Impact on Pakistan’s Security  
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal * 

The development/procurement and operationalization of ABM systems by India, certainly introduce an element of uncertainty into an already militarised situation between India and Pakistan. In such a situation, the Pakistanis might feel more vulnerable and less secure, psychologically. Worst-case analysis and mirror imaging could oblige Pakistan to devote more resources to its defences for sustaining its nuclear deterrence. The credibility and effectiveness of the Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is based on the manifest capability to inflict unacceptable damage on India, if it attacks.

The issue that India’s ABM system would undermine Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is also debatable. The development of foolproof ABM system is extremely costly and complex. The important question is that whether India will be able to develop and deploy an effective ABM system in the near future? Will it provide an effective defensive shield to India against Pakistan’s nuclear strikes? What is the appropriate strategy to counter this new emerging challenge to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence? Such questions need serious considerations. In the following discussion, the impact of Indian ABM on Pakistan’s deterrence is analysed and appropriate strategies for countering this new emerging challenge to Pakistan’s security are discussed. Before envisaging the possible repercussions and discussing the counter measures, it is important that one should be aware of the Indian ABM potential, which is being developed with the assistance of Russian Federation, Israel and the United States (U.S.).

 

Indian ABM Programme: Other States Contribution

India’s ABM capability has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Since July 1983, the Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).1 India’s other preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states. The Russian Federation and Israel have signed agreements with India, under which India has been receiving TMD components and technology from these states. The U.S. has been forging a new strategic partnership with India, in order to contain its future adversaries in Asia. Therefore, instead of opposing India’s missile build-up, the U.S. is supporting it.

 Ironically, these states condemn Pakistan’s indigenous missile programme and oppose alleged transfer of missile-related technology. On September 1, 2001, the Bush administration announced that it would levy sanctions on a Chinese privately owned Metallurgical Equipment Corporation for shipping missile equipments to Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex, in violation of a pledge Beijing made last November.2 On April 28, 2002, however, the successful trial of India’s BrahMos — supersonic cruise missile developed jointly with the Russian Federation has not been condemned by the U.S.3 The important contributors to the Indian ABM programme are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 

 

United States

The U.S. has increased her level of engagement with India in the recent years. The Bush administration has further intensified its engagement with India, particularly in the military field. On July 18, 2001, General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) said in Delhi, “the U.S. hopes to establish a strong military-to-military relationship with India, which is a major power with global influence.”4 In the post September 11, 2001, international setting, the U.S. has sustained its previous arms deals and close military contact policies with India. On November 5, 2001, the U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld met with Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes in New Delhi and agreed to begin discussions on possible arms deals soon.5 Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific Command, visited India on November 28, 2001, to meet India’s top defence officials. The two sides discussed conducting of joint military exercises, increasing military contacts, and reviving the U.S.-Indian Defence Policy Group, the forum through which Washington and New Delhi will hold talks on resuming military ties.6

The U.S. new strategic policy communicates that it will assist its allies in developing their defensive capabilities. India has been developing the missile defence systems by fusing the foreign and domestic research and missile components. India can derive many advantages from the U.S. new strategic policy. Therefore, India had endorsed U.S. BMD policy. On May 11, 2001, the then Indian Defence and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, said after an extended hour-long meeting with visiting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, “We are endeavouring to work-out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe.”7 The U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, again confirmed this approach on November 21, 2001. He told reporters that the two countries have been discussing “exercises and education, arms sales and so forth” and that the U.S. anticipates a “robust U.S. - India defence relationship of kind that is unprecedented in our bilateral relations.”8

The U.S. had invited India to the missile defence exercise and demonstration to be held in the U.S. This invitation was extended to India during the visit of U.S. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Douglas Feith, on December 3, 2001.9  In May 2002, an elite brigade of Indian paratroopers, and the U.S. Pacific Command Special Forces conducted joint war games, code named “Ex Balance Iroquois” in the arid plain of Agra, India. This was the first joint exercise to take place after 39 years. Former Indian Air Vice Marshal commented, “We see much happening now in Indo-U.S. military cooperation besides just exercises. Now we also see equipment-transfer relationships emerging between the two sides.”10     

 

Russian Federation

                Indo-Russian defence cooperation in the post-Soviet era has continued. In January 1993, India and Russia signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation replacing the similar 1971 Soviet-Indian Treaty. In October 1997, the Russians agreed to extend bilateral defence cooperation till the year 2010. Initially, the period was from 1994 to 2000. In March 1999, Russian Defence Minister Igor D. Sergeyev and his Indian counter part, George Fernandes, signed a military cooperation agreement to train Indian defence personnel in key Russian military academies.11 These long-term bilateral defence cooperation programmes included the transfer of anti-missile defence systems. For example, in the first week of June 2001, the Indian and the Russian officials agreed on air defence system for India, which included the purchase of Russian S-300 PMU-1 surface to air missiles,12 which is a highly mobile surface to air missile system. 13

                On June12, 2001, in a joint venture in missiles development, scientists of India and Russia successfully test-fired PJ-10 medium-range, two-stage (liquid-solid propellant) surface-to-surface cruise missile. The 6.9 meter long missile is capable of carrying multiple warheads and can hit a target at about 280 km within 300 seconds. The missile is specifically designed as an anti-ship weaponry system.14  In addition, both states are discussing that India would buy three Russian aircraft, which would be fitted with the sophisticated Israeli Phalcon radar system. Consequently, it would provide New Delhi an advanced air borne early warning capability.  

 

Israel

                Israel, according to the assessment of Jane's Intelligence Review (March 2000 edition) is aggressively seeking new customers for sales of weapons and military equipments. These sales are sometimes supported by offers of technology transfers and specialized advice.15 Israel has no hesitation in the spread of the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the transfer of technologies related to the development of ballistic and other missiles. For example, Israel is transferring to India, its Arrow Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon-Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. India is also developing an AEW platform equipped with phased array radar technology, similar to be used by Phalcon, to cue its ATBM system.16

                In addition, Indian Navy had finalized the deal regarding purchase of Barak anti-missile defence system with Israel. The Barak missile is designed to operate in high-clutter environment against small fast targets. Its range is 6-8 kms.17 It can deal with sea skimmers coming in at under a meter in height. India decided to purchase Oren Yarok airborne radar warning and command (AWACS) systems and Advanced Electronic Guidance System and Remote Sensing and Observation Systems from Israel. Indo-Israel co-operation is vital for the success of the India’s TMD project.

                It was reported in The Hindustan Times that a Pentagon official said, “We expect U.S. policies to be more liberal in terms of defence transfers to India, not only with regard to Israeli exports, but also with regard to U.S. sanction legislation. This liberalization, we hope, will open a window of opportunity for us to finalize a number of pending deals,” referring to the nearly $1 billion worth of contracts under discussion or in negotiation.18  It is expected that the pending deals could be finalized in near future because in September, 2001, President George W. Bush waived sanctions enacted after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests that had prohibited the U.S. from selling U.S. arms to or maintaining close military contacts with New Delhi. Consequently, the new Indo-U.S. strategic understanding has boosted Indo-Israel defence cooperation.

 

Indian Capabilities: An Appraisal

India decided to place priority on the development and procurement of TMD. According to the published literature, the Indian scientists have successfully developed a limited capability of TMD, designed to protect Indian forces from the hostile theatre and tactical missiles. Presently, they are conducting its verifying tests. While, it is an open secret that their plan is not only limited to the development of the TMD, they have designs to extend or expand these capabilities, which could provide an effective defensive shield to entire India against the Chinese and the Pakistani theatre and strategic ballistic missiles. In simple words, one can say that Indian ABM scope is, more or less identical to the U.S. National Missile Defence (NMD) system. Many Indian strategic pundits call for an early nation-wide ABM deployment. However, the development of the ABM systems is not going apace, because India lacks technological expertise in this field.

                India needs to master in the following components of weapons and sensors for deploying an effective ABM system against Pakistan and China:

 

a.        Battle Management Command and Control Centre. The centre should possess advance technologies, which constitute appropriate  C⁴I system (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence).19

b.       A ground-based Ballistic Missile Interceptor Missile.

c.        Warhead or exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle mounted on the interceptor.

d.       High Frequency Land Based Early Warning Radar, for example, x-band radar and space based information gathering (satellite) systems. For identifying and detecting hostile missile (short, medium, intermediate-ballistic missiles)20 from its launch boost phase and its approximate flight course, tracking its path and forwarding its data to the Command Centre.

 

 

India’s Satellites Potential

                The space satellites are an integral component of missile defence systems. These satellites would be used for early warning to detect a ballistic missile from its launch boost phase. In addition to the identification of the location of the missile launch site, they provide information about its approximate flight course. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) with the foreign assistance has been developing defence support programme satellites and their space-based infrared system.21 The Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) series of satellites are in orbit, which can be used for the TMD.

                In December 1995, the IRS-1C was launched. Its panchromatic camera has a resolution of 6 meters, which allows satellites orbiting at the height of approximately 800 km, to see ships, bridges, buildings and other installations. With an infrared and wide angle field camera as back up, IRS-1C can also achieve satellite surveillance capability to prepare detailed terrain maps highlighting important enemy military installations, which are invaluable in war. The cameras can also record and keep imageries on board, and these can be retrieved as and when required. India’s indigenous remote sensing capability for military applications got a boost when ISRO launched IRS-1D in September 1997, using an Indian launch vehicle.

                The dual use IRS-1D with a resolution of 5.8 meters has pioneered techniques for using civilian remote sensing satellites for gathering military related intelligence from space, which includes monitoring of nuclear and missile related activities. Experts feel that IRS-1D’s panchromatic camera is good enough to photograph a truck on the ground; this would make it possible to pick up armament factories, radar and communication installations, missile test sites and troop concentrations of the target country. Thus IRS-1D is the precursor to future Indian surveillance satellite, providing her with a cutting edge in intelligence-based warfare.

                With expertise gained through designing, fabricating, launching and successfully operating remote sensing satellites, Indian space scientists would not find it difficult to build high-resolution reconnaissance satellites for the exclusive use of the armed forces. However, India still lacks right Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The SBIRS-low orbit is considered to be capable of contributing to the accurate operation of an interceptor missile by monitoring the whole flight course from the boost phase of a ballistic missile launch, through the re-entry of warhead into the atmosphere and distinguishing a warhead from a decoy.22

Surface to Air Missiles

India has developed and tested a short-range surface to air missile - Trishul and medium range surface to air missile - Akash. India is trying to develop its Akash into Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile system (ATBM) and has claimed that it is comparable in capabilities to the US Patriot system.23

a.        Akash (Sky). Akash is a low to medium altitude multi-target surface to air missile. It has a multi-target handling capability. Its range is approximately 27 km. According to DRDO sources, its thrusting range will be increased to 60 km and eventually to 120 km.24 The missile uses a solid propellant rocket booster motor to accelerate itself to Mach 2, whereupon an advanced ramjet sustained cuts in for the remainder of the powered flight phase.25 It is reported that Akash is a copy of the Soviet SA-6. An important feature of it is the Rajendra phased array radar, which is also a copy of Russia's S-300V anti-missile system.26 The Rajendra radar is used for multiple target tracking and engagement. The Rajendra radar can reportedly track up to 64 targets at a range of 50 kilometers.27 Once enemy aircraft are detected and identified, the radar locks on to each of them and launched up to 4 missiles at a time. No amount of manoeuvring by the enemy aircraft will be able to shake off the missiles homing on to them. The stated goal of the eventual upgrade project is to intercept missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km.28 In addition, the Navy can use Akash missile and ground based forces too. It would be effective against aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, because it is capable of intercepting up to medium range missiles in the terminal phase. It would be used to replace the Russian Pehora SAMs, which comprise the bulk of the Indian air force defence missile system.29 In August 1990, its first flight test was held. Since then, it had been tested more than eight times. It was planned to be given to the Indian Army in 2001.

b.       Trishul (Trident). Trishul is a truck mounted low-level quick-reaction surface to air missile, with a range of 500 m to 9 km. It resembles Soviet SA-8, SAM. It has an on-board computerized control system. It was first test fired in 1985.30 After 37 to 38 tests, it is currently undergoing user trials with the army and air force. This missile will be used by all three armed services of India. The Army version comprises a twin tail launcher assembly and Flycatcher radar unit mounted on a tracked BMP-1/2IFV chassis. The main target of the Army version is enemy aircraft. The Indian Air Force will use six-round launcher variant mounted on a locally built Czechoslovak Tata (8x8) truck chassis. The Air Force can also use it against enemy aircraft. The Navy, however, will use it as an anti- missile, against skimming missiles, like the Exocet or the Harpoon.31

 

Challenges for Pakistan’s Security

Pakistan’s geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth and the Indian commitment to introduce more sophisticated nuclear capable delivery systems, like cruise missile, and ABM systems, pose serious challenges to the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Indian weapon procurement and development policy has the potential to erode strategic equilibrium and shift balance of power in its favour. The calculus of real-politic holds that India behind the safe missile shield might be more likely to adopt adventurous policies against Pakistan. For instance, by neutralizing Pakistan's retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of anti-missile systems, India could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Such apprehensions have not only been expressed by Pakistani strategists,32 but also by the foreign security analysts.  Michael Quinlan wrote, “sudden strike and the use thereafter of systems such as Arrow to ward off surviving retaliatory capability might give India a pre-emptive option.”33

Chalking out a counter strategy, simply based on the assumptions that India is developing an ABM system, is not an appropriate approach. Especially, when Pakistan lacks economic resources to develop its own ABM system. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence must take into account the following five interrelated issues:

 

a.        The nature of threat posed by the ABM system.

b.       The technical feasibility of India’s ABM capabilities and its likely effectiveness in addressing Pakistan’s offensive ballistic missiles capabilities.

c.        Short and medium ballistic missile flight time, i.e. 3 – 11 minutes.

d.       The geographical terrain of Pakistan.

e.        The nature of nuclear weapons and effects of nuclear explosion.

 

Theoretically, during the future Indo-Pakistan conflict, India could target and destroy Pakistan’s offensive missiles at the four different stages. They are:

 

a.        Pre-launch Stage, means attacking the missiles before their launch.

b.       Boost-phase Interception, means attacking the missiles while their rocket booster is accelerating them. During the boost phase, booster burns and the missile moves relatively slowly.

c.        Exo-atmospheric Interception or in Midcourse, means attacking the missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it, when the attacking missile is travelling outside the atmosphere.

d.       Endo-atmospheric Interception, means attacking the missiles or their warheads during the re-entry phase in the lower denser atmosphere. When the offensive missile is approaching its target within the atmosphere.

 

                India needs advance ABM technology for targeting and destroying hostile ballistic missile at its pre-launch stage, in its boost phase, mid-course/trajectory, and re-entry phase. The available literature concerning the Indian scientific research and development indicates that it is too difficult for India to acquire proficiency in ABM technologies in the near future.34 At the same time, one cannot underestimate Indian commitment to modernization of their nuclear and missile programme. During 1993 - 2000, military research and development expenditure by the India’s Department of Defence Research and Development of the Ministry of Defence has increased by roughly 66 per cent. In addition, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy increased its total budget by 24 per cent in real terms over the period 1998/99-2000/01.35 This indicates that India is spending a huge amount on its ambitious nuclear and missile programmes. Moreover, it is receiving missile technology assistance covertly/overtly from Israel and Russian Federation. The transfers of missile technology certainly enable India to overcome the shortcomings, which it is facing in the development of ABM system. But these developments do not provide India a foolproof missile shield against the Pakistani nuclear strikes.

                The most feasible choice for India is to destroy Pakistan’s offensive ballistic missiles at their pre-launch stage or in their boost phase. In fact, there is one inflexible rule about missile defence — the later you detect and intercept an enemy missile, the closer it will be when you destroy it, and the smaller the area you can defend. Conversely, the earlier you detect and act, the farther away it will be when you destroy it and the greater the area you can defend. Therefore, farther is better. It gives you enough time to gain a chance for a second or third shot if you miss. In addition, during the pre-launch stage the missile is at static position and easier to hit, instead when it is in flight. For this strategy, India requires advanced surveillance and efficient intelligence systems for the identification of missile deployments. Secondly, its own missiles should have high degree of accuracy. Both are not available as yet.

India’s both Prithvi and Agni missiles have a large circular error of probability (CEP). T S Gopi Rethinaraj argued:

 

Prithvi poses serious technical dilemmas. Even though India claims that it would use only conventional warheads with Prithvi, the high circular error probable of the missile is a serious deficiency in carrying out precise attacks. Deploying the short-range Prithvi with nuclear payloads, on the other hand, is fraught with other risks.36

 

Thus, with these missiles, India cannot initiate a disarming first strike in the present situation, though she is trying to overcome these drawbacks.

In boost phase, the offensive missile travels at a relatively slow speed, the target is large as compared to mid-course and re-entry phase. It presents a high infrared profile. It also eliminates the problems of dealing with multiple warheads or sub-munitions.37 The problem with this option is that the reaction time is very limited. A boost-phase intercept would need to be conducted within the 250 seconds burn-time of an ICBM.38 Therefore, in case of short and medium range missiles, the reaction time is even less than one minute. Secondly, a boost-phase defence can only work if the interceptor is stationed at a distance of 500km from the target.39  Thus even if India would station an interceptor on its border with Pakistan, it would be incapable to target Pakistan’s medium range missiles — Ghauri and Shaheen, that could be launched sufficiently far away from the eastern border. In addition, India’s boost phase interceptors, in principle, would be vulnerable to Pakistan’s short-range missile or aerial attack. The alternative to the ABM ground based boost phase intercept is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) and space based Laser. India’s mastering in these sophisticated technologies will take many years.

                In case of mid-course, the missile can be intercepted while it travels in the upper atmosphere or vacuum of outer space. In case of ICBM, mid-course is attractive because it is the longest phase. It permits more time for decision to the command and control centre for reaction. Secondly, it permits multiple chances to destroy a warhead.40 Thirdly, the warhead is destroyed when it is moving through the space; therefore, there is no risk of the nuclear explosion fallout. However, the most serious problem with a mid-course option against Pakistan is that it’s short and medium range missiles make smaller trajectory curve. India, however is reportedly receiving Israel’s Arrow missile technology for its ABM systems. The Arrow-2 uses a mobile two-stage interceptor missile carrying a blast-fragmentation warhead. Its capabilities are identical to the Patriot PAC-3. Notably, Patriot PAC-3 is designed to defend limited areas from short and medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.41 It seems that it can be an effective weapon against the tactical missiles or it can be used for defending counter force targets. This project, however, is being funded by the US, with usual restrictions.     

                Technically, intercepting during the re-entry phase or within the atmosphere is easier for the ABM because warhead is highly visible to radar and to optical sensors. Due to very hot ‘wake’ produced by the Mach-23 RV as it enters the atmosphere, balloons and light chaff are no longer effective against sensors; they will be retarded or destroyed on re-entry. Though there is little time left at this point. Computers can calculate the trajectory of the warheads, making interception possible. A sophisticated attacker, however, can complicate the problem by making the warhead manoeuvrable and the interceptor may not be able to determine its path. In this case the warhead must be destroyed twenty miles above the earth, otherwise there would be fall-out damages.42

Destroying nuclear warhead in the re-entry phase is not an appropriate defensive action. The fall-out damages associated with the nuclear explosion are inevitable.43   

 

_{Pakistan’s Strategy}

_{India’s deployment of missile defences would make imperative for Pakistan’s offensive force modernization. So that it could guard itself and penetrate India’s defences. The corollary of this anticipated action-reaction relationship is the hypothesis that the limitation of strategic defences establishes the necessity of offensive limitations.44 But it seems that India will not limit itself with its offensive might. It will deploy missile defences once it overcomes its technological shortcomings in this field. Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence requires maintenance of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements of Indian missile defence systems.}

Being a neighbouring state of Pakistan and due to a short flight time of hostile missiles, India might prefer to adopt a strategy for intercepting Pakistan’s offensive missiles at their pre-launch site and boost phase. Therefore, Pakistan has to adopt some countermeasures to ensure the credibility of its offensive missiles. Notably, for pre-emptive strikes, India has to locate where Pakistan’s all offensive missiles are based. If it discovers them, it could destroy them through pre-emptive strikes, in the case of hostilities. However, Pakistan’s mobile missile launchers, if out of garrison and not otherwise observed, are not vulnerable to such attack. In addition, Pakistan could disperse and store these missiles in hardened silos. Building bomb-proof hardened silos in plain areas is a costly affair. The economical strategy is that Pakistan shelters its missiles in mountain tunnels. These natural shelters could be modified into bomb-proof silos by limited financial investment. In addition, it could also build dummy missile silos and make dummy missile deployments as well.   

Pakistan would initiate work on the technology and techniques, which nullify or defeat the boost phase interceptors. Countermeasures to a boost-phase interceptor system might include redesign of the missiles to become a fast-burn missile. Because the boost-phase interceptors carry a simple sensor to detect visible or near-infrared energy. On account of which, it immediately detect the bright flame of the rocket and home the interceptor on the flame. Moreover, one-stage dummy missiles might be launched to provoke and disguise the launch of the interceptors.

Some analysts believe that in addition to ballistic missiles, Pakistan ought to develop cruise missiles and ABM systems. The indigenous development and manufacture of cruise missiles require expertise in airframes, propulsion systems, flight controls and warheads.45 Presently, Pakistan’s economy may not be able to sustain the burden of additional defence expenditure. Therefore, the best option for Pakistan in the present scenario is that, while it avoids arms race with India, it should concentrate on improving its existing missile capabilities. It should increase the numerical strength of its missile potential. For example, if India is able to intercept Pakistan’s twenty missiles, it must have twenty-five missiles in its arsenal.

It is noteworthy that since 1960s missile defence systems have been subject of security debates in the U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s administration (1980-88) started the Strategic Defence Initiative or commonly known as Star Wars research and development programme.46 Despite the U.S. missile defence systems programme’s long history, there still exist a lot of technological gaps for a probability of hit of more than 90 per cent success. India would, therefore, take no less than ten years at the minimum to address all the technological issues involved even with the support of the U.S., Russian Federation and Israel. This period should be utilized by Pakistan to establish a politico-military balance with India by improving its economy.

 

Conclusion

In the prevalent South Asian strategic environment, the relationship between India and Pakistan is no longer solely a zero-sum game with only winner and looser. Both states are aware of this harsh reality that nuclear war between them would be a calamity whatever the result in relative disadvantage. Since the overt nuclearization, they appeared to have realized that the presence of nuclear arsenals in both states and the associated spectre of nuclear devastation has forced them to exclude all-out war option from their strategic doctrines. The fact of nuclear possession is forcing strategic pundits in both states to realize the importance of crisis avoidance and management. Nonetheless, the introduction of new weapon systems, such as missile defence shield, may jeopardize the current strategic stability between India and Pakistan.

India possesses limited capabilities to intercept the theatre and tactical missiles. India’s ABM programme is aimed at countering the threat from the Pakistani and the Chinese theatre and strategic ballistic missiles. The present deterrence between India and Pakistan or China and India is built on a nuclear retaliatory capability of each other. India’s ABM can potentially endanger Pakistan’s deterrence in particular, and China’s, in general. To counter the Indian ABM, both Pakistan and China will be compelled to increase their stockpiles of tactical and strategic missiles. Pakistan, however, is under pressure in this case because of its financial constraints.

The advantage, however, to Pakistan is that in the near future, India would not be able to achieve a high ballistic missile interception capability. The appropriate technology needed for this system still does not exist in India. Therefore, it will not be capable to deploy even a rudimentary system before a decade. Secondly, it is too difficult for India to hit Pakistani ballistic missiles in their boost phase, without developing a laser capability. Thirdly, even the full NMD system would be defeated by simple countermeasures.

To be precise, the pragmatic approach is that Pakistan shall refrain from following India in the development of ABM, because it is expensive, it is unproven, it will trap Pakistan in costly arms race and above all it is not even required in the most likely conflicts with India.n