Farah Zahra*

 Introduction

lthough India and Pakistan have embarked upon a path of establishing peace and stability in the region, they continue to strengthen their military capabilities, as if oblivious of the positive political developments. Alongside these developments, discussions on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs) began last month. Thus, South Asia presents an interesting situation where, despite détente, number of aspects gain significance within the realm of nuclear weapons.

Regarding nuclear weapons, a number of technical stability-enhancing measures such as notification of missile tests, moratorium on testing, non-deployment suggestions, etc., will form part of the series of discussions to be held between India and Pakistan. However, these NCBMs should not delude us into thinking that India and Pakistan can overcome the nuclear risks involved in maintaining and improving their nuclear arsenals by working towards implementation of NCBMs. Both states might move towards a reduction of nuclear risks–though it is debatable whether specific technological CBMs  make us safer or more vulnerable–a poor substitute for a larger vision of the future of nuclear weapons. The majority of us may take for granted that “nuclear development is likely to continue in predictable directions in the move towards stable deterrence”.[1]

Secondly, the question arises as to what shape a wider, long-term vision of their nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan might take. As the two begin to mend fences and there seems to be enough goodwill on either side, this may be the right time to set a “preamble” to the NCBMs, not a concretely-defined, highly optimistic vision, yet containing some positive ideas for the future, even outside the confines of “stable deterrence”. There has to be a preamble to the eventual aims of the NCBMs. In formulating such a preamble, we need to factor in two realities: (a) even if the Kashmir dispute is “resolved”, nuclear weapons will still exist in the subcontinent; and (b) the deterrence equation is not static: capabilities and scenarios are changing in the region. A perfect deterrence situation for South Asia perhaps exists only in the realm of dialectical discussions.

Thirdly, the proposal put forward by India’s External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, for a “common nuclear doctrine” received an apt response from the Pakistani Government–neither acceptance nor rejection; Indian analysts predict that the proposal has a shelf life of about two months.[2] However, Mr Singh’s suggestion should be seen as a reiteration by India that its security calculus also includes China, and that India is willing to think in terms of a regional solution (which, for India, also includes China), in contrast to its prior position calling for global solutions.

This article aims to examine NCBMs in the light of the Strategic Restraint Regime (SSR) suggested by Pakistan and the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding signed between India and Pakistan. It will also examine the technological limitations of NCBMs, and consider the role the United States and the international community in managing proliferation in this region. The conclusion includes some suggestions and policy recommendations in view of the three points mentioned above. 

Restraint Regime and Stability

Pakistan proposed what it calls the “Strategic Restraint Regime” (SRR) in October 1998, five months after the nuclear test explosions by India and Pakistan. It has since repeatedly presented this proposal to India at different regional and international fora. India has clearly and persistently declined the offer. For Pakistan, there may be little more to this suggestion than maintaining the high moral ground: Repeating it over a prolonged period is not likely to get India to change its mind. India is looking at a much larger canvas as far as its defence requirements go. Pakistan, on the other hand, is vigilant in fulfilling its requirements and making advancements in military technology to match those made by India, to remove any gaps in what it terms the “equilibrium”.

Pakistan also keeps India and the international community informed that it is mindful of these gaps (it “will retain the edge”–presumably a reference to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent) and that it does not appreciate India’s creating imbalances through defence purchases.[3] What this amounts to if not an “arms race” is somewhat confusing since Pakistan maintains that “an arms race is not sustainable by Pakistan”.[4] Finally, Pakistan has enunciated that its “nuclear deterrence level is not static”, as the “deterrence level is linked to the Indian threat”.[5]  This is also symptomatic of Pakistan’s disarmament policy rhetoric which might now be curtailed, after Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri’s recent call for a “rhetoric restraint regime” for both countries.

Pakistan’s SRR proposal was based on three suggestions: (a) to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons; (b) to ensure the lowest possible quantity and quality of nuclear weapons; and (c) to prevent the spread of nuclear-weapons technology.

Some Indian analysts maintain that India needs ICBMs to potentially deter the United States, probably invoking India’s sovereign right to make its security determinations. However, India has shown interest in the first suggestion in the SSR, putting the NCBMs talks on track. The second and third areas are of less significance to India. It has previously aspired to a level of deterrence commensurate with its global status, though it might now be open to further discussions on this issue, given Mr Singh’s statement, proposing a regional nuclear doctrine. On the other hand, proliferation of  nuclear technology is something that India has claimed to have effectively controlled in the past and is doing a good job presently. Both of these, therefore, become issues that Pakistan has to contend with, with some possible assistance from India on the second point in, dealing with nuclear restraint.

In order to tackle the issue, Pakistan has suggested five measures within SRR. These are: a moratorium on testing; implementation of non-weaponization and non-deployment; a moratorium on deployment; a moratorium on the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD); and an implementation of risk reduction measures. Some of these steps were embodied in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding, signed between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan on 21 February 1999.  

Lahore MoU and NCBMs

The Lahore MoU laid down a comprehensive set of eight CBMS, mostly nuclear, which have been largely neglected since the MoU was signed on 21 February 1999. 

1. The Lahore MoU begins with a pledge for bilateral consultations on security concepts and “nuclear doctrines”. After five years of the tests and four years after the MoU was signed, Pakistan has no official “doctrine” which can be made the basis for official discussions. Some analysts have urged Pakistan to adopt a declaratory doctrine as “fudgy red lines can keep moving further back when it comes to the crunch and in Pakistan’s situation, perhaps a clearly enunciated one-rung escalation ladder–given the prevailing asymmetries–may be more useful”.[6] However, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains conjectural since it is the country’s considered policy not to put forward a doctrine

On the other hand, Pakistan has already repeatedly conveyed its reservations about the robust Indian doctrine, which India converted from draft status to an official doctrine in January 2003.[7]

 

2. The second point deals with advance notification of ballistic missile tests. A strange record exists in this regard. The following is the Pakistani version since April 1999.

India:         Three Agni tests were notified, one was not

                  Four Prithvi tests were notified, six were not

                  None of the seven Brahmos tests were notified.

Pakistan:    Notification of all 13 Hatf, Shaheen and Ghauri tests.[8]

Pakistan accuses India of not abiding by the agreement of prior notification and also feels that India is sticking to the letter and not the spirit of the MoU (since it is not notifying Brahmos tests at all because it is not a “ballistic” missile, but a cruise missile). It may be worth noting here that approximately 50 per cent of the total missile tests conducted by India and Pakistan have been in the last three years.[9]

 

3. The third point in the MoU deals with a commitment on the national level to undertake measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under the respective control of both countries. Both India and Pakistan have in place formalized structures that deal with the command and control of nuclear weapons. Pakistan set up its National Command Authority (NCA) in Febuary 2000 and India set up its NCA three years later, in January 2003.

 

4. Moratorium on conducting further test explosions: The moratorium on nuclear testing stands while India does not test. According to many analysts, this may also depend on whether America starts retesting and whether India considers its needs for testing fulfilled, both of which are tenuous assumptions.
   
    
5. Prevention of incidents at sea was a troublesome area as, occasionally, fishermen stray across assumed boundaries in search of catch and are apprehended and imprisoned for years. This is linked to the border dispute of the 60-mile long estuary of Sir Creek in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch.

What could make the situation a little more complicated is the new Proliferation Security Initiative, instituted by the United States and other countries, which allows interdiction “to halt shipments of dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern–at sea, in the air, and on land.”[10] If there are to be joint Indo–US exercises, which, given the delicate nature of the peace process underway, are not desirable at present, a new situation will arise for Pakistan to worry about.
 

6. Neither side undertook periodical review of the implementation of existing CBMs.

 

7. Upgrading and improving communication links and providing for fail-safe and secure communications: Hotlines are considered limited in scope since they are voice communicators and can at times convey an unintended message; computer hotlines are being considered as apt replacements. Multiple channels would facilitate communication, though it should be mandatory to ensure some kind of centralization of the channels to eradicate confusion. Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres could prove helpful in this matter.

8.    Bilateral consultations on security, disarmament, and non-proliferation issues for multilateral fora: Positive diplomacy can yield dividends if both countries adopt stances favourable to each other and appreciate each other’s point of view. 

The NCBMs talks will most probably encourage this kind of communication; a further positive development would be for both countries to support each other, where possible, at international fora. A traditional Pakistani point of criticism against India has been that Indian nuclear ambitions are spreading “nuclear evil” in the region. Pakistan could instead turn its ire on the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) for being the perpetrators of this evil and not doing enough on the vertical proliferation front where the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty promised in good faith to move towards global nuclear disarmament. However, there are forums such as the Conference on Disarmament, where Pakistan would be unable to go along with the Indian position of not accounting for existing stocks in discussions on the fissile material treaty. It may now be possible to hope that both states will avoid sharp criticism of each at international fora and devise some method of dealing with such issues at the bilateral level. 

It needs to be noted here that, as opposed to the SRR which was a Pakistani suggestion spurned by India, the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding was signed by both India and Pakistan. This document merely contained the test moratorium element of the SRR, as India envisaged that it would place no immediate restraints on improving its nuclear arsenal. There is no mention in the Lahore MoU of non-weaponization, non-deployment, cessation of fissile material production, or any constraints to rein in the nuclear weapons programmes. India is willing to engage Pakistan, to a cautiously limited extent, to improve the nuclear environment. Nevertheless, we are still left with the question: How can India allay Pakistan’s nuclear fears while continuing to fulfil its nuclear ambitions? In view of this question, we should keep in mind that, going by empirical evidence so far, there is no reason to assume that at any point in the future, the US may be able to exert any serious pressure on India, or for that matter even Pakistan, on non-proliferation.

Secondly, at this stage what seems even more significant is that there exists no common nuclear lexicon between India and Pakistan. For example, there seems to be no consensus on the term “deployment”: what the Indians have termed as “forward storage” has been assumed by Pakistan to be “operational deployment”.[11] However, the word “deploy” has been used by India with regard to its Agni missiles.[12]  

Limitation of Technological NRRMs

Technological Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) would certainly have a positive influence, facilitating further contact, generating an exchange of ideas and views, regardless of whether there is strict implementation of the measures themselves. However, we should also be clear that technological CBMs or NRRMs also have a few special drawbacks. The simplest ones between India and Pakistan have a bad and, at best, a strange record of implementation, though this could change for the better in future with the improvement in relations. The second problem is that of verification and monitoring.  And the last one pertains to the situational changes (before ideas can be materialized), since the nuclear situation is rather dynamic. For example, W. P. S. Sidhu, in an article on nuclear risk reduction measures, argued for a “third option under which the missiles are inducted, but not deployed…”, going on to suggest that “a series of innovative NRRMs are required”.[13]  We now know that the Prithvi missiles have been inducted and “deployed”. It does seem that merely a series of NRRMs or NCBMs may not be enough without the bedrock of a progressive outlook, based on a long-term vision of nuclear weapons as mentioned earlier.

Let us examine the case of early warning systems which both states are endeavouring to obtain in order to further “stabilize” deterrence.       

 
Early Warning Systems

An early warning system gives us warning that there is an external (nuclear) attack under way via missiles. This system, however, does not merely comprise a set of radar detectors and a platform. Included in this system is also an evaluation of the threat and formulation of a response strategy–and all this is to be done within the warning time provided by the system. The system could either be ground-based or via satellite. A very recent study done at Princeton University, USA, suggests that this warning time can be between 4-7 minutes for both systems, and, if a capital city is being targeted, it would barely be enough for the warning to be communicated.[14] The study further envisages the three possible responses, all of which make this warning redundant. The three options include: feeding the warning signals into a missile defence system so that the interceptor can locate and destroy the incoming missile; the second option would be riding out a possible attack, i.e., waiting to see if the attack is for real and then respond and the last possibility could be to retaliate immediately which would mean maintaining a launch-on- warning posture (which is fraught with numerous possibilities of technological mishaps and false warning actually bringing about a nuclear war). In all three cases, the early warning systems seem to be of no use. However, both India and Pakistan seem to be headed in that precise direction. India even has it in its doctrine to set up “early-warning capabilities… space-based and other assets …”[15] 

Although these systems may, by and large, prove effective in this scenario, there are two major drawbacks. Firstly, there is considerable disparity between India and Pakistan in terms of technology for early warning; secondly, if such systems were to be in place, the next step, almost inevitably, for both countries would be to increase their arsenal. Increase of arsenals would in any case be underway, but the perspective and calculus would change with working EWS in place.

India’s quest for the Green Pine and Phalcon radars from Israel, along with its capability to launch geo-synchronous satellites and its Tech Exp Satel with high-resolution camera, capable of “sensitive defence surveillance”, are not only evidence of its resolve to pursue EWS in earnest but also of the fact that Pakistan lags behind in this sphere. Pakistani experts have already advised a high state of alert.[16] Pakistan’s Ministry for Science and Technology hinted at matching Indian plans for EWS by launching a geo-stationary satellite to “meet its strategic and communication needs”.

India might argue that its EWS has utility in its security calculus beyond Pakistan as well. Once the EWS are in place in both countries, the next step, a technological requirement, would be to have nuclear arsenals powerful enough to overcome the barriers posed by the EWS 

Role of the US and the International Community

Former Commisioner of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Dr Victor Gilinsky, in his testimony on 30 March 2004 to the House Committee on International Relations on “The fuel cycle and the spread of the bomb” made two very pertinent points on non-proliferation. Firstly, he said that, “Nothing will be done to tighten the rules unless the United States takes the lead”. In order to illustrate his point, he quoted former US President Ford who had said that, “We must be sure that all nations recognize that the US believes that non-proliferation objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made”. Secondly, he tried to emphasize that an approach was required that made non-proliferation a top priority in US foreign policy. However, empirical evidence shows us that the US has repeatedly and for an extended period of time, made choices in favour of politics and economics instead of non-proliferation in South Asia. This is what the US is doing currently and, in all likelihood, this is what it is going to do in future.

India, which supported the US when it decided to scrap the BMD, has found new moral force to go ahead with its own BMD plans, aggravating the nuclear situation between India and Pakistan. These are not the only US policies that have been detrimental for non-proliferation in South Asia. A certain amount of moral punch has been induced into the Indian actions and policies and statements as it saw the United States hounding the ghosts of 9/11 into far-flung lands, amidst calls for a “war on terror”. It picked up the courage to say to the international community that, “we too should strike places that provide sanctuaries for our cross-border terrorists”, meaning the alleged training camps in Pakistan. This created further tensions between both countries. Thus, the new laws of pre-emption laid down by the sole superpower have not been without their fallout for South Asia, aggravating the nuclear situation in the subcontinent.

The US and the international community are in fact retaining and improving their nuclear arsenals, which puts India, an emerging global power, on firm ground to make provision for its own security needs. Instead of any earnestness to push for a re-think on Article 5, to come good on their promise of eventually getting rid of these weapons and cutting down on them, the P5 are generating a plethora of discussion on how to refurbish the NPT, so as to eliminate  the problem of horizontal proliferation.

Fancy solutions have been put forward that speak of academic and innovative brilliance, without tackling the core issue. At the Moscow Carnegie International Conference 2003, American non-proliferation expert, George Perkovich, defended the NPT, saying that it was merely “a tool” that dealt with non-proliferation and that more tools needed to be produced in order to deal with states such as Iran, etc. Dr Victor Gilinsky, former US NRC Commissioner, and former Head of Physical Sciences Department at the Rand corporation has presented a set of “do’s and dont’s” that he recommends be introduced into a new NPT, making it more difficult for states such as Iran to proliferate via the excuse of nuclear energy production.[17] And finally, Professor John Endicott from Atlanta suggests Nuclear-Free Zones and tackling proliferation on a regional basis and introducing that into the NPT.[18] A new report on Universal Compliance by five well known non-proliferation experts in the US suggests that the strategic aim of the non-proliferation policy must now be to achieve universal compliance with the norms and terms of a deepened nuclear non-proliferation regime.[19] However, it is pertinent to mention here that South Asia is outside the US counter-proliferation policy, whose ambit only covers states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea–the so-called “rogue” states.

It seems that the global ire expressed at the 2000 NPT conference and the hard time that the American delegation had in New York has been washed out of the US memory altogether. As long as the United States and other P5 states think there is a way out of the proliferation problem by remaining outside the loop while trying to tighten the noose and rope others in, states like Israel, India, and Pakistan will continue to show the international community that they can defy all NPT norms, as they are NOT party to the treaty. Furthermore, hey can get away with this stance, regardless of whether the US and the international community like it or not. Though there may be weaker states that the US can handle and console itself with the thought that the nuclear-weapons threat is controllable, challenges will arise regularly that it will have to be dealt with on military rather than moral grounds. As far as South Asia is concerned, it is a region that is beyond this debate and the NPT anyway.  

Military Détente with Pivotal Shifts and Concrete Steps

Strides towards relaxed military relations would be easier sought once there is substantive progress in the resolution of disputes. However, if, in tandem with conflict-resolution, attention could be focused on the military aspect, room might be created for joint reflection by both India and Pakistan on where they want their nuclear capabilities to continue over the long term. In other words, a special emphasis must be placed by both parties on coming to a mutual understanding that the time is ripe for working out a “preamble” for NCBMs to follow in the coming months. This would surely go a long way in keeping it clear that the NCBMs are not an end in themselves, as they are not the vehicle to perfect our “deterrence”. Deterrence in the South Asian case may never be perfected. At the same time, we should not be paranoid or naïve enough to subscribe to the alarmist view and believe that we are perilously close to a nuclear disaster and we need to abandon nuclear weapons immediately.[20] 

In dealing with deterrence, first and foremost is the requirement for an admission by both countries that advancement of and addition to nuclear technology may be a limitless exercise, without a point which could be termed as the final point of security or of absolute, complete, and fully stable deterrence. Needless to say, “deterrence” is a word antithetical to the very process of peace and friendship that has begun here.

The psychological attitude towards nuclear weapons requires the pursuit of better technology as the ultimate solution. An exploration of the role of military and nuclear technology itself may be in order, to find out if under the tutelage of its military protectorate, not only in Pakistan but increasingly in India as well, it may have acquired a dynamics of its own.[21]

All such suggestions which can provide additional safety for the nuclear arsenals and facilities of India and Pakistan should be put on the table for brainstorming and mutual discussion. All “value-added” measures such as agreements ranging from notification of tests to a moratorium on testing to non-deployment agreements will be discussed in the coming months. The idea of risk reduction centres on either side would be a great leap forward and the foundation for further discussion on the technical side. as well as providing a regular body for enhanced contact, regardless of the political temperatures. The maximum benefit is to be derived from measures that generate regular contact and encourage exchange of data and enhanced transparency–all of which are embodied in the risk reduction centre idea. [22]

As a central body, the NRRC could provide a structure dealing with unilateral measures as well as bilateral measures, which could include: improving domestic capabilities, such as threat analysis to all nuclear facilities; investing in indigenous physical security technology; performing system upgrades; and instituting more rigorous personnel reliability programmes. Though initially suggested as unilateral measures, these could be taken on to the bilateral level, once NCBMs between the two countries are well-established.[23]

Pakistan could take advantage of the turn in relations with India and shift the emphasis of its dissatisfaction with managing nuclear proliferation to the nuclear club members, without making India the prime target, even though it is the country of direct concern.[24] In fact, were it to form a partnership with India on matters of concern to both countries and forward a common cause at international fora, the international community might give South Asian concerns more recognition. For the people of the subcontinent, there are no indications that the world is moving towards nuclear disarmament, even though the weapons of mass destruction threat in Iraq may be taken care of, and Iran, North Korea, and others states may be brought in line. The case of vertical proliferation stands starkly neglected by the jury of nations that proactively seek to eliminate horizontal proliferation.