The Scourge of Small Arms: Challenge to Human Security 

 Salma Malik * 

 While not by themselves causing the conflicts in which they are used, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy rather than a peaceful resolution of unsettled differences. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons, which itself breed still greater insecurity, and so on.1 

Introduction

 

According to one estimate, “each year, 700,000 civilians are killed by SAs fire. SAs lower the barrier for violence and terror because they are inexpensive, simple to use and portable. Their widespread availability multiplies their lethal effectiveness and makes conflict easier. They have in fact truly become weapons of mass destruction and are often in the hands of civilians, rebel forces and make shift militias.”4

As the primary instruments of violence in internal conflicts; SAs and LWs are responsible for a large number of deaths and displacement of citizens around the world and with every passing year, they consume larger amounts of resources of all affected countries. By one estimate, one third of the states in the world suffer with some sort of internal conflict. During 1995 alone, there were 30 major armed conflicts nearly all in the developing countries, which strongly reinforces the need for establishing some norms. While there exist some agreed global norms and standards against weapons of mass destruction, there are no such standards and criteria that can be used in reducing excessive and destabilizing accumulation of such armoury.

It is true that weapons do not kill people, people do. Conflicts occur due to deep-rooted causes that are often never easy to resolve and get progressively worse with the passage of time. It is only through eradicating the root cause of the violence that we can hope to reduce its occurrence. But, the scale of violence and the resultant deaths from it are helped enormously by the widespread availability of the means of killing. Both the intensity and the duration of violence are determined by the availability of SAs and their proliferation in the region of conflict.5 This violence takes shape of an extremely vicious and vehement cycle, which not only breeds from the frustrations arising out of socio-economic and political inadequacies and injustice, but also in its wake leads to further social anomalies.

       This paper will survey some of these issues that surround current attempts to slow or reverse the proliferation of SAs and LWs. It will discuss briefly:

[

a.        What threat LWs pose to the overall Human Security perspective, and the relative importance of this threat?

b.       What different policy frameworks for the problem of SAs and LWs have been identified?

c.        What are some of the general obstacles that render ineffective international actions in this area?

d.       With the focus of our study being on the South Asian case study at large and Pakistan specifically, the paper would review the major sources of SAs and LWs proliferation in the country and its broader socio-political implications. Finally some remedial measures would be discussed, for an effective control of this scourge and issuance of an effective state mechanism providing its citizens with the basic security needs.

 

What is Human Security?

Before we move further on, to discuss the issue of SAs, let us first dwell on the fundamental question, as to what exactly is meant by the concept of Human Security? To begin with, human security does not supplant national security, rather it brings security to the level of the people, in the process asserting that the security of the state is not an end in itself, but a means of ensuring security for its people. In this context, state security and human security are mutually supportive.6 The specific phrase, Human Security has been defined in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report by the late Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq, as “the summation of seven distinct dimensions, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.” A central strategy for promoting human security calls first and foremost for the building of an effective, democratic state that values its own people and protects minorities. For human security of the people strengthens legitimacy, stability and security of the state. When states are extremely aggressive, internally repressive, or too weak to govern effectively, they threaten the security of their people and those beyond.7 This has a very negative impact on the societal development, deepens and enhances political, religious and sectarian fissures and polarization, which in turn retards opportunities for economic growth and development. Over a period of time people in such states loose confidence in the ability of the law enforcing agencies to protect them, and gradually the society moves towards an anarchic situation, with the common man taking to firearms for their personal protection and security. Usually the trend has been that such a situation does not remain confined to a single state or society alone, but in fact has a domino effect on its neighbouring areas as well.

The Charter of the United Nations embodies the view that security cannot be achieved by a single state in isolation. The very meaning of the phrase, International Security and Peace implies that the security of one state depends on the security of other states. A human security perspective thus builds on the logic that the security of people in one part of the world depends on the security of people elsewhere. In Pakistan’s perspective, an example could be the impact of the appalling human security situation in Afghanistan on the everyday life of Pakistani citizens.8

Complimentary to human security is Human Development, which is only possible when the state ensures protection of its citizens from crime and political violence. It also extends to them the fundamental human and political rights, and equitable access to justice. The absence of such guarantees of human security constitutes a powerful barrier to human development. Regardless of the socio-economic class structure, if people lack confidence in society’s ability to protect them, they will have little incentive to invest in the future. Human security provides an enabling environment for human development. Where violence or threat of violence makes meaningful progress on the developmental agenda impractical, enhancing safety for people is a necessary pre-requisite.

At the same time, promoting human development can also be an essential first step for furthering human security prospects. By addressing inequalities, which are often the root cause of violence and aggression, by strengthening structures of governance and by providing humanitarian assistance, development compliments political, legal and military initiative in enhancing human security.

In today’s conflict zones, more than 100 million people are chronically malnourished, while in the mid 1990s, the world had nearly 27 million refugees and displaced persons, an eleven-fold increase since 1970.9 Development has fallen precipitously, and as the World Bank Report notes, “Conflict can destroy human capital gains and development investment that took decades to accumulate.” The crux of the problem is a global availability of LWs out of state control that has fuelled conflict world wide and prevented peace keeping and conflict management from making perceptible dent in any of these areas. Estimates of global availability are difficult, but one source puts the figures a little over 500 million, with at least 4-6 billion Dollars worth of weapons in Afghanistan alone.10

 

 

 

The Scourge of Small Arms

The proliferation of SAs and LWs is a major obstacle to any process seeking to establish or consolidate a lasting internal or external peace. In countries affected by violent conflict, wide spread SAs proliferation, possession and usage are key elements in the perpetuation of conflict, political and economic marginalization and insecurity.

SAs and LWs range from clubs, knives and machetes to those weapons just below those covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms, e.g. mortars below the calibre of 100 mm. The SAs and LWs that are of main concern are those manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war.11

                LWs refers to crew portable land-based armaments. This definition includes SAs such as pistols, rifles, assault rifles and submachine guns; light and medium range machine guns; heavy machine guns (HMG) with a calibre not exceeding 14.5 mm; anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, light mortars and grenades.12

                If we need to examine as to why do SAs and LWs have such a widespread appeal, then few characteristics that come forth are, that:13

 

a.        These have an exceptionally low rate of obsolescence.

b.       They rarely require spare parts.

c.        They do not need an introductory elaborate infrastructure for their production and manufacture.

d.       Once the control over these weapons is lost, it becomes very difficult to maintain some kind of control or regulation.

e.        They can move from one sub-state actor/group to another with considerable speed.

f.         Less expensive than conventional weapons, they can easily be used without extensive training and being light, are fit to be carried on person

 

                Besides, SAs and LWs are weapons of choice in most internal conflicts for a number of reasons: they are widely obtainable, relatively cheap, deadly, easy to use and easy to transport. Unlike major conventional weapons, such as fighter jets and tanks, which are procured almost exclusively by national military forces, SAs span the dividing line between government forces - police and soldiers - and civilian populations. Depending on the gun laws of a particular country,14 (if such regulations even exist or are enforced) citizens may be permitted to own anything from pistols and hunting guns to military-type assault weapons.

In contrast to the declining trade in major weaponry since the end of the Cold War, global sales of SAs and LWs remain strong. No organization, private or public, provides detailed data on the global trade in these weapons, in part because of the difficulty of tracking so many transactions (and because of the low level of attention that has been paid to the problem). Reliable estimates of the legal trade in SAs and LWs put the annual figure between $7 billion and $10 billion15. A large but unknown quantity of SAs worth perhaps $2 billion to $3 billion a year is traded through black-market channels16. Because data are so scarce, comparing these numbers to those for SAs exports during the Cold War is difficult. But studies in Southern Africa and the Indian subcontinent do indicate that during the 1990s the availability of modern assault rifles increased considerably.

Governments transfer vast quantities of SAs either through open, acknowledged military aid programmes or through covert operations. And as the size of their militaries has dwindled, Western and ex-Communist countries have sold off their excess weapons to almost any interested party. Most arms though are sold by private firms on the legal market through ordinary trade channels. Although such sales are supposedly regulated, few countries pay close attention. The US probably has some of the strictest controls, but even so, it sold or transferred 463 million Dollars worth of SAs and ammunition to 124 countries in 1998 (the last year for which such data is available). Of these countries, about 30 were at war or experiencing persistent civil violence in 1998; in at least five, U.S. or U.N. soldiers on peacekeeping duty have been fired on or threatened with U.S.-supplied weapons.17

The former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright, in her speech to the U.N. Security Council on U.S. policy shift solely from crime-related illicit firearms trafficking to a concern about weapons shipments — whether legal or otherwise into Zones of Conflict, stated that, “This dirty business fuels conflict, fortifies extremism, and destabilizes entire regions. All of us who sell such weapons or through whose area the traffic flows, bear some responsibility for turning a blind eye to the destruction they cause.” 18

There is available relatively scant data on the quantity or dollar value of SAs sold by other manufacturers. Based on existing weapons inventories of military and police forces around the world, certain major suppliers can be identified — Russia (maker of the AK-47 assault rifle and its derivative, the AK-74), China (maker of an AK-47 look-alike known as the Type 56 rifle), Belgium (FAL assault rifle), Germany (G3 rifle), the US (M16 rifle) and Israel (Uzi submachine gun).19

 

The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of SAs and LWs is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence. It is, therefore, a legitimate concern for the international community, groups and individuals operating outside the reach of State and Government forces making extensive use of such weapons in internal conflicts. Insurgent forces, irregular troops, criminal gangs and terrorist groups are using all types of SAs and LWs. The illicit trafficking in such weapons by drug cartels, criminals and traders in contraband goods has also been on the increase. The main problem area that should be dealt with is the source and availability and not merely the accumulation of these weapons that  contributes  to  the  exacerbating of conflicts

by increasing the lethality and  duration of  violence. By  encouraging  violent, rather

Figure I: Trend of SAs Manufacturing in Various Regions

of the World

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  Graph: Laurie Grace20

than a peaceful resolution of difference and by generating a vicious circle of a greater sense of insecurity, provocative conditions are created which lead to an increasing demand for and use of such weapons. 21

Through the following figure, an effort has been made to highlight the effects and problems posed by SAs proliferation and its impact on human security situation.

Figure II: Different Ways of Framing the

SAs and LWs Problem22

Statement of Problem	Description of Problem	Way LWs Contribute as a Cause or Catalyst
Humanitarianism and Human Rights	Culture of violence; child soldiers; personal insecurity; vulnerable groups (women, visible minorities, ethnics); excessively injurious weapons	Proliferation of Sas; weak national control systems; vicious cycle of violence
Public Health and Criminality	Drugs/terror/arms nexus; increase in petty criminality or "disorganized" crime; "contagion effect"	Weak national export/import control systems; weak law enforcement; state corruption
Economic Development and Good Governance	"Gun as livelihood" problem; extortion; "Mafia;" corruption; weak climate for investment	Weak or eroded governance structures; economic underdevelopment
Communal Conflicts	Flow of LWs increases level of violence and intractability of communal wars	Deep-rooted causes, but easy access to LWs thwarts peaceful solutions to conflicts and facilitates slide to violence
Extra-Regional Conflict Intervention	Grey market transactions (government to government or insurgent) designed to affect course of a conflict	No international transparency
Regional Destabilization	Spill over of conflicts; recycling of surplus weapons	Weak accountability and tracking mechanisms; no post-conflict disarmament measures
International Terrorism	Potential attacks on high profile "soft targets" around the world	Proliferation of sophisticated LWs, e.g.: Stinger anti-aircraft missiles

 

In Pakistan the issue of SAs is that of proliferation, as well as its production (i.e. by indigenous elements) and added to this is the problem of culture, let alone a legacy of conflicts. But before taking up Pakistan’s case study, let us focus on the two main reasons for the increase in the supply of these weapons. According to Chris Smith:

 

a.        The availability of modern LWs may raise the level of violence. Implying that if those under attack feel insecure, possession of LWs - such as assault rifles - could allow an individual or a small group to inflict considerable damage upon a numerically larger group, the majority of which either are poorly armed or totally unarmed. However, even if the short-term effect could be self-defence, the long-term consequence might be to limit, if not negate, other ways of addressing conflict resolution by peaceful means and to start an arms race. It is possible to imagine a sub-national arms race with both sides seeking types of weapons, which they believe the other side has already acquired. This has occurred to a greater extent in Pakistan as well.

b.       These weapons can change the balance of power between the state and sub-state groups, such as insurgents and drug traffickers and other criminal.23 Because such weapons can move from one sub-state group to another with considerable speed due to their small size and relatively low cost. If they are available within the region or if a supply line can be established, particularly if funded by outside interests, sub-state groups can rapidly change the balance of power between themselves and the security forces. In some instances, security forces might even find themselves facing weapons that are more sophisticated than those to which they themselves have access.

 

                Examples from within the South Asian Region are that of Afghan Mujahideen, Sikh separatists, Kashmiri freedom fighters etc. Even where these groups are unsuccessful in achieving their political or ideological goals, they extract a heavy price in terms of measures that the state is forced to adopt to counter their activities.

 

The Pakistani Case Study

The region of South Asia has been unfortunate enough to inherit similar patterns of violent conflict in at least three areas of Kashmir, Indian Northeast and Sri Lanka. Three cases of societal violence due to huge diffusion of weapons, have afflicted Karachi (Pakistan) as well as Indian Punjab, the Frontier regions including Afghanistan and violent political turmoil in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, together with a rise in organized crime overall. This state is directly related to the fact that there are some 3 million weapons out of the control of state machinery24 with more coming in, primarily from Afghanistan and the South East Asian and international black markets. Influx of these weapons is beginning to make their presence felt. Where as all countries of South Asia are affected by the scourge of SAs proliferation to different degrees. Pakistan has been the hardest hit, with the largest concentration of weapons. The source of this is known to be the CIA sponsored arms pipeline to Afghan Mujahideen through Pakistan in the 1980s. Besides this, is the traditional Darra in the Frontier region of Pakistan, commonly known as the Open Arms Bazaar. Outside Pakistan, a number of underground arms bazaar have grown - Cox Bazaar (Bangladesh), in areas outside major urban centres such as Mumbai and Delhi and a pipeline coming in via Nepal and Myanmar. In short, the issue of LWs is one that seems common to all states in the region and not limited to India and Pakistan alone.

The South Asian region seems to be progressing along two contradictory paths. On the one hand, it is perceived as a vibrant, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society that has by its very diversity and size, the potential to grow into a formidable economic and cultural pole of power and influence. On the other hand, this potential is being eroded from within and without by an unprecedented spread of LWs that has transformed religious diversity into a maelstrom of violence, communal fraction and pushed ethnic differences into a bloody and unrelenting conflict.25 Simply put, the availability of SAs and LWs has weaponised societal discontent and empowered a variety of non-state actors of all kinds. Facing them, the police and para-military forces, often let loose a reign of terror under pressure to retrieve the situation. Caught in between these two factions, i.e. one state and the other non-state, are men, women and children who want no part of either but suffer most of the casualties.

In a study conducted on the pilferage and trafficking of SAs, Brig. Shahidul Anam Khan regards the end of the Cold War and transformation of the world order as the main cause behind the easy flow, availability and trade of these weapons at illicit level.26 The reason being that in this transitional phase, Europe, North America and Asia unveiled their huge arms stockpiles, creating a glut in the world arms market of used but quite modern weapons. This gradually put pressure on cash-poor countries — such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries — to sell their surplus. Not all of these transactions, however, were done officially. Arms were also sold illegally, ensuring LWs delivery around the world through the black market, secret government - to - government deals and the sponsorship of sub-state groups.

 

Sources and Incentives for LWs in Pakistan

The motives for which suppliers and recipients engage in transfers may be mixed. Suppliers may have political agenda or commercial motives or a mix of the two. In particular reference to Pakistan, the predominant form of acquisition of weapons by security forces as well as non-state actors continues to be through:

 

a.        Imports or foreign technology transfers.27

b.       The availability of LWs in other parts of South Asia partly reflects the onward shipment of weapons originally intended for use in Afghanistan.

c.        A major source of weapons purchase, proliferation and production is the centuries old, Darra which was once regarded as a cottage industry but has now become a huge industrial enterprise, free of government’s control and taxation policies. The private gun manufacturing units of Darra have a production capacity of not less than a hundred AK 47s per day. Proud of their skill, the gunsmith of Darra Adam Khel and Landi Kotal, as well as those scattered around Peshawar, certain parts of Balochistan and Afghanistan are proficient enough to manufacture any kind of sophisticated fire arms, which are much cheaper in cost.28

d.       The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, ushered in a new era in the LWs trade in South Asia. Other interested parties also contributed directly and indirectly to Mujahideen, such as China (weaponry) and Saudi Arabia (financing). Pakistan became the conduit for this massive military assistance programme, with the CIA coordinating the supply of weapons and the Pakistani ISI responsible for receipt and distribution. 29

e.        Since the end of the Afghan War, the availability of arms on the commercial market has increased considerably and in some cases prices have fallen. For one thing, many Afghans returning to their country after months or years in the refugee camps in the NWFP left their weapons behind in Pakistan.

 

                Based on these sources, the various weapons on sale fall into four categories:

 

a.        First, there are weapons that leaked from the U.S.-supported arms pipeline. Following the Geneva Accord, which effectively marked the withdrawal of Soviet occupational forces, U.S. arms supplies actually increased to ensure a Soviet withdrawal. All of these systems, notably the Stingers remained in the region after the Soviet withdrawal.

b.       Second, the stocks of Soviet weapons captured by the Mujahideen during the conflict.

c.        Third, those manufactured by the small-scale producers within the region. This would include both the Darra private gun manufacturers and the state licensed and regulated public arms producers.

d.       And finally, arms bazaars of NWFP are full of miscellaneous weapons that arrive in the region through extremely circuitous routes - from Vietnam or the Middle East. 30

 

                Chris Smith in his study also taps the Pakistan Ordinance Factory (POF) as a possible source, but the likelihood of any pilferage is very less, given the stringent control measures enforced. In any case, the array of weaponry on sale in the arms bazaars makes the NWFP a unique region in South and South-western Asia, with virtually any type of weapons available for purchase without any state regulation.

 

Negative Fall-Out of Small Arms Proliferation for Pakistan

                One region that was most directly affected by the growing availability of SAs and LWs has been the province of Sindh, and its state capital Karachi. Though the problems in Sindh have been more political than ideological, much division occurs along ethnic lines. Throughout the 1980s, levels of violence in Karachi reached unprecedented and shocking levels prior to Pakistan Army intervention in 1992. Although, Sindh traces a streak of violence, several analysts from Karachi agree that the dramatic increase in the violence and polarization dates from 1985 to 1986, when weapons from the Afghan pipeline began to find their way into commercial channels.

                Dr. Ayesha Agha in one of her studies31, pinpoints several factors that have affected and in turn been adversely hit by the SAs proliferation and these namely being:

 

a.        Ethnic divisions and bad governance.

b.       Rise in sectarianism, coupled with mushrooming of religious schools that took sectarian ideology to the grass roots level, enhancing dogmatic orthodoxy.

c.        Lack of social and human development, accompanying fragmentation of Pakistan’s Muslim society.

d.       Systematic judicial corruption.

e.        Very adversely affected economic indicators.

f.         Added to these is an additional factor of fragmentation of Afghanistan, rise of Taliban movement, which was followed by an Islamization of arms transfer.

g.       Appeasement policies adopted by the political leadership. Awarding various alliance group members with prohibited bore licenses.

 

                The impact of these factors on the overall societal growth and human security aspect of the Pakistani society was extremely negative. The rising sectarian, dogmatic orthodoxy coupled with easy access and unabated usage of firearms besides instilling deep-rooted fears in the masses brought Pakistan close to being labelled as a terrorist state.

Conclusions and Recommendations

                Although there is no easy answer to Pakistan’s insidious gun culture, encouraging signs are apparent in the sitting regime’s keen interest in, if not totally eradicating, at least managing this manic. Evident from the Government’s Seven Point De-escalation Plan, to make Pakistan a weapon free society,32 a ban has already been enforced on carrying weapons and their display, along with a ban on issuance of all kinds of arms licenses. The Government also plans to recover illicit arms, cancel prohibited arms licenses and regulate arms manufacturing in the Darra Bazaar.33 by providing the Darra gunsmiths opportunities for regular employment at state-run ordnance factories; also to benefit from their skill and expertise.

            Yet the solution to this deep-rooted problem is not so simple. In Pakistan the twin manic of widespread corruption and weak leadership has cast a very negative impact on the overall domestic, as well as regional human security situation. The above mentioned 7-point plan, and the Government’s actions towards curbing the spread of terrorism and militancy are indeed a much desired first steps towards a safe, secure and stable future, the present Government’s efforts so far have not been able to yield any positive dividends. The few examples of providing the Darra gun-manufacturers alternate vocation at the state run factories, has very little monetary incentive for them. Convincing a sizeable population of the country mainly belonging to the frontier or tribal areas, to give up their generations old tradition of displaying guns is not a very easy task. The state regulations may be effective in select urban belts where already a sizeable number of gun-carrying population is licensed, but the main problem area is the unmarked, unlicensed, black-marketed weaponry which remains out of the state control and very much in demand, given the pervasive environment of conflict.  

Statement of the Pakistan	Potential (or Attempted) Solutions	Possible International or Multi-lateral Instruments/Forums
Humanitarianism and Human Rights	National firearms control/licensing legislation and enforcement; weapons "buy-backs;" cantonment and storage measures	Certain Conventional Weapons Convention; humanitarian law; codes of conduct; multilateral treaties; global monitoring, transparency and "accountability" measures; grassroots efforts
Public Health and Criminality	SAs crime and injury surveys; firearms marking and tracing; curtailing of black market; tighter export/import control systems; police training	UN Crime Commission; WHO; regional or global regulation of illicit arms traffic (OAS 1997); international cooperation between police forces and between customs services (Interpol); global marking/registration and tracking

The above figure provides a list of options ranging from the immediate state to international level that can be adapted to solve the problem of small arms proliferation and pilferage.n