From Divergence to Convergence and Back Again: SomeStructural Constraints on Stability in India-Pakistan Relations -

Subrata K Mitra  

n retrospect, once the dust has settled on the embattled mountain peaks of Kargil, the four months that separate the Lahore Declaration and the first Indian air strikes will be remembered as a period of lost opportunities for lasting peace in South Asia. If the signing of the agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in the historic location of Lahore, signaled the maturing of a process of deliberation between India and Pakistan on the main points of conflict including Kashmir, then the discovery of the massive infiltration on the Indian side of the Line of Control, and the rapid Indian response including air strikes, not seen since 1971, were a return to the past when the two neighbours could conceptualize one another only in terms of violent conflict. The sheer rapidity with which the scene changed from diplomacy of Lahore to war in Kargil questions the foundations on which the former was based.
                In their own ways Lahore and Kargil describe two different ways of conceptualizing India-Pakistan relations. The Lahore Declaration symbolizes a non-dichotomous model which suggests a substantive base of shared interests from which diplomacy could work towards the containment and solution of other conflicts. Now, the outbreak of war so soon after the fanfare with which the Lahore Accord was signed makes the peace process look irrelevant to the reality of India-Pakistan relations which is better described as a dichotomous model, one where the two countries are seen as locked in a zero sum conflict which leaves no room for negotiation or co-operation. The objective of this essay is to enquire into the origin of the two models and examine their implications for regional security.  

The Problem Stated              

Both dichotomous and non-dichotomous models start from the premise that states are sovereign actors which act solely out of national interest. The dichotomous model which underpins the analysis of India-Pakistan relations for many observers of South Asian politics since the inception of the two states as a consequence of the Partition of British India. The non-dichotomous model conceptualizes the interests of the two states in non-zero sum terms which allows for co-operation in some areas. There are other secondary differences between the two approaches as well. The dichotomous model is `backward looking’ in the sense that it draws its main inspiration from the `two-nation theory’ which conceptualizes the contemporary political scene in South Asia in terms of the unfinished history of Partition as long as Pakistan does not have control over the whole of Kashmir. The state of Pakistan, according to the advocates of this approach is locked against a more powerful strategic adversary. In consequence, as the sole actor capable of defending the integrity of the nation, the state can, if need be at the cost of democracy at home, take every measure including alliance and war, to protect its sovereignty.1 The non-dichotomous mode, on the other hand, looks beyond the Partition of the sub-continent and postulates the foundation of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation as the point of departure and recognizes the national states as principal but not exclusive actors in regional politics. At a given point of time, the state is represented by specific interests though the representatives of the state typically speak in the name of the whole nation, and with an indefinite time horizon. The non-dichotomous model recognizes actors above and below the state and brings into analysis, interests that are not represented by the state. It casts binary conflicts as nested within larger, regional structures.
                Drawing on the history of conflict in South Asia and the logic of two-person non-cooperative games, this paper suggests that lasting peace in the region requires both India and Pakistan to follow the non-dichotomous model. A temporary and fragile truce is possible when both follow the dichotomous model. But belligerency and low intensity war can be expected when one actor follows the dichotomous model and the other a non-dichotomous model. The paper examines the implications of these conjectures on the basis of the history of war and security dilemma in South Asia. It shows that though the dichotomous model has mostly dominated this relation, there has been an increasing realization that the maximization of interests in terms of this model could actually lower the interest of individual actors. These lost `peace dividends’ nevertheless remain beyond the reach of the states locked in zero-sum conflicts because of the very logic of the nature of their conflict relations, akin to a prisoner’s dilemma game. Drawing on Axelrod’s model of recursive games and confidence building measures the article shows how a non-dichotomous approach could enhance welfare of both sides. However, the return of violent conflict in Kargil shows the fragility of the process of transition from the dichotomous to the non-dichotomous model. On the basis of the analysis undertaken here, the article suggests that stable peace in the South Asian context requires the adoption of a two-track strategy by both actors and a triangular normalization which involves India, Pakistan and China. Before we look at the origins of the two models and the history of their interaction, we shall briefly examine their formal implications with the help of a two person, non-co-operative game.  

A Formal Model of India-Pakistan Relations  

                The theory employed here is taken from two person non-co-operative games. For each party–India and Pakistan–there is a choice between two tactics:

a)       maintain status quo, corresponding to a state of  conflict.

b)       arms reduction.

Both players make their choices independently (i.e., without negotiating with the other). The `pay-offs’ to the players make no inter-personal comparison of utility. Thus, 0 implies the least utility to the actor concerned, i.e., a least desirable outcome. Higher numbers in the cell entries imply more utility for the actor concerned, and as such, more preferable outcome. In the pay-off matrix presented below, the first figure in each cell denotes the utility to the player named on the left (i.e., India) and the second figure the utility to the player named above (i.e. Pakistan). In the game analysed below, the expected outcome in an end-game scenario is as follows:

If both players try to `play it safe’, i.e., maximize minimum gain, they end up at the status quo where each is individually worse off than the best outcome where both reduce arms. Players might realize that and try to move away unilaterally in the direction of co-operation, leading to unilateral, non-negotiated arms reduction. For this, they run the risk of being punished, as a result of attempts by the other player to take advantage of the window of opportunity to strike the fatal blow. As such, both will be weary and neither will move away from the status quo.

It can be shown that each player would reason from `how much it stands to lose’ in each case and would calculate what could happen at the worst. They would then choose that option which brings the best of the worst possible outcomes. In the language of the game, they would try to maximize the security levels. For India it is [10]; for Pakistan [5]. They would thus unilaterally choose to be at the cell 1.1, with the [10,5] outcome, far less than the possible [50,60] outcome. Thus, a non-co-operative variable sum game produces a sub-optimal game in an end-game scenario.  

The Genesis of the two Models  

                Following independence, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India adopted non-alignment and planned development as the cornerstone of India’s domestic politics. In spite of three wars with Pakistan, a serious border conflict with China and the dispatch of Indian Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka and their subsequent ignominious withdrawal, the average voter as well as the politicians of India remain relatively unconcerned about foreign policy. Panchasheela which was intended to provide a link between domestic and foreign policy was based on a non-dichotomous model that however lost most of its moral force in the perception of Pakistan because of its unstated assumption that Kashmir was a non-issue when it came to India-Pakistan relations.

                The state of Pakistan, in contrast to India, started with different premises from the outset. As a state based on the two nation theory, Pakistan saw itself as the defender of the Muslims of the sub-continent, and as such, locked in conflict with India on the issue of Kashmir whose Muslim majority should have logically made it a part of its own territory. The greater military resources at the disposal of India have made Pakistan look for an equalizer in the form of military alliances with the United States and subsequently with China. The tit-for-tat nuclear explosions in Pakistan in response to the Indian tests have proved once again the durability of dichotomous thinking in Pakistan. Within this perspective, the bus diplomacy of Vajpayee and Sharif and the Lahore Declaration were an aberration from which, with shots flying in Kargil, the system has retracted to its original state under the weight of the history of conflict and dichotomous thinking on the part of key actors. The cost of this strategy has however been enormous in terms of the economy and arms race in the region.

                In order to maintain steady economic growth and credibility in the international market both Pakistan and India need urgently to invest in key sectors of the economy, infrastructure and education, and, at least give the appearance of being serious about solving conflicts with her regional neighbours. Crucial to the latter is a formal or even informal regional security arrangement. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), hamstrung by a Charter which explicitly forbids the public discussion of matters of `domestic’ politics, is currently unable to play the role. It is further restrained by the likelihood of parties to conflicts within South Asian calling on the good offices of non-regional forces, lowering the legitimacy and effectiveness of any regional arrangement. Besides, it has not in the past received sufficient endorsement from India, the most important country of the region. While contextual factors such as the personal equations between the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan from 1996-1999 have produced an informal environment of regional conflict resolution, developments in domestic politics in India appear to cast a shadow on the recent foreign policy gains with regard to the creation of a South Asian security framework. The analysis that follows looks at the ensemble of factors that impinge on Indian policy in the face of South Asian security dilemma.   

South Asia’s Security Dilemma  

                Since the departure of British colonial rule from the region, South Asia has witnessed a series of severe border conflicts leading to war as well as serious outbreaks of mass insurgency, riots and communal violence. India and Pakistan had a serious conflict over Kashmir in 1947-1948, a border war in 1965, a war on both the eastern and the western fronts in 1971 and a state of low intensity conflict in the 1980s. The India-China border war of 1962 saw the Chinese troops coming close to the North Indian plains. There have been mass insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and Maoist violence in southern and eastern India. Pakistan has had a continuous series of ethnic conflicts in Sind, Karachi and has faced massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan. Sri Lanka has been beset with insurgency and large scale military operations against the Tamil rebels.  Bangladesh has faced insurgency in the Chakma Hill Tract. The Maldives faced a coup which was diffused with Indian assistance. It is strongly, believed that South Asia’s domestic conflicts are not entirely endigenous and that foreign help plays an important role in exacerbating them. South Asia’s domestic and regional conflicts are linked, greatly complicating the issues and contributing to the financial and military burden of maintaining order. The security problem and the lack of a comprehensive regional security arrangement have had their repercussions on the military budgets. A brief perusal of the relevant statistics shows the imbalance of developmental and military expenses in South Asia. South Asia’s states are quite heavily armed (table 1).  

Table-1

India and her Neighbours: Conventional Weapons  

  Source:  IISS: The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: Brassey’s, October 1994.  

Notes:    MBT=Main Battle Tank

AIFV=Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle

APC=Armoured Personnel Carrier

Artillery includes self propelled, drawn artillery and MLRS-systems. Helicopters include combat helicopters and armed helicopters. Combat Aircraft includes fighters and fighter bombers. Warships include major surface combatants from frigate upwards.            
Their military burden during the post-cold war period has gone up in contrast to the trend in all developing countries taken together (table 2).

  Table-2

Post-Cold War Military Burden (% change between 1987-94)  

Source: Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia 1997. Karachi et. al.: Oxford University Press 1997, p.81 (Table 4.2)

                Their percent increase of 12.4 in military spending during the period between 1987-1994 is a sharp contrast to the decrease of 41.2 on the part of the industrial countries of the world. Particularly striking is the increase of the military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP between 1985-1994, from 2.6 to 3.6 in India and 5.2 to 7.0 in Pakistan (Table 3).One can talk about a virtual arms `race’ between India and Pakistan in terms of their military expenditure, which, in case of Pakistan, has almost doubled during the period from 1987-1996 (figure 1). By all reckoning, however, the states of South Asia are among the poorest in the world (table 4), a fact that gives great significance to the `peace dividends’ (table 5). It should be noted here that the military expenditure of South Asia to a large extent goes into the purchase of arms and technology from powers outside the region and thus, does not act as a multiplier to defence and related industries in the region itself. It thus constitutes a `net drain’ on the resources of South Asian countries.
Such heavy military expenditure in South Asia might come across as a surprise in view of the overall poverty of the region. Since strategic thinking of countries is guided by security as well as welfare, it would not, therefore, be unrealistic to expect the decision-makers of the states of South Asia to be aware of the trade-off between the defence and welfare budgets. The question that arises here is why are they unable to go from `here’ and reap the benefits of the peace divided by reducing military expenditure? The next section would analyse the question from the point of view of India by concentrating on the evolution of Indian policy during the period after independence. (Table 3)  

Table-3  

Burden of Military Expenditure in South Asia

* 1993 value. Source: Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia 1997. Karachi et. al.: Oxford University Press 1997, p. 80 (Table 4.)

(Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1997, online)

  The Evolution of India’s South Asia ‘Policy’ since Independence  

This section will provide the historical backdrop to the present context by drawing on the earlier years, going back to Nehru. For the purpose of this analysis, the period can be divided into four phases:

a)             Classic non-alignment (1947-1962)

b)             War, alliance with the USSR and attempts at regional dominance (1963-89)

c)             Contained dominance based on negotiation (1989-1999)

d)             The return to conflict and the limits of the `two-track’ strategy (1999--)

  [a]           Classic Non-Alignment (1947-1962) – the `Nehru Doctrine’

                The first place after independence, starting with the first war with Pakistan over Kashmir (1947-1948) and ending with the totally unexpected Himalayan war with China in 1962, is characterized by India’s self-perception as one of the leaders and co-founder of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). This first phase also was clearly dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru, one of India’s founding fathers. Under his leadership, the newly independent state ventured out onto the international stage, firmly determined to stay clear from any entanglement with superpower politics. Nehru retained a deep distrust of the superpowers and was weary of their designs on the newly emerging post-colonial societies. But Nehru the internationalist was also a great believer in the United Nations Organization and wished to strengthen it by India’s active participation in it. Unfortunately for Nehru (and India), the Kashmir drama was unfolding just about the time that Nehru was seeking to find a just and honourable place for India in the world system2. Contrary to Nehru’s internationalist aspirations, the Kashmir imbroglio and the conflict with Pakistan was to become the focal point of India’s security politics.

                Nehru’s view on Kashmir, which amounted to a doctrine-like position, was based on his firm conviction that, thanks to a lawful and legitimate Instrument of Accession, the status of Kashmir, like the other regions of India, was that of an integral part of the Union. The application of this doctrine to the creation of specific policies to Kashmir as to other regions of India during the two decades following independence would depend on the specific circumstances of each. The resulting confusion and contradictions would, in the years to come, give an appearance of a certain fuzziness, to Nehru’s position. At various points, and to different actors, the Nehru `doctrine’ would appear inconsistent, indecisive and vulnerable to pressure. Nehru would by turns be perceived as a half-hearted bully and a naïve internationalist. But the power and the institutional strength of this policy consisted in its internal cohesion notwithstanding its apparent contradictions, and, its close links with the ideological basis of the state in India.

                Nehru’s Kashmir policy also resulted over the years in a larger paradox with regard to Indian foreign policy. While its rhetoric gave every appearance of being non-dichotomous with regard to Pakistan, thanks to its intransigence when it came to Kashmir it was perceived by Pakistan as essentially dichotomous but not necessarily equipped with the requisite force to reinforce its implied belligerence. The perceptions of Nehru’s policy towards Kashmir which in turn affected the perceptions of India’s overall policy by the key players in the region and in the world at large can be summed up as follows:  

[1]           Indecisiveness.     With Nehru as prime minister and as such, the de facto decision-maker of the dominion, India lost valuable time in air-lifting elite troops to defend Kashmir. When they were effectively employed in fending-off the tribesmen, and were poised to push them back to the frontier of Kashmir, instead of pressing on the advantage, Nehru’s India did not put the military success to political use. Instead, the military gains were lost in political manoeuvres. 

                The same is true for Indian diplomacy on Kashmir. Even when India repeated in every conceivable forum that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that the accession of Kashmir on the basis of the Instrument of Accession was final, India’s decision-makers, nevertheless kept behaving as if this was not the case and channels of negotiation were kept open to settle the Kashmir issue.
                The contradiction between India’s principle intransigence regarding the status of Kashmir as an absolute and irrevocable part of India based on the Instrument of Accession and her willingness to negotiate the point when called upon to do so was perceived by Pakistan and the external world as Indian vulnerability to pressure3.

[2]           Half-hearted bully. Nehru’s India, while giving a formal commitment to provide a higher degree of autonomy to Kashmir than what was available to the rest of India, nevertheless took up a series of measures that diluted this in practice. Nehru, however, stopped short of a full integration of Kashmir to bring it in line with the other parts of India. India’s military actions, against Goa in 1961 and Indian opposition to self-determination in Kashmir through a ‘plebiscite’ are seen in this light.

                Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was originally instituted as a guarantee of the autonomy of Kashmir in all areas except defence, foreign affairs and communication. This formal undertaking was compromised in practice through a steady chipping away as the legal safeguard through amendments of the Constitution and Presidential Orders. On the other hand, full integration was deliberately obstructed through the prohibition of the settlement of refugees through the allocation of evacuee property and a special provision for the return of those who left Kashmir for Pakistan in the future. In spite of the fundamental right to the freedom of movement within India, Indian’s were not allowed to settle in Kashmir.  

[3]           Naïve Internationalist.        Nehru’s India went to the Security Council with great fanfare, but then, had cold feet when it came to follow this initiative up with action. Nehru went to the Security Council hoping to get the endorsement of the international community for the Indian position on Kashmir without taking into account the fact that the realpolitik underlying the perceptions of the superpowers dictated otherwise. Nehru’s policy decisions regarding Kashmir, drawn from the basic goals of secure frontiers and popular consent, were increasingly affected by his basic equation of Kashmir’s integration with India as a moral guarantee of India’s secularism4. Nehru clearly wanted the world to condemn Pakistan for trying to undo the integration of Kashmir by brute force5. When it became clear to Nehru that the world did not accept India’s case as categorically as Nehru had hoped, he became bitter and disillusioned.  

[4]           Vulnerability to Pressure. Above all, Nehru followed the traditional policies of the Indian National Congress which was to rule by consensus and accommodation. He was aware of the conflicting pulls of narrow self-interest and high principle and through a long experience of the congress culture. But Nehru who was also intensely aware of the international arena, was conscious of being constantly under observation6 and had to find a solution acceptable to all parties concerned7.  His policies were thus not entirely his choices but were influenced by local conditions in Kashmir; the jockeying for positions and power in India’s national politics, and, the regional and international actors, such as Pakistan, China, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. These conditions changed from one period to another, causing, in the process, Nehru’s policies to fluctuate.
                The quintessence of the Nehru doctrine was a moral vision, seeking to balance security with democracy and categorically opposed to the `two nation theory’ and the religious dogmatism on which it was perceived to be based. Convinced about the rightness of his cause Nehru believed that with persuasion, patience and enlightenment others in Pakistan and in India would also be able to see things from his point of view.  

[b]           Attempts at Regional Dominance: the ‘Indira Doctrine’  

From 1947 to 1962, Kashmir was the focal point of India’s – and Nehru’s international politics. The 1962 Himalayan war with China drove home the point that there were other security problems, too. Nehru the internationalist was not willing to believe up to the last minute that his vision of “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” (Indian and Chinese are brothers) was not shared by China and that a war, or at least an armed conflict, was imminent. Therefore, the Chinese attack on Indian position along the border hit the Indian army unprepared. It has been argued that had Nehru been more realistic and less idealistic (or simply less native), this war probably could have been avoided8. As a direct result of this war, India went on an international shopping spree to acquire – finally – all those sophisticated weapons the Indian armed forces had been lobbying for years. For Pakistan, the pace of India’s armament gave cause for alarm. As Ganguly argues9, the Pakistani government saw a window of opportunity for the capture of the whole of Kashmir, created through the humiliation and the weakness of the Indian armed forces, closing rapidly. In this very crucial moment. Nehru died, causing a perception of vulnerability on the part of India.

With Nehru removed from the scene, the probability of war increased. On the Pakistani side, the replacement of Nehru by Shastri, perceived as less assertive, reinforced the perception of Indian vulnerability. On the Indian side, on the other hand, the military-strategic initiative passed into the hands of a different group of decision-makers who saw in Kashmir not so much the symbol of India’s commitments to democracy and secularism but, instead territory, power, national self-interest and security. The policies pursued by Shastri and subsequently Indira Gandhi provide some insights into the transformation of the Nehru doctrine, and to the subtle shift from position of interest with regard to the general directions of India’s Kashmir policy. These new men in charge of India’s security were a military-political complex whose commitment to Kashmir, compared to Nehru’s, was simultaneously less doctrinaire and more realistic. While lowering the intensity of the political rhetoric they were willing and able to increase the stakes in military terms.

Shastri’s succession, stage-managed by the Congress Syndicate – India’s regional power-brokers – took place against a background of ominous developments in the international arena. The famous threat of Bhutto’s  thousand year war against India on the floor of the Security Council found much comfort in the statement of  the British delegate Sir Patrick Dean, who, while stating the British case for self-determination in Kashmir, made the statement: “We consider it unrealistic to consider the status of Kashmir purely in terms of the legal effect of the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession”10. The American representative kept a low profile but in the background was the intense annoyance of President Johnson at what he perceived as Nehru’s high profile moral posturing, coupled with the repeated requests from India for ever-increasing quantities of food aid11.

Lacking Nehru’s stature and probably acting out of a sense of interest (i.e., territory as the basis of the power of the state) rather than position (i.e., Kashmir’s status as symbolic of Indian commitment to secularism), Shastri came out with a package of policies that held out the possibility of a dialogue with Pakistan. Srivastava, Shastri’s biographer, sums them up as follows12:

a)             India had no desire whatsoever to acquire even one square inch of Pakistani territory.

b)             India genuinely wished Pakistan well and would be delighted to see Pakistan progress and prosper.

c)             India would never allow any interference by Pakistan in Kashmir which was an integral part of India, and

d)             India and Pakistan had to live together in peace and harmony as they were constituted without either side trying to do anything to destabilize the other.

                On the basis of these policy statements of Shastri and the impression gathered by Ayub Khan after their first meeting, the recently constituted Kashmir cell of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the “new Indian Prime Minister was unlikely to loosen India’s links with Kashmir and that it was time for Pakistan to take some overt action for `reviving’ the Kashmir issue and, defreezing the Kashmir situation”13.

                Shastri’s handling of the situation was entirely in keeping with his character which marked a significant departure from Nehru. He quickly established a personal rapport with the defence chiefs and the leaders of the opposition in the Indian Parliament. In the place of the combination of  Nehru’s personal aloofness and the conspiratorial style of Krishna Menon, Nehru’s main link with the party and the country at the height of the Indo-China conflict, Shastri’s method was to build up a strong national consensus to meet the Pakistani challenge in Kashmir. As his biographer puts it, “On the political side, Shastri was in control of the situation and never allowed it to get out of hand. He had shown firmness, self-confidence, self-restraint, wisdom and flexibility. He was in favour of peace, but not peace at any cost”.14

                Shastri was able to take the initiative in political as well as military matters, ordering the Indian army to cross the international frontier in order to march in the direction of Lahore to relieve pressure on the Chhamb sector in Kashmir which was facing a massive armoured attack, getting the air force to come into the battle right at the outset in spite of the risk of the superior Pakistani air crafts. On the other hand, as in the Rann of Kutch where there was a first trial of strength between the Indian and Pakistani forces, in Tashkent, Shastri showed flexibility, trading land against security. Of course the Indian response to Pakistan greatly benefited from the fact that the `spontaneous’ mass uprising in Kashmir on which the Pakistani strategy had heavily banked did not take place. Srivastava reports how the people of Kashmir cooperated with the Indian army in order to capture Pakistani infiltrators – a fact that was used effectively by Indian publicity both to present India’s case internationally as an attempt by a nation to defend her legitimate interests, and, internally, to bring the war to Indians in their personal capacity. This equation led in 1965 to the birth of the famous Shastri aphorism – “Jai Jawan – Jai Kisan”- victory to the soldier, victory to the peasant – meant for projecting the production of food and defence of boundaries as two different but complementary methods of safeguarding one’s self-respect and self-confidence.

                In spite of their different styles, the essentials of Shastri’s flexible style and military pragmatism were adopted by Indira Gandhi. Under her tutelage, in radical contrast to the tenor of domestic politics in Nehru’s life-time, India went on vigorously using Kashmir to generate power internally as well as by entering into alliances with the Soviet Union15. India’s efforts were matched by the efforts of Pakistan – through border provocation, war and diplomacy aimed at the internationlisation of the Kashmir issue, particularly in the UN. Even the Simla Accord, where Indira Gandhi gives sufficient evidence of having moved from position of interest as compared to her father, barely managed to paper over the wide gulf separating the perceptions and policies of the two neighbours.

                In view of the brevity of his tenure, it is difficult to say how Shastri would have sought to reconcile the needs for security and democracy in Kashmir. Indira Gandhi clearly opted for the former. The policy of surreptitious integration that saw the autonomy of Kashmir steadily whittled away during Nehru’s second phase, became the explicit basis of policy under Indira Gandhi. Pakistan and possibly the United States as well were slow to appreciate this change which came during 1969-71, which led to the brinkmanship of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. The war of 1971 which we can call Indira Gandhi’s war because, unlike her father, she stage-managed it with great dexterity and proclaimed the temporary abandonment of Nehru’s doctrinaire commitment to the non-dichotomous model. No serious or sustained efforts were made thereafter to win the hearts and minds of Pakistan and Kashmir while maintaining the needs of secure frontier, democracy and secularism.

                The period following the 1971 war can be called retrospectively the “golden age” of Indian international politics16. Pakistan was split in two, the Kashmir issue solved, at least militarily, in India’s favour and the USSR had been won as powerful ally against the USA and China. It is not surprising, therefore, to see a triumphant Indira Gandhi formulating a kind of “Monroe-Doctrine” for India. Like its famous predecessor, the Indira `Doctrine’ tried on the one hand to keep “foreign hands” off from South Asia, on the other to persuade the smaller states of South Asia that this was done in their own interest. With regard to the smaller South Asian states except Pakistan, the doctrine was not that difficult to implement: there was simply not enough interest from outside powers in these states17.  Trying to keep foreign hands off the Indian Ocean proved to be very difficult, however. In the era of British dominance, the Indian Ocean had been a `British Lake’. Now, after the termination of British military presence east of Suez, the US Navy was about to establish their own presence in this waters, which, from an Indian point of view, should be turned into a `Mare Indicum’. Inspired by similar attempts in other parts of the word, India tried to establish a zone of peace, which would have virtually closed the Indian Ocean to foreign warships, especially those equipped with nuclear weapons. The ambitious plan misfired, at least partially because of India’s neighbour’s suspicion and their perception of being unduly bullied but basically because of the United States’ interest in the Indian Ocean as a gateway to the Persian Gulf. The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace Plan (IOZOP) was a still-born child in the very moment the USA acquired Diego Garcia from the United Kingdom18.

                The single most important event in the two decades discussed here, which still has repercussions today, is the so-called “peaceful explosion” of a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974. India proved to the word that she had the capability to establish itself as the sixth nuclear power, but for several reasons she abstained19. Part of the explanation can be found in the Emergency from 1975-77 and the subsequent change of government. The newly inaugurated Janata government was not as keen for a status as a world power as Indira Gandhi’s government had been. This hiatus in India’s quest for power did not last long, however. The elections of 1980 saw a comeback to power for Indira Gandhi, who had not changed her political ambitions in the meantime. But she found herself more and more entrapped in the Punjab crisis, which culminated in 1984 in the Operation `Bluestar’ and her assassination by two of her own Sikh bodyguards20. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, carried on with the same set of international aspirations, but he, too, became a victim of his policies: he was assassinated in 1991 by Tamil extremists after the ill-fated Indian peace-keeping effort in Sri Lanka21. With him the Gandhi `Dynasty’, as well as India’s attempts to dominate the region through a coercive application of the  dichotomous model, came to an end.  

[c]            Contained Dominance Based on Negotiation (1989-97) – the `Gujral Doctrine’  

                The successive Indian governments after the demise of the Gandhi `Dynasty’, all had one thing in common: the weakness of their domestic power base. This weakness necessitated complicated political manoeuvres of those in power to keep their fragile coalitions together. The weakness of the various coalition governments fell in a time of radical domestic changes. Communal riots of unparalleled violence swept through several parts of India, highlighted in December 1992 by the destruction of the Babri mosque by a Hindu mob. The rise of Hindu nationalism, supported by parties like the BJP, went hand in hand with an upsurge of terrorism in the Punjab, in Kashmir and in West Bengal. This forced the Indian policymakers to concentrate on domestic politics, which led to an introspective policy that tried to take international events in its stride.

                Unfortunately, this was a time of sweeping changes in the very structure of international relations – the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the process leading to the re-unification of Germany, the end of the Cold War and, finally, the end of India’s most powerful ally, the USSR. These events in the nineteen eighties took India’s policymakers, concentrating on their own domestic problems, by surprise. Obviously, it was very hard for the Indian government to come to terms with the new realities. This can be illustrated by the Indian reaction to the putsch against Michail  Gorbachev in Moscow, where the Indian government chose to support the conservative communist elements which tried to save the already doomed communist system.

                The Gulf War two years later again found the Indian government in disarray. India, still perceiving itself as one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement, first initiated an unsuccessful peace mission to Baghdad and then alienated the USA with first allowing, and then disallowing the refueling of US planes in Bombay. The Indian vote against the UN Security Council’s call for Iraq’s surrender which bracketed the largest democracy of the world with Cuba and Yemen completed the series of Indian diplomatic blunders during the Gulf War22 .

                In September 1996, India again found itself trapped between a rock and a hard place, this time because of her stance on nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban. Only two states supported India in rejecting the test ban: Bhutan and Libya23. In this context, Ramesh Thakur blames the Indian government of being “caught in a time  warp”24 We will see in the “prisoner’s dilemma” below, however, that it is not easy for India to change its politics on nuclear weapons without taking the “Pakistan factor” and the “China factor” into consideration. Nevertheless, India’s position was hard to sell given the realities of an international “quasi taboo” against nuclear weapons.

                The spectacular series of Indian diplomatic disasters and the upsurge of communalism and terrorism on the domestic front makes it very easy for the casual observer to overlook the first tentative steps towards peace in South Asia, also initiated by and large by various Indian governments after the end of the Gandhi `Dynasty’.

                The first factor conducive to peace which has already been mentioned was the internal weakness of the coalition governments from 1989 onwards. The political manoeuvres to keep the coalitions intact led to a process of accommodation between various interest groups. Getting used to politics of accommodation at home could lead to de-emphasising conflictual, dominance-based behaviour towards Pakistan. Illustrative of this point is the resumption of talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan and the talks between the Prime Ministers, I.K. Gujral of India and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, themselves in the Maldives in May 1997, and which, despite regime changes finally led to the Lahore Declaration.

                A second factor conducive to peace is the process of liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy, which is rapidly picking up pace, and a similar policy in Pakistan, where the industrial and entrepreneurial class forms the power base of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Both India and Pakistan seem to be more interested in furthering their economic relations than with waging war against each other. The focus on economics could lead to a new life for the nearly defunct SAARC, which would certainly help India to improve the bilateral relations with her neighbours.  India’s new prime minister I.K. Gujral, sworn in April 1997, even went so far as to talk about unilateral and nonreciprocal concessions from India to her neighbours. His `carrot without stick-approach’ has already been called the `Gujral Doctrine.25

                A third factor conducive to the potential for a regional security arrangement is a renewed interest of the sole surviving superpower, the USA, in the region. For the USA, South Asia in general and India in particular, forms a region of possible economic growth, and, as such, a lucrative future market for American goods. Therefore, the government in Washington is very keen to sponsor peace initiatives and tries to encourage both India and Pakistan to follow up on their first steps. However, the next steps towards a regional security arrangement are far more sophisticated than one realizes.

                There is a growing realization in India that the arms race simply cannot be financed any longer without neglecting economic development at home. The same certainty is true for Pakistan, which is, like India, weary of war26. Indicative of this trend is a new interest in confidence and security building measures (CSBM)27. The talks about CSBMs between India and Pakistan are perhaps the most important step towards peace in South Asia. Establishing CSBMs between India and Pakistan is the sine qua non for all attempts to solve the Kashmir problem or the nuclear weapons issue within the framework of a regional security arrangement.

                While some of these developments created a case for optimism with regard to peace in South Asia, the “China factor” continues to be one major obstacle. Since the days of the Himalayan war in 1962, India has watched China with a weary eye. The possibility of a conflict with China was often put forward to defend Indian armaments and Indian positions on nuclear weapons. The appearance of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean did not help to alleviate Indian fears, too. Improving Indian relations with China would of cause give the Indian government the chance to concentrate on South Asian problems. Other constraints can be found in the domestic problems of India. In a worst case-scenario, the rising forces of Hindu nationalism could destroy all steps towards peace, and India could embark on chauvinistic politics again28. Another worst case-possibility would be a divided India, rendered ungovernable by the forces of separatism and terrorism.  

[d]          The Return to Conflict and the limits of the `Two-track’ Strategy (1999--)  

                We do not yet have any reliable information on the strategic thinking on the part of the Pakistani elite; on the Indian side, predictably, great recrimination between advocates of negotiated settlement of outstanding conflict with Pakistan and those who could see violent conflict with Pakistan as both natural and necessary, has already started in the earnest and will get more acrimonious as the elections to the Lok Sabha, scheduled for September, get nearer. Thinly disguised by the outpouring of patriotism, the political recriminations on the Indian side (and presumably on the Pakistani side, but possibly to a lesser extent) reveal two clearly different mind-sets that underpin the different schools of thought on how the structural differences of interest between India and Pakistan are organized and the political language in which they could be articulated.  

Indian Opinion and its Implications for Regional Security: Results of an Opinion Survey, 199629

                    India’s domestic politics is an important constraint on her regional policies. In view of their implications for the potential support for the non-dichotomous model in the electorate, we have selected three questions from a survey of the Indian population. After the 1996 parliamentary elections in India, a post-poll survey was conducted in 108 Lok Sabha constituencies, where 10000 Interviews were held. Among the questions asked were several which enable us to shed some light on the security perceptions of the Indian citizens themselves. Because of the importance of the opinions expressed, the three questions and the answers given by specific subpopulations provide important insights into both India’s problems an available alternatives.
                The first important question deals with relations with Pakistan: Question: India should make more efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. Do you agree or disagree with this?  

 
Table-6a  

    As we can see, a majority of 44.6% favours a development of relations with Pakistan. The detailed levels of agreement, which are clearly connected with the level of education and religion, can be broken down as follows:  

      Table-6b  

  The high level of support for policies resembling those advocated by the Gujral doctrine among highly educated Indians is most significant. Related with that question is the next question, which covers the perception of the people on the Kashmir problem, the most contentious issue between India and Pakistan. Question: People’s opinions are divided on the issue of Kashmir problem. Some people say that the government should suppress the agitation by any means while others say that this problem should be   resolved by negotiation. What would you say – should the agitation be suppressed or resolved by negotiation?

  Tale-7a:  

  It is very interesting to see that only a minority of 11.1% opined in favour of suppression, while a majority of 33.5% voted for negotiations. Again, there is a connection between the level of education and the willingness to negotiate:  

Table-7b:  

  A more hawkish position, however, is taken regarding nuclear weapons: those advocating that India needs nuclear weapons are more numerous than those who argue to the contrary: Question: There is no need for India to make the atomic bomb. Do you agree or disagree?

 
Table-8a:

        The detailed profile of the `peacemongers’ is as follows:

  Table-8b:

  As for the advocates of nuclear weapons, table 8c provides the profile:  

Table-8c:  

For the government it means that the resumption of talks with Pakistan and probably, the attempts towards establishing CSBMs, is buttressed by a majority of Indians. The nuclear issue, however, will be much more difficult to solve.

Divergence and Convergence in South Asia’s Regional Politics  

                The analysis from the previous section shows that for the last decade, there has been a growing realization among South Asia’s states of the importance and necessity of constituting South Asia as a region, and to look for solutions to the problems of resource and security management within a regional framework. In specific terms, this indicates a convergence towards a regional framework, from the earlier divergence away from the region in search of particular national strategies, often in alliance with non-regional powers. The indicators of this convergence are: attempts at negotiated solutions to outstanding regional conflicts, strengthening of SAARC, regional trade. CBMs are an evidence that some convergence has taken place. In terms of the arguments presented so far, the following factors could lead India towards convergence:

[1]           The Gujral doctrine as an evidence of elite awareness of the peace divided on the Indian side:

[2]           Liberalisation of the Indian market pushing towards the search for regional markets;

[3]           American encouragement towards conflict-resolution.

  On the other hand, the following factors could hinder convergence:

[1]           Continued insurgency in Kashmir
[2]           Residual opposition to a rapprochement with Pakistan in some sections of Hindu nationalists and a similar apprehension in the Jamat-I-Islamic in Pakistan.
[3]           The instability of India’s current ruling coalition
[4]           Resistance from the Pakistani military establishment to a peace deal by politicians
[5]           The `China’ factor, discussed at length below

The Need for a Triangular Normalisation that Includes China               

The scenario depicted in the game theoretic model in the first section of this paper which showed the status quo synonymous with conflict as a far from an ideal situation. However, it at least suggests a wasteful but stable relation between the two neighbours. Unfortunately, that is unlikely to be the case in view of the China factor in South Asian politics. The problem we are facing in South Asia is that the India – Pakistan two person game is part of a three person non-co-operative game together with China (the “China factor”). The presence of China makes a stable relationship proportionality difficult.30  The likely scenario which makes a relationship between India and Pakistan as stable adversaries is presented below.[

Suppose that at the outset of play, India and Pakistan work out a ratio of 3:1 which guarantees their mutual threat perception. At the next step, India would demand an additional unit of power k to meet the Chinese threat. Since Pakistan cannot be sure that India would not divert the k units in an end game with Pakistan, for her security needs Pakistan would want an additional increase of k/3. At this point, India, to keep the proportionality, would demand (k/3) x 3, i.e., an additional k, leading to a total of 3+2k units which will send Pakistan on another round of arms procurement. As such, until China is brought into a triangular security nexus along with India and Pakistan, no stable relationship, even adversarial, is possible. (Table 9)    

Table-9

Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?  

                For those concerned with South Asia’s security dilemma, the examples of the European Union and the ASEAN hold important lessons with regard to the policies that promote convergence to a regional solution for problems of security and welfare. These comparative cases also indicate the limits to the process of convergence in terms of endogenous and exogenous factors that constitute the boundary conditions of the process. In both the EU and the ASEAN, the presence of external enemies has been an important incentive towards convergence. The lack of radical asymmetries in size has been conducive to co-operation in both cases. The third main factor has been domestic ideology. The American presence on European soil after the war, the democratic constitution imposed on a vastly reduced Germany and the Marshall aid provided a firm basis for economic consolidation; the Franco-German Coal and Steel Community laid, the first groundwork towards regional co-operation. Anti-communism played a similar role in the coming together of the states and markets of Southeast Asia in a similar manner.  These factors, as we have seen above, were conspicuous by their absence in South Asia.

                In addition to these structural factors, convergence towards stable peace in South Asia has been further handicapped by the self-perception of the actors. As we have seen above, the self-perception of India as a country unequivocally committed to peaceful conflict resolution in the Panchsheela mode is not borne out by the perception by her neighbours who see her as a bully and a belligerent power. The mirror image is provided by Pakistan which has often portrayed itself as the wronged party and the occupant of the moral high ground, often neglecting to temper this image with the fear and anxiety that her position invokes in large parts of India’s electorate and among her policy makers. This mutual self-misperception has produced the chronic Indo-Pakistan rivalry, to the point where the international arena perceives South Asia exclusively in terms of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Following this is the solicitude of the outside experts to be even-handed between the two warring neighbours. This position is anathema to Indian policymakers who are more prone to speak about India- China rivalry and are at a loss to understand as to why the world cannot understand the legitimate security needs of India. Indian inability to abide by the terms laid down by the West (the crucial role of India’s threat perception from China is not taken sufficiently into account by western policy makers) is seen as Indian equivocation, for which the West’s preferred solution has been to cut-off aid under the assumption that nation-states can be prevented from going to war because they do not have the cash to start a war.

                If we focus on India, we can see that India’s impressive arsenal is not backed up with cultural cohesion, governmental stability or great economic might. Mobilisation on the issue of cultural nationalism, a phenomenon to which Huntington alludes in his concept of Hindu fundamentalism as a political force31, is far from it, being both socially inchoate and politically fragmented. Survey data shows simultaneously a peaceful and sanctimonious self-perception but at the same time, the desire to arm on self adequately. The ambiguity regarding CTBT shows the same tendency. On the Pakistani side, on the other hand, there is weary perception of the enormous cost of the nonfactual status quo with India and the awareness of the lost opportunity of the benefits of trade and economic co-operation with India. But the uncertain power equations between the civil and military authorities make it difficult to develop a consensus behind the peace initiative.32

                The nuclear tests of South Asia have radically altered the security perception of the region because the start of an accidental nuclear war remains high. The fact remains, however, that though India and Pakistan are locked in combat across the Line of Control in Kashmir and both have their armed forces in a state of alert all along their frontier and at sea, the two sides appear to have devised some new rules of engagement. India, while undertaking a maximum mobilization of forces has nevertheless so far desisted from crossing the Line of Control. Pakistan, on her side, has made continuous efforts to involve other powers in this bilateral conflict, looking for the equalizer in international mediation. All along, unlike in the previous three wars, there has been continuous exchanges through the normal diplomatic channels. This two-track strategy – of defending the borders while negotiating – on the part of both the actors is perhaps the best strategy for peace in the region.