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Fact Files
Part II
Nuclear Apartheid
Just before New Year, President George Bush and Britain's PM Tony Blair staged a brilliant and breathtakingly cynical political coup. After eight months of secret negotiations with Washington and London, Libya's strongman, the flamboyant and eccentric Col. Muammar Qadhafi grandly proclaimed his nation was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction (wmds). Bush, his neo-conservative supporters, and the US media crowed that Qadhafi's surrender confirmed the wisdom of invading Afghanistan and Iraq. The evil had been cowed by Anglo-American military might into giving up his arsenal of deadly wmds. Other 'rogue' states would hasten to follow Libya's lead. But on closer inspection, there was much less to this drama than met the eye. Qadhafi, in fact, had no weapons of mass destruction, contrary to the claims of the Bush administration. According to UN inspectors and European intelligence sources, Libya had only small amounts of World War I technology mustard gas, a primitive battlefield weapon. It had no biological or nuclear weapons. Libya had no means of delivering wmds beyond some rusting Scud-B missiles with only 180 miles range. Libya possessed an assortment of nuclear junk: a small research reactor, some lab equipment, and a few inoperative, third-hand centrifuges reportedly bought from Pakistan or Malaysia. There was no sign, at least so far, of any capability to make or deliver weapons of mass destruction. When I was in Libya interviewing Col. Qadhafi, I found there was not a single elevator repairman in the entire country. Bakers had to be imported from Egypt to make bread. Seventy per cent of Libya's military equipment was broken down. In short, tiny, backward Libya, with a population of only five million, had no military capability. However, in the 1980s, Libya certainly did fund all sorts of violent revolutionary groups and was implicated in the bombings of French and US airliners. After 17 years of punishing sanctions against Libya, Qadhafi sought to improve relations with the West by paying heavy reparations for the airliners, and handing over for trial two agents involved in the 1988 PAN-AM bombing. Now, by pretending to eliminate wmds he does not actually possess, the colonel has given a huge political bonus to Bush and Blair, a way for them to evade censure for shamelessly lying their nations into the Iraq War. They will reward Qadhafi by halting efforts to overthrow him, slowly lifting sanctions, and allowing US and British oil firms to resume exploiting Libya's high-grade oil. That's politics. CIA helped Qadhafi into power in 1969. In the 1980s, the US, Britain and France each tried to assassinate him. Now, it seems the flamboyant colonel with nine lives is slated to be re-born as a good Arab and US ally. Right after the Libyan charade, Washington opened a major new campaign to deprive Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal. The US media trumpeted leaked government reports alleging Pakistan had secretly supplied Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology. These reports blurred the lines between exports of civilian and military nuclear technology. Washington accused Pakistan of being a major nuclear proliferator. Pakistan nervously admitted some of its nuclear scientists may have privately aided neighbour Iran, which has sought nuclear weapons for the past 28 years.
Eric S. Margolis, Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/06/ed.htm>
Nuclear Spotlight Shifts from Libya to Israel
But any rejoicing will have been shortlived, as Israeli decision-makers quickly began to understand that the decision by the flamboyant Libyan leader had suddenly reopened the discussion on monitoring of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East. This cast an uncomfortable spotlight on the Jewish state's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal, which no Israeli government has ever officially acknowledged. In the wake of Qadhafi's announcement, as well as Iran's declared willingness to accept nuclear inspections, both Egypt and Syria have recently called on Israel to give up the bomb. Syrian President Bashar Assad, now facing threats of US sanctions similar to those encountered by Qadhafi, repeated that call on a trip to Turkey earlier this week. Qadhafi made specific mention of Israel after his shock pronouncement. He reasoned that if other countries in the region followed his example, pressure would grow on Israel to follow suit. "This would tighten the noose around the Israelis so that they would expose their programmes and their weapons of mass destruction," he said. Following Iran's declaration, and possibly knowing that a Libyan deal was in the works, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei called on Israel last month to give up its nuclear weapons as part of a regional peace agreement. ElBaradei suggested Israel was fueling a WMD race in the Middle East. He said he feared a situation in which "there will be continued incentive for the region's countries to develop weapons of mass destruction to match the Israeli arsenal." Arab League chief Amr Moussa sounded a similar note on Wednesday, saying that Israel's possession of WMDs would "perhaps" lead other countries in the region to try "to protect themselves against such weapons." Despite the diplomatic heat, Israel is not about to alter its decades-old policy of "nuclear ambiguity". It neither admits to, nor denies, having nuclear weapons - and the United States is not about to force it to do so. Israel continues to view nuclear deterrence, even if undeclared, as the ultimate guarantee of its survival in a hostile neighbourhood. But that does not mean the changing nuclear climate has gone unnoticed in the Israeli Foreign Ministry or the defence establishment. Officials are considering the question whether Israel should agree to monitoring of its own free will sometime down the line, or wait until outside pressures become irresistible. There has been speculation in the wake of Libya's move that Israel might consider ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) if other countries in the region do the same. But the longstanding position of countries like Egypt and Syria, both believed to have chemical weapons, is that they will not sign the CWC until Israel signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Prof. Efraim Inbar, head of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies near Tel Aviv is unconcerned by the greater scrutiny of Israel that Qadhafi's decision has spawned. He views Libya's move as a positive development. "It's good news," he told IPS. "It removes a threat (to Israel)." Inbar, who supports the 'ambiguity' policy, is less enthusiastic about Iran's acceptance of nuclear inspections. "They might adopt the talk-and-build strategy of North Korea," he says. With no prospects of regional peace on the horizon, the one party that could force Israel to give up its nuclear weapons is the United States. But US officials speaking anonymously have told Israeli media in recent days that Washington is not about to lean on its key Mideast ally.-Dawn/The InterPress News Service. Peter Hirschberg, Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/10/int4.htm>
Pakistan Cooperating with IAEA
In a letter to the editor sent in response to an article published by Washington Post, ambassador Qazi said: "The US administration has accepted Pakistan's assurances." He said Pakistan has arrested a number of Taliban and made clear that it made no distinction between them and the remnants of Al Qaeda network. "The PML-Q's agreement with the MMA, far from implying an understanding with pro-Taliban forces, in fact, drives a clear wedge between conservative and traditionalist parliamentary politicians on the one hand and extremist/radical organizations on the other." Qazi said "it is easy enough to fashion a wish list and judge reality by it. But it would be more responsible to assess the choices that reality offers." He said President Pervez Musharraf remains the best bet for "enlightened moderation" in Pakistan and the Muslim world and for the war against global terror.-APP Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/10/nat18.htm>
Bush Unveils Indo-US Space, Nuke Plan
President George W Bush has announced that the United States and India would step up cooperation in non-military nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and technology trade and expand dialogue on missile defence. In a statement released on the sidelines of the Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico, on Monday, Bush said, "Cooperation in these areas will deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations, and will increase stability in Asia and beyond." Bush said the proposed cooperation would progress through a series of reciprocal steps, including expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues and missile defence, ways to enhance cooperation in peaceful uses of space technology and steps to create the appropriate environment for successful technology commerce. "The expanded cooperation launched today is an important milestone in transforming the relationship between the United States and India. "The vision of US-India strategic partnership that Prime Minister [Atal Bihari] Vajpayee and I share is now becoming a reality," Bush said. He said the two sides would tighten restrictions aimed at curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He said the "relationship is based increasingly on common values and common interests.” "We are working together to promote global peace and prosperity. We are partners in the war on terrorism and we are partners in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them." In a hastily arranged press conference at the state department just hours after Bush's statement, an official, who wished not to be identified, said this so-called "Glide Path" would not take place overnight. He said -- and reiterated several times -- that the announcement would be contingent on India taking steps to address concerns, specially in the export control area. "We will offer India expanded cooperation as India takes concrete steps to address our concerns, especially in the export control area. We also emphasise that we are not asking here for any changes in US domestic law or our international obligations. "Similarly, this is not about diminishing in any way our concerns about India's nuclear weapons or domestic missile programmes. We have not said anything to support India's nuclear weapons or domestic missile programmes," he said. He added that it is very clear "to us and I believe it's very clear to the Indians, what the distinction is between a civilian nuclear programme and a military programme". Asked if all of these caveats implied that India's exports control safeguards were inadequate, the official replied, "I really can't speak for the Indians here. But I think for example, one of the things that we have had to do over these years is to sanction Indian companies that have taken high technology goods and exported them to Iraq for example -- to the previous regime. "And so what we would like to see are laws and regulations that are put into place -- not by us but by the Indians for Indians -- which make that kind of thing impossible. "We would like to see the regulations that exist today are implemented so that a year from now, there are regulations and implementations and a commitment by India on these issues so that sanctioning companies doesn't have to be used again. "We see them attempting to take steps, attempting to enforce this law or that law, but in many cases, they can't finish the job." However, he asserted that the US did not expect the process being put into place to break down "because it stitches together two very important desires of two very important countries". Asked if Pakistan had expressed any apprehensions over the Indo-US cooperation, he said, "Not that's been reported to me." He added that the US had offered a similar dialogue with Pakistan. "We like to have conversations on strategic stability with both India and Pakistan on missile defence." The official denied that the announcement was "a reward" for India for the envisaged rapprochement with Pakistan and for agreeing to include Kashmir in the dialogue that is on the cards.
With Inputs from the Press Trust of India, Aziza Haniffa, 13 January 2004 <http://us.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=/new2s/2004/jan/13bush.htm/430/2004> Flynt Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,"New York TimesWASHINGTON. As President Bush made clear in his State of the Union address, he sees the striking developments in relations with Libya as the fruit of his strategy in the war on terrorism. The idea is that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's apparent decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction was a largely a result of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which thus retroactively justifies the war in Iraq and holds out the prospect of similar progress with other states that support terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction and brutalize their own people. However, by linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq war, the president misrepresents the real lesson of the Libyan case. This confusion undermines our chances of getting countries like Iran and Syria to follow Libya's lead. The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990's to seek normalized relations with the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations sanctions against Libya. Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a "script" indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case. We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted permanently. This script became the basis for three-party negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue. By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted responsibility for its officials' actions. But during these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of United Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction. This is the context in which Libyan officials approached the United States and Britain last spring to discuss dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead the removal our own sanctions, perhaps by the end of this year. The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has refused to take this approach with other rogue regimes, notably Iran and Syria. Until the president is willing to employ carrots as well as sticks, he will make little headway in changing Iranian or Syrian behavior. The president's lack of initiative on this point is especially disappointing because, in the diplomatic aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the administration has a singular opportunity to effect strategic realignments by both Iran and Syria. Well-placed Iranians, including more pragmatic elements of Iran's conservative camp, have indicated through diplomatic channels and to former officials (including myself) their interest in a "grand bargain" with the United States. Basically, Tehran would trade off its ties to terrorist groups and pursuit of nuclear weapons for security guarantees, a lifting of sanctions and normalized relations with Washington. Likewise, senior Syrian officials — including President Bashar al-Assad himself, in a conversation in Damascus last week — have told me that they want a better strategic understanding with the United States. To achieve this, however, Washington needs to be willing to spell out what Syria would get in return for giving up its ties to terrorists and its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. As Mr. Assad told me, Syria is "a state, not a charity" — if it gives up something, it must know what it will gain in return. One reason the Bush administration was able to take a more constructive course with Libya was that the White House, uncharacteristically, sidelined the administration's neoconservative wing — which strongly opposes any offer of carrots to state sponsors of terrorism, even when carrots could help end such problematic behavior — when crucial decisions were made. The initial approach on the Lockerbie case was approved by an informal coalition made up of Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Likewise, in the lead up to the negotiations involving Libyan weapons of mass destruction, the neoconservatives at the Pentagon and in the shop of Under Secretary of State John Bolton were left out of the loop. Perhaps a coalition among members of the State Department's bureau of Near Eastern affairs and the National Security Council's more pragmatic elements can chart a similar course involving Iran and Syria. However, until the administration learns the real lessons of the Libyan precedent, policy toward other rogue regimes is likely to remain stuck in the mud of ideology.
Flynt Leverett, a visiting fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Politics at the Brookings Institution, was senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security Council from 2002 to 2003, 23 January 2004 <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/libya.htm>Business in Timbuktu
Conflicting views about Army’s awareness of Qadeer’s engagements ISLAMABAD: Not many Pakistanis would even know that the famous “Timbuktu” is a city in the African state of Mali. Even fewer would know that the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan has built a fabulous hotel there and has named it after his Dutch wife, Dr Hendrina Khan. Hendrina Khan hotel in Timbuktu was one of the dozens of business and financial undertakings of Dr Qadeer that are now being investigated by the Pakistani intelligence officials, currently probing the IAEA charges that an extensive nuclear black market is tied to a few Pakistani nuclear scientists. Not only that the Pakistani investigators discovered that Dr Qadeer owned the Hendrina Khan Hotel in Timbuktu, they were shocked to learn that a Pakistan Air Force C-130 aircraft was also used by Dr Qadeer in early 2000 to ferry an exclusive range of carved Pakistani wooden furniture from Islamabad to his Timbuktu hotel.
Because of the landing problems at the Timbuktu airports, officials said that
the cargo was offloaded at Tripoli from where it was taken to Mali by road.
Ironically, the investigation has revealed that an experienced nuclear
scientist accompanied this expensive carved furniture for Dr Qadeer’s Hendrina
Hotel from Islamabad. Dr Muhammad Farooq, a centrifuge expert at the KRL, who
accompanied this antique furniture onboard the PAF C-130 to Timbuktu via Relevant Pakistani officials, familiar with the investigation against the nuclear scientists here, have said that a damning account of Dr Qadeer’s “international activities” came from Dr Muhammad Farooq. “Farooq had the most specific information on transfer of knowledge and technology to Libya and Iran. He put Qadeer in a very tight corner,” said one official. “At least one other KRL scientist confirmed Farooq’s account independently.” Officials said that at least two other senior KRL scientists have independently confirmed Dr Farooq’s account on Dr Qadeer. “Don’t be surprised. It is just the tip of the iceberg,” said an exhausted Pakistani investigator, adding: “There are dozens of such business undertakings suspected to be linked to Dr Qadeer that are still being investigated.” Several investigators said that they had detected an indirect business interest of Dr Qadeer in expensive London real estate, consisting of apartments in posh districts of the city. Dr Qadeer’s indirect connection with some Dubai-based companies, including a real estate project and several bank accounts, is also being probed. In Islamabad and in the nearby Bani Gala, the authorities have uncovered Dr Qadeer’s direct or indirect association with at least half a dozen houses, having combined value exceeding Rs 150 million. Relevant officials have also disclosed that Dr Qadeer has already conceded that his former son-in-law Noman Shah, who had divorced his daughter Dina after four years of marriage in 1994, was helped by him to set up a supplier firm for the KRL. “The KRL preferred Noman Shah in procurements worth tens of millions of dollars for its nuclear and missile programme,” an investigator said. Another informed source said the KRL decision to award contract for the purchase of titanium aluminium from Noman Shah’s firm allegedly at an inflated price had created a stir of sorts at the KRL. In their investigation of the financial status of those closely related with Dr Qadeer, the investigators have also probed the business activities of his elder brother, Abdul Qayum Khan, a retired banker. The investigators have found strong clues to believe that Qayum also had business interests with the KRL. A source close to Dr Qadeer, while offering Qadeer’s defence during a background interview with this correspondent in Islamabad this week, asked as to why the authorities were not probing Dr Qadeer’s “incredible financial support” in the establishment of some of the important centres of learning in the field of science and technology in the country. “Dr Qadeer arranged at least Rs 1,500 million for the establishment of GIK Institute of Technology in Bannu, another Rs 200 million for the Mianwali Institute of Technology and for Qadeer Khan Institute of Technology,” said one personal friend of Dr Qadeer, who asked not to be named. “Why there is no investigation for at least Rs 150 million support to the Academy of Science, Institute of Behavioural Sciences (IBS) and for the charity rganizations such as Sashe.” Most interestingly, even the staunchest supporters of Dr Qadeer do not have the exact information about the source for Dr Qadeer’s Rs 2,000 million support for the education and welfare programmes. While the investigation on financial charges against Dr Qadeer and a few other colleagues continue in full swing, there is an overwhelming view even in the senior brass of the Army that no probe can get to the bottom of the matter unless it finds out the reasons as to why the military guardians and overseers of the nuclear programme failed in their administrative, security and intelligence responsibilities regarding the KRL. “We must concede that there is a growing perception both within the country and abroad that the Army is essentially trying to cover up its failures on the KRL,” said a federal cabinet minister during a private conversation with this correspondent in Islamabad on Friday. Several serving and retired officials, former retired Pakistani nuclear scientists and serving KRL scientists interviewed in Islamabad in the last few days almost unanimously agreed that being the principal overseer of the country’s nuclear programme, the General Headquarters (GHQ) would also examine its shortcomings and failures in protecting the nation’s nuclear programme from falling into irresponsible hands, particularly during the 1990s. “Briefing on nuclear programme is provided only on the need-to-know basis; I don’t think there is any need for that at this moment,” replied Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, the then chief of Pakistan Army, when former prime minister Benazir Bhutto asked him about the status of the country’s nuclear programme, during a military briefing arranged for her at the Joint Staff Headquarters, a few months after her take-over as the prime minister for the first term in 1989,” according to a retired Pakistani military official who was present on the occasion. Pakistani officials related with the country’s nuclear programme and several retired military officials confirmed that during her two terms in power Benazir was never invited, despite her repeated requests, to visit the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL). During his first term as the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif was also denied a request to visit the KRL by Gen Mirza Aslam Beg and also by his successor Gen Asif Nawaz, according to a retired corps commander. “Gen Beg kept the programme under such a thick cover that he didn’t even allow the two successive prime ministers to look inside,” said another retired lieutenant general, who had also commanded a corps of Pakistan Army in the 1990s. “What do you do when the army chief thinks that the prime minister of the country is a security risk.” At the same time, Gen Beg went an extra mile to cement the GHQ’s relations with the nuclear programme, particularly with the KRL, by creating the Directorate General of Combat Development (DG CD) at the General Headquarters. “After the cold test in 1987, the Army wanted to be on the driving seat in weaponisation programme,” a former military intelligence official said. Afterwards, the DG CD served as a potent bridge between the nuclear research and development and the GHQ. Before being promoted as lieutenant general, Ziauddin Butt, who was subsequently appointed as the ISI chief by Nawaz Sharif in 1998 and Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who later headed the Wapda for five years, had long served as the Director General for Combat Development, hence both of them had the responsibility of staying fully aware of the work at the KRL. Background interviews with present and retired military officials and Pakistani nuclear scientists who remained actively associated with the programme showed that while Gen Ziaul Haq had actually acceded to a long-term Iranian request for cooperation in nuclear arena in 1987, but there is still no mention of that secret agreement between Islamabad and Tehran in the government documents. Launched by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975 following India’s first nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan’s nuclear programme worked exclusively under Army’s umbrella from the day one. ZA Bhutto’s military secretary Brig Imtiaz had hired Dr Khan and introduced him later to the then COAS Gen Ziaul Haq. Well-informed Pakistani officials and scientists said that to undertake the massive construction of the KRL, the Army created Special Works Organisation (SWO) headed by a brigadier and placed him under Dr Qadeer in 1975. “From almost 25 years Dr Qadeer had absolutely no-questions-asked authority to run the nuclear facility, with complete backing of the Army,” according to a retired nuclear scientist, who had also served the country’s nuclear establishment for almost 25 years. “Dr Khan used to come to the GHQ in a motorcade escorted by the troops from the Special Services Group,” recalled a retired military official. “There used to be decoy cars in his entourage, which was always bigger than that of the Chief (COAS).” Several official sources have said that the military was also in full picture about secret financial assistance to the programme from a few Islamic countries. Two retired military officials separately confirmed an early Libyan monetary assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Though no accounts are available with any government of Pakistan department, Pakistani nuclear scientist community and other informed officials estimate that some $10 billion had been spent on the secret programme till 1998 when Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests. A serving KRL official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Army as “the guardian of programme” had multi-tier involvement in the KRL affairs. “While Army chiefs gave strategic guidance and regular appreciation to scientists, Army Chief of General Staff was there to iron out significant administrative and financial issues and the DG CD coordinated research and development,” the KRL scientist said. “Two separate brigadiers had hundreds of troops and agents at their disposal to run an impregnable multi-tier security network at the KRL,” he adds. “The ISI had a separate detachment for the KRL.” Suspecting a possible collusion of certain military officials in the systematic pilferage of technology and knowledge from the KRL, intelligentsia and many civil and military officials are questioning the government’s half-hearted effort to find the whole truth. “How can you blame a person who enjoyed an explicit authority from the state to beg, borrow or steal for no less that 20 years to deliver his nation its nuclear bomb,” asked a senior serving military official during a recent private conversation. “Which country in the world didn’t become the nuclear state without any help from the nuclear black market?” “We embraced him when he stole the technology and most crucial information from Urenco in Holland and delivered the most unachievable to us. What harm has he caused to Pakistan by extending the same knowledge to another Islamic country,” the official questioned, echoing the theme circulating in various educated circles. Several officials said by the time Gen Pervez Musharraf launched a low-key cleansing operation in the country’s nuclear programme, particularly the KRL, by replacing Dr AQ Khan with Dr Javed Mirza damage was already done.
Kamran Khan, The News <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2004-daily/01-02-2004/main/main3.htm>
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 31 — The Pakistani government on Saturday removed Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, from his post as a special adviser to the country's prime minister. The step, and other measures, suggested that the government was laying the groundwork for exposing wrongdoing by Dr. Khan, a man revered as a national hero in Pakistan. Dr. Khan, three scientists and three low-level army officers are the focus of an investigation into the possible sharing of Pakistani nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and other countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani president, has said that "some individuals" appear to have sold nuclear technology for personal profit. General Musharraf, who seized power in a coup, has been under competing pressures from the United States, secular and Islamist political rivals and Pakistan's powerful army. He must somehow strike a balance between being tough enough in the investigation to satisfy American concerns and not being seen as an American lackey, or betraying the army, his base of support. Officials outlined a series of steps that suggested an airing of evidence would occur, but it was not clear whether Dr. Khan or low-level scientists and army officers would be prosecuted. General Musharraf will make a televised address to the nation "shortly after" a series of national holidays that end on Thursday, a senior official said. An already extensive security presence around Dr. Khan's home has been "enhanced," the official added, but he has not been arrested. The removal of Dr. Khan from his post came after the National Command Authority, the senior military and civilian leaders who oversee Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, was briefed on the investigation's progress. The authority issued a statement saying it "condemns and distances itself in categorical terms from individual acts of indiscretion in the past." Pakistani officials have said that bank accounts believed to belong to Dr. Khan and nuclear smugglers from Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa and Sri Lanka have been found in Dubai and other Persian Gulf cities. Analysts are divided on the meaning of General Musharraf's action. Ayesha Siddiqa, a security analyst in Islamabad, said the army feared that if Dr. Khan was arrested he would identify senior military officials who approved the transfers. The military-led government has thus far taken the position that any sales of technology were an unsanctioned act, perhaps by Dr. Khan and a handful of close aides and low-level military officials. "A. Q. Khan will lead to more names," Ms. Siddiqa said in a telephone interview. "That is what they are weighing." But Rasul Baksh Rais, a professor at Lahore University of Management Sciences, said the Saturday actions were a signal that Dr. Khan had committed a serious offense. Mr. Rais said he expected the government to move against Dr. Khan, if clear evidence against him existed. "It suggests that there is something serious against him," Dr. Rais said. "That Dr. Khan is no longer in the same esteem and respect of the government of Pakistan and he has done something really serious against the interests of Pakistan." Pakistan began its investigation in November, when Iranian officials told the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency that black marketeers who aided Iran's nuclear program had ties to Pakistan. In early January, Libya told Pakistan that nuclear smugglers it had used also had ties to Pakistan. Dr. Khan's troubles began in 2001. General Musharraf forced him to retire from his post as head of Khan Research Laboratories, the country's main nuclear weapons facility, which was named for him. American officials have said they pressed General Musharraf to remove Dr. Khan, whom they have long suspected of sharing nuclear technology with other countries. Dr. Khan was appointed special adviser to the prime minister for strategic programs in 2001, a term used to describe the country's nuclear program. A government statement issued Saturday said Dr. Khan had been removed from the post in order to "facilitate" the investigation into the sharing of nuclear technology in a "free and objective manner." Since his retirement from the nuclear program, Dr. Khan, a larger- than-life figure who is a fierce nationalist, has brought out deep divisions in Pakistan. His enemies, including a rival faction of nuclear scientists, dismiss him as a megalomaniac who exaggerated his role in constructing Pakistan's nuclear bomb and accuse him of corruption. Dr. Khan's supporters say he achieved an astounding feat, successfully enriching uranium and eluding an American effort to block the Pakistani nuclear program. In a rare interview recorded in late December and aired in full on Jan. 23 by the private Pakistani television channel Geo, Dr. Khan denied sharing technology with Iran. He said international news organizations were maligning him because the weapons he built thwarted India's plan to "destroy Pakistan." "What I did, I made all of their policies go to waste," he said. "A single person destroyed all of their intended planning for the next 25 years." He then laughed and said: "Who made the atom bomb? I made it. Who made the missiles? I made them for you." On Saturday, the president's chief spokesmen continued to assert that the inquiry was making progress. Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan Khan, the military's chief spokesman, said the investigation had "narrowed down to a few people." Asked if Dr. Khan was one of the remaining suspects, he replied "he is certainly among them."
David Rohde, The New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/01/international/asia/01STAN.html?ex=1081656000&en
Key Pakistani is Said to Admit Atom Transfers
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Feb. 1 — The founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has signed a detailed confession admitting that during the last 15 years he provided Iran, North Korea and Libya with the designs and technology to produce the fuel for nuclear weapons, according to a senior Pakistani official and three Pakistani journalists who attended a special government briefing here on Sunday night. In a two-and-a-half-hour presentation to 20 Pakistani journalists, a senior government official gave an exhaustive and startling account of how Dr. Khan, a national hero, spread secret technology to three countries that have been striving to produce their own nuclear arsenals. Two of them, Iran and North Korea, were among those designated by President Bush as part of an "axis of evil." If the Pakistani government account is correct, Dr. Khan's admission amounts to one of the most complex and successful efforts to evade international controls to stop nuclear proliferation. The account provided by Pakistan on Sunday night came after years in which the government strongly denied that it or scientists at the Khan Research Laboratories had given crucial technology to other nations. Officials detailed how Dr. Khan had presided over a network that smuggled nuclear hardware on chartered planes, had shared secret designs for the centrifuges that produce the enriched uranium necessary to develop a nuclear weapon, and had given personal briefings to Iranian, Libyan and North Korean scientists in covert meetings abroad. Dr. Khan said he shared the technology because he thought the emergence of more nuclear states would ease Western attention on Pakistan, the senior official told journalists. He also said he thought it would help the Muslim cause. The Bush administration offered no public comment on the Pakistani announcement on Sunday. But in recent weeks, administration officials have said that they forced the government of President Pervez Musharraf to confront the evidence, after Iran and Libya made disclosures that showed their reliance on Pakistani-supplied technology. "This is the break we have been waiting for," a senior American official said. But the account provided by Pakistani officials carefully avoided pinning any blame on General Musharraf, the army or the Pakistani intelligence service, despite the fact that some of the material — especially what was sent to North Korea — appeared to have been transported on government cargo planes. Pakistani and American officials have said senior Pakistani Army officials would have known if nuclear hardware had been shipped out of a tightly guarded nuclear facility. The senior official told journalists that all nuclear transfers ceased after General Musharraf established a new National Command Authority to oversee the country's nuclear arsenal in early 2002. But according to American accounts, the nuclear transfers to Libya continued through last fall. The Khan laboratory has for years been the crown jewel of the Pakistani nuclear program, and it received the highest-level support after Dr. Khan stole the basic technology for uranium enrichment from a European consortium, Urenco, in the late 1970's. Dr. Khan's house has been surrounded by Pakistani security officials for several weeks, and he could not be reached for comment on Sunday. A spokesman for the families of Dr. Khan and six detained officials who the government says aided him said they would respond to the government allegations on Monday. It was unclear whether Dr. Khan would be arrested, or whether General Musharraf's government would be further shaken by his decision to take on a man revered as the creator of the first Islamic bomb. At the briefing on Sunday night, the Pakistani official insisted that the country's military and intelligence officials had been unaware of Dr. Khan's activities during the past decade, despite the huge houses and lavish life he maintained on a relatively modest government stipend. "There were intelligence lapses on our part, and we admit to them," the official said, according to the journalists who attended the meeting. "We should not have allowed this loose administrative and security system to have prevailed." There was no way to independently verify the senior official's account, though senior American officials said parts of it seemed in accord with intelligence they had gathered and provided to Pakistan.
David Rohde and David E. Sanger, The New York Time
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/international/asia/02STAN.html?ex=1081656000&en=
Tip of Iceberg: Diplomats
VIENNA, Austria (Reuters) -- The nuclear black market used by Pakistan's top atomic scientist to sell nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea may be far bigger than initially feared, the U.N. nuclear watchdog and Western diplomats have said. The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, publicly confessed to leaking nuclear secrets on Wednesday, and several Western diplomats told Reuters they suspected the Pakistan-led black market uncovered by the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might only be the tip of the iceberg. "Our big priority is to figure out if there are any other countries that might have benefited from this nuclear network," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said. Media attention has focused on Khan's atomic aid to Tripoli, Tehran and Pyongyang. But Western diplomats said it could not be ruled out that other countries had been customers of Khan's network of nuclear "middlemen." "This is what we are all worried about," said one Western diplomat. He declined to say what other countries might have been customers of Khan. In contrast to media reports that the nuclear black market Khan used was small, diplomats said the available evidence indicated it is massive. Its aim is to skirt international sanctions and sell potentially weapons-related technology to nations under embargo. "Clearly what came out of Libya is that this is much bigger and more extensive than was previously thought," said a second Western diplomat. In December, Libya said it would allow international experts to destroy its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. Diplomats said Libya had provided the IAEA with key evidence to implicate Khan in Tripoli's illicit procurement of uranium enrichment equipment -- a key technology in making nuclear weapons. The second diplomat said the size of this black market, which spans the Eurasian landmass, should not be underestimated. "It's not as big as the automotive industry, but it's certainly bigger than the tiddlywinks industry," he said. Diplomats said the "middlemen" who helped countries like Iran, North Korea and Libya acquire sensitive nuclear technology operated in Germany, Netherlands, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates -- and possibly other states as yet undisclosed. 'Could not have acted alone'Diplomats also doubted Khan's statement that he had arranged it all himself and that Pakistan's government and army knew nothing of his actions. They said it was inconceivable Khan acted alone given the interest Pakistan's military takes in the country's nuclear programme. At the same time, some Vienna-based diplomats said the most important issue was not who did what but that the investigation by the IAEA uncovered every tentacle of the global nuclear black market so that it could be destroyed. "The most important thing is that this never happens again," said the first diplomat, who added that export controls on all sensitive nuclear technology across the globe must be tightened to prevent rogue states from developing atomic weapons. Several diplomats said they believed Khan had either directly or indirectly supplied Libya with designs for nuclear weapons and they feared these designs could have ended up in Iran and North Korea. Tehran insists U.S. allegations that its civilian nuclear power programme is a front for developing the bomb are false and says its atomic ambitions are purely peaceful. Western diplomats remain skeptical. A third diplomat said Khan may be able to provide the "silver bullet" showing he sold Tehran not only uranium enrichment technology, which has peaceful uses, but know-how that could only be used for bombs.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/04/pakistan.nuclear.reut/index.html> U.S. Stands by Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- The United States is standing by key ally Pakistan after the father of its nuclear weapons program admitted he had shared nuclear secrets with other nations. In a stunning admission on national television, Abdul Qadeer Khan on Wednesday apologized for transferring nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, following a whirlwind of allegations against him. Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, who is considered a national hero, said he acted alone, and the government was not involved. But the admission has alarmed diplomats around the world, who say this is just the tip of the iceberg of a nuclear black market. The U.N. nuclear watchdog and Western diplomats have warned Reuters news agency the nuclear black market used by Khan may be far bigger than initially feared. (Tip of iceberg) But for its part, the United States is standing shoulder to shoulder with Islamabad on the issue. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Wednesday the United States will work closely with Pakistan to win the war on terrorism. "We appreciate their efforts to address what is a serious concern, which is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Iran and North Korea, two of the countries that Khan says received technology from him, made up part of the "axis of evil" invoked by U.S. President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address. Iraq was the third. Nayyar Zaidi, Washington bureau chief of Pakistan's Daily Jang newspaper, told CNN Thursday the United States knew that without the support of Pakistan, it was impossible to fight terrorism in the region. Zaidi told CNN Thursday he believed Khan had made the "supreme sacrifice." American officials won't publicly discuss suspicions the Pakistani government was involved in the technology transfer. But privately, some western diplomats say they suspect Pakistani officials may have been involved. WhirlwindKhan's admission came after he met with President Pervez Musharraf and followed days of speculation about his activities after he was sacked as a government adviser Saturday. After being confronted with government evidence that Pakistani technology was given to Iran, North Korea and Libya over more than two decades, Khan responded on Wednesday by saying: "Much of it is true," Khan said. "I have much to answer for." Khan expressed "the deepest sense of sorrow and anguish," saying he knew the actions had jeopardized Pakistan's national security. A government statement said Khan "accepts full responsibility for all the proliferation activities which were conducted by him during the period in which he was at the helm of affairs at Khan Research Laboratories." Khan founded the lab in the 1970s and headed it until retiring in 2001. Khan is waiting to hear his fate and has asked for clemency. Pakistan's cabinet is meeting on Thursday to discuss his plea, and Musharraf has called a news conference for later in the day, where he is expected to announce what action will be taken. Khan has been kept under tight security at his home in Islamabad. Khan's alleged admissions have shocked many in Pakistan, and raised questions about how he could have spread nuclear technology without the consent of the military -- which has often ruled Pakistan since the country gained independence from Britain in 1947.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/04/pakistan.nuclear/index.html>
Pakistani Press Defends Nuclear Scientist
Papers in Pakistan are united in their high opinion of top nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, following his televised admission of involvement in nuclear proliferation abroad. Some papers feel that Dr Khan has fallen on his sword in order to defend Pakistan from foreign attempts to rid the country of its nuclear status. Others express scepticism over how nuclear material was sent abroad without the knowledge of the authorities. The US wants to end our nuclear status and we are making its job easier. Now if it puts forward allegations of our government's involvement in the proliferation of nukes, who then could stop it from attacking us? Ausaf The exaggerated statement presented by Western media regarding our nuclear programme and nuclear proliferation has unveiled the fact that the US, Europe, Israel and India intend to do away with our nuclear status. Express We should not ignore the threats and pressure to roll back our nuclear capabilities. We are passing through a very critical time. Our rulers should take careful steps to steer the country out of the crisis. Jang There is no legal evidence to prove what really happened. The opinion of almost all Pakistanis has been summarised in a recent letter to the Pakistan News Service, which reads: "... Previous Pakistani regimes did not indulge in any nuclear weapons proliferation, but they did acquire and develop nuclear capability and missile technologies to defend Pakistan. Dr A. Q. Khan is merely taking the blame in order to protect the Pakistani nation from malicious propaganda of the anti-Pakistan media. Dr Khan, sir, I salute you." Asim Mughal in Paknews.com The admission by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan should now close this painful chapter and the much revered scientist allowed to retire in peace and with dignity. This should strengthen the government's case of its ignorance of the unauthorised activities by some of its officials, but it does not quite clear up how the proliferation was undertaken undetected. This is the point that needs to be cleared up as Dr Khan's statement only admits half the fact. The News It is difficult to believe how anyone could claim that the transfer of nuclear technology and hardware was in the national interest. A Pandora's box has been opened. Dr Qadeer has done the nation great service, and deserves more than to be penalised for actions taken in good faith, no matter how mistaken. However, this does not mean that a microscopic examination of procedures and structures can be avoided, lest there is a repetition. The Nation The official position is becoming untenable in the eyes of the people who regard Dr Khan as a national hero. If the state of Pakistan was involved in proliferation, how can the scientists be isolated and made the scapegoat? No one believes that the scientists could have smuggled some heavy nuclear hardware abroad without the knowledge of the Pakistan army which has been in charge of the nuclear programme. The only way out of this crisis is to close the
nuke scientists' file by accepting the mercy petition of the scientists.
5 February 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3461227.stm>
I Seek your Pardon
It is with the deepest sense of sorrow, anguish and regret that I have chosen to appear before you in order to atone for some of the anguish and pain that has been suffered by the people of Pakistan on account of the extremely unfortunate events of the last two months. I am aware of the vital criticality of Pakistan's nuclear programme to our national security and the national pride and and emotions which it generates in your hearts. I am also conscious that any untoward event, incident or threat to this national security draws the greatest concern in the nation's psyche. It is in this context that the recent international events and their fallout on Pakistan have traumatised the nation. I have much to answer for it. The recent investigation was ordered by the government of Pakistan consequent to the disturbing disclosures and evidence by some countries to international agencies relating to alleged proliferation activities by certain Pakistanis and foreigners over the last two decades. The investigation has established that many of the reported activities did occur and that these were inevitably initiated at my behest. In my interviews with the concerned government officials, I was confronted with the evidence and the findings and I have voluntarily admitted that much of it is true and accurate My dear brothers and sisters, I have chosen to appear before you to offer my deepest regrets and unqualified apologies to a traumatised nation. I am aware of the high esteem, love and affection in which you have held me for my services to national security and I am grateful for all the awards and honours that have been bestowed upon me. However, it pains me to realise this in retrospect that my entire lifetime achievement of providing foolproof national security to my nation could have been placed in serious jeopardy on account of my activities, which were based in good faith, but on errors of judgment related to unauthorised proliferation activities. I wish to place on record that those of my subordinates who accepted their role in the affair were acting in good faith, like me, on my instructions. I also wish to clarify that there was never ever any kind of authorisation for these activities by the government. I take full responsibility for my actions and seek your pardon. I give an assurance, my dear brothers and sisters, that such activities will never take place in the future and I also appeal to all citizens of Pakistan in the supreme national interest to refrain from any further speculations and not to politicise this extremely sensitive issue of national security. May Allah keep Pakistan safe and secure. Long live Pakistan!
5 February 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,1141630,00.html>
Pakistan's Nuclear Secrets
Who has them? It had long been assumed that they were solely in the possession of Pakistan. However, investigations by the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Authority, into the Iranian nuclear programme - and later into Libya's - revealed that some of Pakistan's technologies had spread. It is also alleged that North Korea's nuclear bombs were built using Pakistani knowhow. How did they get there? Pakistan launched an investigation in November, and discovered that the founder of its nuclear programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was at the centre of the black market deals. He admitted, in a televised apology, that he accepted "full responsibility for all the proliferation activities conducted". Was it just him? There are six other suspects, but many are incredulous at the thought that Dr Khan could have acted without the wider support or knowledge of Pakistan's government and military elite. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, has also said that the scientist is just "the tip of an iceberg" of the many people in many countries who form an international trafficking network. "There's a lot of chains of activity that we need to follow through on," he said. Police in Malayasia are currently investigating whether a company controlled by the prime minister's son supplied nuclear components to Libya in a deal linked to Dr Khan. The Associated Press has reported that Pakistani officials told it Dr Khan occasionally ordered "disused equipment" to be sent to Malaysia for reconditioning before it was shipped to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Who is Dr Khan? The 69-year-old returned to Pakistan in 1976 after studying in Europe, and led the country's nuclear programme. The first tests of the country's nuclear deterrent against India in 1998 turned him into a national hero.
What will happen to him? Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, granted Dr Khan a pardon after his televised apology for his role in the trade. Putting such a popular figure on trial would have caused domestic difficulties for the president - opposition groups demonstrated on the streets in support of Dr Khan - and could also have led to embarrassing revelations about senior government and military officials. Why did he do it? "What is the motive of people? Money, obviously. That's the reality," Mr Musharraf said after granting the pardon. However, if there was a wider complicity on the part of elements of Pakistan's military and government, it is possible that money was not the sole motivation. The US and Britain went to war against Iraq to stop proliferation. Why did they ignore Pakistan? In part, there was an intelligence failure. Iraq's WMD programmes were believed to be more advanced than they actually were, while Iran's and Libya's, and the smuggling networks that created them, caught the international community off-guard. Little is known of the true extent of North Korea's programme, although it is believed that the country has enough reprocessed plutonium to manufacture a small number of bombs. But there is also a question of politics. Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, is an important US ally, and Washington is unwilling to put the kind of pressure on Mr Musharraf that would threaten his rule or make his job more difficult. The US state department has said that Pakistan has given it assurances that it will not allow its "technology to be used to help other nations that might be trying to develop weapons of mass destruction".
Simon Jeffery, The Guardian, 5 February 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,1141781,00.html> Why Dr Khan is Still a Superstar
Even during Pakistan's most recent decade of democracy, between 1988 and 1999, the country's politicians joke, no civilian was more powerful than the disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Cosseted by Pakistan's all-powerful army and the intelligence service, Dr Khan enjoyed unrivalled prestige and access to state resources. His motorcade, including special forces troops and decoy cars, was bigger than that of the commander-in-chief. Then came Pakistan's first nuclear bomb test in 1998, catapulting him to superstardom. His image was everywhere: on billboards, in classrooms, on bumper stickers. He won Pakistan's highest civilian honour, twice. Senior army officers and the popular press championed him as thecountry's defender against the threat of Indian aggression. "In terms of what he did for the country, no one can compare to A Q Khan," said a former army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg. "He gave us the nuclear bomb, he gave us protection against India." Dr Khan encouraged the adulation. He founded youth programmes and seminars in his name and distributed school textbooks telling his life story.
In
private, some former colleagues questioned his status. They noted rumours of
his vast fortune and considered him arrogant and vain. In the words of one
former associate: "The man's little better than a gangster." But even in
disgrace, most Pakistanis revere him. "Whatever he has done, we respect Dr
Qadeer as our father," said Omar, a student standing by one of Islamabad's
several nuclear monuments yesterday. "He made Pakistan strong." James Astill, The Guardian, 6 February 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1141957,00.html>
There is the Air of a Done Deal
"While the government has accepted Dr Khan's apology, the critical issue is how the world would view it ... Will Pakistan's non-proliferation vows be deemed credible by world opinion after all that has happened? The issue is ... the very image of Pakistan as a responsible nation that can be trusted with a finger on the nuclear trigger ... The international community has so far accepted Pakistan's possession of the nuclear bomb as a weapon of deterrence very grudgingly. Any suspicion that Pakistan remains a possible source of the spread of nuclear technology will render the country vulnerable to severe international pressure to roll back its nuclear programme." MA Niazi Nation, Pakistan, February 6 "There are only three possibilities. First, that Dr Khan was acting on orders from above, and now a huge cover-up is being conducted. Second, that Dr Khan managed to fool the entire military and intelligence establishments for two decades. Third, that he was proliferating on his own, either in the national interest, or purely for profit, or both, but that the authorities learnt about it afterwards, and kept quiet ... "General Pervez Musharraf himself was out of the loop until he became [army chief] in October 1998, but his insistence on a nuclear command authority was clearly the result of concern that Dr Khan was a loose cannon ... Gen Musharraf is paying for others' sins. One can disagree totally with how he has handled the affair, and in many ways it has been mishandled, but he did make one valid point at his briefing: if this business is ever going to be used by the 'international community' (ie, the US) to go after Pakistan as it did after Iraq ... it won't matter how it was handled; any excuse will be good enough." Arab News Editorial, Saudi Arabia, February 6 "There is the air of a done deal about Dr Khan's admission and now his pardon. Was it at Washington's prompting? Was Dr Khan's confession designed to short-circuit the more dramatic revelation of a Pakistani role by nuclear inspectors examining Libya's nuclear weapons programme? America does not want to see Gen Musharraf weakened. He is too important a part of President George Bush's war against the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida in eastern Afghanistan. Maybe knowing that emboldened the Pakistani leader yesterday to refuse UN supervision of its nuclear arsenal ... "It is understandable that Pakistanis are hurrying to defend the man who they believe has done so much to help defend them. But the wider ramifications of what Dr Khan has done are altogether harder to defend, particularly as regards North Korea, an unstable, erratic and unpredictable regime. If this renegade state ever unleashes a nuclear attack against its southern neighbour, Dr Khan's actions will be seen as unpardonable." Washington Post Editorial, February 6 "The attempt by Gen Musharraf to whitewash his country's marketing of nuclear weapons technology to rogue dictatorships and sponsors of terrorism comes as no surprise ... What's hard to believe is the Bush administration's reaction ... Rather than moving to impose sanctions on Pakistan ... it has swallowed his cover-up and even congratulated him on it. "Perhaps there is no alternative to a relationship with the general. But that relationship cannot be the only defence against further delivery of Pakistan's nuclear weapons technology to enemies of the US. Mr Bush should insist that Pakistan supply the details of its trafficking to the International Atomic Energy Authority and allow outside monitoring of its programmes. Stopping Pakistan's proliferation is vital to US security. It cannot be left to Gen Musharraf to decide how or whether it will be done." Financial Times Editorial, February 6 "There is not much good in all this, except that Libya's decision to abandon weapons of mass destruction has now brought to light a previously hidden network of nuclear proliferators. This has forced Gen Musharraf to take action ... and exposed Washington's Faustian pact with Islamabad in the war on terror ... At least the US goes to this month's nuclear negotiations with North Korea in Beijing armed with evidence that Pyongyang is lying when it claims to have no uranium enrichment programme. The problem is that the North Koreans are trying to follow the Pakistani example of having ... nuclear bombs as well as good relations with the US. "Pyongyang should not have both. Nor should Pakistan if it proliferates nuclear weapons. Gen Musharraf and Dr Khan must disclose everything they know about the international trafficking networks. That should help, and be followed by, an urgent review of current non-proliferation treaties to shut down the underground trade so starkly revealed this week."
The Guardian, 7 February 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,1143094,00.html> Bush Proposes Strict Limits on Black Market Sale of Equipment to Make Nuclear Fuel
WASHINGTON, Feb. 11 — President Bush on Wednesday proposed a seven-point plan to make it far more difficult to sell nuclear equipment on the black market, declaring that the ease with which North Korea, Iran and Libya received help from a Pakistani scientist showed that the United States must "prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses." Speaking at the National Defense University, Mr. Bush described the network created by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, more fully than any American official has in public. In doing so, the president broke years of official silence about a man who American intelligence agencies determined years ago was one of the world's most successful traffickers in nuclear technology. "There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated," Mr. Bush said in the half-hour speech, his most detailed yet about proliferation challenges. "Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction." But a crucial part of the seven-point plan led some critics to complain that Mr. Bush had not gone far enough. The president stopped well short of calling for an end to all trade in fissionable material — enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium — saying his plan would only limit such shipments "to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants." Those carefully chosen words would make Iran's current activities illegal, as well as North Korea's — providing the administration can persuade the country to dismantle its two nuclear weapons projects. But his proposal leaves room for multibillion dollar fuel-reprocessing operations in many developed nations in Europe — and nonnuclear states like Japan — that supply nuclear power plants. Several experts said they feared that the dual standard could undercut Mr. Bush's ability to sell his proposals among the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, many of whom have long resented what they view as an effort by the five original nuclear weapons states — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — to extend their monopoly. Israel, Pakistan and India also have nuclear weapons capability, and North Korea is widely believed to possess several weapons. Mr. Bush proposed a significant expansion of his Proliferation Security Initiative, a program to share intelligence among more than a dozen nations to intercept nuclear, biological and chemical weapons shipments — an operation that scored a major victory in October when it intercepted parts that Dr. Khan's network was sending to Libya. On Wednesday, the president said he wanted to "take direct action against proliferation networks," and he issued a warning akin to the one he has sent to terrorists. "We will find the middlemen, the supplier and the buyers," he vowed, adding later, "We will find you and we're not going to rest until you are stopped." Mr. Bush renewed a call for the United Nations Security Council to require all states to criminalize nuclear weapons proliferation — but he made no demand that Pakistan join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or allow international inspectors into the country. Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, said last week as he pardoned Dr. Khan that he would never submit to international control over Pakistan's weapons program. Mr. Bush, in one of his vaguer proposals, called for an expansion of legislation to retrain weapons scientists, saying the Nunn-Lugar program should be expanded from the former Soviet states to countries like Libya and Iraq. Former Senator Sam Nunn, one of the legislation's authors, said on Wednesday evening that Mr. Bush "never mentioned resources" in his speech, noting that the government now spends $600 million to $800 million a year on the program, an amount he considers insufficient. "The president said the terrorists are racing ahead" in their effort to obtain nuclear materials, Mr. Nunn said. "But we are walking." Mr. Bush also said that starting next year he wanted to make sure no country shipped nuclear equipment to any nation that had not signed the "additional protocol" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That protocol gives expanded rights to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, to inspect a country's nuclear facilities. Among those that have not yet adopted the protocol is the United States, and Mr. Bush called on the Senate to ratify it. It was a largely symbolic
gesture because the United States is already a declared nuclear weapons state.
David
E. Sanger, The New York Time Missing the Point
The worldwide concern caused by the unravelling of a nuclear black market is natural. Much has been said about it in the past few days and much is likely to be said in the coming weeks and months. Pakistan has been in the eye of the storm because it was here that the black market was apparently centred, but operatives were located in several countries. The issue is not just one of criminal activity on the part of some individuals, who must be identified and punished; it is one that involves the entire question of non-proliferation, and the current debate has to move to a wider plane. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr M. AlBaradei, has just tried to put it in perspective. He has stressed that the five established nuclear powers must set the pace by reducing their nuclear arsenals and that the international community must start addressing the root causes that create a sense of insecurity among nations and peoples. Who has the biggest responsibility in establishing a precedent for nuclear disarmament? Obviously the one country that has used atomic weapons - the United States. It also has the biggest stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and continues to experiment with the development of more sophisticated systems. The US has also employed other weapons of mass destruction on a large scale; its use of napalm during the Vietnam war remains horrifyingly fresh in memory. Even where more conventional weapons are concerned, America is far ahead of others, with awesome bombs such as the bunker busters that it rained on Afghanistan to locate Al Qaeda and Taliban elements hiding in mountain caves. Britain, France, China and Russia also remain in possession of WMD stockpiles. Nuclear weapons were justified during the cold war on the basis of establishing a balance of terror between the East and the West. In the current international situation, with even China swiftly integrating into the general economic and political order, that justification no longer exists. America is so powerful that the only threat of attack it faces is from terrorists, and "terrorists" and suicide bombers cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. If the US wishes to command moral authority in moving the world towards nuclear disarmament, then in concert with the other major powers it should start reducing and eventually destroying all weapons of mass destruction.. Moral authority will also be established if the US particularly and the western powers generally abandon their self-righteous role as the arbiters of right and wrong. People suffering from oppression but far too weak to protect themselves with the traditional means of armed resistance will inevitably resort to unconventional methods, as the Iraqi situation so vividly illustrates. The phenomenon of Palestinian suicide attacks is a direct outcome of Israeli policies of occupation and dispossession - policies backed by the US and the West. A fairer international system has to be created where people's rights, human dignity and independence and equality of all nations are recognized as basic guiding principles. Both the political and what Mr AlBaradei has called the security deficit need to be addressed if the development, acquisition and use of arms, both licit and illicit, have to be prevented. In the volumes of comments so far on the issue of nuclear proliferation, including President Bush's recent peroration, the US seems to be missing this essential point.
Dawn, 15 February 2004
US Urges China to Help Contain Spread of WMDs
The US Undersecretary of State said he had extensive discussions with Chinese officials on President George Bush's recent proposals to improve international non-proliferation efforts. Mr Bolton said he and his counterpart, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui, discussed Mr Bush's proposal to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to intercept weapons shipments. "Significantly, we had very good discussions on the Proliferation Security Initiative. Both China and the United States obviously are firmly opposed to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery," Mr Bolton told reporters. "We stand ready to enhance cooperation in such areas as information (intelligence) exchange. ... China shares the non-proliferation principles and objectives of those countries participating in PSI ..." Mr Bolton, who is in charge of arms control and international security, steered clear of criticizing China on proliferation, but indicated the Bush administration still had concerns. While China has cooperated with the US on some non-proliferation efforts, including weapons seizures, it has been found to have participated in proliferation, Mr Bolton alleged. "I think we've imposed more sanctions on China in the first three years of the Bush administration than in all eight years of the Clinton administration," he said, adding Washington wants Beijing to tighten weapons export controls. "It's something we just keep working at day after day." On Sunday, the Washington Post said US government officials and arms experts had released documents that showed dramatic evidence of China's role in Pakistan's nuclear programme. It said the documents were found in Libya, some of which included text in Chinese, and contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. The designs were sold to Libya by a Pakistani-led network, the daily alleged. Mr Bolton confirmed weapons designs were found but refused to comment on reports of Chinese involvement. China's foreign ministry did not respond to phone calls, but last week denied it was involved in proliferation. Under the PSI, Washington aims to implement widespread powers to seize suspected shipments of weapons of mass destruction or related materials transported by land, international waters and airspace. Though it voiced support for a global bid to stem the spread of the weapons, China has remained non-committal about joining the PSI and has raised concerns about whether PSI falls within the framework of international law. Mr Bolton also discussed the North Korean nuclear issue with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and on Monday said "the ball was in their (North Korea's) court" in terms of how well the second round of six-nation talks to convince the North to abandon its nuclear weapons programme, would go. The talks are scheduled to open in Beijing next Wednesday.
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/17/int12.htm> Musharraf Rejects N-Site Inspection
"This is a very sensitive issue ... Would any other nuclear power allow its sensitive installations to be inspected? Why should Pakistan be expected to allow anybody to inspect?" he asked in an interview with the Financial Times published on Wednesday. "We are not hiding anything - what is the need of any inspection? What for?" he said and added: "We will cooperate with any organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or anybody. But don't treat us as if we do not know what we are doing. We are doing everything according to international standards." He said the investigation into nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's proliferation ring had not uncovered any evidence that other countries had received nuclear secrets from Pakistan. Replying to a question, President Musharraf denied that nuclear weapons technology had been exchanged for North Korean ballistic missile technology. "Whatever we bought from North Korea was with money," he said. Gen Musharraf said Pakistan had no intention of freezing its nuclear weapons programme. It was self-sufficient and would not require the import of more material or designs from abroad, he said and added: "We will never stop our nuclear and missile programme." "That is our vital national interest. It is totally indigenous now. Whatever had to be imported and procured has been obtained," he said. President Musharraf said Pakistan would not try to match India's nuclear weapons development but would test-fire the Shaheen-II missile with a range of 2,000km in a few weeks. "We are not interested in competing with India," he said. "If they want to reach 5,000km or have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are not interested in those. We are only interested in our own defence," he said. Gen Musharraf said Dr Khan was a hero for him and the nation for having provided Pakistan with its nuclear deterrent. "I have been meeting Dr Khan ... I have had dinners with him and I held him in the highest esteem. Who in Pakistan did not hold him in high esteem," he said. He said Dr Khan and his six associates had acted without official authorization or knowledge. He said Pakistan's nuclear programme was not under the aegis of the military. "No sir, it is not, under the aegis of the military. It never was and it is not now," Musharraf said. "We have a National Command Authority with the president as the boss and there are a number of ministers - all the stakeholders - and the military men also. This is not a military body, it is the highest body of the nation," he said. President Musharraf reiterated that he had heard nothing of Dr Khan's nuclear smuggling since he became the military chief in 1998 and the ruler in 1999. "I believe in the army dictum that a commander is responsible for all that happens or does not happen in his command, and to that extent any president is responsible for what happens in the country," he said. "But otherwise, if you are hinting at my direct responsibility, no not at all. I do read in some newspapers some aspersions being cast ... it is all nonsense," Gen Musharraf said. He explained why it was plausible that Dr Khan and his accomplices had managed to smuggle nuclear designs past extensive security checks. "It is an unfortunate reality when the boss of an institution himself is involved," he said. "If there was a security problem here, and if I myself am involved in the breach, do you think anyone is going to check me? I am free to go anywhere, I can take anything in my car, I can take anything in my briefcase," he said. He said the investigators in the country had not established that Dr Khan had smuggled anything other than designs for centrifuges. He said the investigation, which was not yet complete, had not so far found that Dr Khan had transferred designs for nuclear weapons or more bulky material. "What is in a design?" he asked and added: "It is a piece of paper you put in your pocket, or it sits on the computer. For that matter I would say it is in the mind of the man. You do not have to carry it if you know it yourself." Gen Musharraf said: "A.Q. Khan has written that he will never be involved in these activities again - proliferation activation - that he regrets all that he has done, that he's not going to get involved in anything of this sort. If he breaches that, certainly the pardon will be revoked."
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/19/nat1.htm>
Pakistan Hopeful About N-Restraint Regime
ISLAMABAD, Feb 19: Pakistan and India agreed during the Feb 16-18 talks in Islamabad to hold technical-level discussions on nuclear confidence building measures with a suggestion for a nuclear restraint regime between the two countries, a foreign ministry official said here on Thursday. Speaking at a seminar, foreign office spokesman Masood Khan said he did not think India would reject the strategic nuclear restraint regime proposal out of hand. "In fact, there is a possibility they would show interest in the subject because they do realize the dangers involved if there is no restraint regime between the two countries at all," he said. Emphasizing the importance of such a regime, Mr Khan said that accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons presented a scary scenario for the two countries. The spokesman said in the beginning of his speech that some of his comments would be in personal capacity and some in official, but the course of his presentation did not specify which of his comments and remarks did not reflect the position of his ministry. On the nuclear issue, Mr Khan said the two countries had some history of discussing a restraint regime and making some progress. About the future talks, Mr Khan said it was premature to comment what the two foreign secretaries would discuss but "we have conventional wisdom behind us". "When they meet they would go into substance of the issue. Their conversations of the issues would not be limited to public statements. They would not stick to their stated positions. At this point, let us say there would be a positive evolution of this composite dialogue process." Referring to the Lahore declaration, he said there was a memorandum of understanding and the foreign secretaries of the two countries had talked about nuclear-capable missile, CBMs and also conventional balance with the objective to avoid conflict, adding, "we must build upon that". The spokesman said that during the three clusters of scheduled talks in the calendar, the most important cluster was with the foreign secretaries who would deal with peace and security, including CBMs and Kashmir as a separate cluster. Talking about Kashmir, Mr Khan said, it was Pakistan's commitment that the Kashmiri people would have to be and would be associated with the peace process at an appropriate time. "The people of Pakistan, India and Kashmiris want peace and resolution of their disputes but it is easier said than done. We have to negotiate in a manner that we find a common denominator that satisfies India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris. We have to find that magic formula." During the talks, Mr Khan said, there was a new chemistry between the delegations of India and Pakistan and the behaviour and conduct during the negotiations of the interlocutors was constructive. He said the momentum of the CBMs announced by Pakistan and India last year had created an enabling environment for the present talks. There were frustrations, and though CBMs were being announced, there was no engagement. What we needed at that time was political intervention and statesmanship and vision. We knew our position. We knew where India stood, where Pakistan stood. We had to move beyond deadlock." He said the operative part of current talks had a "strong, sincere expressions of intent that both sides would sustain this process." Former diplomat Akram Zaki, Air Marshal (retd) Ayaz Ahmed Khan and Lt-Gen (retd) Talat Masood were prominent among other speakers.
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/20/top2.htm>
Nuclear Underworld
The latest report comes from Kuala Lumpur, where the Malaysian police said Mr Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, served as a middleman on Dr Khan's behalf. In a 12-page report, the Malaysian police said citizens involved in proliferation came from Britain, Germany, Switzerland and Turkey. Accordingly, it suggested that the IAEA should launch investigations against "several individuals from Europe" involved in nuclear proliferation. On Thursday, the New York Times came out with a more revealing story, saying that while Dr Khan had been "demonized" by Europe and America, western intelligence agencies have known that nuclear technology had been "pouring out of Europe" for decades despite export control measures. The NYT also reported the case of a South African-born Israeli national who sold nuclear triggers to both Pakistan and India. Going by the cities where nuclear agents carried out their dangerous operations - Dubai, Istanbul, Caracas - one feels as if one is reading a James Bond novel. This underworld of greed and supreme criminality was abetted by what the New York Times calls "competition within Europe" for lucrative contracts with nations aspiring to produce nuclear weapons. Wile the international efforts to stop further spread of nuclear material must continue, it is time the West also examined the causes why some countries have been so keen to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The truth is that the US-European stand on the nuclear question has been marked by duplicity from the very beginning, for it helped Israel become a nuclear power. France gifted the Demona reactor to Israel, and the enriched uranium found "missing" from an American reactor landed up in Israel. Given the nature of Israel's conflict with its neighbours and its superiority in conventional weapons, Arab states were not doing something out of the ordinary by trying to match their enemy's nuclear capability. That they failed in this attempt is another matter. As for Pakistan, this country was left with no option but to develop its nuclear deterrence once India went nuclear in 1974. The revelations implicating other countries do not make Pakistan's job any easier, for Islamabad must continue to cooperate with the IAEA and other friendly countries in non-proliferation. Dr Khan's confession should serve to make Pakistan tighten its anti-proliferation measures. To be specific, Pakistan must so act and its control system should be so fool proof that the world community should believe in Islamabad's assurances on this score. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are only for defensive purposes and no country need have any misunderstanding or apprehension on this count. Enough damage has been done to the country's credibility on this score. One hopes Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri was not being overly optimistic when he said Pakistan had been able to "navigate" through multiple challenges successfully and that the fallout from the Dr Khan affair had been "contained."
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/22/ed.htm>
Responsible Nuclear State
It took foresight and courage on the part of President Pervez Musharraf to abandon the ostrich posture and take courageous decisions in order to reassure the world community that Pakistan can and will put a stop to criminal activity of the individuals who sold sensitive technology for personal greed. Thanks to the correct policies that ended Pakistan's isolation and brought it in the mainstream of the world community, our country today enjoys the goodwill and understanding of major powers so that they have refrained from voicing indignation or threatening sanctions. President Bush has noted Pakistan government's assurances that the "country will never again become a source of weapons proliferation." Under-secretary of state John Bolton has stated he did not detect any involvement of government leaders in the sale of nuclear technology. IAEA director-general Mohammad ElBaracie has expressed appreciation for Pakistan's cooperation in investigation of charges of leakage. Still apprehensions abound about future penalties and sanctions. Nor can these be dismissed, particularly if Pakistan were to fail to deliver on its pledge. But there is no basis to the speculation about a demand for unilateral rollback or a drive for "joint control" over Pakistan's nuclear assets. No such proposal has so far been made. Nor can Pakistan succumb to any demand, which might deprive it of the deterrence necessary for its security. To that end, the state has to continue the pursuit of the polices and approaches that can steer the ship of the state out of the current crisis. A salutary strategy has to aim at resuscitating confidence in our state's capacity for rectification and reform, and assure the world community that the leakage of sensitive technology will never happen again. Any attempt to belittle the past failure to safeguard sensitive technology would betray a cavalier attitude towards an issue of utmost gravity and further undermine our claim as a responsible nuclear state. Criminal activities of state functionaries cannot be shrugged off by equating them with private peddlers. Law holds a state responsible for the misconduct of its officials. Poor governance or prevalence of corruption and venality cannot win international extenuation or exculpation. Nor would it avail us to take shelter behind seductive slogans. The reasons are not to be found in prejudice alone even though Pakistan is painfully aware that it suffered discriminatory sanctions despite a convincing rationale for acquiring the capability for deterrence. Nor did Non-Proliferation Treaty apply to Pakistan as a non-party. The immediate trigger for counter-proliferation sanctions was the Indian bomb test in 1974. Canada and the US promptly prescribed mandatory sanctions against the acquisition of fissile technology. The western countries then decided on new measures to prevent transfer of nuclear technology. The pseudo-doctrine of clash of civilizations came much later. It was irrelevant to the main US focus in the 1990s on prevention of leakage of nuclear material and technology from Russia. Even currently, not all the states in the eye of the storm are Muslim. The principal driver of the recent anti-proliferation drive was 9/11. It conjured up the nightmare of weapons of mass destruction being used for terrorist acts and injected a new urgency into the prevention of proliferation. Not only in the United States perceptions and preoccupations changed. Mohammed ElBaradei has warned, "With deadly technology going on the market, there is the terrible possibility that terrorist groups could obtain the ultimate weapons they desire most." The main targets of counter-proliferation now became the states suspected of pursuing the weapons option even though they were parties to the NPT. The world community is also concerned about he danger of loss of control and of weapons falling in the hands of the extremists. Recognizing the objective reality and mindful of lurking dangers, our state must continue to walk the right road, cooperate with the world community, devise and learn efficacious measures, and pursue proactive policies and solemn approaches to reassure the world community that Pakistan has turned the page. Those who peddled the state secrets and exposed the nation to international censure and jeopardized national security must be held to account. Deterrent action has to be an integral part of crime prevention. Pakistan should show willingness to cooperate with the world community in reduction of nuclear dangers. Expanding programmes and arsenals, dispersal of warheads and delivery systems, and increase of personnel in the chain of command have added to the dangers of accidental or unauthorized use. Pakistan's strategic plans division has already introduced stringent custodial controls and reliability checks on the personnel. It will no doubt continue to devise and implement additional measures. Other neo-nuclear states, too, can benefit from cooperation with the more experienced nuclear powers in order to learn means and methods for foolproof security of strategic assets. A proposal for initiation of such a multilateral dialogue would underline Pakistan's earnestness and sense of responsibility. Pakistan should also support the proposal put forward by Mohammed ElBaradei, calling for the international community "to engage in an urgent dialogue that can move up towards an agreed package of measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and international security system." The European Union has suggested that nuclear plants in all countries should be brought under IAEA safeguards. At the first sight the idea seems impractical. Safeguards were devised only to prevent clandestine diversion of fissile materials for weapons. But if the other seven nuclear states show a positive inclination, Pakistan should do the same. Islamabad is on record to be willing to sign the NPT if India did. Utmost caution is needed in public discussion of nuclear issues such as 'No First Use'. Fortunately, our articulation has matured so that few flaunt nuclear weapons as some did in the past. That was never necessary. Every one understands that deterrence depends on the fear of the use of weapon of last resort. But threatening their use projects an image of a trigger-happy people. Instead, our emphasis should be on the prevention of nuclear as well as conventional war. (No first use of force). The task confronting Pakistan is difficult but doable. It can overcome the proliferation crisis just as it has others over recent years. It has extricated itself from external isolation and multiple sanctions. Aid flows have been resumed. International financial institutions and aid donors have commended Pakistan's performance. Transparency International has recognized the curbing of corruption. Not only is the state financially stronger and more self-reliant. It has also taken encouraging strides toward improved governance and political consensus. Of course, this encouraging record needs to be built on. The problems at home and abroad will not go away. We have to cope with them through provident policies and improved performance.
Abdul Sattar, 23 February 2004 <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/23/op.htm> Peace in Nuclear South Asia
There is danger of a possible loss, leakage or pilferage of nuclear weapons or technology. The Soviet nuclear scientists and technicians rendered surplus have been hired elsewhere. Thus the resultant nuclear proliferation became a matter of great concern, if such weapons, material or technology fell in unauthorized hands. The nuclear arsenal of Russia remains intact. The nuclear countries retain the option of conducting nuclear tests and maintaining or increasing their nuclear stockpiles. China is the only country which has made a commitment renouncing the first use of its own nuclear weapons. Russia, China and France have self-imposed a moratorium on nuclear testing. The Bush administration is opposed to any such limitations. In spite of several international conferences on the subject, no date or time has been set to ultimately, ensure a world, free of all types of nuclear weapons. The Middle East situation is far from being normal. United States continues to occupy Iraq. Whatever nuclear capability Iraq had, was destroyed under the IAEA supervision long ago. Israel is the only nuclear power in the region, increasing the chances of a nuclear blackmail. Its aggressive policy, the killing of the innocent people and destroying the homes of the Palestinians leaves little hope of peace in the region. In fact, real peace may evade the region if Israel's nuclear capability is not fully addressed. In order to comprehend the implications and inherent dangers in the present state of the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia, it is important to take into consideration the events resulting in the present state. There have been three wars between India and Pakistan. India enjoys a considerable superiority in conventional weapons. Its indigenous defence production is superior to that of Pakistan. India is also one of the biggest importers of military hardware. So when India progressively developed a nuclear capability starting in 1974 and eventually conducted a nuclear explosion, Pakistan had no option but to do what it did. As declared by President Musharraf, the policy is to develop and maintain minimum nuclear deterrence. The minimum deterrence that has been developed will continue to be improved both qualitatively and quantitatively in accordance with the requirement of the developing situation. Similarly an appropriate delivery system will continue to be improved in terms of pay-load as well as range. This is necessary to ensure strategic balance in the region. Should the understanding between the two countries improve to complete satisfaction of both, the need for deterrence may disappear. Today both countries not only have nuclear weapons but also a well developed delivery system. With a common border and with no understanding on nuclear restraint regime, the situation could be highly explosive. As a follow-up from the joint statement by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, a number of steps have been taken and further steps are likely to be taken to resolve outstanding problems and issues between the two countries. One of the most important issues, which deserves immediate and urgent attention is that of creating a nuclear restraint regime. The two countries have to come to an understanding to avoid a nuclear confrontation and holocaust which can lead to mutual destruction. An understanding on this issue will go a long way to remove fears, apprehensions, bitterness and hostilities that have existed so far. In view of the inherent dangers, Pakistan has been advocating bilateral discussion on the nuclear issue. Several proposals had been made in this regard in the past. As India feels that the nuclear capability of China and Pakistan poses danger to its national security, Pakistan proposed in 1991, a five-power meeting between the representatives of the US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan to arrive at an agreement for keeping the South Asian region free of nuclear weapon. India rejected this proposal. Pakistan and India must retain the nuclear option as long as other nations possess nuclear weapons. A division of the world between the nuclear-haves and nuclear have-nots cannot be accepted. Denunciation and rejection of nuclear weapons must remain the ultimate objective. While Pakistan and India have pledged to work to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, both have reiterated that neither would sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In any case the NPT has become meaningless as the goal of general and complete disarmament is nowhere in sight. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is taking place not only because it is a profitable business - it has more sinister motives behind it. As is evident, subversion and attempts by foreign agents to destabilize Pakistan has continued. A nuclear- free zone for South Asia has been proposed from time to time. This may not be a practical proposition in the present circumstances. In the absence of nuclear-free zone in South Asia, Pakistan is willing to accept any non-discriminatory regional settlement for establishing a nuclear safe zone in South Asia. The security and well-being of more than one billion people residing in South Asia must remain the primary concern of not only this region but also of the world in general. India and Pakistan bear special responsibility in this regard. Should India and Pakistan agree to declare South Asia as a Nuclear Safe Zone, which they must, to avert a nuclear holocaust, they have to devise a mechanism for nuclear arms control measures similar to those evolved by the two superpowers. These may include arms control, mutual inspections in addition to considering containing their nuclear weapons capability under verifiable safeguard, covering nuclear material and facilities. Safety of nuclear installations to prevent nuclear hazards and transborder effects by major nuclear accidents will have to be ensured. Towards that end it is desirable to create a crises control mechanism. All this could only be done by promoting bilateral nuclear transparency in the spirit of peace and security. Could it be possible for India and Pakistan to agree to cap their nuclear programmes at the existing or some agreed levels? Of course the entire problem of establishing nuclear safe zone and nuclear restraint regime requires a comprehensive examination by both countries at political, diplomatic and technical levels. While discussing the evolution of a nuclear safe south Asia, it must be emphasized that we have to remove the existing impasse by resolving the core political issue, which has caused hostilities between our two countries for more than a half century. An amicable settlement of Kashmir issue can bring about a positive change in our bilateral relations. Let us break the prevailing barriers of doubt and suspicion and look to the future with an open mind. Let us cooperate to create a durable peace in the subcontinent.
Ghulam Umar, Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/24/op.htm>
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative Conference
Baroness Symonds, Chairman Oakden, and distinguished colleagues, allow me to begin by expressing the appreciation of the United States Government to the United Kingdom for hosting the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative Conference in this gracious setting. Since the first modest gathering at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels in the summer of 1999, this event has brought together a growing number of experts to share information, explore options, and help shape innovative action to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and reduce their presence in the world. There is, as President Bush said on February 11, no greater threat to world peace than weapons of mass destruction in the wrong hands. Dealing with the legacy of the Cold War in Russia and other Eurasian states continues to command most of our collective resources and efforts. But new threats and challenges have arisen around the world that require our urgent attention. In his recent speech at the National Defense University in Washington, President Bush cited the consensus among nations that proliferation must not be tolerated and called on all countries to strengthen their international nonproliferation efforts in several areas. Last week, the UK’s Foreign Secretary Straw spoke on these same issues, as did Australia’s Foreign Minister Downer. Other important voices have joined the growing chorus urging vigilance against this threat to peace. While I will confine myself to President Bush’s remarks, the ideas expressed by these statesmen are highly complementary. The President proposed steps to tighten control of the nuclear fuel cycle so that fissile material can’t be diverted to military programs; he offered more reliable access to fuel for those countries who renounced dangerous technologies of enrichment and reprocessing but wish to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The President reiterated his call for a UN Security Council Resolution requiring states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure dangerous materials. He proposed the universalization of the Additional Protocol by a date certain to enhance international safeguards and urged that the International Atomic Energy Agency be given the tools to do its job more effectively. Further, he proposed that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to law enforcement cooperation, to prosecute illicit networks and other sources of proliferation. Finally, the President proposed expansion of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Nonproliferation will be a major focus of discussion at the Sea Island Summit of the G8 in June and enhancing the Global Partnership will be a prominent goal. Since the Global Partnership was launched in June 2002 at the G8 Kananaskis Summit, the international community has renewed and reinvigorated cooperation with Russia to address the WMD legacy of the Cold War in order to reduce, control, and eliminate weapons, materials, and expertise. The G8 partners are now fully engaged with Russia on a wide variety of projects. In response to the United States pledge to contribute half of the $20 billion target of the Global Partnership, the other G7 countries have thus far pledged an additional $7 billion to be used over ten years. Last summer, at the Evian Summit, the G8 welcomed Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden as new contributors to the Partnership. So far, these six nations have committed to projects totaling over $200 million, and we hope that they will be making significant additional commitments over the coming year. There is strong consensus within the international community that $20 billion, although a substantial commitment, is not sufficient to meet the priority proliferation risks over the Global Partnership decade. In proposing expansion of Global Partnership donors, the President recognized the need to do even more. The United States, on behalf of the G8, urges other governments to join the Global Partnership and increase the resources and expertise needed to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and those who support them. Several nations met with current Global Partnership members here in London yesterday to explore joining the Global Partnership. We are confident that these efforts will pay off in an expanded Global Partnership that better accomplishes our crucial goals. We welcome expressions of interest from other countries. Additional partners and increased resources will help expand the work of the Global Partnership beyond Russia, as envisioned by the G-8 from its inception. Projects on nonproliferation in other states, both in Eurasia and beyond, should be encouraged and recognized under the Global Partnership. Though the United States and some other nations already have substantial work underway in other Eurasian countries, the challenges of preventing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their delivery systems; of tightening export controls; and of redirecting the work of former weapons scientists are compelling, they require greater international attention and cooperative efforts. In recent months, we are seeing new opportunities in countries such as Iraq and Libya, where cooperation was not previously possible. In short, we believe the Global Partnership should be expanded both in terms of participating donor countries and geographically in terms of recipients where there are pressing needs and challenges. We also believe, however, that Russia should remain our primary priority. I would like to briefly describe some of the work the U.S. is doing in Russia and elsewhere in Eurasia under the Global Partnership. From 1992 through 2003, U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in the region totaled about $8.2 billion, and have spanned a range of activities to address nuclear, chemical, and biological concerns that include cooperation on export controls, and redirection of former weapons scientists. The U.S. Congress has appropriated about $1 billion in FY 2004, including Department of Energy programs of about $441 million, Department of Defense programs of about $456 million, and Department of State programs of about $125 million. Outside of the former Soviet Union, the United States now spends about 200 million dollars per year on nonproliferation work ranging from assistance to improve export controls and border security to the removal of HEU from research reactors. I am eager to hear more about the plans and programs that other governments will present today, and I know that we will all learn a great deal from one another, as we always do, in the working sessions. The high quality of the professionals gathered here is an inspiration to all of us as we face the challenge of confronting and defeating the scourge of weapons of mass destruction. Success will take time, patience, ingenuity, and resources but I’m confident and my government is confident that together we can manage and defeat this global menace through our collaborative efforts. Thank you very much.
Andrew K. Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/31034pf.htm>
US, Europe at Odds Over Strategy on Iran
Although the United States and its allies have expressed concern about Iran's nuclear pursuits, the issue is sowing new trans-Atlantic divisions, with Washington demanding tougher action against Tehran than the Europeans are willing to consider. "Everybody is a little bit shy about what to do (on Iran) because the European Union 3 (Britain, France and Germany) has hijacked the process," one US official said. "What this has done ... is to drive a wedge between the United States and the EU3. It creates a lot of uncertainty ... There are countries out there who are always going to give Iran the benefit of the doubt," he said. The 35-member board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will meet on Monday, with Libya and Iran key items on the agenda. Late last year, Iran acknowledged it was secretly developing a broad range of nuclear capabilities for 18 years. In November, however, the IAEA board opted not to sanction Iran for these disclosures after Tehran, in negotiations with the EU3, pledged new cooperation, including snap inspections and a temporary halt to enriching uranium, a bomb fuel. Since then, there have been new revelations about Iran's programme and an IAEA report last week concluded Tehran still had not answered key questions about its programmes. Looking to June: Iran, which insists its nuclear programmes are peaceful, made another pledge to halt all uranium enrichment. The United States insists evidence is mounting that Tehran is bent on producing nuclear weapons, but IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei this week hailed a "sea change" in Iran and voiced confidence it would make good on its new pledges. US officials said previously that the IAEA board might not be ready at its March meeting to declare Iran in non-compliance with its international obligations and refer the issue to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. But Under secretary of State John Bolton, the top US non-proliferation official, was in London for new talks this week and President George Bush has also weighed in in phone calls to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders. "We did our darndest to get a non-compliance resolution," one official said. US officials and experts fear that failing to take action against Iran would undermine the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, a bedrock against the spread of nuclear weapons. Now US officials said they are looking to have the IAEA board adopt a statement that keeps Iran on the agenda and underscores concern about the new revelations. "We want to be tougher (than the Europeans) and call Iran to task for past failures. The question is whether it will be tough enough to meet our standards and to convince Iran we really do mean business," one US official said. US officials say if they are patient now, they will be in a stronger position to advocate censuring Iran at the next IAEA board meeting in June. But a European diplomat disagreed. "It wouldn't make sense to set unrealistic deadlines, especially if we knew the IAEA would not have time to do a full technical analysis of the data" on Iran, he said. At next week's meeting, the United States, Britain and Libya will sponsor a resolution praising Libya for its recent decision to abandon its nuclear programmes and highlight by comparison Iran's refusal to do so, a US official said. Significantly, the board will refer the Libya issue to the UN Security Council because that is what the NPT demands in any case of a violation, and it sets a precedent for possible future action against Iran, he added. -Reuters
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/05/int8.htm>
Reflections on the Proliferation Scandal
China’s handling of the North Korean nuclear issue has a lesson for Pakistan. Besides, China may be helpful within the Security Council framework but outside of it Beijing’s usefulness would be quite limited The nuclear-proliferation scandal has been a harrowing experience for Pakistan. While the atmosphere is still emotionally charged, every day bringing a new revelation, it is appropriate to reflect on some of the issues that have arisen in the course of this crisis, especially, the question of how we can handle the threat to our nuclear programme in the future? When the government initially decided to investigate the matter, it was bitterly criticised. Most Pakistanis said the West had no locus standi in the matter and was equally guilty of proliferation. This was an indiscreet argument. Failure to investigate the matter would only have strengthened the suspicion of the international community regarding Pakistan’s involvement in proliferation. While the media in the West continue to allege the involvement of Pakistani state in the business, the fact remains that the IAEA, the EU and the Bush administration have issued a clean bill of health to Islamabad. This is owed to Pakistan’s prompt action in the matter. One could argue that the acceptance by the West, particularly by the Bush administration of the non-involvement of Pakistan, is motivated by its need for Pakistan in the war against terror. True. But why would Mr Elbaradei, chairman of IAEA, absolve Pakistan of any wrongdoing? The IAEA is a technical body and its head cannot make a statement unless he is convinced of it. The certificate of non-involvement by Pakistan, whether political or otherwise, is a saving grace. It could not have come about without the cooperation extended by Pakistan to the IAEA. Pakistan has a good case of non-involvement and it is borne out by considerable circumstantial evidence. For example, Col. Qaddafi’s son has revealed that Libya paid $40 million to Pakistani scientists. According to papers discovered in the 1990s, a certain Malik, supposedly acting on behalf of Dr A Q Khan, offered the sale of nuclear technology to Iraq for a paltry sum of $5 million. This ridiculously small sum precludes the possibility of government-to-government dealings, but is a huge amount in individual deals. The non-involvement of Pakistan is also proved by the kind of relations that existed between it and some of the beneficiaries of the nuclear technology during the period in question. Take the case of Iran. During the 1980s and 1990s, when the nuclear technology transfer took place, Pakistan, except for a brief period, did not enjoy good relations with Iran. Similarly, the allegation of transfer of nuclear technology to Libya cannot stick because Pakistan has not enjoyed good relations with that country since the execution of premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It is hard to believe that Pakistan was transferring nuclear technology to these countries while not having good relations with them. As to North Korea, it has been an open secret that the latter has been more in need of cash than technology and that Pakistan paid through its nose to acquire missile technology from it. If Pakistan’s involvement is ruled out, can we say that the Pakistan army was involved? Unlikely. The army as an institution, like the government, would not stoop so low for such a ludicrous amount. What cannot be ruled out is the involvement of some army personnel in personal capacity, including perhaps the chief of army staff, in addition to the scientists. There is a mystery regarding the role played by Iran and Libya in blowing the whistle on Pakistan. It is not clear what made them do so. One can only guess and conjecture. Iran has traditionally treated Pakistan as an inferior nation and has always found hard to accept it as a nuclear power. Could this be the reason for its denunciation of Pakistan? Or has the bitter memory of Pakistan’s support for Taliban made it do it? Or was it because of the inferior quality of centrifuge parts reportedly provided by Dr AQ Khan? Similarly, what made Libya denounce Pakistan? Did the mercurial Qaddafi want to ingratiate with the US at the expense of Pakistan or was he incensed by the ingratitude of the latter despite bankrolling its nuclear programme in the initial stages? In any case the dirty role played by these two Muslim countries hopefully would have a sobering effect on those who have delusions of an “Islamic bomb”; they should be disabused of such wishful thinking. Some quarters have argued that Pakistan has done no wrong since it is not a party to the NPT. This argument is flawed because Pakistan has, on a number of occasions, given assurances to the international community to be bound by the NPT regime. Indeed, these “unilateral declarations” could, in light of international law, be construed as creating treaty obligations for Pakistan. Also, of all the crimes relating to nuclear matters, proliferation is emerging as the most heinous one, forcing some analysts to term it as a crime against humanity. Finally, the West that sets the rules of the game in international politics has proscribed it and Pakistan can defy this norm at its own peril. For all these reasons we cannot successfully argue that Pakistan can proliferate at will because it is not a party to the NPT. Now, the final question: Is there a threat to Pakistan’s nuclear programme following Khan’s confessions? In our judgment, the threat remains, despite Bush administration’s statement to let bygones be bygones as long as Pakistan acts responsibly in the future by not becoming a source of nuclear proliferation. But it is not imminent. There has been a bipartisan consensus in the US against Pakistan’s nuclear programme from day one. The threat, which had increased with the advent to corridors of power of the neo-cons, has been compounded since 9/11. This signifies that the US would be on the look out for an excuse to get Pakistan to roll back its programme or seek to bring it under international control. What can Pakistan do to ward off any threat to its nuclear programme? The option of help from the toothless and fragmented Islamic ummah is not a serious one. This is amply demonstrated by the role the OIC has played in the recent Middle Eastern crises. Can Pakistan count on China? It must be said that by issuing a statement absolving Pakistan of any involvement in nuclear proliferation and showing trust in it despite the fact that its name was somewhat sullied because of the revelations of wrongdoing by Pakistani scientists the Chinese have been most helpful to Pakistan. Their help can be expected in the future provided it is not at variance with China’s own national interest. This caveat is in order because China has taken the strategic decision not to challenge the US at this stage. China’s handling of the North Korean nuclear issue has a lesson for Pakistan. Besides, China may be helpful within the Security Council framework but outside of it Beijing’s usefulness would be quite limited. This point is important, as the West has handled nuclear issues in recent times outside the UNSC as demonstrated, for example, in the Iranian case. Pakistan, thus, will have to rely on its own resources to counter any threat to its nuclear programme. For this purpose we need to put our house in order through restoration of full and genuine democracy urgently and shun the one-man pseudo-military rule because it is amenable to American diktat as demonstrated by the way the US is currently dealing with Pakistan, particularly in its so-called war on terror. Parallel with this, it is absolutely imperative that we put in place a foolproof mechanism to stop the export of nuclear-related technology.
Ijaz Hussain, The Daily Times <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_5-3-2004_pg3_2>
"We have no reason to believe that President Pervez Musharraf or the top echelons of the Pakistani government were in any way involved with Khan," US Under secretary of State John Bolton told reporters in Lisbon where he is taking part in a two-day security conference. "There may well be officials in the Pakistani government, military people, scientists, who were part of his network," he added. "But I distinguish between that and sanctioned approval, complicity, by the top levels of the Pakistani government as to which we have no evidence." Mr Bolton said Washington could not rule out the possibility that Dr Khan and his network had made out nuclear sales to other countries or that the trafficking was still continuing. "We do not know the extent to which other parts of the network may have survived, we are still investigating," he said. "There are reports that Khan was engaged with other countries and I wouldn't say these are reports that we feel we can confirm but it is obviously critical to try and understand the extent of his network's activities." The under secretary praised Gen Musharraf, however, for taking what he described as 'important steps' to disrupt the network and make sure that the nuclear proliferation stops. -AFP
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/05/top3.htm>
Libya Ready to Sign Inspection Protocol: More Equipment Sent to US
On Monday, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors begins meeting to discuss resolutions on Iran and Libya's previously undeclared nuclear programmes. "Libya is expected to sign the Additional Protocol at the meeting," a Western diplomat said, referring to the tough inspections procedure that allows snap UN inspections of nuclear facilities. It was unclear when the signing would take place at the meeting, which is expected to last until Friday. While backroom talks on Libya among the 35 nations on the IAEA board have been relatively unproblematic, discussions on an Iran resolution to be submitted to the board have been much more difficult and will continue throughout the weekend. Originally France, Germany and Britain had promised Iran they would block any resolution in exchange for Tehran's promise last week to suspend all activities related to the enrichment of uranium. The United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia have prepared a draft resolution on Iran that stops short of reporting Tehran to the Council, but draws attention to Iran's failure to declare potentially weapons-related technology and research in an October dossier it said was full and truthful. "They (the Europeans) have come round and see the need for a resolution on those omissions," another Western diplomat said. "We want to maintain the heat, the pressure." The October dossier did not mention designs and parts for advanced "P2" centrifuges capable of producing bomb-grade uranium, as well as experiments in making plutonium and polonium, which can be used to spark a chain reaction in a bomb. The diplomat said the resolution was in the process of "fine tuning". Although the board members appeared close to a text that was acceptable to most, it was too early to say the draft resolution was nearly final. Consent: Tripoli promised to sign the Additional Protocol as soon as the IAEA board officially approved its intention to join the protocol. Currently fewer than 40 of the more than 180 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories have approved the protocol. When IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei visited Tripoli in late December, Libyan officials agreed to act as if the protocol was already in force by giving UN inspectors unfettered access to all its sites. Libya has also consented to a US-British sponsored IAEA resolution that will praise Libya's decision to disarm but will notify the UN Security Council about its past violations of the NPT, diplomats said. The report to the Council, which has the power to impose sanctions, will be purely informative and will not call for punitive measures, diplomats said. Equipment Sent to US: Libya on Saturday sent to the United States all the known remaining equipment associated with its nuclear weapons programme, along with its longer-range missiles and launchers, the White House said. A contracted ship containing 500 tons of equipment left Libya early in the morning and was on its way to an undisclosed site in the United States, White House National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said. The shipment included all of Libya's known centrifuge parts and all equipment from its former uranium conversion facility. The White House said the ship was also carrying all of Libya's longer-range missiles, including five Scuds, and all associated equipment, including launchers. "It's coming to the US. We're not saying where or when for security reasons," Mr McCormack told reporters after President George Bush met the president of Mexico at his Texas ranch. He said the United States would begin discussions with Libyan officials on Sunday on retraining their weapons scientists. Libya announced in December it would abandon any efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and has allowed US inspectors to search its weapons sites and to remove sensitive equipment. In recognition of its efforts, the Bush administration announced last month it would allow US oil firms to begin negotiating to return. It also ended a restriction on Americans from using their US passports to visit the country. In addition, the administration decided to allow Libya to establish a diplomatic presence in Washington following its decision to base several US diplomats in Tripoli.-Reuters Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/07/int1.htm> China Denies N-Transfer
Referring to North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment programme, Foreign Minister Li said at a news conference: "We don't have (any) such information about the alleged uranium programme of North Korea." "(Even) if the media's information is supported by evidence, that will have nothing to do with China," the minister added. Stressing that China has always advocated a nuclear-weapon- free Korean peninsula, Mr Li said: "We don't wish to see the Korean peninsula with nuclear weapons, we wish to see (the) peninsula that is peaceful, stable and prosperous." Li Zhaoxing at his annual news conference on Saturday contributed much of his time to talk about bilateral relations between China and its neighbouring countries. Talking about a tension-free South Asia, he said China was "very pleased to see" that Pakistan and India were trying to improve bilateral relations. Deliberating on Sino-Russian ties, Mr Li announced that Chinese and Russian presidents would hold a summit in Beijing in the latter half of this year. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Premier Wen Jiabao would also visit to Russia this year. Li said only when the Japanese leaders take history as a mirror and look into the future, can the friendship between China and Japan develop. -APP
Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/08/top16.htm>
Nuclear Watchdog Presses Pakistan for Help
But informed diplomats said that Pakistan, recently revealed to be at the centre of a vast nuclear trafficking network, was refusing to provide detailed information or access to nuclear facilities. Opening a meeting in Vienna of the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr ElBaradei indirectly said Pakistani assistance was critical to making sense of the nuclear clues found by his inspection teams in Iran. Information from Pakistan is also crucial because of recent revelations of an extensive black market in nuclear technology masterminded by the Pakistani metallurgist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and his confession that he supplied Iran, Libya, and North Korea with illicit nuclear equipment. "They are not letting us get hold of the discussion with Khan," one diplomat said. The status of Iran's nuclear programmes is the biggest issue at the meeting of the 35-strong board, with the US at odds with the EU troika of Britain, France, and Germany over how to deal with the Iranians. Those differences persisted yesterday, with diplomats shuttling from one meeting to another arguing over the wording of a draft resolution. One of the biggest riddles concerns traces of highly enriched uranium - the fissile material used for nuclear warheads - found by UN inspectors in Iran last year and never satisfactorily explained. The Iranians claimed the traces were imported on equipment bought from Khan's network. But the inspectors need to match the samples with samples in Pakistan to verify the explanation. Otherwise, the inspectors may conclude that Iran was itself enriching uranium secretly, a crucial step towards obtaining a nuclear bomb. "It is essential that the [IAEA] receives full cooperation [from] those countries from which nuclear technology and equipment originated," said Dr ElBaradei. "This is particularly the case with the major outstanding issue regarding the low and high enriched uranium contamination found [in Iran]."
Ian Traynor, The Guardian, 9 March 2004 No Plans to Quit Nuclear Treaty, says Tehran: Inspectors' Return Negotiable
Foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi also left open the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors which Tehran suspended after the strong IAEA resolution against it, but said this would have to be renegotiated. "The method of cooperation could change if the realities are ignored," Asefi told a press conference, while adding, "the question of cooperation is not at issue." Asefi was reacting to Saturday's US-backed IAEA resolution condemning Iran for hiding possibly weapons-related nuclear activities. "We have cooperated with the IAEA and we are still interested in this cooperation because we are clear on our objectives and intentions", he said, recognising that European allies had "done what they could" to assist Iran. "We were expecting (more) from them, but the Europeans did what they could," Asefi said. "We have not noticed any violation of their obligations," he added. In October, the German, French and British foreign ministers persuaded Tehran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and suspend uranium enrichment. Asefi said remarks on Wednesday by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi indicating that Tehran could break ties with the IAEA had been misinterpreted. Kharazi had said: "We are engaged in cooperation (with the IAEA), and for this to continue the cooperation has to be bilateral. If one side does not respect its obligations, the cooperation will end." Asefi branded the IAEA resolution "unfair and insulting," saying the cancellation of the inspection team's visit was Tehran's response to it. "The necessary coordination will take place with the IAEA for the visit of the inspectors and the conditions and date of their arrival will be the subject of discussions", Asefi added. "We will not allow anyone to speak of the Islamic republic in this manner," Asefi warned. He dubbed "unacceptable" IAEA demands for a complete accounting of Iran's nuclear activities, stressing that Tehran had "nothing to hide." And he said that the refusal to allow in the inspectors should not be used as a pretext to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, which could decide to implement sanctions. But senior diplomats in Tehran said such rampant threats were customary and often hot air, even if they should be taken seriously, and that it was not the first time Iran had refused to welcome IAEA inspectors. "There are public statements and then there is work behind the scenes. What we see is Iranians continuing to cooperate. They took part in all the meetings in Vienna," said one diplomat. "The question is whether Iranians have any choice other than cooperation and whether those who extol a breach are able to enforce their views," he said. "It is not what happens at the IAEA meetings which count, but at least what happens between the meetings," another diplomat said, "and if the resolution highlighted the deficiencies, it also stressed that the Iranians have shown cooperation". The IAEA, which verifies the NPT, has since February 2003 been working to determine whether Iran's nuclear programme is peaceful, or geared towards secretly developing atomic weapons, as the United States has charged. It is to review the Iranian programme in June and Tehran's decision to put off the inspection could mean the inspectors would not have enough time to file a full report, a diplomat said in Vienna. -AFP
<http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/15/int7.htm>
US Monitoring China, Pakistan's Nuclear Activities Since '60s
For the purpose of intelligence gathering the US government deployed a variety of detection systems, including US Air Force planes, spy drones, satellites, human intelligence and acoustic, seismic, and radiological equipment to monitor nuclear activities such as the production of fissile materials, plutonium and enriched uranium. A Nov 18, 1964 telegram from the US embassy in Karachi to the US State Department records formulation of a proposal to monitor secretly, from Pakistani territory, China's nuclear activities. Even though the proposal was rejected by the then President Ayub, declassified US Department of State documents reveal the US secretly went ahead with its planned proposal. According to the report sent by the US delegation after meeting President Ayub, it was said: " ... I observed that several weeks ago we had asked for standby permission to bring in C-130s for atmospheric samplings over Pakistan as needed within 24 hours after the next Chinese detonation. Ayub said he knew about (the) request. But he (was) unable to agree to it." An outgoing joint state/defence message titled 'Project Clear Sky' said (according to the declassified US document): AEDS (Atomic Energy Detection Systems) activities were planned for 31 countries, including Pakistan with the operational responsibility assigned to the USAF (US Air Force). A document from US deputy chief AF Technical Applications Centre to the US State Department shows that one of the assigned tasks performed by the USAF as part of the AEDS was the determination of rare gases produced as a result of nuclear activities in different target countries. "This is accomplished by analysis and evaluation of atmospheric samples collected by a world-wide network of stations." Some AEDS projects took up so little space that the US government could operate the applicable equipment at embassies or consular offices without the knowledge of the host government and without any approval. Documents (a letter from the department of the US Air Force to special assistant for US atomic energy agency dated April 1,1962) show that during the 1960s, circumvention became possible through use of the B/20-4 'heat exchangers' of the size of a refrigerator which could be used to measure levels of 'rare gases.' "The equipment we employ in this operation is called a B-20- 4 atmospheric sampling unit or 'heat exchanger.' This equipment is installed in a cabinet which is approximately 7.5-foot high, 1.5-foot wide, two-foot deep and weighs approximately 500 pounds," an official document reveals. Moreover, documents (telegram from US State Department to embassies, including the US embassy in Karachi dated Oct 7, 1964) show Ground Filter Units (GFUs) were scheduled for installation at various posts, including Karachi. "Experience has proven units can be installed and operated without reference to host government," the documents said. Another document reveals the American consulate in Karachi was listed as one of the recipients of related equipment which said "USAF has high priority requirement to obtain air samples in addressee countries." "Samples would be obtained with up to six USAF C-130 or WB- 50 aircraft operated by the Air Weather Service." A 1964 telegram to the US embassy in Karachi said that Pakistan's Mauripur airport would be used for operations to monitor China's nuclear capabilities. "Cover story for flights would be "weather research carried on with USAF weather research aircraft." "The primary use for the air samples obtained from these flights is to compare the total amount of a rare gas given off in the process of producing plutonium, which is a prime element in the construction of nuclear weapons," the document said. According to another secret document: "Although this project is related to the US Atomic Energy Detection System (Project Clear Sky) in that sense the AEDS is primary 'customer' for information on rare gas, the aircraft are to be operated by the USAF Weather Service, and there would be no outward connection with the AEDS." "The unclassified cover story is that the aircraft are obtaining air samples for use in studying radioactive fallout." A secret but now declassified US State Department document dated June 23, 1983 reveals the US had access to information about various nuclear activities in Pakistan, despite efforts of successive governments to keep the plans under wraps. According to the document, "Pakistan's major fuel cycle facilities include the Canadian supplied, CANDU-type power reactor located on the coast near Karachi." "A uranium ore concentration plant and UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) production plant are located (at) Dera Ghazi Khan near deposits of uranium." By 1983, the Americans intelligence agencies believed the UF6 plant was externally complete and could "produce more than enough for the Kahuta enrichment." "There are two major fuel cycle facilities located at the Chashma Barrage on the Indus River," the document said. "Pakistan's uranium enrichment facilities are located at Kahuta near Islamabad," the document relating to the year 1983 shows. About spent-fuel reprocessing, the US document said: "We believe that facilities exist in the basement of the main building of Pinstech which would allow laboratory experiments with solvent extraction. A still larger, the so-called New Labs, is nearing completion near the main building." "The New Labs seem to be large enough to allow for expansion of reprocessing facility," the document said. "Spent-fuel from Kannup is the only source of suitable quantities of irradiated uranium to support a nuclear weapons programme." The 1983 intelligence report expressed fear that Pakistan was introducing indigenously-produced fuel rods into Kannup and the IAEA was unable to monitor the amount of fuel flowing through the reactor. The document also raised concerns regarding the "possible diversion of spent fuel from the reactor to the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities." The United States is at present operating at least two satellite imaging systems. The LACROSSE/VEGA satellite, launched in October 1997, was the first of a new generation of radar imagery satellites. Since October 2001, at least two US spy drones have crashed inside Pakistani territory with little information about their activities from official quarters. According to US Central Command data regarding support provided by Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom till October 2002 included "provision of five air bases/airfields." "A total of 57,800 sorties have been generated from Pakistan's air space/ soil," the US CENTCOM's data says. With so much US air traffic criss-crossing Pakistani air space since October 2001, there is hardly anything, especially domestic nuclear activity, which would have missed the highly sensitive hi-tech recording equipment mounted on the US aircraft.
Arshad Sharif, Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/20/top3.htm> The Bush Administration’s Non-Proliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges
John
R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Washington, DC, March 30 2004, [Remarks to Panel I of Hearing] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today before this Committee to discuss what the Bush Administration is doing to keep our country and our friends and allies safe from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush has stressed repeatedly that “the greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or nuclear weapons.” We take this threat very seriously, and are working diligently to protect the American people from it. Why Ousting Saddam Hussein Bolstered International Security Until the U.S.-led Coalition took action last year, the world faced a serious security threat with Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Here was a dictator who had used chemical weapons against his own people and against his neighbors, had defied more than a dozen Security Council resolutions, had ambitions to reconstitute his weapons arsenal, had obstructed and deceived international inspectors for the better part of twelve years and did so to the end of his regime, had twice invaded neighboring countries, and who had harbored and supported terrorist groups. Eliminating his dictatorial regime, while far from solving all of Iraq’s or the region’s problems, has nonetheless manifestly made the region and the world safer and more secure. Much has been made of the fact that the United States has not yet found chemical or biological weapons in Iraq. Sadly, however, there has been inadequate attention to what has been found, evidence of significant and dangerous WMD programs that I believe clearly justified Operation Iraqi Freedom. David Kay last fall testified to the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) that Iraq’s WMD programs spanned more that two decades, involved thousands of people and billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of the major combat-phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The discoveries Kay reported to HPSCI included:
In particular, Saddam Hussein’s aggressive missile program begs two important questions: What was the purpose of these missiles? Were WMD payloads planned for them? CIA Director George Tenet’s provisional bottom line in his Georgetown University speech was that although Iraq was not in possession of a nuclear weapon, Saddam Hussein still wanted one, and Iraq intended to reconstitute a nuclear program at some point. I believe this is consistent with a statement Hussein made in September 2000 calling on his “nuclear mujahedin,” Iraq’s nuclear scientists, to “defeat the enemy.” He noted that a senior Iraqi official confirmed that Iraq had misled inspectors about two groups that were working on a number of unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV”) designs. Some UAV programs, in the past, had likely been intended to deliver biological weapons. Although Tenet conceded that the jury is still out on whether Iraq intended to use its newer, smaller Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to deliver biological weapons, he also stated that a senior Iraqi official admitted that their two large Unmanned Aerial Vehicles—one developed in the early 90s and the other under development until late 2000—were intended for delivery of biological weapons. Tenet noted that Saddam Hussein had dual-use facilities that could quickly produce biological agents and provisionally concluded that Saddam Hussein had the capability and the intent to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production. To date, we have not found post-1991 chemical and biological weapon stockpiles and there are numerous outstanding questions raised by UNSCOM about Iraq’s WMD program. Some of these questions, reported in UNSCOM’s final comprehensive report in January 1999, include:
Some have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that, therefore, our Coalition military action was not justified. These criticisms miss the mark. Saddam’s continued defiance of UN resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm and his continued interest in developing weapons of mass destruction justified coalition action. Our concern was not the imminence of Saddam’s threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities, and intentions. President Bush made this point forcefully in his 2003 State of the Union address: “Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.” David Kay has said that because of the fact that Iraqi officials clearly had acquired WMD know-how and were in contact with terrorist organizations, and because Saddam clearly was growing increasingly desperate and loosing control over his regime, Iraq in many ways was an even greater threat than before: “I quite frankly think we were on the verge of Iraq becoming more dangerous as it decayed into this storehouse of huge amounts of military equipment, including WMD capability and technology, just at the time that other groups and countries were seeking that. … I think, if Saddam had remained in power and this regime continued to crumble, you could have gone there and got it [WMD] in one-stop shopping. And people would have sold it, not fearful of a Saddam regime that would have kept them from it. He was less and less in control of it. So I think by removing that, we've removed that threat. That doesn't make the world safer completely, but it does take one major threat down.” We acted in Iraq because we were not willing to trust our security, and the security of our friends and allies, to the supposed restraint and circumspection of a dictator committed to acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction, a history of using chemical weapons, and a twelve-year track record of defiance. The risks of continued inaction were simply too high. As President Bush said in his speech earlier this month to U.S. military personnel at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, “my administration looked at the intelligence, and we saw a threat. Members of Congress looked at the intelligence, and they saw a threat. The United Nations Security Council looked at the intelligence, and it saw a threat. “ The President concluded, “I had a choice to make, either take the word of a madman, or take such threats seriously and defend America. Faced with that choice, I will defend America every time.” Kenneth Pollack, a former staff member of the Clinton National Security Council (NSC), now at the Brookings Institution, well summarized how the evidence of Iraq’s WMD program was widely seen as compelling before the war. He wrote in a February 2004 article in The Atlantic that “[s]omewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France's President Jacques Chirac told Time magazine last February, ‘[t]here is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed.’ In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.“ Pollack also observed that despite the criticism of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, “the report accurately reflected what intelligence analysts had been telling Clinton Administration officials like me for years in verbal briefings.” People may have disagreed about what to do about the Iraqi threat, but there was unanimity on the dangers of the Saddam regime. When we think about Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is important to remember that it was Saddam Hussein who was defying the international community and violating UN Security Council resolutions that required him to disarm and cooperate with UN inspectors. Iraq harassed inspectors and concealed its WMD/missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Saddam wasted untold billions building “presidential palaces” that he declared “off limits” to UN inspectors, rather than buying food at a time that Iraq was spending less on food than the UN recommended. Operation Iraqi Freedom was amply justified by Saddam’s behavior and his calculation that he could flout the UN Security Council and the United States and not be held accountable. He was wrong. Libya We face significant challenges in other parts of the world from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Rogue states whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, reckless behavior, and repressive ideologies make them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. The government of Libya came to this conclusion in early 2003 as the United States was preparing to go to war with Iraq. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, as in the case of Libya, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, the imposition of sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table. On December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it would voluntarily rid itself of its WMD equipment and programs. Libya also declared that it had “decided to restrict itself to missiles with a range that complies with the standards of the Missile Technology Control Regime.” Libya declared its intention to comply in full with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”) and the Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”), and that it intended to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”). All of these remarkable steps, Libya announced, would be undertaken “in a transparent way that could be proved, including accepting immediate international inspection.” Libya appears to be living up to these commitments. In cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the IAEA, Libya has dismantled its declared nuclear weapons program. Libya has destroyed more than 3,000 unfilled chemical munitions. They are planning to destroy their stockpile of approximately 23 tons of sulfur mustard gas under the supervision of the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (“OPCW”) which would have gone into those bombs. The declared SCUD-C missile program has been removed. Within the last few months, with Libya’s cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom removed:
This month, Libya submitted its first declaration under the CWC, and signed its IAEA Additional Protocol in Vienna. Questions still remain regarding certain aspects of Libya’s WMD programs, and long-term verification issues also remain open, but we are working with Libya to resolve these questions as quickly as possible.
There has been much speculation about Libya's reasons for making this historic
decision. Here are the facts: In March 2003, as we were preparing to invade
Iraq, Libya approached the United Kingdom seeking to discuss its WMD program
with the United States and the United Kingdom. In October, as we and our
allies stopped a large shipment to Libya that would have advanced their
uranium enrichment effort, Libya agreed to allow visits by U.S. and UK teams.
Finally, in December 2003, Libya announced that it would voluntarily rid
itself of its WMD equipment and programs. I believe the conclusion is obvious.
As Col. Qadaffi himself put it, weapons of mass destruction now clearly
“represents a danger to the country which has them.” Libya recognized that the United States and the international community would not tolerate their development of nuclear weapons. Iran has not. But our resolve on the continuing threat posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons program has brought this issue to the attention of the world. Although Iran has robust BW, CW, and missile programs, today I will focus just on its nuclear weapons efforts. The United States has worked hard over the last three years to garner international support to require Iran to admit and to end its almost twenty-year-long covert nuclear weapons program. That Iran has such a program is the inescapable conclusion not just of our intelligence findings, but of four reports by the IAEA Director General that disclose Iran’s repeated failure to abide by its safeguards obligations and Tehran’s two-decades long record of obfuscation and deceit vis-a- vis the IAEA. All four IAEA reports are now on the public record. Despite strong actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors over the past year, there is no reason to believe that Iran has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The recent discovery of Iran’s development and testing of uranium enrichment centrifuges of an advanced design is a clear indicator that Iran continues its quest for nuclear weapons. Following an all-too-familiar pattern, Iran omitted this information from its October, 2003 declaration to the IAEA -- a declaration that Tehran maintained was the “full scope of Iranian nuclear activities” and a “complete centrifuge R&D chronology.” Iran’s known civil nuclear power program currently consists of a single nuclear reactor under construction by Russia at Bushehr. Over the past three years, President Bush and his Administration have had intensive discussions with Russian authorities, from President Putin on down, on the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Russian leaders have repeatedly assured us that they will not supply fuel for the Bushehr reactor until agreement is reached with Iran to return all spent fuel to Russia, the subject of difficult and protracted negotiations that are not complete. The Russian government won't ship the initial fuel load for the Bushehr reactor before next year, with the commissioning of the reactor well after that. These delays and postponements are significant, and we intend to continue to work closely with Russia on Bushehr. Iran’s ambitious nuclear reactor program is a remarkable venture for a country whose oil and gas reserves will last several hundred years at current extraction rates. In my testimony on June 4, 2003, I displayed charts showing that Iran’s uranium resources are so small that nuclear power cannot materially increase exports of Iran’s vast oil and gas resources. There is no conceivable economic justification for Iran to build costly nuclear fuel cycle facilities to support this small “nuclear power” program. We can only conclude that the primary role of this program is to serve as a cover and a pretext for the import of nuclear technology and expertise that can be used to support nuclear weapons development. Iran has embarked, moreover, on a massive and, until recently revealed, largely clandestine effort to put in place all the elements of a nuclear fuel cycle. Iran is developing a uranium mine -- after receiving IAEA assistance in uranium prospecting -- and is constructing a facility for conversion of yellowcake into other uranium compounds, including uranium hexafluoride and uranium metal. Uranium hexafluoride is the feedstock for the centrifuge enrichment process. Uranium metal is the feedstock for the laser enrichment process, and also has important nuclear weapons applications. Iran has pursued two separate approaches to uranium enrichment. It has established a number of workshops for the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components (most of which, according to a recent IAEA report, are owned by military-industrial organizations), a pilot enrichment facility designed for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large, partially underground facility at Natanz intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has pursued another program to enrich uranium with lasers, a complex and difficult technology few countries have mastered. Laser technology is not used commercially for uranium enrichment even in the most advanced countries because it is considered uneconomical in commercial applications. Both of these programs were covert until their existence was publicly disclosed by an Iranian opposition group. In addition to this effort to produce enriched uranium, Iran also has a program to produce plutonium, which represents an alternate path to nuclear weapons. Iran is building a large heavy-water production plant, which was also covert until disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002. Its purpose is to supply heavy water for a “research reactor” that Iran plans to begin constructing this year. The technical characteristics of this heavy water moderated “research reactor” Iran plans to build are well-suited for producing weapons-grade plutonium. Not by coincidence, Iran was also forced to admit earlier this year that it had secretly conducted experiments in plutonium reprocessing that involved uranium “targets” irradiated at the Tehran research reactor. Iran is also pursuing a reprocessing capability, a necessary step to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel. Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr reactor. That reactor is under IAEA safeguards, and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return spent fuel to Russia, but if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty after three years of operations, the reactor and spent fuel would contain enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons. There can be no economic reason for such a massive investment in facilities encompassing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle other than to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Another unmistakable indicator of Iran’s intentions is the pattern of repeatedly lying to and providing false reports to the IAEA. The IAEA Director General has reported on several such instances, including some where Iran had to change its story after being confronted with evidence by the IAEA that it had not been truthful in its disclosures. Recent press reports suggest that Iran’s nuclear denial and deception efforts continue and are very elaborate. Despite Iran’s massive deception and denial campaign, the IAEA has uncovered a large amount of information indicating numerous major violations of Iran’s treaty obligations under the NPT and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The list of serious violations discovered by the IAEA increased over the last few months and the results of several 2004 IAEA inspections of Iranian facilities have not yet been reported to IAEA member governments. To date, violations cited by the IAEA include:
On the basis of the evidence collected by IAEA inspectors and exhaustively documented in his reports, the Director General concluded in his November 20, 2003 report to the Board of Governors that, “it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement....” The international community has reacted strongly to the revelations contained in the Director General’s reports. The IAEA Board of Governors’ most recent resolution, adopted on March 13, “deplores” the omission of advanced P-2 uranium enrichment centrifuge development and testing from Iran’s October, 2003 submission to the IAEA, a declaration that was supposed to be the correct, complete, and final story of Iran’s past and present nuclear activities. Nonetheless, Iran has repeatedly sought to “close the file” at the IAEA, and get out from under the international spotlight. Iran seems determined to pursue its nuclear weapons program in an undisturbed and clandestine fashion, and so that it can more easily obtain critical nuclear technology that it needs for its weapons program. An important feature of the March 13 IAEA resolution, however, is precisely that it does not “close the file” on the problems that have been uncovered to date in Iran. Instead the resolution decides that the next meeting of the Board of Governors in June will consider the omissions already uncovered, in addition to whatever is contained in the next report of the Director General, or whatever other information becomes public by then. The IAEA statute requires that non-compliance with safeguards obligations be reported to the United Nations Security Council. In the U.S. view, this standard was clearly met as early as June of last year: Iranian noncompliance with safeguards obligations has been manifest for many months, and both the Board and the Director General have noted Iran’s multiple breaches and failures in this regard. We did not press for such a report at the recent March meeting, in part because the Board had considerable work to do on Libya, including a report to the Council on Libya’s non-compliance and its voluntary decision to eliminate all elements of its nuclear weapons program. The Board’s handling of the Libya issues sets an important contemporary precedent for the responsible handling of nuclear weapons programs that violate the NPT. Similarly, the IAEA Board will at some point, in order to uphold the effectiveness and credibility of the entire NPT regime, need to fulfill its responsibility under the IAEA Statute to report the safeguards failures found in Iran to the UN Security Council. If Iran continues its unwillingness to comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, the Council can then take up this issue as a threat to international peace and security. If the Security Council is unable to do so, it will not only be a blow to our efforts to hold Iran accountable, but also a blow to the Council itself. Prior to the November, 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany went to Tehran. The result was a publicly agreed to statement committing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as defined by the IAEA, something the IAEA Board had already called for in its September 2003 resolution. The same parties reached a further elaboration of this agreement just prior to the March Board. The revelations in the Director General’s most recent report in February that the production of centrifuge components had not stopped in Iran, and that IAEA inspectors uncovered undisclosed work on a more advanced centrifuge design months after Iran’s commitment to suspend all of its enrichment activities and provide a full accounting of its nuclear program, raise serious doubts about Iran’s commitments to the Europeans. If Iran has followed through on these commitments, why did it postpone inspections scheduled for earlier this month? Was it afraid of what they would find? Repeated public statements by senior Iranian officials that the suspension of enrichment activities is only temporary, and that their enrichment program will resume once the issues with the IAEA are resolved, raise further questions whether the undertakings between Iran and the Europeans are having the intended effect of turning Iran away from its nuclear weapons effort. For example, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on November 2 that Iran would not “give up” enrichment “at any price.” Hasan Rowhani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, has been consistent and explicit that the suspension of enrichment is temporary, stating on November 29, 2003, that “a permanent suspension has never been an issue and will never be,” and as recently as March 7, 2004, that “there is nothing permanent … when to resume is in the hands of our system.” He has been equally clear Iran expects European cooperation and support while retaining the right to continue its nuclear program. “Iran will not accept restrictions on its peaceful nuclear program,” he said on January 22 in Paris, and continued that, “Iran expects its European friends to honor their commitments.” Rowhani has been remarkably candid on Iran’s goals and intentions -- to get out from under the scrutiny of the IAEA and press on with its nuclear program. He said on March 7, on the eve of the IAEA Board meeting, that Iran had two goals: “We must arrive at a stage where the Board of Governors totally close the file and list of concerns on the Iranian nuclear program,” and “the international community has to accept Iran in the world nuclear club.” The Iranian nuclear weapons program, compounded by the Iranian effort to develop long-range missiles, is one of the most serious proliferation challenges we face today. It is clear that Iran draws from many of the same networks that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components, and materials, including the A.Q. Khan black market network. Destroying this network is a priority objective of the United States. Our strategy is to use bilateral and multilateral pressure, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. If Iran does not comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, the IAEA Board of Governors must do its duty and -- based on the facts already reported by the Director General, along with whatever else he reports and other public information -- report to the Security Council Iran’s noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. If that occurs, we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands, and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts. North Korea Ensuring a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons remains a central Bush Administration focus. The quickest and easiest route to achieving this goal would be for North Korea to make the same historic decision that Libya made, and abandon the pursuit of WMD in a verifiable way. North Korea should take note that Libya opened itself up voluntarily to full transparency about its weapons programs, and that, with continued cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom, a completely transformed relationship with the United States may be possible. Absent a Libya scenario, we believe that the best way to achieve our goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is through the Six-Party Talks. But let me be clear -- the Six-Party Talks are a means to an end. We are not talking simply for the sake of talking. As Secretary Powell has stated, we want and expect “tangible” progress and results, which will serve the national security goals of the United States, and which coincide with those of North Korea’s neighbors. Nonetheless, the dangers presented by North Korea’s ongoing nuclear weapons program -- not to mention risk that Pyongyang might export nuclear expertise, technology, fissile material, or even transfer nuclear weapons, which they have threatened to do -- are too serious to ignore. The greatest obstacle to a successful conclusion for the Six-Party Talks remains North Korea’s unwillingness to date to address the problem honestly. The DPRK dictatorship contends that the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks is because the U.S. refuses to abandon its “hostile” policy. It cites the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea and activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative as examples of this “hostile” policy. As for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, they are there because both the United States and South Korea want them there to deter North Korean aggression. Moreover, Pyongyang’s criticism of the Proliferation Security Initiative is akin to drug lords complaining about drug laws. If North Korea has a problem with the Proliferation Security Initiative, there is an easy solution -- get out of the proliferation business. It is time for North Korea to embrace the principles of the free market in industries besides weapons of terror and illegal narcotics. The real obstacle to progress in the Six-Party Talks remains North Korea’s unwillingness to commit to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs. Setting aside the crucial issue of verification for a moment, let me discuss what the United States and our allies mean when we talk about the complete and irreversible dismantlement of the North’s nuclear weapons program. In order for dismantlement to be “complete,” North Korea must give up not only all elements of its path to nuclear weapons based on the reprocessing of plutonium, but also its nuclear weapons path based on highly-enriched uranium. And, in order to ensure that the world will not continue to be at risk from the threat of the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear-weapons activities, this dismantlement must be “irreversible,” which will require North Korea to abandon both its so-called “civil” and “peaceful” nuclear programs and permit the removal of all critical items. North Korea also does not accept our definition of “irreversible.” In December and January, Pyongyang offered some indication through public pronouncements that it would be willing to “freeze” its plutonium program, including the five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. This was only a freeze, mind you, which would, by definition, be neither complete nor irreversible, but North Korea wasn’t willing to stick with even this tepid promise. At the last round of Six-Party Talks, however, the DPRK reversed course, claiming that only those facilities directly related to the weapons program would be subject to a freeze, assuming, of course, that adequate compensation were provided. The idea that the Yongbyon facility serves any peaceful purpose is untenable. The amount of electricity it could produce is minimal, and it is questionable that North Korea even has the necessary infrastructure in place by which to distribute it. North Korea must declare and fully account for all of its nuclear activities and subject them to effective verification measures. While the exact modalities of this verification regime are to be worked out -- in part because of its decision to withdraw from the NPT last year and the removal of international inspectors and monitoring equipment -- one could reasonably expect some of the five legitimate nuclear weapons states, which are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, would play a role in dismantling the weapons and extracting all weapons design information from North Korea. Other inspectors, with the IAEA playing an essential role, would undoubtedly assist in verifying the dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs. Unfortunately, North Korea continues to make clear that they have no intention to dismantle their facilities in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way, claiming as recently as last Saturday, "How can our Republic accept such a thing?" In this statement, their clearest to date, North Korea made the absurd claim that inspectors would "ransack" their country as a pretext for U.S. intervention. They also unequivocally stated that they would not dismantle their so-called peaceful nuclear reactors. In the eyes of North Korea, the solution is for us to “compensate” them, even for just a “freeze” of the weapons aspect of its nuclear program. It would appear, as President Bush has stated before, that North Korea is "back to the old blackmail game." This time, however, it will not work. We will not follow the mistaken path of the 1994 Agreed Framework because as Secretary Powell has said, “we bought that horse once.” We will not provide inducements or reward the North Koreans to come back into compliance with their international obligations. Fundamentally, North Korea needs to understand that the end state is not a freeze, but the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all their nuclear programs, including the Yongbyon facility. While I have focused my remarks on the nuclear programs of the DPRK, the Six-Party Talks have also provided a vehicle to identify other critical issues of concern. These issues, which the United States and others have raised in both previous sessions of the Six-Party Talks, include the disposition of conventional forces along the demilitarized zone, North Korea’s other WMD programs involving chemical and biological weapons, and its outward proliferation record, with particular regard to missiles constraints on DPRK’s indigenous missile programs that threaten the U.S. and its Asian allies, and its dangerous exports of destabilizing missiles and missile technologies. Moreover, we must also deal with North Korea’s abysmal human rights record, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens. We do not raise these issues because we want to set the bar higher for any negotiated settlement with North Korea. While our long-term goal remains the peaceful reunification of the peninsula, we know that any interim solution will require a comprehensive change in North Korean behavior. Given its past violations of agreements, its extensive, well-documented program of deception and denial, its dangerous proliferation activities, as well as its terrorist activities and its egregious human rights record, North Korea must know that relations with the United States can only become fully normalized when it deals with all of our concerns. They must make this strategic decision themselves, or face continued isolation and other unwelcome consequences. The Six-Party Talks can help to persuade North Korea and its neighbors that such a decision is in its own interests as well as those of its neighbors and the international community as a whole. The choice is Kim Jong Il’s. Syria As I testified to this Committee last fall, we are concerned about Syria's nuclear research and development program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the IAEA Technical Cooperation program -- that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand further its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Syria is a party to the NPT, and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol, if fully implemented by Syria, could enhance the IAEA's ability to verify whether Syria has been conducting clandestine nuclear weapons research barred by the NPT. The President signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act last December, which provides for the imposition of sanctions if the President determines that the Syrian government has not ended its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as ceased providing support for international terrorist groups, ended its occupation of Lebanon, and ceased any support for terrorist activities inside Iraq. Syria has not met these requirements, and the President will soon announce tough sanctions against Syria under the Act. The Bush Administration intends to impose further sanctions if Syrian behavior does not improve. In addition, Syria's failure to demonstrate a consistent effort against foreign fighters reaching Iraq increases the threat to Coalition forces. We saw Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces in the days before the war and shortly after hostilities began, such as allowing equipment to flow into Iraq. Syria also permitted foreign fighters to transit on their way to Iraq, volunteers who sought to attack coalition forces. Although the Syrian Government has taken steps to secure their Iraqi border, Syria remains a preferred hub for foreign fighters on their way to Iraq and more needs to be done. Cuba Cuba is a special security concern to the United States, lying just 90 miles from the U.S. mainland. This totalitarian state has long been a violator of human rights, earning it a place on the State Department’s list of state-sponsors of terrorism. We said last year in the Annual Report on Human Rights Practices for 2003 that human rights abuses in Cuba worsened dramatically last year when 75 peaceful dissidents were sentenced to prison terms averaging 20 years for trying to exercise their fundamental rights. The Cuban Government continues to violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of its citizen. Citizens there do not have the right to change their government peacefully. Prisoners die in jail due to lack of medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials continues to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. The Government denies its citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. Havana has long provided safe haven for terrorists, and has collaborated in biotechnology -- including extensive dual use technologies with BW applications -- with state sponsors of terror. The country is known to be harboring terrorists from Colombia and Spain. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, both maintain a permanent presence on the island. Perhaps the clearest evidence that Cuba is ruled by a criminal regime is the fact that it is providing refuge to over 70 fugitives wanted by the FBI. Many have committed serious crimes, including assassination, murder, bombings, and narcotics trafficking. Three have killed American policemen. The Bush administration has said repeatedly that we are concerned that Cuba is developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on Fidel Castro to cease his BW aspirations and support of terrorism. Existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence Community’s ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access, reliability, and motivation. In early 2002, the intelligence community approved the following unclassified language on Cuba’s BW efforts for an unclassified speech I was planning to give: “The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.” In March and June 2002, Assistant Secretary Carl Ford used the above IC language in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I used the same language in a May 2002 address to the Heritage Foundation, although I dropped the word “developmental” since I thought it was superfluous. Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism. He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives. In 2000, Castro visited Iran, Syria, and Libya. He made the following disturbing comments in mid-2001 at Tehran University: "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up." Incredibly, a major U.S. intelligence analysis in 1998 concluded that Cuba did not represent a significant military threat to the United States or the region. It went only so far as to say that, "Cuba has a limited capacity to engage in some military and intelligence activities which could pose a danger to U.S. citizens under some circumstances." Why was the 1998 report on Cuba reach so narrow a conclusion? Why did it underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major reason is Cuba’s aggressive intelligence operations against the United States, which included recruiting the Defense Intelligence Agency’s senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to spy for Cuba. Montes had a hand in drafting the 1998 Cuba report. She also participated in interagency coordination of a national intelligence estimate on BW, and passed some of our most sensitive information about Cuba back to Havana. Additionally, Monte’s espionage materially strengthened Cuba’s denial and deception efforts; the data Montes passed gave Havana ample opportunity to generate controlled information that could, via defectors and émigrés, reach Washington. Montes pleaded guilty to espionage for Cuba against the United States, and was sentenced to a 25-year prison term in 2002. For four decades, Cuba has maintained a well-developed and sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in Latin America, and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Some analysts and Cuban defectors, however, have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedical facilities. Nor can we forget what was learned after the collapse of the USSR about the biological warfare research and development work carried out by ostensibly “civilian” facilities belonging to the Cuban biotechnology industry’s Soviet patrons. As I said earlier, I believe the case for the existence of a developmental Cuba BW R&D effort is strong. The Administration believes that Cuba remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States. The Bush Administration continues to watch this rogue state very closely. While my remarks so far have focused on rogue states, I would also like to take this opportunity to discuss our non- and counterproliferation dialogue with India and with Pakistan. Both could assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short period, and have air-delivered bombs and land-based missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and India is pursuing a sea-based ballistic missile capability. We believe this has diminished, not strengthened, security on the subcontinent. India With respect to India, in September, 2001, the Bush Administration lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed on India following its 1998 nuclear weapons tests. This decision resulted not from a diminution of U.S. concerns regarding India’s development of nuclear weapons, but reflected the Administration’s view that a different approach, including regular engagement on nonproliferation issues, would prove more effective in advancing our nonproliferation goals. We have embarked on an intensive program of cooperative technical exchanges on export controls, which both sides have found useful. While there has been progress in some notable cases, U.S. sanctions remain in place against proliferating entities in India, such as NEC Engineers, and its president, Hans Raj Shiv. We are gratified by the ongoing Indian prosecution of NEC and are following the case with interest. On January 12th of this year, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (“NSSP”) initiative to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian nuclear and civilian space applications, high-technology commerce, and dialogue on missile defense. This important initiative reflects our growing strategic relationship with India. As part of the expanded cooperation, India will undertake meaningful steps to improve its export controls systems, and work with the U.S. in pursuit of shared nonproliferation goals. Consistent with its obligations under U.S. law and international commitments, the United States is offering no assistance to India’s nuclear weapons or missile programs. Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network The United States Government is working cooperatively with Pakistan to improve its export control regimes and nonproliferation policies. While Pakistan has not conducted nuclear explosive tests since 1998, it continues to develop nuclear weapon and missile programs. The sanctions imposed in 1998 were lifted in September, 2001, and a more cooperative approach to achieve our mutual nonproliferation goals has since been implemented. Our recent nonproliferation focus with Pakistan is to work with the government to eliminate once and for all the network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Recent revelations have implicated Khan in leading an international network working in Europe, Asia, and Africa that sold uranium enrichment technology and equipment to rogue states. As the President laid out in great detail in his NDU speech last month, we have been concerned about the scope and the breadth of Khan’s activities for quite some time. What we have learned about the international black market in weapons of mass destruction shows how sophisticated WMD proliferators are, and how skilled they are at deception and camouflage. The complexity of the Khan network illustrates the need for a multi-faceted approach to ultimately defeat the WMD black market. This approach will require using all the tools we have available, including close cooperation with our allies and friends. Khan’s recent admissions that he provided uranium enrichment expertise to North Korea and Iran has put the lie to protestations by these states about their covert uranium enrichment programs. President Musharraf has assured the United States that he will provide us, and the IAEA with information from Khan and his associates that we can use to advance our investigations into the Khan network and worldwide trading in nuclear weapons technology. President Bush’s Counterproliferation Initiatives In his speech at the National Defense University last month, President Bush said, “There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.” The President made seven proposals to strengthen the world’s efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons:
The Proliferation Security Initiative Foremost among President Bush’s efforts to stop WMD proliferation is the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and ten other close allies and friends have worked assiduously from May 2003 to develop this initiative, which seeks to combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land. Our goal is to create a more robust approach to preventing WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative is unique in that it is not an organization but an activity. Countries will participate in a variety of ways. On September 4, we published the PSI “Statement of Interdiction Principles” and shared it with countries around the world. Already, more than 60 countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to cooperate in interdiction efforts. States are becoming involved in PSI efforts in a number of different capacities -- operational, political, or both -- to help build the initiative. Three additional countries -- Canada, Norway, and Singapore -- joined the PSI core group at the most recent PSI plenary meeting in Lisbon earlier this month. As PSI has developed, countries have worked together under PSI auspices to prevent additional shipments of illicit materials. The most recent example of this cooperation, noted by the President in his February 11 address, involved the United States working with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany to stop and seize a shipment of centrifuge parts useful for uranium enrichment bound for Libya. In mid-April, PSI operational experts will gather in Ottawa, Canada, to develop further the work of the December meeting hosted by the United States, where PSI participants agreed on a growing series of sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises. Six have already taken place, and four additional exercises will occur in the coming months. Most recently, the United States led an exercise in January in the Arabian Sea, known as “Sea Sabre,” and the Italians hosted an air interception exercise in February. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdictions in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and the western Pacific Ocean, all areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking, and are beginning to evolve our collective ability to conduct air interceptions. Meanwhile, as we speak, Germany is hosting the first airport-based law-enforcement-focused interdiction training exercise, “Operation Hawkeye.” Poland will host the first ground interdiction training exercise in April; Italy will host a maritime interdiction exercise in April; and France will host an air interdiction exercise in June. As the PSI moves forward, other countries will join in training exercises to enhance global capabilities to respond quickly when governments receive intelligence on proliferation shipments. Our ally, Japan, has worked closely with the United States as it deployed expert missions to each of the ASEAN nations to encourage support and active involvement in the PSI. We have been in close discussions in these capitals, including visits I have made to two key countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. President Bush has made clear that the long-term objective of the United States is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. With this in mind, we are making progress in negotiating ship-boarding agreements with key flag states. Liberia was the first country to sign an agreement, and cited its desire to work with us so that its ships were understood to operate under high standards. The Administration also is discussing with the United Kingdom and others, proposals to deny ships known to have unacceptable proliferation records from entry into ports. Our PSI interdiction efforts rest on existing domestic and international legal authorities. The national legal authorities of each participant will allow us to act together in a flexible manner, ensuring actions are taken by participants with the most robust authorities in any given case. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction. Experts will work to improve our ability to share information with law enforcement and military operators in a timely and effective manner, in order to allow operators to increase the number of actual interdictions. In his February address, President Bush directed that we work with other participants to expand PSI’s mission to target not only shipments and transfers of WMD, but the entities and networks involved in illicit proliferation activities more aggressively. Such steps will require greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services but in law enforcement as well. Specifically, PSI participants will focus more broadly on those who traffic in deadly weapons, and work to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets, to disrupt the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers. Work has already begun to build support for this expanded PSI effort. At the most recent plenary meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, the Chairman’s Conclusions contain a strong statement of political support for the President’s call to expand PSI’s role. Participants agreed to pursue greater cooperation through military and intelligence services and law enforcement to shut down proliferation facilitators and bring them to justice. PSI participants agreed on some practical first steps to: 1) identify national points of contact and internal processes developed for this expanded goal; 2) develop and share national analyses of key proliferation actors and networks, their financing sources, and other support structures; and 3) undertake national action to identify law enforcement authorities and other tools or assets that could be brought to bear against efforts to stop proliferation facilitators. We are nearing the first anniversary of President Bush’s announcement of PSI in Krakow, Poland. To commemorate the anniversary, the Government of Poland will host a meeting in Krakow, where they anticipate participation by many of the governments supporting PSI, and ready and willing to participate in PSI activities. This meeting will demonstrate PSI’s global scope and the strong resolve of nations to take robust actions to deny proliferators the ability to trade in the most deadly weapons and materials. As the President said in his February address: “Our message to proliferators must be consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped.” Strengthening Laws and International Controls Governing Proliferation In his February address and also in his September address to the U.N. General Assembly, the President called upon the Security Council to pass a resolution calling for each nation to require all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. After months of difficult negotiation, the Permanent Five members of the Security reached agreement last week. We have circulated a draft resolution to the rest of the Council, and we hope that the full Council will move quickly to adopt this resolution. WMD Sanctions The front lines in our nonproliferation strategy need to extend beyond the immediate states of concern to the trade routes and entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation concern. In support of this “forward” policy of nonproliferation, we are employing a number of tools to thwart and counter countries’ weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction, and credible export controls. Most of these states are still dependent on outside suppliers and expertise. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their weapons development plans by implementing a policy that seeks to disrupt their procurement attempts. Proliferating states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missile-related equipment, materials, and technologies. They rely heavily on the use of front companies and illicit arms brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dual-use goods for their WMD programs. These front companies and brokers are expert at concealing the ultimate destination of an item, and in making an illicit export appear legitimate -- in essence hiding the export in the open. Proliferators take other measures to circumvent national export controls, such as falsifying documentation, providing false end-user information, and finding the paths of least resistance for shipping an illicit commodity. If there is a loophole in a law or a weak border point, those responsible for rogue states’ WMD programs will try to exploit it. All too often they succeed. Economic penalties or sanctions are an essential tool in a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. The imposition or even the mere threat of sanctions can be a powerful lever for changing behavior, as few countries wish to be publicly labeled as being irresponsible. Sanctions not only increase the costs to suppliers but also encourage foreign governments to take steps to adopt more responsible nonproliferation practices and ensure that entities within their borders do not contribute to WMD programs. The Bush Administration has imposed WMD sanctions an average of 22 times per year and 32 times per year in 2002 and 2003. Compare that with the average number of sanctions imposed per year during the last Administration -- eight -- and you will see that this Administration is very serious about using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. We have imposed measures under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and Executive Order 12938 among others. While we see sanctions as an effective policy tool, most of these sanctions are required by law and we will implement them as Congress intended. Consider a recent case involving Macedonia. In December, 2003, the United States imposed nonproliferation penalties pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and E.O. 12938 on the Macedonian entity, Mikrosam, and Macedonian citizen, Blagoje Samokovski. Penalties were imposed because the United States Government determined that these entities contributed materially to the efforts of the end-user to use, design, develop, produce, or stockpile missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The Macedonian Government understands the importance of dealing with these issues and has recently completed a first draft of a new Macedonian export control law. Our perspective on sanctions is clear and simple. Companies around the world have a choice: trade in WMD materials with proliferators, or trade with the United States, but not both. Where national controls fail, and when companies make the wrong choice, there will be consequences. U.S. law requires it, and we are committed to enforcing these laws to their fullest extent. For example, the forthcoming report that the Department of State will soon submit to Congress pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act illustrates how we are implementing the Act to advance our nonproliferation goals. We will be announcing 13 new sanctions for transferring WMD technology to Iran. Restricting Dangerous Materials and Continuing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Another important Administration initiative is the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by the Leaders of the G-8 at the Kananaskis Summit in June, 2002. The G-8 Leaders pledged to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear safety cooperation projects to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands. The United States will contribute half of this total -- $ 10 billion -- through projects funded and implemented by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, most of which were begun under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Of the remaining $10 billion to be committed by other G-7 countries, approximately $7 billion has already been pledged. Last year the G-8 welcomed the participation of six additional donor countries -- Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland -- and we have recently invited a number of additional nations to join this important enterprise. The initial focus of the Partnership has been on projects in Russia, with formal recognition anticipated for other states of the former Soviet Union, but the problems of dangerous weapons, materials, and expertise extend to many other countries. The United States already has nonproliferation projects underway in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other FSU states, and counts this assistance toward our Global Partnership commitment. Some other Global Partnership countries already have assistance in the FSU as well. The United States has recently begun assistance in Iraq and Libya. We are encouraging our partners to undertake their own projects in such states and to expand the Global Partnership into these areas. The United States has new legislative authority to devote a portion of Department of Defense CTR resources to countries beyond the former Soviet Union, and we are looking to expand the scope of our efforts accordingly. In the decades after World War II the United States and the Soviet Union built research reactors that used highly enriched uranium for fuel in dozens of locations around the world. As a result, substantial amounts of highly enriched uranium fuel are stored at or near such reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in quality. Both the United States and Russia want to convert such reactors to low enriched uranium fuel, and to remove highly enriched uranium. In recent months we have worked with Russia to remove highly enriched uranium fuel from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Libya, and continue to plan for additional removals. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in weapons-usable uranium throughout the world. Another important nonproliferation instrument, our Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program (“EXBS”), is our primary vehicle for providing other governments the advice, training, and equipment they need to bring their export control systems up to international standards. The EXBS program also initially focused on the former Soviet Union and nearby transit states, but in recent years has expanded to over forty countries in South Asia, Southeast Europe, and key transshipment states from the Mediterranean to the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Foreign governments receiving this assistance have passed new export control laws and interdicted shipments of arms, radioactive materials, and other sensitive items destined for suspicious end-users. The Dangerous Materials Initiative (“DMI”), responds to the President’s February 11th call to strengthen efforts against the spread of deadly weapons. The DMI is a project-based international assistance initiative that will help criminalize proliferation, remove and/or secure dangerous materials, enact stricter export controls, expand G-8 nonproliferation efforts beyond Russia and help implement the Proliferation Security Initiative. We have already conducted DMI projects in Libya to remove nuclear materials and related material, and in Iraq to control dangerous materials. We are seeking DMI partnerships with other countries, on a pilot basis, to strengthen national controls over biological and nuclear materials, including sensitive technology and equipment. We encourage other countries to participate in similar partnerships in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere. Closing NPT Loopholes and Strengthening the IAEA President Bush is committed to ensuring that all IAEA members and all states parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty honor their treaty obligations, and that banned activities are reported to the United Nations Security Council. The President is determined to stop rogue states with secret nuclear weapons programs from benefiting from peaceful nuclear technology. President Bush has proposed creating a special committee of the IAEA to “focus intensively on safeguards and …[and] ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.” The President also wants to stop states that are suspected of having covert nuclear weapons programs from holding seats on the IAEA Board of Governors from which they now can sit in judgment of their own programs as well as the weapons programs of other rogue states. For example, it was outrageous that Iran actually was a member of the Board last year while that body was deliberating how to deal with Iran’s nuclear weapons effort. Ensuring that suspect states do not sit on the IAEA Board is particularly important given the Board’s tradition of trying to reach decisions by consensus – which is obviously impossible when the fox helps guard the henhouse. Stopping MANPADS Proliferation The Administration is also actively seeking to address the threat posed by the terrorist use of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (“MANPADS”) through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. At the June 2003 G-8 Evian Summit, leaders agreed to a U.S.-initiated MANPADS Action Plan that includes: providing assistance and technical expertise for destroying excess MANPADS; adopting stringent national controls on production of and export of MANPADS and their essential components; banning transfers to non-state actors; exchanging information on uncooperative countries and entities; and examining for new MANPADS the feasibility of adding specific technical performance or launch control features that preclude their unauthorized use. During the October 2003 APEC summit, APEC economies issued a statement on MANPADS similar to the G-8 Action Plan. In December 2003, the Wassenaar Arrangement adopted strengthened guidelines for control over MANPADS transfers. We are continuing efforts in all of these fora this year. New MANPADS initiatives are also being proposed in the OSCE and other regional organizations. We are also engaged on a bilateral basis with countries that have a combination of excess MANPADS stocks, poor controls, and a demonstrable risk of proliferation to terrorist groups or other undesirable end-users. The existing NADR Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Program is funding programs to destroy obsolete weapons which have little military value, but could be lethal against civil aviation in the hands of terrorist organizations. NADR also strives to improve safety and security of weapons which may be needed for legitimate self-defense purposes; and improve standards of inventory control and accountability to ensure that remaining stocks are not stolen or illicitly transferred. Many countries participating in the bilateral MANPADS reduction programs have requested that we treat their activities as confidential. Public success stories include the destruction of nearly 6000 MANPADS in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a State Department-led assessment, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia declared that Cambodia would destroy its entire stockpile of 233 MANPADS. The State Department also disabled and will destroy 45 MANPADS in Liberia. 7,922 MANPADS have been destroyed in eight countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America since the beginning of 2003. We have received commitments for the destruction of almost 2,500 more and continue to pursue efforts worldwide. Conclusion We are making steady progress in the war against WMD proliferation and terrorism. We have broken up the Khan network, worked in partnership with Libya to dismantle its WMD programs, put the international spotlight on Iran’s nuclear program, moved North Korea into multilateral negotiations, eliminated Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and successfully used the Proliferation Security Initiative to stop WMD shipments. We are turning up the pressure on Syria to end its WMD efforts, and by all these efforts are seeking to deter other would-be proliferators. We have worked with our G-8 partners to spend billions of dollars to safeguard dangerous materials and weapons left over from the Cold War. We are strengthening the Nunn-Lugar program and the G-8 Global Partnership and we are assisting other countries to develop and enforce effective export controls. India and Pakistan have committed to strengthen their export controls to prevent transfers of sensitive technology and have launched a dialogue of their own that we hope will lead to the reduction of nuclear risks on the Subcontinent. These efforts are bearing fruit. Proliferation is today becoming riskier and more uncertain, and we are now sending the message that the pursuit of WMD brings not security but insecurity. At the same time, we have made clear that countries that abandon such dangerous pursuits can enjoy the prospect of improved relations with the United States and our friends. President Bush said in February, “We’ve shown that proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We’ve shown that for regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences.” But while the United States has made progress in stopping WMD proliferation, the threat is far from being eliminated. It would be irresponsible to believe that stopping WMD proliferation will be any easier than the war against terrorism, or that it will be resolved any sooner. Only by sustained efforts over a protracted period will we achieve our goals of allowing America and its allies to be free from the continuing threat of blackmail and terrible destruction that these weapons pose. [End] Released on April 1, 2004
Act Now on Fissile Material Treaty
Since the early 1990s, states at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) have sought to begin formal talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). FMCT negotiations have been stymied by China since 1999 in an attempt to gain leverage on its priority issue: a treaty for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Unwilling to constrain its ambitious plans for missile defense systems that could include space-based weapons, the United States has said there is no arms race in outer space and will only allow exploratory discussions on the subject. Successive presidents of the CD and, more recently, a group of five ambassadors have tried to bridge the political differences by proposing to start negotiations on an FMCT in an ad hoc committee, as well as to simultaneously begin substantive discussions on PAROS and general discussions on nuclear disarmament. Last August, China indicated it could agree to this formula. The United States has since balked. In November, the U.S. representative to the UN voted for a resolution supporting an FMCT but noted that the United States had, after nine years of support, initiated a “review” of the concept. In January, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Steve Rademaker told Arms Control Today, “We are looking at the threshold question, does an FMCT make sense?” From the U.S. perspective, moving ahead on FMCT negotiations is a no-brainer. A universal measure, it would reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and voluntary nuclear export controls, as well as help contain the nuclear programs of the three NPT holdout states: India, Israel, and Pakistan. The five major nuclear-weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have all indicated they are no longer producing fissile material for weapons purposes. On the other hand, India and Pakistan have active production programs for both HEU and plutonium, and it is likely that their stocks of weapon-grade material are increasing. It is not clear whether Israel is continuing to produce fissile material for weapons purposes. Under the guise of civilian nuclear power research, other states, including Iran, have built facilities capable of producing fissile material for weapons. An FMCT and its additional verification system would augment existing efforts to detect and deter clandestine nuclear bomb production and acquisition efforts. In addition, FMCT talks could also produce confidence-building declarations from all states with nuclear weapons and/or HEU or plutonium stockpiles, as well as associated fabrication, reprocessing, and storage facilities. There is no practical reason for the White House not to support initiation of FMCT negotiations under the compromise formulation. So far, however, it has not. In his February 11 speech outlining steps to restrict access to nuclear bomb material and related technologies, President George W. Bush failed even to mention an FMCT. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) has called an FMCT “an essential supplement” to the president’s proposals. In recent weeks, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and key U.S. allies have also urged the United States to support FMCT negotiations. Though some states may not be enthusiastic, no other nation has registered its opposition. The absence of continued strong support for an FMCT would doubtless undermine the legitimacy of other, vital U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Completion of an FMCT by 2005 and informal discussions on nuclear disarmament at the CD were two of 13 action steps to which all NPT states-parties committed themselves in May 2000. Yet, since taking office, the Bush administration has undermined almost every one of those measures and has sought to keep its nuclear weapons research, production, testing, and deployment options open. In his speech about nuclear proliferation challenges, Bush cautioned that rising awareness and condemnation “means little unless it is translated into action.” The president would do well to heed his own advice and seize the opportunity to begin negotiations on a verifiable, global ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons.
Daryl G. Kimball<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_04/Focus.asp>
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