Sino-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Factor

Ghulam Ali*

hina, Pakistan and India form a triangle with convoluted relationships. Security in the region is shaped by the intertwining policies of all three powers. The policies adopted by one country have an immediate impact on and response from the other two. A review of the history of these turbulent relations reveals that, in the period following the establishment of diplomatic ties, China and India were on friendly terms. The first decade of their relations was based on the myth of Hindi Chini bhai bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers), while Pakistan, with its pro-West orientation, tilted towards the US-led capitalist bloc. There was, therefore, limited co-operation between China and Pakistan during the 1950s. This pattern of relations changed drastically with the advent of the 1960s. The heydays of Sino–Indian friendship turned into open rivalry, which led to severe border clashes in November 1962. Pakistan, whose relations with India had never been cordial, was disappointed when its Western allies began arming India on a scale it thought was unjustified. However, it found in China, with its new anti-Indian sentiments, a potential ally. Thus, in the wake of the Sino–Indian border clashes, relations between China and Pakistan improved remarkably.

In the post-Mao era (i.e., since 1978), the new Chinese leadership of Deng Xiaoping wrought drastic changes in the country’s economic and foreign policies. These changes had a considerable effect on the nature of the triangular relations.[1] China paid due attention to improving its relations with India, relations that had been frozen for the last two decades. At the same time, Beijing moderated its stance on the Kashmir issue, abandoning its erstwhile support for the right of self-determination in the disputed territory, and instead emphasized the need for a peaceful solution of the issue. This attitude was further reflected in China’s response to the Kargil crisis and to the Indo-Pakistan stand-off in mid-2002.

            Some scholars view these changes as a significant development in the triangular relationship and argue that the friendship between China and Pakistan developed in the backdrop of their common enmity towards India. Once Sino–Indian relations started improving, the traditional warmth between China and Pakistan began to cool somewhat. This paper is an attempt to study how far the Indian factor played a role in bringing China and Pakistan closer, and whether it led to a strengthening of ties between the two; and what the future impact might be. A brief historical background is given, highlighting the Sino–Indian border clashes which proved to be a turning point in the triangular relations. The latter part of the paper focuses on major political and strategic issues.

The Context

The links between China and India go back a long way. Even prior to independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, the founding father of Indian foreign policy, was an ardent admirer of the socialist system prevalent in the USSR and in China; this led to India’s early recognition of China and the launching of an enthusiastic struggle to place China in the UN. Thus, in the early days of their diplomatic relations, China, India and the Soviet Union were closely allied. This pattern of relations lasted till the late 1950s, when it took a hostile turn. The heady days of Hindi Chini bhai bhai changed to open rivalry, the causes being the Tibetan issue, boundary disputes and a claim to a leadership role for the Third World countries.[2]

The US, with its own enduring interests in the region, kept a watchful eye on the rapidly deteriorating Sino–Indian relations. Immediately in the wake of the border skirmishes of November 1959 in Ladakh, President Eisenhower undertook a tour of Asia and discussed regional problems with Nehru against the background of the Sino–Indian controversy. The magnitude of US concern at the souring of relations between the two giants of Asia can be measured in economic terms: up until 30 June 1959, the total American economic aid to India in the twelve years since its independence was officially valued at somewhat over $ 1,705 million, which included $ 931 million in agricultural commodities. Against this amount, in a short period of less than four years,

from 1959 to 1963, India received $ 4 billion from the US, many times more than the amount which it had received in the earlier 11-year period. [3] This tilted the regional balance of power decisively in favour of India. The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, lodged a strongly worded protest against the precipitate Western action in favour of India. He stated, “In their own global interests, these countries have taken a stand and offered arms assistance to India despite our protest.” According to Bhutto, these supplies augmented Indian armed forces by no less than 40 per cent.[4] When there were ample possibilities for resolving the crisis, why was India doubling the size of its standing army to 22 divisions?

President Ayub Khan commented on the situation in these words:

The fact of the matter is that, taking advantages of the favourable western response to her demands for arms, India is planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan and her other smaller neighbours in pursuance of her expansionist objectives. Any army meant for China would by the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel round swiftly to attack East Pakistan. Thus both the armies pose a grave threat to Pakistan.[5] Most scholars agree that US benevolence towards India emanated largely from its deep-rooted enmity towards China. Pakistan was a US ally in SEATO and CENTO and also a signatory of the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1959. Pakistan joined these alliances to enhance its defence capability vis-à-vis India. The US policy of arming India disillusioned Pakistan, which had been relying solely on the West for its defence. Following these developments, inter-state relations of the regional countries underwent drastic changes. The Sino–Indian and Sino–Soviet rifts contributed to the forging of close military, political and economic links between India and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ushered in a new era in friendly relations between China and Pakistan on the other. China accused India of becoming part of the Soviet “strategy of encircling and containing China.”[6] To counter this nexus, China encouraged anti-Indian sentiments in neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan, and paid special attention to promoting relations with Pakistan. Consequently, China and Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement in March 1963, followed by an Air Service agreement, which had the effect of ending China’s isolation through the extension of the services of Pakistan International Airlines to its territory. China also became a reliable source of military hardware during a period that saw growing Western restrictions and embargoes on Pakistan.[7]

The US was unhappy about Pakistan’s improving relations with China. Later, the American stance during the war of September 1965 and its overt inclination towards India provided added justification for Pakistan’s closer ties with China, a country that extended moral support and material support to Pakistan to help it counter Indian aggression.[8] Thenceforth, Sino–Pakistan relations improved steadily.

Relations between China and the USSR were low-profile during the 1960s. Thus, when the US signalled its desire for normalization of ties with China, it received a positive response. Since Pakistan played a role in the Sino–US rapprochement,[9] India perceived it as a US–Pakistan–China axis and correspondingly strengthened its relations with the USSR. The two countries signed a mutual defence agreement in August 1971, which effectively prevented China from providing other than diplomatic support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.[10]

China, Pakistan and the Afghan War

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 opened a new chapter of consultation and collaboration between China and Pakistan. The two countries were in total agreement on the threat that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan posed to the security of the entire region and prepared to co-ordinate their policies to face the challenge. According to an analyst, “Support to Pakistan’s security was the major feature of China’s Afghan policy because they wanted to honour their often repeated commitments.”[11]

            During his visit to China in May 1980, President Ziaul Haq stated that the two countries had a “perfect understanding in all fields.”[12] China, through Pakistan, provided covert military supplies worth US $ 200 million to the Afghan resistance and agreed to provide the US with facilities to monitor Soviet activities in its Xinjiang province, while India’s Afghan policy was based on maintaining its traditional cordial relations with the Soviet Union. In the face of international opinion, India did not condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; as a reward, the flow of sophisticated Soviet arms to India increased many times.[13] Regarding recent developments in Afghanistan, China and Pakistan have a close understanding of each other’s point of view. China made it clear that US military strikes in Afghanistan should be target-specific, to avoid civilian casualties.[14] President Jiang Zemin was quoted as saying that peace and stability in Afghanistan meant a great deal to China and Pakistan, as both shared borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan and China have consulted with each other and co-operated closely since the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States; both have played a constructive role in promoting a just and reasonable solution to the Afghan issue.[15] China hopes that peace in Afghanistan will be achieved as soon as possible, a desire shared equally by Pakistan.

Indian Missile Programme: Implications for China and Pakistan

Despite a thaw in Sino-Indian relations, New Delhi covertly considers Beijing its enemy number one. To quote a recent example, General K. V. Krishna Rao, a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, stated, “China is the real enemy not Pakistan. We are capable of finishing Pakistan with ease.”[16] According to analysts, the Indian Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles–Agni II, for instance–would primarily target China, though these missiles are also capable of attacking sites in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asia as well as American bases in the Indian Ocean. Joseph Cirincione concludes: “India’s nuclear tests and current deployment plans have much more to do with China than Pakistan.” The deployment of the Agni series would make it possible for India to hit virtually all industrial, cultural and politico-administrative targets in mainland China. In fact, China is the yardstick against which India measures itself. India recognizes that China is the stronger power, especially at the strategic level.[17]

            Naturally, the Indian missile and nuclear build-up has alarmed China. Pakistan likewise lives in fear of Indian missiles, most of which were deployed along the Pakistani border during the Indo–Pakistan stand-off in mid-2002. The ultimate Indian aspiration is to emerge on the world stage as China’s strategic equal by developing sufficient military capability, especially in nuclear and missile forces.

Indian Ambitions for Naval Hegemony in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is of strategic importance in international politics. Its extensive raw material and geographical proximity to the oil-rich Gulf region are the key factors which have led India to strengthen and expand its navy.[18] New Delhi adheres to the flawed perception that it is the custodian of the Indian Ocean. According to an analyst, perhaps this erratic notion emanates from the name of the ocean.[19] This self-assumed domination syndrome in the Indian mindset can breed conflict with China and Pakistan, as both those countries have enduring interests in the region too. One of Beijing’s primary aims is to maintain stability in the Indian Ocean for the unimpeded flow of maritime traffic: freedom of navigation, security of sea-lanes of communications as well as normal business activities, free from problems and interference.[20] To attain these objectives, China emphasizes regional co-operation and considers it one of the ways to reach the goal of economic advancement in South Asia. This is why Beijing lauded the inauguration of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in Mauritius on 5 March 1997, while India opposed Pakistan’s membership tooth and nail.[21] Indian ambitions of supremacy in the Indian Ocean are no secret: its naval officers have spoken openly of their intent to check the expansion of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean by controlling the Malacca Straits.[22] India is expanding its naval forces to match its hegemonic designs. In this context, a clash of interests among the triangular states is likely. 

Nuclearization of South Asia

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s justification that the perceived nuclear threat from China in particular and from China’s ally, Pakistan, compelled the Indian government to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998, shocked Beijing as well as Islamabad and many other countries. The remarks unambiguously reflected Indian enmity towards its neighbours. The roots of the Indian nuclear programme can be traced back to its border clashes with China in 1962; the programme gained momentum after Beijing’s first nuclear test in 1964.[23]  Since then, the Indian nuclear programme has been developing continuously and has become an important element of India’s foreign policy. Currently, New Delhi’s nuclear doctrine amply reflects its nuclear ambitions. It defies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), terming it “discriminatory”. Its objection is to the clauses which block India from going all out to develop its nuclear technology.[24] The formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in India in March 1998 brought about a significant change in the country’s perceptions of its nuclear programme, which has now been given the highest priority.[25] In May 1998, shortly before the Indian nuclear tests, The New York Times published a letter from Prime Minister Vajpayee to President Clinton in which Vajpayee all but named China as the rationale behind the decision to test. The letter read:

I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state, which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.[26]

            The Indian justification for its nuclear detonations was a grave development. Besides other repercussions, the irresponsible Indian posture blocked the steady development in Sino–Indian relations which had progressed substantially during the previous decade. China’s response to the first day’s tests was low-key. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented on these developments by saying that, “The Chinese government expresses its grave concern”, and that the tests were “detrimental to peace and stability in the South Asian region.” When the contents of Mr Vajpayee’s letter came to light, Beijing reacted strongly.[27] After the second explosion, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated: “The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation.” The spokesperson noted that New Delhi had “maliciously accused China of posing a nuclear threat to India”.[28]

            After the tests, the Indian leaders issued a tirade of irresponsible and threatening statements, targeting both China and Pakistan. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, expressed India’s nervousness about the rising power of China; he said India considered itself a victim of “nuclear apartheid”. He further remarked that China was the source of all Indian troubles, as Pakistan could be handled easily.[29] On another occasion, Singh stated that the Indian tests had changed the strategic world order put in place by the “Permanent Five”, and that India found the situation untenable as it was based on the security interests of the few as opposed to the security interests of the world as a whole.[30] Other Indian leaders made similar remarks, stating that India’s development of nuclear weapons was not focused solely on Pakistan. Rather, India was more concerned about its rivalry with China, its desire to be seen as China’s equal in Asia and its aspirations to become a great power on the world stage.[31] These statements amply conveyed Indian perceptions of China and Pakistan as enemies of India. The Indian remarks were particularly disappointing for China, as it had expressed its sincere desire to sort out differences to restore peace and tranquility in the region.

 The situation demanded close collaboration between China and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary flew to China where he held an extensive exchange of views with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, on the developments, which threatened regional security.[32] The Sino–Pakistan synergy could be assessed from the press conference, which the Foreign Secretary addressed on his return from a successful visit:

There is a complete identity of views between Pakistan and China on the gravity of the situation, which has resulted from India’s reckless actions, and China agreed that Indian nuclear explosions were a threat to Pakistan’s security. He further said that China has promised not to retaliate with economic sanctions against Pakistan should it explode a nuclear device and the Chinese leadership reaffirmed that the all-weather friendship between the two countries was above any political expediencies.[33]

China rendered significant political and moral support to Pakistan in helping it to arrive at a decision to conduct six underground nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. These tests re-established the strategic balance in South Asia. After the Indian tests and before those conducted by Pakistan, some countries attempted to move a Pakistan-specific resolution in the Security Council, calling for Iraq-like sanctions against any country testing a nuclear device in future. This was thwarted only by the threat of a Chinese veto. Had this move succeeded, an expert notes, “Pakistan, on testing a nuclear device, would have been subjected to sanctions altogether of a different category than those imposed on India.”[34] Had fear of such sanctions prevented Pakistan from testing its nuclear devices, it might have fallen victim to permanent Indian pressure.

Growing Indo–US Relations

The reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping brought phenomenal economic development, improved patterns and volumes of manufacturing and trade, personal income levels, state revenues, foreign exchange and higher levels of technology. China also started modernizing its armed forces.[35] Externally, this led to an enhanced Chinese role and active Chinese participation in international politics. The US perceived China’s new role as a potential threat to its interest in the region. Some Western writers termed it the beginning of a new “Cold War” between China and the US.[36] RAND scholars, in a recent study, reached similar conclusions and stated that managing the rise of China would be the most pressing challenge for the US in the twenty-first century.[37] This perception was the moving force behind US manoeuvering to further expand its sphere of influence in Asia; and it found in India an ideal ally, with a track record of confrontational relations with China. This shared perception revived the old Indo–US nexus, which had first emerged in the early 1960s in the backdrop of hostility between China and India, and has added a new dimension to the security issues in regional politics.[38] In this regard, President Clinton’s visit to South Asia in March 2000 proved a major US initiative for expanding co-operation with New Delhi across a broad spectrum of issues, including economic ties, regional stability, nuclear proliferation, security concerns and combating terrorism.[39]

While the situation was conducive to the establishment of an Indo–US nexus, a number of Indian authors took on themselves the task of projecting China as a threat to the shared interests of India and the US in the region. Take the example of an analyst who noted: “India and the United States must ensure that Chinese assertiveness does not threaten the common values and interest of two of the world’s largest democracies”, and emphasized the importance of a substantive strategic dialogue between India and the United States.[40] He further suggested, “It is in the interests of the United States to acquire the strategic space and flexibility that may be needed to deal with a hegemonic China. New Delhi can play an important role as part of a trilateral US–Japan–India partnership.”[41] He also pointed towards Chinese military modernization, its aggressiveness on Taiwan and its intransigence over disputes in the South China Sea, involving the Spratley, Senkaku and Paracel Islands.[42]

President George W. Bush has been influenced by the strategic importance of India for the protection of US interests to a greater extent than his predecessor, Bill Clinton. During his campaign for the presidency, Bush nominated Robert Black, one of his senior policy advisers, as his ambassador to India. After coming to power, the Bush administration significantly shifted away from Clinton’s nuclear policy towards South Asia and decided not to persuade India or Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or to give up their nuclear programmes.[43] The new US policy directly supported Indian nuclear doctrine, which was in defiance of both the CTBT and the NPT. The remarks made by Richard Armitage, Deputy US Secretary of State, explained the importance that the Bush Administration attached to its relations with India. He stated that, ‘‘When it comes to our own relations with India, it took the Clinton administration seven years to get to the point that Mr. Bush has got to in two months.’’[44] In response, India pledged public support for America’s National Missile Defense programme (NMD). New Delhi believes that NMD can help shield India from nuclear missile attacks launched by either Pakistan or China.[45] China and Pakistan unanimously rejected Indian claims and both believe that NMD might initiate a new missile race. Additionally, Pakistan has emphasized the need for Beijing to play a greater role in world politics, in order to maintain a strategic balance. The Bush administration assumes that Islamabad’s stand is against the interests of the US–India partnership in the region.[46]

In the pre-9/11 scenario, one writer painted the picture of Indo–US relations in these words: “It was almost like a love affair between the US and India. It was a fundamental shift and recognition of India as a power in South Asia. CTBT was dead and there was talk of more trade and lifting of economic sanctions . . . India responded in kind by its total support of missile defense. A presidential visit, so soon in the Bush Presidency was in making and even talk of military bases in India.”[47]

The events of 9/11 changed the regional and international scenario. It became indispensable for the US to address frozen Pak–US relations in order to get the latter’s strategic support, so vital for its war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It revived the “cupboard love” between Islamabad and Washington, which had previously lasted through the Soviet–Afghan war. While analysing the situation in the context of the uneven history of Pak–US relations, experts do not consider it a long-lasting partnership.[48] No sooner than US interests are met, it will no longer treat Pakistan in the same preferential way.[49]

India also responded to the new developments in a befitting manner. Immediately after 11 September 2001, it offered to the United States all possible co-operation and the use of its bases for the war on terrorism.[50] Soon after, in January 2002, the two countries established a Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism.[51] An Indian newspaper reported that one of the recent issues of concern for China was the coming together of India and the US for the patrolling of the Malacca Straits (due to which the proposed visit of the Indian Army Chief to China was delayed).[52] An Indian expert predicted that: ‘NATO, the United States and India will be on one side and China and rogue states including Pakistan, Burma and North Korea on the other side’.[53] China thoroughly understood the prevalent circumstances in which Pakistan decided to join the international coalition against terrorism and it continued to abide by its traditional friendship with Pakistan.[54]

As a result of their shared perceptions, Indo–US co-operation has expanded in many ways. The latter has become one of the largest trade partners of the former. Bilateral trade in 2001 exceeded US $ 14 billion–double the amount of a decade ago. America is also the largest cumulative investor in India, both in direct and foreign investment. Approximately 1000 US companies are currently doing business in India–a more than 14-fold increase over 1991. 500 companies now meet their software needs from Indian companies.[55] The Bush Administration believes that, as China’s power grows, a strong India will provide stability and balance in the region. 

In the shadows of Indo–US collaboration, Israel is also expanding defence co-operation with India, adding a new security dimension to Pakistan’s defence policy. Recently, India and Israel have engaged in negotiations for the sale of Arrow-2 anti-tactical ballistic missile. Negotiations are also underway regarding the proposed sale of three Phalcon Airborne Early-Warning (AEW) aircraft for approximately $ 1 billion. India has already taken delivery of the Israeli Green Pine radar for installation at a ground site for use as an early warning platform. Israel has reportedly also sold the Harpy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to India.[56] Naturally, India’s increasing co-operation with Israel and the US is a matter of deep concern for Pakistan.

China on the Kashmir Issue

Kashmir has vital importance for Pakistan. Its unresolved status and continued occupation by Indian forces are the root cause of conflict in South Asia. Its strategic location makes Kashmir an important part of Pakistan’s foreign policy. In the initial phase of the conflict, China took a non-partisan stance on the issue, as it followed a policy of Afro-Asian unity. Since both the contenders, i.e., Pakistan and India, were Asian states and neighbours, Beijing emphasized the need for a bilateral solution of the problem and advised both countries to avoid UN and Western involvement.[57] It maintained this policy even when Pakistan joined the Western defence pacts. As a result of the improvement in Sino–Pakistan relations, China shifted its stance on Kashmir and voiced support for the right of self-determination of the Kashmir people. The Sino–Pakistan Border Agreement was the first occasion where China raised its deep concern at the unresolved status of the Kashmir problem. In the joint communiqué issued on that occasion, China expressed its appreciation of Pakistan’s stand in seeking a peaceful settlement of the issue.[58] From 1964 to 1980, China sided with Pakistan in the United Nations voting and resolutely pressed for the right of self-determination for the Kashmiri people. However, in the post-Mao period, with the normalization of Sino–Indian relations, China, without any caveat, moderated its support for the Pakistani point of view on the issue.[59] Since then, China has been advocating a peaceful solution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan.

            During his visit to Pakistan in May 2001, the Chinese Prime Minster stated, ‘‘Kashmir is a problem left over by history. China appreciates and agrees with the position taken by Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. We will try our utmost and spare no efforts for peaceful resolution of this issue.’’[60]  The change in its stance can be understood in the context of China’s post-Mao policies of forsaking the path of leftist revolution in the interest of greater economic development.

            A number of observers and diplomats in Pakistan are of the view that, despite a shift in China’s Kashmir policy, it is still inclined towards Pakistan. Their opinion is based on the fact that Kashmir remains on the agenda of most bilateral talks between the two countries. For instance, during the recent visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali to Beijing, Chinese officials once again appreciated Pakistan’s efforts for the peaceful solution of the dispute.[61]

China and the Kargil Conflict

China’s stand on the Kargil conflict–the first serious encounter between the military forces of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, which started in mid-1999–is termed a neutral posture.[62] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to Beijing in June 1999 at the height of the crisis and discussed the matter with his Chinese counterpart, Zhu Rongji, as well as with President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Li Peng. The official statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged both India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement of the issue.[63] In a departure from its usual tilt towards Pakistan, an analyst commented, Beijing not only followed a scrupulously neutral path but also played the role of informal mediator by hosting separate visits of the Pakistani and Indian Foreign Ministers. The official Chinese statement neither blamed Pakistan for the crisis–a view projected by India and held by a number of other countries–nor did it support Pakistan, as many in Pakistan had expected. This neutrality was perceived by India as a significant change in China’s stance on the Kashmir issue and its recognition of India as a big power. An Indian scholar commented, ‘All indications are that China regards India as a major power and a potentially important player in a putative multi-polar world.’[64] In spite of the neutral stance taken by the Chinese government, the coverage of the Kargil conflict in the Chinese media was generally in favour of Pakistan. The Chinese daily, The Liberation Army, was the most strident in lashing out at India: it termed India’s Kargil operation an act of expansionism.[65]

China and the Indo-Pakistan Stand-off

The events of 9/11 changed the regional security environment. Pakistan took the difficult decision of supporting the US-led coalition in its war against terrorism. This revived Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance in international politics, which India found unpalatable. It employed every method to isolate or at least marginalize Pakistan’s role in international politics.

            As part of its marginalization strategy, India attempted to link the freedom struggle in Kashmir to terrorism, employing the term “cross-border terrorism”, allegedly sponsored by Pakistan. It also stepped up its policy of placing the blame for all untoward incidents within its borders on Pakistan-based extremist groups.[66] After failing to discredit Pakistan by these tactics, India staged two episodes to establish Pakistan’s link with the terrorists. The first was a bomb blast in Srinagar on 30 September 2001; the second a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001.[67] Additionally, an attack on the US Cultural Centre in Delhi and a bomb blast in an army camp in Jammu on 14 May 2002 were also used in attempts to tarnish Pakistan’s international image.

            The attack on the Indian Parliament–a strange incident in which no one was hurt, and not even the building damaged–was especially blown out of proportion and, in January 2002, was used as a pretext for India to move its armed forces into a confrontational position along the entire stretch of the Indo-Pakistan border and the Line of Control (LOC) in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It reportedly kept its Air Force and Navy on high alert.[68] More than 800,000 troops remained eyeball-to-eyeball for several months. This massive mobilization of troops and India’s jingoistic attitude aggravated the security environment in the region, bringing the two nuclear rivals to the brink of war.[69] In this critical situation, Pakistan consulted with its close ally, China. President Musharraf made an overnight stay in Beijing on 3 January 2002, en-route to Kathmandu; he met the Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji and the two leaders held in-depth discussions on the situation in Afghanistan and the Indian military build-up on Pakistan’s border.[70]

China adopted multi-channel diplomacy to defuse the tension in South Asia and stressed the need for the international community to take a more balanced and unprejudiced approach to the problem. When the situation reached critical level, China expanded its diplomatic efforts and discussed the situation with other leading powers, including the US and Britain.[71] It also raised the issue at the summit of Central Asian leaders in Russia’s northern city of St Petersburg and expressed its deep concern at the highly volatile situation in the subcontinent. A spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Kuong Qihuan, stated on the occasion: ‘‘This question must be settled through a direct dialogue between India and Pakistan,’’ and declared that, ‘‘China and Pakistan have friendly relations, and China and India have friendly relations too.’’ He added that, ‘‘China has always called on these countries to exert restraint and solve their conflict through peaceful means.’’[72] At the height of the tension, a section of the press in Pakistan and India reported that Chinese President Jiang Zemin, during a meeting with a US delegation, stated that his country would not side with Pakistan in case of a war with India. However, Beijing denied the report and stated that Jiang Zemin had only expressed his hope that Pakistan and India would settle their dispute and take steps to reduce the tension.[73] Chinese neutrality during the India–Pakistan military stand-off gave added flexibility to Chinese diplomacy in helping to avert a war in South Asia.[74]

Changing Pattern of Sino–Pakistan Relations

Despite the close understanding between the two countries of each other’s points of view and their mutual stand on various regional and international issues, the pattern of Sino–Pakistan relations has been undergoing changes since the post-Mao period, when China took the initiative in improving its relations with India. As a result of this rapprochement, the then Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China in 1979: the visit proved a major step towards normalization of ties between the two countries. It was at this point that China changed its stance on the Kashmir issue, stopped supporting Pakistan in its dispute with India and emphasized the need for the peaceful solution of all outstanding issues between the two archrivals.

            China’s neutrality was amply evident during the Kargil crisis and the Indo-Pakistan stand-off in 2002. Several scholars noted the shift in China’s policy and termed it an important development in the triangular relations.[75] When the troops of the two countries were positioned on their borders, China advised Pakistan and India to defuse tensions, remarking, ‘‘China is a friend of both Pakistan and India.’’[76] This phrasing–‘friend of both’–was new in Beijing’s position on Indo-Pakistan conflicts. It signified that India was no longer a common enemy, and that Beijing and Islamabad now had different perceptions of New Delhi. Sultan M. Khan, formerly Pakistan’s ambassador to China, commented on the changing pattern of Sino–Pakistan relations in the following words:

There is however a very different China now on the international scene. It has to take positions on a number of issues. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the economic and political confusion can be global. The emergence of the US as the sole superpower, the economic and political confusion in Russia, the future of Taiwan, world trade and other issues on that scale, now engage China’s main interests. Regionally, China will continue to support Pakistan but much depends upon how Pakistan itself manages to come out of its current problems. The old intimacy and warmth, which once were the hallmark of Sino–Pakistan friendship, is a part of history.[77]

Another scholar with a similar point of view stated that the post-Mao Chinese policy towards Pakistan had changed considerably and the warmth that prevailed during the 1960s and the 1970s has started to recede.[78] Beijing had traditionally supported Pakistan against India, but in the post-Cold War era, the Chinese have distanced themselves somewhat from Pakistan in order to cultivate better relations with India, states a UK-based scholar.[79]

Correlation between Sino–Pak and Sino–Indian Ties

In the early 1950s, China and India were closer to each other than were China and Pakistan. This pattern of relations existed till the late 1950s when palpable differences emerged in Sino–Indian relations, leading to severe border clashes in November 1962. China’s relations with the USA and the USSR were already hostile; the addition of India as a new enemy increased its trepidation, as Beijing felt more isolated and encircled.[80] In these conditions, both China and Pakistan realized the need for close co-operation to protect their mutual relations in the region. Negotiations to demarcate the undefined Sino–Pakistan boundary were progressing very slowly, mainly due to China’s cautious attitude; these were accelerated after the Sino–India border conflict and, soon after, the two countries signed a border agreement.[81] Thus, along with the Indian threat faced by both China and Pakistan, the other factors like China’s fear of isolation and encirclement and Pakistan’s disappointment in its Western allies, equally played a role in bringing the two countries closer to each other.

Links between the two countries remained strong throughout the Mao era. The post-Mao leadership, as mentioned earlier, embarked upon drastic changes in its internal and external policies, aiming at comprehensive economic development and diversification in the realm of foreign policy. China opened up towards the West and concentrated on normalizing its relations with all countries, including India, and the two countries reached a considerable level of understanding. After Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 1979, China took a modified stand on the Kashmir issue, exhorting Pakistan and India to resolve the problem peacefully. Some analysts link China’s moderated stance on the Kashmir issue to the thaw in Sino–Indian relations and argue that the improvement in Beijing–New Delhi ties could affect the traditional friendship between China and Pakistan. To further strengthen their argument, they cite China’s neutrality during the Kargil crisis and the Indo–Pakistan stand-off in mid-2002. Certain political circles in Pakistan were-rather optimistically-expecting China to intervene directly in support of Pakistan. However, this author reaches a different conclusion and does not find the Indian factor responsible for the change in China’s policy. The following arguments are presented in support of a different viewpoint:

·        The normalization of Sino–Indian relations was the sequel of a restructuring of China’s policy that started under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and was not an independent move towards India. Beijing improved its relations not just with New Delhi but also with a number of other countries, the most important among them being the United States.[82]

·        The reduction in Beijing’s support is not confined to the freedom struggle in Kashmir. China’s post-Mao policy has considerably reduced support to revolutionary movements around the world. [83]

·        China has uncoupled its relations with Pakistan from those with India. As one writer aptly comments: “Better relations between India and China have not led to a weakening of the Sino-Pakistan entente. China has been fairly effective in pursuing these two relationships simultaneously.” China therefore encourages moves for improvement in the relationship between Pakistan and India, this being a new element in its policy towards the subcontinent.[84]

·        In the contemporary international context, it is dangerously unwise if Pakistan expects China’s direct involvement in any dispute that might erupt between Pakistan and India, particularly when Islamabad partly responsible for such “misadventures”.

A number of complicated issues bedevil relations between China and India: the boundary dispute, the Tibetan issue and continued Indian hospitality to the Dalai Lama, and the rivalry between the two countries for regional supremacy. These are problems that cannot be resolved in a short span of time. However, even if Sino–Indian relations improve, Sino–Pakistan relations will continue to flourish. First, China has reiterated, time and again, that the improvement in its ties with India would not in any way affect the traditional friendship between China and Pakistan, a friendship that has withstood the vicissitudes and vagaries of time. Second, China will be in a better position to exhort India to moderate its policy towards Pakistan. Third, the non-existence of any political or territorial dispute and the strict adherence by China and Pakistan to the five principles of peaceful coexistence has cemented their friendship.[85] Fourth, besides many other factors contributing towards the sustainability in their relations, the identical perception of the obtaining regional and international milieu is an important binding force between them. Fifth, there has been continuity in the military structures of the two countries; which has a direct bearing on the continuity in their bilateral relations.[86]

It seems logical to conclude that the India factor might well have played a role in strengthening Sino–Pakistan relations, though other forces were also of immense importance in bringing the two countries closer to each other. In future as well, their relations are likely to continue to progress, independent of the Indian factor. And that is the reason why, despite their divergent socio-political systems and ideologies, Sino–Pakistan relations are considered a ‘‘unique example in modern history’’.

Future Scenario

In the light of this study, the likely policy behaviour of the triangular countries in relation to one another can be determined to a certain degree. It is expected that India’s China policy will be based on contradictions. India might engage with China and resume negotiations on the border issue as well as in the Joint Working Group (JWG). Economic co-operation and the exchange of official visits between Beijing and New Delhi are likely to increase. India will probably ask China to demonstrate its sincerity by ending its support to Pakistan in the field of defence technology, particularly nuclear and missile technology.[87] India might also press China to endorse Indian occupation of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Parallel to these moves for thawing relations, India will continue to project China as an undesirable emerging power, one that poses a serious threat to its security, thus seeking justification for advancing its nuclear and missile programmes. This could trigger an arms race in the region as Pakistan naturally feels insecure if it lags behind India in arms procurement. India is well aware of the US obsession with the great-power potential of China, and it could cajole Washington into a strategic understanding to counter the Chinese threat. In this context, Indo–US co-operation is likely to expand further, while the Indo–Israel nexus has already acquired considerable strength.[88]

            India’s Pakistan policy will continue to be based on threats and intimidation. New Delhi may even resort to military harassment of Pakistan by deploying its armed forces on its border with Pakistan, as it did in 2002. To cover its atrocities in Occupied Kashmir, India will continue to dub Pakistan the hub of terrorist activities and to call on the international community to pressurize Pakistan to stop “cross-border terrorism”–a term India has coined. The purpose behind this malicious propaganda would be to suppress the Kashmiri struggle. This volatile situation might prove unfavourable to the Chinese desire to maintain peace to boost the economic activities. 

The traditional friendship between China and Pakistan will probably continue to exist in the same spirit seen now. Bilateral economic co-operation and cultural exchanges are likely to increase. China, under heavy US pressure, may reduce its assistance to Pakistan in key areas, such as development of its missile and nuclear programmes.[89] Beijing will most likely pursue its policy of peaceful co-existence, reduction of tension, and peaceful resolutions of all disputes, including the thorny issue of Kashmir, for greater economic co-operation. Chinese intervention in any confrontation between India and Pakistan is, therefore, unlikely.

It also seems reasonable to conclude that in its relations with China, Pakistan is living in the past, cherishing memories of the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the regional and international environment has changed drastically. It must reorient its China policy in the light of Beijing’s new outlook on world affairs, if it wishes to maintain the traditional warmth, which has been the hallmark of Sino–Pakistan relations. Both countries should further the spirit of seeking common ground, while shelving differences and promoting frankness and mutual trust. There are several areas where Pakistan can avail Chinese knowledge and expertise, such as agriculture, infrastructure development and information technology. Both countries should also work towards expansion of mutual trade and cementing ties based on people-to-people contact.[90]