering the political and economic travails that assailed the CARs after independence, there was considerable anxiety in Washington that the weapons would either be stolen or else purchased by undesirable nations, groups, or individuals. By May 1995, however, all nuclear weapons on Kazakh soil had been removed.

During the mid-1990s, America became an enthusiastic participant in the race for access to the enormous oil and gas deposits of Central Asia. America itself possesses only 3 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves and, with less than 5 per cent of the world’s population, it nevertheless accounts for over 25 per cent of the world’s oil consumption.[9] Imports account for 60 per cent of America’s daily oil consumption, with 13 per cent of that coming from the Persian Gulf.[10] It is estimated that, by 2050, Central Asia could account for 80 per cent of America’s oil supply.[11] Keeping in mind these startling figures, it is hardly surprising that, even before the US had established embassies in each of the new republics, major US oil companies, encouraged by energy giant Chevron’s earlier discovery of oil and gas in Kazakhstan, had arrived to take stock of the region’s energy potential.[12] The competition for pipelines between the US, Russia, Iran, China, Turkey, and Pakistan became known as the New Great Game. The original Great Game, played out in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had involved only two participants: czarist Russia and imperial Britain, locked in a titanic struggle for ascendancy in Central Asia. The New Great Game had many competitors, all striving for one prize: pipelines.

America’s main objective in the New Great Game was to break the existing Russian monopoly over both Central Asian energy development as well as the transportation of that energy to the outside world. In 1995, Unocal, a US energy company, came up with a plan to build a gas pipeline from Daulatabad in Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, and onwards to the Pakistani city of Multan. The US government gave the plan its complete support, mainly on account of the fact that the proposed pipeline would avoid routes leading through Russia and Iran. But for the pipeline to become a realistic possibility, the internecine civil strife that had engulfed Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal would have to come to an end, and a strong central government would have to be in place in Kabul to maintain peace. With this end in mind, both Unocal and the US administration welcomed the takeover of Kabul by the hardline Taliban regime in 1996.[13] It was only when feminists in the US began to protest against the discriminatory treatment of women by the Taliban did the Clinton administration distance itself from them.[14] The official severance of any ties that might have remained was confirmed in 1998, after the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The attacks were believed to have been masterminded by Osama bin Laden, who at that time had taken refuge with the Taliban. Thirteen days after the bombing, the US fired 70 cruise missiles at bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan.[15] Needless to say, Unocal’s pipeline plan was immediately shelved.

Even before Afghanistan’s volatility put breaks to US plans for tapping into Central Asia’s oil wealth, there was a school of thought in Washington that argued against an increased American presence in the region on the plea that it would antagonize Russia. Strobe Talbott, the Russo-centric Deputy Secretary of State, was particularly keen to prevent any move that might be construed by Moscow as American encroachment into its backyard.[16] But as Russia’s economic condition became increasingly chaotic, Talbott’s policy of engagement came under bitter criticism from conservative elements in the US administration and in Congress, the extremely powerful Jewish lobbies in Washington, and US oil companies. It was then that the US decided to put its weight behind Unocal. By 1997, however, disillusionment with the region had begun to set in. In that year, Talbott delivered a major address on the US approach towards Central Asia in which he emphasized that America had no binding interests in the region and did not harbour any ambition to “plant its flag” in Central Asia as a participant in the New Great Game.[17] America felt no need to have an immediate presence in Central Asia; its interests would be served equally well–if not better–if the region remained “a no-man’s land outside any other power’s sphere of influence.”[18]

This hands-off approach continued till the end of the Clinton administration. By that time, relations between the US and the CARs had reached a difficult stage. The region’s standing in the West had gone down considerably on account of reports of widespread corruption, increasing despotism, and a lack of progress on economic reform.[19] Experts in the US began to envisage the CARs “not as the next generation of Asian tigers but as the next wave of failed states.”[20]

While the Clinton administration maintained a careful distance from Central Asia, the Bush administration that took office in 2001 chose to adopt a more aggressive approach towards the region, mainly on account of the tempting prospects for energy development that it offered. The administration is dominated by individuals with links to the powerful US oil lobby. President George W. Bush’s family has itself been running oil companies since the 1950s.[21] His father, the first President Bush, made millions during the Texas oil boom in the 1950s and 1960s. In the process, he inevitably developed close ties with many in the oil industry, whose interests he then faithfully served during his long years in Washington’s corridors of power.[22] Amongst the major contributors to several of the Bush family’s political enterprises was, rather ironically, the bin Laden family of Saudi Arabia.[23]

The current President Bush kicked off his business career in the 1970s by setting up his own oil company.[24] His Vice-President, Dick Cheney, spent the late 1990s as the chief executive of Halliburton, the world’s largest oil services company. Even at that time, Cheney fully appreciated the tremendous energy potential of the Caucasus and Central Asia: “I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian.”[25] President Bush’s National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, sat on the board of Chevron during the early 1990s, while the Commerce Secretary, Donald Evans, remained the CEO of a natural gas firm for more than a decade.[26] Richard Armitage, currently the Deputy Secretary of State, was contracted by Unocal to work on Central Asia pipeline interests in 1997.[27] The US special envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, also served as an adviser to Unocal and took part in talks between the company and the Taliban in 1997.[28] Never has a US administration been so dominated by oil interests as it is today.

Oil played as much a role in precipitating the US bombing of Afghanistan in October 2001 as did Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. Afghanistan itself has very little oil and gas of its own; its real importance lies in its geographical position as the gateway to Central Asia. America was never unmindful of this fact: its tacit support to the Taliban in 1996-7 was motivated by the need for a strong government in Afghanistan that would pave the way for US-sponsored pipelines from Central Asia. Continued transportation through Russia would have prolonged that country’s economic and political control over the region, while pipelines through Iran were also unacceptable, as they would have benefited a regime unfriendly to the US. A secure Afghanistan was considered the best option.

By providing refuge to Osama bin Laden, the Taliban signed their own death warrant. Previously, the US had seen them as the only party capable of ensuring a secure Afghanistan. By 2001, however, the reasoning in Washington had changed; it was now thought that Afghanistan could be secured only if the Taliban were removed. Even before 11 September, plans were well under way to eliminate the Taliban. In May 2001, there was a meeting in Geneva between American, Iranian, German, and Italian officials, where the main topic was devising a strategy to remove the Taliban and put in place a “broad-based government”.[29] The topic was deliberated further at a G-8 summit in Geneva in July 2001.[30] A few days after the summit, secret negotiations took place in Berlin between US, Russian, German, and Pakistani officials. Later, the Pakistani officials, on condition of anonymity, described a plan devised by the US around the end of July 2001 to conduct military strikes against the Taliban from bases in Tajikistan before mid-October.[31]

11 September merely served as the pretext for launching a war that had been planned long before. Yet, very few analysts in the American media highlighted this fact, or the hugely important role played by the oil factor in determining the parameters of the “war against terrorism”. One of those rare few was a commentary by Frank Viviano in the San Francisco Chronicle of 26 September 2001 in which he observed: “The hidden stakes in the war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil. The map of terrorist sanctuaries in the Middle East and Central Asia is also, to an extraordinary degree, a map of the world’s principal energy sources in the 21^st century….”[32]

Ever since the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent campaign in Afghanistan, the US has managed to increase its involvement in Central Asian affairs to an extent hitherto considered unimaginable. At present, it has bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and, as was the case in the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War in 1991, there is every indication that these bases will remain in place well into the future. Ostensibly set up to facilitate America’s campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the bases actually signify its determination to establish a permanent foothold in a region of immense geo-strategic importance and enormous untapped energy resources.

In her testimony before the Senate Sub-Committee on Central Asia and the Caucasus on 13 December 2001, Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, professed America’s commitment to ensuring political and economic reform, respect for human rights, and the establishment of a “just society” in Central Asia.[33] In other words, the US is trying to establish a correlation between the long-term presence of its troops in Central Asia and the improvement of the region’s internal conditions. Such reasoning is designed merely to hoodwink and mislead; American forces have been present in large numbers in the Persian Gulf for the past twelve years but there has been no corresponding change in the despotic nature of the regimes in that region. And Central Asia will be no different: as long as America’s strategic interests are secured, democracy and human rights issues will not be strenuously pursued.

            When America talks about bringing stability to Central Asia, it actually means creating an environment that will provide maximum protection to American interests in the region. Promotion of democracy and protection of human rights are, at best, only secondary interests. The real objectives are: 

i)               making the region a veritable bonanza for US oil companies;

ii)             curbing the influence of Russia, China, and Iran; and,

iii)            eradicating Islamic radicalism.

            In pursuance of these objectives, the US has made optimum use of the opportunities afforded to it after 11 September 2001 to increase its military presence in Central Asia. The Manas base in Kyrgyzstan houses 3000 US soldiers, and Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev himself revealed that the number would eventually increase to 5000.[34] The base has an area of 27 acres and is equipped with a 13000-foot runway.[35] Troops are housed in 10-man tents that have floors and a heating system.[36] The base has 24 fighter bombers, including F-15e and FA-18 aircraft, as well as C-130 cargo planes and six KC-135 refuelling planes.[37] The lease of the base is valid for only a year but, considering the lavish scale on which construction has already taken place, it is unlikely that the Americans will be winding up operations any time soon.

              The Karsi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan is a “semi-permanent” one, consisting of heavy-duty tents equipped with latrines, water-purification systems, and work facilities.[38] There are between 1000 and 2000 troops present at the base.[39] It was made available to the US in October 2001, along with a considerable number of airfields, in return for an American guarantee that Uzbekistan’s security would be protected.[40] In December 2001, Tajikistan also announced that it would provide air bases for US forces, with Kulyab, Khojand, and Kurgan-Tyube coming under consideration.[41] In 2002, transport planes from the US, France, and Italy used the Kulyab airfield to move troops, munitions, and various other essential commodities to Afghanistan.[42]

At the outset of the “war against terrorism”, the US publicly gave the impression that its presence in Central Asia was merely a short-term necessity for ensuring victory against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In private, however, US officials admitted that they were there to stay.[43] Even after the Taliban had been routed and Osama bin Laden had been compelled to become a fugitive, the US gave no indication of withdrawing from Central Asia and justified its continued presence by now publicly suggesting that the “war against terrorism” would be “long” and “open-ended.”[44] While visiting Japan in January 2002, President Bush himself stated: “We stand more committed than ever to a forward presence in this [Central Asian] region.”[45] Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defence and arguably the most hawkish member of the administration, maintained that the bases in Central Asia “send a message to everybody, including important countries like Uzbekistan, that we have a capacity to come back in and will come back in–we’re not just going to forget about them.”[46] General Tommy Franks, Commander Central Command (CENTCOM), initially denied allegations that the US intended to establish permanent military bases in Central Asia: “What we do is we work together (with other countries) to have forces that come and go.”[47] Later on, however, he contradicted his own statement; on a visit to Uzbekistan in August 2002, he declared that the American military presence in Central Asia would increase, the Americans would expand military ties with the CARs, and US forces would stay on longer than expected.[48] 

US Objectives and their Implications

American military expansionism in Central Asia is designed to achieve certain objectives that the Bush administration views as critical to the retention of US hegemony over the entire world. 

Securing the Region’s Oil and Gas

As mentioned before, several of the leading members in the present US administration, including President Bush himself, have close relations with leading US oil conglomerates. Both Vice-President Cheney, as the CEO of Halliburton, and National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, as a board member of Chevron, devoted considerable attention to the tantalizing prospects for energy development in Central Asia. In 1994, Cheney facilitated a deal between Chevron and Kazakhstan in his capacity as a member on the latter’s Oil Advisory Board.[49] In a speech in 1998, he decried the US policy of imposing sanctions on oil-rich countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Azerbaijan: “The good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas only where there are democratic regimes friendly to the US.”[50] Later that year, he said: “You’ve got to go where the oil is.”[51] With Cheney as Vice-President, America is doing just that.

            Condoleezza Rice joined Chevron’s board in 1991 and performed sufficiently well for the company to name an oil-tanker after her.[52] She was reportedly hired for her expertise on the former Soviet states and spent much of her time at Chevron working on prospective energy deals in the Caspian region.[53]  By 1993, Chevron had concluded a $20 billion deal with Kazakhstan to develop its Tengiz oil-field.[54]

With Rice as National Security Advisor, it is highly probable that Chevron will play a major role in future US energy enterprises in the region. In fact, the wheels have already been set in motion: towards the end of 2001, the first new pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium–a joint venture, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Oman, Chevron-Texaco, and Exxon-Mobil–was officially opened. The $2.65 billion pipeline links Tengiz to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The White House is now envisaging a network of multiple pipelines, including Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Baku–Supsa, and Baku–Novorossiysk.[55] The Unocal gas-pipeline project also appears to have been revived; on 27 December 2002, an agreement was signed by Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to carry Turkmenistan’s natural gas to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan, thereby avoiding undesirable routes through Russia and Iran.[56] The US looks well set to achieve its long-standing dream of controlling Caspian oil and gas, thereby ending Russia’s monopoly and significantly reducing its own dependence on OPEC oil. 

Containing Russia, China, and Iran

Another key US objective in Central Asia is to restrict the influence of important regional players like Russia, China, and Iran. Russia stands to lose the most from a long-term US presence in Central Asia. Ever since the CARs became independent, Russia has been the most influential external player in the region, both through its monopoly over energy transportation as well as by virtue of its position as the guardian of the Republics’ territorial integrity. Many in Russia’s official circles are of the opinion that it has a distinct set of economic and security interests in the region, which other powers should be obliged to respect.[57] Russian foreign policy pundits and security specialists fear that any increased US involvement in the region will be the prelude to an eventual military presence.[58] With American troops now present in three CARs and showing no signs of an imminent withdrawal, it appears that those fears are by no means unfounded.

America’s determined stride into Central Asia has awakened Russia to the painful reality that it is no longer the pre-eminent power in the region. Initially, there were strong protests issued by many in the Russian political and military hierarchy against nascent American expansionism into Russia’s “near abroad.” In January 2002, the speaker of the Russian Parliament, Gennady Seleznev, stated that Russia would not approve of even the “appearance” of permanent US bases in Central Asia.[59] Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, maintained that Russia viewed the US military presence in Central Asia as a temporary measure and expected it to leave as soon as the anti-terrorist operation was completed.[60] General Konstantin Totsky, head of the Russian Federal Border-Guard Service, warned that if the US tried to establish a prolonged military presence in Central Asia, Russia and the US would be unlikely to remain friends.[61]

With the passage of time, however, Russian protestations have become much more muted, a clear indication of Russia’s diminishing clout in the region, as well as of its disinclination to take on America. And the erosion of its influence is not confined to Central Asia alone; in the Caucasus too, the US has already made its presence felt. A day after the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, warned the US that its planned deployment of commandos in Georgia could destabilize the whole region, Russian President Vladimir Putin suddenly declared that he saw “no tragedy” in the plan and was completely supportive of US efforts to assist Georgia in smoking out Chechen and Al Qaeda militants from the Pankisi Gorge.[62] The US has also improved ties with Armenia, one of Russia’s closest allies in the former Soviet Union. In February 2002, a delegation of American military experts visited Armenia to discuss plans to upgrade the Armenian armed forces’ communications system, to set up a military training complex, and to train and equip an Armenian peace-keeping force.[63]

Russia might be of the opinion that the benefits obtained by co-operating with the US outweigh those that may be garnered by opposing it. It is undoubtedly true that Russia’s struggle against the Chechens is now seen in a more favourable light by the US, as are Moscow’s claims of Osama bin Laden’s complicity in fuelling the fires of separatism in Chechnya.[64] Nevertheless, Russia cannot afford to be complacent about the US presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It should not allow itself to be lulled into a false sense of security by US moves to facilitate a more amicable NATO–Russia relationship. America clearly intends to encircle Russia and prevent it from becoming a major force in world affairs once again. NATO’s eastward expansion is designed to achieve that very objective, as is the present US involvement in the Caspian region. US interests dictate that Russia must be given less room to manoeuvre in its immediate neighbourhood, and must, therefore,  be precluded from exercising the same level of influence as it did in the past. The pipeline factor must also be remembered; America is determined to find alternatives to Russia as routes for its proposed pipelines, which makes it necessary not only for it to have its troops in the relevant places, but also to cultivate ties with the region’s energy-producing and transporting countries at Russia’s expense.

Russia has, of late, taken steps to reassert its position in Central Asia. In October 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev jointly inaugurated a Russian air base in Kant, about 20 kilometres east of Bishkek. During his speech, Putin emphasized the importance of the Russian air detachment at Kant in safeguarding regional security. Akayev, for his part, unequivocally maintained that Kyrgyzstan viewed itself as Russia’s political base in the region, and that, “Russia was given to us by God and by history.”[65] At present, the force at Kant includes more than 20 aircraft and more than 150 troops. Thus far, Russia has spent 79 million rubles ($2.6 million) to upgrade the base, and the total bill is expected to reach 219 million rubles.[66]

Like Russia, China too has been compelled to come to terms with the US military presence in Central Asia. Prior to 11 September 2001, China had been assiduous in its efforts to forge closer economic, political, and military relations with the CARs. In 1995, it teamed up with Russia to establish the Shanghai Five, an informal security alliance that also included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined the grouping in 2001, following which it became known as the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). Russia and China intended to make the SCO a military-political alliance, one that would “fashion a new regional security architecture.”[67] But the “war against terrorism” and the US presence in Central Asia have made that an increasingly unlikely possibility. In fact, there are genuine fears in both Beijing and Moscow that the SCO has become redundant; it could not come up with a credible response to the terrorist presence in Afghanistan and its own Central Asian members, particularly Uzbekistan, warmly welcomed US troops on to their soil.[68] Tashkent has actually been accepted by Washington as a regional partner.[69] Kazakhstan is wooing the US in order to secure greater investment as well as support for its application for membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO).[70] And the more impoverished of the SCO members, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are hoping for US largesse to flow in and invigorate their ailing economies.

The setback to the SCO must be particularly galling for China, which had hoped to use the organization as a springboard into Central Asia. America is now firmly settled in China’s strategic backyard, which was precisely what China had hoped to forestall when it led the way in forming the SCO. Well before 9/11, China had been concerned about the growing US and NATO presence in Central Asia. These concerns were aroused by the waning of Sino–US relations, chiefly by Nato’s Partnership for Peace programme with the CARs and the US 82nd Airborne exercise, CENTRAZBAT, in Kazakhstan in 1997. One of the primary motivating factors in China’s decision to create the SCO was, therefore, to become firmly entrenched in Central Asia before the Americans could do so, but 9/11 put paid to that objective.

A regional power broker prior to 11 September 2001, China now finds itself marginalized and isolated, “pondering the unenviable option of playing second fiddle to the US and a host of its newfound best friends.”[71] Amongst those friends are India–China’s long-term rival for supremacy in Asia–and Pakistan, a long-time partner of China. While China, like Russia, might have benefited from the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, the long-term presence of US forces in Central Asia will seriously undermine China’s efforts to become an Asian superpower.

All is not, however, by any means lost for China in Central Asia. Its influence is constantly on the rise and, with Russia’s role receding rapidly, it is now the region’s most dynamic and resourceful neighbour. New routes of trade, such as pipelines, highways, and railroads, are linking Central Asia to the world, and China is well placed to capitalize on the potentially tremendous economic opportunities on offer. In the military sphere too, China is gradually making inroads; for instance, in October 2002, it conducted joint military exercises with Kyrgyz forces, the first such venture of its kind in the history of the PRC.

Iran is another country that the US is desirous of countering in Central Asia. Ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, relations between the two countries have been characterized by hostility and mutual suspicion. Iran already feels threatened by the presence of US forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, and its sense of encirclement has now increased, following the American advance into Central Asia. While the Taliban held sway in Afghanistan, Iran played a pivotal role in supporting the opposition Northern Alliance and wielded considerable influence in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan, with whom it shares ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties. Tajikistan served as Iran’s foothold in Central Asia, but post-9/11 developments have deprived it of its most valuable Central Asian partner. The alacrity with which Tajikistan accepted US forces on its soil was a considerable blow to Iran. Also, the opening of Turkmen airspace to American overflights and the creation of US bases in three CARs have clearly signalled to the Iranian political establishment that, in a conflict with the US, it would now need to worry not only about the American presence in the Persian Gulf but also in the north–Central Asia and the Caucasus–to say nothing of the east and south–Afghanistan and Pakistan.[72]  

Stamping out militant Islam

A major area of concern for the US in Central Asia is the rise of radical Islamic groups that threaten the survival of the existing regimes and aim to establish Islamic governments in their stead. Militant Islam in Central Asia is one issue on which there is a complete convergence of views between the US, Russia, and China. One of the main reasons that prompted Russia and China to form the SCO was to counter the challenge presented by militant Islamic groups, not only to the continuation of the existing status quo in Central Asia, but also to their own efforts to wipe out insurrection movements within their respective territories. Russia has accused Al Qaeda and Central Asian groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), of fomenting trouble in its breakaway republic of Chechnya, while China accuses the same parties of having created similar problems in its renegade province of Xinjiang.

Under Communist control, Islam in Central Asia had been brutally suppressed. It did, however, continue to flourish underground, due in the main to the dedicated missionary work of secret Sufi societies, or tariqas.[73] Once independence was attained, the people of Central Asia, restrained for so long from observing even the most basic rituals of their faith, embraced the opportunity to rediscover their Islamic identity and to re-establish links with their Muslim neighbours to the south, relations that had been severed ever since Stalin closed the borders between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.[74]

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of young men from Central Asia who had been drafted into the Red Army had returned home with nothing but admiration for the bravery and Islamic fervour of their Afghan adversaries. Their hatred for the Soviet Union became more pronounced after their experiences in Afghanistan, as the discovery of the religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties that they shared with many of the people against whom they had fought made them more conscious of how profoundly the Soviet system had deprived them of their heritage and national pride.[75]

After gaining independence, many Central Asians realized that the policies of their governments would determine both the political future of their respective states as well as the nature and extent of the Islamic revival in the entire region. But whatever hopes they might have entertained were dashed by the conduct of their leaders; in all the republics, authoritarianism reigned supreme, democracy, dissent, and debate were ruthlessly suppressed, and the Islamic revival was curtailed, often through the use of force. The draconian measures enforced by the leaders forced even moderates and liberal reformers to join the rapidly swelling ranks of the militants. The regimes responded with even greater force; repeated crackdowns were launched against Islamic activists, in which not only militants but thousands of ordinary practising Muslims were tortured and imprisoned for long periods.[76] From 1992 to 1997, a bloody civil war between Islamic rebels and the Tajik regime engulfed Tajikistan, ultimately claiming over fifty thousand lives.

At present, the most prominent militant Islamic group operating in Central Asia is the IMU. Since 1999, it has been the most potent military threat, not only to Uzbekistan, but to the stability of the entire region. Under the leadership of the charismatic Juma Namangani, the IMU launched guerrilla attacks against the regimes from bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan from 1999 to 2001.[77] It is alleged to have strong links to Al Qaeda; in fact, Namangani is believed to have been killed whilst fighting with the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces against Northern Alliance forces in Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001.[78] His demise has obviously been a tremendous setback for the IMU, but the group, although crippled, does remain intact and operational. Even after Namangani’s death, IMU fighters participated in the intense battles of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan and continued to launch small-scale guerrilla attacks against the US and its allies in the Pakistani border areas.[79] US officials estimate that the IMU is still capable of recruiting and training a multi-national force of up to 5000 guerillas within a year.[80] This force will be more than likely to target US troops and facilities situated in Central Asia. 

Promoting democracy and protecting human rights

The authoritarianism of the Central Asian regimes has been one of the main factors behind the region’s instability and the rise of militant Islam. All the Central Asian rulers are autocrats who have consistently employed brutal force to keep their populations under control. In the process, they have ridden roughshod over all democratic norms and have sown the seeds for the region’s ethnic fragmentation.

In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Unity Party has won all presidential and parliamentary elections since 1991, owing to state pressure, massive election rigging, and a refusal to accord representation to opposition parties.[81] In June 2000, Nazarbayev’s hand-picked parliament passed a bill conferring lifelong legal and political rights on himself and his entire family, thereby granting immunity against any charges that had already been made or could be made in the future.[82]

Kyrgyz President, Askar Akaev, initially demonstrated a modicum of enthusiasm for democratic norms and institutions but has gradually become increasingly despotic. Kyrgyzstan’s debt had mushroomed to $1.27 billion by 1999, resulting in increased unemployment and poverty, as well as stiffer political opposition to the regime.[83] Akaev’s response was identical to that of other Central Asian leaders facing similar problems: political dissent was crushed, the media was curbed, and elections were rigged.

Although all the CARs have been beset by chronic internal instability, only one of them–Tajikistan–has thus far suffered a civil war. To its credit, however, Tajikistan rose from the ashes of war to produce a democratically- elected coalition government that accommodated both secular and religious parties. The peace agreement remains intact, but social unrest, lack of outside assistance, and crippling poverty have prevented Tajikistan from making any substantial progress.

Turkmenistan appears to be the personal fiefdom of President Saparmurad Niyazov. Niyazov’s personality cult has developed to such a remarkable extent that buildings, streets, and even entire cities have been named after him. The regime of “Turkmenbashi” (Father of all Turkmens) is probably the most repressive in the region. Political parties have been outlawed, the media languishes under strict government control, meetings of all kinds are forbidden, and Christian and Hindu leaders have been thrown out of the country.[84] In January 1994, the Turkmen parliament nominated Niyazov president until 2002. This was followed by a parliamentary vote asking him to remain president for life. In February 2001, Niyazov announced that he would step down in 2010. As things stand, however, such a voluntary relinquishment of power seems very unlikely. Through the “indiscriminate use of the death penalty”, the “torture of prisoners in overflowing prisons”, and the “disappearance of dissenters without a trace”, Niyazov has made evident his paranoia about staying in power.[85]

And finally, in Uzbekistan, the largest and most powerful of the CARs, President Islam Karimov also rules with an iron hand. After becoming president in 1991, he drove his main opponent, the head of a secular nationalist party, into exile. He then targeted radical Islamic groups based in the Ferghana Valley. Besides the radicals, hundreds of ordinary Muslims were also arrested in a series of crackdowns, and mosques and seminaries were closed. This indiscriminate violence led to the development of a formidable Islamic opposition, embodied mainly in the IMU. “The rise of the IMU….can be directly linked to Karimov’s refusal to allow Muslims to practise their religion and his extreme attitude to all religious expression or political dissent.”[86]

The “war against terrorism” has allowed the leaders of the CARs to intensify their violent suppression of dissent and their flagrant violations of human rights. Previously, the fear of international condemnation and the consequent threat of economic chastisement had inspired a certain amount of caution in the way the leaders dealt with their political opponents. Now that the CARs are frontline states in the “war against terrorism,” however, the need for caution is nowhere near as great.  In 2002, President Nazarbayev launched a crackdown on opposition parties and journalists during which offices were destroyed, property was confiscated, and scores of individuals were arrested.[87] President Karimov has used the pretext of fighting terrorism to increase his repression of political opponents; hundreds of people have been arrested thus far on trumped up charges.[88] And in the other Republics as well, the leaders have made full use of the international community’s preoccupation with fighting terrorism to increase political repression within their territories.

The US administration tries to justify its presence in Central Asia on the basis that it will promote democracy and protect human rights. Yet, considering Washington’s previous record of supporting despots and dictators whenever it suited its own interests, one can safely say that the democratization of Central Asia will be one objective that the US will be in no hurry to fulfil. America is fully aware of the repressive policies of the Central Asian leaders, of their total disregard for all democratic norms, and of their blatant violations of basic human rights. It is also aware that militant Islam is on the rise and remains convinced that it can be countered only by propping up and strengthening those same despotic regimes. This explains the generous financial rewards that have been flowing into Central Asia ever since 11 September 2001: American aid to the region increased from $270 million in 2001 to $408 million in 2002.[89]

Central Asia is hardly the first example of America sacrificing its cherished concepts of democracy, justice, and the rule of law at the altar of expediency. The Middle East presents a particularly damning picture of American double standards. For decades, America has supported a tightly controlled monarchy of the House of Saud, for fear of the world’s largest oil-producing nation falling into anti-American hands. It has also propped up equally undemocratic regimes in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. During the Cold War, it supported innumerable dictators, simply because they were opposed to Communism; it made precious little difference to the Americans how corrupt, undemocratic, or repressive they might have been. The “war against terrorism” is being fought on the same lines: those who co-operate with the US will be generously rewarded and allowed to rule as they please, while those who do not co-operate will be targeted. 

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that America’s increased involvement in Central Asian affairs, particularly those related to the region’s security and energy resources, will have major implications not only for Central Asia but for the entire world. In the short-term, Central Asia might benefit from an increase in US financial assistance and greater foreign investment. Also, US forces in the region could prove effective in battling the militant Islamic groups that threaten the survival of the existing regimes. However, a long-term US presence in Central Asia will be more than likely to increase instability in an already volatile environment. America’s financial aid will end up in the hands of Central Asia’s despotic leaders, who will use part of it to line their pockets and most of what remains on strengthening their security apparatus. The prolonged presence of US troops in the region will antagonize Russia, China, and Iran, as will US plans for developing alternative pipeline routes for the transportation of Central Asian oil and gas. Even before the US advanced into Central Asia, all three countries were extremely concerned about the ring of US bases on their borders. With America now firmly entrenched in Central Asia as well, the sense of encirclement that was being felt in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, will be reinforced.

As far as combating militant Islam is concerned, a long-term US military presence in Central Asia might actually prove counter-productive. America already has bases in several Muslim countries; the people of those countries generally resent the presence of American forces on their soil, and their bitterness has increased after 11 September 2001: the attacks themselves were a dramatic manifestation of that bitterness. Osama bin Laden has consistently demanded the withdrawal of US forces from the Persian Gulf, and from Saudi Arabia in particular. If America decides to maintain a presence in Muslim Central Asia on the lines of the one that it maintains in the Persian Gulf, then it should be prepared for more acts of terrorism, particularly as it has now also invaded Iraq. Groups like the IMU will be more determined than ever before to undertake terrorist activities, directed not only at the Central Asian regimes but also at the American troops present to protect them.

In spite of America’s repeated professions of sincerity about bringing democracy and the rule of law to Central Asia, or for that matter, to Iraq, the truth is that in Central Asia, as in Iraq, the expansion of the Pax Americana remains America’s foremost priority. Like every other major empire in human history, the American empire also relies on bases to augment its power and enforce its control over other peoples and nations. After every major war that it has fought and after every major foreign intervention that it has undertaken, America has stationed its forces behind to protect its interests and to enforce its writ. The “war against terrorism” is merely a convenient excuse for the extension of US hegemony over the entire world, and Central Asia is only one of the regions where that extension has taken place. From South Asia to the Middle East to the Balkans, and from Latin America to the Caribbean to Africa, the projection of American power and the protection of American interests have become an undeniable, though deeply disturbing reality.