Book Review-I

 Pakistan's Foreign Policy — A Re‑Appraisal 

Shahid M. Amin, Karachi: Oxford University Press,  2000,
Pages 327, Price Rs. 495.00

 by

Colonel (Retired) Ghulam Sarwar

hahid M. Amin, an accomplished diplomat and foreign affairs expert, sets out to analyse the successes and failures of Pakistan's foreign policy, as pursued by various governments. He concedes that despite many failings on the part of various rulers, their over‑riding motivation has been the desire to safeguard the country's independence and territorial integrity. In view of India's persistent hostile attitude towards Pakistan, our quest for security has been marked by a consistent and unvarying dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy. Much that Pakistan has done for furtherance of its foreign relations has been influenced greatly by its perception of threat from India.

Fully aware of nefarious design of Hindu leadership, the Muslim League leaders had come to the conclusion that instead of fighting each other interminably, it was better for Hindus and Muslims both, to part company and live side by side as independent neighbours. Motivated by this spirit, Quaid‑e‑Azam had said in a statement issued only a week before Pakistan gained independence. He said, “Our objective should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and have friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large. We have no aggressive designs against anyone. We stand by the United Nations Charter.” Thus, consolidation of friendly relations after independence was Quaid’s sincere hope, which was frustrated by India's persistent intransigence.

Here, the author regrets that had Indian leaders shown even a fraction of goodwill and accommodation, as well as the necessary statesmanship, it would not been difficult for them to adopt a mutually beneficial course of compromise and cooperation. This could have saved both the countries huge expenditure on defence, which has kept hundreds of millions of their countrymen so deeply impoverished.

With passage of time, it is now abundantly clear that the Indian leadership, in the early years of our independence, held on to the belief that the Partition of India would shortly be undone. As such, ‘Akhand Bharat’, remained the cherished dream of Hindu leaders. The then President of the Congress Party, Mr. Kriplani’s remarks merit special attention. He says, “Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a United India.” This hostile attitude towards Pakistan, obviously, could not but create bitterness and suspicion in Pakistan. Jinnah’s own expectations about peaceful existence were shattered within two months of Independence.

Soon after partition, India forcefully annexed Kashmir and this problem has been a constant eye‑sore ever since. This dispute has sapped, energies of both the countries, with no solution in sight. Pakistan’s policy makers have always remained convinced that India, several times bigger than Pakistan in size and resources, was conspiring against Pakistan’s very independence and territorial integrity. In their perception, India’s hostile designs not only consisted of the conventional methods of warfare, but also included diverse political and other pressures, including a psychological war of relentless propaganda, questioning the very raison d'etre of Pakistan’s creation.

Here, the author maintains that to overcome these grave challenges to Pakistan’s security, Pakistan, perforce, had to find an equalizer against India. This has, ever since, remained the most important pre‑occupation of Pakistan's foreign and defence policies. However, through the years, Pakistan’s quest for security had to undergo various phases.

Talking about the 1965 War, the author feels convinced, that the war ended up with adverse consequences for Pakistan — both short‑term as well as long‑term. To him, these effects were far‑more damaging than what most people in Pakistan could ever imagine. The most menacing feature of this futile exercise was that the internal cohesion of Pakistan was greatly disturbed, thus, hastening, the separation of East Pakistan.

With regard to the 1971 War, the author asserts that Pakistan's defeat was mainly due to the alienation of the east wing’s Bengali population and perceived injustice to East Pakistan. Then, a point of no‑return was reached in 1971, when Islamabad decided to suppress the secessionists with an iron hand. India too, had played an active role in these developments through years of sustained propaganda in East Pakistan against West Pakistan. The 1971 war had been an unmitigated disaster for Pakistan. In the words of British historian, Huge Trevor‑Roper, “In December 1971, Pakistan was divided, defeated, demoralized and in the eyes of the world, disgraced.” However, in spite of these setbacks, Pakistan’s geo‑strategic importance remained in tact and indeed came to the country’s rescue. Later, a number of developments helped Pakistan, not only recover from the initial trauma, but in some ways, helped it emerge stronger in the international setting.

Talking about Pakistan’s relations with the Islamic world the author regrets to say that Pakistan received minimal support in the past from the Arab and Islamic world in its confrontation with India. Instead, some Islamic countries had more cordial and friendly relations with India rather than Pakistan. In view of these stark realities, it will be rather naive to make any strategic planning for the future on the assumption of any solid support from the Arab and Islamic world for Pakistan in its conflict with India. The author firmly believes that realistically speaking, there is no such thing as an Islamic bloc. To him, Pan‑Islamism as a philosophy has had little appeal in Islamic countries in the twentieth century.

                Highlighting Pakistan's relations with China, the author holds that Pakistan enjoyed a remarkably close relationship with China from the early years of its independence. Considering that the two countries have been ideologically far apart, and have at times, even belonged to two opposite military blocs, China-Pakistan friendship has aroused considerable curiosity for this seemingly odd partnership. Past history of the relationship reveals that the two countries have proceeded step‑by‑step towards establishing friendship on the basis of a mutuality of interest, which side tracked even ideological differences, India, no doubt, figured in an important way in the calculation of both sides. However, both Pakistan and China are moved by wider geo‑strategic considerations as well.

            As hinted earlier, long‑tangled issue of Kashmir has embittered relations between India and Pakistan over the years. The disproportionate burden of defence expenditure over the years has hurt Pakistan more than India. Against the backdrop, there is need for some cool‑headed thinking in Pakistan. We must try and stick to our old stance of securing self‑determination for people of Jammu and Kashmir, but at the same time, we must see to it that in the process of securing Kashmir, Pakistan’s own survival is not put at stake. Our policy makers in Pakistan must, therefore, make some hard calculation and adopt a rational policy so as to suit best interests of the country. Playing politics with Kashmir issue has got to end. It is, therefore, in Pakistan’s own interest to try to come out of the present impasse and seek a change for the better. Realism and cold calculation of national interests should become the hallmarks of the foreign policy of Pakistan. While the presentation of Pakistan’s sovereign independence and territorial integrity should be our over-riding objective, internal consolidation and high economic growth would need to become our main priorities. Peace with honour with India and promotion of regional cooperation should be adopted as our immediate policy objective. The development of nuclear capability has, no doubt, given Pakistan’s defence a big boost, but the example of the Soviet Union shows that nuclear capability itself is not enough. It does not necessarily guarantee a country’s survival. After all, the Soviet Union had possessed thousands of nuclear war heads, ICBM and other latest weapons but it felt like a house of cards and its nuclear might did not come to its aid. The Soviet economy proved to be its Achilles heel and the ground simply gave in under its feet. It would, therefore, be unwise to ignore this historical lesson since Pakistan’s precarious economy can be its undoing as well. The hard reality is that living beyond means can be dangerous for nations, no less, than it is for individuals!