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Fact Files Increasing Indo-Israel Strategic Collaboration
Assistant Editor
Bilateral Agreements At A Glance (1992-1997)
Indo-Israel Ties: A New Beginning
It took eight years for India to send an external affairs minister to Israel after both the countries established diplomatic relations. Home Minister L K Advani also visited the country to lay the carpet for a new relationship. India and Israel are vibrant democracies. After these recent overtures, it is clear India sees Israel in a new light and is serious about establishing a lasting and fruitful relationship with that country. After so many years of inactivity, the relationship is finally promising to bloom. Roving Editor Ramesh Menon examines the emerging Indo-Israeli ties.
Indians Always Secretly Admired Israel In the seventies and eighties, when Indian governments lambasted Israel and orchestrated the Arab stance, Indians knew it was more of a strategic stand. India had strong business ties with the Arab countries and wanted to keep them going, especially in the case of oil. India also wanted to use the relationship to neutralise Pakistan's loud international campaign that India was anti-Islamic. Now, with the cosmetics off, India wants to begin on a new slate with Israel. Down the years, India figured out that its special relationship with the Arabs did not help in times of need. It was a logical move to edge closer to Israel.
India Stands to Gain India sees multiple benefits in holding hands with Israel. Business from both the sides are looking at the development of getting closer with great interest. In an exclusive interview, Dov Segev-Steinberg, Israel's Consul General in Bombay told Radiff.com: "In 1992, when Israel and India established formal diplomatic relations, the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries was $ 200 million. At the end of 1999, the volume of trade was $ 1 billion. The volume of bilateral trade will now increase. In the first four months of 2000, there was a phenomenal increase of 42 per cent as compared to the first four months of 1999." Apart from Jaswant Singh and Advani, West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu was recently in Jerusalem with a 20-member strong trade mission headed by Somnath Chatterjee, MP, chairman of the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation. In its own way, this is significant. Not very long ago, Basu and his ilk in the Marxist fold used to lambast Israel as a tool of Western imperialism. With this visit, the stigma is off. Apart from beefing up its defence, it could help India a great deal in crucial sectors like agriculture. Israel, with its modern methods of farming, irrigation, genetic development of seeds, could help revolutionise farming. In agriculture, India is looking at Israeli technologies in sprinkler and drip irrigation systems, greenhouses, hybrid seeds, tissue culture and dryland farming. Other areas are horticulture, solar energy, animal husbandry and dairy development. Some projects are already on to improve agricultural yield. Says Steinberg: "Israel can easily help India increase its crop production by three times with better technology." In science and technology, both countries will co-operate in areas like biotechnology, advanced materials, lasers, electro-optics and information technology. Steinberg points out that both India and Israel are emerging IT giants and since they are not competing with each other, they should hold hands to work in Third World countries as there is so much potential. Way back in the seventies, Israel had offered to convert areas of the arid and barren Rajasthan desert into a green belt. But thinking it would offend the powerful Arab nations, India ignored the proposal. India has also learnt the hard way. Its friendship with the Arab countries yielded little and was of no real advantage. Friendship with Israel will also open new doors in terms of trade, commerce, industry and software development. More importantly, India would also benefit in areas like counter-terrorism and security. External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and his Israeli counterpart David Levy will soon establish a Indo-Israeli Joint Commission to channelise their relationship in areas of energy, defence, agriculture, tourism, culture, science and technology. Steinberg says that tourism is one major area and Israel with a population of just 6.2 million had three million tourists and could help India develop its tourism, as it is "such a beautiful and vibrant country." Israel is all set to supply arms and advanced technology to the Indian army. Israel plans to sell the Indian army $ 9 million worth of 5.56 calibre ammunition and an Israeli firm is to sign a contract of $ 47 million to upgrade India's 155-mm artillery. On the anvil is a proposal of the Israel Aircraft Industries to supply the Indian Air Force with $ 80 million worth of radar jamming tools for its MiG-21 warplanes. India is also reported to be interested in buying a spy plane, which has a Soviet built Ilyushin airframe repacked with Israeli technology. January 29, 1992 seems to be like a long time ago. This was the day Israel and India established diplomatic relations. Not much happened till a few days ago. Suddenly, the western and specifically the Arab world is watching both countries reaching out for each other. On the diplomatic front, India will have to do some tightrope walking not to prod the United States into seeing red as it comes closer than ever to Israel. When Jaswant Singh was in Israel there were reports floating around that the United States was asking Israel to scuttle a deal to sell India a sophisticated radar system that would deter ballistic missiles. But Levy has denied this. However, Israel has buckled under US pressure to scrap its $ 250 million sale of Phalcon early-warning aircraft to China. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak did this, as it was a constant irritant in relations with the United States. The deal was earlier negotiated by the then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Phalcon is an advanced radar and battle control system mounted on a Russian made Ilyushin-76 aircraft. It is similar to the US Airborne Warning and Control System. Members of the Congress had warned that they would cut US military aid to the Jewish state if the arms deal went through. Pentagon officials had strongly objected to the sale saying the radar could upset the strategic balance between China and Taiwan and also threaten US forces in some future conflict. India has wanted to buy the Israeli developed Green Pine Radar since 1998. If it goes through, the deal will be worth around Rs 4.5 billion. The US have asked Israel to keep it posted on any arms deals with a clutch of countries which includes India. If American pressure builds on the arms sale with India, Israel may have to buckle as Barak is negotiating with the US for a $17 billion military aid package. Israel must look forward to defence deals with India as it will run into billions of dollars. India wants to acquire Israeli serial surveillance drones to bolster its defences along the Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir. On his visit, Home Minister Advani was basically trying to understand how Israel could help in combating border terrorism. Israel is as much a victim of it as India. But the conditions are different. Advani visited border areas to study Israel's integrated border management, which was geared to give an advance warning of any threat. Said Steinberg: "During the last 20, 30 years, we had to fight terrorism in different ways. We now want to share our experiences as it will help fight terrorism."
The Arabs are Feeling Edgy There has been an alarm in the Arab world after Jaswant Singh and Advani's visit to Israel. The Dawn of Pakistan said the Arabs were figuring out how to safeguard their long-term interests in the region after the thaw in Indo-Israel relations. But no one in the Arab world is talking about how it has conveniently ignored India's interests since Independence. Clearly, the Arabs are not amused. More so, when Jaswant Singh said that domestic politics dictated by a Muslim vote bank had till now prevented India from getting close to Israel. For the last few years, the Indian government has been laying the ground for this to happen. Earlier, Attorney General Soli Sorabjee and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra had visited Israel. Groups of businessmen and industrialists from both countries visited each other. Clearly, academic, cultural and economic ties were being allowed to flower. Joint research projects worth $ 3 million are underway in areas of agricultural biotechnology, electro-optics and information technology. For the first time a Hebraic Studies chair has been established at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. The number of Indians participating in various tailor-made courses in Israel like agricultural development, healthcare administration, hospital management, energy utilisation and conservation is expected to increase as both countries come closer.
Lessons of History India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru eagerly tilted towards the Arabs, supporting the Arab world in its armed struggle. The argument was that India was against colonialism and imperialism. India had commercial interests with the Arab world and with various technological and economic developments; India took a renewed interest in the Arab world. But time and again, India saw this friendship did not pay any dividends. In the 1962 Indo-Chinese war, India realised it got no support from the Arab world. In fact, a 1962 United Nations resolution pertaining to Kashmir saw Arab countries endorsing Pakistan's stance on the disputed area. In 1965, several Arab states endorsed the Pakistani position on the Indo-Pakistani conflict. But India continued to support the Arab cause against Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It was the Jan Sangh, which argued that there was little logic in not having diplomatic relations with Israel just to please Arab nations when we could have relations with hostile nations like China and Pakistan. The logic escaped mandarins at the external affairs ministry. The Arab world continued to ignore India though Congress governments eloquently orchestrated their cause and denounced Israel. They did this even when India was invited and then denied entry into the Rabat Conference in September 1969 to condemn Israel for the destruction of the Al-Aksa mosque in Jerusalem. The Indian delegation led by Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was denied entry as Pakistan did not want Indian participation in the conference. It was a slap on India's face. Similarly, during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, the Arabs kept mum. Ironically, Swaran Singh, the then external affairs minister, chose to apologise for them defending India's relations with the Arab world, Looking back, it is now clear that it was the economic and political clout of over 130 million Arabs that tilted India's relations in their favour. On the other side there were just three million Israelis.
It was Actually Oil The world was stuck by an oil crisis in 1973. India needed oil. It was dependent on the oil producing Arab states. This also compelled India to hold on to its anti-Israeli stance. India, in fact, sought punitive action against Israel in the United Nations occupying Arab territory. When the Janata Party rode to power in 1977 after the Emergency, then Prime Minister Morarji Desai wanted to have diplomatic relations with Israel. As there were no channels to start, Morarji invited then Israeli defence minister Moshe Dayan to India. He came sans fanfare. Both nations agreed to establish diplomatic links. But there was a rider. Morarji did not also want to anger or upset the Arabs and so asked Israel to vacate Arab territory. Israel refused. There was a freeze in relations again. New Delhi continued to lambaste Israel. But when Yosef Hasseen, the Israeli consul in Bombay, told The Sunday Observer in 1982 that India was competing with Pakistan to please the Arabs, he was expelled. Today, the irony stares India in its face. In June 1988, things changed. Rajiv Gandhi set the ball rolling to establish diplomatic relations. The Indian tune slowly changed from belligerence to understanding. India started mellowing down its official statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict, saying that Israelis also had a right to live in peace. Numerous officials and delegations visited India in the eighties and nineties. Ties were established. To cover up, many of them came on tourist visas. By the end of 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organisation had recognised Israel's right to exist. The United States had started talking to the PLO. It was therefore easier for India to make overtures to Israel. India also saw it as an opportunity to get closer to Washington. The Arab stand on the Kashmir issue, which sounds like Pakistan's, was also another nugget that drove India towards Israel. After all, as Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha says, foreign policy must be dictated by national interest. The thaw came in the later part of the nineties.
India Looks Ahead
The hype and interest of Indo-Israeli
relations gave the Indian government a shot in the arm. It was a good
diplomatic coup when depressing issues of autonomy and attacks on the minority
Christian government was gnawing away at Prime Minister Vajpayee's
credibility.
Ramesh Menon and Martin Sherman, Strategic Assessment, Vol. I, No. 4, January 1999
The Rationale For Strategic Diversification
Since the end of the 1967 War, Israel has been almost entirely dependent on the US as its source of strategic support. This is a highly precarious position for any independent nation -- particularly one living in such inhospitable geo-political conditions as Israel does. While the unusually intimate relationship between Washington and Jerusalem has proved highly advantageous in numerous ways, Israeli leaders should not lose sight of one of the most basic tenets of international relations. This is the fact that the international system still functions essentially in an anarchic, self-help fashion, in which states pursue their own egoistic national interests without coordinating them with, or subordinating them to the interests of other states. Accordingly, the durability of alliances should be considered limited, and contingent solely on a mutual perception of concordant national interests. The essence of this anarchy was succinctly articulated by Lord Salisbury's observation that in the international system 'the only bond of union that endures [among nations] is the absence of all clashing interests.’ Should any contradictory interest arise, there is nothing to sustain such a union, and all mutual obligations between the previously united parties will be of little worth. Israel should therefore be mindful not only of the fate of such erstwhile US allies as South Vietnam, who were abandoned when the cost of continued support was perceived to be exorbitant, but also of its own experience with "strategic patrons" in the past. In this regard, France's retraction of support for Israel in the wake of the 1967 war is a particularly pertinent illustration of the transience of inter-state amitié -- however cordial relations may initially be. Likewise, the unpleasant episode of severely strained US-Israeli relations during Washington's "reassessment" of its Middle East policy during the Kissinger era should not be forgotten; this too constitutes a sobering, albeit perhaps less extreme, reminder of the potential fickleness of alliances between sovereign states. There is, of course, much that binds the US and Israel together -- politically, militarily and in terms of shared social values. Nonetheless, both political prudence and past experience suggest that the Israeli leadership should not disregard the prospect that the congruence of US-Israeli interests may not continue indefinitely. A possible divergence of interests may of course arise because of substantive policy disagreements between the two countries on a wide range of issues -- from the proliferation of technology and weapons to relations with the Islamic world. However dissension may also stem from factors largely unconnected to Israeli policy itself. Such factors might include: (a) Changes in the American domestic power structure and in the relative influence of various pro- and anti-Israeli power centers and/or pressure groups; (b) A reordering of national priorities due to new global realities (such as China's growing challenge to US primacy, or a possible rise in the importance of Central Asia as an alternative to the Middle East as a major source of energy); or (c) A possible resurgence of isolationist sentiment and preoccupation with domestic issues, fueled by problems of burgeoning ethnic diversity that challenge the prevailing definition of American national identity.
These and other developments could all lead to a potential re-channeling of US effort and interest in new directions, which marginalizes, or at least significantly diminishes, the importance of the ME on the US strategic agenda. Accordingly, Israel should not discount the possibility that changing domestic and international conditions may induce a re-definition of Washington's allegiances within the region, and the emergence of more sympathetic US stance towards Arab positions. There are, however, more "mundane," but perhaps more immediate, grounds for pursuing the concept of diversification of strategic reliance, arising from a possible need to augment rather than replace US strategic support. Even if the present level of US support continues unabated at its present nominal rate, it may well prove inadequate for Israel's future defense requirements. Such a situation may arise because of (a) Inflationary erosion of the real value of the US aid package; (b) The spiraling costs of new advanced weapons systems, over and above the rate of general inflationary rises; (c) Real increases in defense requirements (both operational and intelligence) to contend with new emerging threats, ranging from non-conventional ballistic missiles to low-intensity warfare and terrorism, which the US may be unwilling or unable to shoulder.
Planning for Strategic Diversification There are thus several substantive reasons why Israel should earnestly consider a scenario in which US strategic support is seriously reduced -- either in absolute terms or relative to new emerging needs -- and set about designing ways to cope with it. Such contingency planning would be appropriate whether the dominant focus is placed on the need to augment or to substitute -- wholly or partially -- the current sources of strategic resources. In exploring alternatives to deal with such an eventuality, it seems almost self-evident that an indispensable precondition is the identification of states likely to be candidates for participation in prospective strategic partnerships with Israel. In its initial stages, this process would involve singling out states that a) Face common or similar threats (either in terms of the nature of the threat or the nature of the adversary); b) Appear to have common (or at least non-conflicting) interests with Israel; c) May benefit from exploiting common opportunities.
Subsequently, possible joint strategies should be mapped out, involving utilization of the respective comparative advantages of the participating parties such as: technological expertise, geo-strategic location, financial ability, competitively priced human resources, and so on. The strategies would be aimed at contending with possible threats and/or realizing opportunities and interests common to both sides. To make these strategies operational, the mapping process would involve several stages, including (i) Defining the diplomatic conditions and initiatives (whether Overt or covert) required making such collaborative strategies politically feasible; (ii) Designating fields of collaboration (such as cooperative logistics and ordnance activities, joint maneuvers, joint manufacture and development of weapon systems) and the financing of all these from sources independent of the US budget; (iii) Specifying the extent, the depth and the objectives of collaboration in the selected areas - both short and long term.
Among the prospective candidate states for such collaborative ventures would be several important non-Islamic countries in Asia. Japan and South Korea, for example, face potential missile threats from North Korea, which also supplies adversaries of Israel, such as Iran and Syria, with ballistic weaponry and know-how. Technological and financial collaboration between the three countries would appear to be no more than a logical imperative dictated by enlightened self-interest. India, too, has to contend with rivals possessing ballistic armaments -- Pakistan and China -- with whom it has been involved in military confrontations along their common borders. There seems, therefore, to be a sound rationale for Indo-Israeli cooperation. Pakistan, sliding into Islamic fundamentalism, has long been antagonistic toward Israel, while China is supplying military hardware and know-how to some of Israel's most implacable foes. In the future, joint Indo-Israeli naval cooperation may well assume vital importance, particularly because modern satellite surveillance techniques, and the dominant Arab presence along most of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean make this an increasingly problematic theater for Israel -- especially in terms of maintaining deterrent retaliatory capabilities outside its ever-shrinking, post-Oslo, territorial confines. It is within the context of these broader parameters that growing Israeli rapprochement with secular Turkey should be construed. The Ankara administration is embroiled in disputes with Syria and Iraq over water, territory and terrorism, and is threatened domestically by the specter of Muslim theocracy. Against this background, the multi-faceted Turco-Israeli collaboration (including weapons upgrading, hardware purchase, joint production and training, and intelligence sharing) should serve as an instructive illustration of how convergent interests can be harnessed in pursuit of mutual strategic advantage -- despite vehement criticism in the Muslim world.
Setting an Agenda: Pitfalls and Payoffs The preceding discussion, although cursory, is sufficient for a preliminary delineation of spheres of activity that prima facie appear most amenable to fertile cooperation. These include the development of means to enhance power projection -- particularly in terms of air and naval forces; ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) including exploration of the boost phase intercept (BPI) technologies; cooperation in contending with nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) threats from non-state actors; and development of effective second-strike capabilities (particularly sea- and submarine-borne) which are essential for any credible no-first-use policy. However, for all the compelling logic in favor of Israel taking vigorous measures to rid itself of its precarious dependency on a single source of strategic support, such a policy is not devoid of possible costs. For while containing several elements of intriguing potential, it is also likely to encounter daunting obstacles, bearing on the feasibility of both the general principle of diversifying Israeli strategic reliance, and that of its implementation in case-specific contexts. Consequently, judicious consideration of the pros and cons is called for. The areas in which such countervailing evaluations may arise are diverse, and in the concise format of this review, an elaborate analysis of so wide and so weighty a topic is clearly infeasible. It is however possible to propose an initial agenda for more detailed and thorough investigation in the future. Among the questions that merit serious discussion on such an agenda are:
(a) The Effects on US-Israel Relations Would broader-based access to strategic resources induce a loss of intimacy with the US, which is still Israel's most important strategic asset? If so, how should these two conflicting prospects be weighed against each other? Alternatively, could greater diversification of strategic reliance serve to reduce tensions between Jerusalem and Washington -- by reducing the perceived burden on the US and making Israel's security less of a perceived liability, thereby actually contributing to improved American-Israeli relations? Would greater degrees of freedom in strategic reliance make Israel more or less susceptible to US (and international) pressure than at present? Would the US feel more or less inclined to withdraw strategic support for Israel, given the possibility that the latter had other sources to draw on?
(b) Israel's International Posture How would closer Israeli military relations with new strategic partners affect the country's standing in international forums such as the UN? Would closer strategic ties with countries like India, Turkey, South Korea and Japan influence their official positions on the Israel-Arab conflict? Would prospective strategic partners expect Israel to project an image of more assertive resolve vis-a-vis the Arabs, which is likely to run counter to the conciliatory policy endorsed by the US? Could perceived Israeli "timidity" be construed as weakness and hence detract from the country's perceived worth as a reliable ally?
(c) Sino-Israeli Relations How is Israel to foster closer Indo-Israel collaboration without damaging Sino-Israeli ties? Is it possible that in the future, Washington might actively encourage closer Indo-Israeli relations to counterbalance an increasingly potent China, which could conceivably challenge the status of the US as the leading world power? Should Israel allow itself to be drawn along this path?
(d) Implications for Possible Contravention/Circumvention of the ABM and Other Arms Limitation Treaties Would a strategic consortium of non-signatories to the ABM treaty open up opportunities for circumventing the prohibitions on development in fields such as BMD systems, BPI and space laser technologies, and satellite-interceptor communications? Would such a move be viewed with favor or disfavor by various US power centers? Could fruits of BMD developments, made autonomously by non-signatories to the ABM Treaty, be used by the US without it being considered a breach of the treaty? If so, what would be the ramifications for countries such as China and the CIS? Would even the unsolicited acquisition of BMD know-how, willingly made available to the US by a non-signatory third party, violate its ABM Treaty undertaking "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems…? " These are all topics that significantly affect not only Israel and the future conduct of its affairs in the field of national security and foreign policy, but also the future of many important issues in the international system as a whole. Thus, the concept of strategic diversification has ramifications that are liable to be far-reaching and complex both on the national and international levels. Accordingly, careful and judicious deliberation is called for in assessing the wisdom and/or necessity of such diversification. Serious debate on the implications of its implementation, together with an evaluation of possible payoffs and potential pitfalls should commence without delay.
Jaffee Center For Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, retrieved on 11 May, 2003, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v1n4p4_n.html>
Strong Economic Synergy Between Israel And India: Exim Bank Study
Exim Bank's latest Occasional Paper on "Israel and India: A Study of Trade and Investment Potential" was released at the hands of Mr. Dov Segev - Steinberg, Consul General of Israel, in Mumbai on June 28, 2000. Releasing the Study, Mr. Steinberg highlighted tremendous potential for further consolidation of the strong commercial relations between Israel and India. The Study traces Israel's evolution from a predominantly agrarian to a globally recognised high tech economy. Sustained investment in research and development has enabled the export-driven high tech sectors to create and maintain a competitive edge. Israel has also emerged as a world leader in the entire range of agro-technological accessories - from irrigation equipment to genetically improved seeds. Trade between India and Israel has witnessed significant growth since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. Trade turnover between the two countries has almost touched the US $ 1 billion level in 1999-2000 - a five fold increase over 1992-93. While rough diamonds and gems and jewellery still dominate Indo-Israel trade (70%), there has been an increase in trade in other items in the recent years. These include exports to India of electronic machinery and high tech products such as telecommunication and medical equipment, digital printing technology. Among the items of exports from India to Israel, the share of drugs, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, cotton yarn, fabrics & made ups is increasing. Israeli companies are increasingly eyeing Indian market as a base for expanding their business. Since 1991, 151 proposals of Israeli companies for such collaborations have been approved, and currently many Israeli companies are operating in India in diverse field of electrical equipment, telecommunications, floriculture, computer software, agro industry and chemicals. Israel and India can take advantage of complementarity and synergy to enhance bilateral economic co-operation. In the area of information technology, the two countries could combine their relative strengths to enhance their presence in third country markets. Joint ventures in software could be mutually beneficial to both countries - especially since India possesses a large pool of trained software professionals and Israel enjoys a proven track record in project execution ability in high technology areas. Potential for increased co-operation also exists in areas such as electronics, agriculture, water management, dairy development, biotechnology and medical technology.
<http://www.eximbankindia.com/pressy2k0628-1.html>
United States Cautioned On Indo-Israel Deal
Ms Lodhi said that simplistic formulae of building India as a counterweight were being propagated through media and, in popular circles, through a well-organized and well-financed machinery. Pakistan, she said, was fully conscious of the need to avoid a war with India, particularly after the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two South Asian neighbours. "Pakistan has displayed self-restraint. We expect India to reciprocate such restraint. Yet, it must be realized that violence in Kashmir will end only once India agrees to desist from its brutal repression of the Kashmiri people." Once Indian repression is halted, the stage would be set to work out ways and means to promote a lasting solution to the Kashmir question, she said. Negotiations could be undertaken to evolve agreement on the modalities to elicit the freely expressed wishes of the Kashmiris. Hypocritical and conditional offers of talks with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference leadership would not bring about a solution, she said, adding that what was required was a genuine commitment in New Delhi to allow the Kashmiris to determine their own destiny as stipulated by the resolutions of the UN Security Council. As yet, she stated, there was no hope of evoking such an Indian commitment. The international community, including the US, must press India to accept a democratic solution to the Kashmir dispute. Referring to relations between the US and Pakistan, she said: "We need to evolve common approaches to the broad goals that the two countries share.
Masood Haider, Dawn, 21 July 2000, <http://www.dawn.com/2000/07/21/top4.htm>
India-Israel Developing Strategic Partnership
The first serious hint about this surfaced ironically in an Israeli newspaper and on the very day external affairs minister Jaswant Singh was to start his serial dialogue with Israel’s top leaders. The widely read and respected newspaper Ha‘artez, which means ‘the country’, carried a report in its Hebrew edition that the US had demanded that Israel withhold the sale of the Green Pine Radar System, part of the Electronic Support Measures (ESM) designed by Elta of Israel, to India. The Green Pine System is funded by the Americans and it was developed by Elta for the narrow anti-missile system following the failure of the US Patriot missiles to deter Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf War. It was not just a failure of the anti-missile missile but in Israeli perception, also a failure of America’s extended deterrence. In its airborne role, Green Pine is fitted on the Russian Ilyushin-76 aircraft and acts as an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) with a surveillance sweep of 400 km. This would enable China to pick up US Naval and Air Force aircraft and imperil Taiwan in case of a war. This is the first time in the history of US- Israeli military relations that Jewish senators have sought to block the sale of Israeli weaponry to a third country and also the first time the US has expressed its anguish over a defence deal by canceling the annual joint exercise between the air forces of the two countries. The induction of Green Pine in a nuclearised South Asia is seen as further destabilisation of the India-Pakistan stand-off. Israeli foreign minister David Levy, without referring to Green Pine, said the Israelis were under no pressure from the US on sale of military hardware to India as both India and Israel are strong democracies. For technology-strapped India, the Green Pine system is crucial to its integrated missile development programme. This is certainly not the last word on the issue as by the time Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had reached Camp David for last week’s crucial summit, Israel had bowed to US demands to cancel the phalcon deal with China so as not to harm its strategic relations with Washington. Israel owes its creation, survival and annual $2.8 billion aid package to the US. The US will compensate Israel for the cost of the AWACs, estimated at $250 million each. China has come out very strongly against the US for scuttling its bilateral deal with Israel and is bound to retaliate in kind. Russia has stepped in with alacrity and offered China an AWACs based on the A-50 system. This is the same early warning system that was flown to Chandigarh in April for joint exercises between the Russian and Indian air forces. The Israeli defence industry’s loss will be Russia’s gain. The cooperation between India and Israel has transcended the limited space of terrorism and low-intensity conflict. India has ordered, and received in part, a wide range of equipment to fight insurgency and terrorism. It now seems that India may have provided strategic space to territorially constricted Israel to carry out official tests on operational equipment for which Israel does not have the reach and space. This is analogous to Turkey allowing the Israeli air force to use its air space for training. According to the Sunday Times, quoted by Ha‘artez, an Israeli navy Dolphin-type submarine tested an anti-missile missile by firing it at an Israeli-made cruise missile off India’s eastern shores, presumably near Balasore. Israel is known to harbour in the port city of Haifa at least three German Dolphin submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The report that the Israeli navy was testing sea-based anti-missiles at an Indian missile test facility at a time when the Indian Navy is negotiating the purchase of the sea-skimming Barak missile from Israel is more than a coincidence. The reported presence in Indian waters of Israeli submarines, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, will refuel speculation on cooperation between the two countries in critical nuclear technology. Green Pine is kidstuff in comparison. But more serious is the Arab League’s most recent accusation of an Indo-Israeli nuclear tie-up that was sourced to home minister Lal Krishna Advani during his recent visit to Israel where he also spoke about joint action against Islamic terrorism. This is bound to put backs up in the Arab world, though it is still premature even for any speculation that India might provide sea space for conduct of missile tests by Israel. A senior official in the external affiars ministry has ruled out the possibility of such tests.
Ashok K Mehta, Discover India, The Observer, 25 July,2000, http://meadev.nic.in/OPn/2000july/25obs.htm
India Cosying Up To Israel
In this context Israel's expertise in countering Arab extremism was found to be highly relevant to India's problems. India finds it diplomatically rewarding to focus on terrorism, notably of the cross-border variety from Pakistan that is alleged to back the "separatists" and "religious extremists" in Kashmir. There have also been other visits by India's defence and nuclear experts, with indications that India is going in a big way for nuclear collaboration with Israel. This led the Arab League headquarters in Cairo to express its concerns publicly. The Indian ambassador there, S.S. Mookerji, was called in on July 13, and a protest was lodged over the reports of Indo-Israel nuclear cooperation emerging from the visits of Indian ministers. Even Indian journalists have taken note of the shift towards Israel following the announcement that the visit of L.K. Advani from June 14 to 16 would be followed by the visit of West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu later in the month, with Mr Jaswant Singh set to become the first ever Indian foreign minister to visit Israel - from June 30 to July 3. Writing in "Asian Age," New Delhi, on June 16, prominent Indian columnist, Seema Mustafa, stated that "the Vajpayee government has shifted its foreign policy focus from the Arab nations to Israel.” “High-level visits leading to defence cooperation at all levels, and intelligence sharing marks the new friendship between India and Israel." She noted that by contrast, India sent only a cabinet minister to attend the funeral of President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, a country with which India had developed close relations. This had "raised eyebrows in diplomatic circles here as India was expected to be represented by the prime minister, or at least by the vice-president." Though India had recognized Israel in 1950, the relationship had been low-key owing to India's awareness of the sensitivity of Arab and Muslim states to any cordiality towards the Jewish state. Even the tempo of routine contracts was reduced as a result of the worsening of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the conflicts of 1967 and 1973. However, in the new situation after the end of the cold war, when New Delhi set out to cultivate the US following the collapse of the Soviet Union, formal diplomatic relations were established with Israel in 1992. Trade, as well as economic and technical cooperation grew, and the outbreak of a popular uprising in Kashmir led India to seek the assistance of Israel on account of the latter's experience in dealing with the Palestinian "intifada." From 1993 onwards, this "counter-terrorist" collaboration became quite open, and some Israeli experts, who were in Srinagar in the guise of tourists, came under the attack of Kashmir Mujahideen. So long as the Congress ran India, the area of Indo-Israel cooperation remained limited to commercial and cultural exchanges despite growing interest at the professional level in India in Israeli military hardware and technology, as the traditional source of supplies from the former Soviet Union was drying up. With growing Indian interest in a long-term strategic partnership with the US after the end of the cold war, it appeared logical to normalize relations with Washington's strategic partner, namely Israel. However, while the Narasimha Rao government did establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, it remained sensitive to the Arab reaction to any major expansion of cooperation with the Jewish state. The factor of India's large Muslim population, and of the importance of relations with the Muslim world also acted as a brake on increased interaction with Israel. Once its embassy was established in New Delhi, Israel began to cultivate Indian politicians of all hues in order to give greater content to its relations with India. However, in the words of the Telegraph, Calcutta, the various parties rebuffed these overtures, except the BJP which shared Israel's anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim perceptions. Mr L.K. Advani, who was then the president of the BJP, visited Israel in 1995. Other BJP leaders followed him. As the Telegraph stated in its analysis of the evolving Indo-Israel relations in its issue of June 25: "Both BJP and Israel believe the two countries, surrounded as they are by hostile Muslim neighbours, should stick together to fight Islamic fundamentalism. With the BJP in power in Delhi, the relationship has taken wings." Israel has accorded a high priority to relations with India, and developed cooperation in sensitive areas of military technology, even at the risk of displeasing Washington. Israeli President Ezer Weizman visited India towards the end of 1996 and since the establishment of diplomatic relations; the two countries have entered into numerous agreements for collaboration in agriculture, science and technology, and culture. Trade has expanded rapidly, reaching the level of $600 million in 1998-99 and is expected to rise to $ 1 billion in the current year. Joint commissions have been set up in the areas of economic relations and science and technology. Annual consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries have been instituted. While the focus of strategic cooperation between the two countries is in the area of countering terrorism, this in itself involves expanded cooperation in the entire sphere of defence and military technology. High-level visits by both civilian and military officials concerned with military equipment and with transfer of sensitive technologies have served to highlight the expanding scope of cooperation which is being watched with unease by the Arab countries, and must be followed carefully by Pakistan. Since the rise of the BJP to power, Israel's role in upgrading India's military capabilities has expanded progressively. Lucrative contracts have been signed with the Indian army, navy and air force. Israel is involved in arrangements to upgrade India's MiG-21 and Jaguar aircraft. It is providing the electronic gear in the aircraft carrier INS Virat. It is also upgrading the army's 130 mm artillery guns to 155 mm., and has sold 40,000 155mm shells and sophisticated radar to the army. Foreign observers believe that the scope of nuclear cooperation between India and Israel is much greater than what is admitted by either of them. According to some reports at that time, Israeli cooperation was involved in India's nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11, 1998, and it was even alleged that the two smaller devices tested on May 13, were for Israel. The Israeli government formally denied this shortly after the tests. However, according to the prestigious Journal of Electronic Defence, India has ordered $200 millions worth of military equipment from Israel following the visit of National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra late last year. The list includes Seacher unmanned aircraft, advanced radar of the type developed for Israel's anti-ballistic-missile programme, and electronic suites to upgrade India's military aircraft and helicopters. Of these, the anti-ballistic-missile equipment is of direct relevance to strategic balance in South Asia, and India is also seeking Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) equipment from Russia. According to Seema Mustafa's write-up in the Asian Age, New Delhi, Israel has been given a contract to fence off sensitive areas in Jammu and Kashmir, and "is probably the only foreign country which was able to clear a presentation by its men inside the 15 Corps headquarters in Srinagar." The fencing gives Israel access to sensitive installations in Kashmir. Israel has been keen to develop closer cooperation with India in its counter-terrorist campaign. Now with the BJP not only in power, but also sharing Israel's concern over "hostile neighbours", the Indo-Israeli relationship is being developed in a manner that suggests that New Delhi has shed all fears of offending Arab and Muslim countries. Some Indian analysts suggest that the BJP government has taken note of the continuing support of the OIC to Pakistan over Kashmir despite India's efforts to placate Arab and Muslim countries, the disappearance of restraint in developing a strategic relationship with Israel is the result. Others see the paradigm shift by India towards Israel as a logical consequence of the New Delhi-Washington partnership evolved following the Clinton visit to South Asia. However, such a strategic alliance which links the US and Israel to India would be seen as directed against the Muslim world, or China, or both. As Dr Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's ambassador to the US has pointed out, such a strategic alliance would be a strategic liability rather than an asset, as it could provoke needless hostility towards the US and its global interests. Pakistan was aware of the need to exercise restraint in the region, especially after the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two South Asian neighbours. But violence in Kashmir will end only when India desists from brutal repression, and instead takes serious steps to resolve the issue peacefully. The stress being laid by India on "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir as the source of tensions and conflict also ignores the underlying cause of instability in the region that arises directly out of India's repudiation of its commitments to the Kashmiri people to allow them to exercise their right of self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the UN. As the publicity given to the virtual abandonment of all constraints on Indo-Israeli strategic and technological cooperation has mounted, Indian foreign policy experts such as former Foreign Secretary Dixit have defended this policy. They point out that India has neither changed its stand on Palestinian rights nor given up its policy of pursuing friendly relations with Arab and Muslim countries. However, the shift towards reliance on Israel's anti-terrorist expertise as well as on its sophisticated military technology does reflect a significant change, notably as the injustices committed by Israel against the Palestinians and its anti-Muslim stance cannot be forgotten, even if the Middle East peace process were to be brought to a conclusion. The growing Indo-Israeli nexus needs to be carefully followed and its effect on the behaviour of both India and Israel watched with close interest.
Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, 31 July 2000, <http://www.dawn.com/2000/07/31/op.htm>
Special Report, Indo-Israeli Conspiracy Against Muslim World; Israel's Mossad To Set Up Spy Cells In Indian Embassies
Top secret details of the Pakistan-baiting Indian Home Minister, L.K. Advani’s Israel-Yatra in June 2000, show that the deals he has struck with the anti-Pakistan Jewish rulers of Israel would make India and Israel partners in threatening the Muslim world with diabolic conspiracies to fragment and cripple it as a political force in the world arena. The details of his meetings with Israel’s rulers, particularly the heads of the Israeli Home Ministry and its intelligence agencies, the notorious Mossad and the Sabak, reveal that the arrangements he has made for joint Indo-Israel espionage operations in key areas of the Muslim world would make the Indian embassies in these Muslim countries the eyes and ears of the world-wide cloak-and-dagger Israeli spy network to which the American intelligence agency, the CIA, has access under half-a-century old liaison. Under the deceptive euphemism of “counter-terrorism” to dupe the international community, India is allowing Israel to establish a huge spy establishment in India which will, inter alia, unearth and monitor “Islamic fundamentalist” individuals and groups for elimination by extra-judicial process or by cold-blooded murder and kidnapping. The most important meeting Indian Home Minister Advani had during his 3-day Israeli tour on June 13-16 was with the top brass of Israel’s intelligence agencies in Tel Aviv, which lasted many hours. Heading the Israeli team was the powerful chief of Israeli police, Yehuda Wilk with the heads of the Israeli intelligence agencies, the Mossad and the Sabak, and the military officials dealing with Israel’s punitive and espionage operations against the Arabs in Israel, Palestine and the neighbouring states such as Lebanon and Syria. Senior officials from the Israeli Foreign Office and the Defence and Home ministries attended this meeting. Israeli experts in bomb detection were also present. Indian Home Minister Advani had a large team with him in which India’s highest-level spymasters were included such as the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Mr. Shayamal Dutta, the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation, Mr. R.K. Raghvan, the head of the Indian Border Security Force, Mr. E.M. Ram Mohan, Indian Home Ministry’s powerful Secretary, K. Pande who oversees the work of the infamous Indian spy agency, RAW, and liaises with the Indian Foreign Office in respect of undercover RAW agents working in Indian embassies abroad, and a senior officer of India’s military intelligence agency (equivalent of the Pakistani ISI). In this top-level meeting in Tel Aviv on June 14, Advani reportedly thanked the Israeli government for its immense help to India in security matters and spoke of the dangers India and Israel face from their common enemies i.e. Muslim neighbours. Advani railed against Pakistan, calling it the base of Muslim fundamentalists who want to destroy India and Israel.
Advani, it is
reported, highly praised the help of Israeli Mossad and army commando
personnel to the Indian Army in the war on “Muslim militants” in Kashmir and
against “Muslim terrorists” such as the “Memon brothers” of Bombay in Dubai.
Advani said he had Mr. Advani explained at length India’s security problems in which the danger from Pakistan and Indian Muslims getting Arab money loomed large. Advani gave a big list of the special services in spying and the anti-insurgency devices and spy equipment India needs from Israel urgently to combat “Muslim terrorism” which will in a way help Israel also. Muslim-baiting L.K. Advani, who migrated from Hyderabad Sindh in Pakistan to India in the 1947 partition, has been a vicious opponent of Pakistan since then, advocating Akhand Bharat by incorporating in the Indian Union by force the Muslim states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. When the BJP came to power in India three years ago, he forced Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to give him the Home and Kashmir Affairs portfolios. He has used ruthless and barbaric methods to suppress the Kashmiri freedom movement. He got Israeli advisers for planning counter-insurgency operations in India-held Jammu and Kashmir. Under him India’s intelligence agencies developed on-going cooperative relations with the Israeli intelligence agencies. For Advani in his grandiose designs of making India a super-power, the cooperation of Israel, having barely three million Jews, seems far more important than the friendship of 1.4 billion Muslims world-wide. Although the oil-rich Arab states are by far the biggest buyers of Indian goods and services, Advani gives them a zero and untouchable status because they are Muslims and considers the tiny Jewish State, having a third of Mumbai’s population, as the biggest asset for India because it also hates Muslims and wants to subdue the Muslim world. Advani thinks he can enlist the support of the US Jewish lobby through Israel. In the June 14 Tel Aviv meeting, the Israeli Police chief Yehuda Wilk, profusely praised India for its friendship with Israel and pledged help to the Indian Government in combating “Muslim terrorism” that poses new threats to Israel and India. The heads of India’s intelligence agencies then briefed the Israeli side in the meeting on the ground situation in India in respect of “Muslim terrorists”, especially in Jammu and Kashmir, and the new dangers looming up for India and Israel because of the Pakistani atom bomb and the fear that Pakistan may give its nuclear weapons to the anti-Israel Arabs. Indian officials stressed in their briefings that this was the first time that Advani as an Indian Cabinet Minister had undertaken a foreign tour and the fact that he had come to Israel first during his 3-nation tour demonstrated his great friendship and respect for Israel. The Indian side showed a keen interest in learning from the Israeli security experts how they had run the slice of Lebanon, which Israel ruled for 18 years and gave up recently. Many questions about how Israel dealt with the Hizbullah militants in Southern Lebanon and how it operated a Christian Lebanese militia (SLA) to subdue the anti-Israel Lebanese Arabs there were discussed, some in the context of the Indian Army’s operations against the Kashmiri freedom fighters in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. Some information about the Israeli torture and investigation methods was gathered by the Indian side from the Israelis in regard to dealing with Arab dissidents within Israel and in the Palestinian Authority region.
The Indian side
gave the Israelis a large shopping list of spying, torture and surveillance
equipment such as electronic fencing of sensitive sites, laser systems,
short-range rockets, eagle-eyed long distance snipers, observation blimps,
giant shields, night vision devices, unmanned aircraft of the MALAT wing of
the Israeli Aircraft Industries Limited, special protective dress and gear for
security personnel, cross border snooping devices and gadgets, training and
deployment of spies and the special gear for them, use of computers and
internet for espionage and disinformation, code-breaking, tailing of enemy
agents and their elimination, nuclear espionage, purloining state secrets of
hostile countries and pooling them for the good of India and Israel and their
mutual friends. The Israeli side said the Indian requests would be considered
by the Israel Government for necessary action. Pakistan’s nuclear capability also figured in Advani’s parleys with the Israeli Home Minister and his espionage chiefs. There has been covert cooperation between India and Israel in the nuclear field for the past many years. In July 1979, Israel had secretly presented to the Carter Administration a sinister plan for destroying the Pakistani nuclear research centre at Kahuta near Islamabad by either internal sabotage or by sending unidentifiable planes through India to bomb it. But the US Government refused to go along with the Bosses about the pro-Israel decision of the Indian Government under Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. The high-powered team Home Minister Advani took with him to Israel had no Muslim members; Advani does not trust Muslims and no Muslim holds any important position in his Ministry. Neither the CBI nor the RAW gives any responsible post to Muslims; they are recruited only on low-grade posts for spying on Muslim diplomatic missions in New Delhi. During his 3-day visit to Israel, Indian Home Minister Advani briefed the Israeli officials on why India wants the USA to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. He wanted the Israeli lobby in the USA to join hands with the Indian lobby in this wicked enterprise. Guiding the India lobby in the USA now is the lucratively-paid ex-Congressman Stephen Solarz, a Jew who loves India and has been serving its interests for the past two decades. He also loves Israel and works hands in glove with the Israeli lobby in the USA, especially the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In June 1988, during a visit to the UN in New York for the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament. I saw him lead a delegation of the Jewish leaders of the USA to see the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The Jews’ memorandum handed over to Rajiv Gandhi called for India’s recognition of Israel and the establishment of Indo-Israel diplomatic ties. Solarz is with the Democratic Party in the USA and has promised to raise large funds from the affluent Indian community in the USA for the Democratic nominee Al-Gore’s Presidential campaign in November this year. Besides US pressure, another reason for Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s recognition of Israel was the collapse of the USSR and the stoppage of Soviet arms supply to India. At that time India voted with the USA for rescinding a UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism. The Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi since 1992 is a former Israeli intelligence officer, Yehodya Haim, who knows Arabic and has read much about Islam. He occasionally visits Muslim institutions and mosques. He masterminded Advani’s visit to Israel and at the end of June India’s wily Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Tel Aviv to firm up the Indo-Israel cooperation arrangements worked out by Home Minister Advani with the Israeli rulers. As a lollipop to Yasser Arafat, Jaswant Singh paid a short visit to Gaza also. India’s weekly Asian Age, in its issue of June 16, wrote that the Vajpayee Government has shifted its focus from the Arab nations to Israel. Instead of sending Prime Minister Vajpayee to Syrian President Hafiz al Asad’s funeral in June, India was represented by a junior cabinet minister, Murli Manohar Joshi. The Asian Age commented that Israel had signed lucrative agreements with the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force; Israel is upgrading India’s MIG-21 aircraft and the ageing Jaguars. It is modernising the electronic system of the Indian aircraft carrier INS Virat. Israel is upgrading the Indian Army’s 130mm artillery guns to 155mm. It has sold 40,000 rounds of 155mm shells to the Indian Army together with radar systems. Israel has been given the contract by the Indian Government for the fencing of sensitive areas in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, using electronic devices. Israel military experts in fencing gave a presentation on the fencing project inside the 15 Corps headquarters of the Indian Army in Srinagar recently. They surveyed the Line of Control (LoC) and photographed the Pakistan side also. An Israeli military cell is being set up in the 15 Corps headquarters in Srinagar for the fencing job. In 1993, when Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Perez visited India, he specially had a long meeting with L.K. Advani who was not a Minister at that time. Perez suggested that India should colonise Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir with Hindus and clip the Muslim majority ratio. Commenting on the respect and power Israel now commands in the Indian Government, the Asian Age of June 16 noted that the doors of the Indian Foreign Office have been thrown open to Israeli diplomats and military personnel who visit it regularly. The Asian Age wrote: “Delhi, which had tread delicately earlier for fear of offending the Arab nations who control a large percentage of the nation’s (i.e. India’s) oil supply, has shed all such reservations now to openly embrace and make common cause with Israel”. It is now obvious that BJP-ruled India has made Israel its ally in its combat with the Muslim world, especially Pakistan, and in seeking global hegemony for its Hindutva doctrine. Three million Israeli Jews are now far more important to India’s Hindu rulers than 1.4 billion Muslims and 54 Muslim-majority states in the world. This is the signal stemming from Indian Home Minister Advani’s visit to the country he seems to adore - Israel. (Mr. Qutubuddin Aziz is a former Pakistani diplomat and veteran journalist who write on international affairs. He has just returned after a 7-week visit to the USA).
Qutubuddin Aziz, August 2000, <http://www.motamaralalamalislami.org/muslimworld/aug2000/aug2000.html http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug-700.html>
Economic / Commercial Affairs, Economic Relations at a Glance (Extracts)
I. Background: Indo-Israeli Political Relations In pursuing normalization, Prime Minister Rao (1991-96), rectified an anomalous situation, which was in existence for over four decades.…
Indo-Israel Bilateral Relations, Bilateral Trade, India-Israel Trade $ million US
India and Israel have established a legal framework for trade and economic cooperation, and a series of agreements have been signed. Notable amongst them are the 'accordance of MFN Status ', avoidance of double taxation, bilateral investment protection, customs cooperation; joint industrial R&D, and the setting up of agricultural demonstration farms. The Indo-lsrael Joint Trade and Economic Committee oversee the development of trade relations. In its second meeting held in October 1998, the Committee decided to set up a special committee to examine the specific trade-related impediments which both countries face, and it is expected that this committee will give a new thrust to ongoing business activities in both countries. Another important decision taken by the Committee is to fund jointly feasibility studies in India for sectors such as agricultural projects, dairy farming, water treatment, alternative energy resources and floriculture. Upon the completion of such studies, the projects will be placed for financing and implementation through the national and international agencies. The next meeting of the Committee is planned to be held in Jerusalem at the end of this year. In May 2000, the ITPO held the first ever '"India Week" in Tel Aviv, to showcase the industrial strengths and business opportunities to the Israeli market. This ever also demonstrated India's rich culture & heritage to the Israeli public. Over 100 leading Indian companies participated in it and it was estimated that there were 25,000 visitors and business was struck at the order of $11 million. There are some 150 joint ventures between Indian and Israeli companies. Most of them are in the sphere of agriculture. Israel's famous drip irrigation systems are jointly manufactured in 3 different locations in India. These ventures enjoy participation by Israel's leading agricultural companies. Agriculture is still-the field for which Israel is best known in India, as can be witnessed in the massive Indian participation in Agritech, Israel's triennial agricultural exposition (held last in 1996 and 1999. However, cooperation also exists in other sectors, such as telecommunications, including joint manufacturing of high speed modems, voice-mail systems and fiber optic production, and software, where a couple of companies have set up their offices as well as R&D centers in India….
A. Light Combat Aircraft Developing a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) remains the most ambitious military program currently undertaken by the DRDO [Defense Research and Development Organization]. The need for a new range of fighter aircraft cannot be overstated. As a middle-sized air power with significant expertise in the license production of Russian-made MiGs, the desire to keep its defense requirements free from external pressures encouraged India to pursue the LCA option, which, with a sufficient domestic market, need not depend on exports to economize the cost of production. For instance, India currently has over 300 MiG-21s (including the 125 slated for upgrading), which would have to be replaced within a decade. In the post-Cold War era, the cost of replacing aging fleets with unsubsidized imports has become astronomical and prohibitive. With the declared intention of replacing the license-built Ajeet (British Gnat Mark I) and MiG-21 fighters by 1991, the DRDO launched the LCA program in 1983. The launching coincided with India's policy to look for non-Soviet options for its military needs and to gradually reduce its dependence upon Moscow for military supplies. Though not as acute as Israel's situation, India's dependence on a single supplier has been enormous and in certain key areas almost total. The LCA has been projected as the most cost-effective and relatively inexpensive alternative for the air force as well as "the front-line air superiority fighter aircraft, with secondary close air-support capabilities, of the Indian Air Force in the early part of the next century (years 2005-2020)." The first technology demonstrator was completed on 17 November 1995 and the first flight test has been re-scheduled for late 1998, as steps have been taken "to accelerate the pace of development, fabrication, flight testing and flight clearance leading to induction of LCA into the Indian Air Force by the year 2003." Like many other projects, the LCA program was constrained, from the start, by technological and financial limitations. Having opted for technological independence, the DRDO found itself dependent on foreign technology for the LCA, and according to some estimates, as much as 70 percent of the LCA components are imported. Delays in the production schedule not only escalate the cost, but add to the technological obsolescence of the finished product. Even if the presented timetable of 2005 is maintained, there would still be a time gap of 23 years since the conception of the project. Further, the preference of the air force for a modern aircraft over a local product modeled on earlier versions at times contributed to the slow progress. India's decision to purchase multi-role combat aircraft from Russia, in the wake of the Hank Brown amendment that enabled Pakistan acquire advanced weapons and platforms from the US, has put further pressures on the resources available for the LCA…. Israeli experience would be particularly useful in areas such as avionics, airframes and the incorporation of engine and weapons into the airframe. While a number of key Lavi technologies were obtained from Washington and hence are subjected to American laws and restrictions, a substantial portion of technologies developed during the Lavi phase are owned by Israel and can be easily exported to, or shared with India. In the past Israel reportedly offered and supplied Lavi-associated technologies to countries such as China, Taiwan and South Korea and there is no reason why India could not benefit in like manner from Israeli expertise and exports. The question of technology 'ownership' has often been a bone of contention in US-Israeli relations, often leading to accusations of un-authorized Israeli transfer of American technology to countries such as China. For a variety of political reasons, such an approach by the US, vis-a-vis Israeli dealings with India, need not be taken, thus enabling close cooperation between the two defense establishments, which would both significantly reduce duplication on the part of India, and atrophy on the part of the Israeli military establishment.
B. Aircraft Upgrading As India would still have to wait for nearly a decade before acquiring the first batch of LCAs, the concern of the air force to upgrade its existing aging fleet would still be an issue. Acquiring new aircraft would not only be costlier, but may even be financially prohibitive, since such a move would further reduce the budget for the LCA. For instance, in early 1993 the Defense Ministry argued that until the LCA could enter into service, and with the view to optimally utilize the available fleet of MiG-21 BIS aircraft "it has been decided to upgrade the aircraft by integration of avionics and weapon systems compatible with comparable state-of-the-art systems fitted on other aircraft of [that] class." As [a] result, India signed a $400 million contract with Moscow for upgrading 125 MiG-21s and prolonging their life span by 15 years….
C. Missiles and Satellites Launched in 1983, the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program is another equally ambitious yet relatively successful defense program undertaken by the Indian defense establishment in recent years. This project was different to anything undertaken by India in the past, signalling a dramatic change in the way missile research was done in India for it was "a well-funded, broad-based effort, involving not only the defense laboratories but also technical institutions, universities, Defense Ministry ordnance factories, and public and private sector firms." Raju Thomas (a strong critic of the LCA) went a step further and stated that almost every need of the missile program was supplied domestically, including computers, computer software, special alloy aluminum, precision gyro-scopes, rocket propellants and radar. As the first Indian attempt to simultaneously develop several missile systems, the program involved design, development and production of five missile systems: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Agni, battlefield support surface-to-surface missile Prithvi, short range surface-to-air missile Trishul, medium range surface-to-air missile Akash and the anti-tank missile Nag. While all other missiles had either completed their user trials or had entered the production stage, Nag "appears to have slipped" and was expected to begin user trials in mid-1998. The progress of the guided-missile program and the close coordination between Agni and Prithvi, the two most prominent missile systems, is remarkable. The first stage of Agni is based on India's success in satellite launching and the second is "a shortened Prithvi stage, modified for high-altitude operations." Since its inaugural launch in May 1989, Agni has completed three successful test flights. However, following pressures from the US, the Indian government described Agni as a "technology demonstrator," and appeared to have quietly capped the program. No Agni tests were conducted since February 1994, and even the change of government in New Delhi following the 1996 election has not altered this position. Adopting a missile-in-the-basement posture, Abdul Kalam declared in April 1994 that if and when a political decision is taken, Agni could be made operational within two years. Referring to external pressures he declared that India's defense preparedness was based on perceptions of threat to the nation's security. "We cannot go by the suggestions of other countries on such matters. Can I ask one country to destroy all its nuclear weapons? It is like King Lear asking the waves to stop rolling." Technology embargoes and sanctions such as MTCR have slowed down the missile program, and pressures reached a crescendo prior to the indefinite extension of the NPT, which India refused to sign. After a two-year ban on Indian Space Research Organization following the cryogenic engine controversy, the US imposed new restrictions in May 1997 on all "dual-use technology components" on the state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd., due to its suspected involvement in India's missile programs. External pressures, in the long run, intensified the process and compelled India to be selective in its approach. The US refusal in the early 1980s to supply supercomputers to India, due to proliferation concerns, has only led to the indigenous development of Anurag. It is recognized that India's "missile-related infrastructure has been developed to the point that it is no longer feasible for outside interests to bring the program to a halt." Likewise, it has been concluded that, while it is possible to question the comparative international quality of the Indian missile program, "the acquisition and absorption of technological expertise...has been more successful than in other areas of military technology procurement." Israel's need to develop ballistic missiles and its need to export this technology was the result of the threat to national survival posed by the Arab and Islamic states, who were armed with massive quantities of both conventional and unconventional weapons by other states. Without the need for the Jericho, for example, there would also be no exports. Thus Israel has an impressive arsenal of indigenous missiles including the ship-to-ship missile Gabriel, air-to-air missile Python, air-to-surface missile Popeye, surface-to-surface missile Jericho I and IRBM Jericho II. They were developed and some even deployed prior to India's guided missile development program in the early 1980s, and hence are more advanced and battle-tested. In May 1997, Israel and Turkey agreed to a deal worth $100 million to jointly produce Popeye II missiles while Gabriel missiles were exported to countries such as South Africa and Taiwan. For quite sometime it was suggested by the Israeli media that certain foreign countries had expressed an interest in 'purchasing' Arrow missile technologies, with countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea and even the UK mentioned as potential clients. As a project substantially funded by the US (partly as a compensation for the reluctant Israeli cancellation of the Lavi), such a move would not be easy and in May 1996, Uzi Rubin, Head of the Arrow Project in the Ministry of Defense, disclosed that Israel and the US had signed an agreement arranging a "division of rights" on the Arrow project. This move was aimed at avoiding erstwhile controversies regarding alleged Israeli illegal and unauthorized sales or transfer of American technology to third parties such as China. In February 1997, the Indian media suggested that India was negotiating with Israel to purchase components and technology of the Arrow. The issue was believed to have been discussed during the visit of a senior Ministry of Defense official earlier that month. The DRDO began working on the pilotless target vehicle Lakshya. Following launch trials in 1983, it is currently being produced in a limited series. Another aeronautical venture, the Nishant RPV made its first flight test in 1995 and was scheduled to be inducted into the army by late 1996/97. However, production delays and technical snags led the army to look to Israeli-built Searchers to compensate for the delays. It is essential to remember that while Israel has been using and exporting UAVs/RPVs since the Lebanese invasion of 1982, India is a late entrant in the field. Both countries however would have to find ways of overcoming the impediments over Israel's membership in the MTCR. While Agni and Jericho II come under the limits set by the missile cartel, other missiles including Prithvi and RPVs are beyond the preview of its limitations. If Israel has more experience and expertise in missiles and RPVs, India enjoys lead-time in space technology. Established in the early 1950s, the Indian Space Research Organization has been primarily concerned with the civilian space program. The use of space technology for military purposes has been a recent phenomenon and the Agni missile is based on a successful satellite launch vehicles used to launch civilian satellites.
D. Main Battle Tank (MBT) For over two decades the DRDO has wanted to design, develop and produce the main battle tank Arjun, which would replace the license-produced Vijayanta. Commissioned in 1974, the first prototype was to have been ready by 1980 and was to have replaced the Vijayanta by 1985. However, as the project design was finalized only in July 1996, a parliamentary committee felt that the delay of approximately twenty four years rendered the production of the Arjun MBT unjustifiable." The first technical trial of Arjun began in 1988 and user trials began six years later. Based on 20,000 km trials under varying terrain conditions, the army proposed ten 'basic imperatives' for improving the performance of Arjun, including improved accuracy of the guns and enhanced cruising range. As a result the government cleared a 'limited series production' of Arjun, and in June 1997 the army opted for 100 Arjun, expecting the first tank to be due in 2002. Besides Arjun, which would eventually replace 1,700 Vijayanta tanks, India is planning to upgrade a similar number of T-52 tanks. In all these four areas, namely the LCA, aircraft upgrading, missiles and MBT, India has been pursuing some of the most ambitious, expensive technology-oriented programs ever undertaken by a developing country. If one adds the space dimension, where India plans to launch by the year 2000 a Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) capable of placing a two-ton satellite in orbit, the ambitions of the DRDO can be seen as astronomical. Most of these programs "have experienced major cost and time overruns and it would not be surprising if the dates currently set as production targets are not met". Unlike the Lavi, there is no foreign option for the Indian military establishment and it cannot argue that imports are possible and would be cheaper than indigenous endeavors. Even those unsatisfied with the projects, progress and achievements of the DRDO are unable to offer a cost-effective alternative. As such, these endeavors enjoy widespread domestic political support, with various political parties, from the Communists on the Left to the Nationalists on the Right, viewing them as vital to national security. The ambitions of the DRDO provide a real, meaningful and long-term challenge and opportunity for Israel. Exports have become an integral part of Israel's quest for qualitative edge. However, instead of viewing India as a market for exports to subsidize its defense research and weapon development, Israel could exploit the opportunities provided by India's unprecedented quest for technology and modernization….
B. Joint Research and Production India's annual defense budget in the early 1990s hovered around 2.5 percent of the GDP and in 1996-97 the budget was close to $10 billion, five percent of which went to defense research. India is committed to increasing the indigenous content of defense equipment from 30 percent at present to 70 percent by 2005, and within the next decade will need to replace or upgrade a large number of its aircraft and main battle tanks. However, India does not have the financial resources for its enormous military needs and modernization programs. Its indecisive stand on acquiring Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT) for over a decade and the time overruns faced by a number of key projects such as the LCA, MBT or MiG upgrading are partly due to the military's inability to find sufficient and uninterrupted financial resources. Even the decision concerning the MiG-21 upgrading was taken only after the air force resorted to 'cannibalization'. As a result, despite the number of visits and regular contacts, the quantum of Israeli exports to India is unlikely to be massive. Equipment from the Former Soviet Union constitutes a vast segment of Indian inventories, and even if India were able to find a willing supplier, India's financial ability to replace this dependency with non-Russian weapons is rather bleak. The indirect costs for spare parts, training, repairs, overhauling and organizational coordination, to name a few, would be tremendous….
C. US Component Even though since 1948 the US consistently pressed India to move closer towards the Jewish State, one cannot be sure that Washington would completely endorse and encourage the current Indo-Israeli security cooperation. A favorable attitude would mitigate, if not nullify tensions between New Delhi and Washington over a number of key issues. For strategic reasons as well as commercial ones, the US is apprehensive of some of India's ambitious plans, and at regular intervals has sought to impose economic and political sanctions to slow down and even bring about the termination of some of the projects. There are clear Indo-US differences over issues such as NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and perceived Israeli influence in the US is insufficient to mitigate these differences. A strong security cooperation in areas underlined in this study, especially in anti-missile, cruise missile or Lavi technology is bound to bring the US into the picture. Some of these projects are transferred or funded by the US and hence would be subjected to end-user conditions. Having been vehemently opposed to the testing of Agni or the deployment of Prithvi, the US is unlikely to be indifferent to Israeli willingness to transfer its Jericho expertise. American criticism of Israeli export of Lavi technology to China becomes hollow if it is indifferent towards a similar Israeli venture with India. The American ability to override sensitive Israeli commitments to India would be much larger than those exhibited over Russia's attempts to sell cryogenic engines in 1993. Political proximity has not immunized Israel from American displeasure and threats of sanctions. Hence Indo-Israeli security relations would have to be coordinated with the US and prior understanding and transparency with Washington becomes essential. Establishing a certain modus vivendi with the US State and Commerce Departments would lessen the friction which could arise by any uncoordinated security deals between India and Israel. Direct or indirect involvement of American companies in Indo-Israeli joint ventures might partially ease the situation….
E. Israel-Pakistan Rapprochement Any significant and substantial security cooperation and under- standing between India and Israel largely depends on the position of a third party: Pakistan. The prolonged absence of Indo-Israeli diplomatic relations was partly influenced by India's preoccupation, if not obsession with Pakistan. Despite the frequency of the visits and contacts, especially in the military and security arena, there is a great Indian reluctance to forge strong political relations with Israel. Since normalization, senior Indian diplomats felt it necessary to 'brief' Arab ambassadors in the Indian capital at regular intervals of India's ties with Israel, the last major occasion being the highly publicized visit of Israeli President Ezer Weizman in January 1997. At the same time, leaders and political figures also give regular reassurance of India's commitments to the Palestinian cause. One cannot dismiss this reluctant and somewhat apologetic approach merely as a continuation of the traditional policy. Even during the absence of diplomatic relations, Pakistan accused India of conspiring with the 'Zionist enemy' to threaten and undermine the larger Islamic world. Ever since normalization, 'Hindu-Jewish', 'Brahmin-Zionist' or Indo-Israeli conspiracies have periodically become a prime theme in the Pakistan media. For instance in October 1997, an editorial in The Muslim commented. One objective of such cooperation [between the Mossad and RAW] is to destabilize Pakistan internally through various means in order to subjugate it and ultimately tame its leadership. This tactic is a classical one, used by the Mossad against Arab countries, especially against Egypt. It is with this in mind, one notices a rather strange domestic situation [in Pakistan]... The editorial went on to attribute terrorist and sectarian violence in Pakistan to 'the Indo-Israeli connection' and warned that Pakistan had plenty of options, which would lead to the "radicalization of Pakistan and the entire Muslim world, against Americanism, Zionism and Hinduism." Neither India nor Israel can influence such a paranoid portrayal. However, normalization of relations between the Jewish state of Israel and the Islamic republic of Pakistan would immensely facilitate India to skillfully articulate its interests in forging close ties with Israel, thus preventing Indo-Israeli normalization from becoming a stigma. Not obliged to constantly explain or justify its relations, India would be free to evolve a strong security relationship with Israel. Political relations or even a public understanding between Pakistan and Israel would indeed facilitate and encourage India to be freed from its obsession with Pakistan and would pave the way for a strong security relationship between India and Israel. Conversely, the absence of an Israel-Pakistani relationship or understanding would remain a major impediment to Indo-Israeli strategic partnership.
F. Greater Circumspection Premature disclosures have become a major operational impediment to Israeli arms exports, and the tendency to disclose more than absolutely necessary has often lead to controversies and even to the cancellation of certain deals. Secrecy is a rare commodity among talkative politicians, indiscreet bureaucrats and inquisitive media in both countries. For example, in its eagerness to forge strong cooperation with the NATO member, Israel found itself embroiled in Turkish internal politics with the Islamists opposing the military's preference for Israel. Moreover, Arab displeasure and anger over security cooperation between Israel and Turkey was preceded by widespread media coverage in Israel over proposed military deals and the possible use of Turkey as a base for monitoring hostile countries such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Given the credibility of the Israeli media, it is natural that these countries are reluctant to accept the official denials to the contrary. Likewise, the official or non-official portrayal of Indo-Israeli security cooperation being targeted at third countries such as China, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Syria would put severe and irresistible pressures on bilateral relations. If the cooperation between the two non-Islamic countries in the region is portrayed as a conspiracy against the Islamic world, even the most pro-Israeli government in New Delhi would find it difficult to endure domestic pressures to abandon security ties with Israel. While total blackout is not possible, military and security cooperation must be handled with greater circumspection and care. Those at the helm of affairs (the usual source of media leaks and disclosures), must be reminded of the consequences and be advised to be discrete. Otherwise, limited military deals would be accompanied by a lot of hot air. Unnecessary coverage would also make things difficult for the Indian government. Though normalization has ceased to be controversial, a sizable section of the population has not totally reconciled itself to the idea and is vehemently opposed to military cooperation. India is capable of tackling the Pakistani threat by itself and on the basis of its own capability and experience. But to give the impression that India will tackle this threat with [Israeli] expertise or experience sends the wrong signal to many people both at home and abroad. Even those reconciled to normalization often adopt emotional positions over security cooperation with Israel. Hence circumspection becomes vital for strategic partnership….
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Indo-Israel Military Cooperation
India's relations with Israel lay dormant for about four decades. However, the changes in the international geo-strategic environment compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. The main events that compelled India to reconsider the decision of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel were—the Gulf War which seriously undermined the unity of the Arab world, end of the cold war, which had a positive impact on the peaceful solutions of many international problems, for example; Arab Israeli peace talks, urgent need for better relations with the US, Pakistan's propaganda against India in the West Asian and North African states in order to establish an Islamic bloc and to internationalise the Kashmir issue, lack of support from the Arab countries during the time of crisis and their support to Pakistan at the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) meetings, and less consideration for the Muslim vote bank in the calculation of the regime in power, on the domestic front. Besides this, India was also aware of Israel's achievements in agricultural technologies as well as better industrial know-how, which could create a big scope for cooperation. The normalisation of relations left both countries to explore as many areas as possible. While Indo-Israel relations increased rapidly in the field of trade and agriculture, both the countries continued to explore as many areas as possible for mutual co-operation. 'Military' is one such area which both the countries are exploring. In the military field, the former Soviet Union has been a strong and traditional friend and partner of India. Though the collapse of Soviet Union affected the Russian military industrial complex and their production capacity has come down from what it was in the Soviet era, but their products are export oriented and relatively low priced. Israel on the other hand, is a late entrant in establishing diplomatic relations with India but has emerged as an important partner in various fields including the military field. Such cooperation is based on India's realistic assessment of the global and regional security environment as well as technological requirement.
Indian Defence Industry India has a diverse modern military industry. India's arms acquisition has been motivated by a number of political, economic and security considerations. The past experiences of India in several armed conflicts with its neighbours led to efforts by the government to intensify both indigenous military hardware production and the import of arms. Military strength was considered important to meet external threats, to provide backing for India's position in world affairs, to enhance its struggle for regional powers status, for national prestige and to fulfill its wish to be recognised as a technologically advanced country. India has kept before itself the goal of self-reliance. The two most important aspects of self-reliance have been hedging against any disruption in the supply of spare parts caused by changes in the international political system and fielding systems that are appropriate for the special conditions of the subcontinent, especially the high altitudes of the Himalayan mountains, the heat and dust of the Rajasthan desert and the high ambient temperature of the Indian ocean. Indian military and industrial leaders have sought state-of-the-art weaponry, not only to ensure technological advantage, but also to demonstrate that India's capabilities compare favourably with those of industrialised countries. Local production from indigenous designs was also intended to help the balance of payments and provide employment for those with scientific and technical skills who might otherwise seek opportunities abroad. Indigenous designs were also intended to foster India's international prestige and save on foreign exchange. India recognised the need to make its military manufacturing complex more capable by indigenously producing weapons when its chief supplier, the Soviet Union, disintegrated. Despite an energetic drive for technological independence, India imports major systems and components in great volume. India's defence officials have indicated that they needed as many as 100,000 spare parts to maintain aircraft, tanks, guns, armaments, missiles, naval vessels and other weapons procured from the erstwhile Soviet Union. Programmes such as Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Main Battle Tank, Arjun and Advanced Light Helicopter though indigenous have an unusually high percentage of imported components. Each of the three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) requires equipment, which includes new fighter aircraft, frigates, submarines and missile systems as well as electronic warfare systems, new transports and new helicopters. It also has requirements to revamp its communications and air defence systems. Moreover the cash strapped military has been severely limited in its ability to modernise. India however is accelerating its self-reliance programme. Given the problems with Russian purchases, there was a need to diversify purchases. Many looked at the Israeli offer in this context, where it was believed that there would be no strings attached. India could seek Israeli technology and expertise in both lethal and non-lethal areas in which Israel has some credible achievements. It included weapons systems as well as support equipments like radar, electronic warfare equipment and a range of engineering items used in border fencing. Israelis are adept at the upgradation of armaments. The biggest advantage of seeking military cooperation with Israel lies in the fact that its technology is largely indigenous and facilitates technology transfer with no end user problem. Given the resource crunch India is not in a position to buy much military hardware. The answer therefore lies in upgradation of the existing armaments and the acquisition of force multipliers.
Israeli Military Industrial Complex Israel had been motivated to develop its armed industry essentially because of security threats, vulnerability to manipulations by the (embargoes), national pride, employment in high technology, and import substitution and export potential. Israel has acquired a great degree of self-sufficiency in arms build up. In addition to light arms, ammunition and communications devices, other Israeli weaponry included force multipliers, remotely piloted vehicles, electronic and anti electronic warfare systems, night vision devices, and naval equipment ranging from command and control systems, missiles and anti missile systems to a variety of patrol boats. Israeli hi-tech companies are known to be among world leaders in radar, avionics and command and control systems. Defence firms in Israel have carved out a technological niche for which they are gaining worldwide recognition in the upgradation of weapons systems. Early efforts of Israel's defence industry focused on delivering basic weapon systems such as tanks, fighter aircraft, artillery and patrol boats. Now it has shifted its focus from developing new platforms to its expertise in crafting advanced electronic subsystems. By focusing on advanced electronic subsystems, Israel's military industry has crafted scores of technologically advanced components that give 20 or 30 year old weapon systems new life and a qualitative edge and improves the capabilities of fighter aircraft, helicopters, combat vehicles, and command, control, communication, and intelligence systems. Earnings from weapons exports are seen as essential for, firstly, the well-being of the Israeli defence industries, which in turn is the corner-stone of the country's security, secondly, for the shoring up of its economy and finally, to support the Research and Development that enables Israel to maintain a leading edge in weapons technology. Besides, the development cost of many Israeli projects is dependent on income from exports. "Certain projects would not have been undertaken, if there was no expectation of exports. Without exports some industries would collapse and certain projects would have to be abandoned". It is because of the arms exports that the Israeli arms industry is able to flourish. The dominant policy impulse with Israel, so far as ties with India are concerned is to seek broader and deeper engagement with New Delhi. During Israeli President Ezer Weizman's visit to India, Doron Suslik, Director of Corporate Communications of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) affirmed that India is one of Israel's important markets. He said Israel would be responsive to Indian requirements in producing military and civil aircraft and its need in high technology and computer software. Israel's approach was not what could be called "in a donor's mode". Businessmen in Weizman's delegation clarified that they were looking for linkages with Indian firms not only for marketing Israeli products, but also to jointly design and evolve new software and technologies for export to other third world countries.
Military Cooperation: Pre-Normalisation Period The motivations of both India and Israel pushed them into the global arena and made them suitable partners in the military area. Though the basic structure of the Indo-Israel relations was laid down by India's first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, who kept the relations at a low key in deference to the value he attached to the relations with the Arab countries, the Israeli authorities nevertheless tried from time to time to upgrade the relationship. All the successive governments in New Delhi showed the courtesies to the visiting officials without upgrading the level of diplomatic representations and sought Israeli help in military matters. Before the two countries established full diplomatic relations, they clandestinely cooperated on military and intelligence matters. It was in January 1963, three months after the border conflict with China, that the government of India showed willingness to consult the Israeli specialists in military matters. In was then that the Israeli Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Military Intelligence were welcomed to New Delhi for an exchange of views with some of India's military top brass, including the Chief of Army Staff. In subsequent years, Israeli dignitaries visited India from time to time, for example, Mr. Yigal Alon, a member of the Israeli cabinet in 1965 and Moshe Dayan in 1977.There was also prolonged cooperation between India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and its Israeli counterpart, the Mossad (Israeli secret agency). Such cooperation existed even during the premiership of Indra Gandhi, (1966-77 and 1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). India's secret contacts with Israel were also substantiated by other sources. According to a controversial book, "By Way of Deception" written by Victor Ostrovsky, a former Israeli agent and a weapons testing expert, recruited by Mosad, India sent a secret mission to Israel, comprising top flight nuclear scientists in 1984. According to him the secret Indian mission came to Israel to exchange information.
Post Normalisation Period Since establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, there had been more than 50 military related visits, contacts and consultations between India and Israel. Israel was more forthcoming in talking of defence ties and in fact offered to help India in defence matters. While Israel was more than eager to enter into a collaborative partnership with India in military production and anti-terrorist measures, the Indian government was reluctant to respond. According to S. Krishna Kumar, Minister of State for Defence, "there was no proposal, no initiative, no offer for any kind of defence ties with that country—that subject had not even been formally discussed in the Defence Ministry." India's traditional Arab policy had been mainly responsible for this, which itself was dictated by two major considerations. First, Arab countries being the largest suppliers of oil to India and source of hard currency remittance from NRIs (Non Resident Indians), India did not want to antagonise them by entering into diplomatic relations with a country hostile to them. Secondly, Congress doggedly persisted in its belief that having diplomatic relations with Israel would prejudice its electoral prospects at home by alienating the Muslim population. Though at the outset the Indian government avoided talking of military cooperation in public, but its interest in getting help from Israel could not be hidden. Defence Minister Sharad Pawar indicated that the formal establishment of full diplomatic ties between India and Israel paved the way for drawing on Israel's successful experience to curb terrorism. And that India would like to get acquainted with Israel's experience in developing technology for anti-terrorist operations. Krishna Kumar too said, "technically no country could be excluded in such matters and that Israel had certain defence capabilities worth noting." By mid 1992, India and Israel had made considerable progress on the possibilities of cooperation in military matters. A six member Israeli defence team visited India and had meetings with several ministry officials. The team had come at the invitation of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) but gave no details of the talks. This visit (within five months of establishing full diplomatic relations between the two countries) was a significant indicator of the rapid progress in Indo-Israel ties. Positive signs were seen from both sides from time to time. In an interview, Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin talked very positively of defence ties with India. "I believe if there is interest on the part of India, I believe there is room for it. We are more than ready to cooperate with India in the field of defence whenever and wherever it suits India. Regarding fundamentalism and terrorism, Rabin had said that they had been a victim of this for a long time and emphasised that the same had been the concern of India. J. N. Dixit's visit to Tel Aviv in the wake of the Bombay blasts, added to the speculation that cooperation in combating terrorism was a possible area of common interest. In May 1993, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres visited India. Peres too dealt with the issues of terrorism and India's territorial integrity. He also supported India's stand on Kashmir. "We support fully and completely the territorial integrity of India and agree with the Shimla Agreement." General Helz Bodinger from Israel visited India in the first week of April 1995. During his visit India was offered a package deal, which included Airborne Warning and Control Systems, Remotely Piloted Vehicles, access to an air platform for anti detection and anti jamming manoeuvre and specialised weapons. In July 1995, a high level Indian team, led by Defence Secretary, K.A. Nambiar, visited Israel. The defence Secretary's visit was necessitated by the urgency to identify the avionics and weapons systems for MIG-21 Bis, which was being upgraded for India under the Indo-Russian joint venture. The talks on the upgradation of the Russian T-72 tank too were part of the agenda. At that time India also showed interest in Remotely Piloted Vehicles. President Ezer Weizman visited India in January 1997. He underlined India as a potential partner in the area of aircraft industry. During his visit the two countries decided to exchange military attaches. Following the visit, senior Indian officials, visited Israel and inspected advanced defence systems. India's top defence ministry scientists too were reported to have visited Israel secretly and toured satellite and missile programmes. A few days after India tested its nuclear devices in May 1998, a top ranking delegation from the IAI toured India. The purpose was to accelerate the sale of Israeli made pilotless aircraft anti-ship missiles. India's Defence Secretary T.K. Banerjee led a high-level defence delegation to Israel in February 1997. The Chief of Army Staff General V.P. Malik visited Israel from March 8-13, 1998. According to India's military attaché Col. Brown it was a goodwill visit. "We are looking forward to building a long lasting defence relationship". In 1998, the IAI finalised a large-scale deal with India to sell Advanced Electronic Equipment (AEEA). The equipment was developed and manufactured in Israel and comprised no American technology. Both the countries Israel and India have been engaged in negotiations over AEE for over a year and an Indian delegation even visited Israel to inspect the equipment. The US was against this deal due to the nuclear tests that India had conducted in May 1998. It demanded that Israel should halt these negotiations. The US pressure on Israel started after India carried out nuclear tests, whereas in the past the US did not oppose arms deals between the two countries. According to the US, the deal violated an international arms control treaty. Israel did not agree and resisted American pressure to cancel the sale of AEE to India. Israeli officials assured New Delhi, that contracts, negotiated over the past year would be honoured. According to a later report, Israel sold advanced electronic warfare system to India over objections from the US, which sought to block the deal after India conducted nuclear tests explosions in May 1998. The report did not elaborate but stated that it was for defensive purposes. Similarly, a spokesman for IAI declined to make any comment. During the recent incidents in Kashmir, Israel agreed to speed up shipments of arms and military equipment to India on the request of the Indian government to accelerate the arms orders, which were submitted before the recent developments. The Israeli defence establishment responded favourably. India and Israel have maintained extensive security cooperation in recent years. Prime Minister Ehud Barak has taken interest in the development of relations with India and even held a special debate on the matter. The two countries maintain two forums for conferring, one between their respective foreign ministries and the other between the defence ministries. At periodic meetings, the parties exchange analyses of the situation in the Middle East and Asia. At the base of the relationship between India and Israel there appeared to be a similarity in an understanding of the geo-political situation. Both are surrounded by strong and hostile neighbours. According to a senior Israeli official, "From the moment we established diplomatic relations seven years ago, we found a common language". According to him, there was a deep understanding between the two countries to have a fluent and clear dialogue. A number of ongoing programmers in India are not radically different from their Israeli counterparts. They include the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) (Israel's Lavi), Arjun (Merkava), Prithvi (Jericho I), and Agni (Jericho II). The same can be said about a number of other Indian programmes such as Remotely Piloted Vehicles, Airborne Early Warning System, and anti-ballistic missile systems. In this India can benefit from Israel as Israeli weapons are more advanced and battle tested.
Areas of Cooperation: Upgrading of Aircraft MiGs: Since the early 1990s, India has embarked upon the upgrading of its MiG fleet. In order to upgrade the aging MiG-21s (which would be replaced by the LCA in the early part of the next decade—2005-2020), the Indian Ministry of Defence considered offers from manufacturers in several countries including France, Russia and Israel besides considering a joint proposal from two state owned Indian aerospace manufacturers (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). During the same year Israel intensified its efforts to secure the lucrative contract to upgrade the MiG-21 bis aircraft operating with the IAF. According to industry sources, representatives of IAI and Elta (a subsidiary of the IAI that manufactures electronic weapons systems have had several rounds of discussions with senior officials in the defence ministry. While the IAI package was expensive, Israel insisted on the technical superiority of their package over the Russian one. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, India's avionics selection is multinational and that Israel was to improve the MiG-21 cockpit layout, including a head-up display. During the same year, there were reports that the IAI had been given the contract for installing the electronic warfare equipment in the MiG upgrade that the IAF had embarked upon. However, according to the latest reports, the upgradation of two Mig-21 aircraft are underway in Russia. After that the upgradation of the rest of the aircraft will be in India.
Light Combat Aircraft India's 17-year-old LCA programme, delayed by more than a decade, continues to be plagued by serious technical uncertainties and cost overruns, according to India's Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). The CAG report stated that it was beset with delays for almost every vital component of the aircraft and has compelled the Indian Air Force (IAF) to seek interim measures to cover the shortfall of aircraft by upgrading around 125 MiG 21 bis fighters. The LCA was originally expected to begin replacing the Mig 21s, which form the backbone of the IAF, by late 1990s. LCA's airframe, multimode radar, its flight control system are all behind schedule. Also the first two LCA prototypes were to be powered by US General Electric F404-FJ23 engines (which were bought in 1986 for the prototype LCAs) despite protests from the US government after Washington imposed sanctions on India for its 1998 nuclear tests. The US engines would ultimately be replaced by the locally developed Kaveri, which has undergone extensive testing in Russia. According to Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, head of the DRDO and scientific adviser to the government, each LCA was expected to cost $22 million and that foreign participation will bring down its cost to $15-$18 million. Israeli experience in avionics, airframes and the incorporation of engine and weapons into the airframe can be useful in the development of LCA. Advanced Light Helicopters: The development of Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) had been adversely affected after Washington imposed sanctions on India for the 1998 nuclear testing. The US embargo resulted in almost total stoppage of activity in regard to the ALH as it stopped getting the turbo shaft engine from the US. It was recommended that the government swiftly seek an alternative engine supplier and avoid all future dealings with companies in sanctions imposing countries. Here again Israeli technology and expertise can be explored in order to remove the difficulties. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS): India was keen to collaborate with Israel in the indigenous AWACS development project. The Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) received a proposal from the IAI on the probability of the collaboration in the project.49 According to the sources in the Ministry of Defence; Israel offered to sell 3 AWACS aircraft to India. But finally, in a recent move, the Indian Air Force got two advanced early warning aircraft from Russia. They have landed at the Chandigarh airbase. According to the published data; one of the variants of the aircraft is a Russia-Israel joint venture. Though the Centre for Airborne Systems in India is developing an Airborne Early Warning Systems for the Indian armed forces, the need for AWACS has been expedited by the recent Pakistan backed infiltration in Kargil. The need for the aircraft was hastened because India needed to keep a strict vigil on any movement in Indian and Pakistani airspace, along the Line of Control and the international borders. The Kargil experience underscored the importance of the state-of-the-art surveillance capabilities.
Surveillance Equipments: Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)/Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) UAVs are increasingly being viewed as strategic force multipliers since they send virtual real time data and pictures from deep inside the enemy territory while safely dodging enemy radars. It can give data on enemy's force deployment, kind of weapons and equipment deployed and the level of enemy's defence preparedness along borders. The Israelis are among the world leaders in the field of UAV manufacturing. The Israeli UAVs are much smaller, lighter and thus have more manoeuverability and strategic value. The IAI, an established player in the UAV market has proved that there was significant export opportunity. During the Paris air show held in June 1995, the Israelis displayed its largest range of UAVs. Airborne surveillance has been one of the key areas of Indo-Israel defence cooperation. India and Israel have already signed a contract for UAVs to boost India's air surveillance arm. Both the countries are exploring joint production of UAVs. Negotiations on potential joint production of the 'heron' UAV for the Indian Navy have already reached an advanced stage. The "heron" is the most modern UAV made by the IAI and has a longer range and more sophisticated payload than the ‘searcher’, which India had first agreed to buy from Israel in 1996. According to the latest reports, India is all set to import from Israel more sophisticated and higher range UAVs for more effective surveillance of the high altitude ranges in Jammu and Kashmir bordering Pakistan. Acquisition of UAVs has become all the more important after the Kargil experience. It was considered as one of the high priority requirements by the IAF. The Indian Air Force Chief A.Y. Tipnis confirmed, that the IAF had stressed for immediate induction of the UAVs for more intensive human intelligence of the 140 km long difficult stretch of high altitude ranges along the line of control in Kargil sector. The Indian armed services already have a few UAVs at their disposal, which were used during the Kargil war, but unfortunately the UAVs were not found to be that effective as world class UAVs are, mainly because not many international UAV manufacturing companies are manufacturing high altitude UAVs. As regards the RPVs, the MOD has reached the final stage of the deal with Israel. India was planning to have one time purchase of RPVs including technology transfer, which will not only fill India's operational requirements, but also help develop the indigenous RPV project.
Main Battle Tank (MBT) Another very important DRDO project concerning combat vehicles is the indigenous design, development and production of the Main Battle Tank, Arjun, which is supposed to replace the older, license produced, Vijayanta tanks. The MBT project began in the 1970s, with the original plan envisaging deployment in the mid 1980s. However in view of critical changes in technologies over the years, the army's requirements for the tank were also successfully altered and which in turn revised costs. According to Indian defence industry sources, the chassis intended for the Arjun MBT has been plagued by technical problems and cost overruns. Israeli expertise again can be found to be of great help in this area as Arjun is the counterpart of the Israeli tank, Merkava.
Missiles India launched its ambitious, Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme in 1983. This programme involved design, development and production of five missile systems: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Agni, surface to surface missile, Prithvi, short range surface to air missile, Trishul, medium range surface to air missile Aakash and the anti tank missile, Nag. Israel has an impressive arsenal of indigenous missiles including ship-to-ship missile Gabriel, air-to-air missile Python, air to surface missile, Popeye, surface-to-surface missile, Jericho I and IRBM Jericho II. They were developed and some even deployed prior to India's guided missile development programme in the early 1980s, and hence are more advanced and battle tested. Israel is in a good position to help develop more effective and cost efficient missile defences. According to media reports, India is negotiating for Israeli missile technology to perfect the launching and guidance systems of the Prithvi, an indigenously developed surface-to-surface missile and also seeking Israeli help in electronics for its submarine launched Sagarika missile. India has also sought certain technical assistance from Israel to develop Akash, the country’s indigenous missile system. These missiles can counter the threat posed by M-11 acquired by Pakistan. Israel is also helping India in developing state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles.
Navy India and Israel are collaborating on IAI's 'Super Dvora' Mark II, Fast Attack Craft. In 1997, India purchased two Super Dvora Mark II attack boats and has been licenced to build another four. It was followed by awarding the contract to IAI's Ramta Division, Beersheba and Goa Shipyards limited for the production of the crafts.65 It is reported that if India's efforts towards fast patrol boats are successful, the two could jointly produce up to 80 boats for India's Navy and Coast Guard. According to other reports, Israeli firms have also upgraded electronic warfare equipments for the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat. Maritime surveillance: Israel has offered its advanced multimode maritime surveillance radar to the Indian Navy to counter the threat from the Pakistani naval fleet which is equipped with the US made P3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft. David Traim, Deputy Director Elta Electronics of the IAI informed that a proposal offering the radar to the Navy has been submitted to the Indian Defence Ministry. The Israeli radar will largely meet the immediate requirements of the Navy and can be fitted on to patrol helicopters.
Nuclear Issue After the nuclear explosion by India in May 1998, both India and Israel have come in for criticism and unsubstantiated charges about cooperation in the nuclear field have been tossed around. The Indian diplomats denied the speculation that Israel assisted India in the May tests and regarded the allegations of Indo-Israeli cooperation in nuclear and missile fields as baseless. Ranjin Mathai, Indian Ambassador to Israel denied any relationship with Israel in the nuclear field. The same was also denied by the External Affairs Ministry spokesman who stated that, "while India had interaction with Israel in various fields, they had nothing to do with its nuclear programme." Israel took the same stand. Alon Ben David, Israel's Army affairs correspondent said—"It is important to stress that the defence ties between India and Israel did not deal with nuclear issues, only conventional arms export." So far as Israel's response to India's nuclear tests was concerned, Israel's Foreign Ministry did not condemn India's nuclear weapons test. The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr. Haim Koren refrained from issuing a special condemnation of Indian tests and refused to say whether Israel would impose sanctions on India or re-examine the close military ties between the two countries. The Foreign Ministry of Israel however stated that "Israel has signed the CTBT that prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and we hope all states will become parties to this treaty." There is however a section in Israel, which brought forth the view that India’s nuclear tests, could indirectly pose a threat to Israel. According to Haifa University security specialist Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor, this was very bad for Israel from several points of view. "Firstly it raises the question of punitive US action against India which might, in the future, be considered a precedent for similar action against Israel. Secondly, the Indian tests are likely to give momentum to the Pakistani nuclear programme and give it more legitimacy… The Pakistani nuclear programme is supposed to be the source of the so called Islamic bomb." The same fear was expressed by David Bar Illan, spokesman for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, "We are worried that Pakistani tests will encourage Tehran and Baghdad to acquire nuclear weapons." Indo-Israel military cooperation did not seem to fade in the wake of nuclear explosions by India. According to a report, Israel was providing India with intelligence on Pakistan from its spy satellite. In return, India gave permission for Israeli military intelligence experts to undertake missions on Indian territory to monitor points of interest. Also, the deal on AEE was made after the May tests.
US Factor Israel is immensely dependent upon the US for its military support besides political and economic. A lot of Israeli military equipment has US components. For the export of these items Israel has to seek the consent of the US. In 1991, Israel was brought under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and this seriously limited Israel's ability to export sensitive technologies to India. For example, the Arrow anti-missile project, developed by Israel and funded by the US comes under the technology rights agreement between the US and Israel. As India is not a close ally of the US, this would impede any Israeli transfer of Arrow missiles or technologies to India in case India needs that technology. The US also tried to bloc the sale of AEE from Israel to India even though it contained no American technology.
Conclusion India's military needs are likely to grow. There are tremendous constraints on upgrading and modernising the armed forces. Though the Indian policy makers have decided to be self-sufficient in core technologies like missiles, tanks and aircraft, there is a vast need for inputs, import of components and collaboration. Moreover, the cost of doing research and development can be crippling in economic terms. The major problems encountered in producing indigenously developed weapons are, first, the indigenous projects rely to a large extent on technical assistance from abroad, and secondly, they have a long research and development gestation period and the delayed production has led to the manufacture of weapons that were already obsolete by the time series production started. The hope to move gradually from the import of arms via licenced production towards indigenous development and production of arms has so far not been realised. There is a definite business potential for new entrants to supply military equipment to the Indian armed forces. Here, besides other countries, Israel is engaged in supplying India with state-of-the-art equipment and technologies. The biggest benefit of military cooperation with Israel can be in the areas of electronics, missile technology and intelligence. Israel has vast experience of fighting in both stony and sand dune waste areas. Given a similar desert terrain in India, a regular interaction between the two armies can be useful. In essence, Indo-Israel relations have grown in importance because it is based on very practical considerations. For India, Israel is a source of high technology in many including military related industries and it is evidently even more vital after post-Pokhran sanctions on India. Building ties with Israel could be an effective counter-balance to Pakistan's military and political tactics. For Israel, India is a large and lucrative market. Any meaningful relationship between India and Israel is more likely to cover joint research, joint production and technology transfer.
Farah Naaz, Associate Fellow, IDSA, retrieved on 21 May, 2003, <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug-700.html> Growing Indo-Israeli Nexus
Reports emanating from various sources clearly confirm the advent of a carefully contrived Indo-Israeli nexus. Not only the ties in the defence sector are strengthening but also the Israeli intelligence agencies are training the Indians how to counter the activities of the freedom fighters in the troubled state of Kashmir. While it is not all that surprising to know that Indo-Israeli cooperation in various fields is taking concrete shape, what appears to be somewhat incomprehensible is why so much time has lapsed in forging closer ties? This is particularly significant when one realizes the existing commonalities between the Jews and the Brahmins. Both propagate the purity and superiority of race, share somewhat bitter historical legacies, suffer from delusions of greatness, demonstrate almost regularly animosity against the Muslims, and assertively stress that the past subjugations and deprivation will - never again’ be allowed to manifest. Changes in international climate coupled with emerging realities might have influenced the two countries to upgrade the existing level of interaction. Among the ground realities that could have been taken into considerations include the post cold war international scenario in which the US is viewed as the sole superpower, the disintegration of the India’s ally Soviet Union, the elevation of market forces to substantively influence the regulation of relations among nations, the changing nature of the conflicts along with the intensification freedom struggle in their countries, the elevation of religious parties and accompanying hardliners to the corridors of power, and the emergence integrative and disintegrative trends could have made substantive contributions in bringing the two states closer. Perhaps the most important factor delaying the emergence of Indo-Israeli nexus is India’s attempt to opt for a secular and socialist society. Nehru’s Congress tried hard to follow an idealist socialistic creed with minimum influence from orthodox forces. For quite sometimes India was able to practice secular ideals. While Nehru has been subjected to biting criticism from many quarters in India, he was indeed a realist if one views his policies in light of India’s diversity in terms of races, creeds, religions and tribalism. To pursue unity in diversity was, in many ways, a pragmatic panacea. Equally significant factor could be the continuous evaluation of the cost-benefit analysis of most Indian governments regarding ties with the Arab world. A closer alliance with Israeli at the cost of Arabs friends was indeed viewed as unwise. Besides, many of the Arab states with their socialist rulers appeared as better states to identify with. It is also possible that regular criticism of those states whose birth was credited to considerable contributions from religious factors impeded the regularly drummed notions of secular ideals. The advent of BJP in India and ascent of Sharon enable both countries to come closer towards each other with an accelerated pace. While the Indians were interested to gain access to Israeli military technology and its advanced intelligence techniques, the Israeli seem to be influenced more by the economic factors along with other considerations. Another factor that could have helped in cementing the relationships is that both are good friends of the US. As far as India is concerned the cooperation with Israel has pronouncedly manifested in three areas; the defence sector, the intelligence services, and training how to counter intifada and freedom movements. While India had established full diplomatic relation with Israel in 1992, the warming of relations only surfaced during the BJP regime. Both Advani and Jaswant have made trips to Israel to discuss cooperation in defence, intelligence, and counter insurgency. India has signed a major agreement with Israeli with a view to acquire three Phalcon airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), radar system, surface-to-surface missiles and up-gradation of aircrafts. Earlier Washington had persuaded Israel not to sell AWACS to China. Besides the agreement calls for increased cooperation between India’s aircraft firm Hindustan Aeronautics and its Israeli counterpart Israel Aircraft Industry. It can be safely assumed that Israel must have secured the green light from the Americans before signing the agreement with the Indians. The second area in which both countries have been cooperating with each other is intelligence. The intelligence failure prior to and during the Kargil clashes influenced the Indian authorities to seek help from the Israeli intelligence services. Israeli teams consisting of senior Intelligence officers have been frequently visiting India in order to train and familiarize the Indian intelligence community with advanced and relatively more successful techniques. Many RAW’s agents have already acquired the benefits of growing closer ties between the intelligence communities of the two countries. Not only Israel’s successful intelligence missions enabled and in some sense emboldened the Israeli forces to initiate target-killing campaign. Finally the third area in which the Indo-Israeli collaboration is specially focusing is the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Not only the Israeli intelligence community has been assisting the Indian authorities in this region in terms of procuring essential information but the Israeli are now training and helping the Indians how to contain the freedom movement of the Kashmiris. The focal point of Advani’s visit to Israel was to seek the assistance of the Israelis in order to effectively cope with the Mujahideen operations. During his Israeli trip, Advani specifically toured the electronic fence area along the Israeli borders with Lebanon, saw functioning of new security system at the Ben Gurion airport, and watched a demonstration of a pilot less drone used for border surveillance. Several independent sources have openly highlighted the presence of many Israeli intelligence teams in Kashmir that are now providing training to Indian forces in counter insurgence measures. It might seem surprising to some that in the past India had taken firm stand against the Zionism and racism but lately it had shifted from its traditional stance though some independent quarters still represent the old school’s thinking. The Zionists have not only been spreading fear and discard through sophisticated propaganda but have also been actively pursuing strategies that entail corrupting and controlling the ruling elite. In addition, efforts are directed to some form of stranglehold over the target states’ economies. A target state is often portrayed as a great danger to world peace and unworthy of trust with a view to secure the desired modifications in the objectives and behaviour of the target state. The techniques employed in their propaganda barrage include lies, distortion, deception etc. The growing Indo-Israeli nexus is not only dangerous for Pakistan and the Muslim world but it would also provide to the Israeli the much desired access and partnership with the main Indian Ocean power. The emerging changes do not augur well for the stability of whole region. Beside the Indo-Israeli nexus could assume strategically dangerous dimension in the global power games. While one is policing the region of oil wealth, the other is engaged in efforts to contain the anticipated emerging power. But both seem to be serving the interest of a third party.
Growing Indo‑Israeli Defence Cooperation
Introduction Israeli‑Indian defence and security cooperation involves military exports and training assistance to India and, in certain areas, joint production, technology transfers, and even joint research in the realms of anti‑terrorism assistance, conventional armaments, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons, especially production and doctrine. A number of defence programmes exist in India that are similar to their Israeli counterparts, such as the Light Combat Aircraft (Israel's' Lavi), the main battle tank Arjun (Israel's Merkava), and the intermediate‑range ballistic missiles Prithvi (Israeli Jericho‑1) and Agni II (Jericho‑II). Additional areas of similar programs include the development and production of remotely piloted vehicles, airborne early‑warning (AEW) systems, and antiballistic missile systems. Israel has emerged as a major supplier of defence hardware for India's armed forces over the past five years, concluding several multi‑million dollar deals. Defence ties have become "extremely warm" in the last three years and can only improve; in the days to come. This is the opinion of Army officers who say that they find Israeli equipment reliable and rugged.
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) signed an estimated two-billion‑dollar weapons contract with India's defence ministry, on 16 July 2001. IAI, which works in cooperation with Israel's defence ministry, will deliver to India aircraft, radar systems and surface‑to‑surface missiles, via Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). Three Phalcon early‑warning aircraft, of the type which Israel was prevented from supplying to China following strong US objections, will be among them. IAI will also deliver surface‑to‑surface naval Barak missiles, worth $280 million, unmanned aerial vehicles valued at $300 million and Green Pine radar systems, estimated at $250 million. The radar is used in the Arrow anti‑ballistic missile system developed by Israel in collaboration with US. In addition, IAI will develop a Super Barak missile for India, which will have twice the capability of the original Barak surface‑to‑surface missiles. One key project being discussed between India and Israel is the joint development of an extended‑range anti‑ship missile based on the Israeli Barak system. IAI's MBT Division is involved in preliminary development of an Advance Naval Attack Missile and a Next‑Generation Defence Missile for the Israel Navy, yet funding constraints have delayed the programme. Israel has offered the DRDO and government‑owned industries a key role in development and eventual licenced production of one or both of the new missile programmes in exchange for significant Indian funding of the programme. Potential deals with HAL include the upgrading of Russian built Indian fighters‑ MiG‑21s, MiG‑29s and Sukhois ‑ as well as Mi‑8s and Mi‑17 helicopters and T‑72 tanks. The memorandum provides a framework for future cooperation that eventually could translate into annual Israeli sales of $200 million for the next five to 10 years. At the same time, the memorandum encourages transfer of IAI technology to HAL in unspecified fields with the aim of establishing licenced production lines in India for the Indian Army, as well as for potential third‑country exports. The MoU is a milestone that will allow both countries to elevate defence cooperative relations to a higher level. Other Israeli firms are expected to enter into similar industry‑to-industry cooperative arrangements with India as the two countries move to solidify defence trade ties.
The government has cleared arms purchases from Israel to the tune of several million dollars. Besides the Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles, the list includes 200 hand‑held thermal imaging systems for the infantry and as many for the artillery for over $20 million. The Israeli firm, Soltam, will upgrade 130mm M46 field guns to 155mm and will also provide kits to the Ordnance Factory Board. Israel is also cleared to supply 40,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition and another 30,000 rounds of 160mm mortar. Under consideration are sales of several thousand radio communication sets, up to 1,000 fire control systems for the Army's T‑72 tank and navigation and targeting pods for Air Force fighters. Israel is also likely to provide the avionics and weapons systems for 40 Russian Su‑30 multi‑role fighters bought by India in 1990. The list is virtually endless. Barak SystemIndia has signed a multi-crore defence contract with Israel for the purchase of seven Barak ship-based anti-missiles systems as part of its overall plan to beef up its naval capabilities. The total deal is worth about Rs 700 crore, with each anti-missile system worth about Rs 100 crore. One of the missile ‘complex’ has been installed on India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Viraat. Besides INS Viraat, the remaining six systems will be mounted on three-Delhi class destroyers and three Kashin or Rajput class destroyers of the Indian Navy. The Barak system is designed to protect a ship from being targeted by sub-sonic sea-skimming missiles in hostile conditions. The weapon is fired from a vertically mounted launcher and each defensive missile has an in-built radar to latch on to the oncoming missile at a range of nearly 10 km. According to data available, the Barak system comprises of two launchers, each capable of firing 8 anti-missiles. The anti-missile is said to travel more than twice the speed of sound. In real-time operational mode, the ship-board anti-missile system will be warned of any hostile low flying object by Kamov-31, a radar picket helicopter that was recently acquired from Russia. The Ka-31 aircraft has the capability of detecting any low flying object at the distance over 100 km. As soon as the ship is alerted, the Barak will home in and destroy the missile. India has already received four of the nine Ka-31 helicopters from Russia. China has purchased powerful Sovremenny‑class destroyers from Russia, which are armed with Sunburn (SS‑21) supersonic missiles. Even the French are upgrading the Exocet sea‑skimming missile, with Pakistan showing interest in buying them. The Russians have armed their ships with Sunburn as well as Moskit supersonic missiles. There are some objections to Barak as well. Critics point out that this system is not proven against supersonic missiles and is exceptionally expensive. With an Indian Navy destroyer costing around Rs 500 crore, in question is the prudence of acquiring a system (solely against missile defence) which is equivalent to around 20 per cent of the ship's value.
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) have unveiled a jointly developed low‑cost maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) based on the Dormer 228, for use by the Indian Navy and potential export customers. Fitted with IAI division Tamam's Airborne Observation System (AOS) mission equipment, several early examples of the aircraft are understood to be in operation with the Indian Navy. A large number of 228s have been produced under licence in India by HAL. The aircraft have been sold in the civil and military markets, including an Information Warfare version for the Indian Navy, and a maritime patrol aircraft for an export customer. A German‑developed maritime version achieved some export success before the European company closed down its production line in late 1990s. IAI says that it sees "a big potential for this aircraft in India and for other customers". The maritime patrol aircraft is equipped with Elta's EL/M2022A radar, which IAI claims has a range of 200km (110nm), and is also installed in Australia's Lockheed P‑3 Orions in an earlier upgrade. The AOS is capable of "full day and night imagery intelligence gathering" and can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance missions, border and coastal patrol and MPA. Tamam's Airborne Multi‑Mission Optronic Stabilised Payload (AMOSP) is mounted on the belly of the 228 and can be used as an electro‑optical sensor or as part of a "standalone AOS", says IAI. The aircraft can simultaneously transmit data to several ground locations and receive data from multiple "airborne sources", the company adds. HAL is responsible for integrating the radar, electro‑optical and mission systems. IAl says it sees export potential from "developing countries" for "a few dozen aircraft over the next three to five years". Submarine SimulatorsThe India's Navy plans to buy Full‑Mission Submarine Simulators from Israel as part of its increasing defence cooperation with that nation. Current plans call for one simulator to be delivered to the Navy's Anti‑submarine Warfare School at Kochi, by October 2001. The deal was finalised during the 16‑19 May 2001 visit to Tel Aviv by defence secretary Yogendra Narain. The simulator purchase was approved during Indian naval chief, Adm Sushil Kumar's mid‑April 2001 visit to Israel. The Full‑Mission Submarine Simulator, built by BVR Systems, provides a complete solution to all of the Indian Navy's tactical simulator needs, including war‑gaming exercises and tactical classroom centres. The simulator works well with several systems currently used by the Navy, including command, control, communication and intelligence, and weapon systems. The BVR Full‑Mission Submarine Simulator reacts logically to events and allows human intervention so that computer commands may be overridden during training exercises. The Navy currently has no submarine simulator. The Indian Navy has 12 Kilo‑class submarines, four T‑209‑class submarine and three Foxtrot‑class submarines. It is difficult to conduct real‑time exercises using real submarines, but programming all known facts about enemy forces and India's defences into a simulator can produce an exercise that presents all possibilities of an enemy attack and its outcome.
US pressure notwithstanding, Israel has supplied India parts of sophisticated radar system `Green Pine' capable of detecting ballistic missile attacks from hundreds of kilometres away. The Green Pine Radar system developed by Elta Electronic Industries is based on technology similar to the Phalcon airborne radar system, which Tel. Aviv had planned to sell to China but cancelled the deal under US pressure. In the wake of Pakistani missile threat perception, India decided to buy the radar in 1998, but the deal came under a cloud following its nuclear tests and the subsequent American pressure on Israel to hold it back.
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