DOCUMENT No. 10 

Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Sattar’s Statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland

March 28, 2002 

Mr. President, it is a matter of great pleasure and privilege for me to participate in the Conference on Disarmament, and to share with you Pakistan’s perspectives on global and regional security issues.

Pakistan is confident that under your presidency the CD (Conference on Disarmament) will register significant advances towards fulfilling its important role. Given our commitment to disarmament objectives, and the excellent relations between Pakistan and Finland, you can count on Pakistan's full support and cooperation in your endeavours.

Also, I congratulate Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze on his appointment as the Secretary General of the Conference. His vast diplomatic experience will be a great asset in facilitating the work of the CD.

Mr. President, the global security environment has been transformed during the last year. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, threw into bold relief the new dimensions of international insecurity and instability. They demonstrated that threats to security can emanate from diverse sources, internal and external; that even the most powerful States are vulnerable; and that the causes of such threats are complex, as are their consequences.

The magnitude of the tragedy galvanized the world community to intensify cooperation in order to strengthen peace and security. It brought together an international coalition to fight terrorism. It has created the possibility of finally bringing peace and reconstruction to Afghanistan. The world community is now engaged in more earnest analysis of the root causes of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Recognition of the problem of poverty has been enhanced, as also the realization of the need to address and resolve conflicts and disputes.

This is a defining moment in history. Right decisions can make a decisive difference. We could succeed in constructing a structure of comprehensive and durable peace and security. We could effectively address and resolve long-festering conflicts and disputes. We should address the security concerns of all States, large and small. We could restrain the desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We could restrict the supply and proliferation of such weapons. And, we could avoid policy decisions and actions that may revive a global arms race.

Mr. President, we have to note, nevertheless, that some recent developments have damaged the prospects of global disarmament. The impending demise of the ABM Treaty, and plans for the development of strategic and theatre ballistic missile defence systems, could erode stability at the global and regional levels. The prospects for the CTBT's entry-into-force have become bleaker. Renewed nuclear testing and the development of so-called `usable’ nuclear weapons could trigger a new nuclear arms race. The prospects of finalizing the BWC Protocol also do not look bright in wake of the breakdown of negotiations last December. And, this Conference remains deadlocked on its work-programme, pending negotiations on a Fissile Materials Treaty, on Nuclear Disarmament and on steps to prevent an arms race in Outer Space.

These negative trends for strategic stability and disarmament could become much worse if existing policies designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons are abandoned in favour of arbitrary and uni-dimensional approaches to security. Serious concerns have been provoked by recent revelations of analysis and projections, which, if translated into policies, would erode some of the fundamental premises of bilateral, regional and global disarmament and non-proliferation paradigms.

Although the powerful may be driven by unilateral impulses, they cannot escape multilateral imperatives. The world has changed radically during the last decade after the Cold War. New power configurations are accompanied by new technologies and new security threats. Major powers, although now more unequal in military capabilities, still possess the capability to inflict unacceptable damage and destruction on each other.

In any new paradigm of cooperative international security, the promotion of arms control and disarmament at the global and regional levels will continue to occupy a central place. An agreed and equitable political and legal framework is essential to ensure strategic stability in future. The United Nations remains the best instrument for the formulation and implementation of such a framework. And this Conference is the best instrument to promote the vitally necessary multilateral agreements for global and regional disarmament.

Mr. President, Pakistan is committed to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Treaty, which should be both a non- proliferation and disarmament treaty. The CD should also open negotiations in Ad hoc Committees on Nuclear Disarmament and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Until agreement on the work programme is achieved, the CD should be utilized to address certain other areas of importance for international security and disarmament, such as the issue of missiles, in all its aspects and regional arms control.

Mr. President, in the emerging international security environment, missiles will clearly constitute a central element in the varying equations of offensive and defensive capabilities. With the demise of the ABM Treaty, some major powers may rely on, as yet, uncertain ballistic missile defences while others may multiply their offensive systems to maintain the credibility of their deterrence. Missiles will also emerge as important elements of deterrence equations, particularly if advanced aircraft are either not available or are too expensive.

Partial approaches to containing the proliferation of missiles, as represented by the MTCR, discriminate against some countries, eroding their national security and advantaging others, which already possess missile capability and other delivery platforms.

It is essential, therefore, to address the missiles issue in a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced manner, covering both non-proliferation and disarmament aspects. That would not exclude interim measures to address specific and urgent issues, which may threaten regional and international peace and stability on the basis of mutual and equitable restraint.

The Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum to address this complex issue. It has the mandate and the expertise to analyse the implications and negotiate a legally binding instrument. Only such an instrument emerging from the CD can expect to enjoy universal acceptance. Accordingly, Pakistan has proposed that the CD should consider the issue of missiles. We are encouraged by the generally positive responses to our proposal, which we hope will lead to an early consensus on an adequate course of action.

Mr. President, the United Nations General Assembly annually adopts resolutions endorsing the pursuit of regional disarmament as a complement to international disarmament endeavours. The General Assembly has also called on the CD to evolve principles for the realization of the conventional arms control and disarmament at the regional and sub-regional levels.

The international community cannot ignore the reality that principal threats to international peace and security now emanate not from any on going strategic confrontation between the major powers, but from regional conflicts and tensions. It is the compulsions generated by these situations that now motivate the continued build-up of conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

The best way to prevent the scourge of war is to follow the vision of the United Nations Charter. International disputes should be resolved peacefully and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. Special attention should focus on the probable flashpoints of conflict and confrontation – the Taiwan Straits; the Korean peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia.

India and Pakistan now possess destructive power that is awesome. Inherent in military conflict is the danger of escalation to the nuclear level. This is not a threat, but a statement of fact. A no-first-use proposal limited only to nuclear weapons may, in fact, enhance the temptation to use conventional force for aggression and erode the deterrence that obtains at present. The option to use force needs to be abandoned. Pakistan is ready to join India in a reciprocal binding commitment to renounce the use of force, conventional or nuclear.

Mr. President, South Asia has been described as the most dangerous place in the world. This is an apt assessment especially at this moment. India has deployed its massive forces, including ballistic missiles in battle-positions, along our international borders and the Line of Control in Kashmir. Resorting to the threat of use of force, India has made unilateral demands on Pakistan. Irresponsible statements have been made by its political and military spokesmen contemplating a limited war against Pakistan.

While crude attempts at coercive diplomacy are obviously inadmissible and Pakistan will protect its sovereignty and territory against any aggression or incursion – our Government has made reasonable proposals for dialogue on issues of concern. We believe progress can be made if, instead of one-sided demands, India enters into a dialogue with Pakistan. Similarly, instead of making diversionary allegations about violations of the Line of Control, India should permit impartial monitoring and stop obstructing the UNMOGIP – the Military Observers Group – from carrying out its mandate in Kashmir.

Every one knows that a serious approach to defusing tension and normalization of relations between Pakistan and India requires a just settlement of the Kashmir question. The principle and the prescription for a peaceful settlement have been sanctified in resolutions of the Security Council. India has an obligation to carry out the resolutions and implement its own pledge to let the people of the State exercise their right of self-determination.

Mr. President, as a first step, it is essential for New Delhi to recognize that no possible benefit of its current brinkmanship can match the disastrous consequences of an apocalyptical war with Pakistan. The President of Pakistan offered his hand of friendship to Prime Minister Vajpayee in Kathmandu, and urged a return to the process of dialogue on which the two leaders had reached understanding at Agra. Settlement of Jammu and Kashmir would pave the way for normalisation of relations between the two countries. The dialogue would encompass security and nuclear issues, terrorism and narcotics trafficking as well as proposals for cooperation in economic, commercial and other fields.

Mr. President, apart from its resort to repression and terror against the Kashmiri freedom movement, India’s reckless build-up of conventional and strategic weapons betrays its hegemonic aims. Over the last three years India has increased its military spending by fifty per cent. Ironically, many of those states, which plead here for non-proliferation and disarmament, are selling advanced weapons systems to India. A responsible approach should require these states to counsel and exercise restraint rather than contribute to India’s destabilizing arms build-up.

Pakistan does not want to be sucked into a debilitating arms race in South Asia. In fact, we have frozen our defence budget since 1999. However, Pakistan will need to maintain the credibility of our deterrence posture. The growing imbalance in conventional military capability would have wider strategic implications. It could aggravate Pakistan’s reliance on the nuclear dimensions of its deterrence posture. It could lower the nuclear threshold in a regional security environment that is already inflammable.

The situation demands determined efforts by influential states to prevent emergent instability and a possibly disastrous conflict. In addition to urgent de-escalation to defuse the current tensions, the incipient trends toward insecurity and instability in South Asia need to be constrained on a durable basis. This can be achieved by constructing a new architecture for peace, arms control and cooperation in the region.

Based on the fundamental principles, which have been approved by the United Nations, especially the principle of equal security for all states, Pakistan has proposed the creation of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia. Incorporating nuclear as well as conventional arms balance and a political mechanism for resolving bilateral conflicts, especially the core dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, the comprehensive proposal includes the following components:

·         Bilateral formalization of the moratoriums on further nuclear testing declared by India and Pakistan.

·         Non-deployment of nuclear capable ballistic missiles.

·         Maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status.

·         Formalization of the understanding to provide prior adequate notification of flight tests of missiles.

·         Acceptance of a moratorium on the acquisition and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

·         Confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation or accident.

·         Discussion of respective nuclear security doctrines with a view to avoiding a regional nuclear arms race.

Pakistan remains prepared to explore these proposals in bilateral talks with India, or through the mediation of the UN or other major powers. We are also ready to discuss the regional restraint measures within the CD. In the pursuit of effective security in our difficult regional environment, Pakistan has adopted responsible policies. We seek credible deterrence but at the lowest possible level. We have upgraded command and control structures and devised ironclad measures and mechanisms to ensure security of our nuclear assets and capabilities. A National Command Authority, chaired by the Head of Government and including three Federal Ministers and Chiefs of Armed Services, provides policy direction, oversees recommendations in regard to deployment and employment of assets, and approves measures to ensure custodial safety and complete institutional control.

Finally, let me add that Pakistan has developed limited nuclear and missile capabilities exclusively for self-defence. It remains committed to the principle of non-proliferation. We agree that proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction will be destabilizing for global, regional and national security. To that end, Pakistan has tightened its already effective export control system, and is prepared to further strengthen laws to ensure against proliferation.

At the global as well as regional levels, the quest for non-proliferation will be unsustainable unless it is accompanied by a matching commitment to the goal of disarmament, nuclear and conventional. It is this commitment which is in question today. This Conference has an indispensable role in reviving the commitment to disarmament and ensuring that it is universally embraced.

I thank you Mr. President. n

 

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