Book Review-I
Islam
and Pakistan’s Identity
Javid Iqbal
Lahore: Vanguard Books, Ltd., 2003.
Pages 391, Price Rs. 495.00.
The author of the book under review, Barrister Dr. Javid Iqbal, the former
Chief Justice of Lahore High Court and a Judge of Supreme Court of
Pakistan argues that the founding fathers of Pakistan desired the country
to be a modern democratic state. He lays emphasis on ijtihad to
bring Islamic laws in conformity with the needs of the modern world. His
book is in line with his earlier works Ideology of Pakistan (1950)
and the Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam (1967).
To prove his thesis he draws inferences from Muslim history, although he
wrongly refers to it as Islamic history. He discusses shariah and
secularism, jihad and religious terrorism, conflict between Muslim
world and the West, challenges faced by Pakistan, reconciliation of
Western ideas with Islam and the peaceful co-existence with the West and
other civilizations.
Citing Mithaq-i-Madina, he establishes that all citizens of the
first Muslim state, i.e., Muslims, Jews, Christians and pagan population,
were treated equally and that the entire population, irrespective of their
ethnicity or religion, were taken as “one people”. The document said
“among them there exists sincere friendship, honourable dealing and no
treachery”. Being a single community they were expected to defend the
territories of the state, and to bear expenses for the same.
Later, Muslim rulers, apart from shariah, usually enforced man-made
laws through a royal decree and ordinance and possibly as a “sovereign”
act. For instance, he cites Ala-ud-Din Khilji whose policy was determined
by what he considered good for the state without caring whether it was
right or wrong according to shariah. The Mughal rulers of India
enhanced or commuted the sentences prescribed by shariah. Hindus
were appointed at higher and lower positions in civil administration as
well as in the armed forces. A lady, Razia Sultana, daughter of Iltutmish,
was made the ruler in Delhi, perhaps for the first time in India.
The author, who himself is a jurist, is of the opinion that the
conventional Muslim jurists “always distinguished the political order from
the legal order of the state of Islam.” The wielders of power “ruled
through edicts and ordinances in addition to and sometime in conflict with
the shariah laws.” The author therefore pleads that the “shariah
laws had to be modernized through the process of ‘Ijtihad’ in the
Parliament.”
Ijtihad
is also necessary because he attributes the decline of the Muslim power in
India to the general lack of creative and innovative activity, an
intellectual stagnation that had gripped the Ulema and Fuqaha
who were unable to offer solutions for the spiritual and temporal problems
of the Muslim community in the changing times.
Referring to the genesis of Pakistan, he points out that Hindus and
Muslims adhered to two diametrically opposed religions and cultures. The
inter-communal antagonism and riots became frequent after the death of
Aurangzeb. During the twentieth century, all attempts of Hindu and Muslim
leaders failed to arrive at an agreement for the sharing of political
power, which again gave rise to the inter-communal problem.
He traces the revival of militant “Wahabi” Islam in India to the 18th
century when the Mughal Empire was disintegrating and the Ulema and
Mushaikh were pitched against each other. Syed Ahmed Barelvi and
others introduced puritanical religious reform movement similar to that of
Ibn Abd al Wahhab of Arabia. They struggled against Sikh rule around
Peshawar in the North West and against Hindu overlords in the Eastern
Bengal. After British supremacy, they branded India as Dar-ul-Harb
(Country of War) which requires jihad or hijrat (i.e. war or
migration) against Dar-ul-Islam (Country of Islam).
But pragmatic and liberal reformers obtained decisions from both Sunni and
Shia Schools of thought that India was not Dar-ul-Harb. A new
catetgory was invented called Dar-ul-Aman (Country of Security).
Despite the Quranic verse that obedience is to be rendered to the wielders
of authority “from amongst you”, it was held that Muslims could obey their
non-Muslim rulers. The Muslims thus learned the necessity of ijtihad
to find solutions to new and complex situations.
The reaction of Muslim world to the new ideas and aggressive policies of
the West has been different from country to country. In Turkey, “Kamal
Ata-turk [Ata turk] obliterated the influence of Ulema from the
religious life of the Turks.” In Muslim India, reformers like Syed Ahmad
Khan and Muhammad Iqbal endeavoured to form a new group of Ulema
who would interpret Islam in an “enlightened, motivated and rational
manner” to evolve a Muslim society with a “modern outlook on life”. On
the other hand, the conservative or fundamentalist Muslims rejected
modernity. Secularism is defined by them as “Godlessness” and profane.
Those who rejected western ideas were extremists and conservatives called
“Wahabis”. The cooperative Muslims were called “Westernised”. The third
category, of integrationists, was called “liberal-reformers”. Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan, who was a liberal-reformer, was for separate Muslim status,
headed one group. Muhammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, following his
thought articulated the formation of a Muslim state in Northwest India.
They eventually founded Muslim League and achieved Pakistan. The other
group consisting of most of the members of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind joined
the Indian National Congress.
Muslim liberal thinkers differentiate between “modernity and
westernization.” The founding fathers of Pakistan have “incorporated the
modern ideas of the West within the Islamic culture. In reality Pakistan
is the product of the fusion of new Western ideas with Islam.” During the
past fifty years, in spite of drifting away from the ideals of the
founding fathers, the preponderant majority of Pakistani Muslims has
always been “moderate” and subscribes to the liberal views of Quaid-i-Azam
Mohammed Ali Jinnah.
According to him, Jinnah drew his inspiration and spiritual support from
Iqbal. Jinnah’s position was that of a “liberal” and ‘modernist’ Muslim.
Jinnah aspired to establish a liberal democratic Muslim welfare state in
Pakistan. In his earlier work the author had said: “The Islamic State of
Pakistan, as envisaged by Quaid-i-Azam, embraces the qualities of an ideal
‘Secular State’.”
The Two-Nation Theory enabled Muslims “to develop a consciousness of their
identity and forged a cultural and social solidarity, which ultimately
formed an ideological basis for the creation of Pakistan.” They did not
visualize Pakistan as a “specific kind of sectarian Muslim state”.
Instead, they reconciled the traditional Islamic values with modern
liberal ideas. This, according to the author, provided a political and
intellectual framework for a new Islamic state.
The federal parliamentary system, which guarantees human rights, treats
all its citizens equally and upholds the rule of law, is not repugnant to
Islamic injunctions. It is enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan
1973. The Islamic inspiration is reflected in the chapters on “Principles
of State Policy” and the constitution of the “Council of Islamic Ideology”
to advise the assemblies in Islamic law making.
He blames Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and President Zia-ul-Haq for
taking a number of steps on the demands of religious parties. The former
declared the Ahmadis as the minority community and the latter introduced
laws discriminating between Muslims and non-Muslims, etc which were not
approved by earlier governments. This change disseminated intolerance and
sectarianism, which increased to such an extent that rival groups of
sectarian terrorists did not hesitate to slaughter their fellow Muslims
even while they were praying in their places of worship.
He correctly points out that Pakistan has been a victim of all kinds of
terrorism: domestic, international as well as transnational. In his view,
of all the problems confronting Pakistan, the rapid growth of religious
terrorism is certainly the worst. It is frightening to realize that the
idealism, which laid the foundations of Pakistan, is being overtaken by
terrorism that can demolish the pluralistic civil society and the
founder’s vision of a democratic state of Pakistan.
As for challenges to Pakistan, apart from the so-called Islamisation, the
author laments the tussle between Presidents and Prime Ministers for power
and recurrent intervention of the army. He correctly brings out that there
was a complete departure from the implementation of Islam in Pakistan, as
visualized by the founding fathers, and from their aspiration of
constructing permanent democratic political structures in the country.
He has adequately defended his conclusion that Pakistan’s “ideology is
derived from a liberal, humanistic and egalitarian vision of a state,
which is to be run according to modern, democratic and Islamic ideals
interpreted on the basis of ‘Ijtihad’ in every sphere of the
collective life of the people of Pakistan. It is the responsibility of
those who wield power to persuade and encourage the educated and dedicated
young men and women to grasp this opportunity to fulfil the dream of the
founding fathers of Pakistan.”
He somewhat digresses from the subject of his book when he discusses the
concept of clash of civilization, explains the meaning of jihad,
distinguishes terrorism from freedom struggle of a majority against
minority rule, brings out the factors responsible for Muslim antagonism
against the West, the double moral standards of the US and its allies
where Muslims are involved which in turn promotes aggressive extremism in
Muslim countries, and the change in the thinking of the West about Islam
after September 11, 2001. But this discussion also adds to the value of
the book.
Noor ul Haq
Research
Fellow, IPRI
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