India's Endorsement of US BMD: Challenges for Regional Stability

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal  

he proposed United States Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system with its national and regional variations would be one of the most advanced and complex weapon systems ever developed. The system would entail the construction or upgrade of a complex and geographically disparate array of facilities and components stretching from one continent to the other. The indispensability of the deployment of the X‑band ground‑based phased‑array radar for the National Missile Defence (NMD) system drives United States (US) to improve and consolidate its strategic partnership with its existing allies  and forge a new strategic partnership with some other states, for example India. The US strategic partners' territory would be used for the deployment of the BMD systems. The objectives of the US BMD policy is to build and deploy defences to protect its people and its forward‑deployed forces as well as to contribute to the defences of its friends and allies. The countries that are vital in future US missile defence calculation would be recipients of the US military technology and economic aid. President George W. Bush's intentions to develop a new strategic framework would fortify US defence1 and intensify the military potential of its strategic partners, consequently destabilising the international strategic stability. Moreover, deploying missile defences will require moving beyond the Anti‑Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The condemnation of the ABM Treaty will have a series of far‑reaching negative consequences for the international security environment.

The US BMD decision would affect global nuclear arms control and provoke strong negative reactions from the Russian Federation and China. It will have a negative cascading effect in South Asia. Therefore, the potential impact of the BMD on South Asian security environment in general and particularly on Pakistan's defence strategy could not be neglected. The real facts on US policy about the US BMD programme are not known. India has extended its unqualified official support to President Bush’s determination to build an anti‑missile shield as a strategic and technological inevitability. This is probably the first time in decades that India has extended such support to US on any global armament issue.2  Interestingly, the US BMD is now seen in India, as having merits it did not have a year ago. On July 24, 2000, Mr. Jaswant Singh, the Minister for External Affairs of India, in an interview with the Times of India said, 'We have consistently held a view that opposes the militarisation of outer space. The NMD will adversely influence the larger movement towards disarmament of which India is a staunch advocate. We believe that technological superiority will result in a reaction in other parts of the world, thus reviving the possibility of yet another, and newer arms race. We cannot support this development'3. This change in Indian stance raises certain questions. For example, what is here for India in the U.S. missile defence plans? What benefits can India draw from its participation with the US in such defence shield plans? Such questions need serious consideration. The immediate endorsement was that for obtaining a better relationship with the US. Mr. P.R. Chad, the Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi commented that 'this serves India's national self‑interest and its larger intention to develop a new relationship with the Bush administration.4 The better understanding with the US is essential for New Delhi's ambitious military modernisation programme coupled with its regional and global objectives. According to Mr. Agha Shahi, former foreign minister of Pakistan, 'nevertheless, reversing its traditional disarmament stance, India has seized the opportunity to move closer to the US as a strategic partner, with the ambition of designing, in alliance with the US a totally new security regime for the entire globe'.5

The supportive Indian response appears to have been clinched by the prospects of cooperation in developing offensive/defensive missile technologies. Under the new strategic partnership, India would have access to the US sophisticated missile technology and conventional arms. Therefore, the shift from an earlier more forthright opposition to the BMD to a much softer even somewhat welcoming line from the Indian Government would adversely influence the South Asian strategic stability in general, and undermine Pakistan's security in particular.  

US New Strategic Framework  

On May 1, 2001, in his speech at National Defence University, the US President George W. Bush announced his intentions to develop a new strategic framework that is based on concepts of deterrence, which rely on both offensive and defensive forces. He stated:

`Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non‑proliferation, counter‑proliferation, and defences. We must work together with other likeminded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use .... We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation .... We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defences to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30‑year‑old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognise the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past’.6

The fundamentals of the Bush administration’s new strategic framework rest on their understanding and interpretation of new post‑Cold War strategic threats and the US role in international politics. They have been convinced that the knowledge needed to design and build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles is now widespread. About 30 countries either have, or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles. According to their assessment North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya pose serious threats to US security, because of their modest ballistic missile capabilities, coupled with their antagonism towards the US and its allies7.

Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, stated that ‘imagine what might happen if a rogue state were to demonstrate the capability to strike US or European population with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give this state the power to hold us hostage.’8 They believe that credible deterrence can no longer be based solely on the  prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. Instead, it must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non‑nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries, the opportunity and benefits from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US. On January 11, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld, in the hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation as Secretary of Defence categorically stated: ‘The US should deploy a missile defence system when it is technologically possible and effective.’9 He believed that deployment of an effective NMD system could strengthen US and allied security. He further pointed out that the failure to deploy appropriate defensive systems could also have the following adverse effects:

a)       Paralysing US ability to act in a crisis or deterring other countries from assisting it;

b)       Providing incentives to US friends and allies to develop nuclear capabilities;

c)       Putting the US in a position where its only option may be pre‑emption;

d)       Moving the US to a more isolationist position because of an inability to defend against ballistic missiles10.

The Bush administration sees missile defence as a hedge against states, which are not deterred by the overwhelming retaliation capability of the US. Thus, without missile defences, the US and its allies can be susceptible to nuclear blackmail and allow the so‑called “rogue states”,11 or, as the US prefers to call them now, ‘countries of concern’, to invade their neighbours. President Bush argued that, for countries of concern, 'terror and blackmail are a way of life'. He added that 'they seek' missiles armed with ‘weapons of mass destruction to keep the US and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world’.12 This verifies that the Bush administration’s strategic policy takes into account the US forces’ inescapable involvement in future military conflicts, which are regional in scope. These include the high probability of military conflict in the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits. They visualise a situation where the vulnerability of US troops to local and regional missile threats, e.g. in the Middle East, East Asia and Far East, would do incalculable harm to US interests in the long term13. For example, China might threaten to attack the US if it moved to defend Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland. Similarly, Iran14 or Iraq might develop WMD to prevent US intervention in the Persian Gulf. Hence BMD would provide the US a defensive shield and confidence that it could intervene without itself suffering severe consequences.

  China: a Competitor and a Potential Regional Rival

 

Since the Cold War ended, American scholars and strategists have debated whether China will pose a security threat to the US homeland, its global and regional interests in East Asia/Far East in the next few decades. For many American strategic analysts, Chinese military of the twenty‑first century is replacing the Soviet military of pre‑Gorbachev years and Japanese economy of the 1970s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership.15 However, in the present international scenario, Washington considers and vocally termed “rogue states” as a threat to its interests. The Americans perceive that it would be difficult to deter these states from attacking the US by the prevalent nuclear deterrence strategy. But this threat perception is debatable. In real terms, these states do not pose any military threat to the Americans homeland. For instance, North Korea one of the most advanced in missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology, among the “rogue states”, is not capable of making multiple launches of missiles. On August 31, 1998, North Korea tested a Taepodong‑1 missile, which is believed to be a Nodong with a Scud‑like second stage and a small third stage kick‑motor. The Taepodong‑1 flew only 1320 km.16 This proves that in order to develop a long‑range ballistic missile, the North Koreans would have to make remarkable progress in propulsion, guidance, airframe, warhead and re‑entry vehicle technology. There is no evidence that North Korea has mastered these technologies. At the same time one cannot ignore the fact that North Korea is eager to open normal trade relations with the West, seems to be willing to suspend its long range missiles programme for real material gain. Secondly, North Korea, Iraq and Iran are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967. And all their nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirdly, there is a reason to doubt that they would ever use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US, due to the overwhelming US retaliatory capability. The historical record shows that in the past, states have been deterred from using such weapons, when the US threatens to retaliate. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War, despite his threats to do so, by the US decision that such an attack would meet with a devastating US response.17

It seems that the “rogue states” threat has been exaggerated out of proportion and made a good excuse to develop the BMD system, which would be employed for the containment of other major powers. Interestingly, some scholars opine that the likeliest nuclear attack against the United States would come not from a nuclear missile launched by a rogue state but from a warhead in the belly of a ship or the back of a truck delivered by a group with no return address. Furthermore, the greatest nuclear danger to the US today and in the near future is likely to be an accidental launch of missile armed with nuclear warhead from Russia. The current US policy of maintaining large numbers of highly accurate nuclear weapons, that can be launched promptly to attack Russia's nuclear forces, stands in the way of reducing this risk.

Some key officials of the Bush administration consider China the predominant threat to American interests. Colin Powell, the Secretary of State has rejected the Clinton administration's posture of 'China as a strategic partner'. In his January 17 confirmation hearing he stated: 'China is a competitor and a potential regional rival’.18 On May 1, 2001 in his speech on missile defences, President Bush spoke of reaching out to both Russia and China. While he was elaborating his desire to build a constructive new relationship with Russia, he ruled out any such prospects with China. Washington reinforced this message when the high‑level emissaries sent to consult with Asian leaders on American missile defence plans conspicuously omitted Beijing from their itinerary. A lower‑level delegation visited Beijing.19

 In late January 2001, the US Air Force staged its first ever space war game. The possibility of war in space turned from pure scientific fiction to realistic planning by the Space War Centre at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The simulation was based on a scenario with growing tension between the US and China in 2017. The exercise perceived that in 2017 US would be involved in a conflict with a large near‑space peer nation 'Red', which threatens to attack 'Brown', a small neighbouring country. The good guys 'Blue' come to the rescue, launching reusable space planes and deploying missile defences, anti‑satellite lasers, and tiny attack satellites known as micro‑satellites. Several participants admitted that Red force was modelled on China.20 The concept of space war exercise is a part of the US East Asian war fighting strategy. The basic elements of the American’s East Asian strategy are deterring attack on allies and friends; maintaining East Asian bases for global power projection; and preventing spirals of tension among regional actors whose relations are plagued by both historical legacies of mistrust and contemporary sovereignty disputes.21 According to Thomas J. Christen’s assessment,'...with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretence of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power or technology'. He added, 'I firmly agreed with those who are sceptical about China's prospects in significantly closing the gap with the US’.22  

Technical Know‑how of the BMD: Problems and Prospects  

The first indication of a missile launch against the US would come from early warning satellites deployed in geo‑synchronous orbits about 36,000 km above the equator. The satellites detect the launch of a missile by seeing the hot and bright plume from its engine. Once the missile is detected, the control centre tells different sensors to track the missile or the warhead and decoy it releases and discriminate between them. After the missile rocket engines have stopped burning, other BMD sensors (X‑band ground based phased‑array radar and a space‑based missile tracking system) take over and detect and track the warhead or warheads as well as discriminate the warhead from any missile debris, decoys or other objects produced by the missile. The data from the radar and space‑based sensors could be sent to the command centres. There the data would be correlated to assess the nature of the threat, to discriminate real warheads from decoys, and to determine when interceptors should be launched against incoming targets.

The interceptors (which Americans call a kinetic energy kill vehicle) employ 'hit to‑kill' technique ‑ hit a bullet with a bullet. The kill vehicles do not have any explosives. The kill vehicles use infrared sensors to hit targets. They destroy the target by a collision, at very high speed of about 15,000 miles per hour or more, with the target missile. In order to maximize the probability of a successful intercept, the BMD system will fire one or two interceptors at each attacking warhead. If timelines permit, the system may then observe results of the intercept attempts and if necessary fire additional interceptors. If time does not permit the use of this  ‘shoot‑look‑shoot’ strategy, the defence may simply fire a single salvo of four or five interceptors against each  incoming warhead.23

There are five basic methods of destroying the hostile missiles;

a)             Pre‑launch attack, meaning attacking the missiles before their launch;

b)             Boost‑phase interception, meaning attacking the missiles while they are being accelerated by their rocket boosters. During the boost phase, booster burns and the missile moves relatively slowly;

c)             Exo‑atmospheric interception or in midcourse, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it, when the attacking missile is traveling outside the atmosphere;

d)             Endo‑atmospheric interception, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during the re‑entry phases in the lower, denser atmosphere. When the offensive missile is approaching its target within the atmosphere; and

e)             Civil defence, meaning reducing the effects of the missile attacks by strengthening constructions on the ground or hiding personnel and facilities at safe locations.

The US has not yet determined the specifics of its future missile defences. The decisions about how, and when, and how much, are still decisions to come. What Bush administration is talking about the BMD at the moment is still a concept. But one fact is clear that the architecture of the missile defences would be different from Clinton's administration NMD plan, which pursued plans for midcourse intercepts with the interceptors initially based at a single location. In his speech on May 1, 2001, President Bush briefly mentioned the prospect of land, air, and sea‑based defences. Although he discussed the advantages of intercepting missiles in the boost phase during the first few minutes of flight, he admitted that there is still more work to do to determine the final form the defences might take.24 Nevertheless, the Bush administration has indicated that the BMD plan would be a multi‑layered defence system, meaning that the system would combine several of the basic options. On May 2, 2001 Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, hinted that in addition to land, air, and sea‑based defences, space‑based options could not be ruled out. On May 8 he announced that the Pentagon office overseeing missile defences had identified 'eight, ten, or twelve different, things .... that they think merit attention.25

                The Bush administration's statements regarding the BMD plan indicates that they would adopt an approach, which would be based on the concept that interceptors can destroy the incoming missile at three stages; the boost phase, exo‑atmospheric interception or in midcourse and endo‑atmospheric interception. Each option has advantages and disadvantages. There is one inflexible rule about missile defence – the later you detect and intercept an enemy missile, the closer it will be when you destroy it, and the smaller the area you can defend. Conversely, the earlier you can detect, and act, the farther away it will be when you destroy it and the greater the area you can defend. Therefore, farther is better. It gives you enough time to gain a chance for a second or third shot if you miss. In addition, during the boost phase the hostile missile travels at a relatively slow speed, presents a high infrared profile, and is well before any deployment of its warheads and decoys. It also eliminates the problems of dealing with multiple warheads or sub‑munitions.26 Hence, the potential to intercept and destroy a missile over enemy territory soon after launch, rather than over friendly territory, makes the development of a boost phase intercept capability very desirable.

But the problem with this option is that the reaction time is very limited. A boost-phase intercept would need to be conducted within the 250‑second burn‑time of an ICBM27. Secondly, the US forward theatre interceptors deployment becomes inevitable to hit the enemy missile in its boost phase. The US has to station its interceptors on land or on cargo ships converted for the single purpose of carrying these interceptors nearer to the state of concern so that its interceptors hit the target within a short span of time. For example, BMD plan designed to hit a missile launched from North Korea interceptors could be deployed at a joint US‑Russian site located on Russian territory south of Vladivostok or on US military cargo ships stationed in the Japan Basin. Against Iraqi ICBMs, a single interceptor base in south‑east Turkey would suffice to protect the entire US national territory. For countering Iran, US would require interceptors based in the Caspian Sea, or perhaps in Tajikistan and on ships in the Gulf of Oman. But the ships in the Japan Basin, Caspian Sea and Gulf of Oman housing the interceptors are in principle vulnerable to attack from the ships or submarines of concern states. The second alternative being touted for the BMD boost phase intercept is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL). The programme has not been considered appropriate because of technical hurdles that thwart development.

In case of midcourse, the ICBM can be intercepted while it travels in the vacuum of outer space. This permits more time for decision to the command and control centre for reaction. However, the most serious problem with a mid‑course system, as many analysts have pointed out, is that it can be defeated by countermeasures that are quite simple to develop compared with an ICBM programme. For example, light and heavy objects follow identical trajectories in the vacuum of outer space, the offensive ICBM could employ a number of techniques to deceive the intercept vehicle. For example, a substantial number of lightweight decoys could be deployed in parallel with the real warhead, making it difficult for the interceptor to discriminate between them. Such lightweight decoys can be designed to simulate the thermal emissions from the real warhead and even the fluctuation in such emissions or variations in reflected light caused by the warheads’ motion. Alternatively, the offence could employ anti‑simulation countermeasures, in which the real warhead is enclosed in a light balloon, making it indistinguishable from a number of accompanying decoy balloons28. However, one potential flaw with a balloon decoy is that its temperature could differ greatly from the temperature of the warhead, thus enabling heat‑sensitive seekers to easily distinguish between the two. Because a warhead has substantial mass (perhaps 500‑1,000 pounds), it does not cool much in its passage through space. Thin, empty decoy balloons, on the other hand, could change temperature rapidly, depending on their surface coating. They could either be warmer than a warhead in sunshine or cooler. At night, they would cool rapidly unless measures were taken to prevent this. This problem, however, could be easily overcome. It takes less than a pound of lithium battery within a decoy balloon to supply as much heat to the interior of the balloon as the warhead itself would have.29

Technically, intercept during the re‑entry phase or within the atmosphere is easier for the defence due to the ICBM warheads being highly visible to radar and to optical sensors. Because of the very hot 'wake' produced by the Mach‑23 RV as it enters the atmosphere. Balloons and light chaff are no longer effective against sensors, they will be retarded or destroyed on re‑entry. Though there is little time left at this point. Computers can calculate the trajectory of the warheads, making interception possible. But a sophisticated attacker, however, can complicate the problem by making the warhead maneuverable and its path may not be determined by the interceptor. In this case the warhead must be destroyed twenty miles above the earth, otherwise there would be fall‑out damages.30

The combination of land, sea and air‑based elements would make BMD greatly effective. For example, under favourable geographic and technical circumstances nonstatic sea‑based BMD can be extremely effective and enjoy the political advantage of being based in international waters. This system cannot be easily targeted by the terrorists because of its mobility.  

Chinese Responses  

Some in Europe even questioned the US threat assessment.31 However, China had more bluntly criticised US plans than Russia and Europe. China is opposed to BMD, which it sees as a potential threat to its own nuclear missile deterrent. Beijing also fears a regional version of the system could neutralise its missile potential against Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province that must return to its rule. Therefore, it has made clear that it does not accept the rogue state rationale and sees itself as the focus of the US BMD systems. China's interpretation that the BMD is directed against it, seems legitimate, due to Americans’ provocative actions like arming Taiwan with Patriot missile capability,32 human rights interventions, a higher profile for the Tibetan cause and above all Bush administration's perception that China is an emerging threat to the US security33.

China fears that a limited US defence could negate its small arsenal of roughly 20 to 25 ICBMs. It has announced that its opposition to BMD would not change. It is expected that China can respond by developing new quantities and qualities of missiles and warheads capable of compensation for the reduction in their deterrent capabilities that would be brought about by a defensive shield. China is thus likely to invest in a more robust nuclear triad. Within the triad, as China’s strategic long‑range strike programmes come to fruition, single warhead liquid‑fuel missiles will be replaced with longer‑range, multiple warhead, solid‑fuel systems. The US BMD could also force changes in China's deployment posture. China currently lacks the technical capability to maintain its nuclear force on a high‑alert status. Warheads are stored separately from their missile launchers. Because Chinese ICBMs are liquid‑fuel, they require lengthy launch preparations. China's current nuclear modernisation plans will bring it within striking distance of deploying a credible and survivable deterrent. However, BMD could prove to be the decisive factor that might persuade Chinese leaders to transform a small strategic deterrent into a full nuclear war‑fighting capability.34 But China's engagement in an arms race with the US would be disastrous for its economy. Perhaps that is part of the American calculation.  

Efficacy of India in the US new Strategic Framework  

The above discussion discloses that the nature and the future of Sino‑US relations once again became questionable. The Bush Administration broke the limited consensus of the two governments on building a constructive strategic partnership. One can consider that their future relationships would be competitive or even confrontational, following the pattern of traditional relations among great powers in the past. The differences between the US and China in international and regional strategic issues, such as Iraq, Kosovo, the US‑Japan strategic alliance, the US and Taiwan military co‑operation and missile defence systems prove that China would be a peer competitor. When the two countries differ in so many strategic issues, it is imperative for the Americans to adopt a containment policy against China. China’s warming relations with the Russian Federation, Central Asian states and Pakistan leaves US to cultivate its strategic partnership with India, besides its East Asian and Far Eastern allies to contain China regionally.

The US has yet to decide how missile defence goal will be technically accomplished. Whatever the final architecture of the proposed missile defence plan would be, Washington has to station its BMD’s critical parts on its allies' territory. If China is the target of the US BMD, the Indian cooperation would be required for enhancing the credibility of the system, against the authorised, accidental and unauthorised missile launches from China. For example, ground‑based sensors (Xband Radar) and boost‑phase interceptors would be deployed in India, similar to the deployments at Flyingdales (United Kingdom) and Greenland (which is under the sovereignty of Denmark). In addition, the interception at the boost phase has a very short, less than three minutes time span. Therefore the interceptors must be homed near the launch site.  

 India’s Warming Relations with the US: Utilitarian Approach  

With the end of the Cold War, India has been forced to rethink its foreign policy priorities. The former Soviet Union, India’s benefactor and primary source of military equipment, is no more, the Non‑Aligned Movement is moribund, China’s economy and armed forces have grown by leaps and bounds, and Pakistan established its strategic equilibrium with India by conducting its nuclear explosions in May 1998. In this new environment, US has assumed relatively greater influence as New Delhi has realised that it can no longer play its 'Soviet Card' and as Indian economic policy has actively sought to attract overseas investment capita1.35 Moreover, the President Bush's strategic framework has shifted the focus of policy away from Russia, whose power is by all accounts declining, to China that is regarded as an emergent power of great future significance. Such strategic shifts have positive influence on India's relations with the US. With this background India had endorsed US BMD policy. On May 11, 2001, Indian Defence and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, said after an extended hour‑long meeting with the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, 'We are endeavouring to work‑out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe’.36

 India can derive many advantages from its support to US BMD plan. According to Pamela Constable, 'India had several motives in welcoming Washington's proposal. It has long sought global prestige as a major democracy and emerging nuclear power, and it is eager to have the U.S. sanctions lifted and to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Moreover, India is keen to replace Pakistan, its neighbouring rival and a Cold War‑era ally of the United States, as Washington's strategic partner in the region’.37

India, a country that has long criticised US strategic policy, described Bush’s speech as “highly significant and far‑reaching”. This unprecedented New Delhi's endorsement comes at a time when there are growing signs that the Bush administration may lift US sanctions imposed on India for its May 1998 nuclear tests. In addition, Indians have been aspiring that they will receive assistance and investment in its backward defence industry from the US. This assistance is essential for the rectification of India’s shortcomings in the missiles and other military related technologies. In fact, in 1999, the Indian All‑Party Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence severely criticised the ordinance factory board for operating its 39 units in a 'sub‑ standard environment' and under‑utilising their capacity38. So, in order to overcome these drawbacks the Indian government has opened its monopolistic state‑owned defence industry to private participation through licensing, with a foreign direct investment39.

The US new strategic policy communicates that it will assist its allies in developing their defensive capabilities. India has been developing the missile defence systems by fusing the foreign and domestic research and missile components. Despite the fact that thousands of Indian scientists have been working on the missile projects, India still needs  foreign assistance for the development of its Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). It has been receiving foreign technology (covertly/overtly) for its missile defence project from the Russian Federation and Israel.40 India's other preference for augmenting its TMD capability is to buy these missiles from friendly states. For example, Israel is transferring its Arrow Anti‑tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) and Phalcon‑‑Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. India is also developing an AEW platform equipped with phased array radar technology, similar to be used by Phalcon, to cue its ATBM system.41 Therefore, India had negotiated an agreement with the Russian Federation for the acquisition of an advanced air defence system with ATBM capability  – either the S300 PMU‑1 or the S‑300V. The S‑300 PMU‑1 is a highly mobile surface to air missile system42. On June 12, 2001 in a joint venture in missile development, scientists of India and Russia successfully test‑fired PJ‑10 medium‑range, two‑staged (liquid‑solid propellant) surface‑to‑surface cruise missile. The 6.9 meter high missile is capable of carrying multiple warheads and can hit a target at about 280 km within 300 seconds. The missile is specifically designed as an anti‑ship weaponry system43. In addition, the Indian Navy had finalised a deal regarding the purchase of Barak anti‑missile defence system with Israel. The Barak missile is designed to operate in high‑clutter environment against small fast targets. Its range is 6‑8 kilometres.44 It can deal with sea skimmers coming in at under a metre in height. Moreover it was reported that three Russian‑built Kivak‑III class stealth frigates are to be commissioned to the Indian Navy in 2002. These frigates are being built for India under a $1 billion deal signed in 1997. Fitted with the most sophisticated weapons, the frigates can destroy Pakistan's Agosta submarines much before coming within the range of their torpedoes.45

Indo‑Israel cooperation is vital for the success of India’s TMD project.46 There are ample chances that India's opposition to the US BMD would impede the progress in relations between India and Israel. Consequently, India could face problems in mastering the anti‑missile defence technology because under US pressure, Israel would cancel its military cooperation contracts with India. In fact, the US funded the Arrow missile project, developed by the Israeli aircraft industry. Moreover, the US ballistic missile defence policy reveals that the US will not only transfer TMD but also co‑operate in the research and development of anti‑ballistic missile defence capabilities with its allies, notably, the technologies related to the missile interceptor of the Theatre High Attitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, when modified, have a delivery capability. Therefore, India is keen to develop an understanding with the Americans, which would assist it in transferring and acquiring American missile technology.  

Challenges for Pakistan's Security: Policy Options  

Pakistan's security interests are inextricably tied to India's military posture. Since its independence, Pakistan perceives constant military threats from India. The 1971 tragedy led Pakistan to rely on its own resources, rather than on the external protectors for its security. This 'look within' strategy justified Pakistan’s overt posture of nuclear weapons capability and their delivery systems. In the prevalent South Asian strategic environment, the relationship between India and Pakistan is no longer solely a zero‑sum game with only winner and loser. Both states are aware of this harsh reality that nuclear war between them would be a calamity whatever the result in relative disadvantage. Since the overt nuclearization, they appeared to have realised that the presence of nuclear arsenals in both countries, and the associated spectre of nuclear devastation, have forced them to minus all‑out war option from their strategic doctrines. The fact of nuclear possession is forcing strategic pundits in both states to realise the importance of crisis avoidance and management. But India’s commitment to develop its TMD will certainly disturb the delicate balance of power and undermine Pakistan's security. Psychologically, Indian missiles defence will make Pakistan feel more vulnerable and less secure than before. At the very least, ballistic missile deployments introduce one more element of uncertainty into an already militarised region. Worst case analysis and mirror imaging could oblige Pakistan to devote more resources to its defences for sustaining its nuclear deterrence. The credibility and effectiveness of the Pakistan nuclear deterrent is based on the manifest capability to inflict unacceptable damage on India if it attacks.

Nuclear deterrence is a dynamic concept, which requires constant vigilance to detect and counteract destabilizing developments. Moreover, a nuclear balance is achieved when each side, after absorbing an initial blow, has a second‑strike force able to inflict unacceptable damage on adversary. Pakistan's geographical narrowness or lack of strategic depth and the Indians' commitment to introduce more sophisticated nuclear capable delivery systems, like cruise missile, and ballistic missile defence systems pose serious challenges to credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. The Indian weapons procurement and development policy has potential to erode the strategic equilibrium and shift balance of power in its favour. The calculus of real‑politik holds that India behind the safe missile shield might be more likely to adopt military adventurous policies against Pakistan. For instance, by neutralising Pakistan’s retaliatory capabilities with the deployment of anti‑missile systems, India could launch a conventional war or nuclear pre‑emptive strike against Pakistan, without fear of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.47 This indicates that Pakistan’s present strategic capabilities cannot provide it a reliable second‑strike capability in future against India. Therefore, the caution against relying on forces that are too small is obvious. In fact, small forces would presumably be easier to destroy in a first strike and therefore would have less credibility as a deterrent because the surviving forces might not be able to retaliate. Based on this, nuclear deterrence requires some balance in terms of numbers of weapons and their technologies. With sizeable forces on both sides, the aggressor cannot be certain of a successful first strike. How should Pakistan effectively respond to the new strategic realities? Pakistan has to revise its strategic policy in order to counter the new strategic challenges. While responding to the Indian TMD threat, the alternative means of achieving its objectives must be weighed carefully and then the option that will maximize Pakistan’s gains and minimize its losses (decrease military vulnerability and economic costs) must be chosen. In the present scenario, Pakistan’s strategic policy ought to take the following factors into consideration.  

a)       South Asian Anti‑Ballistic Missile Treaty

Pakistan and India have already signed some nuclear and missile related agreements. For example, agreement not to attack each others’ nuclear facilities. Both states are honouring these agreements. Though the expectations would be modest, there are possibilities for more confidence building measures. Pakistan and India should negotiate the South Asian Anti Ballistic Missile (SAABM) Treaty, prohibiting nation‑wide defences against strategic and tactical ballistic missiles and barring the development, testing, and deployment of sea, air, space and mobile land‑based ABM systems or components. The basis of this treaty would be the mutual recognition that India and Pakistan have already attained a strategic balance based on nuclear deterrence. Neither side could launch a nuclear attack against the other without calculating the risk of a retaliatory strike that would produce unacceptable damage. Therefore, without nation‑wide defences, both India and Pakistan have confidence that the other would not risk a nuclear attack, knowing that it would be vulnerable to a retaliatory strike.

The possibility for the constitution of SAABM Treaty is remote between India and Pakistan. But the encouraging factor is that China opposed the developments and deployments of anti-missile systems. India always legitimised its nuclear weapons programme by linking it with China's nuclear weapons capabilities. Therefore, simple rejection of SAABM Treaty is not possible for India.  

b)     Qualitative and Quantitative Development of Missiles

India’s deployment of missile defences would make imperative the modernization of Pakistan's offensive force so that it could guard itself and penetrate India’s defences. The corollary of this anticipated action‑reaction relationship is the hypothesis that the limitation of strategic defences establishes the necessity of offensive limitations.48 But it seems that India will not limit itself with its offensive might. It will deploy missile defences once it overcomes its technological shortcomings in this field. Therefore, Pakistan’s credible nuclear deterrence requires maintenance of an unmistakable, secure retaliatory capability, preferably unchallenged by quantitative or qualitative improvements of Indian missile defence systems. Being a neighbouring state of Pakistan and due to a short‑flight time of hostile missiles, India would prefer to adopt a strategy for intercepting Pakistan’s offensive missiles at their pre‑launch site and boost phase. Therefore, Pakistan has to adopt some countermeasures to ensure the credibility of its offensive missiles. Notably, for pre‑emptive strikes India has to locate where all Pakistani offensive missiles are based. If it discovers them, it could destroy them pre‑emptively, in the case of hostilities. However, if Pakistan’s missiles are mobile, and if they are out of garrison and not otherwise observed, they are not vulnerable to such attack. In addition, Pakistan could disperse and store these missiles in hardened silos. Building bombproof hardened silos in plain areas is a costly affair. The economical strategy is that Pakistan shelters its missiles in mountain tunnels. These natural shelters could be modified into bombproof silos by limited financial investment. In addition, it should also build dummy missile silos and make dummy missiles deployments as well.

Pakistan should also start working on the technology and techniques, which nullify or defeat the boost phase interceptors. Countermeasures to a boost‑phase interceptor system might include redesign of the missiles to become a fast‑burn missile. Because the boost phase interceptors carry a simple sensor to detect visible or near-infrared energy, it immediately detects the bright flame of the rocket and home the interceptor against the flame. Additionally, one‑stage dummy missiles might be launched to provoke and disguise the launch of the interceptors.

Some analysts also believe that in addition to ballistic missiles, Pakistan ought to develop cruise missiles and missile defence systems. The indigenous development and manufacture of cruise missiles require expertise in airframes, propulsion systems, flight controls and warheads.49 Unfortunately, at the moment, the development of these systems are not advisable. Pakistan’s economy cannot sustain the burden of additional defence expenditure. Therefore, the best option for Pakistan in the present scenario is to avoid arms race with India. Instead of developing new kinds of offensive and defensive systems, Pakistan should concentrate on and be contented with its existing missile capabilities. It should only increase the numerical strength of its missile potential. For example, if India would be able to intercept Pakistan’s twenty missiles, it must have twenty-five missiles in its arsenal.  

Conclusion  

The US BMD has an inherent potential to initiate an action‑reaction arms race cycle. In the 1960s arms competition was between the US and the Soviet Union. That essentially bilateral competition is still not resolved. Since the primary rationale for the US BMD is that the missile programme is for ‘rogue states’, such as North Korea, Russia fears that the US BMD, even initially limited to counter North Korea, might serve as a base for a highly effective system, capable of countering a reduced number of the Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. In East Asia a much more complex scenario is in the offing. China is the most directly influenced by the US BMD initiatives. The most predictable impacts of the BMD are: firstly, it will jeopardise the global strategic balance and stability; and secondly, it will hamper the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race. To be specific, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons. Thirdly, it will undermine the international non‑proliferation regime and efforts to reverse the arms race. Fourthly, the US BMD programme will increase the weight of the military factor in international relations, which is detrimental to international peace and security.

The US shifts from the protection of Mutually Assured Destruction towards the pursuit of missile defences, and India’s support to this decision would have negative and destabilising effects on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. India's offensive and defensive modernisation and deployment plans with the assistance of its friendly states would undermine Pakistan's diplomatic attempt for institutionalising some form of nuclear strategic restraint regime in the region. In addition, India's successful developments and deployment of missile defences would undermine the strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan and missile defences would intensify India's confidence to counter Pakistani retaliatory capability. Hence Pakistan's response to the Indian anti‑missiles plans is inevitable. Most pressing need for Pakistan is to augment its own limited short‑range as well as intermediate‑range missile force, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the present scenario Pakistan has nowhere to go to acquire SAMs/TMDs even if it wanted to purchase them. Moreover, Pakistan's economy may not bear the cost of purchasing TMDs. Therefore, it has to rely on its own existing indigenous scientific missile infrastructure. The best option is that Pakistan modernise its offensive missile capabilities, so that, these missiles dodge the interceptors and successfully inflict intolerable damage by hitting the target. Multiplying the number of missiles and warheads is an applicable choice in the present economic circumstances of Pakistan. Enlarging Pakistan's missile forces to overwhelm the enemy defence certainly has some significant costs for Pakistan’s fragile economy. Nevertheless, it is imperative that Pakistan keep the option of missile build‑up intact. The reason for this is that the build‑up option is so simple to understand and so certain to work. Another advantage is that the build‑up would be visible to the outside and would therefore help to discourage any first strike against Pakistan. In a nutshell, it is the only pragmatic option for maintaining the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence.