The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise

By P.R.Chari & Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, A Publication of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo Published by Manohar, New Delhi, 2001, 218 pages,  
Price Rs. 390.00. by Rafiuddin Ahmed  
 

he Simla Agreement of July 1972, between India and Pakistan was acclaimed at that time as a landmark event in their turbulent history of bitter relationship since the Partition of British India. It was believed to carry a promise of peace and amity between the two countries and of stability and progress in South Asia. Yet in the very early stages of its implementation, the goodwill and the spirit of accommodation it had generated had begun to crumble under the pressure of events that led to the Simla Agreement and the new political compulsions created by it. The impact was deep, overbearing and painful. Although, the Indians still regard the Simla Agreement as an instrument of peace and continue to insist on its being the basis for all future political negotiations and crises resolution, factually during the following thirty years, its attributed elan had since long faded away and its promise of peace is nothing more than a dream.

Did the Simla Agreement really carry the claimed promise of lasting peace between India and Pakistan and for South Asia? What caused its failure and the dissipation of the much talked about Simla Spirit? Is it still workable? These questions have agitated the minds of many in this sub-continent during the decades that followed with increasing instability and confrontation.

                Many answers are provided in the comprehensively researched and well documented book under review, The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, the latest addition on the subject. It consists of two parts, carrying the excellent work by Mr. P.R.Chari, a former member of the Indian Administrative Service and Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a scholar of international repute and a leading Pakistani authority on regional and international security. Both writers have provided a critical evaluation of events that led to the Simla Agreement and its interpretation from their national perspectives. As one reads through the book, the compilation of facts and the arguments in their analysis and interpretation, particularly those by Professor Cheema advocating Pakistani perceptions, its value almost immediately becomes apparent. The readers would find it interesting and instructive to compare the two versions which bring out the frequent divergence of views and perceptions in the interpretation of events, motivations and compulsions which dominated the process of Simla Agreement and adversely affected the following developments. Perhaps, this alone answers many questions.

                The Simla Agreement was the product of 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, a traumatic event in Pakistan’s short history. It was concluded as a result of Pakistan’s military defeat in former East Pakistan and its forced break away into Bangla Desh. Although the victory came easily to the Indians due to peculiarly favourable conditions in former East Pakistan, it had given to them a decisive moral and psychological ascendancy over their main rivals, in terms of Prisoners of War (POW) and large territories captured in West Pakistan. They were obviously in no mood to give in without extracting maximum benefits and advantages. The most important of these as defined by the Indians were a permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute, resolution of all differences through bilateral mechanism and establishment of durable peace in South Asia. Implicit in these principles and their application was the acceptance by all, the undisputed Indian leadership and dominance in the region. Although, in retrospect these do not appear too ambitious for a victor who had won the war, the Indians wasted the opportunity in clever and insidious exploitation. The Indian version and the subsequent development of events clearly point towards Indian failure in their stated goals.

The Pakistani leadership had gone to Simla with little to defend their national interests against mounting Indian overbearance and Bengali anger, except perhaps their skill in political negotiations. That they came out of it with minimum bruises without compromising on vital national issues was by itself a great achievement. Their immediate gains were the signing of the Simla Agreement which initiated the process of normalization of relations, vacation of captured territories in West Pakistan, and withdrawal of troops to international borders. Pakistan agreed to the new arrangements in Kashmir related to the conversion of Cease Fire Line (CFL) into Line of Control (LOC) and its inviolability with certain reservation and did not pursue the POW’s case. The latter was a shrewd decision which as the time passed became an Indian liability without gain and worked in favour of Pakistan. Even the Indians agree that it was a mistake which not only hurt the Indian image but failed to coerce Pakistan into recognizing Bangla Desh. Pakistan also played her China card well.

Thus in the final analysis it seems that it was the settlement of the Kashmir dispute that captured the main attention of the Simla Agreement and perhaps the only area where certain relevant clauses of the Agreement still stick and continue to influence the situation. Both authors readily agree to the Indian goals and intention in this respect, in which the redesignation of the CFL as LOC and its inviolability and imposition of bilateralism were directed towards breaking or eroding Kashmir’s disputed linkage with the UN and gradually converting the LOC into a permanent border, while at the same time eliminating third parties option and retaining the ability of coercive manipulation through bilateralism. That the Indians succeeded for a time, there is no doubt but despite their denials, and the Indian version is silent over it, these arrangements too could not endure and were broken by them when they aggressed into Chorbat la and Siachen and defiantly violated the Agreement and created the grounds for the Kargil episode. Although the Pakistanis did not make much noises over the earlier Indian aggressions, the Indians made a big issue out of Kargil in the name of Simla Agreement and succeeded. Nonetheless, these serious military engagements and constantly active LOC, coupled with the decade long state of insurgency and popular freedom movement inside Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) clearly indicate the fragility of the Indian design for the permanent settlement of Kashmir dispute. Peace and stability in South Asia have consistently proved elusive and the promise of Simla Agreement remains unrealized. Now the addition of nuclear factor has further complicated the situation.

Many good reasons have been advanced by the authors for this unfortunate dissolution of a dream, still valid for the Indians to take lessons from. Forced peace and expedient solutions against the wishes of the people do not endure, nor a dispute of the dimension of Kashmir can be wished away. But above all, resolution of such dispute requires fair and generous attitude and commitments from the contending parties. Instead the Indians succumbed to the base temptations of petty victor, trying to exploit the helplessness of the vanquished. In the process they lost their historic advantage of creating trust and goodwill for establishing durable peace in South Asia. Also, their policy of bilateralism has failed to address a single issue with the other states, since the concept is impaired with Indian advantage of size, power and over-bearance, nor has it prevented from internationalizing the Kashmir dispute. Its invalidity is amply proved in the setbacks caused to the Agra Summit despite Pakistani eagerness and flexibility to resolve the core issue. The current relevance of Simla Agreement as presented by the author, without the basic values of mutual trust and accommodation would remain questionable.

The book is a valuable addition to the genuine research works on 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, a treasure of source material and references and a must-read by students of political science and regional affairs.