Australia's Policy Towards India:From Indifference to Cordiality 

 Samina Yasmeen* 

 

 

Australia and the World: Differing Approaches

Australia is a relatively recent entrant in the South Asian arena.  As a middle power in the Indian Ocean region, it has gradually moved out of its narrow focus on the South-East Asian region to operate in South Asia and the Middle East. The question arises as to what is the nature of this involvement? Has Australia learnt from the lessons of other external actors or is it still at an early stage of developing viable strategies for the subcontinent?  This paper attempts to answer these questions with reference to Canberra’s policies towards India. It argues that the 1990s have been characterised by an Indo-centric approach in Australia.  Determined by a predominance of economic interests, Australia has been prepared to compromise its claim to ‘good international citizenship’ especially on the issue of nuclear proliferation. The post 11 September days have seen some change in the South Asia policy but Canberra still maintains an Indo-centric policy. Unlike in the case of major powers, this relationship has not caused undue pressure on Australia’s relations with Pakistan.  But the imbalance needs to be addressed if Australia is to develop a more effective South Asian policy. This, in turn, requires greater interaction between South Asian and Australian civil societies, which could pave the way for developing mutual understanding.

A combination of realism and neo-liberalism has provided the context in which Australia has related to the outside world.  With its predominantly Anglo-Saxon population in close proximity to Asia, Australia has always sought allies that could guarantee its survival in what was previously perceived to be a hostile environment. While in the past, Britain had fulfilled the role of a protector, after the end of the Second World War, the United States was chosen as the main ally.  The ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, therefore, has been a significant denominator in Australia's foreign policy.  As a member of the alliance, Australia has cooperated closely with the United States in political and strategic sphere. While following the United States line on foreign policy, Canberra has also taken initiatives like sending troops in the Vietnam War with a view of earning some credit from its main patron state. The nature of the alliance has not remained unchallenged in the country as the population mix has changed and various governmental and non-governmental groups have explored alternative approaches to foreign policy. The 1980s, for instance, witnessed the addition of the concept of ‘self-reliance’ to the generally accepted need for a close relationship with Washington. Others even suggested the abrogation of the Treaty or at least adopt an attitude similar to that of the Government of New Zealand. These alternative suggestions notwithstanding, the primacy of Australia's relationship with the United States has remained an enduring feature of Australia's foreign policy.

The concept of national interest has also encapsulated an emphasis on establishing economic links with all possible partners. The ultimate aim of these partnerships has been to ensure that Australia does not lose its identity as a ‘lucky country’.  This emphasis has not disappeared despite the slow down in the rate of economic growth.  Instead, committed to retain its status as a ‘developed state’, Australia has explored alternative avenues of building economic links with other countries and regions.  Such exploration has been at the heart of the country establishing close economic links with countries with diverse social and political systems. [1]   Japan and China, for instance, have attracted a lot of attention from Australian governmental and non-governmental business interests. In the 1980s, the salience of economic links was acknowledged by bringing trade and foreign affairs under one government department, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).  Australia also played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with a view to enjoying the benefits of rapid economic growth in South East Asia and the Far East in the 1990s. The emphasis on economic links has continued into the new millennium as well.

The realist perspective has coexisted with the idea of Australia as a ‘Middle Power’.  As a state, that is neither the strongest nor the weakest in the international system, Australia has sought to carve out a niche for itself in world politics. It has projected itself as a middle power state that is committed to the idea of raising issues and setting agenda that contribute toe the common good of the international community. In other words, its assumption and projection of itself as a middle power relies heavily upon its claims to ‘good international citizenship’. The claim found expression in a series of policies adopted by the Labour Government in the 1980s and the 1990s. Under the leadership of the former Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, Australian government proposed or closely cooperated with others interested in dealing with the emerging agenda of world politics.  For example, Australia was at the forefront of securing agreements to control the spread of chemical weapons. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), therefore, owes its existence partly to the efforts by Canberra to raise awareness of the need to find mechanisms for controlling trade in chemicals that could lead to the spread of chemical weapons.  Similarly, the Australian Government cooperated at the international level to deal with the emerging environmental concerns. Specifically in 1996, Canberra successfully manoeuvred to wrest from the Conference on Disarmament, the question of concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and paved the way for its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly. These claims to ‘good international citizenship’ have not subsided since 1996 when the Liberal Party rose to power. Despite reversing its policy on the Kyoto Protocol, and taking a less than charitable stance on asylum seekers, the Liberal Government has continued to project itself as a good international citizen.

 

Australia and India: From Indifference to a Close Relationship

Against the background of a combination of realist and neo-liberalist approach to foreign policy, Australia's policy towards South Asia was marked by a limited understanding of the region for a large part of the post-Second World War era.  This was despite the fact that cameleers from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of the British India had arrived in Australia in the second half of the 19^th century. They had played a prominent role in opening up the interior of the large continent and had left an imprint on the Australian history by building mosques in a number of cities. [2] The limited nature of the relationship also existed despite the romantic images of the sub-continent that prompted a number of young Australians to visit India in search of the ‘Wisdom of the East’.

At the governmental level, Australia's membership of the ANZUS and the Commonwealth provided the context in which Canberra related to South Asia in general and India in particular. Under the Colombo Plan, a number of Indian (and Pakistani) students were provided training.  The relationship between India and Australia, however, remained limited in nature due to the respective foreign policy orientation of the two states. [3] Despite its claim to non-alignment, New Delhi established a close relationship with Moscow and came to be regarded as a de facto member of the Soviet alliance system. As a member of the ANZUS alliance, Canberra viewed India with suspicion and was reluctant to develop a close relationship. The Indian Government, in return, looked at Australia as an aligned state in a dependent relationship with the United States and, therefore, incapable of making independent foreign policy decisions. Coupled with the suspicion was the reality of two different economic models being adopted by Canberra and New Delhi. While the former favoured a market economy, the latter opted for a closed and state-controlled economy. Their trading partners also differed, thus accounting for limited economic links between the two states. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the trade between them did not exceed an annual limit of A$300 million. [4]

The 1980s witnessed an increase in the level of trade between Australia and India but their diplomatic relations remained hostage to their respective foreign policy agenda. [5] New Delhi initiated a process of dialogue with Washington but continued to support Moscow on a number of significant international issues. India supported the Soviet version of invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and also approved of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Having initiated a reappraisal of its foreign policy stance, the Australian government had increasingly come to project and affirm its interests in South East Asia. Hence, it remained suspicious of the Soviet plans in the regions close to Australia and the Indian support for Moscow’s moves.

Paradoxically, the Indo-Soviet nexus provided the impetus for improving Australia’s relations with India towards the end of the 1980s. In early 1988, India acquired a Charlie class submarine from the former Soviet Union.  This acquisition, which later turned out to be fraught with problems, caused apprehension among some analysts and policy makers in Australia about Indian intentions in areas considered significant for its own defence. However, while voicing its concerns, the Australian government embarked upon a process of re-evaluating its relations with New Delhi.  The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade initiated an inquiry into relations with India. Early next year, the Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke visited India.  Australian aid to New Delhi was increased from a low level of A$2.8 million in 1988 to A$35 million for the next three years. The two states also agreed to set up a Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) in 1989, and revived the post of Defence Adviser in the Australian High Commission in New Delhi. It was apparent that Canberra wished to limit any possible negative influence of Indian cooperation with Moscow to Australian security by engaging rather than ignoring India. 

The real shift in Australia’s relations with India, however, took place after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union.  The loss of its mentor prompted New Delhi to rethink its foreign policy options, which resulted in it’s further opening up to the West. More importantly, the experiences of the Gulf War caused the Indian government to review its economic policies.  The return of Indian workers and the loss of remittances combined with the increase in the price of petroleum put pressure on the Indian economy. Fearful of an impending collapse, New Delhi proceeded to liberalise its economy. The process of deregulation and privatisation started in early 1990s and gained momentum as the decade came to a close.  It targeted a number of areas including telecommunications, the energy sector, mining and banking.  Tariffs were consistently lowered to attract foreign investors. The processes of applying for and receiving approvals by foreign business interests were simplified. The Indian government also engaged in an aggressive policy of ‘selling’ this change to foreign investors.  Given that India’s middle class was estimated to be between 100 and 300 million, these policies attracted attention from a number of outside actors. [6]   The United States and a number of European states decided to respond favourably to the opening up of the Indian economy.

The promise of economic benefits by exploring possibilities in the Indian market formed the basis on which Australia built its links with India in the 1990s. The Australian government took the lead by sending a number of senior officials and political representatives to India. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade published information to encourage business community to take advantage of the opportunities being offered by India. The AUSTRADE opened an office in Mumbai in November 1992 and began to provide on-site information to interested Australian parties. [7] Initially large businesses including the BHP (now BHP-Billeton), and the world's largest mining company, CRA Ltd., Command Petroleum and Telstra made use of the information. Gradually, however, even smaller firms got began forays into the Indian market. Meanwhile, different state governments in Australia also moved to establish separate connections with Indian states.  Western Australia, for instance, appointed its own representative in India to provide information on business opportunities. Other states, especially Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland also devised strategies to operate in India. The areas of economic interaction expanded to include education, computer technology and management services. Air links improved between the two states with Air India and QANTAS providing flights into selected points. [8]

The economic relations between Australia and India registered a sharp improvement in the 1990s due to the efforts made by Canberra and reciprocated by New Delhi and Indian State Governments. The net result was an increase in the level of trade. The two-way trade between the two countries, for instance, rose from A$866.1 million in 1989-90 to A$1.78 billion by the end of 1996. [9] This excluded Australian diamonds processed in India and then sold through Antwerp that would have raised the total value of trade above A$2 billion. India ranked 18^th as the destination for Australian exports and was 29^th in the list of countries exporting goods and services to Australia. Australian exports were predominantly primary commodities like coal, wool, petroleum products, specialised machinery, non-ferrous metals and ores.  The imports from India were more diversified and consisted of textiles, clothing, vegetables and fruit, pearls, gems, engineering goods and chemicals.   Australia also provided aid for humanitarian purposes to India. The total amount had risen to A$1,565 million in 1995-96 and was being used for a variety of projects including those focusing on women's health issues. Although the Liberal Government reduced the amount of this aid as part of an overall reduction in its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programme, sufficient notice was given to avoid major disruption in the programs.

The rapid improvement in economic relations created space for closer Indo-Australian cooperation in the political and strategic arena. A number of high-level exchanges of visits took place between the two states. In 1994, the then Vice President K.R. Narayanan visited Australia. The next year, Australian Minister for Trade, Senator Bob McMullen, led the largest Australian business delegation to India. In 1996 five senior Australian Cabinet Ministers visited India within a short period of five weeks. This was followed in 1997 by the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer's visit to India.  These were reciprocated by the Indian Ministers for Commerce, Food Processing Industries, Petroleum and Natural Gas, and Railways. [10] To some extent, these visits were designed to explore or enhance economic links.  They also supported large-scale cultural/technological fairs that were meant to build cultural bridges between the two states that went beyond knowledge of cricket! The visit by the Indian Vice President, Narayanan, for instance, was linked to his launching a month long festival in Australia, India Today ‘94. Similarly, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, led the delegation to India to participate in the New Horizons programme organised to familiarise Indians with the ‘new’ Australia.

The relationship, however, did not remain confined to boosting economic links through political interaction.  Instead, the two states moved to establish understanding in a number of areas. The setting up of Australia-India Council and the India-Australia Council on reciprocal basis strengthened cultural ties. These councils facilitated greater people-to-people contacts. Educational and scientific interaction also increased with Australia offering scholarships to Indian students under a number of schemes. Even Universities cooperated and initiated expos designed to attract students from a number of Indian cities.

The expanding scope of understanding was most obvious in the political and diplomatic arena. Australia supported India’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum. India and Australia adopted similar positions on the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). They also played a major role in the International Forum of the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) held in Perth in June 1995. This finally culminated in the formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) in March 1997. Cooperation in the strategic arena also improved. For example, the Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Shekhawat, visited Australia in June-July 1996. India and Australia trained two officers at brigadier level on reciprocal basis. At a more junior level, Indian officers were trained in all the staff colleges in Australia, including the Joint Services Staff College (Canberra), the Army Staff College at Queenscliff and the Royal Australian Naval Staff College.  In return, Australian officers had the option of being provided training in India. Although the number of Indian officials visiting Australia always was higher than the other way round, this did not undermine the strategic understanding between the two countries.  Regular sharing of information took place on unclassified security matters between the Defence Attaches of the two countries. 

The qualitative improvement in Australia's relations with India was not without minor irritants. A number of business interests found it difficult to enter into and conclude quick deals. A lack of knowledge of the cultural context in which business deals are signed proved to be an obstacle. The cultural aspect also some times created embarrassing situations for the two parties. During the New Horizon programme, for instance, the Australian hosts extended invitations to a number of senior officials who did not confirm their acceptance but turned out for the planned event. Unaware of the cultural nuances, the Australian side had already filled the seats with other invited guests thus denying the senior officials chosen seats. The saga created some consternation among those who were not seated according to their status in the Indian society!

In the political arena differences emerged on the nature of the IORARC. Having hosted the IFIOR and working to set up a regional organisation that could build linkages between countries of the Indian Ocean region, Canberra and New Delhi differed on the process and qualification for membership in the organisation. While Canberra argued for ‘inclusivity,’ the Indian government insisted on keeping the membership of the IORARC ‘exclusive’ which was a euphemism for keeping Pakistan out of the organisation. The Australian government ultimately gave into the Indian position but continued to argue for broadening the membership.

The most important difference of opinion, however, related to the issue of nuclear proliferation. Both India and Australia had argued for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament but they differed on how best to achieve the goal. While Australia supported the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India opposed the idea. It claimed that the CTBT was neither ‘comprehensive’, nor a ‘test ban’, nor a ‘treaty’ as it did not prevent declared nuclear states from modernising their nuclear stockpiles. [11] Faced with Indian opposition to the Entry into Force clause of the proposed treaty, the Australian government took an initiative, which undermined New Delhi’s stance. Supported by nuclear powers, the Australian UN Representative, Richard Butler, tabled a resolution which asked the UN General Assembly to adopt the CTBT, and requested the Secretary General to act as depository of the treaty and open it for signature at the UN Headquarters. An overwhelming majority at the UN General Assembly passed the resolution. The process angered some Indian officials who were critical of Australia’s ‘high handed approach’ and of the negative remarks given by Richard Butler about India’s stand on the CTBT. [12]

These differences notwithstanding, Canberra and New Delhi managed to keep the relationship on an even keel.  The improvement in their relationship continued despite occasional hiccups and differences of opinion.

 

India's Nuclear Tests: End of a Special Relationship?

The limits of Australia’s relationship with India were tested by New Delhi’s nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998.  The Australian government, like other members of the international community, condemned the nuclear tests. But Canberra’s reaction was more vehement than others including the United States were. The Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer ‘unreservedly’ condemned the nuclear tests and accused New Delhi of having ‘the utmost disregard for accepted international norms of behaviour.’ While asking India to refrain from further nuclear tests, Canberra also took a series of punitive measures.  The Australian High Commissioner to India was recalled as a sign of Canberra’s displeasure.  At the same time it announced a suspension of Ministerial and senior official visits, as well as a suspension of non-humanitarian aid to India.  While vowing to condemn and raise questions about India’s ‘outrageous’ and ‘ill-judged actions,’ the Australian government also suspended bilateral defence relations with India. The Defence Adviser stationed in New Delhi was immediately recalled, all ship and aircraft visits suspended and the reciprocal training of Indian and Australian defence officials was immediately ceased. [13]

The vehemence of Australian’s response drew criticism from the Indian government. Critical of the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard’s identification of South Asian states as ‘dirt poor’ and the immediate suspension of defence and diplomatic links, it accused Canberra of failing to understand India’s security concerns. New Delhi also responded in kind to the steps taken by Canberra. It withdrew its own Defence Attaché based in Canberra and suspended all proposals for bilateral military cooperation. Australian naval ships were denied “permission to visit Indian ports or operate in Indian territorial waters.” [14]

Australia’s response was also criticised by a number of academics and analysts in India.  Following the Pakistani nuclear tests of May 28 and 30, 1998, which attracted almost identical Australian response, these analysts accused Canberra of hypocrisy. As a member of the ANZUS, they argued, Australia was already protected by American nuclear umbrella, but was unwilling to acknowledge security needs of other states. Referring to the role played by Australia in getting the CTBT through the UN General Assembly, they also accused Australia of ‘nuclear racism’.  Canberra was portrayed as having established categories of legitimacy of nuclear status. ‘The first tier,’ one analyst maintained, “consists of the white states which are acceptable to Australia as nuclear powers.  The second tier consists of yellow nuclear powers which Canberra accepts.  But it is unwilling to accept the last tier of nuclear states which are brown in colour.” [15] Such portrayal of Australia’s response, it is interesting to point out, was coupled with criticism of Canberra’s response to Pakistan’s nuclear tests. 

Cognisant of such criticism, the manner in which Canberra had reacted to the nuclear tests in South Asia came under scrutiny in Australia. While acknowledging that Australia’s claims to ‘good international citizenship’ required it to react negatively to the nuclear tests, they questioned the manner in which the reaction was conveyed.  Emphasising that the policies based on the notion of ‘good international citizenship’ could undermine Australia’s economic and long-term strategic interests; they pressed for a change in Canberra's policy. Members of the business community who had developed economic links with India after the liberalization of the Indian economy consistently highlighted the need for such moderation vis-à-vis South Asia. They argued that Canberra’s response could jeopardise the success or viability of these links.  They also pointed out that any further exploration of economic areas in which India and Australia could cooperate would also be undermined by Canberra’s negative reaction to the tests, and its inability to understand the context in which India had crossed the nuclear threshold.  These arguments were supported and reiterated by members of the academic community who had focused on the Australian-South Asian relations, and played a major role in pushing for Australia’s policy of establishing closer economic relations with the Indian Ocean Region.  

That the Australian government was not averse to these arguments, and that it actually appreciated the need for maintaining economic relations with South Asia and particularly India was apparent during these early days of Australia’s critical attitude towards India and Pakistan.  Soon after nuclear tests and Canberra’s decision to recall its ambassadors to Pakistan and India, for instance, AUSTRADE organized a series of seminars on investment opportunities in South Asia.  Australian representatives based in the High Commissions in New Delhi and Islamabad attended the seminars. More interestingly, in the sessions held in Perth, the Indian desk at which potential and existing investors could get information was attended by none other than the recalled Australian High Commissioner to India!

The interest in not losing the Indian market to other competitors caused Canberra to revert to its policy of using political links to support economic diplomacy. By December 1998, it had decided to lift ban on visits by Ministers and senior officials. This resulted in the visit by the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer’s visit to New Delhi in February 1999. [16] At the ASEAN meeting in Singapore in July 1999, the Australian and Indian foreign ministers also agreed that the Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs would visit India. The next year, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, and Prime Minister John Howard visited India in March and June 2000 respectively. It was obvious that Canberra had decided to put aside its concerns about nuclear proliferation and demands of ‘good international citizenship.’ The Australian Foreign Minister, Downer, once again visited India in April 2002, to discuss trade and security matters.

That the policy paid off is evident in the continued strengthening of Australian-Indian economic links with India. Australia’s exports to India are now totalling A$2.8 billion, and India has moved up to the position of its15^th largest trading partner. [17]   The number of Australian companies with a permanent presence in India has nearly reached 100 and includes AMP and ANZ Bank. [18]   The two countries have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on tourism and cultural heritage during Foreign Minister Downer’s visit to India in April 2002. [19]   The Australian government is also encouraging Australian companies to outsourcing to India in the field of information technology. [20]   India's Satyam Computer Services Limited has established first software development centre in Australia. [21]   Although the tensions between India and Pakistan have created the possibility that some of the business for software development might move back to Australia, or even Indonesia, [22] the likelihood of the trend towards greater cooperation between India and Australia in the IT field will not decline.

Having removed the temporary negativity, Australia’s relations with India have also expanded to include greater cooperation in the security and defence arena. The impetus for this cooperation comes from the change in American attitude towards India.  As Washington has moved towards building a strong relationship with New Delhi, the Australian Government has also followed suit.  While careful not to antagonise China, it has moved to improve the quality of its relationship with India.  This attitude was apparent during the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh’s visit to Australia in June 2001. The two countries agreed to initiating a strategic dialogue and its first meeting was held in August 2001. During Foreign Minister Downer’s visit in April 2002, the two sides also held detailed discussion on a series of regional and global security issues including ‘particular security situations in the broad Asia-Pacific region.’ They also began ‘working towards holding direct military-to-military talks towards the end of 2002.’ [23]

As the security relationship is improving, India and Australia are also opting for similar positions on a number of international issues. The most prominent example is the positive attitude adopted by Canberra and New Delhi vis-à-vis the Bush Administration’s decision to proceed with its plans for building a National Missile Defence (NMD).  While the Australian government supports the idea of NMD, the Indian government has also adopted a positive attitude towards the idea. [24]

Based on the manner in which Australia has established a close link with India since the early 90s, one could argue that the relationship is likely to improve further. While some irritants may emerge in their relationship, the two sides will continue to iron out those differences for the larger goal of mutual economic and security benefits.

 

 

 

 

 

Australia-India Relations: Implications for Pakistan

The continual improvement in Australia’s relationship with India raises a question about its implications for Australia’s links with Pakistan.  The record indicates that for a large part of the 1990s, the Australian government had pursued a policy of ‘de-coupling’ its relationship with the two South Asian states. While it opted to build a strong link with India due to the economic benefits, its policy towards Pakistan remained one of benign indifference. One could argue that, to some extent, this indifference was a function of frequent change of governments in Pakistan and the related uncertainty about the successive governments’ trade and investment policies. Some difficult experiences encountered by Australian business interests caused concerns about the possibility of profits being remitted out of Pakistan. This, in turn, affected the level of economic interest in Pakistan, which directly affected Canberra’s interest in the country as well. Nonetheless, the Australian government did maintain a modest presence in the country, and encouraged trade and educational links with Islamabad.

Since Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998, the relationship has changed.  Although Canberra imposed similar sanctions on both India and Pakistan in the wake of their tests, Pakistan appears to have suffered more than India. While the relationship with New Delhi was revived within a year, Pakistan continued to experience Australian sanctions until after the 11 September attacks. The defence link was not revived until after Pakistan’s participation in the ‘War on Terrorism.’ More importantly, the revival of Australia’s close links with India appears to coexist with an implied reluctance on part of Canberra to give any indication of treating the two states as equals.  Unlike in the past, the visits to India are not combined with visits to Pakistan.  The Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, for instance, had not visited Pakistan after visiting India in the post-nuclear test days. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and the Foreign Minister have also followed the same pattern. [25]

The improvement in Australian-Indian relations has also prompted Canberra to side with New Delhi on issues involving the two South Asian states. This has been apparent in the recent round of tensions between India and Pakistan. During his visit to India in April 2002, the Australian Foreign Minister asked that Pakistan to be vigilant in stopping activities of terrorist groups. [26] Also, as the danger of India and Pakistan going to war increased in late May 2002, Downer described the situation as ‘very grave’ and asked President Musharraf to take ‘still further actions to rein in militants in Kashmir and beyond.’ In contrast India was urged to ‘continue to exercise restraint.’ Such an approach implied that the tension had been created by Pakistan’s failure to fulfil its commitment to countering terrorism while the Indian restraint had averted a war. [27]

The shift from a policy of benign indifference to conscious distancing has not caused concerns in Islamabad. Primarily relying upon the United States, it has not looked upon Australia as a significant actor that needs to be courted.  In other words, while Canberra is moving towards an erroneous policy of ‘coupling’ its relations with India and Pakistan, Islamabad also contributes to the Australian neglect by not engaging Canberra. This, in turn, reflects a lack of real understanding in both Pakistan and Australia about each other. The perceptual gap could be filled by increasing the level of second-track contacts between the two countries. The process would be slow but it could enable Canberra to appreciate that an Indo-centric policy does not necessarily mean ignoring Pakistan. It may also help Pakistan appreciate Australia’s value in the former’s still nascent Look East policy.

 

Lessons for Pakistan

The rapid improvement in Australia’s relations with India highlight the role of economic diplomacy. They also indicate that once relations improve in one area, the spill over effect can create space for improvement in other areas. The process, however, is only possible through concerted effort on part of both parties to gradually build on the links established. Significantly, the process cannot be left to the governmental sector only. The civil society has to play a role in this context to increase the level of understanding about respective societies.

The evolution of Australian-Indian relationship provides a model for Pakistan to follow. One could argue that the relative difference in the size of Indian and Pakistani economies would always limit the extent to which Pakistan can be seen as an option for Australian business interests. This, in turn, would work against the relationship expanding in other areas as well. While that may be true, Islamabad can still try and ‘educate’ Australian business about business prospects in Pakistan. The success of this effort, however, depends upon a process of economic liberalization in Pakistan. It also requires guarantees that profits could be remitted without a lot of red tape.  Most importantly, however, the Pakistani government needs to give more attention to changing its negative image in the Asia-Pacific region. The process requires giving more weight to diplomacy targeting the region east of India. Pakistani missions in Australia and the region cannot be expected to either gather sufficient information or project Pakistan’s point of view with extremely limited resources. Changing the images requires increasing the number of diplomatic staff in Australia who can fulfil their responsibilities more efficiently. Meanwhile, Australia and Pakistan can cooperate in the educational field to build an understanding of the ‘other.’ While the process has been initiated in the 1990s with an increase in the number of students studying in Australia, the Pakistani government also needs to provide scholarships/facilities for academic exchanges. Finally, given the emphasis in Australia on controlling human trafficking, Pakistan can engage Canberra in a dialogue on how best to deal with the problem. Given that Pakistan has been a main source of illegal migrants, such engagement is possible and can also open up space for more interaction between the two states.

These suggestions would raise the question of Australia’s interest and role in building such a relationship with Pakistan. One could easily argue that as a state concerned with developments in the Indian Ocean region, Australian government needs to create opportunities for greater knowledge about Pakistan as well. This is essential due to Pakistan’s status as one of the largest Islamic states in the area as well as its participation in the counter-terrorist operations. However, the fact that Canberra has not fully appreciated this need does not mean that modest beginnings are not possible. The Australian government could support a Second Track Strategic Dialogue with Pakistan. The forum will not only enable it to learn about Pakistan’s viewpoint but also use it to devise a more effective South Asian strategy.  The direct and indirect effects for a state concerned with economic diplomacy can hardly be overstated.n