Fact Files

Indo-China Relations

Editor
Dr.Noor ul Haq

Assistant Editor
Sadia Nasir

Convention Between Great Britain,China and Tibet (3 JULY 1914)

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga‑den Shatra Pal‑jor Dole; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

ARTICLE I

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the Present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE II

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognizing that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognizing also the auto­nomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administra­tion of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Gov­ernment at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE III

Recognizing the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tib­etan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station mili­tary or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Conven­tion of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

ARTICLE IV

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continu­ance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high offi­cial with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

ARTICLE V

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

ARTICLE VI

Article 3 of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article 9 (d) of the Convention of September 7,1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term 'Foreign Power' does not include China.

            Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the nation commerce of China or of the most favoured

ARTICLE VII

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 are hereby cancelled. (b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE VIII

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7,1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

ARTICLE IX

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown as in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudcie the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions?

ARTICLE X

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE XI

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood‑Tiger year.

Initial of the Lonchen Shatra.                               (Initialled) A.H.M.

Seal of the                                                         Seal of the

LONCHEN SHATRA                                      British Plenipotentiary

[Dalai Lama of Tibet]

Schedule

(1) Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March, 1890.

(2) Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.

(3) Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:

(I)                  It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

(2)                 After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.

(3)                 It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

(4)                 Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

(5)                 It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet hall not exceed seventy‑five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

(6)                 The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article 3 of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the. Tibetan side of the Tibet‑Sikkim frontier

(7)                 The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatofies to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial of Lonchen Shatra                                        (Initialled) A.H.M.

Seal of the                                                            Seal of the

LQNCHEN SHATRA

[Dalai Lama of Tibet]                                            British Plenipotentiary

Declaration appended to the Simla Convention, July, 1914

We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet, hereby record the following declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as initialed to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing there from.

In token whereof we have signed and sealed this declaration, two copies in English and two in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand rune hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood‑Tiger year.

Seal of the

DALAI LAMA

(Signed) A. HENRY McMAHON

British Plenipotentiary

Signature and seal

Of the Lonchen Shatra              

Seal of the British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the         Seal of the                     Seal of the         Seal of the

Drepung           Sera                              Garden             National

Monastery         Monastery                     Monastery         Assembly

Parshotam Mehra, Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987: Problems and Prespectives
(New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1989), pp. 183-189.

Agreement Between The Republic of India and The People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India (29 April 1954)

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China,

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India,

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

1.    Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

2.    Mutual non‑aggression,

3.    Mutual non‑interference in each other's internal affairs,

4.    Equality and mutual benefit, and

5.    Peaceful co‑existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The government of the Republic of India, H. E. Nedyam Ragh‑ avan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H. E. Chang Hanfu, Vice‑Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

1.       The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.

2.    The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail‑bags and communications in code.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

2. The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima‑Khargo, (4) Gyanimachakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra,(7) Puling‑Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (R) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

1.       Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.

2.       Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

3.       Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

1.          Shipki La pass; 2. Mana pass, 3. Niti pass, 4. Kungri Bingri pass, 5. Darma pass, and 6. Lipu Lekh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE V

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Article.

1.             Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorized agents and examined by the border check‑posts of the other Party,

2.             Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends, and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits:

3.             Porters and mule‑team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registratinn at the border checkposts of the other‑Party.

4.             Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkposts of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

5.             Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either government may refuse entry to any particular person.

6.             Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party. Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty‑ninth day of. April 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

(Sd.) Nedyam Raghavan,                                           (Sd.) Chang Han‑fu,

Plenipotentiary ‑of the                                              Plenipotentiary of                        

Government of the                                                  Republic of India.                                                     Central People's Government,

People's Republic of China.

Parshotam Mehra, Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987: Problems and Prespectives
(New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1989), pp. 200-203.

Mr. Chou En-lai’s Visit to Delhi

After paying a brief visit to Rangoon, Mr. Chou En-lai arrived in Delhi on April 19, accompanied by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi.

            Welcoming Mr. Chou at Delhi airport, Mr. Nehru recalled the friendship and co-operation which had flourished at the time of his two previous visits, and continued: “Unfortunately, other events have taken place since then which have put a great strain on this bond of friendship and have given a shock to all our people. Thus our relations have been imperilled in the present and for the future, and the very basis on which they stood has been shaken.

            “It is our belief that peace is essential for the world and necessary for our two countries in their relations with each other. But that peace has to be based on good faith and understanding and on strict adherence to those principles which we once proclaimed. It has to be not only external peace, but also peace of mind.

            “We are faced with grave problems which disturb the minds of millions of people. It is a hard task to go back and recover that feeling of good faith and friendship; yet the future depends upon it. I earnestly trust that our efforts will be directed towards undoing much that has happened, and thus recovering that climate of peace and friendship on which our relations ultimately depend.”

            In reply, Mr. Chou said that there was “no reason why any question between us cannot be settled reasonably through friendly consultation” in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence, adding that he had come to India “with the sincere desire to settle questions.”

            Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai began their talks on April 20, whilst the Chinese Premier also had talks with President Prasad, Vice-President Radhakrishnan, and senior Cabinet Ministers, including Mr. Krishna Menon, Pandit Pant (Home Minister), and Mr. Morarji Desai (Finance Minister). At the conclusion of the talks on April 25, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou issued a communiqué announcing that they had not succeeded in resolving the differences between the two countries, and that it had therefore been agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet to examine all relevant documents. The communiqué stated:

            “The two Prime Ministers explained fully their respective stands on problems affecting border areas. This led to a greater understanding of the views of the two Governments, but the talks did not result in revolving the differences that had arisen.

            “The two Prime Ministers agreed that a further examination should take place by officials of the two sides of the factual material in the possession of both Governments. They therefore agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check, and study all historical documents, records, maps, and other material relevant to the boundary question on which each side relies in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points on which there was agreement and those on which there was disagreement or which should be examined more fully and clarified. The report should prove helpful towards a further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.”

            “It was further agreed that officials should meet from June to September 1960 alternately in the capitals of the two countries. The first meeting should take place in Peking, and the officials would report to the two Governments by the end of September 1960. During the period of further examination of factual material, every effort should be made by the partics to avoid friction and clashes in border areas.”

            At a press conference in Delhi on April 25, Mr. Chou En-lai listed six points which, he suggested, could form the basis for a settlement, as follows:

“(1)  There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.

(2)       There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercise administrative jurisdiction.

(3)       In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys, and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.

(4)       A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains.

(5)       Pending a solution of the boundary question through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward terrorital claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made.

(6)       In order to ensure tranquility on the border and thereby facilitate discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.”

The Chinese Prime Minister stated that the principal difference between Mr. Nehru and himself related to the western (Ladakh) sector of the border. In the eastern sector, although the McMahon Line was “absolutely unacceptable” to the Chinese Government, it would not cross that line and had not put forward any terrorital claims in this sector. In the middle sector there were only disputes over individual areas which were not very significant. “We have requested the Indian Government to take an attitude towards the western sector of the boundary similar to that of the Chinese Government towards the eastern sector of the boundary,” he continued. “We have said that the Indian Government can keep its stand and enter into negotiations with us. We have also asked India not to cross the line up to which China exercise jurisdiction… To all this the Indian Government has not entirely agreed…” Asked whether any of the Indian leaders had suggested in the talks that China had committed aggression, Mr. Chou declared that “none of the leaders of the Indian Government has raised such a question.”

After Mr. Chou En-lai, had left Delhi on April 26 for an official visit to Nepal, Mr. Nehru told press correspondents at the airport that “the joint statement indicates that we were unable to come to any agreement; that is eloquent of the positions.”

Asked about Mr. Chou’s assertion that the Indian leaders had not accused China of committing aggression, Mr. Nehru said: “If we think and if I told them that they have entered our terroritory, what does it mean? Obviously it means that they have committed aggression.” Commenting on the suggestion that India should accept the Chinese position in Ladakh in return for Chinese acceptance of the Indian standpoint in the eastern sector, Mr. Nehru emphasized that “There is no question of barter in these matters.” He thought that the existing tension might lessen for the moment as a result of the talks, but stressed that the basic dispute which had caused the tension still remained. There had been no clashes in the disputed areas for seven or eight months, partly because of the winter, but partly also because of instructions on both sides to avoid them; he did not expect further clashes or encroachments to occur.

Later the same day Mr. Nehru said in the Lok Sabha  that “during the discussion we always came up against the hard rock of different sets of facts.” This had led to a position where both sides were unable to convince each other, and it had therefore been agreed that the two sets of facts should be examined. He had suggested that officials should undertake such an investigation immediately, but the Chinese had not had their material with them.

Commenting on Mr. Chou’s six points, Mr. Nehru said that point (2) meant that each side would retain what was under its military control, while point (3) “does not get us anywhere.” Point (4) was a response to the Indian people’s feelings about the Himalayas, and “if the Chinese feel strongly about the Karakorans they are welcome to do so.” On point (5) he observed: “Whatever the explanation of that may be, it is rather an odd way of putting it. Presumably it means that they will not discuss anything unless a territorial claim is accepted.” Point (6) was “not something I agreed to.” On the question of whether the Chinese had committed aggression, Mr. Nehru declared: “The reason why Mr. Chou En-lai came to Delhi was that, according to us, they had entered our territory over a large area, which was considered aggression.”

Mr. Nehru told the Lok Sabha on April 29 that he had information that the Chinese had built a new road in Ladakh about the middle of 1959, west of the road along the Aksai Chin caravan route which they had built in 1957-58. He had raised the matter during his talks with Mr. Chou, and had been surprised to find that the latter “did not know much about it.”

Keeisng’s Contemporary Archieves, 5-12 November 1960, pp. 17737-38,

Facts Behind China-India Border Dispute

If a general of the Chinese imperial government representing the Manchu dynasty had, by force of arms, pillage and plunder, succeeded in subjugating the North American continent and on that basis had artificially created a border line between the United States and Canada called, let us say, The Manchu Line, would a sovereign U.S. government abide by thus border line?

Let us suppose further that the boundary line demarcated by this general included, for the Canadian side, parts of Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle and Duluth. Let us suppose again that the treaty between Canada and the U.S. dictated by this general had never been accepted by any government of the United States, and that in truth the people of the U.S. regarded this treaty and its boundary line as illegal, null and void, and as the imposition of a foreign power at a time when the U.S. was weak, divided and under the domination of a foreign imperialist power.

All we have to do with this analogy is to just change the name -- Canada to India, United States to China and China to Great Britain -- and the picture becomes immeasurably clearer than it is represented in the U.S. press.

The McMohan Line

It is the position of the Chinese People's Republic that the so-called McMahon Line -- named after the British General McMahon -- is illegal, null and void, and the result of a predatory, imperialist imposition of the British government in the year 1914.

No Chinese government ever accepted the McMahon Line. Neither did the Imperial Government of China in 1914, nor the Chiang Kai-Shek government ever agree to it. The very fact that even the Chiang Kai-Shek clique, which is nothing but a tool of U.S. imperialism, has not dared to dispute the Chinese People's Republic's position of the China-India border dispute, it in itself the most eloquent testimony to the correctness of the Chinese position.

Nevertheless, the Chinese People's Republic has made every effort to achieve a reasonable and just settlement of the territory in dispute. It has consistently shunned the use of arms.

Proposals for Negotiations

Although the border dispute is almost three years old now, and the Chinese have made innumerable other approaches to the Indian government to settle it on some amicable and acceptable basis the Nehru government has invariably turned them down. In the past two months alone the Chinese government made several proposals for negotiations.

It made a notable effort on August 4, and another one on September 13. In neither of these proposals did the Chinese government lay down any preconditions for the negotiations. Nor did the Chinese government resort to the type of language which could in any way be construed as a threat to India.

On the contrary, the diplomatic notes directed to the Indian government were couched in the most conciliatory language, and were calculated to effectuate a reasonable settlement which would safeguard the territorial integrity of China as well as India.

As a matter of fact, the London Times, certainly no friend of the Chinese revolutionary government, had to publicly admit on October 8 that if military operations were resumed on the Sino-Indian border, "onlookers will have to note that it was New Dehli . . , that declined to embark upon them (talks) . . ."

The position of the London Times is of exceptional importance because it has always sided with India as against China. The London Times was obliged to make the above statement only after the Indian paper, Tribune, had reported that at a cabinet meeting the Indian government had decided to use armed force to deal with China.

Nehru’s "Limited Offensive"

It was also reported in the world press on October 8, that Nehru had authorized India's new commander-in chief of the eastern border area to "fight a limited offensive operation."

These are the incontrovertible facts.

As to what lies behind the aggressive attitude of the Nehru government, it must be borne in mind first of all that the imperialist world, particularly the U.S. would like nothing better than to see the two principal Asiatic powers, the two powers which hold the greatest revolutionary promise for mankind in the east, locked in military combat, shedding the blood of thousands, absorbing the resources and energies of millions of people, which should be used to construct a revolutionary way of life.

The efforts of the U.S. government, it must be noted, have been directed, insofar as India is concerned, not only to make it economically and financially dependent upon U.S. monopoly interests, but also to inflame the Indian bourgeoisie, particularly its right-wing extremist elements, against the Chinese People's Republic.

Four Billion U.S. Aid

According to The New York Times of October 22 (1969), the U.S. has poured into India more than four billion dollars. A substantial section of this money has gone to line the pockets of Indian businessmen, government officials, and especially the extremist elements who are interested in diverting the mass discontent of the Indian peasants and workers into other channels.

U.S. diplomats, State Department planners, and military figures in the Pentagon have for a long time felt that the biggest diversionary tactic that imperialism could employ to disrupt the revolutionary anti-imperialist front was to continually stir up, bribe and corrupt as many of the representatives of the Indian bourgeoisie as it could to fan the flames of an India-China war.

Nehru himself was subjected to unremitting pressure when he was in the U.S. More U.S. aid was used as bait to lure Nehru into the trap of a protracted India-China war, which can only result in further detriment to India, China and the cause of all oppressed people.

Since Nehru's Visit

Since the Indian Prime Minister left the shores of the U.S. there have been only rare intervals in which there has been a let up in the war fever fanned by the Indian bourgeoisie and its agent Nehru. For a long time Nehru played the role of moderator between left and right in the Indian-China border dispute, cautioning the extremist elements of the bourgeoisie in Parliament, and repudiating suggestions for offensive operations by his military advisers.

But his October 4 decision, taken after a cabinet meeting, made it clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that he had completely capitulated to the right wing on this issue and was kowtowing to U.S. imperialist interests.

The present military efforts of the Chinese are merely a response to the offensive action taken after the Indian cabinet session.

A Defensive Battle

The Chinese government is fighting a defensive battle. It is only too well aware that U.S. imperialism is ready at all times to take advantage of any preoccupation that China may have with India to open another front against China wherever and whenever it finds it feasible, whether it be in the Pescadores, the Taiwan strait or new harassments over the air space of China.

There are those who say China should give in -- give up what belongs to China in the interest of peace. These are the people who are always ready to give, especially things that do not belong to them.

When to give -- or whether to give -- is a question which only the Chinese can decide, as it as their territory. Surely the Chinese, who have gone through hell and fire in the course of 22 years of civil war, in which they have had to trade many times -- space for time -- and in fact have endured many retreats, need no reminders on this score.

Solidarity of Asian people

The workers of the world and the progressive anti-imperialist countries in particular, are most deeply concerned in a speedy, reasonable and honorable settlement on the part of China and India. Such a settlement can only be arrived at if the ruling group in New Delhi accepts China's offer for the resumption of talks on a high level between the two governments without any pre conditions. A border settlement would remove a tremendous obstacle to the solidarity of the Asian people who are struggling for a new life, and would be a tremendous rebuff to imperialism and its servants and underlings.

26 October 1962

<http://www.workers.org/marcy/china/2_5.html>

 

The Colombo Conference Proposals and After (As released by the External Affairs Ministry of Ceylon, 19 January 1963)

1. Proposals made by‑the Colombo conference of six non‑aligned nations for border settlement between India and China

1. The conference considers the present de facto cease-fire period as a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict.

2. a) With regard to the Western sector, the conference appeals to the Chinese Government to carry out the withdrawal of their military posts by 20 kilometres as has been proposed in the letters of Mr. Chou En‑lai to Mr. Nehru dated November 21 and 28, 1962.

b) The conference appeals to the Government of India to keep their existing military positions.

c) Pending final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon without prejudice to the rights of the presence of both India and China in that area.

3. With regard to the Eastern sector the conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both Governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions. The remaining areas in this sector can be settled in future discussions.

4. With regard to the problems of the middle sector, the conference suggests that they be solved by peaceful means without resort to force.

5. The conference believes that these proposals which could help in consolidating the cease-fire once implemented, should pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving the problems entailed in the cease fire positions.

6. The conference would like to make it clear that a positive response to the appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two governments as regards its conception of final alignment of boundaries.

 Parshotam Mehra, Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987: Problems and Prespectives,
(New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1989), pp. 291-292.

 Sino‑Indian Relations, 1977 To 1981 – Mr. Huang Hua's Visit to New Delhi ‑ Agreement to Discuss Border Question

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Huang Hua, visited New Delhi on June 26‑29, 1981, for talks with Indian leaders, during which it was agreed to hold discussions on the longstanding border dispute between their two countries. His visit, the first by a Chinese minister since the late Mr. Zhou Enlai's visit in 1960, marked a major advance in the gradual improvement in Sino‑Indian relations which had taken place since 1977.

The Janata Government, which took office in March 1977, took a number of steps to improve relations with China, including the signing of a trade agreement, but the Chinese Government at first made little response to the Indian initiatives. The official New China News Agency moreover strongly criticized a courtesy call which the Dalai Lama paid to Mr. Morarji Desai (then the Indian Premier) on July 22, asserting that Indian support for "the chieftain of the Tibetan rebel bands" constituted an interference in China's internal affairs. A Peking radio broadcast of Nov. 27, which referred to the border war of 1962, was described by Mr. A. B. Vajpayee (then the Indian Minister of External Affairs) on Dec. 12 as "needlessly provocative".

China adopted a more conciliatory policy early in 1978. A trade delegation visited India on Feb. 8‑25, and stated that China wished to conclude a long‑term trade agreement. A goodwill mission led by Mr. Wang Bingnan, president of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which visited India on March 7‑23, met Mr. Desai and Mr. Vajpayee, and on behalf of Mr. Huang Hua extended an invitation to Mr. Vajpayee to visit China, which was accepted. Mr. Desai told the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) on March 16, however, that he had made it clear to the Chinese mission that "full normalization of relations, of course, cannot be attained till the main outstanding issue‑the border question‑is resolved to our mutual satisfaction by negotiations".

Relations were strained during the summer of 1978 by the opening on June 18 of the Karakoram Highway linking China and Pakistan, which ran through the Pakistani‑occupied area of Kashmir by the speech given on this occasion by a Chinese Deputy Premier, Mr. Geng Biao, in which he referred to the Kashmiri people's right of self‑determination; and by the reported training in China of Naga and Mize, insurgents. Mr. Vajpayee rejected opposition demands that he should cancel his visit to Peking because of these issues, but on Oct. 27 it was announced that he had had to postpone the visit, which was due to begin three days later, for medical reasons.

Mr. Vajpayee arrived in Peking on Feb. 12, 1979, for his deferred visit, the first by an Indian minister for over 20 years, and began talks with Mr. Huang Hua on the following day. While in Peking he also had talks with Mr. Hua Guofeng and Mr. Deng Xiaoping (then the Chinese Premier and senior Deputy Premier respectively). He left on Feb. 16 for visits to Shanghai, Hangzhou and Canton, but following the Chinese invasion of Vietnam cut short his tour by a day and returned to New Delhi on Feb. 18.

 Reporting to the Lok Sabha on his visit on Feb. 21, Mr. Vajpayee said that he had emphasized the "fundamental importance" of the boundary question, which "must be satisfactorily settled if relations of mutual confidence are to be established". He had also informed the Chinese leaders that the attitude towards the Kashmir question adopted by China in the past 15 years had been "an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino‑Indian relations"; reiterated India's concern at the construction of the Karakoram Highway across territory forming part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; and drawn attention to the moral and material support from China received by disaffected elements from Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur for their insurgent activities inside India. "I was glad to learn from the Chinese leaders," Mr. Vajpayee added, "that such support which may have been given‑the last instance was some time ago was looked upon as a thing of the past." He had assured the Chinese leaders that it was in deference to the Dalai Lama's spiritual position that he had been given asylum in India; that Tibetan refugees had been allowed to settle there for purely humanitarian reasons; and that if they wished to return to Tibet India would not stand in their way. He had invited Mr. Huang Hua, he stated, to visit India to continue the dialogue.

Little progress was made in the later months of 1979 because of the unstable political situation in India, where Mr. Desai's Government resigned in July and was succeeded by a caretaker Government without a parliamentary majority. Following general elections in January 1980 and the formation of a Congress (1) Government, however, the new Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, met Mr. Hua Guofeng on May 8 in Belgrade, where both were attending President Tito's funeral. Mr. Eric Gonsalves. The Indian Foreign Secretary, visited Peking for discussions on June 20‑23, and delivered a new invitation to Mr. Huang Hua to visit India. It was announced on June 20 that the visit would take place later in the year.

In an interview with an Indian journalist on June 21 Mr. Deng Xiaoping suggested that the border question should be solved by a "package deal", whereby China would recognize the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and India would recognize the status quo in the western sector. Indian sources pointed out that this proposal, which was repeated in a New China News Agency commentary on June 25, was merely a "feeler", which had not been officially put forward during the talks with Mr. Gonsalves.

Commenting on Mr. Deng's proposal, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, said in the Lok Sabha on July 2: "The Government of India has never accepted the premise on which it is based, namely, that the Chinese side is making a concession in the eastern sector by the giving up of territory which they allege is illegally incorporated into India. Nevertheless, we welcome the prospect of the eastern sector being settled without any particular difficulty . . . .

Mr. Wang Bingnan said in an interview with an Indian journalist on July 27 that a recently discovered document disproved India's contention that the Simla Agreement of 1914 confirmed the McMahon Line as the traditional Sino‑Indian boundary in the eastern sector. The British representative at the Simla conference, Sir Henry McMahon, he went on, had merely suggested a boundary line, but the British Government had later prepared a "fake document" saying that the boundary had been decided at the conference. Mr Narasimha Rao, however, said in the Lok Sabha on July 31 that "the Government, who keep abreast of all important research on the subject, are fully convinced that the alignment shown in our maps conforms to the true international border".

Relations again deteriorated after India recognized President Heng Samrin's Government in Kampuchea on July 7. An Indian spokesman stated on Aug. 6 that the Chinese Government had recently informed New Delhi that Mr. Huang Hua would not be able to visit India before the end of the year because of other internal and external commitments. An incident on Aug. 20, however, when the Chinese returned 40 Indian Army officers who had accidentally crossed the Sikkim border into Tibet on Aug. 7 (the delay in their return being due to bad weather) was regarded as an indication that the Chinese Government wished to maintain friendly relations.

Mr. Huang Hua arrived in New Delhi for his visit on June 26, 1981, and began discussions with Mr. Narasimha Rao on the same day. After he had met Mrs. Gandhi on June 28 she announced that it had been agreed to hold talks to resolve the border issue. Mr. Huang told a press conference later the same day that at an appropriate time officials of the two countries would explore ways for the settlement of the issue and discuss measures for the development of relations in various fields. He also stated that he had invited Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Narasimha Rao to visit China, and that China would allow Indian pilgrims to visit two Hindu holy places in Tibet.

Mr. Narasimha Rao told the Lok Sabha on Aug. 20 that preparations for official‑level meetings later in the year were being made in consultation with the Chinese Government. China, he said, had accepted India's basic proposition that progress in relations between the two countries could not be complete until the boundary question was solved, but India had made it clear that settlement of this question was not a precondition for developing relations in other fields. (The Hindu, Madras ‑ The Statesman, Calcutta ‑ Beijing Review BBC Summary of World Broadcasts).

Note. In two important articles published in The Statesman of Calcutta in November 1978 and May 1981 Dr. Karunakar Gupta, a leading Indian authority on international relations, questioned the official Indian view on the border question in both the eastern and the western sectors. His findings are summarized below.

The McMahon Line. "In a secret exchange of notes between the Tibetans and Sir Henry McMahon, the British representative at the Simla Conference of 1913‑14, a new boundary about 60 miles northward from the plains of Assam was agreed on," Dr Gupta wrote in his article of 1978. "The Chinese representative at the conference was not informed about the negotiations .... Whether McMahon's secret agreement was a valid legal basis for his line as an international boundary was one of the main issues debated between the Indian and Chinese Governments in the early 1960s. But the archives show that in 1914 even the British Indian Government did not regard the McMahon Line as a valid boundary‑and the Government in London certainly did not.

"Records show that London, as much as the Chinese, was kept in the dark about McMahon's attempts to negotiate a new boundary with Tibet. The first recorded reference to them came in the Viceroy's report to London on the abortive Simla Conference, in which he [i.e. the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst] said: `We recognize that a consideration of the eastern or India‑Chinese portion of the north‑eastern frontier did not form part of the functions of the conference.' He forwarded to London McMahon's report on his exchanges with the Tibetans . . . but asked that McMahon's `views and proposals be regarded as personal and not at present carrying the endorsement of the Government of India'.

"The Viceroy's tentativeness may have been due to his awareness of the fact that McMahon's dealings with the Tibetans leading to territorial cessions by them were in breach of treaties London had concluded with Russia and China . . . . The official record of all treaties entered into by the Government of India was kept in a series of volumes known as Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sannds. The first of these to cover the period of the Simla Conference, Volume XIV, was published in 1929, and said: `In 1913 a conference of Tibetan, Chinese and British plenipotentiaries met in India to try and bring about a settlement in regard to matters on the Sino‑Tibetan frontier, and a tripartite convention was drawn up and initialed in 1914. The Chinese Government, however, refused to permit their plenipotentiary to proceed to full signature.'

"Thus there was no attempt to disguise that the conference had been abortive, and there was no mention of the McMahon Line. But in 1938 this volume was withdrawn from circulation (as far as possible) and ordered to be destroyed. It was surreptitiously replaced by a new volume, still bearing the date 1929. This volume gave a different account of the Simla Conference and its results.

"It suggested that a valid convention, ratified by Britain and Tibet, had emerged from the Simla Conference, and that this had included a definition of a part of the Indo‑Tibetan frontier, the McMahon Line. This falsification of the official record has been an important source of public confusion in India…"

After alleging that Mr. (now Sir) Olaf Caroe, then Deputy Secretary of the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, had in 1935 "`unearthed' the dead letter of the McMahon Line, as he put it" and had "succeeded in convincing the Government in New Delhi, and then in London, that the McMahon Line should be regarded as the boundary", and that "accordingly, official maps, which until then had never shown the McMahon Line, began to do so in 1939", Dr Gupta continued: "The British Government did not, however, agree to Caroe's suggestion that a protest be sent to China about Chinese maps which ignored the McMahon Line. London must have felt that no protest should be made, since it was likely to lead to an undesirable discussion with the Chinese Government about the validity of the 1914 agreements McMahon had made with the Tibetan delegation to the Simla Conference (which of course China had all along dismissed as illegal and invalid). . . Documents also reveal that Caroe's persistent efforts after 1936 to induce Tibetans to agree to the McMahon Line were fruitless (Lhasa had never ratified the agreements made at Simla between Tibetan plenipotentiaries and McMahon) . . . ."

Dr. Gupta also asserted that Sir Henry Twynam, an Indian Civil Service official who became acting Governor of Assam in February 1939, "emerged as the main protagonist of the `moderate' school", and he went on: "In a letter to the Viceroy [the Marquess of Linlithgow] in March 1939 he suggested . . . that the British were not on `absolutely firm ground juridically' in their interpretation of the Simla Conference and its results. He pointed out that the letters exchanged in 1914 between McMahon and the Tibetans were `lacking in the formalities associated with a treaty', and argued that the fact that the Government had taken no steps to implement the McMahon Line from 1914 to 1938 must adversely affect its position, both in equity and in international law . . . .

The Kashmir Frontier. In his second article Dr Gupta quoted the following comment by another distinguished Indian scholar, Mr. K, P. S. Menon [who served as ambassador both to China and later to the Soviet Union], on the disputed Aksai Chin area, on the frontier of Kashmir and China: "The maps, treaties, agreements and other documents on which both sides rely cannot be said to place the boundary, as conceived by either party, beyond the region of doubt or the need for negotiation. The watershed principle, on which we have heavily relied in other sectors of the frontier, is in the Aksai Chin area not in our favour. Moreover, Aksai Chin is of no importance to India, whereas to China it is of utmost importance, because it is the link between two historically troublesome regions, Tibet and Sinkiang."

"From the official Indian point of view," Dr Gupta continued, "the Sino‑Indian border dispute is now limited to the Chinese occupation of about 14,000 square miles of territory in the Kashmir‑Ladakh region. According to the authoritative Aitchison's Treaties, Volume XII (1931), however, the northern and eastern frontier of Kashmir remained `undefined' during the Rai. Also, many official maps, including the map of India attached to the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (Simon Commission), Volume 1 (1930), and the map of India submitted by the General Staff of the British Indian Army (marked `Top Secret') to the British Cabinet Mission in 1946 [the Pethick‑Lawrence/Cripps/Alexander mission), show the crest of the Karakoram Mountains as the approximate alignment of the northern and eastern frontier of Kashmir.

"During the Raj, however, there were two other versions of the northern and eastern frontiers of Kashmir, one proposed by Sir John Ardagh (1897) and the other by Macartney‑Macdonald (1899), which tried to push the Kashmir frontier beyond the Karakoram ranges. But these lines were never officially accepted. In July 1954, however, the Indian Government . . . published a new official map of India showing a boundary line in the Kashmir‑Ladakh sector which took the crest of the Kuenlun range some 80 miles further north‑east and placed within Indian territory, for the first time, the whole of the Aksai Chin area, notwithstanding the fact that the area was at that time under the actual control of China. This new boundary line was a version of the Ardagh Line, which had been dismissed by the General Staff on the ground that it was difficult to defend and strategically useless in comparison to the Karakoram line . . . .

"In 1977 Sir [Algernon] Rumbold, a [former] senior official of the India Office, revealed the truth about the western sector of the northern frontier of British India in a review article in Asian Affairs (June 1977). He said that in the north‑west, `in the frozen, uninhabitable wilderness of the Aksai Chin', there was no defined frontier. He further said: `In researching this point, I found nothing in the India Office Records to justify the line on the Kuenlun range indicated on some maps, and the (Simon) Commission's map accordingly adopted a line roughly along the crest of the Karakoram ranges' . . . . "‑(The Statesman, Calcutta)

 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 23 October 1981, pp. 31153-54

India‑China Joint Press Communiqué Issued on 23 December 1988

At the invitation of Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made an official goodwill visit to the People's Republic of China from December 19 to 23, 1988. Accompanying His Excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to China were Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, Mr. Narasimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs of India, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of Commerce, Dr. B. Shankaranand, Minister of Law and Justice and Water Resources, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs and other Indian officials.

Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in an atmosphere of friendship, candidness and mutual understanding. President Yang Shangkun of the People's Republic of China, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the Military commission of the CPC Central Committee had separate meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During his visit, the two Governments signed the Agreement on cooperation in the Field of Science and Technology, the Agreement Relating to Civil Air Transport, and the Executive Programme for the Years 1988, 1989 and 1990 under the Agreement for Cultural Cooperation. Both the Premier and the Prime Minister were present at the signing ceremony. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi and their party also toured historical sites and scenic sports in Beijing, Man and Shanghai.

During their talks and meetings, the leaders of the two countries had a wide exchange of views and ideas on bilateral relations and international issues of mutual interest. Both sides found such talks and meetings useful as they enhanced mutual understanding in the interest of further improvement and development of bilateral relations. The two sides made a positive appraisal of the cooperation and exchanges in recent years in trade, culture, science and technology, civil aviation and other fields, and expressed satisfaction with the relevant agreements reached between the two countries. They emphasized the vast scope that existed for learning from each other.

They emphasized that the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non‑aggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, which were jointly initiated by India and China, which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between states. These principles also constitute the basic guidelines for the establishment of a new international political order and the New International Economic Order. Both sides agreed that their common desire was to restore, improve and develop India‑China good‑neighbourly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles. This not only conforms to the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but will actively contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. The two sides reaffirmed that they would make efforts to further their friendly relations.

The leaders of the two countries held earnest, in‑depth discussions on the India‑China boundary question and agreed to settle this question through peaceful and friendly consultations. They also agreed to develop their relations actively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this question. In this context, concrete steps will be taken, such as establishing a joint working group on the boundary question and a joint group on economic relations and trade and science and technology.

The Chinese side expressed concern over anti‑China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the long‑standing and consistent policy of the Government of India ‑that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti‑China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.

With regard to the international situation, the two sides held that in the present‑day world confrontation was giving way to dialogue and tension to relaxation. This is a trend resulting from long years of unswerving struggle by the peace‑loving countries and people of the world against power politics. It is conducive to world peace and to the settlement of regional problems. It also facilitates the efforts of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to develop their national economies. India and China will make their own contributions to the maintenance of world peace, promotion of complete disarmament and attainment of common progress.

His Excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and their party expressed heartfelt thanks to the Government and people of the Peoples Republic of China for the warm and friendly hospitality accorded to them.

            Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited Premier Li Peng to visit the Republic of India at his convenience. Premier Li Peng has accepted the invitation with pleasure. The date of the visit will be decided upon through diplomatic channels.

 C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, India and China: The way ahead after “Mao’s India war”
(New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000) pp. 182-184.

Visit by Li Peng

The Chinese Premier Li Peng arrived in Delhi for talks with Indian leaders on Dec. 11‑16. The visit, the first by a Chinese Prime Minister in 31 years, marked a further stage in the thaw in bilateral relations which bagan (began) with a visit to China by the late Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in December 1988.

Regarded by analysts as a political and diplomatic triumph for China, the visit secured a formal undertaking by India to check the activities of its Tibetan refugees. Three major agreements were also concluded covering principally the expansion of consular representation in Bombay and Shanghai, increase in cross‑border trade (reportedly worth currently US$34,100,000‑for its resumption in February 1991), and co‑operation in space technology.

Outstanding differences on the border dispute between the two countries failed, however, to be resolved decisively.

Hopes of a settlement had emerged after Li was quoted, in an interview in Beijing on Dec. 4, as saying that China would seek "mutual accommodation", and that "pending a resolution of the border issue, both sides should abide by the border lines under actual control". Subsequent reports ' claimed that Li's offer had effectively endorsed the status quo under which China retained control over the Aksai‑Chin region in northern Kashmir, with India preserving sovereignty over the disputed state of Arunachal Pradesh.

In a joint communique issued on Dec. 16 both sides stressed that they would continue to work towards "a mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question" through meetings of joint working parties established in 1988.

Later that day, All‑India Radio quoted Narasimha Rao as saying that "there has not been much progress on the border issue with China".

On Tibet the communique noted that China had "expressed concern about the continued activities in India by some Tibetans against their motherland", while India had reaffirmed that "Tibet is an autonomous region of China". In a gesture construed as a concession to China, the communique also stated that India "does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti‑China political activities in India".

On Dec. 11 the Indian government had ordered the arrest (overturned by the Supreme Court on Dec. 13) of more than 200 Tibetan demonstrators who clashed with police while protesting against Li's visit. The move, reportedly aimed at assuaging Chinese fears about growing unrest among India's estimated 110,000 Tibetan exiles, came as their spiritual leader, His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, gained increasing recognition from government leaders in the USA and the UK.

 In an apparent concurrence of views on human rights, the two sides stated that "for the vast number of developing countries, the right to subsistence and development is a basic human right".

Earlier, at a joint press conference on Dec. 13, Li had said that both India and China regarded human rights as primarily "the right to development". Agreeing with Li, Rao added that India found it hard to accept the Western concept of human rights "in its entirety".

Unconfirmed reports said that other issues discussed and left unresolved were the question of the sale of Chinese missiles to Pakistan and Indian misgivings about recent proposals for a South Asian nuclear‑free zone.

Keesing’s Record of World Events, December 1991, p. 38683.

Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India‑China Border Areas Signed in Beijing on September 7, 1993

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China, (hereinafter referred to as the two sides), have entered into the present Agreement in accordance with the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non‑aggression, non‑interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence and with a view to maintaining peace and tranquility in areas along the line of actual control in the India China border areas.

ARTICLE I

The two sides are of the view that the India‑China boundary questions shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment.

ARTICLE II

Each side will keep its military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the line of actual control in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed. The extent, depth, timing and nature of reduction of military forces along the line of actual control shall be determined through mutual consultations between the two countries. The reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages in mutually agreed geographical locations sector wise with the areas along the line of actual control.

ARTICLE III

Both sides shall work out through consultations effective confidence building measures in the areas along the line of actual control. Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted under this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

In case of contingencies or other problems arising in the areas along the line of actual control, the two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel of the two countries. The form of such meetings and channels of communications between the border personnel shall be mutually agreed upon by the two sides.

ARTICLE V

The two sides agree to take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place and shall undertake mutual consultations should intrusions occur. Both sides shall also consult on possible restrictions on air exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the line of actual control.

 ARTICLE VI

The two sides are agreed that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question.

ARTICLE VII

The two sides shall agree through consultations on the form, method, scale and content of effective verification measures and supervision required for the reduction of military forces and the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the areas along the line of actual control under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

Each side of the India‑China Joint Working Group on the boundary question shall appoint diplomatic and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present Agreement. The experts shall advise the Joint Working Group on the resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the line of actual control and address issues relating to redeployment with a view to reduction of military forces in the areas along the line of actual control. The experts shall also assist the Joint Working Group in supervision of the implementation of the Agreement, and settlement of differences that may arise in that process, based on the principle of good faith and mutual confidence.

ARTICLE IX

The present Agreement shall come into effect as of the date of signature and is subject to amendment and addition by agreement of the two sides.

Signed in duplicate at Beijing on the 7' day of September, 1993 in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all three texts having equal validity.

For the Government of the

Republic of India

For the Government of the

People's Republic of China

C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna,  India and China: The way ahead after “Mao’s India war”
(New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000) pp. 185-187.

China, India Sign Accord To Ease Border Dispute; Other Agreements Seen Boosting Trade (Excerpts)

China and India signed an accord today pledging to reduce troops and respect the cease-fire lines along their long Himalayan border, a move both sides hailed as important progress toward reducing tensions between the world's two most populous countries.

The border dispute has been a major obstacle to better ties between China and India since 1962, when they fought a brief but intense war in which Indian troops were defeated. In recent years, however, relations have warmed as the two sides expanded trade and other contacts without linking them to the question of the 2,100-mile border.

Today's agreement, one of four signed by Chinese Premier Li Peng and his visiting Indian counterpart, P.V. Narasimha Rao, says that pending a final resolution, both countries agree to respect and observe the "line of actual control" that separates their troops and promise not to resort to force or threats of force. But the "extent, depth, timing and nature of the reductions will be worked out through mutual consultations," the Indian Embassy said.

Li, who welcomed Rao with a 19-gun salute in Tiananmen Square on Monday, said today's agreements will "pump new vitality into the growth of bilateral ties." He noted that trade between the two countries, which totals about $340 million a year, is "incompatible with existing potential," Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin told reporters after the talks.

The other agreements are for increased cooperation on the environment, radio and television, and border trade.

The border question remains the most emotional issue for both sides. India claims land held by China in southwestern Xinjiang and western Tibet along the Kashmir border; China claims land that is part of northeastern India.

Under the accord signed today, China and India also agreed to start confidence-building measures and give prior notification of military maneuvers, and it pledged to prevent airspace intrusions, the Indian Embassy said.

Lena H. Sun, Washington Post, 7 September 1993                                                                                        World Tibet Network News, 8 September 1993

< http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1993/9/8_1.html>  

Visit by Chinese President

Chinese President Jiang Zemin began a four-day state visit to India- the first by a Chinese head of state- on Nov. 28. He held talks with President Shankar Dayal Sharma and Deve Gowda, and on Nov. 29 the two sides signed a confidence-building agreement to minimize the chances of armed border skirmishes. They also endorsed bilateral co-operation agreements on shipping, combating crime and drug trafficking, and the maintenance of the Indian consulate in Hong Kong after its handover from UK to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

Keesing’s Record of World Events, November 1996, p. 41367.

Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of India and The Government of The People's Republic of China on Confidence Building Measures In The Military Field Along The Line of Actual Control in The India‑China Border Areas

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the two sides),

Believing that it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of India and China to foster a long‑term good‑neighbourly relationship in accordance with the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual no aggression, non‑interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co‑existence,

Convinced that the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas accords with the fundamental interests of the two peoples and will also contribute to the ultimate resolution of the boundary question,

Reaffirming that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means or seek unilateral military superiority,

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India‑China Border Areas, signed on 7 September 1993,

            Recognizing the need for effective confidence building measures in the military field along the line of actual control in the border areas between the two sides,

Noting the utility of confidence building measures already in place along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas,

Committed to enhancing mutual confidence and transparency in the military field,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquility and stability in the India‑China border areas.

ARTICLE II

Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas., No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.

ARTICLE III

The two sides agree to take the following measures to reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India China border areas:

(1)          The two sides reaffirm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas to minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.

(2)        The two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, para‑military forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed forces deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The major categories of armaments to be reduced or limited are as follows: combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface‑to‑surface missiles, surface‑to‑air missiles and any other weapon system mutually agreed upon.

(3)     The two sides shall exchange data on the military forces and armaments to be reduced or limited and decide on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas. The ceilings shall be determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communication and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments.

ARTICLE IV

In order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas and to prevent any tension in the border areas due to misreading by either side of the other side's intentions:

(1)     Both sides shall avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one Division (approximately15,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas. However, if such exercises are to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main force involved shall not be towards the other side.

(2)     If either side conducts a major military exercise involving more than one Brigade Group (approximately 5,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, it shall give the other side prior notification with regard to type, level, planned duration and area of exercise as well as the number of type of units or formations participating in the exercise.

(3)     The date of completion of the exercise and deinduction of troops from the area of exercise shall be intimated to the other side within five days of completion or deinduction.

(4)     Each side shall be entitled to obtain timely clarification from the side undertaking the exercise in respect of data specified in Paragraph 2 of the present Article.

ARTICLE V

With a view to preventing air intrusions across the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas and facilitating landings by military aircraft:

(1)                 Both sides shall take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place. However, if an intrusion does take place, it should cease as soon as detected and the incident shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft. The results of the investigation shall be immediately communicated, through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings, to the other side.

(2)        Subject to paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Article, combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within ten kilometers of the line of actual control.

(3)        If either side is required to undertake flights of combat aircraft within ten kilometers from the line of actual control, it shall give the following information in advance to the other side, through diplomatic channels

(a)     Type and number of combat aircraft;

(b)    Height of the proposed flight (in meters);

(c)     Proposed duration of flights (normally not to exceed ten days);

(d)    Proposed timing of flights; and

(e)     Area of operations defined in latitude and longitude.

(4)        Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft aid helicopters shall be permitted to fly up to the line of actual control.

(5)        or land on the other side only after obtaining the tatter's prior permission after providing the latter with detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard.

No military aircraft of either side shall fly across the line of actual control, except by prior permission. Military aircraft of either side may fly across the line of actual control or overfly the other side's airspace

Not with standing the above stipulation, each side has the sovereign right to specify additional conditions, including at short notice, for flights or landings of military aircraft of the other side on its side of the line of actual control or through its airspace.

(6)        In order to ensure flight safety in emergency situations, the authorities designated by the two sides may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.

ARTICLE VI

With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas, the two sides agree as follows:

(1)     Neither side shall open fire, cause bio‑degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometres from the line of actual control. This prohibition shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges.

(2)     If there is a need to conduct blast operations within two kilometres of the line of actual control as part of developmental activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.

(3)     While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the line of actual control, precaution shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not accidentally fall on the other side across the tine of actual control and causes harm to the personnel or property of the other side.

(4)        If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face‑to face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self‑restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.

ARTICLE VII

In order to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between their military personnel and establishments in the border areas along the line of actual control, the two sides agree:

(1)        To maintain and expand the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between their border representatives at designated places along the line of actual control;

(2)        To maintain and expand telecommunication links between their border meetings points at designated places along the line of actual control;

(3)         To establish step‑by‑step medium and high‑level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.

ARTICLE VIII

(1)        Should the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control and enter the other side because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters, the other side shall extend all possible assistance to them and inform their side, as soon as possible, regarding the forced or inadvertent entry across the line of actual control. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be settled through mutual consultations.

(2)        The two sides shall provide each other, at the earliest possible, with information pertaining to natural disasters and epidemic diseases in contiguous border areas which might affect .the other side. The exchange of information shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings.

 ARTICLE IX

 In case a doubtful situation develops in the border region, or in case one of the sides has some questions or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this Agreement, either side has le right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE X

(1)        Recognizing that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India‑China border areas, the two sides agree to speed up the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control. As an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions. They also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible.

(2)                 Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control, the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence building measures envisaged under this Agreement on an interim basis, without prejudice to their respective positions on the alignment of the line of actual control as well as on the boundary questions.

ARTICLE XI

Detailed implementation measures required under Article I and Article V of this Agreement shall be decided through mutual consultations in the India‑China Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question. The India‑China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group shall assist the India‑China Joint Working Group in devising implementation measures under the Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in effect until either side decides to terminate it after giving six months' notice in writing. It shall become invalid six months after the notifications.

            This Agreement is subject to amendment and addition by mutual agreement in writing between the two sides.

            Signed in duplicate in New Delhi on 29 November, 1996, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of                             For the Government of the

The Republic of India                                People’s Republic of China

C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna,  India and China: The way ahead after “Mao’s India war”
(New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000) pp. 188-195.

Narayanan's China visit to strengthen ties

 

President K. R. Narayanan's weeklong visit to China from Sunday symbolizes the desire of the two Asian giants to forge stronger ties 50 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between them.

Reaffirming Chinese President Jiang Zemin's statement during his 1996 visit to India that friendship between the two countries is a "historical necessity" for not only the people of the two countries but the world, Foreign Secretary Lalit Mansingh said on Friday that India attached "great importance" to Narayanan's visit.

He is the first Indian president to visit China since R. Venkataraman traveled to that country in 1992.

"There have been ups and downs in our relationships," Mansingh acknowledged, but said the decision by the Joint Working Group (JWG), at its last meeting here in April, to expedite its work to provide a solution to the old boundary dispute was a "good backdrop" for Narayanan's visit.

"This is for us a very important visit because of the importance we attach to our relations with China," Mansingh told journalists and noted that the visit was taking place during the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Though trade ties between the two countries remained relatively modest at $2 billion, considering their size and potential, no business discussions are expected to take place during Narayanan's visit, he said.

But, he indicated that the presence of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises Minister Manohar Joshi in the president's delegation and its visit to Dalian, an industrial center, could be expected to be used by the two countries for important discussions.

Besides Dalian, Narayanan will also visit Kunming in Yunnan province where he will inaugurate the famous Yunnan horticultural exposition.

Narayanan will hold talks with Jiang after a welcome ceremony on Monday morning. The Chinese president will host a banquet in his honor on the same night, when a "very special cultural program" would also be held. Indian violin maestro L. Subramaniam and the Beijing Symphony Orchestra will perform at the program.

He will address a distinguished gathering of scholars, academicians, students and officials the next day at Peking University and present a bust of Rabindranath Tagore to the university.

He will leave for Dalian on May 31, and after spending the next day in the city, leave for Kunming.

The President will be accompanied by First Lady Usha Narayanan and four members of Parliament -- Sushma Swaraj (BJP), S. Ramachandra Pillai (CPI-M), Somnath Chatterjee (CPI-M) and Sushil Kumar Shinde (Congress), besides senior officials.

Narayanan returns to New Delhi on June 3.

P. Jayaram, 26 May 2000

<http://newsarchives.indiainfo.com/spotlight/indo-china/jayaram.html>

China-India Relations Since Pokhran II:

Assessing Sources of Conflict and Cooperation

Until very recently, relations between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) drew less attention from security analysts and scholars than might be expected of the two largest countries in Asia, considering their immense populations, rapidly growing economies, military modernization programs, and an unsettled border dispute that led to war in 1962. India’s underground detonation of five nuclear devices in a sequence of tests in May 1998 brought Sino-Indian relations into vivid relief almost overnight. Just before the tests, India’s defense minister explicitly singled out China as India’s "number one" security threat. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee explained in a letter to President Clinton that the nuclear tests were necessary in light of China’s aiding and abetting Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, Pakistan responded with nuclear tests of its own within weeks of the Indian tests.

Assessments of the Asian security environment, long centered on how regional powers viewed conditions on the Korean peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, now need to incorporate the uncertain and in many ways puzzling course of bilateral relations between the two continental powers of East and South Asia. Analyses of Sino-Indian relations in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests differ rather sharply in identifying the driving forces behind each state’s recent behavior and pronouncements toward one another. Some analysts have concluded that India and China share a number of common interests that portend a future of cooperative behavior, while others point to significant areas of disagreement that lead to a strongly negative outlook regarding their future relations. The purpose of this article is to sort through existing evidence and claims found among a small but growing body of literature on Sino-Indian relations and to suggest areas of research that might explain certain patterns in the evolving relationship.

The contemporary states of India and China can claim an inheritance of cultural traditions stretching back several millennia. Yet as nation-states, both are relatively new, having emerged through nationalist, anti-imperialist, and socialist (Leninist in the case of China) mass movements during the mid-20th century. While India’s parliamentary democracy obviously stands in sharp contrast to China’s communist party dictatorship, both share a number of internal security challenges that influence their perceptions of each other and their respective regional security environments. With populations of over one billion each, both states now face environmental challenges and potential resource scarcities that arise from such large populations. No nation-state has ever administered populations of such size. In an era in which national identity is challenged by regional, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other sources, India and China are grappling with crises of national identity and even separatist movements among certain groups. The leaders of both states are acutely aware and resentful of what they view as efforts by the international community, and the United States in particular, to interfere in the resolution of autonomy questions. Nowhere is this sensitivity greater than in discussions over Taiwan and Kashmir—perceived by many Chinese and Indians as "partitions" of their respective nations during the establishment of statehood fifty years ago.

While neither China nor India appears to be offering a revisionist challenge to international security and trade regimes, leaders of both states have expressed opposition to existing international protocols on nonproliferation, the environment, human rights, and trade policy. Indeed, Indian and Chinese interests in modifying current international institutions constitute an important area in which they might make common cause. Economically, India and China are in the midst of an uncertain period of transition and transformation as each undertakes liberalization programs to further its integration into the global economy. Liberal-minded economic reformers within both governments face challenges from more protectionist "statist" groups (especially the military and industrial bureaucrats) who have benefited from state-administered economies for much of the past fifty years and who stand to lose status and wealth as a result of liberalization and integration with the global market. In security matters and military modernization, both have turned to Russia as an important supplier of advanced weaponry and defense systems. Finally, both view the United States as a necessary if suspect partner in their current strategic objectives. Both pursue improved relations with the United States for obvious strategic and economic reasons but resent American efforts to criticize and curb their acquisition of conventional and nuclear weapons. While PRC and Indian security establishments have far more pressing regional concerns to cope with in the short and medium term, both are, post-1998, increasingly aware of the other as a potential partner or adversary in their long-term strategic projections. Thus, identifying the parameters of the Sino-Indian relationship at this stage provides something of a roadmap for where the relationship might be headed in the coming years.

"Pokhran II" and China's Puzzling Reaction 

On May 11 and 13, 1998, India detonated five underground nuclear devices in the desert region of Pokhran, where one such explosion in 1974 had signaled India’s nuclear aspirations. A week before the 1998 tests, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a controversial television interview that "China is potential threat number one. . . . The potential threat from China is greater than that from Pakistan, and any person who is concerned about India’s security must agree with that fact." Since Fernandes is well-known to the defense and diplomatic establishments in Beijing and New Delhi for his off-the-cuff statements, at the time these may have been interpreted as regrettable remarks from an official known for his bluster. With the first round of tests coming just one week on the heels of Fernandes’s remarks, it may appear that the interview was well-timed to alert the international community. Subsequent investigations have revealed that Fernandes in fact had been left "out of the loop" and was not aware of the impending tests.

In between the May 11 and May 13 tests, The New York Times published a letter from Prime Minister Vajpayee to President Clinton (the letter was presumably leaked by U.S. officials) in which Vajpayee all but named China as the rationale behind the decision to test. Vajpayee’s letter read in part:

I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.

If Fernandes’s remarks could be placed in the context of the personality behind them, the letter from the Indian prime minister to the U.S. president identifying China as the reason India was compelled to conduct the tests could not be so easily dismissed. This letter elicited a strong reaction from Beijing, whose official response to the first test had been delayed.

The day after the first round of tests, on May 12, PRC media devoted surprisingly brief stories to the test, and on May 13, before the second round of tests had been announced, a foreign ministry spokesperson noted only that "the Chinese government expresses its grave concern" and that the tests were "detrimental to peace and stability in the South Asian region." After news of the second round of tests spread later that day (along with news of Vajpayee’s letter), Beijing’s reaction was rapid and more severe: "The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation." The statement noted that India had "maliciously accused China of posing a nuclear threat to India," which the statement called "utterly groundless." Diplomatic relations between India and China plummeted, as did India’s relations with the United States and the global community. The scheduled 1998 meeting of the "Joint Working Group" (JWG), a Sino-Indian bilateral organization that met regularly to discuss border disputes and develop confidence-building measures, was cancelled.

Given the circumstances, China’s reaction to the "Pokhran II" tests was actually more restrained than most characterizations have put it. From a broader perspective, the Chinese reaction to the Indian tests, and to the subsequent tests by Pakistan in late May, surprised many observers who predicted that Beijing would issue ominous warnings. Instead, throughout the summer of 1998, PRC President Jiang Zemin and other foreign policy officials adopted a posture that placed China "above the fray" and worked in cooperation with the United States, the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and international nonproliferation regimes to push India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapon programs. During President Clinton’s visit to China in June 1998, the United States and China released a joint statement resolving that the two sides would cooperate on nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Had it been India’s intention to alert the world to its security concerns about China as a dangerous rising power, the tests managed to do just the opposite—they gave Chinese officials the opportunity to present China as a cooperative member of the international community seeking to curb nuclear weapons proliferation. Far from looking like a revisionist state, China played the role of a status quo power, and a rather assertive one at that.

PRC officials declined to exercise a number of other steps that they could have taken in the aftermath of the Pokhran II tests. Beijing did not, for example, impose economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, as the United States did. More significantly, Chinese officials decided against brokering a UN Security Council initiative to halt India’s nuclear program. PRC officials only joined the international community in calling on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To go further would have perhaps violated Chinese foreign policy norms and sensitivities about interference in internal affairs. In subsequent remarks by Chinese officials on India’s nuclear tests, there was also the hint that some PRC leaders viewed the tests not as an expression of genuine security concerns but as the product of domestic politics and India’s desire for international prestige. The blunt-speaking PRC Premier Zhu Rongji noted in a July 1998 foreign interview that "the real target behind the nuclear tests is [the] practice of hegemony as well as settling the internal crisis facing the ruling party." Zhu was referring to the tenuous coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, a government that in fact did fall in April 1999, though it would gain seats in parliament in subsequent general elections in the autumn of 1999. An Indian delegation of security analysts reported after a workshop in China that their PRC interlocutors believed that India had conducted the tests to enhance its prestige and less so for security purposes.

India-China Relations Since Pokhran II

Perhaps the most significant litmus test of Chinese views of South Asia in the two years since the nuclear tests was China’s stance on the India-Pakistan conflict in the disputed Kashmir region in June 1999. As the conflict developed into a shooting war between Indian troops and Pakistani-backed Muslim insurgents in the high mountain passes of the Kargil area, the PRC took a pronounced and extraordinarily neutral position. In a departure from its usual tilt toward Pakistan in such incidents, Beijing not only followed a scrupulously neutral path but also played the role of informal mediator by hosting separate visits from the Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers.

Faced with mounting pressure from the world community and the United States to withdraw support of the insurgents, Pakistan turned to Beijing, its normally reliable backer in these cases. Pakistan’s foreign minister, followed by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, made separate visits to Beijing, where their discussions resulted in nothing but official silence from PRC officials regarding the Kargil crisis. The contrast with earlier statements from Beijing that supported Pakistan was striking. When Sharif reached the United States just after his trip to China, he announced his decision to order the pullback of Pakistani troops and to withdraw support for the insurgents. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing shortly thereafter, and the Kargil crisis was left aside in favor of discussions on the broader bilateral relationship. While the official statement Beijing released on Kargil did not go so far as to blame Pakistan for the intrusions, the fact that China gave no overt support for Pakistan was perceived by India as a significant change in China’s stance on the Kashmir issue. "All indications are that China regards India as a major power and a potentially important player in a putative multi-polar world," noted an Indian specialist on relations with China. 

Not long after the Kargil crisis, a group of Pakistani generals known to be hard-liners with respect to India removed Sharif from office and declared one of their own as chief executive—in effect the first-ever coup d’état to take place in a nuclear-weapon state. It remains to be seen if China’s neutrality in the Kargil crisis signals a major shift away from its historic support for Pakistan. While China has hosted visits by Pakistani generals and may have lobbied for President Clinton to include Pakistan on his South Asia visit in March 2000, there is reason to believe that China is no longer willing to brook reckless behavior on the part of Pakistan. Given Beijing’s own concerns over Islamic insurgencies and trans-border arms and drug shipments into China’s western regions, there is strong reason to believe that China would want to avoid extending diplomatic or other support to the Islamic militants in the Kashmir region. China’s official press maintained near silence on the Pakistan coup, simply quoting a foreign ministry spokesperson on China’s wish as a "friendly neighbor" for the restoration of "normalcy."

Another significant development in the restoration of India-China relations has been the convening of the first ever security dialogue between the two in March 2000 and the resumption of other confidence-building measures. The security dialogue took place in Beijing, where Zhang Jiuhuan, director general of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented the Chinese side, and Rakesh Sood, the joint secretary for disarmament in the External Affairs Ministry, led the Indian delegation. Neither side relented from previous stances—China said that it would continue to lead opposition to India’s nuclear program and India expressed its continued concern that China was assisting Pakistan’s nuclear and missile production program. Following the security dialogue, the PRC ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, said through the Indian press that India and China should pursue a "cooperative partnership" to thwart efforts by the United States to "create a unipolar world." In April 1999 the Joint Working Group resumed the session that had been cancelled in the wake of Pokhran II. While little of substance was accomplished during the 1999 round, its resumption at least maintained continuity of a dialogue that had begun shortly after the normalization of relations in 1988. A twelfth JWG met in April 2000 and expressed the usual commitments to resolve border issues; of greater significance was the announcement that senior-level military contacts would be resumed and ministerial and state visits planned for the future.

A final settlement on the disputed portions of the 2,500 mile Sino-Indian border remains elusive. Even before the 1962 war, the delineation of the border along the Aksai Chin plateau in the western sector and Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector had been one of the most contentious issues in Sino-Indian relations. Presently, India claims that China has occupied over 125,000 square kilometers of its territory in these two sectors. While the border dispute is no longer the obstacle to high-level dialogues and state visits that it once was, Indian and Chinese officials have not yet been able to reach an agreement over the Line of Actual Control that might serve as a basis for more formal negotiations on the international border itself. Indian officials almost always list resolution of the border dispute as a top priority in relations with China, whereas Chinese officials conventionally characterize it as a problem that should be treated with patience and care—in short, an issue whose resolution PRC officials could postpone indefinitely. Nonetheless, the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group has established a progressive sequence of confidence-building measures associated with the border and with the troops posted to guard it. Much of this progress was made in the early 1990s after exchanges in high-level visits between New Delhi and Beijing, culminating in Jiang Zemin’s trip to India in 1996.

The border dispute and its speedy resolution served as one of two major themes of Indian President K. R. Narayanan’s state visit to Beijing in May 2000. (The other was the promotion of economic ties and trade between India and China, whose bilateral trade stands at only $2 billion a year.) According to Indian observers, one of the main purposes of Narayanan’s trip was to inject the border dispute resolution process with a greater sense of urgency. While Narayanan conveyed the point on numerous occasions that the boundary dispute could not be laid aside forever, Chinese leaders appeared less willing to push for a speedy resolution of the border question. Jiang Zemin expressed the sense that the disputes over the border should not prevent the development of bilateral relations—yet he also stated that a resolution of the border question should not be put off indefinitely. Any progress on the border issue arising from Narayanan’s discussions in Beijing will await subsequent meetings of the Joint Working Group. A former Indian diplomat offered perhaps a more realistic assessment of the boundary dispute when he noted that "The border issues are so complicated and difficult they could be set aside for a while as both countries concentrate on areas of common interests." This appears to be the position officials from both sides have taken, with the expansion of commercial ties—including a proposed road through Myanmar linking China and India—acting as another form of confidence building. Even if China and India reach an agreement on their disputed border, other important problems will remain in their bilateral relations. These include China’s military assistance to Pakistan, as well as Myanmar; the direction of India’s nuclear program; the pursuit of strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia; the future of Tibet and the Tibetan community in India; and more recently, India’s announced intention to hold naval exercises in the South China Sea.

China’s assistance to Pakistan dates from diplomatic agreements signed in 1963 that were themselves responses to the 1962 border war and the flourishing ties between India and the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1960s, Beijing has steadfastly supported the Pakistani position on Kashmir and served as Pakistan’s principal arms supplier. China’s provision of technical assistance and military hardware to Pakistan is well-documented, as is the transfer of nuclear technology and intermediate range missiles to Islamabad during the mid-1990s. Jiang Zemin’s highly successful South Asia trip in 1996 succeeded in positioning China in a less overtly supportive role of Pakistan as China’s "all-weather friend." In a speech before the Pakistani senate, Jiang suggested that Islamabad should put aside disputes with India over Kashmir and instead pursue economic development. Since then, Beijing appears to have drawn the line on support for insurgents in Kashmir, as the Kargil episode of 1999 demonstrated.

The extent (and intent) of Washington’s pursuit of better relations with New Delhi and Beijing has brought noticeable unease to officials in the other capital. The visit of President Clinton to India in late March 2000 raised some concern within China over warming U.S.-India ties—revealing how absorbed Beijing’s foreign policy community has become with American motivations. In a rare expression of concern over a state visit, PRC officials questioned U.S. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger regarding Clinton’s India visit. During the India visit itself, Clinton’s criticism of the Indian nuclear program was met with vehement defense by Indian officials, including President Narayanan. While the United States and China both have pressured India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, China has taken a stronger posture than the United States on India’s nuclear weapons program, demanding that India sign the CTBT as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States, which did impose legally-mandated sanctions on India after Pokhran II, appears to have accepted India’s pursuit of a minimal deterrent as a fact of life and now seeks to limit India’s ability to conduct further tests. This is a strategy that has largely proven successful, in the eyes of some analysts, who predict India and Pakistan’s imminent signing of the CTBT. Ratification, a course that neither the United States nor China has yet taken, remains another matter.

Regardless of how India’s commitment to nonproliferation regimes plays out, the prospects for India-China relations involve a number of other sensitive issues. Missile technology and the testing of intermediate- and long-range missiles, obviously inseparable from nuclear weapons, appear to be proceeding apace in India, China, and Pakistan. China and India have not altered nuclear doctrines since Pokhran II and will continue with plans to develop long-range missiles for second-strike capabilities. Both will rely heavily on Russia for assistance in this project as well as for their pursuit of conventional forces modernization. As Gary Bertsch and Anupam Srivastava of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia have noted in a recent article, "a crucial reason for India and China to proceed expeditiously with these ambitious plans has been the ready availability of advanced Russian arms and technologies." In fact, China and India together make up 75 to 80 percent of all Russian arms exports.

It is difficult to tell how far India’s nuclear policy-makers wish to pursue nuclear weapons development and deployment. After India conducted missile tests in April 1999, Prime Minister Vajpayee said that India had now achieved a minimum nuclear deterrent with the successful flight-test of its medium-range Agni II missile. China responded by expressing "regret and concern," though it framed this concern in terms of damage to Indo-Pakistani relations, not as a threat to China itself or to Sino-Indian relations. However, here it is doubtful that Beijing’s patience could be so elastic. Should India decide to weaponize and deploy nuclear missiles, defense planners in China would probably react with far more serious countermeasures than they have elicited to date, and depending on the state of play in East Asia, could even roll back the PRC’s commitment to arms control regimes. 

The issue of Tibet has always been a very sensitive one in Sino-Indian relations, and after Pokhran II, remarks by Indian officials regarding Tibet and Taiwan have drawn sharp reactions from PRC sources. In early 1999, an Indian cabinet minister for urban development voiced his support for an independent Taiwan, resulting in a scathing commentary by the Xinhua news agency. It described the official’s comments as a "grave development" and said that they revealed "that there is a force in India that is opposing the improvement of Sino-Indian relations and attempting to split China." A similar reaction came from Beijing after Vajpayee met with the Dalai Lama in October 1998. Official commentary typically framed the meeting as an interference in China’s internal affairs. The flight of the Karmapa Lama to India in early 2000 also raised the sensitive question of India offering refuge for Tibetan spiritual leaders and exiles. The Karmapa Lama is the third most esteemed figure in Tibetan Buddhism (after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas). The sudden arrival in Dharamsala, India of the current Karmapa Lama, a 14-year-old youth, after he apparently fled his monastery in Lhasa, has created a delicate diplomatic situation between New Delhi and Beijing. India has delayed officially granting asylum to the Karmapa Lama, and PRC officials claim he is only there to retrieve the belongings of his predecessor, the 16th Karmapa Lama. Indian foreign affairs officials find themselves in the unenviable position of trying to improve relations with China while placating the large Tibetan community in Dharamsala. While the Dalai Lama remains the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan exile community, the choice of his successor—as the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama and the leader of the Tibetan exiles—will quite likely embroil China and India in further disputes over Tibet and the question of secular versus religious authority.

Explaining Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of Post-Pokhran II

A number of recent studies that seek to explain the rationale behind the South Asia nuclear tests have raised many important questions and even challenges to conventional explanations for why states pursue nuclear weapons. Together, these studies also reveal several curious patterns of foreign policy behavior by India and China that deserve further exploration. For example, how do we account for China’s comparatively restrained reaction to India’s nuclear tests and China’s relatively accommodative stance toward South Asia, in contrast to its more assertive and less compromising regional postures in Northeast and Southeast Asia? Moreover, how has it developed that China, so often accused in international fora of violating the nonproliferation regime, makes nuclear nonproliferation the centerpiece of its policy toward India? Conversely, what explains India’s highly ambivalent orientation toward nuclear weapons—one in which India has historically condemned the world’s nuclear powers for possessing weapons while its politicians have actively pursued a nuclear weapons program and benefited from it politically? How have India and China pursued, in the wake of Pokhran II, a far more cooperative relationship than might be expected under the circumstances? This section provides partial answers to some of these questions by way of a review of recent studies on Pokhran II and China-India relations. The following section ensues with an analysis of foreign policy-making institutions in China and India as a way of understanding recent trends in China-India relations.

While China admittedly faces several other urgent security issues, the degree to which China’s defense and foreign policy communities have underplayed the Indian nuclear tests, and India as a strategic concern, is worth further exploration. China’s muted reaction in the aftermath of Pokhran II might be attributable to one or more of the following possibilities: 1) PRC foreign policy-makers were divided over what to do about India; 2) PRC foreign policymakers had mistakenly underestimated India’s resolve to demonstrate a nuclear weapons capability; 3) China was quietly adjusting its security posture and nuclear weapons deployments to take into account developments in India; and 4) China was using the Indian tests to demonstrate its bona fides as a responsible great power and its willingness to contribute to the multilateral resolution of global security issues. Given the preponderance of Chinese security concerns directed toward East and Southeast Asia, it is not surprising that South Asia has always stood at a very distant third in research and policy priorities of PRC analysts (fourth if one includes the former Soviet Union). Yet this might be changing in strategic terms as Chinese analysts appear to have identified areas of common ground with India in taking on "international hegemonism by the United States." That is the phrase used by one of the foremost academic strategists in the PRC, Yan Xuetong, in an article obviously timed for the convening of the Sino-Indian security dialogue in Beijing in March 2000. Writing in the China Daily for foreign consumption, Yan argued for China’s strengthening ties with "neighbors" but never specifically named India or any other state in the article. "Although there are many undeniable differences between China and its neighbors, the other nations have more in common with China than more distant countries," Yan observed, referencing "cultural similarity plus shared views on human rights and national sovereignty" and challenges posed by globalization. Zhou Gang, China’s ambassador to New Delhi, was far more explicit in an interview with an Indian publication in the week before Clinton’s visit. Zhou noted that China and India share a common problem strategically, namely the United States: "The threat is not from China to India and not from India to China. It comes from other places," he said. "If you sum up [the] Kosovo crisis and expansion of NATO, you will see the fact that there is only one force dominating the world and asserting its domination to create a unipolar world. . . . It is quite realistic for [India and China] to improve our relations to a cooperative partnership," Zhou suggested. 

Among foreign specialists on the Chinese military and security, the obvious divisions between area specialists, as well as disciplinary boundaries, have contributed to the relative scarcity of work on China-India relations. Much of the gap in this respect has been filled in recent years by specialists in conventional and nuclear weapons proliferation. Among the handful of established specialists on Sino-Indian relations, assessments range from gloomy to positive. Ming Zhang’s study for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace carefully assesses China’s reaction to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, concluding that the tests themselves have not caused any significant changes in China’s nuclear doctrine, defense modernization plans, or stated commitment to nonproliferation. Yet he cautions that the status quo might be altered with negative consequences if it were to become apparent that India sought to deploy nuclear weapons, and especially if the security environment in East Asia were to change for the worse.

A recent article by Wade Huntley, director of the Nautilus Institute’s Global Peace and Security Program, notes that the Pokhran II tests actually opened the way for China to influence a potential nuclear arms race in South Asia to a greater degree than before—especially by increasing its assistance to Pakistan. Indeed, China’s future support of Pakistan will be a critical determinant of stability in South Asia. To the extent that China feels threatened by India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, Beijing is likely to provide technology and hardware to Pakistan, leading to a competitive nuclear arms race in South Asia.

A look at recent changes in bilateral relations between India and China on the one hand and the United States and China on the other might lead one to surmise that a pattern of inverse proportion exists, with advances and setbacks in the Washington-Beijing relationship driving nearly equal and opposite setbacks and advances in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. This is the view of Professor Mohan Malik, who has followed the relationship between India and China closely for many years. Malik argues that as India watched the United States and China move toward friendlier ties and exchange presidential visits in 1997-1998, Indian officials voiced their insecurity with these developments by suddenly and overtly enhancing the nations’s nuclear status. By this logic, a worsening U.S.-China relationship, as witnessed in 1999, might drive relations between the United States and India on to firmer footing, which according to Malik has been just the case. Malik predicts that if a new cold war between the United States and China breaks out, "India might come to occupy the same place in the U.S. security calculus that China had during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War years from 1971 to 1989." Malik has also concluded that "Sino-Indian relations today constitute a new cold war" that he says will be "the dominant feature of Asian geopolitics in the early twenty-first century."

Other scholars have made a more benign assessment of Sino-Indian relations, including most recently Bertsch and Srivastava in their article on Russian arms exports to Asia. They argue that India and China face pressing security matters within their respective regions and are also directed toward developmental priorities. Given these factors, Sino-Indian relations are better characterized by restraint and rapprochement. While Bertsch and Srivastava identify extensive Russian involvement in the defense modernization of China and India, they observe that recent changes in doctrine made possible by such procurement nonetheless portends no direct confrontation in the near to medium term. Rosemary Foot argued in a 1996 article that China’s expressed willingness to engage in confidence and security building measures with India premised a more cooperative and collective attitude toward security that might be furthered in PRC relations with Southeast Asia. While Foot’s analysis obviously preceded Pokhran II, the establishment of the first-ever Sino-Indian security dialogue in March 2000 and the resumption of the Joint Working Group would seem to support her contention that Chinese relations toward India continue to show signs of cooperation despite the 1998 setback.

Other analysts view the Pokhran II tests as the logical culmination of several decades of Indian security concerns about Pakistan, China, and the established nuclear powers. George Perkovich and Sumit Ganguly (in separate publications) have identified the importance of the scientific and defense research communities in India since independence. Ganguly argues that the combination of an insulated nuclear weapons research establishment and important shifts in the post-Cold War security environment with the collapse of the Soviet Union led Indian officials to pursue a nuclear deterrent capability—and to do so in the face of the international nonproliferation regime. China’s arms transfers to Pakistan, and especially Pakistan’s March 1998 ballistic missile test, which India viewed as the result of PRC assistance, lent a sense of urgency to the timing of the May 1998 tests.

Perkovich’s book-length treatment of India’s nuclear weapons program culminating in Pokhran II persuasively demonstrates how the pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities cannot always be explained with reference to external security concerns of states. Perkovich’s analysis goes inside the "strategic enclave" of nuclear scientists and engineers who operated in isolation and with the blessing of Indian prime ministers since Nehru. Indeed, politicians and scientists have been the driving force behind India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, relegating military officers and strategic analysts to a subordinate, if not outright irrelevant, role in the articulation of nuclear doctrine and strategy (to the degree that pronouncements from politicians and officials have been coherent enough to merit these terms). Perkovich shows that this civilian control over the nuclear program in India’s parliamentary democracy has in fact exacerbated the potential for arms races and nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia. No elected leader wants to be seen as vulnerable to attacks from political opponents for being "soft" on nuclear weapons development. Ironically perhaps, it has been military strategists and officers in India who for decades have exercised a much more cautious and gradual approach toward nuclear weaponization. Some of these analysts, as early as 1966, have argued that India’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal on par with that of China’s would be a strategic mistake—doing so would only drive Pakistan and China toward each other and would lead to a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. 

This is not to say that security analysts in India have unanimously argued for greater rapprochement with China. Articles by several specialists in semi-official think tanks have called for the government to take a hard-line stance against China. Some among this community assert that India should move from a nuclear posture of "dissuasion" to one of credible deterrence against China. Gurmeet Kanwal of the Institute for Defence and Security Analysis has called for India to pursue a "realistic deterrence" against China, which he defines as developing—and demonstrating—the capability to target major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai with nuclear weapons. Another analyst, Senthil Ram of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, advocates a strategic rationale for outspoken Indian support of Tibetan autonomy:

The Chinese military mobilization in Tibet is the most serious problem impinging the Indian security. India cannot defend the boundary it claims except by supporting Tibetan autonomy. . . expressing support for Tibetan autonomy could be a strategically suitable change in China policy. . . India will definitely get the support of the West if it talks about the suppression of human rights and cultural genocide in Tibet. India should not miss this opportunity to gain legitimacy for its realpolitik interests. 

It is difficult to discern how seriously strategic and defense planners take the prolific policy reports and proposals being churned out of India’s foreign policy think tanks. One can say with certainty that New Delhi’s think tanks, offering as they do "one hundred schools of thought" on policy issues and reflecting India’s hyper-pluralist democracy, do not enjoy the same degree of authority among official circles that China’s think tanks do within its authoritarian system.

RC specialists on defense and security policy toward India are far outnumbered by their counterparts in India who research and write about policy toward the PRC. Still, one can identify a number of critical centers for the study of India, foremost among these being China’s military. PLA analysts have since 1998 characterized what they view as an Indian pursuit of regional hegemony in South Asia, warning of a dangerous military buildup. Senior Colonel Zou Yunhua of the Foreign Affairs Bureau at the General Armaments Department of the PLA has argued that India now seeks to become a world power by controlling the Indian Ocean and maintaining a nuclear deterrent against China. Likewise, in a lengthy Liberation Army Daily article PLA analysts Liu Yang and Guo Feng asserted that India’s strategic posture is to "seek hegemony in South Asia, contain China, control the Indian Ocean, and strive to become a military power in the contemporary world." The authors also observed that India’s intermediate-range missiles could reach targets in Central and South China.

The literature on Sino-Indian relations thus reveals a number of observations that warrant closer examination for their policy and theoretical significance. First, as Perkovich and others have noted, our understanding of why states pursue nuclear arsenals, and presumably deterrence, has for long rested on the view of states as unitary actors responding to the global configuration of power and threat assessments of the external environment. Yet India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons also arises from a complex mix of domestic sources, including individual personalities and historical and institutional legacies. Second, the relative restraint that China showed after Pokhran II deserves further scrutiny because it may offer some conditions under which PRC foreign policy behavior is inclined to be more cooperative with the international community, more supportive of multilateral approaches, and less likely to be framed as an issue of sovereignty. In other words, what is it about India that has caused the PRC to act in ways that appear exceptional in other contexts? The sections that follow identify a number of key domestic institutions and relations among them that might explain the recent course of China-India relations.

Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy and Views of India

The two key institutions within China most influential over foreign affairs, including policy toward India, are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army. For a state that Beijing engaged in armed clashes in 1962, and which has had nuclear capabilities since 1974, surprisingly little attention is paid to India by the PRC’s foreign policy community. With China’s attention devoted to a number of more pressing foreign policy and security issues in East Asia, this neglect of India in Beijing’s thinking is perhaps understandable. Yet PRC officials in general have traditionally held negative attitudes about India’s place in world politics, regarding India as a "friendly" but ultimately insignificant state. Since the Pokhran II tests, much more is being written about China’s posture toward South Asia and its relations with India. Nonetheless, the low priority that China places on relations with India is striking, and to India, particularly galling. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for example, has divisions devoted to Russia, North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Asia—none devoted specifically to South Asia. However, because international negotiations over China’s arms control and disarmament fall under the purview of the MFA, it has exercised important powers over China’s decisionmaking regarding accession to regimes such as the CTBT in 1996. To the degree that relations with India become centered on nuclear proliferation questions, the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the MFA could become influential in policy toward India.

It is the People’s Liberation Army of course that remains the critical determinant of China’s defense policy, including nuclear doctrine. The PLA has been reluctant to support China’s participation in international agreements that the MFA negotiates, especially those that call for greater transparency in defense budgets, doctrine, deployments, etc. The structure of civil-military relations in China impacts foreign policy making in important ways. The PLA in effect reports to the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party, not to the Ministry of Defense or the State Council (China’s cabinet). In fact, the Ministry of Defense has all of its functions dispersed within departments of the PLA—departments that are accountable not to the civilian authorities in the executive branch but to the Party’s CMC. Moreover, one of the three major departments of the PLA, the General Staff Department, exercises functions that would otherwise be those of civilian officials in national defense ministries of other governments—foreign intelligence and foreign affairs, among many others. Rivalries between civilian foreign affairs and defense officials is not unique to China of course, but in the PRC this rivalry takes on far more serious proportions since defense and diplomatic officials essentially report up separate chains of command. Thus, while China has made progress in exercising party (civilian) control over the military during the reform era, executive (state) control of the military remains a serious shortcoming and manifests itself frequently in China’s foreign affairs.

What this means for policymaking toward India is still difficult to discern. Structurally, the General Staff Department’s foreign affairs division has a branch devoted to South Asia. In terms of policy, it is well known that PLA officials are much warier of Indian intentions and less willing to negotiate border agreements than are MFA officials. Gauging from how PLA analysts in the PRC media reacted to India’s nuclear tests, defense planners are much more concerned about India’s strategic intentions than are their civilian counterparts. Specifically, PLA analysts have noted India’s strategic goal of controlling the Indian Ocean and South Asia, and India’s expanding production of weapons grade plutonium. The PLA’s Liberation Army Daily is among the most strident of India’s critics in the PRC press.

Another obvious but opaque source of China’s policy toward India lies within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Military accountability to the CCP is lodged within the aforementioned Central Military Commission, a group of seven military officers and party leaders that is headed by PRC President and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin. The CMC is in turn accountable to the CCP Politburo (whose military membership has declined to 2 out of 21 members). The actual locus of foreign policy making within the CCP is its Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group (FALSG), chaired also by Jiang Zemin and because of this fact, this group is now perhaps more influential in coordinating foreign policy than at any other time in its existence (when leaders other than the highest party official chaired it). The PLA is represented within the FALSG but only by the Minister of Defense. The Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group, like other leadership groups within the highest ranks of the party, is the ultimate authority in foreign policy-making, but given its small membership size, it relies on the staff of various government departments for its information—in this case primarily on the staff of the MFA. If the MFA provides the most staff support to the top decision-makers on China’s relations with India, while military staff report to the same top party leaders through a different set of channels (the CMC), then this fragmented structure might explain much of China’s initially somewhat delayed official reaction in the immediate aftermath of India’s tests. The actual content of the advice and policy recommendations that civilian and military staff are providing to China’s leadership regarding India is not known. Malik cites a policy paper presented to an unspecified part of "the Chinese leadership" (the Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group?) that proposed to "target" India’s Bharatiya Janata Party in an attempt to weaken its governing abilities. It is believed by some in India, including Indian intelligence agencies according to Malik, that the CCP was behind the downfall of the BJP coalition in April 1999. Presumably this alleged strategy to influence domestic politics in India backfired when the October-November 1999 general elections resulted in an even stronger BJP-led parliamentary coalition.

Much as the United States has zeroed in on the nonproliferation issue to the exclusion of most others in its relations with India, it appears that since May 1998 China’s relations with India have also been defined in these terms. Aside from the Joint Working Group’s attention to the border issue, one of the most prominent actors in managing relations with India has been the PRC’s fledgling nonproliferation community. The primary institution involved in policymaking toward India appears to be the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, which as noted is lodged within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its director general, Sha Zukang, has been at the forefront of China’s calls for the international community to put a halt to the South Asia nuclear programs. This is a rare posture for China to take in international politics, so vividly resembling what in another context would violate its norm of non-interference in domestic affairs. Despite Sha’s professionalism and experience, the fact that his bureaucratic position is in a new and relatively weak department means that it is unlikely that he will have decisive influence over important nonproliferation and export control questions, especially where PLA interests are involved. Nonetheless, it does appear that he may be carving out a niche in foreign policy toward India. In fact, Sha has been rumored to be next-in-line to serve as China’s ambassador to India.

Domestic Factors in Indian Foreign Policy and Views of China

Like Beijing, New Delhi’s foreign policy community is deeply divided between civilian and military officials. India’s nuclear and ballistic missile research is carried out by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The Atomic Energy Commission has a history dating from the first days of independence, and its founder, the charismatic Homi Bhabha, ensured that the AEC would operate almost free of government control. Bhabha, with Nehru’s collaboration, created what Perkovich has called a "nuclear state-within-the-state." This "strategic enclave" of thousands of scientists and engineers (whom Perkovich also refers to as "weaponeers") has turned out to be woefully short of strategic foresight and unwilling to rely on input from India’s armed forces. The irony is that AEC-DRDO dominance of India’s nuclear weapons program and its isolation from the military (a division which even involves caste, since the ranks of nuclear scientists are dominated by high-caste Brahmins) actually serves as an obstacle to nuclear weapons deployment. If India were to pursue the latter, the scientists and their political patrons would have to turn over partial control of India’s nuclear policy to the leaders of the armed forces.

As is the case in China, there is no formal foreign policy-making staff at the disposal of the executive, and much information comes through the Ministry of External Affairs. The Prime Minister’s Office has recently established a National Security Council that might become an important player in articulating India’s nuclear doctrine and policy toward China. Establishing a U.S.-style National Security Council was a top priority of the BJP government after the general elections in 1997, though India’s NSC was not set up until after the nuclear tests, in November 1998. The NSC’s resources are questionable since it is made up of only a handful of cabinet ministers and others who serve as part of a National Security Advisory Board within the NSC. Still, the creation of an NSC, and a single National Security Advisor who reports to the Prime Minister, represents a significant effort to resolve the decades-old problem of civilian-politician dominance of the armed services.

The reluctance of India’s military to see India pursue a nuclear weapons program should not be equated with "soft" or flexible views toward China by military strategists. Defense policy analysts and associated think tanks in New Delhi frequently report on troop movements and missile deployments in Tibet and express growing concern over China’s expanding military relations with Myanmar and several of India’s neighbors, not to mention Beijing’s support of Pakistan and its nuclear program. The 1997-98 Defense Report of India called China "the main reason for the deterioration of the security environment in South Asia." There are signs that especially before the Pokhran II tests the defense establishment of India and the civilians within the Ministry of External Affairs were at odds over the efficacy of India’s pursuing confidence-building measures with China. Cooler heads in the Indian defense establishment appear to recognize the strategic impossibility of India militarily engaging Pakistan and China at the same time, and have acknowledged that China could rather easily foment domestic insurgencies within any number of Indian states. For these reasons alone, some argue that Sino-Indian rapprochement is a strategic necessity.

Also worth mentioning are the personal knowledge of China and diplomatic experience in Beijing that India’s current Prime Minister and President hold. Vajpayee was India’s Foreign Minister in 1978-79 and had an unfortunate but perhaps instructive experience during a sensitive trip to Beijing, where he had hoped to push ahead the normalization of relations between India and China. Vajpayee’s visit coincided with China’s invasion of Vietnam and put the foreign minister in the unenviable position of having to support or condemn an action about which he had no advanced warning. President Narayanan has an extensive diplomatic background including service as the Indian Ambassador to Beijing between 1976 and 1979—a pivotal interlude in Chinese politics during which Narayanan is said to have cemented friendships with many of the current leaders of the CCP. His visit to Beijing in May 2000 was heralded with much fanfare by the Indian government, yet it is worth noting that the office of the presidency is a largely ceremonial position, and it is unlikely that substantive issues such as the border were addressed in much detail during his visit.

The Bharatiya Janata Party is another critical actor in foreign policy. Vajpayee, as head of the party, must balance hard-liners who advocate "Hindu values" (generally anti-Muslim) in domestic and foreign policy with his party’s interest in making India a stronger economic and military power. (If the recent past is any guide, Beijing can expect unwelcome utterances from BJP parliamentarians over Tibet and even Taiwan.) Critics of the Vajpayee government accuse the Prime Minister of bungling an important relationship. Subramanian Swamy, the president of an opposition party who has been closely involved in India’s China policy over the years, says that the Vajpayee government has managed to convince China that India "is laying the foundation for emerging as a ‘counterweight’ to China and [is] pursu[ing] policies that would seek to undermine China’s security and integrity." The Ministry of External Affairs, under Jaswant Singh, gained considerable enhancement of its status when Singh succeeded in shoring up the bilateral relationship during his June 1999 visit to Beijing, at the height of the Kargil crisis. Despite the timing, and the imminent arrival of the Pakistani foreign minister, Singh and his counterpart Tang Jiaxuan centered their discussion on the bilateral relationship. Singh reportedly assured Tang that, Fernandes to the contrary, India did not consider China a threat to its security.

A recent article by Gaurav Kampani, a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, suggests that the balance of power between "moderates" and "hard-liners" in New Delhi over the nuclear issue has swayed to the former, a group that includes Prime Minister Vajpayee and the ruling BJP. It is not without irony that the political parties opposing India’s signing of the CTBT are those who also demand global nuclear disarmament, not "hawks" who might otherwise oppose the CTBT on grounds of national security. 

Prospects for India-China Relations

An important factor in India-China relations will be the degree of division and consensus between civilian and military officials within each state. Keeping in mind the civilian and military views and decisionmaking structures outlined in this article, one might look at the future of the Sino-Indian relationship with a close eye toward the following questions: Will ruling parties in India and China pursue assertive diplomacy to enhance support among domestic constituencies? Will this assertiveness spill over into the pursuit of more advanced nuclear weapons technology and the demonstration of nuclear capabilities? Will China’s military accept the formal transfer of its accountability to civilian authorities in the state (as opposed to the party)? Will a more stable coalition government in India led by a religious-based party exercise greater influence over India’s foreign policy-making process? How will civilian and military leaders in both states respond to changes in great power alignments and the international system more generally? The answers to these questions are largely driven by domestic processes that will be central to the future of India-China relations.

Domestic sources aside, relations between the two Asian powers will also depend on the United States—the next presidential administration in particular—and how it redefines its interests in Asia and foreign policy strategies in general. Of immediate concern are four variables: pursuit of national and theater missile defense systems; the U.S.-China relationship and its spillover effects on India; the degree to which the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council accept India’s nuclear strategy; and finally, how the United States clarifies the "where possible" condition in the Clinton-Blair Doctrine of military intervention to defend persecuted ethnic minorities. U.S. defense planners and strategists are carefully gauging how China’s reaction to the deployment of American missile defense systems might trigger a competitive nuclear arms race in Asia, with India possibly compelled to develop a nuclear arsenal in response to China’s accelerated production of nuclear missiles. The last variable is particularly important. Following the Kosovo conflict, speculation quickly arose that Russia might join India and China in an anti-NATO alliance. All three states have reason to fear Western intervention on behalf of ethnic populations demanding autonomy or independence. But how Western powers react to struggles within Russia, India, and China over national and ethnic aspirations and regional autonomy depends on how governments, as well as groups demanding greater autonomy from the center, balance and negotiate competing demands.

Mark W. Frazier, 16-29 September 2000

<http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol3no2/essay.html>

Co-Existence Principles Key to Ties

China and India agreed to follow the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in seeking solutions to problems generated by their past history.

Li Peng, visiting chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), and Indian President Kocheril Raman Narayanan stressed (Friday) the great vitality of the principles.

The two countries jointly enunciated the principles in the 1950s. Their core tenet is to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

"Understanding and trust are the common aspiration of the peoples of the two countries," Li said.

He also said the twin imperatives of economic prosperity and world peace impel the two largest developing countries in the world to build on their historical affinity and expand their co-operation and contacts.

Friday morning the visiting Chinese top legislator met with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh.

Calling Singh "old friend," Li said China appreciated his working to improve and develop Sino-Indian relations.

Regarding the differences and problems the two countries have, Li said China does not wish to see them become obstacles to the development of bilateral relations. They can be settled through amicable consultations.

When Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988, the two countries reached an understanding on the settlement of their boundary issue in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. In 1993 and 1996 the Chinese and Indian governments reached two agreements on maintaining peace in the border area. The two sides are implementing the documents.

The two countries have made progress in finding solutions to building trust.

"We should continue to work for it, as the gradual settlement of the boundary issue will contribute to long-term stable and healthy development of bilateral relations," Li said.

China and India share about 2,000 km of border. The disputed areas are about 125,000 square km in size. The two countries fought a brief war over the border in 1962, which greatly impaired bilateral relations.

Their relationship did not start to improve until 1976, when Narayanan came to China as the first ambassador to China to renew relations after a rupture of more than a decade. Both sides decided to develop a constructive and co-operative partnership during President Jiang Zemin's state visit to India in 1996.

Against the background of political multipolarization and economic globalization, it is necessary for the two countries to increase dialogue and co-operation, Li said.

"It is China's unswerving policy to develop a long-term and stable good-neighbouringly and friendly relationship with India, which is our important neighbour," the Chinese top legislator said.

Singh hailed Li's ongoing visit to India as an important step in the development of bilateral relations.

The Indian minister said the problems left over by their past history can be settled gradually as long as the two sides make great efforts sincerely.

While meeting with Sonia Gandhi, leader of Congress Party, Chinese NPC Chairman congratulated her on her re-election.

Sonia Gandhi said she is touched by the Chinese leaders and people's remembrance of her husband Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated in 1991.

"Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 was a turning point in China-India relations," Li said.

Both China and India have glorious pasts. They represent two of the world's great civilizations and their contacts have spanned millennia.

Friday afternoon at the reception given by Najma Heptulla, deputy chairwoman of the Council of States, Li encouraged Indian people from all walks of life to visit China.

"I will also encourage Chinese people to come to your country so we can have a better understanding of each other," Li said to the personalities who came from various circles of Indian society.

            Li is on a eight-day official goodwill visit to India, which will end on January 17.

14 January 2001

<http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jan/6395.htm>

India, China exchange sample maps of LAC: China

China today described the latest round of boundary talks with India as "very good" during which it said the two sides exchanged sample map of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

"The just-concluded 14th Joint Working Group meeting on the boundary issue was a very good one. At the meeting, they exchanged sample map for the LAC along the border and exchanged views on how to implement confidence building measures," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.

But Kong did not clearly say whether the two sides exchanged sample map of the western sector this time. In November 2000, India and China had exchanged sample map of the middle sector which is less disputed.

However, the India-China Expert Group (EG) of diplomatic and military officials under the JWG had met recently in New Delhi and discussed matters pertaining to the Western sector of the LAC. Once they are through with the Western sector, the most complicated Eastern sector would be dealt with.

India says China is illegally occupying 43,180 sq kms of Jammu and Kashmir including 5,180 sq km illegally ceded to Beijing by Pakistan under the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement in 1963. On the other hand, China accuses India of possessing some 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory.

Commenting on the latest round of the JWG which was held in New Delhi on November 21, Kong said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi's talks with the Indian side was "frank and friendly.

Wang, who led the Chinese side to the JWG, had extensive talks with Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal. He also called on External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra.

"The talks have been frank and friendly. They have narrowed down their differences," Kong said.

The Ministry of External Affairs, in a statement had described the 14th round of the JWG as "positive and forward-looking." He also said China and India have also agreed that the Expert Group (EG) on the boundary issue will hold its 14th session in Beijing in January, 2003.

This year, the EG met thrice for the first time since the group was set up under the JWG.

Meanwhile, official sources said India and China undertook a detailed review of their bilateral ties since the 13th JWG, which was held here on July 31, 2001.

The two sides also agreed on the need to substantially enhance trade and economic relations, cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

The Chinese Government has invited Lok Sabha Speaker Manohar Joshi for an official visit in early January. The trip would reciprocate the visit to India by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Li Peng in January 2001.

At the meeting, Sibal and Wang also reviewed the functioning of the existing dialogue mechanisms such as on counter terrorism and security.

The two sides also discussed regional and international issues, the sources said.

Anil K Joseph, 26 November 2001

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=100057>

China and the Kashmir Crisis

China has long been involved in a triangular relationship with Pakistan and India, and is now a reluctant and silent third party to the dispute over Kashmir.

Beijing has traditionally supported Pakistan against India, but now in the post-Cold War era the Chinese have distanced themselves somewhat from Pakistan in order to cultivate better relations with India.

Nevertheless China has a strategic interest in the survival of Pakistan and it will not want to see it drawn into a war which it cannot win, nor will it want to see its government humiliated.

The Chinese approach is determined by three broad considerations; border issues, geopolitics and international strategy.

Borders

There is a contested border with India, and India has not forgotten its defeat by China in a border row in 1962.

China also borders Kashmir and the Indians do not recognise the border agreement the Chinese reached with Pakistan over the section of Kashmir under Pakistani control.

Although the Chinese and Indian sides have been unable to resolve their border dispute, they have nevertheless agreed in recent years to take various measures to reduce tension and the possibility for conflict along the lines of control that separate their two forces.

Geopolitics

From a geopolitical point of view, China has consistently sought to constrain Indian power and confine it essentially to the region of South Asia.

In addition to the strategic interest in not having to confront a single powerful neighbour to the south of the Himalayas, China is also concerned by the residual Indian interest in Tibet.

After all India still harbours the Dalai Lama and his unofficial government in exile.

China has contained India by cultivating its neighbours and by blocking Indian aspirations to be the dominant power in the southern reaches of the Himalayas.

Thus China continues to refuse to recognise India's claims to Sikkim, it encourages Bangladesh to stand up to India and above all China has supported India's arch-rival Pakistan.

In the 1965 Indo-Pak war China went so far as to threaten to open a second front against India. But its main support has been expressed through the supply of arms.

Once Pakistan was confined to its western sector in 1971 it became no match for Indian power.

The Chinese have sought to redress the balance by helping Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons and missile technology.

Despite repeated Chinese denials the evidence supplied by the Americans is overwhelming on this score.

International strategy

From a wider international perspective, India and China were rivals in the Cold War era. From the 1970s this was reflected in American support for China and the Soviet alliance with India.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, India and China have scaled down their enmity and have found reason to co-operate, more especially in managing relations with the sole superpower, the United States.

But after 11 September matters became more complicated. Both China and India have drawn closer to the US - India perhaps more so than China. Indeed India and the US held joint military exercises for the first time in May.

But China is anxious to avoid trouble with the US at a time of leadership succession, and at a time when it has to adjust to the terms of entry to the World Trade Organisation.

Moreover, China has benefited to an extent from the "war on terror", which has enabled it to suppress resistance to its rule in its Central Asian province of Xinjiang.

Nevertheless the Chinese eye warily the American military presence in Central Asia.

Nuclear fall-out

Thus from a Chinese point of view the crisis in Kashmir has come at a most difficult time, and it is clear that the Chinese are not best pleased with their Pakistani friends for provoking it.

The Chinese opposed the Pakistani incursion into Kargil 18 months ago, and on this occasion it is clear that the Chinese have withheld support from Pakistan.

They have not joined Islamabad in calling for an international settlement of the Kashmiri issue, but have implicitly sided with New Delhi in calling for dialogue between the two.

Although they have not said so publicly, the Chinese are very much opposed to the possible use of nuclear weapons.

It is they who will be blamed for having supplied Pakistan, and they too have much to fear if the psychological barrier to their use were to be broken.

Michael Yahuda, 2 June 2002

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2020788.stm>

China's Exports To India Zooms 34.4 Per Cent In First 9 Months

Even as India-China bilateral trade is set to achieve an all-time high of over USD four billion in 2002, Chinese exports to India during the first nine months have registered an impressive 34.4 per cent growth over the same period last year.

While bilateral trade during January-June period of this year was somewhat lackluster, the momentum has picked up during the third quarter, official sources said here today.

Bilateral trade from January to September amounted to USD 3.44 billion, up 28.7 per cent over the corresponding period last year, according to latest Chinese customs statistics.

While Chinese exports to India increased by 34.4 per cent to USD 1.848 billion, India's exports to China touched USD 1.596 billion, up 22.7 per cent.

"If the current trend persists, India-China bilateral trade will easily cross the four billion US Dollar-mark and achieve a new record this year," First Secretary (commercial), Indian embassy, Dinesh K Patnaik said.

In 2001, India-China trade amounted to USD 3.596 billion, up 23.4 per cent over 2000.

Indian exports to China last year reached USD 1.7 billion, up 21.3 per cent while Chinese exports to India touched USD 1.896 billion, up 25.6 per cent. China enjoyed a trade surplus of USD 196 million.

China's exports to India continued to spurt during the first nine months of the year with organic chemicals, electronic machinery and TV picture tubes growing at a rapid pace.

Anil K Joseph, 22 November 2002

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=99121>

India-China relations look up in 2002 (excerpts)

As the world witnessed rapid changes in international relations brought out by war on terrorism and global economic slowdown in 2002, the Sino-India ties remained stable with both sides evaluating progress made in bilateral relations during the year.

The bilateral Sino-India political ties were strengthened with a steady flow of exchange of visits at various levels. New Delhi and Beijing are also moving towards finding an amicable solution to the vexed boundary issue that has bedevilled their ties for over four decades "China is willing to further ties with India and to build on their steady development in recent years," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told PTI.

Liu said the two nations continued frequent high-level exchanges, reinforcing political trust and expanding economic cooperation while promoting exchanges in other fields.

Official sources also said the latest round of India-China boundary talks was held in a "positive and forward looking manner" and that the two sides have agreed on the need to substantially enhance trade and economic relations, cultural and people-to-people relations.

While political ties warmed up, the two-way trade is all set to cross a record USD four billion in 2002 and many Indian and Chinese businesses exploring avenues for cooperation so as to tap the huge market comprising 2.3 billion people.

The most important political visit in 2002 was that of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to India in January which injected fresh momentum to bilateral ties. Zhu met the entire spectrum of Indian leaders and had an in-depth exchange of views on how to develop Sino-India relations.

However, a widely expected return visit by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China did not materialise this year. This important visit is now scheduled for sometime in mid-2003 after the expected leadership changes at the government level in Beijing in mid-March.

The visit by the then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to Beijing in March helped both sides to lead their ties into a more predictable path by charting out a roadmap for contacts and meetings throughout the year at various levels.

There was progress on the India-China boundary front with the Expert Group (EG) meeting three times in 2002 and discussing matters concerning the "western sector". At the 14th round of the Joint Working Group (JWG) held in late November, the two sides decided on modalities of exchanging sample maps of western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at the next meeting of the EG to be held in January.

The third round of India-China security dialogue was held in September, during which the two sides had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on major issues of mutual concern, and reached consensus on strengthening coordination and cooperation on the international and regional arena.

Bilateral military-to-military ties showed further signs of improvement with exchange of high-level visits. The latest visit from the Indian side was by the commander-in-chief of the central command of the army, Lieutenant General D S Chauhan in November, who held talks with the top leadership of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

On the military front, Chinese Defence Minister Gen Chi Haotian has invited his Indian counterpart, George Fernandes to visit China at his convenience. This visit is also expected to take place in 2003.

17 December 2002

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=105066>

 India, China Look to Enhance Ties

India and China on Monday decided to step up military-to-military exchanges, hold a counter-terrorism dialogue and increase confidence-building measures to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control.

The counter-terrorism talks will be held in Beijing next month, an official source said at the end of the first day of talks between visiting Defence Minister George Fernandes and the Chinese leadership.

Fernandes, who is the first Indian defence minister to visit China in over a decade, had 'fruitful' meetings with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Defence Minister General Cao Gangchuan and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Guo Boxiong.

"The talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and both sides expressed satisfaction over the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary remained tranquil," the official said.

Fernandes, who is on a weeklong visit to China, stressed that the two countries are 'good' neighbours and as members of the international anti-terrorism alliance, they have cooperated well.

"As the two countries confront the same challenges in national security, the two militaries should further cooperation and exchanges," he said.

Fernandes, who called on Wen, talked about the planned visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China later this year.

Wen said Vajpayee's visit would be an important trip in Sino-Indian ties.

While welcoming Fernandes, Wen said China and India should do more to cement their ties.

"Our two big countries should always be friendly with each other from generation to generation," he said at the meeting, which was held at the Zhongnanhai Chinese leadership compound in Beijing.

Fernandes is the first Indian leader to meet China's new generation of Communist Party and government leaders.

Wen also noted that China and India have enjoyed friendly cooperation and contacts since second century BC.

"So I think during the past 2200 years, about 99.9 per cent of the time we have devoted to friendly cooperation between our two countries," Wen, also a politburo standing committee member of the ruling Communist Party of China, said.

The remaining 0.1 per cent time that the premier did not refer to could be the 1962 India-China war as well as the disturbances after the 1998 nuclear tests by India.

Earlier in the morning, Fernandes, attired in a bandh-gala, inspected a guard of honour presented by the tri-service PLA marching contingent of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

After the ceremonial welcome, Fernandes held official talks with Gen Cao. During the talks, the general said the armed forces of China and India have enhanced mutual trust and understanding, and also maintained stability in the border area, thanks to exchanges of visits over the last few years.

Indian and Chinese frontier forces have had frequent exchanges and established friendship on the basis of mutual understanding, said Fernandes, according to the Xinhua news agency.

"With similar national situation, the two countries share a wide range of interests in the world and have identical views on many international issues," the agency quoted Gen Cao as saying.

Gen Cao, who is also vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and state councilor, said that the two nations have established and developed a constructive and cooperative friendship.

"It conforms to the fundamental interests of the two nations to live in harmony and strengthen cooperation. China is willing to work with India for regional peace and stability," he said.

Anil K Joseph, 21 April 2003                                                                                                                                               

<http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/21china1.htm>

India-China Relations: On Slow Burn

THE Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes' recent visit to China was important as it took place soon after new leaders took over the reins in Beijing, and also because he had cited the Chinese threat as a reason for Pokhran II. Interestingly, the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, told the Lok Sabha that India's nuclear weapons programme is not "Pakistan-specific", and that New Delhi has to take into account the environment in "neighbouring nations".

He was making the point that unlike Pakistan's "India-centric" nuclear programme, India's security concerns are wider and, therefore, Pakistan's proposal for the "denuclearisation" of South Asia is not acceptable. However, China would have preferred a nuclear-free South Asia.

The Defence Minister's trip had been on the cards for several months, especially after March 2002 when the then External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh visited the country and inaugurated direct air links between India and China. The Foreign Ministers of the two nations also agreed on a "timeframe" to clarify the Line of Actual Control (LOAC) which has separated the two countries after the 1962 border war.

The joint expert group — created under the landmark Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity in border areas, signed during the former Prime Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing in 1993 — was to have exchanged the maps of the border's western sector by 2002 before taking up the eastern sector this year. This has not happened.

The exchange of the middle sector's maps took place early last year. The 1993 agreement explicitly stated that reference to the LOAC did not prejudice the respective position of the two countries on the boundary. The two countries were to continue the search for a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement" of the boundary question. That search goes on with painful slowness.

The Defence Minister's visit was, thus, in the nature of building on friendly relations with China — a huge modern military power and economic giant with a significant share of global trade, capital flows and reserves. The "reasonable timeframe" for the delineation of the LOAC has not been spelt out so far, despite India's emphasis on it at various high-level visits, including that of the former President, Mr K.R. Narayanan, in 2000.

China regards the border problem as a legacy of the past, which requires "time and patience", and one which should not be allowed to stand in the way of the two nations realising the potential of cooperation in all fields of development.

Mr Fernandes' visit has added a dimension of interface between the armed forces of the two countries following discussions with his Chinese counterpart.

The upshot of the Defence Minister's China visit is that the two countries agreed to sustain the LOAC clarification processes, enhance cooperation in combating terrorism, and strengthen the ongoing bilateral cooperation in several spheres.

The Chinese leaders appear to be satisfied with the progress on the border issue, citing stability in the area and mutual trust and understanding between the two military forces. Mr Fernandes feels that his meetings with the Chinese leaders went on well, and that it will provide the beginning of a road map for greater interactions of the two defence forces. One has to wait and see whether the Prime Minister's visit to China later this year yields more results.

However, for the present, India has to reckon with the reality of "all weather" friendship between China and Pakistan. Renewing their military ties, the two countries signed a Charter on Bilateral Cooperation in the field of defence, industry and technology on April 2.

China has taken the stand that disputes between India and Pakistan must be settled bilaterally, and has indicated that it will not take sides. The Indian hypothesis is that with both countries growing economically, and increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the two nations are less likely to involve themselves in a military conflict. At the same time, the far stronger economic and military strength of China is regarded as a potential challenge over the next two decades. The India-Pakistan hostility adds a complicating element to the evolution of closer friendly relations between Asia's two large powers with over 2.3 billion people.

It is in the economic sphere, therefore, that Sino-Indian relations should seek a comfort level and grow with considerable mutual advantage. There is also a great deal of convergence between the two countries on refashioning the international economic order. It is expected that they will, in concert with other developing countries, make efforts to secure results in the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks which will reflect the needs and concerns of the developing countries.

China's pragmatism has helped it leap forward over the last two decades, and it has successfully weathered a series of shocks, including high inflation due to overheating of the economy in the early l990s. Maintaining a high growth of 7-8 per cent and expanding the exports, it became the fifth largest trader in 2002 with a 5 per cent share of global export.

Currently under the cloud of SARS, China's growth will slowdown by some 1 per cent. The region as a whole is estimated to lose $15-16 billion in output of goods and services. The world GDP expansion and trade recovery in recent years has been sustained by China along with some Asian and transition economies. China is also importing more to meet the rise in domestic consumption and infrastructure spending. The impressive growth in intra-regional trade among Asian developing countries, and the moves for free trade by ASEAN with both China and India point to the intensification of trade and investment flows in the near future. This can well reduce the region's dependence on the US and the EU markets for export-led growth.

S. Sethuraman, 13 May 2003

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/bline/2003/05/13/stories/2003051300040800.htm>

China Announces US $500 MN for Investment in India

China today announced a 500 million US dollar corpus for enhanced investment in India even as the two countries signed nine agreements covering a wide variety of subjects, including simplification of visa procedures.

The Chinese side conveyed its decision on the corpus which will further enhance this country's investments in India, during the discussions between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao here.

Vajpayee assured Wen that the Chinese investments in India would be on the same terms as offered to investment from other foreign countries.

The Chinese Premier was full of praise for India's booming economy and said that India's remarkable development had contributed to rejuvenation of Asia.

Besides the agreement on simplifying visa procedures, the agreements signed after the talks also includes an MoU on cooperation between the law ministries of the two countries for close cooperation in the judicial field and one on strengthening of mutual cooperation in education. The two countries will discuss mutual recognition of academic degrees.

An MoU for enhanced cooperation in the field of renewable energy signed by the two sides seeks to establish cooperation in hydro-power, wind power and in other areas of renewable energy through joint research and development. The objective is to commercialise the result of such cooperation and create business opportunities.

Another MoU signed aims at promoting development and cooperation in integrated coastal zone management and exploration of seabed resources. Such cooperation will be developed through the exchange of scientists, research works and scholars.

The two sides also signed another MoU for the maintenance and development of cooperative research activities in the field of Natural sciences.

A protocol of phytosanitary requirements to facilitate exports of Indian fresh fruits and vegetables to China was also inked. India had proposed 17 categories of fruits and vegetables, but the Chinese decided to deal with each item separately and today's protocol covers mangoes.

Reciprocal establishment of cultural centres in the two capitals and an executive programme for cultural exchanges were covered. Two other agreements were signed in the presence of Vajpayee and Wen.

23 June 2003

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=149238>

Sino-India Ties Not to Affect Pakistan

ISLAMABAD, June 22: Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan said on Sunday that Pakistan understood that growing relations between China and India were not at the expense of Pakistan-China friendship.

            Talking to APP here, he said: "We have followed the developments on rapprochement between China and India." When asked to comment on Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's six-day visit to China, the spokesman said: "Pakistan and China have very close and long-standing relationship."

The successive leadership and generations of Pakistan and China had worked with each other, he said, adding: "We completely trust each other. We have followed the developments on rapprochement between China and India."

He said Pakistan understood the growing relations between China and India were not at the expense of Pakistan-China relations. "These relationships have different trajectories," he added.

The spokesman said China had played a constructive and positive role in South Asia and Beijing's relations with South Asian Nations, particularly with Islamabad, had been a factor of peace and stability in the region.

He recalled that Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali was the first world head of the government received by top Chinese leadership - President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and an elder state leader Jiang Zemin - after the National People's Congress (NPC) and the transition of the leadership. This, he said, was a great honour for Pakistan and it reflected the close understanding between the two countries. APP

23 June 2003

<http://www.dawn.com/2003/06/23/top7.htm>

Documents Signed Between India and China During Prime Minister Vajpayee's Visit to China

Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Expanding Border Trade, 23 June 2003

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the two sides), 

With a view to promoting the development of friendly relations between the two countries and two people’s, 

Pursuant to the Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Resumption of Border Trade signed on 13 December 1991, and Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade signed on 1 July 1992, 

Desirous of opening another pass on the India-China border and setting up an additional point on each side for border trade, 

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

 

The Indian side agrees to designate Changgu of Sikkim state as the venue for border trade market; the Chinese side agrees to designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the venue for border trade market. 

ARTICLE II

The two sides agree to use Nathula as the pass for entry and exit of persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in border trade.  Each side shall establish checkpoints at appropriate locations to monitor and manage their entry and exit through the Nathula Pass. 

ARTICLE III

All the provisions of the Memorandum on the Resumption of Border Trade signed between the two Governments on 13 December 1991 and the Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade signed between the two Governments on 1 July 1992 under the Memorandum shall also be applicable to the border trade through the Nathula Pass.

ARTICLE IV

This Memorandum may be amended or supplemented by agreement in writing between the two sides. 

ARTICLE V

This Memorandum shall come into force as from the date of its signature and shall be valid during the validity of the Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade signed between the two Governments in New Delhi on 13 December 1991. 

Done in Beijing on 23 June 2003 in two originals each in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, the three texts being equally authentic.

For the Government                                 For the Government of the of the Republic of India     People’s Republic of China

 

(1)        Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Ministry of Law and Justice of the Government of the Republic of India and the Supreme People's Prosecution Service of the People's Republic of China. 

(Signatories: Shri Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister and Mr. Jia Chunwang,Procurator General on the Chinese side) 

The MoU envisages facilitating closer cooperation in the judicial field between India and China, through the exchange of information, experience in legal matters, including drafting of laws and Implementation of legal provisions, exchange of experience and best practices, mutual support for training public procurators and auxiliary judicial personnel, and cooperation in other legal and judicial matters of interest to both countries. The MoU also provides for setting up of expert working groups, facilitation of direct contacts, conduct of joint seminars and exchange of experts to meet the objective of cooperation in the judicial field. Seminars and conferences on issues of mutual interest will also be organized. 

(2)        Executive Programme on Educational Cooperation and Exchange between the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of the Republic of India and Ministry of Education, the People's Republic of China. 

(Signatories: Shri Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister and Mr. Zhou Ji, Minister for Education of the PRC on the Chinese side) 

Under this executive programme, both sides aim to consolidate and strengthen mutual cooperation in the field of education through sharing of experiences between the educational administrators and through the study of education systems and innovative education programmes in each country. The two sides agree to exchange views and conduct discussion on mutual recognition of academic degrees. They will also cooperate in such areas as the development of curricula for primary and secondary school education, exchange of teaching materials, teaching methodologies as well as the feasibility of conducting joint research in various modes of pre-research and in-service teachers' training and will examine the possibility of jointly establishing a Demonstration Centre for Teacher Training. They will also take measures to encourage higher education institutions from their respective countries to establish direct exchange and cooperation through exchange of lecturers, scholars, books, research materials and audio-visual aids, holding of joint seminars/ symposia etc. They have noted the importance of student exchange programmes in various areas including IT and have provided for 25 post-graduate scholarships to be offered annually by both countries. They have also agreed to exchange two language teachers in Hindi and Chinese respectively. This programme will be valid from June 2003 to 2006 and will be extended for another three years if both sides so agree.  

(3)        Protocol of Phytosanitary Requirements for Exporting Mangoes from India to China between the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of India and General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China.  

(Signatories: Shri Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister and Mr. Li Changjiang, Head of AQSIQ on the Chinese side) 

Under the India-China bilateral WTO accession agreement of February 2000, both sides agreed to sign a Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) protocol to facilitate exports of Indian fresh fruits and vegetables to China. An umbrella MoU on the application of Phyto-Sanitary Measures was signed during the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji in January 2002. India proposed 17 categories of fruit and vegetables (including mangoes, guavas, grapes, papayas, melons, gherkins, cucumbers, beans, aubergines, capsicums, gourds etc) for coverage under this MoU. The Chinese side decided to deal with each item separately. The first item taken up for consideration under this procedure was the mango. After completion of a Pest Risk Analysis and detailed negotiations, agreement has now been reached on procedures relating to inspection, certification, packaging and labelling of all consignments of mangoes to be exported to China from India. Now that we have a basic understanding of the relevant procedures, it is hoped that agreement on similar protocols for all the other identified fruits and vegetables can be concluded expeditiously. 

(4)        Memorandum of Understanding on Simplifying Visa Procedures between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China. 

(Signatories: Shri Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary, on the Indian side, and Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC on the Chinese side) 

This MoU lays down mutually agreed procedures for the issue of visas in various categories (business, employment, tourism, students, conferences and other short-term academic and cultural exchanges etc.) for private passport holders and on the Chinese side, also for holders of "ordinary passports for public affairs" who are mainly employees of state owned enterprises. This MoU provides clarity on the kind of documentation required for various visas and on the duration and validity of visas issued for different purposes. This will help streamline the process of obtaining visas for businessmen, tourists, students, academics and other experts travelling to each other's countries and will serve to promote people-to-people interaction. 

(5)        Memorandum of Understanding for Enhanced Cooperation in the field of Renewable Energy between the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, Government of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Water Resources, Government of People's Republic of China.

(Signatories: Shri Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary, on the Indian side, and Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC on the Chinese side) 

This MoU seeks to establish cooperation in the field of small hydropower, wind power and other areas of renewable energy through joint research and development activities, exchange of technical expertise and information networking. The ultimate objective is to commercialise the result of such cooperation, create business opportunities and facilitate sustainable market development in an environmentally responsible manner. Areas of cooperation will be defined by mutual consent in accordance with the interest of experience of the scientific, technological and industrial institutions and personnel of the two countries and the facilities available. The MoU provides for exchange of scientific and technological problems, formulation and implementation of joint research and development and demonstration projects on application of renewable energy technologies for augmenting energy availability in a cost-effective manner, training of personnel and setting up of technical demonstration projects in areas of renewable energy. 

(6)        Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the field of Ocean Science and Technology between Department of Ocean Development, Government of the Republic of India and State Oceanic Administration, People's Republic of China. 

(Signatories: Shri Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary, on the Indian side, and Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC on the Chinese side) 

This MoU aims at promoting development and cooperation in areas such as integrated coastal zone management, sea-based resources exploration and exploitation technology, polar science, ocean energy, gas hydrate exploration and exploitation technology, marine resources assessment, seaweed production and processing, satellite oceanography and other fields of marine science of mutual interest to both sides. Such cooperation would be developed through the exchange of scientists, research workers, specialists and scholars; exchange of marine data and information; organization of bilateral symposium, training courses and seminars; joint identification of marine problems, projects and planning and their formulation and implementation; exchange of experience and know-how gained through development and activities in marine science and technology; mutual supply of equipment; utilization of facilities for R&D and other such mutually agreed means of cooperation.

(7)        Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Science and Technology of the Republic of India and the National Science Foundation of China. 

(Signatories: Shri Shivshankar Menon, Ambassador of India and Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister on the Chinese side) 

This MoU provides for maintenance and development of cooperative research activities in the field of natural sciences within the framework of the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China signed on 22 December 1988 in Beijing. The objective will be to ensure that the cooperation will bring real benefits to the development of science and technology in both countries. Collaborative activities will be undertaken in the fields of natural sciences with emphasis on Physical Sciences, Mathematical Sciences, Chemical Sciences and Biological Sciences. It recognizes that as a first step, a practical means of initiating collaboration between scientists of the two countries is provided by holding meetings of equal numbers of researchers (to be known as N+N meetings) from each side alternatively in India and China. Other forms of collaboration, including individual outgoing and incoming visits by leading scientists and joint research in areas on subjects identified as a priority by scientists of both sides will be based on the relationship built by N+N meetings, or on other established relationships. Priority areas for cooperation will be identified as also a framework of cooperation for each selected area (key institutions, key persons, forms of cooperation, financing etc.).  The MoU also provides for periodic reviews of on-going programmes and for the exchange of information. 

(8)        Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Reciprocal Establishment of Cultural Centres in their Capitals. 

(Signatories: Shri Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary on the Indian side and Mme Meng Xiaosi, Vice Minister of Culture on the Chinese side) 

This MoU reflects the agreements reached in principle by both sides to establish independent cultural centres in each other's capital cities. Relevant details such as location, staffing patterns, broad consensus on activities to be undertaken by the centres and so on will be worked out through mutual negotiations in the near future.  

(9)        Executive Programme of Cultural Exchanges between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the years 2003-2005. 

(Signatories: Shri Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary on the Indian side and Mme Meng Xiaosi, Vice Minister of Culture on the Chinese side) 

The Executive Programme of Cultural Exchanges (CEP) provides for exchange of cultural troupes, art exhibitions, and cultural festivals, cooperation in the fields of archaeology and library science, cooperation between the National Museum, national Gallery of Modern Art, National Library, Sangeet Natak Academy and their respective Chinese counterparts etc. It also provides for interaction in the fields of youth affairs and sports, social sciences and mass media, including exchange of radio and TV programmes and training of personnel in radio, TV and films. This is a programme valid for the period June 2003-2005. There is, however, a provision which states that after June 2005, this agreement will remain operative till such time as a new CEP is negotiated and formalized.

23 June 2003

<http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/agg-ind-china.htm>

Speech by Prime Minister of India Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee at Peking University

Mr. Minister, President of Peking University,

Distinguished Faculty Members, Friends, 

I thank you for inviting me to speak today at this renowned centre of learning. This premier University of China has had an eventful history, including migrating over 3000 kilometres during the Second World War to maintain its uninterrupted academic tradition.

            You also have a special connection with India. We are grateful to your University for having sent Professor Tan Yun Shan to Shantiniketan many decades ago.  It was he who inspired our great poet Rabindranath Tagore to set up the famous “Cheena Bhavan” in Vishwa Bharati University, of which I have the honour to be the Chancellor.

Today we repay this debt in some measure by pledging our support for a Centre for Indian Studies in this University.  I have just had the privilege of inaugurating that Centre and of making a symbolical initial donation to its library. My government is prepared to depute two faculty members from India to the Centre. We have pledged to contribute an amount of one million rupees annually for the first five years towards its running costs.  We can fund an annual scholarship at an appropriate institute in India for a student of the Centre. We are also offering an annual prize of a three-week visit to India for the first-ranked student of the centre. I propose we call this the Tan Yun Shan Award in memory of that modern-day pioneer of India-China cultural understanding. We would be happy to extend any other form of support, which the Centre may require.

Friends,

Initiatives like the Centre for Indian Studies are specially welcome as part of our current effort to enrich the interaction between the India and China of today. We are, of course, two of the world’s oldest civilizations with contacts over at least two millennia. The Silk Route connected us through commerce, but also by facilitating the free flow of our music, our scriptures and our literature. The message of the Buddha, transmitted from India, was received by millions in China. Our maritime trade links kept us in close contact and also created a confluence of our cultures with that of  South-East Asia.

            But there were periods in history when our civilizations went into an introspective phase and lost regular touch with each other. In a later era, both countries suffered from colonial invasions and deprivations, which accentuated this trend. The shadow of the Cold War and the consequent distortions of global international relations had its impact also on India and China. From relative isolation from each other, we went into a state of estrangement.

            We have emerged decisively from this dead-end of mistrust, already a few decades ago. We have vigorously set about recovering our mutual understanding, building a broad base for our cooperation and redeeming the promise of our complementarities.

It is in this task of recovering mutual understanding that the Centre for Indian Studies can make a significant contribution. You have built up an impressive scholarship in Indological studies, focussing mainly on history, languages and literature. I would suggest that you also strengthen your scholarship on modern Indian political, economic and sociological studies. Distance encourages caricatures and stereotyped images, based on old experiences. Academic exchanges and contemporary studies help to bridge the gap of information and perceptions. You can make your centre fulfil Lao Zi’s ideal of knowledge and understanding:

“Without stirring abroad, One can know the whole world; Without looking out of the window, One can see the way of heaven.” 

We know where we have come from. Let us better understand each other as we are today, and comprehend where we can go together in the future. The better we understand each other, the more we can do together.

No objective analysis can deny the combined strength and complementarity of an India-China partnership:

     We are the two most populous countries of the world,

     We have the two fastest growing economies in the world – yours faster than ours. In any economic forum in the world these days, the focus is on India and China.

     Both of us have continent-sized markets, with the advantages of huge economies of scale.

     We also have the problems of continent-sized countries – unequal development, a wide spread of income disparities, and a potential digital divide. Exchange of developmental experiences can be valuable.

     We are both at the forefront of developing and applying the technologies, which drive the Knowledge Economy.

     We have a harmonious balance of strengths. India’s strengths in Information Technology, software engineering, management and financial services are well matched by the Chinese expertise in hardware, construction and industry.

     Both India and China were present at the broader dialogue of developing countries with the G-8 countries in Evian earlier this month. I was struck by the congruence in our positions. If we acted in concert, it would be very difficult for the world to ignore us.

     India and China have frequently reiterated their commitment to the development of a cooperative multi-polar world order. In the complex international situation of today, we have a role to play in helping to restore the authority of the international organisations, which have been undermined in recent months.

Our two countries have been taking steps towards increasing mutual trust and understanding, through more intensive interaction. In recent years, our cooperation has greatly expanded and diversified. Our bilateral trade has shot up from around 200 million dollars in the early nineties to around 5 billion dollars. Indian business and industry have overcome their initial cultural and commercial apprehensions of Chinese business and are strengthening their linkages. The conclusive proof of this is the size and variety of the business delegation, which is here in China to coincide with the visit. It is also noteworthy that Indian investment in China is nearly 65 million dollars.

            The India-China dialogue already transcends bilateral relations to encompass international issues such as terrorism, security, environment and sustainable development. We have an increasing commonality of interests within the World Trade Organization and overlapping concerns on globalization. Our coordination and collaboration in various multilateral institutions is expanding into newer and newer areas. A small, but important, example of such effective joint action is our cooperative effort to make the infrastructure lending policies of the World Bank more rational.

            But, as I have said before, for two countries of our human resources, economic strengths and technological skills, we have only scratched the surface. Your senior leader Mr. Deng Xiaoping once said that the 21^st century can only be the Asian century if India and China combine to make it so.  To do so effectively, we should be conscious of our complementary strengths, resist contradictory pulls, and deploy our resources in a mutually reinforcing manner. Our trust and understanding should be able to withstand forces which seek to divide us.

            I would like to dwell in this context on what is frequently described as “rivalry” between India and China. As two large developing countries at roughly the same stage of development, sharing the same neighbourhood, pursuing similar growth trajectories, with comparable economic priorities and similar political ambitions, it is inevitable that comparisons will be made between India and China. It is also an unavoidable characteristic of human nature that there is always a sense of competition between two close and equal neighbours.

            But we need to clearly understand the difference between healthy competition and divisive rivalry. Even in the present-day world, you can find examples of countries which have maintained close political coordination, strengthened their economic complementarities and harmonized their international objectives, even while maintaining a healthy and good-natured economic and commercial competition. The developing world in general, and our two countries in particular, can benefit greatly by absorbing the lessons from these experiences. We should focus on the simple truth that there is no objective reason for discord between us, and neither of us is a threat to the other. These simple, but profound, principles should form the bedrock of the future India-China partnership.

            One cannot wish away the fact that before good neighbours can truly fraternize with each other, they must first mend their fences. After a hiatus of a few decades, India and China embarked on this important venture a few years ago. We have made good progress. I am convinced that, with steadfast adherence to the Five principles of peaceful coexistence, with mutual sensitivity to the concerns of each other, and with respect for equality, our two countries can further accelerate this process so that we can put this difference firmly behind us.  I am encouraged after my discussions with Premier Wen Jiabao that both our countries see an opportunity to proceed along this path.

            It is a tryst with destiny, which beckons to us. When we redeem it, we can truly fulfil the ideal of close cooperation, described so colourfully by Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore :

                  "When daylight breaks, we are free from the enclosure and the exclusiveness of our individual life. It is then that we see the light, which is for all men and for all times. It is then that we come to know one another, and come to cooperate in the field of life."

India and China can create this destiny.

Thank you.

23 June 2003

<http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/pmpekingunvi.htm>

Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and The People’s Republic of China

At the invitation of Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China H.E. Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of the Republic of India H.E. Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to the People’s Republic of China from 22 to 27 June 2003. 

During this visit, Premier Wen Jiabao held talks with Prime Minister Vajpayee. Their Excellencies President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Jiang Zemin of the Central Military Commission, Chairman Wu Bangguo of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and Vice President Zeng Qinghong of the People’s Republic of China held separate meetings with Prime Minister Vajpayee.  The talks and meetings were held in a sincere and friendly atmosphere. 

Leaders from both countries noted with satisfaction the progress made over recent years in bilateral relations. This is conducive not only to their respective development, but also to regional stability and prosperity.  The two sides recalled the historical depth of their friendly contacts.  India and China are the two largest developing countries of the world with centuries-old civilization, unique history and similar objectives.  Both noted that the sustained economic and social development in the two countries, representing one third of humanity is vital for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity not only in Asia but also in the whole world. 

The two sides agreed that India and China have a mutual desire for good neighborly relations and have broad common interests.  They agreed to fully utilize the substantial potential and opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation. 

Friendship and cooperation between the two countries meets the need to:

promote the socio-economic development and prosperity of both India and China;

·         maintain peace and stability regionally and globally;

·         strengthen multipolarity at the international level; and

·         enhance the positive factors of globalization. 

Both sides affirmed that they would abide by the following principles, promote a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership and, on this basis, build a qualitatively new relationship:

·         Both sides are committed to developing their long-term constructive and cooperative partnership on the basis of the principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and equality;   

·         As two major developing countries, India and China have a broad mutual interest in the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world, and a mutual desire in developing wider and closer cooperation and understanding in regional and international affairs; 

·         The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences.  The two countries are not a threat to each other.  Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other; and 

·         Both sides agree to qualitatively enhancing the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas while addressing differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable manner.  The differences should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.  

Both sides agreed to hold regular high-level exchanges between the two countries.  This will greatly enhance mutual understanding and expand bilateral relations.  With a view to deepening their coordination and dialogues on bilateral, regional and international issues, both sides agreed on the need for annual meetings between Foreign Ministers of the two countries.  They also agreed that personnel exchanges and friendly contacts between ministries, parliaments and political parties of the two countries should be further enhanced. 

The two sides welcomed the positive momentum of bilateral trade and economic cooperation in recent years and shared the belief that continued expansion and intensification of India-China economic cooperation is essential for strengthening bilateral relations. 

Both sides shared the view that existing complementarities between their two economies provide an important foundation and offer broad prospects for further enhancing their economic relations.  In order to promote trade and economic cooperation, both sides will take necessary measures consistent with their national laws and rules and international obligations to remove impediments to bilateral trade and investment.  They reaffirmed the importance of the ministerial meeting of the Joint Economic Group (JEG) and agreed to hold the next (seventh) JEG meeting within the year. 

The two sides will set up a compact Joint Study Group (JSG) composed of officials and economists to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation.  The JSG would also draw up a programme for the development of India-China trade and economic cooperation for the next five years, aimed at encouraging greater cooperation between the business communities of both sides.  The Group should present a study report and recommendations to the two Governments on measures for comprehensive trade and economic cooperation by the end of June 2004.   

The two countries will launch a financial dialogue and cooperation mechanism to strengthen their dialogue and coordination in this sector.   

The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation at the World Trade Organization, which is not only to mutual benefit but also in the broader interest of developing countries.  The two sides will hold dialogues on a regular basis in this regard. 

Historical and cultural links between India and China will be strengthened, inter-alia, through the promotion of exchanges in culture, education, science and technology, media, youth and people-to-people relations. They agreed to set up Cultural Centers in each other’s capitals and facilitate their establishment.  

Both sides will work towards the enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism, exchange hydrological data in flood season on common rivers as agreed, cooperation in agriculture, dairy, food processing, health and other sectors.  

They agreed on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, which will help enhance and deepen the mutual understanding and trust between the two armed forces.  They confirmed that the exchange of visits by their Defence Ministers and of military officials at various levels should be strengthened. 

The two sides exchanged views on the India-China boundary question and expounded their respective positions.  They reiterated their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution through consultations on an equal footing.  The two sides agreed that pending an ultimate solution, they should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, and reiterated their commitment to continue implementation of the agreements signed for this purpose, including the clarification of the Line of Actual Control. 

The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement. 

The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about “independence of Tibet”. 

The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation of the Indian position. 

India and China recognized the primacy of maintaining international peace.  This is a prerequisite for the socio-economic development of all developing countries, including India and China.  The world is marked by diversity.  Every country has the right to choose its own political system and path to development.  As two major developing countries, India and China acknowledged the importance of their respective roles in the shaping of a new international political and economic order.  The international community must help the developing countries to eliminate poverty and narrow the gap between the North and the South through dialogue and cooperation so as to achieve common prosperity. 

The two sides acknowledged the vital importance of the role of the United Nations in world peace, stability and development.  They are determined to continue their efforts in strengthening the UN system.  They reaffirmed their readiness to work together to promote reform of the UN. In reform of the UN Security Council, priority should be given to enhancing representation of the developing countries.           

Both sides stood for continued multilateral arms control and disarmament process, undiminished and equal security for all at progressively lower levels of armament and for multilateral negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons.  They are firmly opposed to introduction of weapons in outer space, use or threat of force against space-based objects and support cooperation in development of space technology for peaceful purposes. 

The two sides recognised the threat posed by terrorism to them and to global peace and security.  They resolutely condemned terrorism in any form.  The struggle between the international community and global terrorism is a comprehensive and sustained one, with the ultimate objective of eradication of terrorism in all regions.  This requires strengthening the global legal framework against terrorism.  Both sides shall also promote cooperation on counter-terrorism through their bilateral dialogue mechanism. 

India and China face special and similar challenges in their efforts to protect the environment while simultaneously forging ahead with rapid social and economic development of their countries.  In this context, the two sides agreed to work together in a practical manner to cooperate on preserving the environment and ensuring sustainable development and to coordinate positions on climate change, biodiversity and other issues in relevant multilateral fora. 

The two sides supported multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such cooperation promotes mutually beneficial exchanges, economic growth as well as greater cohesion among Asian countries. The two sides viewed positively each other’s participation in regional and sub-regional multilateral cooperation processes in Asia.            

The two sides stated that the improvement and development of India-China relations is not targeted at any third country and does not affect either country’s existing friendly relations and cooperation with other countries. 

            The two sides agreed that the official visit of the Prime Minister of India to the People’s Republic of China has been a success, has contributed to enhancing mutual understanding and trust between the Governments, leaders and peoples of the two countries, and marks a new step forward in strengthening the all-round cooperation between India and China in the new century.  

Prime Minister Vajpayee invited Premier Wen Jiabao to visit India at a mutually convenient time and conveyed to President Hu Jintao an invitation from President Abdul Kalam to visit India. The Chinese side accepted the invitations with appreciation. The dates of the visits will be settled through diplomatic channels. 

On behalf of the Government and the people of India, H.E Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee thanked the Government and the people of China for the warm welcome received by him and his delegation. 

Signed in Beijing on 23 June 2003 in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages.

(Atal Bihari Vajpayee)                             (Wen Jiabao)

Prime Minister                                       Premier of the State Council
The Republic of India                             The People’s Republic of China

3 June 2003

<http://www.meadev.nic.in/ind-chn-decla.htm>

India and China Agree Over Tibet

Talks between India and China have led to a major improvement in  relations, following a landmark agreement over the status of Tibet.

            India has now formally recognised that the area known as the Tibetan autonomous region is part of the People's Republic of China.

China, for its part, has agreed to start border trade through the north-east Indian state of Sikkim - a move that is being seen as an acceptance by Beijing of India's claim over that area.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee says relations with China have been transformed as the two sides seek new ways to overcome their differences.

However, BBC India correspondent Sanjeev Srivastava says the joint declaration is in reality as much diplomatic fudging as genuine progress in areas of differences.

The Tibet and Sikkim agreements are the first details to emerge of a declaration signed by India and China aimed at solving their long-running border disputes, which erupted into war in 1962.

Mr. Vajpayee is on the second full day of what is the first visit to China by an Indian prime minister for 10 years.

"Our present course of developing all-round bilateral co-operation, while simultaneously addressing our differences, has transformed the quality of our relationship," Mr. Vajpayee said on Tuesday.

He was speaking after talks with former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin.

The world's two most populous nations have appointed envoys "to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement", according to a joint declaration released after the talks.

Mr. Vajpayee added: "The appointment of special envoys is a special step that reflects the desire of both countries to settle the border issue as early as possible."

The joint declaration adds that India will not allow "anti-China political activities" by Tibetan exiles, who have fled to India in their tens of thousands.

Talks hope

The Indian Foreign Minister has said this will not affect the status of the Buddhist Dalai Lama, who leads a Tibetan government-in-exile based in the Indian town of Dharamsala.

The agreement has surprised observers as border disputes have bedevilled relations between China and India.

Fifteen rounds of talks since the 1980s have failed to resolve India and China's boundary disagreements.

Even in this declaration, our India correspondent says, the Indian leadership is keen to differentiate between the Tibet autonomous region and the whole of Tibet.

The Tibet autonomous region, west of the Yangtse river and south of the Kunlun mountains is the only area recognised by modern-day China as "Tibet".

It is about one third of the size of the old Tibet that existed before China invaded in 1950 and started incorporating areas into surrounding Chinese provinces.

Tibetan exiles in India believe improved relations between India and China would help negotiations between the Dalai Lama and Beijing over Tibet.

Thubten Samphel, a spokesman for the Tibetan government-in-exile, told the Reuters news agency: "Relations between India and China based on mutual trust will enable India to play the role of a honest mediator to help resolve the Tibet issue."

'Nothing new'

The Dalai Lama wants to see greater autonomy for Tibet inside China's borders.

But Beijing usually accuses him of seeking outright independence for Tibet.

The Dalai Lama's London representative, Kesang Y Takla, described India's position as "not new... but it is certainly of interest and concern to all three parties concerned".

The director of the Tibet Information Network, Thierry Dodin, said local people living on the border would benefit from the establishment of Himalayan border trading posts. in Sikkim and Tibet.

"Trade is something both nations see as being in their national interests," he told BBC News Online.

"The local population will benefit from that and both nations will benefit from that. In terms of the economy, tourism and communication it's a very important thing."

Promoting co-operation

On Monday, Mr. Vajpayee and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao signed nine agreements to boost relations between the two Asian rivals.

The agreements include:

Increasing co-operation in science, technology, commerce and education Easing visa rules Setting up joint infrastructure development projects, focusing on water and energy resources Establishing cultural centres in each others' countries

24 June 2003

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/3015840.stm>

 

India-China Ties: No Longer Hostage to The Past

 

If the principles enshrined in the Joint Declaration signed by the two prime ministers last Tuesday are upheld in political practice and policy, then Mr Vajpayee will have succeeded at long last in moving the bilateral relationship firmly onto the track of cooperation in all fields of a nation's activities.

Over the years since 1962, as memories began to dim, and the world changed, both India and China faced a compelling need to move towards a 'normal' or working relationship. The effort began with Mr. Vajpayee's visit of 1979 as foreign minister, and was given a boost by the decision to seek 'normalisation' in tandem with a border settlement during Rajiv Gandhi's visit of 1988. Nevertheless, this process has not been easy and it has been difficult to surmount the many obstacles that divide them.

Some, like the territorial issue and the nature of the Sino-Pakistan equation, arouse strong national emotions and have a complicating domestic dimension. Moreover, images and fears of the 'other' in the public mind also need to change if policy is to change. For instance there was (is) the Indian image of a belligerent China, unwilling to see India emerge as an equal, determined to seek 'hegemony' in Asia, befriending Pakistan to 'keep India tied down to the sub-continent' etc. China's shadowy role in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme, its Myanmar connection and its economic dynamism only added to Indian fears.

Thus, on the eve of the prime minister's visit to Beijing, the cover story of a popular newsmagazine was titled 'Who's Afraid of China? and projected a country where among other things 'the supermarket hides a super gulag.' There is the Chinese mirror image of an equally hegemonistic India, lording it over its smaller neighbours, seeking superpower alliances to 'encircle' China etc.

Hopefully, recent government policies and pronouncements, increasing interest in China's stunning economic performance, and, of course, television that has made the Chinese real to vast numbers in this country will help change these images as will tourism and academic exchanges. The prime minister has given a grant to set up a Centre of Indian Studies at Beijing University but Chinese studies in India still lag far behind and need support. Already a shift in the media projected image and perception of China seems to have come about as interest in the economic has displaced focus on the political and strategic, and there has been great interest in the Vajpayee visit. The very fact that a 51-member trade delegation accompanied him, as did the two ministers of commerce and IT, and his scheduled visit to China's commercial capital, Shanghai, raised public expectations on the economic front.

These expectations have not been belied. The political green light for a rapid expansion of trade and commerce has been given at the highest levels. Industry has received the support and encouragement from government that it had been yearning for. Visa rules are to be relaxed, bureaucratic procedures simplified, trade expected to triple within the next decade, and a new high-level group of economists and officials to identify areas of cooperation between the business communities of the two sides. Finally, the prime minister revived and endorsed the powerful image of an unbeatable combine of Indian software and Chinese hardware that had been suggested by Premier Zhu Rongji on his visit to India last year.

An unexpected bonus was the agreement to open an additional point for border trade via Nathu La in Sikkim. This agreement appears to be politically innocent but actually has great political significance. Article 1 of that agreement reads inter alia that 'the Indian side agrees to designate Changhu of Sikkim state as the venue for border trade market; the Chinese side agrees to designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the venue for border trade market.' This bald sentence masks the diplomatic achievement of the seemingly impossible. It is being interpreted as a confirmation of the existing realities, namely, that Sikkim is part of India as Tibet is of China though both will continue to assert that this is not so. That is the way of diplomacy and there is no way to simplifying this interlocking problem.

It stems from the bitter dispute between India and China over the opaque and complex territorial issue that remains unresolved. It also relates to the 1975 merger of Sikkim with India, which China does not recognise, to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India which acknowledges Tibet only as an 'Autonomous Region of China,' while China insists that Tibet be described as an 'inalienable' part of China. These firmly held positions have severely inhibited normalization as well as the movement of goods and people across the Tibet-Sikkim border. Yet, in today's world of aggressive economic globalisation, the imperative of neighbourhood and regional cooperation is battering away at hard national borders. And as the experience of South Asia shows, borders remain closed to trade, travel and tourism, while territorial disputes remain unresolved and relations strained.

China's experience has been different. In the last decade, it gave priority to settling territorial disputes with all of its five new Central Asian neighbours that became independent when the USSR disintegrated. It also did so with Vietnam, Laos and Mongolia. Consequently it has close relations, border trade and even strategic understanding with all its peripheral states except India. In that same decade, the India-China border has been peaceful and stable. Confidence Building Measures are in place on the Line of Actual Control, the territorial issue is under discussion, and the two sides have agreed to abjure the use of force 'by any means.' Vajpayee's subtle recognition of the frontier realities in Sikkim and Tibet will/should spur a reasonable resolution of the border dispute, encourage cross border trade and tourism and help to improve local and regional economies.

Mr. Vajpayee attempted to cut through this complex mix of suspicions and realities to reach out to the future when he declared: 'We should focus on the simple truth that there is no objective reason for discord between us and neither of us is a threat to the other.' To reassure his domestic public, he confirmed that the 'highest political levels' in China shared the same sentiment and wanted 'to build stable, enduring and forward looking ties of friendship.' In short, what Mr Vajpayee will bring home is that the overall relationship and the economic development of the two countries and the region, will no longer be hostage to the past. 

Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, 27 June 2003
http://in.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/27guest.htm

India, China Plan Naval Exercises

As a follow-up of recent highest-level exchange of political visits, India and China are planning to hold the first-ever joint naval exercises later this year.

A three-day search and rescue exercises is being planned in which major warships from the two countries would participate, according to the Vice Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral John Desilva.

He said the date and venue of the exercises were being worked out by officials of the two countries.

With thaw in relations, Indian and Chinese warships have been making port calls to each other countries, but this would be for the first time that the two navies would be holding joint exercises.

India has initally proposed to hold anti-piracy exercises in the Malacca straits on the pattern of similar exercises held with Indonesian and US Warships in the region. However, the Chinese officials said the anti-piracy role was performed in China by border guard vessels. So the two countries have decided to hold search and rescue exercises, he said.

Indian and Chinese Red Army have recently started a greater interaction by sending officers to each other's military acadamies. Just recently a high-level Chinese team is attending a course at India's prestigious NationaL Defence College.

Desilva said that Indian Navy was in the process of replacing the four IL-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft lost in air collision over Goa from Russia.

"Some of these aircraft, which are upgraded versions, have already been inducted into the Navy", he said adding that with the lifting of US sanctions, the Navy had started getting supply of critical components and spare for its Anti-Submarine SeaKing helicopters.

The Naval Vice Chief also said that two of the three Indian Navy's Stealth Krivak Class Warships would join the Western Naval fleet making the Arabian Sea based fleet one of the most powerful.

The Western Naval fleet is already equipped with the country's sole aircraft carrier INS Viraat, Russian Kashin class destroyers and indigenous Delhi and Bhramaputra class missile frigates.

He said while the first of the Krivak class frigates christened INS Talwar would come via Cape of Good Hope, the second frigate INS Trishul would come via West Indies and Pacific.

Top naval officials also said the deal for acquisition of Russian Admiral Groshhkov carrier was almost finalised and the warship would be equipped with Mig-29K fighter aircraft.

27 June 2003

http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=150068

India Grants Major Tariff Concessions to China

A day after Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's return from China, India tonight granted major tariff concessions to Beijing, which is termed as a "milestone" in bilateral trade, surging towards five billion dollars annually.

The tariff concessions were offered under the 1975 Bangkok Agreement, which provides for trade expansion through such concessions among developing countries of the ESCAP region.

With the Cabinet approving China's entry into the pact, India would be offering concessions on 106 Chinese items, while China is to extend concession on 182 Indian items including chemicals, leather, textiles and diamonds.

After the exchange of concessions with China, India would be eligible for concessions on 722 items, which cover around 25 to 30 per cent of its total exports to China, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj told reporters after the Cabinet meeting here.

Chinese accession to the tariff agreement, which was initially ratified by five countries including Bangladesh, Korea, Sri Lanka and Lao PDR, would help increase India's market prospects in the region while strengthening the bonds of goodwill between the two countries.

The Cabinet also gave post facto approval to the Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan, which had been signed on March 6, 2003 during the Afghan President's visit to India, Swaraj said.

The tariff concessions granted to Afghanistan were extended on a non-reciprocal basis keeping in mind the long-term interest and to facilitate trade and economic ties between the two countries.

The Union Cabinet also approved creation of a Rs 500 crore fund for urban reforms as announced in last year's budget, Swaraj said.

Under the scheme, states would be eligible for central assistance and incentives on 100 per cent grant towards housing, urban development and poverty alleviation.

She said 50 per cent of the states' allocation for 2003-04 would be released as incentive on signing of an agreement by them and the balance released on the achievement of specific milestones.

An empowered committee headed by Secretary in Urban Employment and Poverty alleviation department would be set up to operationalise urban reforms and monitor and supervise various programmes under the scheme.

28 June 2003,

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=150357>

Vajpayee's China Visit to Boost 'Strategic Triangle'

With India-China bilateral ties entering a new phase after a successful Prime Ministerial visit to Beijing, Chinese analysts say the stage is now set for enhanced strategic cooperation and coordination between China, India and Russia on global issues for a new international political and economic order.

"China, Russia and India share many common interests in promoting a democratic international relationship and safeguarding international security and stability as well as developing regional economy and safeguarding regional stability and development," a senior Chinese foreign ministry official said.

He pointed out that the three countries have many identical positions and concerns and recently scholars of the three countries have had some discussions on trilateral cooperation.

In the past, he said the proposed strategic triangle between India, China and Russia failed to take-off mainly due to lack of trust between New Delhi and Beijing. Now that relations between the two nations have entered a new phase, analysts say trilateral ties between the three countries offer immense scope for them to cooperate, maintain regional and global peace and stability.

"We believe that those exchanges, coordination and cooperation conform to enhancing mutual understanding and bilateral ties between the three. They also help to maintain peace and stability of the region and the world at large," former Chinese Ambassador to India, Zhou Gang said while commenting on the scope of trilateral partnership between the three nations.

Anil K Joseph, 30 June 2003

<http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=150524>

Pakistan Hails India-China Friendship

ISLAMABAD, June 30 (AFP) - Pakistan Monday welcomed rival India's efforts to reach out to Pakistan's traditional ally China, saying New Delhi could now end an "unbridled" weapons shopping spree.

            "This is a good omen. This augurs well for peace and stability in South Asia. We welcome this," foreign ministry spokesman Masood Khan said of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's six-day visit to Beijing last week.

"Beijing and Delhi have had problems in the past. We are glad that they are trying to resolve these problems and they are moving towards reconciliation, understanding and cooperation."

Khan said the new warmth between China and India, who like Pakistan are nuclear rivals, should bring an end to India's militarisation program.

India has recently refused Pakistani calls for denuclearisation of the subcontinent on the grounds that it also faces threat from China, not just its western neighbour Pakistan.

"Because of this new-found relationship and because of this warmth on both sides, I think that the pretext for further militarisation or development of weapons of mass destruction by India has been removed," the spokesman said.

"I think that now Delhi should put an end to its unbridled defence shopping spree."

30 June 2003

<http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/bl/Qpakistan-india-china.RlnE_DuU.html>

Vajpayee's Historic Trip Strengthens India-China Ties

The historic six-day (June 22-27) visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took place at an extremely crucial time. The long-term outcome of the trip will emerge over the weeks and months. What is certain, however, is that both Beijing and New Delhi considered the visit as more than strengthening the bilateral relations, but an opportunity to take measure of the grave world situation in a new and hostile environment.

Prime Minister Vajpayee was accompanied by about 100 Indian businessmen and entrepreneurs, beside External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, Ambassador to China Shiv Shankar Menon, and Commerce Minister Arun Jaitley.

Following the signing of a joint declaration with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, in Beijing, the Indian Prime Minister declared: "We should focus on the simple truth that there is no objective reason for discord between us, and neither of us is a threat to the other." This statement of Vajpayee, who is the first Indian premier to visit China in a decade, should serve as a warning to those who believe that these two, the world's most-populous nations can be kept separated by planting suspicion of one against the other.

Prime Minister Wen provided direction to the future development of the ties by making some concrete proposals. He said the two countries should extend contacts to enhance trust and dispel suspicion, expand cooperation to raise bilateral trade volume to $10 billion by 2005, develop cooperation in science, education, culture, and health, and set up cultural centers.        

The Strategic Context

Prime Minister Vajpayee was scheduled to visit China later this year; A number of events caused the trip to be moved up. To begin with, the Iraq War: The U.S. invasion of Iraq, defying the United Nations and the goodwill of billions of people worldwide, came as a shock to both the Indian and Chinese leaders. It became evident to them that the world had changed for the worse. The United States, once considered as the icon of economic development and a motive force behind social stability, has now turned unpredictable, if not downright dangerous.

It is this realization that led Vajpayee to tell reporters, less than 48 hours before his departure for Beijing, that the world around us has changed dramatically during recent years, and that "two of the world's largest and most populous developing countries, India and China, should remain in close touch on global issues of concern to developing countries."

Elaborating on the evolution of Sino-Indian relations, Vajpayee continued: "Our dialogue now addresses not only the various areas in which we can improve bilateral cooperation, but also international issues such as terrorism, security, environment, sustainable development, and multilateral economic regimes."

The second important event that hastened the Indian Prime Minister's visit was the late-April visit to China by India's Defense Minister George Fernandes. A sharp critic of China in earlier days, Fernandes was impressed by what he saw and heard in China and, at the same time, was firm and categorical in expressing his views.

His refusal to cut short the trip in light of the SARS epidemic in some parts of China, impressed his hosts.

Perhaps the most important meeting that Fernandes had was with China's leading politician and former President, Jiang Zemin. Jiang, who now heads the Chinese People's Liberation Army, told Fernandes that the people of China and India enjoy long-term friendship, and exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in all fields have shown good momentum in recent years. Jiang underlined the need for enhancing Sino-Indian bilateral ties, including military ones, which was in the "fundamental interest" of the two nations, and he fondly recollected his visit to India in 1996.

In his talks, Fernandes went a step further. He proposed to the Chinese leaders the Indian interest to patrol the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal jointly with the Chinese Navy. Following the events in Iraq, and the continuing overwhelming presence of the Americans in the Persian Gulf, it is no surprise that New Delhi and Beijing are uneasy about the way the region has been militarized by outsiders. Although China did not respond to the Indian proposal on the spot, it is a matter of great importance, and it is evident that it involves considering a gamut of items. It is only expected that Fernandes' proposal will be considered with due attention in Beijing. It is also a certainty that further discussion on the subject, long before it finally matures, would take place at the highest level of both countries.

The Russian Factor

In 1998, while visiting India, then-Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov had suggested the development of a Strategic Triangle among Russia, China, and India. The objective, he explained, was to use the scientific and technological capabilities, skilled manpower, and available resources of these three nations to stabilize the region through wide-ranging economic development. This concept of a Strategic Triangle had been advocated by Lyndon LaRouche in a number of EIR  Features during that period.

Despite the stated intent, the progress in working toward developing such a strategic relationship was slow and hesitant. Some claim that the escalation of NATO's air offensive against Belgrade and China's stiff reaction to the accidental bombing of its embassy in the Yugoslav capital in May 1999 seem to have brought the triangle concept back to the fore. Again, the events of Sept. 11, 2001 in the United States shifted the world's focus to terrorism. But, it has become evident once more in Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi, that serious efforts are necessary to put such a triangle into effect.

It is perhaps for this reason that at St. Petersburg, during the city's 300th anniversary celebrations last month, following his meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Vajpayee spoke about an "Asian Century"—a reference to the 1988 meeting between senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. On that occasion, the Chinese leader had pointed out that the coming of the real Asia-Pacific Century or Asian Century "can only be declared when China, India, and other neighboring nations become developed."

Since the St. Petersburg meeting, a new liveliness in the relationship has been observed. In Phnom Penh on June 17, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of ASEAN+3 (the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea), Russia, China, and India offered to forge strategic partnerships with the Southeast Asian nations. These three nuclear powers gave "strong signals" that they would sign up to the grouping's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, effectively a non-aggression pact among the ten ASEAN member countries.

Russia, China, and India were the first to offer to sign up to the pact. According to an ASEAN diplomat, quoted by the international media, these three powers were keen to demonstrate to the Southeast Asian nations that "we are benign powers and do not desire your territory."

The move by the three nuclear powers to forge such pacts comes as the United States is stamping its influence on the region under the guise of the international fight against terrorism, analysts said.

In mid-June, a week before Vajpayee left for Beijing, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was in Delhi on his way to Phnom Penh. Reports indicate that the triangular interaction was at the core of his agenda, during his talks in Delhi.

Close views shared by Russia, India, and China on international issues provide a basis for continuing trilateral dialogue among them and for upgrading its level, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said, ahead of Ivanov's trip to South Asia.

Subsequently, on June 22, the very day that the Indian Prime Minister arrived in Beijing, China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao invited India to join China and Russia in holding regular trilateral talks on issues of great importance, such as Iraq.

Important Bilateral Agreements

On June 22, India and China signed their first-ever joint declaration, setting out "goals and guiding principles" to promote their bilateral talks, with the leaders of China proposing a "phasing out" of Sino-Indian differences on their nearly 40-year-old border dispute. The subject was endorsed during the Vajpayee-Wen meeting later.

A Memorandum of Understanding expanding bilateral border trade was also signed by Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha and Chinese Commerce Minister Lu Fuyan, in the presence of the two prime ministers.

On June 24, India and China decided to further step up bilateral trade and increase cooperation to safeguard the interests of developing nations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). These decisions were taken during a meeting in Beijing between Minister of Commerce Arun Jaitley and his Chinese counterpart, Lu Fuyan, official sources said.

The two sides also decided to hold the next round of the Joint Economic Group meeting sometime in November-December this year.

China is a new entrant to the WTO and, like India, is concerned about some of the measures the WTO has imposed on the developing nations. Following his meeting with Lu Fuyan, Jaitley pointed out to the Press Trust of India that India and China have many commonalities and their cooperation is vital to safeguard the interests of the developing countries. His discussion with Lu had centered on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), in the area of public health care, as well as agricultural negotiations and investment-related issues. Jaitley, a lawyer who is considered an expert on WTO issues, said, "We have decided to explore how to cooperate with China at the WTO," adding that the two countries have agreed to inform their ambassadors to the WTO in Geneva, so that they could have consultations and adopt a common stand on major issues affecting the developing nations, ahead of a major WTO session in September in Cancún, Mexico.

This article appears in the July 4, 2003 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.

Ramtanu Maitra, 4 July 2003

<http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2003/3026india_china.html>

China-India Relations "cannot be normalised without addressing the Tibetan issue," Samdhong Rinpoche: An Interview

His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Government in exile views the current visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China as an important step taken at an appropriate time. Samdhong Rinpoche, Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) of Tibetan Government in exile speaks to Sahara Time about the impact of the visit. Excerpts:

Q: How do you look at the current visit of Indian Prime Minister to China?

A. We think it is an important step taken at a very right time. Good relations between the two most populous nations of the world can prove good for the world peace and also peace in Asia. We sincerely hope that Mr. Vajpayee's China visit will lead to many political, social and economic changes in this part of the world. So we welcome it. We find it still more welcome in the light of how the Indian Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister have presented their policies on Tibet before the world during this visit.

Q: But newspaper headlines during this visit give impression as if India has sold out Tibet to China?

A. I think it will be unfair to blame the newspapers for what they published on one day on Tibet. In reality it was the Chinese government news agency Xinhua that released wrong news claiming, "India had, for the first time in history, explicitly recognized Tibet as an inalienable part of China." Newspapers just published it verbatim without verifying it. But Mr. Yashwant Sinha very rightly and effectively clarified the situation. This event has only exposed the real intentions of Chinese government and its propaganda machinery.

Q: What would you say about Mr. Sinha's statement from Beijing on this issue?

A. His statement is very precious to us. One thing is that he made is quite clear that there is no change in India's policy on Tibet. Secondly, his statement from no other place than Beijing that His Holiness Dalai Lama is a respected guest of India and that the government of India cannot even think of asking him to leave India is very significant. In my opinion Mr. Sinha has demonstrated high levels of courage and morality by taking such a principled stand. Not only we Tibetans but, I am sure, people from all over the world would respect him and welcome his stand. His statement would have had lesser meaning had he said same thing in some other country. But by saying it in Beijing itself he has earned a lot of respect for himself, his government and, above all, for India as a nation.

Q: How the current talks and subsequent agreements between India and China would affect Tibetan movement?

A. It will be a positive impact. One good thing that happened during this China visit of Mr. Vajpayee relates to people's concern for Tibet. After sometime people tend to forget Tibet. Even if it was because of a Chinese blunder, the issue of Tibet once again came back to international centre stage during Mr. Vajpayee's China visit. Just before his visit the newspapers were ignoring the Tibetan issue as if it had ceased to be of any consequence to India. But thanks to the blunder by Xinhua and Indian media's reaction to it, Tibet has once again emerged as an important issue in relations between India and China. However, we are of the opinion that the chances of a solution to the Tibetan issue will improve with improvement in India-China relations. This way this visit is going to help the Tibetan movement.

Q: What kind of change in Chinese attitude do you expect with improving economic and political relations between India and China?

A.                 One thing is that Chinese leaders must have realized by now that relations with Indian cannot be normalized without addressing the Tibetan issue. Moreover, we are noticing in past one year that Chinese leadership have started realizing that they can no more ignore international opinion on Tibet. I think they are also coming to the conclusion that finding a solution to the Tibetan problem through India could be more beneficial than through the western countries. Mr. Vajpayee's China visit can prove significant in this direction.

Vijay Kranti, 4 July 2003

SAHARA TIME weekly, New Delhi, Issue July 5, 2003

<http://www.tibet.net/flash/2003/0703/040703.html>

Chronology of Major Events (1949-1981)

• India extended official recognition to the Peoples Republic of China on December 30, 1949. India was the second among the non-socialist countries, after Burma (Myanmar) to recognise PRC.
• India and China established diplomatic relations on April 1, 1950.
• An agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India was signed on April 29, 1954. 
• Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in June 1954. The two Prime Ministers jointly enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Note: The five principles are (a) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (b) mutual non-aggression, (c) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (d) equality and mutual benefit, and (e) peaceful co-existence.)
• A trade agreement between India and China was signed on October 14, 1954.
• The Indian Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in October 1954.
• Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in November 1956.
• The Dalai Lama left China and came to India on March 31, 1959. He was given asylum. The understanding was that there would be no political activity on Indian territory.
• In September 1959, the Government of China,… laid a formal claim to 50,000 square miles (128,000 square kilometres) of … territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh).
• The Prime Ministers of India and China met in Delhi in 1960 to discuss the boundary issue and this was followed by the meeting between officials of the two sides.
• [Sino-Indian Border Conflict 1962].
• During the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965, the Chinese side extended material assistance to Pakistan and its official statement accused India of ‘criminal aggression’.
• During the India-Pakistan conflict in 1971, China criticised India for ‘gross’ interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. It condemned Bangladeshi leaders as a ‘secessionist group’ and was one of the last countries to accord recognition to Bangladesh.
• China was officially admitted into the UN in 1971 replacing Taiwan including on the Security Council (Note: India has consistently followed the ‘one-China policy’. Despite ups and downs in bilateral relations, India had consistently advocated, since 1950, that PRC should represent China in the UN).
• The Chinese Government, on April 29, 1975, issued a statement on merger of Sikkim with India, calling it as ‘illegal annexation’. (Note: China has not yet officially recognized Sikkim as an integral part of India)
• In 1976, the two countries restored ambassadorial level relations after 15 years. In April, India announced the nomination of Shri K.R.Narayanan as India’s Ambassador to China.
• The then EAM, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China in 1979. The visit marked the resumption of high level exchanges.
• The then Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India in June 1981.

<http://meadev.nic.in/foreign/china.htm>

Post-1976 Trend of India's China Policy

IF Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 was the breakthrough event, Ambassador K.R. Narayanan inaugurated the evolution of the positive trend in national policy 12 years before that. Here are some of the markers of this trend, which suffered a setback in May 1998 and recovered in June 1999:

July 1976: Re-establishment of Ambassadorial-level relations; K.R. Narayanan is India's first Ambassador to China since 1962.

February 1979: External Affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee makes an important visit to China. Greeting him, new helmsman Deng Xiaoping says: "We do have some issues on which we are far apart. We should put those on the side for the moment and do some actual work to improve the climate to go about the problem. Our two countries are the two most populous countries in the world, and we are both Asian countries. How can we not be friends?" December 1988: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi makes a five-day breakthrough visit to China and is warmly greeted by Deng Xiaoping, who sets the tone for the breakthrough. Both sides agree to develop relations in various fields. The decision to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG), with the twin mandate of ensuring peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and working on a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question, is the creative, breakthrough event in post-1962 India-China relations.

December 1991: Premier Li Peng makes a return visit to India; the communique concluding this official visit reiterates the mutual commitment to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LAC.

May 1992: President R. Venkataraman makes a State visit to China.

September 1993: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao makes a return visit to China. The most significant development is the signing of an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. A Sino-Indian Expert Group (EG) is set up to assist the work of the JWG on the boundary question.

October 1994: Vice-President K.R. Narayanan visits China and is warmly received as an "old friend of China."

November 1996: President Jiang Zemin makes a four-day visit to India - it is the first ever visit by a President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to India. An important outcome is the signing of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. Other agreements signed relate to the maintenance of the Consulate General of India in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC; Cooperation for Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Other Crimes; and Maritime Transport. President Jiang extends an invitation to the Indian President to visit China.

May 1998: Negative Indian official statements preceding and following the Pokhran-II nuclear explosions disrupt Sino-Indian relations. Public acrimony and a chill descend on the relationship.

February 1999: The first round of Foreign Office Consultations between India and China, as decided by the JWG, takes place in Beijing. The talks, which cover bilateral, regional and international issues, help break the ice.

June 1999: External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visits China at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to make amends. The two sides agree jointly to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations (April 1, 2000). Agreements are reached on promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), starting a Security Dialogue, and expanding economic and trade relations.

March 2000: The first round of the India-China Security Dialogue is held in Beijing.

April 1, 2000: Official celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations begin.

(1988-2000: Various sets of India-China exchanges take place at the party-to-party, parliamentary, Ministerial, official, military, business, science and technology, professional, cultural, sports and other levels. Two-way trade between India and China reaches $ 1.987 billion in 1999.)

May 28-June 3, 2000: President Narayanan makes a week-long State visit to China. The Indian President invites President Jiang to visit India again. The Chinese President accepts the invitation. It is decided that the Foreign Minister and Premier will visit India in the near future.

<http://www.flonnet.com/fl1712/17120220.htm>

Agreements/MoUs Signed Between India and China

1954: Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. (Note: The Agreement was valid for eight years and lapsed in 1962)

1954: Trade Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China.

1984: Trade Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
1988: Protocol between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Resumption of Border Trade between the Tibet region of China and India.

1991: Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Aero-Space Industry of the People’s Republic of China and the Department of Space of the Republic of India on Co-operation in the Peaceful Application of Outer Space Sciences and Technology.

1991: Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Resumption of Border Trade.

1991: Trade Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Calendar Year 1992.

1991: Consular Convention between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China.

1992: Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Custom Regulation, Banking Arrangements and Related matters for Border Trade.
1992: Protocol between The Ministry of Human Resource Development Department of Education, Government of India and The State Education Commission of the People’s Republic of China on Co-Operation in the Field of Education for 1992-1993.

1992: Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of Civil Services, Personnel Management and Public Administration between the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions of the Government of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Personnel of the People’s Republic of China.

1992: Memorandum of Consultation in the field of Social Welfare.

1992: Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade.

1992: Memorandum of Understanding between The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Republic Of India and The Audit Administration, People’s Republic of China.

1992: Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in Agriculture between the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Agriculture of The People’s Republic of China.

1993: Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for Extension of Border Trade across Shipki La Pass.

1993: Agreement between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Radio, Film, Television of the People’s Republic of China on Radio and Television co-operation.

1993: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Republic of India and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on co-operation in the Field of Geology and Mineral Resources.

1993: Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line Of Actual Control in the India-China Border areas signed in Beijing on September 7,1993.

1993: Agreement on Environment Co-operation.

1994: Memorandum of Understanding on simplifying the Visa Procedures between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

1995: Memorandum of Understanding between Ministry of Metallurgical Industry of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Steel of the Government of the Republic of India.
1996:Agreement between the Government of The Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line Of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.

1996: Agreement between The Government of the Republic Of India and The Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the Maintenance of the Consulate General of the Republic of India in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.

1996: Agreement on co-operation for combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and other crimes between The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

1996: Agreement on Maritime Transport between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

1997: Protocol on co-operation between the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

2000: Memorandum of Understanding signed during the 6th Joint Economic Group Meeting in Beijing on February 21-22, 2000 on co-operation in the field of steel between India and China.

2000: Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of Information Technology. (July)

2000: Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of Labour (Employment services, vocational training and social security). (September)
2002: MOU on the Application of Phytosanitary Measures between the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of India and the State General Administration of the People’s Republic of China for Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ). (January)

2002: MOU between ISRO and the China National Space Administration on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. (January)

2002: MOU between Department of Science and Technology of the Republic of India and the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs of People’s Republic of China on Exchange of Personnel between India and China. (January)

2002: MOU between Department of Science and Technology of the Republic of India and the Chinese Academy of Sciences of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology. (January)

2002: Agreement between India and China on Cooperation in the field of Tourism. (January)

2002: MOU between the Ministry of Water Resources of India and Ministry of Water Resources of China upon provision of hydrological information of the Yaluzangbu / Brahmaputra river in flood season by China to India. (January)

 India-China Trade Statistics Table I: India China Trade  (1995-2001) (US $ million)