Fact Files

Part I
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (1967-2004)

Editor
Dr. Noor ul Haq
Assistant Editors
Syeda Talat Yasmin
Ghulam Ali
 

                                                                                          Date of      

                                              Date of                                Deposit of

Country                                 Signature                             Ratification

Antigua & Barbuda                  10/11/83                              10/11/83 1 

Argentina                                09/27/67

Bahamas, The                                                                      07/16/76 a

Barbados                                10/18/68                              04/25/69

Belize                                      02/14/92

Bolivia                                    02/14/67                              02/18/69

Brazil                                      05/09/67                              01/29/68 b

Chile                                      02/14/67                              10/09/74 b

Colombia                               02/14/67                               08/04/72

Costa Rica                               02/14/67                               08/25/69

Dominica                                05/02/89

Dominican Republic                07/29/67                                 06/14/68

Ecuador                                 02/14/67                                 02/11/69

El Salvador                             02/14/67                                 04/22/68

Grenada                                 04/29/75                                06/20/75

Guatemala                              02/14/67                               02/06/70

Haiti                                      02/14/67                                05/23/69

Honduras                                02/14/67                                09/23/68

Jamaica                                   10/26/67                              06/26/69

Mexico                                   02/14/67                               09/20/67

Nicaragua                               02/15/67                             10/24/68

Panama                                   02/14/67                           06/11/71

Paraguay                                 04/26/67                            03/19/69

Peru                                       02/14/67                            03/04/69

St. Lucia                                  08/25/92

St. Vincent/Grenadines            02/14/92                            02/14/92

Suriname                                 02/13/76                            06/10/77

Trinidad & Tobago                 06/27/67                              12/03/70 c

Uruguay                                  02/14/67                             08/20/68

Venezuela                                02/14/67                            03/23/70

TOTAL                                    29                                          26

                                                                                 (24 in force)

1 Dates given are the earliest dates on which countries signed the agreements or deposited their 

ratifications or accessions -- whether in Washington, London, Moscow, or New York.  In the case of 

a country that was a dependent territory which became a party through succession, the date given 

is the date on which the country gave notice that it would continue to be bound by the terms of 

the agreement.

a.        This is date of notification of succession.  The declaration of waiver was 
     deposited 4/26/77, which is date of entry into force for the Bahamas.

b.       Not in force.  No declaration of waiver under Art. 28, para 2.

c.       The declaration of waiver was deposited 6/27/75, which is date of entry into force for 
     Trinidad and Tobago.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America

                                                                                            Date of

                                              Date of                                  Deposit of

Country                                 Signature                                              Ratification

France                                    03/02/79                                               08/24/92

Netherlands                             04/01/68                                               07/26/71

United Kingdom                     12/20/67                                               12/11/69

United States                           05/26/77                                               11/23/81

Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin America

                                              Date of                                  Date of                  Deposit of

Country                                 Signature                                              Ratification

China, People's Republic of      08/21/73                                               06/12/74

France                                    07/18/73                                               03/22/74

Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics                    05/18/78                                               01/08/79

United Kingdom                     12/20/67                                               12/11/69

United States                           04/01/68                                               05/12/71

Press Release/SG/SM/7367 <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/docs/nptstatus.htm>
 

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [Treaty Of Rarotonga]

1. On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Forum, a body comprising the independent and self -governing countries of the South Pacific (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa), endorsed the text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and opened it for signature.

2. The attached text of the Treaty with its Annexes was formally communicated to the Director General by the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), who has been nominated as Depositary of the Treaty, and is herewith being circulated to all Member States for their information pursuant to a request made by the Director of SPEC.        

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty,

United in their commitment to a world at peace;

Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

Believing that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security;

Noting, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Noting that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific;

Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific;

Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communique of that meeting;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Usage of Terms

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(a)      "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;

(b)     "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them;

(c)      "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;

(d)     "stationing" means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

ARTICLE 2

Application of the Treaty

1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

ARTICLE 3

Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a)      not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(b)     not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;

(c)     not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 4

Peaceful Nuclear Activities

Each Party undertakes:

(a)      not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:

(i)      any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or

(ii)      any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Any such provisions shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;

(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

ARTICLE 5

Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices

1. Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

2. Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

ARTICLE 6

Prevention of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a)   to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(b)  not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 7

Prevention of Dumping

1. Each Party undertakes:

(a)      not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

(b)     to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;

(c)      not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(d)     to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

2. Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

 
ARTICLE 8

Control System

1. The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

2. The control system shall comprise:

(a)      reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;

(b)     consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);

(c)      the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;

(d)     a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

ARTICLE 9

Reports and Exchanges of Information

1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

2. The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.

3. The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Articles 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4).

ARTICLE 10

Consultations and Review

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

ARTICLE 11

Amendment

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptances from all Parties.

 
ARTICLE 12

Signature and Ratification

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

3. If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as is required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.

ARTICLE 13

Withdrawal

1. This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

ARTICLE 14

Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 15

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.

2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 16

Depositary Functions

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.

                                                                                                                                   ANNEX 1

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

A. The area bounded by a line:

(1)     commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;

(2)     running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea;

(3)     thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;

(4)     thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;

(5)     thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;

(6)     thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East;

(7)     thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;

(8)     thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;

(9)     thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(10)    thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;

(11)    thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;

(12)    thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;

(13)    thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(14)    thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West;

(15)    thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South;

(16)    thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East;

(17)    thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;

(18)    thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;

(19)    thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;

(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;

(21)    thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and

(22)    thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

B. The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.

(illustrative map not included)

                                                                                                 ANNEX 2

Iaea Safeguards

1. The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.

4. Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.

                                                                                                  ANNEX 3

Consultative Committee

1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall, adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.

2. The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.

                                                                                                           ANNEX 4

Complaints Procedure

1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.

2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

3. The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

5. In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

6. Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee.

7. The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

8. The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

9. If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

1. On 8 August 1986 the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty were adopted by the South Pacific Forum at its 17th session, in Suva.

2. The attached texts of the Protocols were formally communicated to the Director General by the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) and are herewith being circulated to all Member States for their information pursuant to a request made by the Director of SPEC.

3. Following the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty entered into force on 11 December 1986.

PROTOCOL 1

The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5 and 6, insofar as they related to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8(2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 2

The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

(a)   Parties to the Treaty; or

(b)  Any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act of a Party to the Treaty which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or to any act of another Party to a Protocol which constitutes a violation of a Protocol.

ARTICLE 3

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE 7

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

In Witness Whereof, have signed this Protocol.

Done at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 3

The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

Done at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language

<http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/spnwfz.htm>

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

[Member States]

Opened for signature: August 6, 1985.

Entered into force: December 11, 1986.

Number of Parties: 13 full members - Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. The five nuclear-weapon states, China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States have all adhered to the Treaty's relevant Protocols.

Duration: Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely.
Organs: Consultative Committee, Director.

Seven dialogue partners: Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, and United States EU. (France was one of the dialogue partners, its dialogue partner status was suspended in 1995 in protest of its nuclear tests in Mururoa but restored in 1996.)

<http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/rara.html>

The Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was formed in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the MTCR has grown to include thirty-three countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime.

The MTCR was initiated partly in response to the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The risk of proliferation of WMD is well recognized as a threat to international peace and security, including by the UN Security Council in its Summit Meeting Declaration of January 31, 1992. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.

National export licensing measures on these technologies make the task of countries seeking to achieve capability to acquire and produce unmanned WMD means of delivery much more difficult. As a result, many countries, including all MTCR partners, have chosen voluntarily to introduce export licensing measures on ballistic missiles and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems or related equipment, material and technology.
The current Chairman of the Regime is Ambassador Carlos Sersale di Cerisano of Argentina, Director of International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at "Dirección de Seguridad Internacional, Asuntos Nucleares y Espaciales, Esmeralda 1212 - Piso 11 (1007), C.A. de Buenos Aires, Argentina", or by e-mail at rcs@mrecic.gov.ar. Additional contacts are "Mrs. Moira Wilkinson (smw@mrecic.gov.ar) and Ms. María Paula Mac Loughlin (lmp@mrecic.gov.ar)."

<http://www.mtcr.info/english>

MTCR Partners

Membership

As with all MTCR decisions, the decision to admit a new partner is taken by consensus. In making membership decisions, partners tend to consider whether a prospective new member would strengthen international non proliferation efforts, demonstrates a sustained and sustainable commitment to non proliferation, has a legally based effective export control system that puts into effect the MTCR Guidelines and procedures, and administers and enforces such controls effectively. The Regime's dialogue with prospective partners is conducted through the MTCR Chair, visits to capitals by teams comprised of representatives of four MTCR partners and bilateral exchanges. The group does not have an observer category.

MTCR Plenary Meetings

The Plenary host becomes the Chair of the MTCR for the period extending to the next Plenary.

 <http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html>

Pressler Amendment

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conditions on Assistance for Pakistan

Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994

Sec. 902. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conditions on Assistance for Pakistan (Pressler Amendment)

Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device."

Syminton Amendment 

H.R.2333
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))
SEC. 826. AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.

(a)         IN GENERAL- The Arms Export Control Act is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:

`CHAPTER 10--NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS
`SEC. 101. NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT TRANSFERS.

`(a)       PROHIBITIONS; SAFEGUARDS AND MANAGEMENT- Except as provided in subsection

(b)                of this section, no funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may be used for the purpose of
providing economic assistance (including assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), providing military assistance or grant military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of part II of that Act, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or after August 4, 1977, unless before such delivery—

`(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and

`(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards
system of such Agency.

`(b) CERTIFICATION BY PRESIDENT OF NECESSITY OF CONTINUED ASSISTANCE; DISAPPROVAL BY CONGRESS- (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that--
`(A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; and

`(B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so.

Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in each particular case.

`(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall take effect on the date on which the certification is received by the Congress. However, if, within thirty calendar days after receiving this certification, the Congress enacts a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the certification, then upon the enactment of that resolution the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of assistance furnished under the authority of that certification shall be suspended immediately.

`(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

 <http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/sa>

 
Raphel: Administration Seeks Revision of Pressler Amendment

 
Tracking Number:  407376

Title:  "Raphel: Administration Seeks Revision of Pressler Amendment." US efforts to work more closely with Pakistan have been hampered by the sweeping sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment which prohibits US aid to Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear explosive device. (950914)

Author:  MARSHALL, RICK (USIA STAFF WRITER)

Date:   19950914

Text:
*NEA405

09/14/95 RAPHEL: ADMINISTRATION SEEKS REVISION OF PRESSLER AMENDMENT (Pressler: guarantees on nuclear program still needed) (460) By Rick Marshall USIA Staff Writer Washington -- U.S. efforts to work more closely with Pakistan have been "hampered by the sweeping sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment five years ago," a senior State Department official told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs September 14.

The Pressler Amendment prohibits U.S. aid to the government of Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan is not in possession of a nuclear explosive device.

"While the Administration strongly supports the Amendment's goal of curbing Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the legislation needs to be revised to fit current global realities and to better achieve our nonproliferation objectives," Robin Raphael, assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, said.

"Of most immediate concern are the Pressler roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering U.S. commercial interests in a lucrative market.... Our ability to press key nonproliferation goals over the longer term has also been eroded by the Pressler Amendment," she stated.

The sponsor of the amendment, Senator Larry Pressler (Republican, South Dakota), also appeared before the subcommittee to urge the amendment remain in force.

"I want to see our relations improve" with Pakistan, Pressler said, "but not by sacrificing other vital U.S. policy goals. Conditions must be made and kept before modifications are made to the Pressler Amendment."

"We need to put South Asia on the path toward a nuclear arms build-down to zero.... Pakistan should provide verifiable, written guarantees that it has capped its nuclear program and that any future U.S. assistance would not be used to further its nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery programs," the senator said.

One of the most contentious issues in U.S.-Pakistani relations concerns the 28 F-16s which United States had planned to sell to Pakistan, but which the Pressler Amendment prevented.

The Clinton Administration is now proposing to sell the aircraft to another country in order to compensate Pakistan for the money it lost. "Putting this issue behind us will permit a more normal and productive relationship between Washington and Islamabad," Raphel commented. "The United States should...resolve the fundamental unfairness of a situation where we have ended up with both Pakistan's money and the embargoed equipment."

The President is also seeking congressional authority to give Pakistan $370 million worth of military equipment, including three P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft.

According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Bruce Riedel, the Administration has carefully considered the impact of transferring the military equipment to Pakistan and concluded that "it would not significantly affect the (military) balance -- India would remain militarily dominant, though not overwhelmingly so."

<http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1995/950914-407376.htm>

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"),

Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects,

Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures,

Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures,

Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects,

Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment,

Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I:
Basic Obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

ARTICLE II
The Organization
A. General Provisions

1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.

3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria.

4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre.

5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty.

6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty.

7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty.

8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval.

9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.

10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget.

11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

B. The Conference of the States Parties
Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.

14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise.

15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:

(a)     When decided by the Conference;

(b)    When requested by the Executive Council; or

(c)     When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties.

The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.

16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII.

17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in accordance with Article VIII.

18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.

19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session.

20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.

21. Each State Party shall have one vote.

22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus.

Powers and Functions

24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.

26. The Conference shall:

(a)     Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;

(b)    Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 9;

(c)     Elect the members of the Executive Council;

(d)    Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Director-General");

(e)     Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;

(f)      Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council, or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty;

(g)     Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V;

(h)     Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents developed and recommended by the Preparatory Commission;

(i)       Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h);

(j)       Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and

(k)     Update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 23.

C. The Executive Council

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council.

28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council shall comprise:

(a)     Ten States Parties from Africa;

(b)    Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe;

(c)     Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;

(d)    Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;

(e)     Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and

(f)      Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.

All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to this Treaty. Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26 (k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII.

29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows:

(a)     At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests, by States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region:

(i)       Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System;

(ii)     Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and

(iii)    Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization;

(b)    One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in- order according to this sub-paragraph; and

(c)     The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or elections.

30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28.

32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.

34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.

35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.

36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions

37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.

38. The Executive Council shall:

(a)     Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty;

(b)    Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;

(c)     Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty;

(d)    Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;

(e)     Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request;

(f)      Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda;

(g)     Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding their adoption;

(h)     Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub-paragraph;

(i)       Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and

(j)       Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat.

39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.

40. The Executive Council shall:

(a)     Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges;

(b)    Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and

(c)     Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV.

41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty. In so doing, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:

(a)     Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;

(b)    Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;

(c)     Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V.

D. The Technical Secretariat

42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre.

43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia:

(a)     Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System;

(b)    Operating the International Data Centre;

(c)     Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data;

(d)    Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations;

(e)     Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;

(f)      Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council;

(g)     Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and

(h)     Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty.

44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.

45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include:

(a)     Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(b)    Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;

(c)     Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs;

(d)    Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and

(e)     Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations.

46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.

47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Organization.

48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.

49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission.

50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues.

52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director- General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team.

53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities

54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 26 (h) and (i).

57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.

ARTICLE III
National Implementation Measures

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary measures:

(a)     To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(b)    To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and

(c)     To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.

2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.

3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article.

4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

ARTICLE IV
Verification
A. General Provisions

1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:

(a)     An International Monitoring System;

(b)    Consultation and clarification;

(c)     On-site inspections; and

(d)    Confidence-building measures.

               At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.

2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.

3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate, through its National Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by, inter alia:

(a)     Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the necessary communication;

(b)    Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System;

(c)     Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process;

(d)    Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and

(e)     Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures.

4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification.

5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.

6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5.

7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty.

8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities.

9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.

10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes.

11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, paragraph 44.

12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes.

13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat

14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the States Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty:

(a)     Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task;

(b)    Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing:

(i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System;

(ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building measures; and

(iii)  Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol;

(c)     Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals;

(d)    Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns;

(e)     Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article;

(f)      Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data;

(g)     Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products;

(h)     Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring System;

(i)       Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party;

(j)       Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned;

(k)     Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and

(l)       Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre.

15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.

B. The International Monitoring System

16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat.

17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.

18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority.

Funding the International Monitoring System

19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of:

(a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;

(b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures;

(d)    Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost-effective means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and

(e)     Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization.

20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of:

(a)   Transmitting data to the International Data Centre;

(b)    Authenticating data from such stations;

(c)     Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;

(d)    If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and

(e)     Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals.

21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party.

22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 per cent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26 (h) and 38 (i).

Changes to the International Monitoring System

23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6.

24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or  technical nature  pursuant  to  Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8:

(a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and

(b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks). If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (d), that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (g), that such changes enter into force upon notification by the Director-General of their approval.

25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24:

(a)   A technical evaluation of the proposal;

(b)  A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and

(c)   A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement.

Temporary Arrangements

26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one year's duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The Director-General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph.

Cooperating National Facilities

27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System.

28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows:

(a)   Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate;

(b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and

(d)    The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party.

      The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network.

C. Consultation and Clarification

29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.

30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response.

31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible non- compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director- General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party.

32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply:

(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt;

(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after receipt of the request;

(d)    The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt;

(e)     If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party.
The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response provided by the requested State Party.

33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under paragraph 32 (d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V.

D. On-Site Inspections
Request for an On-Site Inspection

34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

35. The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.

36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.

37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.

38. The requesting State Party shall present the on- site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing.

Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request

39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.

40. The Director-General, after receiving the on- site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours.

41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay.

42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request.

43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification.

44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.

45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46.

Executive Council Decisions

46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken.

47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.

49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.

50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection.

52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50.

Follow-up After Executive Council Approval of an On- Site Inspection

53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party.

54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.

55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 43 of the Protocol.

The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection

56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control.

57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party shall have:

(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;

(b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection;

(d)    The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures;

(e)     The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and

(f)      The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol.
Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area.

58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty. The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party.

59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task.

60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.

Observer

61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:

(a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection;

(b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council;

(c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol;

(e)     The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.

            There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties.

Reports of an On-Site Inspection

62. Inspection reports shall contain:

(a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team;

(b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection;

(c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection;

(e)     A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and

(f)      Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection.
Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report.

63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Director- General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them. The Director-General shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report.

64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director-General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, the Director-General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph.

65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to:

(a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and

(b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused.

66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V.

Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests

67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the following:

(a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat;

(b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and

(c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time.

E. Confidence-Building Measures

68. In order to:

(a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions; and

(b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitoring System, each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in implementing relevant measures as set out in Part III of the Protocol.

ARTICLE V

Measures To Redress A Situation And To Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions

1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.

2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.

3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law.

4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI
Settlement of Disputes

1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken.

3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26 (j).

5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h).

6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.

ARTICLE VII
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, shall  be  subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.

2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference.

3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.

6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and III of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;

(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;

(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

(f)      If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;

(g)     The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph; (g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

ARTICLE VIII
Review of the Treaty

1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.

2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.

3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.

ARTICLE IX
Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

ARTICLE X
Status of the Protocol and the Annexes

The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol.

ARTICLE XI
Signature

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.

ARTICLE XII
Ratification

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE XIII
Accession

Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE XIV
Entry Into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.

4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers.

5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE XV
Reservations

The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI
Depositary

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.

2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.

3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.

4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XVII
Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ANNEX I TO THE TREATY

List of States Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28

Africa:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, C“te d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Eastern Europe:

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.

Latin America and the Caribbean:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Middle East and South Asia

Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Oman, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

North America and Western Europe:

Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East:

Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY

List of States Pursuant to Article XIV

List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World", and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World":

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland,   Turkey, Ukraine,    United   Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

Brownback Amendment of 1999

BROWNBACK AMENDMENT NO. 602 (Senate - June 08, 1999)
[Page: S6721]

Mr. STEVENS (for Mr. Brownback) proposed an amendment to amendment No. 578 proposed by Mr. Roberts to the bill, S. 1122, supra; as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment, insert the following:
Title---Suspension of Certain Sanctions Against India And Pakistan
SEC. X1. Suspension of Sanctions.

(a)   In General: Effective for the period of five years commencing on the date of enactment of this Act, the sanctions contained in the following provisions of law shall not apply to India and Pakistan with respect to any grounds for the imposition of sanctions under those provisions arising prior to that date:

(1)  Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa). [editor's comment - sec. 101 is referred to as the "Symington Amendment"]

(2)  Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) other than subsection (b)(2)(B), (C), or (G). [editor's comment - sec. 102 is referred to as the "Glenn Amendment," and subsection (b)(2) is a list of sanctions. Subsections (B), (C) and (G) are specific sanctions.]

(3)  Section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)). [Click here for a description of sec. 2(b)(4)]

(b)  Special Rule for Commercial Exports of Dual-Use Articles and Technology: The sanction contained in section 102(b)(2)(G) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1(b)(2)(G)) shall not apply to India or Pakistan with respect to any grounds for the imposition of that sanction arising prior to the date of enactment of this Act if imposition of the sanction (but for this paragraph) would deny any license for the export of any dual-use article, or related dual-use technology (including software), listed on the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations that would not contribute directly to missile development or to a nuclear weapons program. For purposes of this subsection, an article or technology that is not primarily used for missile development or nuclear weapons programs.

(c)   National Security Interests Waiver of Sanctions:

(1) In general: The restriction on assistance in section 102(b)(2)(B), (C), or (G) of the Arms Export Control Act shall not apply if the President determines, and so certifies to Congress, that the application of the restriction would not be in the national security interests of the United States.

(2) Sense of the senate: It is the sense of the Senate that--

(A) no waiver under paragraph (1) should be invoked for section 102(b)(2)(B) or (C) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to any party that initiates or supports activities that jeopardize peace and security in Jammu and Kashmir;

(B) The broad application of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities is inconsistent with the specific national security interest of the United States and that this control list requires refinement.

(C) export controls should be applied only to those Indian and Pakistani entities that make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute such programs.

(d) Reporting Requirement: Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees listing those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute directly and materially to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs.

(e) Congressional Notification.--A license for the export of a defense article, defense service, or technology is subject to the same requirements as are applicable to the export of items described in section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(c)), including the transmittal of information and the application of congressional review procedures described in that section.

(f) Renewal of Suspension: Upon the expiration of the initial five-year period of suspension of the sanctions contained in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), the President may renew the suspension with respect to India, Pakistan, or both for additional periods of five years each if, not less than 30 days prior to each renewal of suspension, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.

(g)  Restriction: The authority of subsection (a) may not be used to provide assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.; relating to economic support fund assistance) except for--

(1)  assistance that supports the activities of nongovernmental organizations;

(2) assistance that supports democracy or the establishment of democratic institutions; or

(3)  humanitarian assistance.

(h)  Statutory Construction: Nothing in this Act prohibits the imposition of sanctions by the President under any provision of law specified in subsection (a) or (b) by reason of any grounds for the imposition of sanctions under that provision of law arising on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. X2. Repeals.
The following provisions of law are repealed:

(1) Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375(e)). [editor's comment - sec. 620E(e) is referred to as the "Pressler Amendment"]
(2) The India-Pakistan Relief Act (title IX of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, as contained in section 101(a) of Public Law 105-277). [editor's comment - The Indian-Pakistan Relief Act is referred to as the "Brownback Amendment" of 1998]

SEC. X3. Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.

In this title, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

<http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/brownba99.htm>
 

Glenn Amendment Fact Sheet

Issued by The White House

The “Glenn Amendment” refers to an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act (Section 102). Under the Glenn Amendment, if the President determines that a non-nuclear weapon state [as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)] detonates a nuclear explosive device, certain sanctions apply. The sanctions impose broad-ranging restrictions on various types of assistance, loans, and trade. The DOD Appropriations Act of 2000, signed into law on October 25, 1999, provides authority for the President to waive Glenn Amendment sanctions.

Glenn Amendment - India

Glenn Amendment sanctions were applied to India in the wake of its 1998 nuclear test. Certain sanctions were waived in October 1999. These included sanctions on some environmental programs as well as other activities. However, sanctions remain on programs which are affected by the following:

• Prohibition of Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)-funded activities, U.S. government credit, credit guarantees or “other financial assistance” by departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the U.S. government where no exemption (e.g., for humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities), “notwithstanding” authority, or existing waiver applies.
• Prohibition of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Prohibition of licenses for export of items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML), certain dual-use exports , and for certain end-users.
• The Glenn Amendment sanctions state that the United States must oppose (vote no or abstain) any IFI loan or financial or technical assistance that does not directly support basic human needs (BHN).

Glenn Amendment and Related Nuclear Provisions - Pakistan

• At the time of its nuclear tests in May 1998, several restrictions on assistance to Pakistan were already in place in connection with the Pressler Amendment (triggered by Pakistan’s possession of a nuclear explosive device) and the Symington Amendment (triggered by Pakistan’s receipt of uranium enrichment equipment). The May 1998 nuclear tests subjected Pakistan to a broader range of economic and military sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. Since most assistance had already been terminated, the Glenn sanctions had limited additional consequences for bilateral assistance to Pakistan. However, they placed new restrictions on U.S. credit and credit guarantees, including by EXIM and OPIC; all Foreign Military Sales; licenses for commercial exports of munitions and certain dual-use items; and commercial bank lending to the government of Pakistan, except for loans or credits for purchasing food or other agricultural commodities. The most significant new restriction for Pakistan under Glenn was a congressional directive that the U.S. shall not support non-Basic Human Needs lending by international financial institutions. In December 1998, the President authorized U.S. representatives to allow for approval of a particular IMF package, but that authorization has since lapsed and has not been renewed.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)

<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/glennfcts.htm>

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

With 40 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG through voluntary adherence to the Guidelines which are adopted by consensus and through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.

The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of nuclear materials and equipment which require the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the recipient facility. The Part 1 nuclear control list is called the "Trigger List" because the export of such items "triggers" the requirement for IAEA safeguards.

The second set of NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials. The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. Both Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices while not hindering such trade.

The NSG was formed in 1974 following the Indian nuclear explosion which demonstrated how nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. The NSG Guidelines, first published in 1978, established requirements for: (1) formal recipient government assurances confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) adequate physical protection; (3) particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials; and 4) retransfer conditions.

In 1992, the NSG added full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states and established controls over exports of significant nuclear-related dual-use items and technology by publication of Dual-Use Guidelines and a control list. In 1995, the NSG added controls on nuclear technology for items on the Trigger List.

Chairmanship of the NSG rotates on an annual basis with the host of the annual Plenary meeting assuming the chair for that year. The Republic of Korea is the current chair and Sweden will assume the chairmanship in May 2004. The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna serves as the NSG point of contact in providing administrative support, including provision of meeting space and distribution of documents. The NSG Consultative Group (CG), currently chaired by the U.S., meets at least twice a year under the mandate of the Plenary to transact NSG business between Plenary meetings on matters such as review of the Guidelines or control lists, procedures, information sharing, transparency and outreach activities.

At an Extraordinary Plenary in December 2002, the NSG agreed: 1) to adopt U.S.-proposed anti-terrorism amendments to the Guidelines; 2) to issue a press statement alerting supplier states to concerns about the DPRK nuclear weapons program; and 3) to have the Chairman alert key non-member supplier and transit states to the risk of diversion of controlled and non-controlled items to the DPRK nuclear weapons program.

At the Pusan Plenary May 19-23, 2003, the NSG considered but did not reach consensus on: 1) membership for Lithuania; and 2) adoption of : a) steps to increase transparency of the NSG full-scope safeguards supply policy; b) catch-all control provisions in the Dual-Use Guidelines; c) the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; and d) technical amendments to the control lists. The Plenary did agree to emphasize the need for vigilance in exports to Iran during any outreach efforts with non-members and it called on the Iranian Government to resolve outstanding questions about its nuclear program. The Plenary also called again on all states to exercise extreme vigilance to ensure that exports of goods and technologies do not contribute to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

The NSG CG will meet in October 2003 in Vienna to consider issues left unresolved by the Pusan Plenary. The CG will continue to meet as necessary on these issues until May 2004 when it will report its progress to the 2004 Plenary in Sweden.

Nuclear Suppliers Group Members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.

<http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/3053pf.htm>

Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - A G-8 Declaration

1. We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security.

2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations  system.

3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat : international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership ; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international co-operation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with  international law.

4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments.

5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of Principles to prevent the spread of WMD and materials of mass destruction to terrorists and those that harbour them. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those Principles and the urgency of implementing them.

6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined them  to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament.
We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.

7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program.

9.We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed.

<http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/non_prolif…>

Zangger Committee

The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee (ZC) is to harmonize implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Committee maintains and updates a list of equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient facility, called the "Trigger List" because such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards.

The ZC is informal and that its decisions are not legally binding upon its members. The relative informality of the ZC has enabled it to take the lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (NSG). The latest such action is agreement to add plutonium separation technology to the Trigger List. The ZC, because of its link to the NPT, is also in a unique position to engage NPT-party non-member critics of the nonproliferation regimes and to present supplier government views to NPT meetings.

All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are members of the ZC. However, China is the only ZC member that is not a member of the NSG, which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states. China has not as yet been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its export control lists are comparable, if not virtually identical, to those of the NSG.

At the April 10, 2003, ZC meeting, members 1) welcomed the inauguration of the ZC website hosted by the Austrian Government; 2) discussed updating the Understandings (Guidelines), including physical protection and the IAEA Additional Protocol; and 3) continued discussion of possible outreach activities with non-member NPT Party states, particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries. The ZC again considered Belarus’ application for membership. The United States is still not prepared to join in a consensus for Belarus membership because of questions regarding that government’s commitment to nonproliferation.

Zangger Committee Members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.

Fact Sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation,

Washington, DC, 10 September,  2003

<http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/3054pf.htm>

India, U.S. and non-Proliferation
 

The Indo-U.S. negotiations reflect a political commitment to deal with a problem that has long hobbled bilateral relations.

CAN THE Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and the U.S. President, George W. Bush, find a way to promote bilateral high technology cooperation without the fear that it might fuel the spread of weapons of mass destruction? In addressing this question, the two leaders, who met on Wednesday, have three decades old political baggage to contend with. Senior officials from the two sides are reported to be furiously crafting a broad framework that will allow America to ease high technology trade with India in return for credible assurances that New Delhi will prevent the outflow of sensitive technology and material from its soil and put mechanisms in place to preclude the use of imported technology for military purposes. The Indo-U.S. negotiations in the last couple of weeks reflect a political commitment to deal with a problem that has hobbled bilateral relations for so long. But the task at hand is too daunting to be overcome in a short round of negotiations.

There was a time, many moons ago, when India and the U.S. used to cooperate in frontier technologies. Recall that the first Indian nuclear power station at Tarapur is American. Similarly, India's space programme, including its early rockets and satellites, had considerable American inputs. The spirit of liberal internationalism and the belief that advanced technology could help accelerate the development of poor nations held sway over the all-powerful community of American physicists in the mid-20th century. These impulses were reflected in the U.S. "atoms-for-peace" and "space for development" initiatives in the 1950s. India was a big beneficiary of these programmes. But this happy phase did not last too long. Three factors put an end to the productive advanced technology cooperation between the two nations.

One was the determination in Washington during the mid-1960s that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a primary national objective. This translated into the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that came into being in 1967. It also led to domestic laws in the U.S. restricting the transfer of nuclear and related technologies. As the NPT froze the number of "nuclear weapon powers" to those who had conducted nuclear tests by January 1, 1968, India became one of the biggest "potential proliferators" — all by an international legal fiat. Secondly, by the mid-1960s, the physicists retreated into the background and an army of lawyers and bureaucrats took over the nuclear debate in the U.S. and became the principal enforcers of the new non-proliferation rules. For them non-proliferation was religion, completely divorced from politics and statesmanship.

            Thirdly, by conducting its first nuclear test in May 1974 after the NPT deadline was over, India presented itself as a "violator" of the non-proliferation "norm". The Indian test led to concerted international action to tighten the rules of nuclear technology transfer and a welter of even stricter domestic laws in the U.S. As a result, some of the earlier nuclear cooperation between the two sides, as at Tarapur, came under a cloud. It took nearly a decade of negotiations to deal with the changed legal conditions on nuclear cooperation on Tarapur.

            That was only the beginning of a running argument between New Delhi and Washington. The non-proliferation rules kept steadily expanding in the range and scope of prohibitions, covering most aspects of modern technology. The "catch-all" provisions of the new non-proliferation laws meant the denial of anything that went into advanced technology programmes. Ironically, the expansion of the non-proliferation regime did not prevent determined nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. It only ended up squeezing those nations like India, which were genuinely interested in applying a broad spectrum of advanced technologies for peaceful purposes. Under the pressure of new rules, India's nuclear power programme slowed down; while the space programme came out less scathed, there was a problem of acquiring even simple items from the cumbersome licensing process in the U.S. Many commercial technologies for industrial use in India were also denied in the name of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

After the nuclear tests of May 1998, the Vajpayee Government and the Clinton administration attempted the first-ever intensive effort to address the basic problems of their divergence on non-proliferation and high technology transfers. India wanted the removal of not just the sanctions the U.S. had imposed after May 1998. It also sought an end to the wide range of technology-related measures since 1974. The U.S. in turn set five benchmarks on non-proliferation for India to address. These were joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supporting the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, strengthening controls on the export of sensitive technologies, providing assurances on a non-threatening nuclear posture, and improving relations with Pakistan as unending military tensions were raising the prospect of a nuclear war in the Subcontinent.

The talks between the then External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, during 1998-2000 did go a long way in making each aware of the nuclear security perceptions of the other. But they remained unfinished. The Clinton administration insisted that Indo-U.S. relations would not reach their full potential unless New Delhi met the nuclear benchmarks to American satisfaction. The assessment in the Clinton administration was that while Mr. Vajpayee had made a serious bid to improve Indo-Pakistan relations, India had not done enough on the four other benchmarks. Meanwhile the domestic politics in both countries at the turn of the decade made it difficult to move forward on the CTBT.

The Bush administration came to the issue amidst a serious reappraisal of American positions on the nuclear doctrine and arms control. The initiatives of the Bush administration on missile defence and its opposition to the CTBT were controversial both at home and abroad. But in relation to India, they opened a rare window of opportunity for resolving long-standing bilateral differences on non-proliferation and technology transfers. Unlike the Clinton administration, Mr. Bush did not define India's signature on the CTBT as the emblem of improving Indo-U.S. relations. More fundamentally, the Bush administration turned the logic of the Clinton administration on its head and argued that more intensive cooperation with India would lead to a resolution of nuclear differences.        

Unlike President Clinton, Mr. Bush did not make non-proliferation the centrepiece of ties with India. For nearly a decade, New Delhi and Washington talked little else other than Kashmir and non-proliferation. Reversing the priorities, the Bush administration held back talks on non-proliferation for more than two and a half years. The focus instead was on facilitating technology transfers, and the emphasis on export controls rather than on CTBT, FMCT or India's nuclear posture. The Bush Administration made an early political commitment to India in November 2001 that it would find ways to ease controls on technology transfer. As a result there was a resumption of cooperation on civilian nuclear safety and peaceful space applications. It also initiated consultations on liberalising the transfer of the so-called "dual use technologies."

            The intense negotiations of the last two weeks reflected a recognition on both sides that they needed to go beyond tinkering with the old rules and create a new framework that addresses India's concerns on better access to high technology and those of the U.S. on ensuring there is no outward flow or inward proliferation to military programmes. The talks are also about exploring opportunities for cooperation in new and sensitive areas such as missile defence. Defining a new Indo-U.S. understanding on these issues has involved a substantive inter-agency debate in the Bush administration. The sections committed to non-proliferation in Washington have many legal and other arguments against liberalising high technology transfers to India. New Delhi has a good case in demanding an exemption for it from the traditional rules of non-proliferation. But there are many in Washington who insist that special treatment for New Delhi might undermine the global non-proliferation regimes.

Given the political burden of the last three decades and the complexity of the issues involved, India and the U.S. may not find an immediate closure easy. But Messrs Vajpayee and Bush could certainly have renewed the political mandate for this all-important negotiations to bridge the Indo-U.S. nuclear divide on the basis of the shared political commitment towards prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the creation of a more effective global security mechanism in which India must be seen as a partner rather than the target.

© Copyright 2000 – 2004, C. Raja Mohan, The Hindu

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The New World After Iraq: The Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

 
It is a real pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Bruges Group to discuss the steps the Bush Administration is taking to keep our country and our friends and allies safe from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Without question, today’s greatest threat to international peace and stability comes from rogue states and terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their choice of weapon and undeterred by conventional means.

Until our Coalition took action last spring, the world faced a serious security threat with Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Here was a dictator who, while defying 17 Security Council resolutions, had ambitions to reconstitute his weapons arsenal, had obstructed and deceived international inspectors for twelve years, had used weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") against his own people, had twice invaded neighboring countries, and who had supported, and in some cases even harbored, terrorist groups. The interim report of the Iraq Survey Group shows that, as we suspected, Saddam never disarmed or disclosed as required. Dr. David Kay reports, for instance, that through interviews with Iraqi scientists and officials, the Group discovered "dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."

Had we not eliminated Saddam's regime, he would have remained, as Condoleezza Rice said earlier this month, "poised in the heart of the Middle East, sitting atop a potentially deadly arsenal of terrible weapons, threatening his neighbors and the world." Some analysts have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that, therefore, our Coalition military action was not justified. These criticisms miss the mark that our concern was not the imminence of Saddam’s threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities and intentions. President Bush specifically and unambiguously addressed this issue in his January, 2003, State of the Union message when he said: "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."

Given the right opportunity or incentive, Saddam could have easily transferred these weapons to terrorist groups or other non-state actors for their use against us, with potentially catastrophic results. For such terrorist groups, a weapon of mass destruction is increasingly a weapon of first, not last, resort, which they seek to acquire way they can. State sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya, are aggressively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Here lies a dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent the one from abetting the other. As President Bush told the United Nations last month, "Outlaw regimes that possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons -- and the means to deliver them -- would be able to use blackmail and create chaos in entire regions. These weapons could be used by terrorists to bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine. The deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away."

We acted in Iraq because we were not willing to trust our security, and the security of our friends and allies, to the supposed restraint and circumspection of a dictator committed to acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction. Saddam's continued defiance of U.N. resolutions and continued interest in weapons of mass destruction justified Coalition action. The risks of continued inaction were simply too high. As the President said recently, "It's a new kind of war, and America is following a new strategy. We're not waiting for further attacks. We're striking our enemies before they can strike us again."

Saddam's removal from power has unquestionably improved the international security situation. We are working tirelessly with thirty other Coalition partners to allow the Iraqis themselves to build the institutions of liberty and representative government, a peaceful society that no longer diverts its resources away from its citizens and toward the pursuit of WMD. But we face significant challenges in other parts of the world from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.

Iran

Let me turn to the problem of Iran. Although Iran has robust BW, CW and missile programs, tonight I will focus on their nuclear weapons program. Our strategy is to use bilateral and multilateral pressure to end that program, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. To date, two reports by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") have established that Iran is in violation -- in multiple instances -- of its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Iran has consistently denied any program to develop nuclear weapons, the large and still-growing number of contradictions, inconsistencies and prevarications in its shifting explanations to the IAEA demonstrate convincingly that Iran is actively concealing a weapons program.

The United States believes that Iran's covert and costly effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran is trying to legitimize as "peaceful and transparent" its pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities that would give it the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. This includes uranium mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment, reactor fuel fabrication, heavy water production, and "management" of spent fuel -- a euphemism for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium. Iran is also benefiting from international nuclear assistance for its reactor project, even while it uses such ostensibly legitimate programs to help conceal its clandestine nuclear work.

For many years, the United States has called for increased international scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program. The member states of the G-8, the European Union, the members of the nuclear supplier regimes, and other multilateral bodies have joined us in expressing the strongest concern over Iran's nuclear activities, and have called on Iran to cooperate more fully to answer all outstanding questions. The IAEA Board's September 12 resolution made these concerns clear, and required that Iran fully satisfy specific criteria by October 31 if it expects to avoid a formal finding of NPT noncompliance by the Board. It is a testimony to the effectiveness of concerted international pressure that Iran has recently been willing to promise to agree to the Additional Protocol, and has provided the IAEA with at least some additional information about its nuclear program, a positive but long-overdue step. It still remains to be seen whether these initiatives will amount to more than mere words, and even if Iran follows through with its promises, many further steps will still be required in order to prove beyond doubt that Iran is foreswearing the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

If Iran does not comply with its NPT obligations, the Board of Governors must do its duty and -- based on the facts already reported by the Director General, along with whatever else he reports next month and other information we now have -- find Iran not in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. This would trigger a report by the IAEA to the Security Council. If that occurs, we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts.

Iran is a crucial test for the international community and for the credibility and survival of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we stand firm together on this crucial issue, I am confident that we can preserve the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and help bring Iran back into compliance.

North Korea

With regard to North Korea, President Bush’s objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs. We seek to bring this about, as we have said repeatedly, through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome. Other states may yet be involved as appropriate. The North Korean nuclear program is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. It is a profound challenge to regional and even global stability, and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

By pursuing this course, the President is determined that blackmail and bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded. North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations.

During the August six-party talks in Beijing, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea emphasized that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons. North Korea further isolated itself by threatening provocative actions such as nuclear tests -- adding to threats it made in April that it might build more nuclear weapons and perhaps even transfer nuclear material or weapons to third parties.

In addition to seeking a solution through multilateral diplomacy, the United States, working with other countries, has taken steps to curtail dangerous and illicit North Korean activities such as drug smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade in WMD and missiles -- activities that finance Kim Jong-il's regime, including its nuclear activities.

We should not forget, however, that -- like Iran -- North Korea's violations of international norms are hardly restricted to its pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Although the DPRK has maintained its September, 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test moratorium, it has remained active in the research, development, testing, deployment, and export of ballistic missiles and related materials, equipment, and technology. During a September, 2002, meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il stated that North Korea would maintain its missile flight test moratorium through 2003. We are concerned, however, that North Korea may be trying to circumvent its promise by cooperating in testing and development with foreign missile programs.

North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), but nonetheless has probably continued a biological warfare capabilities effort that began in the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological agents, and may have biological weapons available for use.

We believe North Korea has had a long-standing chemical weapons program. North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea’s international procurement actions continue. In May, 2003, for example, German authorities intercepted 30 metric tons of the Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons precursor, sodium cyanide, bound for North Korea. In August, 2003, Taiwan authorities off-loaded 158 barrels of the controlled chemical weapons precursor phosphorous pentasulfide, from the North Korean vessel Be Gae Hong. North Korea represents a dangerous mix of repressive dictatorship, pursuit of WMD capabilities, and longstanding ties to international terrorism.

Syria

As I have recently testified to Congress, we are concerned about Syria's nuclear research and development program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the IAEA Technical Cooperation program -- that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Syria is a party to the NPT, and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations.

Since the 1970s, Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX. Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program, which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. It remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. As a result, Syria will need to continue foreign procurement activities in order to continue its CW program. We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability as well.

In addition, Syria's failure to secure its border with Iraq to guerrillas and terrorists poses a continuing threat to Coalition forces in Iraq. We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces, such as allowing dual-use and military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq, volunteers who sought to attack and kill our service members during the war. Although the situation on the Syrian border has improved somewhat in recent weeks, the infiltration of these fighters into Iraq continues to be a significant problem for us, and we call on Syria to stop such traffic from moving across its borders. As Secretary Powell said last month, "I made it clear to the Syrians that to have good relations with the United States and with a liberated Iraq, they should do everything they could to make sure that the wrong sorts of people are not crossing the border to cause trouble in Iraq." The message that the Bush Administration and the Congress are sending is clear: Syria must immediately change course and change its behavior on all of these fronts, or face the consequences.

New Initiatives

To roll back the proliferation activities of the rogue states, and to ensure that any of their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups, the United States is employing a variety of methods, including multilateral agreements, diplomacy, arms control, threat reduction assistance, export control aid, and other means where necessary. Most importantly, we and our partners in the international community must maintain an unvarnished assessment of the proliferators, and disrupt their supply of sensitive goods and technology before it contributes to an increased WMD capability or falls into the hands of terrorists.

In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant behavior, or where items are shipped despite our best efforts to control them, we also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure the technology does not fall in to the wrong hands. These interdiction efforts are an important addition to our comprehensive strategy to prevent proliferation. Interdiction involves identifying an imminent shipment or transfer and working to stop it. As the President noted in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

Proliferation Security Initiative

One of our newest and most promising counterproliferation initiatives, the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), was announced by President Bush on May 31. An essential component of U.S. counterproliferation strategy is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on land. In this context, the United States and ten other close allies and friends -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK -- have worked to develop this new initiative. Our goal is to create a more dynamic, creative, and robust approach to preventing WMD, missiles, and related technologies flowing to and from countries of proliferation concern.

The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. On September 4, after just three months, agreement on and publication of the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" was achieved. The Statement of Interdiction Principles has been shared with countries around the world. The response to the PSI and the Principles has been very positive, with more than 50 countries already indicating they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts. We are moving to establish the practical basis for cooperating on interdictions with such countries.

PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises to occur into 2004. Australia organized and executed one such exercise last month in the Coral Sea that involved both military and law enforcement assets. Four PSI partners, including the United States, sent vessels to the exercise, and all PSI partners were involved in some capacity. On October 8-9, the United Kingdom hosted the first PSI air interdiction training exercise, designed to explore operational issues associated with the interception of proliferation-related trafficking in the air. And in mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime interdiction training exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. This exercise involved concrete contributions from France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as observers from other PSI participant nations. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdiction operations in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking. Additional training exercises will be held in the months to come, further improving our ability for interdictions.

As the PSI moves forward, we expect other countries will join in these training opportunities. President Bush has made clear that we hope to involve all countries that have a stake in nonproliferation and who have the will and ability to take necessary action to address this growing threat. Our long-term objective is to create a web of counter proliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile related technology. As the President said last month, "We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies."

It is important to note that our interdiction efforts in PSI are grounded in existing domestic and international authorities. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we can draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction; that is, the sum of our efforts may be more effective than taking action individually.

Properly planned and executed, the interception of critical technologies while en route can prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase their cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.

G-8 Global Partnership

The G-8 Global Partnership Initiative, launched by G-8 Leaders at the June, 2002, Kananaskis Summit, is also an important nonproliferation achievement of this administration. The goal of the Global Partnership Initiative is to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear safety cooperation projects to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

President Bush is committed to raising half of this total. Counting the U.S. contribution, the G-7 countries have pledged a little over $16 billion to date, and Russia intends to spend about $2 billion on its priority projects. We hope to see the remaining gap closed by the next G-8 Summit. The G-8 welcomed the participation of six additional countries -- Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland -- this past summer. The initial focus has been on projects in Russia, but we expect the Partnership to recognize additional states of the former Soviet Union as recipients in the coming year, beginning with Ukraine.

As we approach the U.S. G-8 Presidency beginning January 1, improved Russian cooperation regarding project implementation remains a challenge for the success of the Partnership. Securing Russian agreement to support effective verification measures and to provide adequate liability provisions, commensurate with those in the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement, is essential to moving forward on key nonproliferation projects. Taxation exemption and access to work sites are continuing concerns, as well as Russian delays in concluding implementing arrangements with other donor countries, impeding expenditure of their pledges.

Dangerous Materials Initiative

Yet another new initiative, the Dangerous Materials Initiative ("DMI"), responds to the President's call at the U.N. General Assembly last month to secure the most dangerous materials at their source. Through the DMI, the administration will work to identify gaps in the control of dangerous materials worldwide. DMI projects will help regulate, track, secure and safeguard biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological materials, as well as the know-how to make them into weapons of terror and war. To encourage international participation, we will share with our partners a menu of important projects in this area that they might support.

HEU Minimization

In the decades after World War II, large quantities of highly enriched uranium ("HEU") were exported to more than 50 countries, primarily by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Most of this material was used to fuel research reactors, and much of it still remains stored at or near these reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in quality. Since 1978, the United States has been engaged in an expanding effort to minimize international commerce in HEU, to reduce, and if possible eliminate, stockpiles of this weapons-usable material in foreign countries. Where this is not immediately feasible, it aims to improve physical protection at storage sites.

Our current efforts include a number of such programs, several of which involve close cooperation with Russia. These programs assist in the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium, and return U.S.-origin HEU from reactors in up to forty-one counties for permanent disposition in the U.S. The Departments of State and Energy are fully cooperating to advance all of these programs. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in and unsecured storage of weapons-usable uranium throughout the world.

Conclusion

Each of these initiatives moves us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist groups they sponsor do not acquire a shortcut to their deadly designs against us. As President Bush said this month, "After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. The danger hasn't passed....America must not forget the lessons of September 11th." Indeed, that danger is present in a growing number of places, and we must be vigilant in recognizing -- and then confronting -- the emerging threats against our common security.

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
Remarks to the Bruges Group, London, United Kingdom, 30 October, 2003

<http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25752pf.htm>