Ghulam Ali* 

hile addressing a gathering at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA) on 30 May 2001, Mr Lin Shanglin, the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appreciated Pakistan’s support in helping China to gain a seat in the United Nations (UN). He stated: 

Neither shall we forget it is our Pakistani friends who gave us firm support when China’s legitimate seat was restored at the UN. Nor shall we forget it is our Pakistani friends again who upheld justice and lend (sic) China consistent and invaluable support on issues bearing on China’s sovereign interests such as human rights, the question of Taiwan and of Tibet.[1] 

Again, on 23 November 2001, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr Lu Shulin, thanked Pakistan for helping to restore China’s seat in the UN in 1971.[2] Such remarks have been expressed on several other occasions as well.

The issue of Chinese representation–whether the Nationalists or the Communists should represent the Chinese nation in the UN–had posed a grave issue for the world body. The problem was compounded by the fact that the Chinese delegation to the UN would have two seats: one in the General Assembly and the other as a prestigious Permanent Member of the Security Council, with the power of veto. Pakistan supported the Communists and stuck to that stance, except for a short period in the latter part of 1950s, when it sided with the US in blocking Chinese entry into the UN. However, in the early 1960s, it reverted to its previous supportive role. This support was directly proportional to its relations with China and considerably helped in strengthening relations between the two neighbouring states. This paper is an attempt to study the nature of Pakistan’s support; and secondly, to assess how far it served China in its efforts to acquire the UN seat; and lastly, what its impact was on Sino–Pakistan relations.
 

Historical Background

During the Second World War, China was embroiled in intense civil strife. Despite this anarchy, it was granted Great Power-status in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943. In December of the same year, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill promised General Chiang Kai‑shek of China that, at the end of war, Manchuria, Formosa, and Pescdores Island would be returned to China.[3]

The civil war in China continued even after the end of  the Second World War. The UN seat reserved for the Chinese nation, including the permanent seat in the Security Council, was granted to the Nationalists. This enabled them to establish diplomatic relations with a number of countries, including Pakistan. However, Pakistan showed no enthusiasm in exchanging ambassadors, due to the known partiality of Chiang Kai‑shek towards Indian leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi.[4] Moreover, Pakistan was totally involved in resolving the initial problems arising from independence and fending off threats to its survival posed by its much larger neighbour, India. Thus, in spite of recognition of each other’s governments, hardly any co-operation existed between the Chinese Nationalists and the government of Pakistan in the initial two years of the latter’s existence.

In 1949, the internal situation in China took a new turn. The Communists expelled the Nationalists to Taiwan Island and established control over the whole of mainland China. Their founding father, Chairman Mao Zedong, renamed the new country the People’s Republic of China and invited other states to establish diplomatic relations with it. Referring to Taiwan, he categorically declared that there was only “one China” and that Taiwan province was an integral part of mainland China. Any country seeking to establish relations with his country had to demonstrate its readiness to severe all diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese authorities and recognize the PRC as the sole, legal government of the Chinese people. Mao also warned that his government would not establish relations with any country that schemed to create “two Chinas” or having prior relations with the Nationalists.[5] Later, on 18 November 1949, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (also Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1956) sent a message to the United Nations Secretary General, Trygve Lie, and demanded the immediate removal of the Nationalists delegation from the world body. In February 1950, he repeated this demand and protested against the “unjustifiable” delay in admitting his country’s representatives to the UN.[6] Within the United Nations, the USSR, then a close friend of China, launched a forceful campaign in favour of admitting the Communists and demanded the immediate expulsion of Taiwan. The level of the USSR’s support can be assessed from the fact that it left the Security Council in protest and decided not to take part in its proceedings until “suitable measures” were taken for the removal of Chiang Kai‑shek’s delegation.[7] At that time, the Communists had gained recognition from a number of countries, both Communist and non‑Communist, which strengthened their position. Optimism prevailed that soon mainland China would be able to acquire the UN seat. In fact, this did not happen for almost two decades.

Pakistan responded positively to the emergence of the PRC and expressed its keen desire to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Mr Qureshi, then Pakistan’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union, informed Premier Zhou Enlai that Pakistan had recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing (then Peking) as the legal government of the Chinese people. He also said that his country had withdrawn recognition of the government of the Chinese Nationalists stationed in Taiwan and had severed all formal and informal links with them.[8]

Some analysts believe that the Kashmir factor played an important role in Pakistan’s decision to support Communist China over Taiwan. For instance, John Garver noted, “If, as then seemed likely, the PRC was going to assume China’s seat on the Security Council, Pakistan did not want that to happen with Beijing more favourably inclined towards India than Pakistan.”[9] S. M. Burke, a noted writer on Pakistan’s foreign policy, maintained the same viewpoint.[10] Whatever the motivation behind this decision, Pakistan’s timely recognition of Communist China and endorsement of the PRC’s Taiwan policy was a positive beginning for establishing good neighbourly relations between the two countries.

Sino–US Enmity: Blockade of China’s Admission

Initially, the US expressed its neutrality on the conflict between the two Chinese factions. It turned down the Nationalists’ demand for military assistance and the appointment of a political and economic adviser in Taiwan.[11] However, this neutrality could not prevail for  long. The bipolarity of the world and the tilt of the Chinese Communist leaders towards the USSR caused a deep cleavage between Beijing and Washington. The US had realized that its interests in the region could be better served by allying with the Nationalists with whom it had already established diplomatic relations. The Sino–US chasm deepened further when the Communists criticized the presence of US forces in Taiwan and its Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Taiwan. They termed it an act of “aggression” and demanded that the Security Council take immediate measures for the complete withdrawal of all US forces from Taiwan and other territories belonging to China.[12] This bitterness was followed by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 in which China sided with North Korea and the US with South Korea. On the pretext of war, the US took Taiwan under its control to protect it from a potential Chinese threat.[13] These developments put a stop to any incipient accommodation between China and the United States and effectively blocked the entry of the PRC into the United Nations till 1971.

The establishment of the PRC as the effective power in mainland China was a significant development, which raised the question of whether the Communists or Nationalists were the representatives of the Chinese people in the UN.[14] Assessing the sensitivity of the issue, in June 1950, the Security Council appointed a committee of experts to investigate the rules governing the issue of credentials of representation.[15] The committee could not find a solution to the problem, despite several sessions. The issue was then referred to the General Assembly, which started discussions on 25 September 1950. There was distinct division among the member countries when a debate was held on the issue. The US‑led Western countries openly opposed the PRC’s seat. They argued that, as the Communists had gained control over mainland China by force, they were therefore unable to carry out the obligations attached to UN membership. Thus, in their view, the Communist government could not be considered legitimate.

Contrary to this viewpoint, Pakistan stood by the Communists and spoke in favour of their entry into the UN. Its chief delegate, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, stated that Article 4 of the UN Charter dealt with the admission of new members and not about the validity of representation, with which this debate was concerned. He argued that China was not applying for admission to the United Nations; it was already a member state, a permanent member of the Security Council, and one of the Big Five. The sole question was who was entitled to represent it in the Assembly. Zafrullah further stated that the undisputed and incontrovertible facts bearing upon the question revealed that the delegation present had for months ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of mainland China. The struggle for supremacy between the Nationalists and the Communists had come to an end with the victory of the latter in mainland China. The Nationalists could no longer claim to be the representatives of the Chinese people.[16] On these grounds, Zafrullah earnestly demanded the seating of the Communists in place of the Nationalists. However, the proposal was rejected by a majority vote.

A number of factors, the most important being a grave security threat from India, led Pakistan to join the Western defence pacts, namely SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955). Interestingly, even after joining these pacts, for some time, Pakistan maintained its independent stand on the issue of Chinese representation. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra assured Premier Zhu Enlai that Pakistan had no fear of “Communist China” and its alliance with the West was not, in any way, directed against China.[17] In case the United States launched a coalition war against China, Pakistan would not be a partner to it, just as it was not a partner in the Korean War. Zhou stated before the political committee of the conference that he was quite satisfied by the assurance given by the Pakistani Prime Minister regarding its joining the Western pacts.[18] P. I. Cheema has written that China’s placatory tone towards Pakistan, even after the latter’s association with the US, was due to the Indian factor, the perception being that by receiving American arms, Pakistan was strengthening its defences against India, not China. In contrast to the USSR, China was far more realistic in assessing Pakistan’s rationale for participation in the Cold War defence alliances. It accurately comprehended Pakistan’s security compulsions and continued to pursue a policy of friendship.[19] Later, in 1955, Pakistan’s ambassador to Beijing told his guests at the Independence Day reception that his countrymen, both in and outside the government, wished for the restoration of China’s seat in the world body.[20] Due credit went to Pakistan’s diplomacy as it successfully maintained the contradiction: joining the Western pacts without rousing Beijing’s opposition.

Hiatus in Relations

When Pakistan’s military dependence on the US increased, it could not maintain for long its neutral stance on Sino–US rivalry and it eventually lent support to the US in blocking China’s entry into the UN. Consequently, the mutuality of understanding between China and Pakistan that had developed during and after the Bandung Conference, began to wane. Pakistan’s explicit pro‑West posture was apparent in Prime Minister Suhrawardy’s visit to Washington in July 1957, where he enunciated his country’s readiness to support anti-communist policies. He had no hesitation in saying that world peace was safe in American hands. In his address to the US Congress, Suhrawardy expressed pride in being a US ally in the “great adventure of establishing in the world the rights of the individuals and opposing the measures that tend to trample that spirit.” He endorsed John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, in denouncing “Communist colonialism”.[21] These remarks provoked dismay in China. However, Beijing showed remarkable patience and did not lodge any protest with Pakistan at its provocative statements.[22] In the UN session of October 1957, the Pakistani delegation was undecided about the position it should take on the issue of China’s seat. At first, the Pakistan delegation abstained from taking part in the voting; then it suddenly changed its stance and cast its vote against China.[23]

Sino–Pakistan relations took another downward trend when, in the same year, radicals ascended to power in China and reshaped country’s internal and external policies. They drew a distinct line between friends and foes and were more critical of Pakistan’s close alliance with the US.[24] A Chinese protest note sent to Pakistan on 22 September 1958 reflected their grievances. The note inquired Pakistan’s opinion on the status of Taiwan. Pakistan was undecided in this regard. Though it refused any de facto or de jure recognition of Taiwan, yet its statement that the decision on the status of Taiwan was unclear was grating to the Chinese authorities.[25] In addition, in 1958, when Sino–US tension was high in the Taiwan Straits, the Pakistani Ambassador in Beijing declined to concede that Taiwan was a part of China. “The juridical position of sovereignty over Formosa is not clear. The problem should, therefore, be settled by peaceful negotiations. The wishes of the local inhabitants should be given due consideration”, the official stated .[26] This was a complete U‑turn in Pakistan’s policy over the status of Taiwan from that it had endorsed while recognizing the government of the PRC in 1950.

During 1959, an assortment of unpleasant events caused Pakistan–China relations to deteriorate further. President Ayub Khan reacted in a surprising manner to Chinese action in Tibet and suggested to the Indian Prime Minster to stop squabbling and make arrangements for common defence of the subcontinent against the inexorable push from the north (China or Russia).[27] The suggestion read: “I foresee China moving south through Burma and Russia through Afghanistan and Iran, if there is no clash between the two of them.”[28] Beijing was perturbed by President Ayub’s self‑created obsession regarding Chinese expansion and inquired against whom this common defence was proposed, as such a plan never existed anywhere in its policy.[29]

Pakistan continued to back away from full support to the PRC, while moving closer to Taiwan. In July 1959, Pakistan gave official protocol to a Muslim Hajj delegation from Taiwan. The delegation met with Pakistan’s Foreign Minster and leaders of some religious parties.[30] Pakistan treated the delegation as if it hailed from a sovereign state, which infuriated the Chinese government. The Peoples' Daily termed the Hajj mission “a plot designed to undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, denigrate the prestige of the Chinese people and follow more closely the US scheme of creating ‘two Chinas’”.[31] The level of China’s anger at Pakistan’s pro‑American policies can be clearly assessed from a commentary published in the People’s Daily: 

At every session of the United Nations General Assembly, from the ninth to the thirteenth, the Pakistan delegate invariably followed the cue of the United States by voting against discussion of the question of Chinese representation. In recent years particularly, the Pakistani Government has increased its contacts with the Chiang Kai‑shek clique. At the same time, responsible personnel of the Pakistan Government have on many occasions openly denied China’s territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and what they call “mainland China” on the same footing. In the autumn of 1958 when the United States created tension in the area of China’s Taiwan Straits, the Pakistani Government in a note to China went so far as to allege that the legal position with regard to the question of sovereignty over Taiwan and Panghu was unclear. This makes clear how closely the Pakistani Government has followed the United States in its conspiracy to create “two Chinas.” [32]

Beginning of a New Era

The mutual defence agreement of 1959 marked the zenith of Pakistan–US relations. Afterwards, differences surfaced which weakened their relations. Parallel to this, certain developments were shaping events in a way that proved conducive for both China and Pakistan to sort out their differences and evolve friendly relations to protect their mutual interests in the region. The heydays of Sino–Indian and Sino–Soviet friendship had ended; substantial differences surfaced among them. New Delhi granted asylum to the fleeing Dalai Lama, his government, and thousands of his followers, an act that perturbed Chinese authorities. At the same time, the Sino–Indian boundary dispute became an explosive issue and led to border clashes. Anwar Syed termed the emerging Sino–Indian rivalry as “important differences of opinion regarding the proper basis for agreement and co-operation among the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America…that is, Chinese sponsored anti‑imperialism versus Indian‑based non‑aligned”.

In the meantime, the US was watching the new developments. The new administration under President John F. Kennedy found India a potential ally to counter China in the region and showed great generosity, bestowing all kinds of US assistance on New Delhi.[33] The magnitude of US concern at the souring of relations between the two giants of Asia can be measured in economic terms: up until 30 June 1959, the total American economic aid to India in the twelve years since its independence was officially valued at somewhat over $1,705 million, which included $931 million in agricultural commodities. Against this amount, in a short period of less than four years, from 1959 to 1963, India received $4 billion from the US, many times more than the total amount it had received in the earlier 11‑year period.[34] Pakistan, which was a US ally in three major defence pacts, was naturally disturbed and reacted against the US policy of enticing India. It concluded that a policy of complete reliance on the West for defence purposes was misplaced and needed thorough revision.

             Thus, in the changing security environment in the region, Pakistan reoriented its foreign policy, which led to its opening up towards the Communist bloc. Commenting on the situation, the then President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, stated that it was important for Pakistan to normalize relations with China and the Soviet Union as it could not afford “an unnecessary political burden.”[35] President Ayub took note of the Sino–Indian rivalry, which flared up on their un-demarcated boundary. With a view to averting a similar conflict with China, with which Pakistan also shared a long un‑demarcated border, he directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find ways to peacefully resolve the boundary dispute.[36] Meanwhile, Pakistan resumed its support for China to be given a seat in the UN. A major breakthrough came on 10 March 1960, when President Ayub, who was in London to attend the Commonwealth session, announced that the Commonwealth countries had, in principle, agreed to support Chinese admission to the UN. Nine days later, he informed journalists that his country would probably vote for the PRC to be admitted to the UN at its upcoming session.[37] Later in November 1960, a special meeting of the Pakistan cabinet approved this decision.[38]

             During the next UN session, in December 1961, Pakistan abandoned its opposition to China’s admission and instead supported its legitimate claim to a seat in the UN.[39] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister in President Ayub’s Cabinet, applauded this decision and termed it a daring step on the part of his government. He stated that it would be impossible for the United Nations to bring to bear the full weight of its authority on any issue without the participation of the world’s largest nation.[40] Beijing duly appreciated this change in Pakistan’s policy. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its review of Sino–Pakistan relations, remarked that in 1961, Pakistan took a great stride forward in improving Sino–Pakistan relations by voting in the UN General Assembly for China’s legal right.[41] Later the same month, Premier Zhou Enlai, while talking to a correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), appreciated Pakistan’s support in casting its vote in favour of China’s rightful place in the world body and not following the US position of retaining the Chiang Kai‑shek clique in the UN.[42] The Border Agreement of March 1963 gave a new impetus to the recently warmed relations. On this occasion, the Chinese official, Mr Chen Yi, said that Pakistan, in defiance of outside pressure, had voted for the restoration to China of its lawful seat in the UN for which the government and the people of China were highly obliged to the government and the people of Pakistan.[43]

China welcomed Pakistan’s independent posture in international politics. Earlier, it had adopted a neutral stance on the Kashmir issue; it now became supportive of Pakistan in its Kashmir policy. The Sino–Pakistan Border Agreement was the first occasion when China expressed its deep concern at the unresolved status of Kashmir. In the joint communiqué issued on the occasion, China appreciated the attitude of Pakistan in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute and was of the belief that expeditious settlement of this question would be conducive to peace in Asia and in the world.[44] In subsequent years, China’s Kashmir policy became aligned with Pakistan’s. Beijing stated its support for the right of self‑determination for the Kashmiri people. In addition, it rendered political support, economic assistance, and technological co-operation in defence production capabilities to Pakistan on an impressive scale. When, in 1965, the American arms embargo created a difficult situation for Pakistan, China came to Pakistan’s help and supplied much‑needed weapons.[45]

Pakistan advocated China’s viewpoint on all appropriate occasions. While welcoming Zhou Enlai on his visit to Pakistan in February 1964, President Ayub reaffirmed his country’s support for China’s lawful right in the world body and stated that, without the representation of one‑fourth of the human race, the UN would remain incomplete. Ayub expressed his desire for the early admission of China to the UN.[46]  A similar commitment was expressed in the joint communiqué, issued in March 1965. President Ayub reiterated Pakistan’s firm support and opposed all schemes for creating “two Chinas”. He also emphasized the need for China’s participation in the negotiations on disarmament, which had started between the US and the USSR, and in international organizations whose membership had not yet been extended to China. Pakistan firmly believed that no step could be taken towards world peace if the biggest nation in the world was excluded from the disarmament process. In a letter written to Premier Zhou Enlai, President Ayub said that Pakistan was well aware of the necessity of China’s inclusion in disarmament negotiations as well as in the UN, under whose aegis disarmament talks were being held. He believed that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by China (in 1964) had further strengthened its case for UN membership. It is worth mentioning that, at a time when the international community was criticizing China for its nuclear explosion, Pakistan adopted an independent stance and stated that China’s acquisition of nuclear capability was an important development for its admission to the UN.

In order to break the deadlock over the issue, some countries  put forward the proposal of dual representation, i.e., both Nationalist and Communist delegates to be given separate UN seats. The idea contradicted the Chinese stance that Taiwan had no separate identity but was an integral part of mainland China. China’s rejection of those proposals as well as of the suggestions of “well-intentioned friends” that Beijing should accept a seat in the General Assembly, pending a settlement of the overall question of the representation, was quite natural.[47] Pakistan fully supported China’s stance and disapproved of the proposal for dual representation. This was further elaborated on at the nineteenth session of the UN General Assembly, where Pakistan’s representative drew the attention of the international community towards the repercussions of dual representation. He stated that China’s admission was not only imperative for the effectiveness of the UN but also for the sake of peace. Only then could a beginning be made towards regulating the situation in Asia and restoring to that vast and conflict‑torn continent the peace and tranquillity which its people desperately needed.[48] Again, in 1966, Foreign Minister Pirzada, while speaking in the General Assembly, doubted the effectiveness of the essential functions of the UN without Chinese representation, which had no justification in logic or on the basis of law. He said that the policy of keeping China out of the UN imposed a disability, not on the People’s Republic of China, but on the UN. The absence from the world body of the real representative of the Chinese people was the single most important cause of the decline in its effectiveness and its inability to settle  conflicts and tensions in Asian region.[49] In 1969, Air Marshal Nur Khan stated that the effectiveness of the UN would remain limited so long as it denied the right of the PRC to be represented in the world body. He reaffirmed, “We categorically reject the fiction of two Chinas. We give firm support and will continue our efforts for the rights of the People’s Republic of China to be represented in the United Nations.”[50]

By the 1960s, it had become part of Pakistan’s foreign policy to support China’s bid for a UN seat. President Ayub’s successor, President  Yahya Khan, followed the same policy. During the visit of a Chinese official to Pakistan in March 1970, President Yahya expressed Pakistan’s opposition to the plot of creating “two Chinas” and demanded the expulsion of the Chiang Kai‑shek delegate from the UN.[51] Later, at the time of his visit to Beijing in November 1970, Yahya delivered an impressive speech in favour of China and once again expressed Pakistan’s solidarity with the Chinese people in their legitimate struggle to acquire UN membership. He argued that China was at par with the two superpowers in every respect. It was home to a fifth of the world’s population and had made great progress in science and technology; it was a major power that could play a significant role in the promotion of world peace to which it had demonstrated its unstinting dedication. Yahya urged the international community to restore forthwith the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations, because, without its participation, the world body was seriously “handicapped”. He added that it was shortsighted to deny the PRC its rightful place in the community of nations.[52] China’s Vice‑Chairman, Tung Pi Wu, expressed deep gratitude for Pakistan’s firm stand and stated that, disregarding foreign pressure, the Pakistan Government and people consistently remained friendly with China and firmly opposed to the scheme of creating “two Chinas”.[53] Pakistan also canvassed for China’s entry into the UN from the Commonwealth platform. At its January 1971 session held in Singapore, Pakistan removed the apprehensions of certain countries and assured them that Beijing had no expansionist designs: neither in the region nor in the world. Pakistan thus provided valuable support to China at a critical juncture when the countries of Southeast Asia were nervous of Chinese intentions and had consequently opposed its entry into the UN.[54] 

Pakistan’s Role in Normalization of Sino–US Relations

The US was the major hurdle blocking Chinese entry to the UN. Pakistan was on good terms with both China and the US and worked as a bridge in normalizing their relations when Washington indicated readiness for such a rapprochement. The idea of reconciliation was first floated in a meeting between President Richard M. Nixon with French President Charles de Gaulle in the late 1960s, where Nixon stated, “... China could no longer be excluded from the international community and that he, as the President of the United States, was probably the only President with the unquestionable power and, therefore, the credibility to make such a gesture.” [55] On 24 May 1970, Nixon asked the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, then in Pakistan, to ask President Yahya Khan to determine Chinese views regarding talks with the US. In July 1970, the US took a series of actions to relax barriers to Sino–American trade and contacts. For the first time, US citizens travelling abroad could bring back $100 worth of Chinese goods.[56] In August 1970, Nixon took the initiative for formal contact with China during his visit to Pakistan and encouraged Yahya Khan to act as an intermediary. Yahya communicated Nixon’s interest to Premier Zhou Enlai during one of their meetings in Beijing.[57] In September, the United States announced the doctrine of “evenhandedness”, which was aimed at not exploiting the Sino–Soviet split, but to “pursue a course of progressively developing better relations” with both countries. This remained the US policy during the 1970s.[58]

President Nixon, in his second annual foreign policy report to Congress stated, “The United States was prepared to see the People’s Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations.” This was first time that the formal name of the Chinese Communists regime was used in an official US document. Finally, during 1970, the Nixon administration, announced that it would no longer block Beijing’s entry to the UN.[59]  Accordingly, special arrangements were made for the participation of President Yahya Khan to attend the UN session in October 1970. The purpose of Yahya’s visit to New York was to directly discuss the normalization of relations between China and the United States. A quote from President Nixon’s book highlights President Yahya’s role in this regard: 

On 25 October President Yahya Khan of Pakistan came to see me, and I used the occasion to establish the “Yahya channel”. We had discussed the idea in general terms when I saw him on my visit to Pakistan in July 1969. Now I told him that we had decided to try to normalize our relations with China, I asked for his help intermediately. “Of course we will do anything we can to help; but you must know how difficult this will be. Old enemies do not exactly become new friends. This will be slow, and you must be prepared for setbacks.”[60] 

A few days after his return from New York, Yahya flew to China and delivered President Nixon’s message to Zhou Enlai. During their meeting in private, Zhou stated that China had always been willing to negotiate its differences with the US. Taiwan, an integral part of China, was occupied by foreign troops of the United States. In order to discuss the subject of the evacuation of the Chinese territory of Taiwan, the special envoy from President Nixon would be most welcome in Beijing. Zhou Enlai further said, “China has had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that proposal has come from a Head through a Head to a Head. The US knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach great importance to it.”[61] He especially thanked Yahya for this diplomatic support. As a result of this understanding, Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing via Pakistan was arranged. The world remained ignorant of these events until the next week when the US and the PRC simultaneously announced that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China and that the invitation had been accepted.[62] Pakistan’s mediation played a significant role in the Sino–US rapprochement. As a result, the US softened its stand on China’s admission to the UN.

However, a hurdle still existed in full acceptance of China’s stand. Washington remained steadfast in its position regarding Taiwan's independent status. Irrespective of its relations with the US, Pakistan opposed this stance in principle and stated that Taiwan had no separate identity but was an integral part of Chinese territory. Pakistan’s chief delegate, Sardar Abdul Rasheed Khan, in his address to the UN, once again rejected the proposal of “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan on both political and legal grounds. Politically, it would create new tensions by perpetuating the deepest grievances of the People’s Republic of China and would set a dangerous precedent for undermining the territorial integrity of validly constituted states. In regard to its legal aspect, both the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 had pledged the restoration of Taiwan to China. The only solution, therefore, was to seat the representative of the People’s Republic of China in all organs of the United Nations and exclude those who illegally occupied the Chinese seat.[63] Pakistan co‑sponsored the successful Albanian resolution presented in the General Assembly that held that there was only one China, and the PRC was the sole lawful representative of the Chinese people. [64] 

The Historic Decision

With the passage of time, the world community came to realize the need for China’s participation in the United Nations. On 15 July 1971, 18 countries, including Pakistan, sent a letter to Secretary General, U Thant, demanding that the General Assembly, in its upcoming session, recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese people and expel “forthwith” the Chiang Kai‑shek delegate from the UN. They also advocated the inclusion of China in the Security Council as a permanent member.[65] Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 26 October 1971, when the historic decision of China’s admission was made, Pakistani delegate, Muhammad Ali, made a fervent speech in favour of China and said: “It is from this viewpoint, as well as from the viewpoint of removing a disability from this Organization that Pakistan considers it essential that the Government of the People’s Republic of China be restored its lawful rights at the United Nations during this session.” The delegate opposed all attempts to promote the idea of dual representation that would set a most dangerous precedent, by permitting two opposing delegations to represent one and the same member state in the United Nations. [66]

Finally, on 26 October 1971, the General Assembly passed a resolution that admitted the PRC to the UN and also granted it the status of permanent member of the Security Council. At the same time, it expelled the representatives of the Nationalists. It was the first time in the UN history that a member state was expelled.[67] Pakistan, which had played an important role in this achievement, expressed its deep “sense of satisfaction” at the decision. President Yahya Khan sent a message of congratulations to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and termed the Chinese victory “as if it was a victory for the people of Pakistan”. He stated that Chinese presence in the UN would make it truly universal and serve as a vital contribution towards safeguarding the rights of all people of the world and also to international peace and justice.[68]

These UN proceedings were widely covered in the Pakistani press. The daily Dawn called it an epoch‑making event in every sense, which had rectified the wrong done to China.[69] The Morning News termed it a “triumph of sanity over insensibility”.[70] Different political parties of Pakistan also welcomed the decision. J. A. Rahim, Secretary General of the Pakistan People’s Party, said on the occasion that China would better protect the interests of the developing countries against the interference of neo‑colonialists powers in their internal affairs. Z. A. Lari, President of the Council Muslim League, described the event as a “landmark, filling a great vacuum which had been badly affecting the working of the United Nations.” The spokesman of the National Awami Party said that seating of the PRC in the UN had restored the faith of the oppressed people of the world in the international body. Organizations like the Pakistan Writers Guild, Pakistan–United Nations Association, and the Karachi Committee for Afro–Asian People’s Solidarity also applauded the decision.[71]

Conclusion

The PRC’s admission to the United Nations and its specialized agencies was a significant development in both the regional and international context. Moreover, it ended the long‑prevailing isolation of the Chinese nation and activated its role in international politics. This also proved a valuable support to Third World countries, as China had been upholding their cause and promoting their interests.

From the very beginning, Pakistan’s stance on the issue was very clear. It was among the first countries to recognize the Communist government in China. Prior to this, it severed all nature of relations with the Nationalist government, which had been established earlier. Pakistan argued that since the Communists had established control on mainland China, they deserved to represent the Chinese nation in the UN, instead of the small group of Chiang Kai‑shek supporters that was confined to Taiwan Island. This policy was motivated by the assumption that, sooner or latter, the Communists would replace the Nationalists in the UN, including at the permanent seat in the Security Council. Therefore, it was important to establish good relations with them to win their support on the Kashmir issue.

It became a significant part of Pakistan’s foreign policy to support China’s entry to the UN, its affiliated bodies, and important international organizations. Pakistan also demanded Beijing’s participation in negotiations on disarmament and sided with it in its opposition to the proposal of dual representation. China reciprocated in a befitting manner and rendered considerable political, economic, and military assistance to Pakistan in the subsequent period. It abandoned its neutral stance on the Kashmir dispute and started advocating the right of self‑determination for the Kashmiri people. China was committed to friendship with Pakistan and helped it in the 1965 and the 1971 wars, winning the hearts of the people of Pakistan and deepening the mutual friendship. After becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, China used its veto in favour of Pakistan to block Bangladesh’s admission to UN and threatened to continue this exercise until Bangladesh and India amicably solved unsettled issues with Pakistan. This determined support greatly helped Pakistan to overcome the traumatic situation in the wake of the 1971 crisis.[72] The episode constitutes an important chapter in the long diplomatic history of Sino–Pakistan relations. It helped to end China’s prolonged isolation and obtain its legitimate seat in the UN.

Today, the friendship between Pakistan and China is an excellent example of mutual relationships. Over time, this relationship has flourished and no event in international politics has damaged the strong bonds. Pakistan’s insistence on procuring for the PRC its rightful seat in the UN helped to further strengthen these ties. That is why Chinese people still express gratitude to Pakistan and its efforts in ushering them into the mainstream of international politics.