Fact Files

War Against Iraq

Editor
Dr.Noor ul Haq

Assistant Editor
Ahmed Ijaz Malik

Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy

            Michael Scott Doran is Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question.

REMOVE THE WEDGE?

            When toppling Saddam Hussein rose to the top of the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda, a chorus of voices protested that Washington had misdiagnosed the root cause of its Middle Eastern dilemmas. "It's Palestine, stupid!" was the refrain heard not only from European and Arab capitals, but from some quarters in the United States as well. These voices argued that attacking Iraq while the Israelis were reoccupying Palestinian lands would substantiate the claim, already widespread in the Middle East, that the United States had declared war against all Arabs and Muslims. The ensuing backlash would undermine the American position in the region and wreak havoc on American interests. What Washington really needed to do was postpone or abandon a showdown with Saddam and focus instead on achieving a breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

            Unqualified U.S. support for Israel, the critics reason, drives a wedge between Washington and the Arabs, most of whom support Palestinian aspirations; for the United States to improve its regional position, it must remove the wedge by tilting somewhat toward the Palestinians. The problem with this argument is that it rests on two hidden and faulty assumptions: about how much Washington would have to change its stance, and about how much goodwill that change would produce.

            Unfortunately, Americans and Arabs nurture such different conceptions of what constitutes a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that it is hard to imagine Washington ever adopting a policy toward it that would be truly popular in the Arab world. The most "pro-Palestinian" policy realistically conceivable would look something like the Clinton plan presented in late 2000, but even this would entail major Palestinian compromises (such as the renunciation of the right of pre-1967 refugees to return to their homes inside Israel proper). Under the right conditions, a handful of Arab leaders might be induced to endorse such a settlement, but they would be denounced by others as puppets of Washington and the Jews. Suicide bombings would very likely continue, and the United States would still find itself entangled in a passionate communal conflict. The Palestine wedge would thus remain in place -- smaller and less troubling, perhaps, but a wedge nonetheless.

            Even if the United States were somehow able to broker a stable Palestinian-Israeli settlement that met many Arab aspirations, however, this would not necessarily generate a great deal of goodwill. Those who argue the opposite see Palestine as the primary obstacle blocking an American-Arab rapprochement. They claim, correctly, that Arab political discourse revolves around Palestine and that a great many Arabs hold the United States responsible for Palestinian suffering. But what they overlook is that although Palestine is central to the symbolism of Arab politics, it is actually marginal to its substance.

            Palestine-as-symbol has a protean nature, a capacity for expressing grievances wholly unrelated to the aspirations of the Palestinians themselves. In Northern Ireland last summer, for example, the Irish Republican Army raised the Palestinian flag over Republican strongholds. Why? Because for many around the world, this pennant now expresses simple anticolonial defiance, the protest of those who believe their native rights have been trampled under the boots of foreign rulers. (Not to be outdone, Unionists countered by flying the Israeli banner over their neighborhoods.)

            The migration of Middle Eastern symbolism to a remote corner of Christian Europe would hardly be noteworthy were it not for the fact that the Palestinian flag plays a similar role throughout the Arab world itself, where it often expresses grievances unrelated to the specifics of Palestine-as-place. In addition to serving as a front for venting anger at local repression, unemployment, and inequity, Palestine-as-symbol expresses the resistance of Arabs and Muslims to Western political and cultural hegemony.

            Palestine has acquired this broad meaning because in Arab political discourse the maltreatment of the Palestinians signifies the prejudice of the West toward all Middle Easterners. Palestine is the only Arab land successfully colonized in modern times, a fact that rankles deeply. According to a commonly held version of history, the Western powers (especially the United Kingdom and the United States) planted Israel in the Arab world and then nurtured it with the intention of using the Jewish state as an "imperialist base," a bridgehead for dominating the entire region. For most Arabs, the history of Palestine is thus not simply the story of two peoples struggling for the same land, but rather evidence that unmasks the true and nefarious intentions of the West toward Arabs and Muslims in general.

            As a sign of anti-Western defiance, Palestine-as-symbol resonates beyond the Arab lands -- in Iran and, to a lesser extent, throughout the entire Muslim world. Precisely because it invokes a version of the history of relations between the Middle East as a whole and the West, Palestine is one of the few communal symbols that crosses religious, ethnic, and national lines. An Iranian Shi`ite, a Moroccan Sunni fundamentalist, and a Syrian Alawite who would never brush elbows at home can all stand united under the banner of Palestine. Although particularly well suited to Muslim immigrants living in the West (who frequently encounter shabby and discriminatory treatment from the majority populations in countries that also maintain good relations with Israel), the symbol's universalism works wherever Middle Easterners engage in mass politics. But, of course, it speaks most directly to Arab aspirations. To call for justice in Palestine is to decry the debasement of the entire Arab world in the modern period, to long for a more just and authentic political order in the Middle East, and to demand a change in the balance of power between Arabs and the West, represented today chiefly by the United States.

            There are many reasons why Washington should distance itself from misguided Israeli policies such as the building of settlements in the occupied territories, but among them should not be the hope that such a move would greatly affect the broader sources of resentment and despair that Palestine-as-symbol encompasses. If coupled with a stand-down on Iraq, moreover, dramatic pressure on Israel now might even inflame matters further, by calling into question American willingness to support its friends and oppose its enemies in the region.

            What the Bush administration seems to understand better than its critics is that the influence of the United States in the Arab-Israeli arena derives, to no small extent, from its status as the dominant power in the region as a whole -- and that this status, in turn, hinges on maintaining an unassailable American predominance in the Persian Gulf. It is worth remembering that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 came on the heels of the first Palestinian intifada, which also provoked much Arab hostility toward the United States. It was Saddam's defeat that cleared a space for the Madrid Conference and eventually the Oslo peace process. Then as now, defeating Saddam would offer the United States a golden opportunity to show the Arab and Muslim worlds that Arab aspirations are best achieved by working in cooperation with Washington. If an American road to a calmer situation in Palestine does in fact exist, it runs through Baghdad.

FUNDAMENTALISM HITCHES A RIDE

            After the September 11 attacks, many in the West wondered how important a concern Palestine was for Osama bin Laden and his followers. Some argued that undermining the United States and the dynastic regime in Saudi Arabia were bin Laden's top priorities, with Palestinian nationalism coming almost as an afterthought. Others saw Palestine as crucial. Citing bin Laden's frequent references to the issue, they argued that even if he personally had only limited interest in the matter, the prominence he accorded it demonstrated how greatly he felt his audience cared. To blunt the edge of radical Islamism, in this view, the United States must successfully address Palestinian concerns.

            For this second camp, al Qaeda's political intentions possess all the subtlety of a laundry list: (1) expel Crusaders from the Holy Land, (2) remove Jews from Jerusalem, and so on. Viewing these concerns in the context of Islamic fundamentalism and inter-Arab politics, however, leads to some skepticism about the role Palestine plays in the al Qaeda phenomenon.

            Bin Laden is a product of a radical Islamic reform movement that originated in the early twentieth century. In the eyes of its adherents this movement represents true religion itself and dates back to the Prophet Muhammad and, before him, to the dawn of human existence. Looking at the state of the Islamic world today, radical Islamists bemoan the degradation of their lands and ask, What went wrong? In formulating their answer, they hark back to a utopian view of early Islamic history -- a time when, as they see it, the companions of the Prophet marched successfully against the greatest empires of their day. In that golden age, the rulers were united in values with the virtuous among the ruled, and both obeyed God's laws.

            The comparison between the idealized past and the ugly present leads them to conclude that Muslims fell into their current state of degradation because they abandoned their true religion. This abandonment, in turn, is held to have two causes: the political, economic, and cultural rise of Western civilization; and the slavish subservience to the West by local, nominally Muslim rulers who use the power of the state to propagate Western values inimical to true Islam. The first is considered the "far enemy" and the second the "near enemy." Both present mortal threats to the umma, or universal Islamic community, that cannot be ignored.

            From the 1970s through the advent of al Qaeda in the 1990s, radical Islamists focused mainly on the near enemy, trying to launch revolutions against local rulers. They calculated that defeating the West required the creation of a base, a bastion of true Islam that could serve as the staging point for spreading their message throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Israel was placed firmly in the category of the far enemy; the struggle against Zionism was seen as a distraction from the essential goal of revolution at home. Israel, moreover, was considered an offshoot of the West -- a particularly ugly and irritating offshoot, to be sure, but not an independent element in the struggle.

            Bin Laden's own statements, including his 1998 fatwa against Crusaders and Jews, clearly portrayed Israel as a derivative factor. To al Qaeda, Palestine's travails were irrefutable evidence of hostile Western intentions toward Muslims. But they were hardly the only example of these intentions and were often mentioned alongside, say, the vast numbers of Iraqi babies the United States had allegedly starved by imposing sanctions on Saddam Hussein.

            After al Qaeda merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the late 1990s, however, Palestine moved to the center of its propaganda. Gone now from al Qaeda's statements were the long, rambling discussions of internal developments in Saudi Arabia, the ills of the Saudi dynasty, and the justification in Islamic law for attacking infidels. In one of the organization's first video statements released after September 11, for example, bin Laden's close associates Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sulayman Abu Ghayth held forth at length on Palestine. Bin Laden himself also had something to say on the matter, and his words were typical of the tone and content of his associates' message:

            That which America is suffering today is an insignificant thing compared to what we have been suffering for scores of years. ... In these very days, Israeli tanks and armored troop carriers have entered Jenin, Ramallah, Rafah, Beit Jala, and elsewhere ... in order to wreak havoc in Palestine, and we do not hear anyone who will raise his voice or lift a finger. ... Neither America nor anyone who lives in America will ever dream of peace until we experience it as a reality in Palestine.

            To interpret this statement properly, one needs to understand that the cause of Palestine is so deeply wrapped up with fundamental questions of identity in the Arab and Muslim worlds that a simple reference to it reveals almost nothing about the speaker's political agenda. A call to action over it, on the other hand, especially when accompanied by implied or overt criticism of government inaction, does reveal something: the speaker's opposition to the status quo. What the statement above shows, therefore, is bin Laden advancing his candidacy as an avenger, an opponent of the West and the corrupt Arab regimes that do its bidding. But it says nothing about his specific goals, nor does it even indicate that he has any practical concern for the fate of actual Palestinians. If anything, quite the opposite: Palestine-as-symbol works best when Palestine-as-place is burning.

            Bin Laden may have moved Palestine to the center of his propaganda on the advice of al-Zawahiri, who brought to the organization years of political experience and considerable acumen. Or he may have recognized that the outbreak of the second intifada created a regional atmosphere conducive to a message couched in Palestinian terms. Whatever the trigger, what matters is that in Palestine-as-symbol he found the perfect vehicle for his propaganda.

            Al Qaeda had been seeking to topple near enemies (such as the Saudi dynasty and the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt) by sparking a conflict with the far enemy (the United States). To achieve this, bin Laden needed a war that would polarize Arab countries between ruling elites allied with the United States and societies sympathetic to him and his cause. If he and his associates had gone before the world proclaiming that they had carried out the attacks in order to, say, raise up the shari`a, they would have alienated potentially valuable constituencies for whom questions of religion are not the main grievance. By spinning the attacks as retribution for crimes committed against Palestine, however, al Qaeda benefited from the symbol's universalism, the fact that it represents all grievances in the Middle East against the West and its local agents.

            In order to foster the broadest possible popular identification with the September 11 attacks, furthermore, the leaders of al Qaeda avoided taking direct responsibility for them, implying that the attacks expressed the collective will of the Islamic world itself. In their imagery, September 11 did not reflect the agenda of a specific political organization with its own parochial interests, but rather a belated counterattack in response to a prolonged war that the United States had been waging against Muslims everywhere -- a natural, even inevitable backlash against the oppressive status quo.

            Given such an ideological framework, it is hard to conceive of any plausible change in American policy with respect to Palestine that would appease bin Laden and his ilk. Radical Islamists are by nature revolutionaries, enemies of the prevailing order and enemies of the West. A practical solution to the Palestine question would solidify the status quo and further legitimate the presence of the United States in the region. Far from welcoming such developments, radical Islamists would consider them a catastrophe.

THE JAWF INTIFADA

            Al Qaeda invoked Palestine as a trump card in a game of Arab nationalist one-upmanship, trying to delegitimize the Saudi regime and weaken its grip on power. It was a kind of political theater that invited audience participation. When a figure such as Osama bin Laden attacks the United States, he hopes to energize disaffected groups and create cadres that, although mobilized in the name of Palestine, will actually work on behalf of local agendas.

            A similar phenomenon has been taking place recently in Al Jawf, a region located in northern Saudi Arabia east of the Jordanian border. In the two years since the second intifada broke out, Al Jawf has earned the distinction of being the only place in the Saudi kingdom repeatedly and consistently to defy laws criminalizing popular demonstrations. Matters reached a head last April 5 in the town of Sakaka, where about 4,000 angry young men congregated in town squares, burned Israeli and American flags, and called on Arab states to take action on behalf of the Palestinians. To restore order Saudi authorities had to dispatch three transport planes carrying 500 riot police, and for weeks afterward these forces continued to patrol the area.

            As extensive reporting in the London-based Arabic daily Al-Quds al-Arabi has made clear, the demonstrations "were organized in solidarity with the Palestinians and in protest over the neglect which the region is suffering at the hands of the government." Al Jawf is one of the most backward places in Saudi Arabia. Many towns in the region, including Sakaka, lack electricity and the basic amenities of modern life. Located far from ports and oil revenues, lacking access to the corridors of power, the residents of Al Jawf feel deprived. They secretly quote lines from their poet laureate, Dabis al-Murkhan, who immortalized the region's anti-Saudi sentiments: "By God, were the skies to rain sheikhs and agencies ffi the tyranny that has been heaped on us would not pass away.”

            Like bin Laden, in their protests the people of Al Jawf chose to express their grievances by playing the Palestine trump card. By decrying the "shameful Arab silence" in the face of Israeli military operations, they telegraphed to their government a simple message: prove that you are authentic Muslims and Arabs by taking meaningful action on Palestine. Of course, the protesters knew that the government, given its strong economic and security ties to the United States, would do no such thing, thus tacitly admitting its complicity in the oppression of fellow Arabs. What was really at issue in Al Jawf, therefore, was less Israeli-Palestinian relations than the legitimacy of the Saudi government -- something that can be seen from the details of the protests themselves.

            The demonstrations were organized by a group called the Popular Committee of the Jawf Region for the Support of the Palestinian People. Although on the surface there might seem to be little seditious about such an organization, in context it represented a direct challenge to the Saudi government, which had already established a number of its own official committees for supporting the Palestinians -- the most notable of these being the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, chaired by the interior minister, Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz, who among other duties runs the police and the secret police.

            In a limp attempt to undermine the protestors, Nayif stated that "those wanting to show support to their Palestinian brothers must do it with money, not words." And sure enough, three days later the Saudi government ran a telethon to raise money for the Palestinian cause. (This latter event was widely reported in the United States but rarely presented in its proper domestic, as opposed to international, context.)

            But the fund raiser did not satisfy the aspirations of protesters in Al Jawf, nor would more criticism of Israel and more diplomatic engagement in the Middle East by the United States. The wedge that separates Washington from Al Jawf and its sister regions throughout the Arab world does not depend primarily on whether Israel is prepared to yield 85 percent or 100 percent of the West Bank and Gaza, or even on whether Palestinians are fighting or living in peace. It stems more from the poverty, repression, and frustration that fuel the region's symbolic politics, and will remain until those larger issues are somehow addressed.

TRUMPING WASHINGTON

            Using Palestine as a trump card is not a new gambit. Since the foundation of the Arab League in 1945, the states of the region have been split into two camps: one supportive of the status quo and aligned with Western powers, and one hostile to it and them. The anti-status quo states have inevitably played the Palestine card in order to deny the Western powers loyal allies in the region. In the Middle East today, three major actors (Iraq, Iran, and Syria) and two minor ones (Hizbollah and al Qaeda) are all doing something similar. Their primary goal is to drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia. They fear the imposition of a Pax Americana in the region and regard Israeli-Palestinian violence as a tool for keeping the United States at bay. For them, in fact, the revolt in Palestine is, among other things, a proxy war against the United States.

            Recent developments in the Saudi-Iraqi relationship show how the game is played. Saddam Hussein first resorted to the tactic against Saudi Arabia in 1990. In preparation for the invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad expressed its casus belli in terms of Kuwait's alleged participation in a Zionist-imperialist conspiracy to destroy Iraq. Saddam accompanied this rhetoric with bellicose anti-Israel statements, such as his famous threat to burn half of the Jewish state with chemical weapons. When the American counterattack began, Saddam backed up his threats by targeting Israel with Scud missiles, trying to foster such unrest inside Saudi Arabia that it could not host the American troops required to oust the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At the time, Saddam's gambit failed. Over the last dozen years, however, he has continued to pursue the same strategy, and finally it is starting to pay dividends.

            Social changes inside Saudi Arabia since the Persian Gulf War have created a constituency that responds more readily to Saddam's lures. Today, two in five Saudis are under 15 years old. The country's population has exploded while its economy has stagnated, with the result that its per capita income has dropped. Under these conditions, a new generation of disaffected Saudi youth has come of age. Fifteen young Saudis attacked New York and Washington on September 11, approximately 80 more are in captivity in Guantanamo, and untold others are moldering in shallow graves in Afghanistan or filtering back home after the fall of the Taliban. These numbers alone suggest that more is going on inside Saudi Arabia than just the fact that, as official spokesmen would have it, a few suggestible young men fell in with the wrong crowd.

            Many from this generation hold the United States responsible for their plight and for the sad state of affairs in the Arab and Islamic worlds more generally. For its part, Riyadh has no ideological resources or public vocabulary with which to counter them and justify its dependence on the United States. Saddam plays the Palestinian card to exploit this gap between ruler and ruled. For the ploy to succeed, the disgruntled young need not admire Saddam personally, nor find the Iraqi model attractive, nor care one iota about the suffering of the Palestinians. Baghdad wins simply if a significant number of Saudis, for whatever motive, reject cooperation between Riyadh and Washington and hitch a ride on the Palestine issue as a means of expressing that rejection.

            Saddam's campaign enjoyed its greatest success at the Arab League summit in Beirut last March. The official symbolism of the meeting had Riyadh and Baghdad putting aside their differences in order to demonstrate unity at a moment when Israel, their putative common enemy, was at war with the Palestinians. The assembled leadership of the Arab world even raised a cheer when Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim received a kiss from Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

            If Palestine provided the symbolism for this Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement, however, it had little to do with the substance. The real story at Beirut was neither the Israeli incursion nor the peace plan that the Saudis floated as a response. It was the battle over Arab authenticity and regional order in the Persian Gulf. Riyadh and Baghdad were negotiating the fate of the Iraqi government, which stood uncomfortably under Washington's sword. Wrapping themselves in the Palestinian flag, Saudi Arabia and Iraq arrived at a quid pro quo: Iraq pledged to "respect the independence, sovereignty, and security of the state of Kuwait and safeguard its territorial integrity," and the other Arab states called for "lifting the sanctions on Iraq and ending the tribulation of the fraternal Iraqi people" while expressing their "categorical rejection of attacking Iraq." Saddam, meanwhile, granted Crown Prince Abdullah the pan-Arab legitimacy that he needed to prove to his own people that he was not a puppet of foreigners, in return for a Saudi pledge to reject any American plan to topple the Iraqi regime.

            The Beirut summit diminished the overtly abusive propaganda coming from Baghdad, but it did not end the Saudi-Iraqi conflict. Immediately after the summit adjourned, Saddam continued to make mischief. On April 6, the day after the riot in Sakaka, thousands of Saudi protesters marched on the U.S. consulate in Dhahran, chanting slogans calling for the government to turn off the flow of oil to the West. Saddam was clearly listening, and out of feigned concern for the Palestinians he obeyed the command. Two days later he announced his decision to stop the export of oil for 30 days "or until the armies of the Zionist entity withdraw unconditionally from the Palestinian territories they have occupied, and respect the will of the people of Palestine, and the will of the Arab nation." This was not a serious attempt at an economic embargo but a challenge to the Saudis either to follow suit or be seen as puppets of the Americans. And in fact, sandwiched between Saddam and their own public, the Saudis have continued to be leery of American invasion plans.

            Many saw the Saudi peace plan presented in Beirut as a beacon by which the United States could chart a new, more "evenhanded" Mideast policy. That plan calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders in return for full normalization between Israel and the Arab states. The fact that all of those Arab states signed off on the idea is certainly significant, marking as it does the first explicit suggestion of a potential all-Arab recognition of Israel. But the boldness of Riyadh's move has been greatly overrated.

            The Saudi plan was not about Palestine-as-place, but rather about balancing the demands of cultural authenticity against the need for an alliance with the United States. In Washington, the Saudis depict it as the work of peacemakers carrying water for American interests. At home, however, Riyadh can point to the plan and depict it as an ultimatum to Washington: "You Americans roll back the Israelis, or else!" The plan requires no practical action by the Saudis or, for that matter, by any Arab party until the far-off time when the Americans will have returned the situation in Palestine to its early 1967 status quo, at which stage Riyadh claims it will stand up and be counted. Far from getting themselves dirty with peace-processing, the Saudis cleverly devised a way to avoid touching Palestine for as long as possible, recognizing that in the end it can only burn them. When it comes to managing the conflict the United States is largely on its own, and Washington should plan accordingly.

            The dance between Baghdad and Riyadh demonstrates that for Arab states the Palestinian issue is a game of four-dimensional chess. When an Arab leader announces a policy toward the issue, he makes a move directed simultaneously at critics at home, Arab rivals abroad, the United States, and the Palestinians and Israelis themselves -- with the last being by far the least important audience. The sad fact is that with the possible exception of Jordan, alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people is not a primary policy objective of any Middle Eastern state. For Washington to mistake symbol for substance and tie itself into knots trying to resolve the Palestinian problem before tackling other matters would thus be a sucker's move, providing its enemies with even greater incentives to incite violence there while avoiding other arenas where it has greater freedom of action and chances for success.

FIRST THINGS FIRST

The United States' present dilemma stems directly from its role as guarantor of the contemporary Middle Eastern order. This order serves several important interests of the United States, regional governments and elites, and the international community at large. But it also fails to serve the interests of many of the people who actually live under it. Those who seek to overturn the regional status quo, such as al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, may be thought of as America's own "near enemies"; they represent clear and direct threats that must be countered firmly and effectively. But factors that contribute to the region's popular anger and despair constitute "far enemies" and must eventually be dealt with just as firmly and effectively if the American-sponsored order is to last and thrive over the longer term.

The United States must indeed help address the festering wound of Arab-Israeli conflict, for so long as several million Arabs chafe under unwanted foreign rule the realities of Palestine-as-place will continue to help fuel the disruptive power of Palestine-as-symbol. But those who say that it should be tackled before or instead of Iraq and al Qaeda have their strategic priorities backward. The near enemies must be met first, both because the danger from them is more urgent and because countering them successfully will actually ease the drawn-out task of addressing the far enemies of occupation, tyranny, and social and economic malaise.

The uneasy, decade-long stalemate with Iraq and halfhearted attempt to contain Iran have raised a question mark over the future of American power in the Persian Gulf. Policies that were intended as patchwork solutions to temporary problems have remained stuck in place even when the problems persisted, thanks largely to inertia and lack of attractive alternatives. Unpleasant for the United States, this has proved far more so for its local allies, especially the Saudis. The presence of large numbers of American troops on Saudi soil irritates nationalists and Islamists alike and eventually may come to threaten the stability of the Saudi regime.

Domestic and foreign opponents of Riyadh often express their hostility to the regime and its alliance with Washington through the rhetoric of Palestine, but care must be taken to distinguish symbol from substance. The new generation in Saudi Arabia, along with its many disaffected counterparts throughout the region, nurtures dreams of an authentic and independent Arab order -- a powerful, unified bloc of Muslims presenting a common face to the outside world. Radical Islamists and other opponents of the status quo are hard at work sending these youths a simple message: "The Americans are finished; your government has the ability to expel them, but for its own crass motives it chooses to ignore this policy option." The Saudi regime does not possess the ideological resources to sell the alliance to its public, and at a time when the American presence in the region appears under attack and on the defensive, the rebelliousness grows.

The first order of business for the United States must therefore be to demonstrate forcefully that challenges to its authority in the region will be defeated. Its near enemies can be met in no other way, since their opposition to the present order is deep-rooted and total. Unless America is prepared to abandon its position and pull back from the region, as the British did three and a half decades ago, it must carry its struggle against al Qaeda and Saddam to the finish, putting an end to all doubt regarding its resolve. Thwarting Saddam's ambitions and continuing to root out bin Laden's henchmen and associates, moreover, will do more than take care of immediate menaces. It will also serve to sober up onlookers with oppositionist ambitions of their own, making them recalculate the odds of defying a power that has demonstrated its intention to remain a permanent and dynamic regional player.

            Once the near enemies have been bested, however, the moment will arrive to launch a vigorous and sustained effort to address the far enemies, as the crucial second stage in strengthening the Pax Americana. Unless the suppression of Saddam is seen to lead to a better life for the Iraqi population, and unless American strength and resolve is used on behalf of all the region's people, not simply the governments of American allies, then a new set of near enemies will certainly arise and have to be dealt with in their turn. In the long run, the strength and passion of Palestine-as-symbol will be sapped only by the creation of a new, more persuasive historical narrative that allows the people of the Middle East to see the United States, and the West more generally, as their partner in the quest for a better life.

by Michael Scott Doran, From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10219-p50/michael-scott-doran
/palestine-iraq-and-american-strategy.html

 

Military Action In Iraq since 1990-2003

2003

Jan. 26, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target five cable repeater sites that could be used for communications in targeting coalition aircraft. The cable repeater sites were located between Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strikes occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m. EST , and were mounted after Iraqi military aircraft violated the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 25, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British participation, used precision-guided weapons to target an anti-air artillery site near Tallil, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 6:20 a.m. EST.   The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 24, 2003: Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 07:15 a.m. EST over communication facilities near An Najaf , approximately 85 miles east southeast of Baghdad , and Umm Qasr and Al Zubayr, both located on the Al Faw Peninsula, approximately 290 miles southeast of Baghdad . A total of 360,000 leaflets were dropped.

The same day, U.S. aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi air defense command and control communication facility, about 5 miles southeast of Al Haswah. The facility was targeted because its presence was a hostile threat to coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 23, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 12:30 p.m. EST over a communication facility near Al Amarah, approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets. The leaflets urged Iraqi military not to repair previously bombed communication equipment and facilities that aid in tracking and engaging aircraft enforcing the No-fly zone. This was the sixth leaflet drop over southern Iraq by coalition aircraft in 2003. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 19, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target eight unmanned cable repeater sites that are part of Iraq’s military air defense command and control system. The sites were located between Al Kut, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 7:10 a.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. The same day other aircraft dropped a total of 360,000 leaflets at approximately 7:16 a.m. EST over Ar Rumaythah, Qawam Al Hamazah, Ash Shahtra, Ar Riffa, Qal’ at Sukkar and Al Majar. The six cities are all located approximately 130 to 225 miles southeast of Baghdad . (CENTCOM)

Jan. 18, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . The leaflets were dropped at approximately 3:45 a.m. EST over Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 180,000 leaflets. The leaflets referred Iraqis to radio frequencies where coalition forces are broadcasting information about UN Security Council Resolution 1441, UN weapons inspectors in Iraq , Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s reign and other topics. (CENTCOM)
Jan. 17, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two cable repeater sites that are part of Iraq’s military air defense command and control system. The sites were located between Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and An Nasiriyah, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The strikes occurred at approximately 1:15 p.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
Jan. 13, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped the leaflets at approximately 7:10 a.m. EST over An Najaf , about 85 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over the location. This was the fourteenth leaflet drop over southern Iraq by Coalition aircraft in three months. (CENTCOM)
Jan. 13, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an Iraqi anti-ship missile launcher near Basrah, approximately 300 miles southeast of Baghdad, at approximately 4:10 a.m. EST. The anti-ship missile launcher was targeted because it was threatening coalition ships operating in the North Arabian Gulf . (CENTCOM)

Jan. 10, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense command and control site at Tallil, approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and four cable repeater sites. The strikes occurred at approximately 7:15 a.m. EST. The coalition mounted the attack after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)
Jan. 8, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to attack two Iraqi air defense cable repeater sites in the southern No-fly zone at about 5 a.m. EST. The attack occurred after Iraqi air defense forces fired anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly zone, as well as in response to Iraqi military aircraft violating the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 6, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi military mobile radars. The radars were located near Al Amarah, approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 3:30 p.m. EST. and came after Iraqi forces moved the radars into the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 5, 2003: The Boston Globe reports that about 100 U.S. Special Forces personnel and 50 CIA officers have been operating throughout Iraq for four months, adding weight to earlier stories reporting a U.S. covert presence.

 Jan. 4, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over the southern Iraqi towns of Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, and As Samawah, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. The drop, totaling 240,000 leaflets, occurred at approximately 6:15 a.m. EST. The same day, precision-guided weapons were used to target three Iraqi military air defense cable repeater sites after Iraqi air defense forces fired multiple anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles at coalition aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)

Jan. 2, 2003: For the twelfth time in three months, U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 5:15 a.m. EST over Basrah and An Nasiriyah. Basrah is approximately 245 miles southeast of Baghdad , and An Nasiriyah is approximately 170 miles southeast of Baghdad . The aircraft dropped a total of 480,000 leaflets, directing Iraqis to radio frequencies where coalition forces are broadcasting information, over both locations. The same day, aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target four Iraqi air defense cable repeaters after Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fired at coalition aircraft in the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)
 Jan. 1, 2003: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons  to target an Iraqi military air defense radar. The site was located near Al Qurnah, approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strike occurred at approximately 1:15 a.m. EST. The U.S. Central Command said the radar was targeted after it was moved into the no-fly zone, thus becoming a threat to U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the zone. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 30, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi military air defense communications facilities and a mobile air defense radar. The coalition struck the communications facilities at approximately 2:30 p.m. EST ; they struck the mobile radar at approximately 3:40 p.m. EST. The communications facilities were targeted after Iraq earlier flew military aircraft into the Southern No-Fly zone. The mobile radar was attacked after Iraqi forces moved it into the Southern No-Fly Zone, as its presence was a direct threat to coalition aircraft and crews. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 29, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi military radar sites. The sites were located near Ad Diwaniyah, approximately 75 miles south of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 7:40 a.m. EST. The Coalition mounted the strike after Iraqi forces moved the systems into the Southern No-Fly zone. Its presence was a threat to coalition aircraft. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 28, 2002: Coalition aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped leaflets at approximately 8:00 a.m. EST over Al Majar and Qal at Sukkar. Al Majar is approximately 200 miles southeast of Baghdad , and Qal at Sukkar is approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 120,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 27, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense command and control system near Al Kut that supported highly mobile surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. The strike occurred at approximately 2:00 p.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi forces moved the system, a threat to coalition aircraft, into the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 27, 2002: For the tenth time in three months, U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq . Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 6:30 a.m. EST south of Ad Diwaniyah, approximately 75 south of Baghdad , Ar Rumaytha, approximately 200 miles southeast of Baghdad and Qawam Al Hamzah, approximately 240 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over the three locations. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 26, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, use precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi military command and control communication facilities. The facilities were located near Tallil, approximately 175 miles southeast of Baghdad . The strikes occurred at approximately 12:00 a.m. EST. The coalition launched the attack after Iraqi military aircraft violated the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 23, 2002: At approximately 7:30 a.m. (EST), a U.S. RQ-1A Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance aircraft was reported missing in Southern Iraq after being fired upon by Iraqi military aircraft. The Predator was assumed destroyed. (CENTCOM)
Dec. 23, 2002: For the ninth time in three months, U.S. aircraft dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq .  Coalition forces dropped leaflets at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST over Ash Shahtra and Ar Rifa, approximately 140 miles southeast of Baghdad .  The coalition dropped a total of 120,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)
Dec. 21, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped informational leaflets over southern Iraq .  Coalition forces dropped leaflets over Al Amarah at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST and over As Samawah at approximately 5 a.m. EST. Al Amarah is approximately 165 miles southeast of Baghdad , and As Samawah is approximately 130 miles southeast of Baghdad . The coalition dropped a total of 240,000 leaflets over both locations. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 20, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target two Iraqi air defense communication facilities. The sites were located near An Nasiriyah and Al Basrah in southern Iraq . The strikes occurred at approximately 2:30 a.m. EST. The coalition forces executed the strike after Iraqi military aircraft flew into the Southern No-Fly zone. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 18, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi military air defense radar site. The site was located south of Al Kut, approximately 100 miles southeast of Baghdad , and it was struck at approximately 4:30 a.m. EST. The coalition executed the strike after Iraqi forces moved the radar system into the Southern No-Fly Zone. (CENTCOM)

Dec. 16, 2002: U.S. aircraft, with possible British involvement, dropped 480,000 leaflets at about 4 a.m. EST over southern Iraq . Leaflets containing six separate messages were dropped at six locations, including near communications facilities that were damaged or destroyed by coalition aircraft flying Operation Southern Watch missions on Dec. 14. Leaflets dropped at those locations warned Iraqi forces that the coalition has targeted fiber optic cables for destruction and that repairing the facilities would place Iraqi military lives at risk.

Other leaflets:

•     referred Iraqis to radio frequencies where they could hear broadcasts by coalition forces providing information;

•     warned Iraqi air defenses that targeting coalition aircraft or tracking them with radar could result in coalition air strikes;

•     stated that coalition aircraft enforce the no-fly zones to protect the Iraqi people, and that threatening coalition aircraft may result in air strikes.

This was the seventh leaflet drop over southern Iraq over the October-December period. ( U.S. CENTCOM)

Dec. 16: In response to Iraqi SAM artillery fire against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi communication site located south of Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Dec. 15: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi mobile radar and cable repeater sites located near An Nasiriyah, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Basra, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraqi forces moved the mobile radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the southern no-fly zone and targeted coalition aircraft with SAM artillery fire. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Dec. 14: In response to violation of the southern no-fly zone by Iraqi military aircraft, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target multiple Iraqi military air defense communications facilities located near Al Kut; Aal’at Sukkar, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad; and Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Dec. 10: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system located south of Al Amarah after Iraqi forces moved the SAM system south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Dec. 7: The Iraqi government delivered a declaration approximately 12,000 pages long to the United Nations today in compliance with the Dec.18 deadline set by the UN Resolution 1441. According to Iraqi officials, the documents contain full and complete details about Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear programs while maintaining that the country harbors no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In so doing, Iraq has passed up a final opportunity to acknowledge any WMD it may have, and so, protect itself against evidence UN inspectors may uncover. The declaration mainly focuses on accounting for civilian facilities and equipment that could be used to make weapons. (The Washington Post)

Dec. 2: In what looks like further preparation for a possible war with Iraq, the United States is installing a command center at As Sayliyah base in Qatar for the official purpose of conducting a major military exercise called Internal Look in December. The exercise will involve the same command and control procedures that would be used in a war with Iraq. This will mark the first time the U.S. military has conducted a war game of this type outside of the United States. The As Sayliyah base covers 262 acres and cost more than $100 million to build. It can store hundreds of M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles and is capable of housing enough armored equipment for a heavy Army brigade. The base currently houses about 300 American troops. Many weapons continue to be shipped from As Sayliyah to Kuwait. Given the base’s existing capabilities, the new command center at As Sayliyah may lead to the establishment of a future U.S. military headquarters there. (The New York Times)

Dec. 1: In response to Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fire against coalition aircraft in the northern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target Iraqi air defense facilities located between Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Basrah, about 240 miles southeast of Baghdad. Thirteen coalition aircraft dropped 23 precision-guided weapons, marking one the biggest coalition strikes this year. This also marks the first time that U.S. military officials cited an incident in the north as the reason for a military response in the south since the no-fly zones were established 10 years ago, signaling an escalation in the U.S. response to Iraq and increasing pressure for Iraq to disarm. This incident also reflects that the U.S. military can more freely carry out retaliatory attacks in the southern no-fly zone than in the northern no-fly zone due to Turkey’s close involvement with operations in the north. Turkey is more sensitive about which targets get hit by coalition aircraft than are the countries that facilitate coalition operations in the south. An Iraqi military spokesman claims that the coalition warplanes targeted a state-run Southern Oil Company on the outskirts of Al Basrah, and that four people were killed and 27 were injured in the attack. He also said that coalition aircraft attacked two other civilian targets in the south and that Iraqi defenses had fired in response. An oil company official identified the casualties as company employers and passers-by. (U.S. CENTCOM, The New York Times, The Washington Times, The Washington Post)

Nov. 23: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile radar system located south of Al Amarah after Iraq moved the mobile radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 22: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target unmanned communications facilities south of Al Amarah, about 165 miles south of Baghdad, after an Iraqi military jet violated the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 21: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an Iraqi air defense radar site near Ash Shuaybah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraq moved the radar south of the 33rd parallel in violation of the established southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

In response to the movement of an air defense radar site south of the 33rd parallel by Iraq in violation of the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target the radar site near Tallil. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 20: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target three unmanned air defense communications facilities located between Al Basrah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, and Al Kut. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 18: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two air defense communications facilities and one air defense radar facility. The radar facility and one communication facility were located near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. The other air defense facility was located near Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Several hundred Marines based in Camp Pendleton were dispatched to the Middle East to join the central command area of operations. The units included many battle planners and senior staff officers. Some of the troops will participate in military exercises in Kuwait to test the military's capability to assemble and deploy forces over long distances. According to Camp Pendleton Capt. David Romley, "Units from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force are departing to support Operation Enduring Freedom." Another several hundred Marines left San Diego for the Gulf region around the same time. (Orange County Register)

Nov. 17: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense system northeast of Mosul in response to Iraqi fire targeting coalition aircraft monitoring the northern no-fly zone. According to an Iraqi military spokesman, coalition aircraft bombed civilian targets near Mosul. (The Washington Post)

Nov. 15: In response Iraqi antiaircraft artillery fire and surface-to-air missiles targeting coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense communications facility near An Najaf, about 85 miles southeast of Baghdad. This marks the first exchange of fire between Iraqi and coalition forces since UN Resolution 1441; although the Bush administration says that the incident puts Iraq in 'material breach' of the resolution, it is improbable that it will trigger a U.S.-led attack on Iraq. (U.S. CENTCOM, Los Angeles Times)

Nov. 13: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announces that Iraq will "deal with" UN Resolution 1441, according to which he will have to allow UN inspectors to search for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and production facilities for such weapons. (Los Angeles Times, CBSNews.com)

Nov. 10: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two SAM sites near Tallil that were relocated into the southern no-fly zone by Iraq in violation of UN resolutions the sites were perceived as a threat for aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov 8: The UN Security Council unanimously passes the tough Resolution 1441 on Iraq calling for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to disband all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs or face 'serious consequences'. Through the new resolution, inspectors have the authority to demand "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to all sites, including presidential palaces. (The Washington Post)

Nov. 7: In response to hostile fire from Iraqi SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense operations facility and integrated operations center near Al Kut. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 6: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target two surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, and a control communications facility near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Nov. 4: Kuwait offers the use of its military bases to American forces in the case of a UN-backed attack on Iraq. Kuwaiti forces, however, would not be involved in such an attack. (Washington Times)

Oct. 26: A solicitation is posted for a U.S. or foreign-flag self sustaining container vessel to transport dry cargo consisting of approximately 550 TEUs of ammunition from the U.S. East Coast to four ports located in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. (Military Sealift Command via www.eps.gov)

Oct. 25: According to a Croatian police source, there is evidence that a seized ship leaving Yugoslavia was heading to Iraq loaded with military equipment. The ship was seized this week in the port of Rijeka on Croatia's Adriatic Coast with the help of the United States and NATO allies. The ship was apparently carrying material used in the ignition of Scud missiles. (The Associated Press)

Oct. 24: According to top military officers, the U.S. Air Force has begun using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) called Predators to strike targets in southern Iraq. Predators are able to hover for 24 hours over a target, record high-resolution images and communicate them to command centers in real-time, and are armed with Hellfire missiles. Predators have been helping to monitor the southern no-fly zone in conjunction with other coalition aircraft for about a month, but usually unarmed and strictly for performing surveillance. Now, Predators identify the source of surface-to-air and anti-aircraft artillery fire in the no-fly zone and respond by launching Hellfire missiles at the targets. (The Washington Post)

Oct. 22: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense communications facility near Al Jarrah, about 90 miles southeast of Baghdad, and an air defense operations center near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile fire against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)

Northeast of Mosul, about 250 miles north of Baghdad, coalition aircraft targeted other elements of the air defense system after being targeted by Iraqi fire, according to the U.S. European Command. (The Washington Post)

The first of two large Military Sealift Command ships was loaded with cargo at the Army dock of the Charleston Naval Weapons Station. The 841st Transportation Battalion supervised the loading of 2,000 pieces of cargo, mostly fuel trucks and engineering equipment. Command spokesman Frank Randall said, "This is surge sealift, in response to a specific requirement. It is mostly Army Reserve equipment and part of the war on terrorism, but I can't say if it has anything to do with Iraq." The ships, both Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on roll-off vessels (LMSRs), are bound for the Middle East to support U.S. CENTCOM activities, although the precise destination of the ships has not been released. The first ship, the Bob Hope, has been loaded with 8,300 metric tons worth of equipment. The second ship, the Fisher, is scheduled to be loaded with 6,600 metric tons in the next few days. (The Baltimore Sun)

Oct. 21: According to Iraqi opposition officials, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established two formal field offices in Kurdish-controlled territory protected by coalition aircraft, marking the first time the CIA has had a permanent base in northern Iraq since 1996. One office is in Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled territory, another is in Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) controlled territory. (The Washington Times)

Oct. 16: Saddam Hussein wins re-election by a reported 11 million-to-0 margin in a one-man, yes or no referendum, further extending his two-decade rule. (CNN)

Oct. 15: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a command and control communications facility near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Oct. 11: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile SAM site near Tallil in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Los Angeles Times)

The U.S. Army’s V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force have orders from the Pentagon to deploy headquarters staff to Kuwait. According to defense officials, this is the first non-routine dispatch of conventional ground forces to the Persian Gulf and is part of preparations for possible military action against Iraq. (The Washington Post)

Commercial bids on two large merchant ships are being sought by the Navy, according to the Navy’s Military Sealift Command. One ship will be scheduled to load in California in mid-October, and the other will come from ports in Belgium and Italy concurrently. According to the U.S. military, this now brings to six the total number of large cargo ships chartered in support of military exercises in Kuwait and Jordan by the Navy since August.

Oct. 10: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) site near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)

At the same time as the Tallil strike, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense radar system near Basra, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to Iraqi hostile SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. According to the Iraqi News Agency, the radar system was destroyed and passenger and service buildings at the Basra airport were damaged. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)

Oct. 7: U.S. President George W. Bush delivers a speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center outlining the case for possible military action against Iraq. Bush stresses that the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers - a tyrant with a history of aggression and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - in one place. He uses many of the same arguments posed during his speech to the United Nations on Sept. 12, 2002, notably citing new evidence to link al Qaeda with the Iraqi regime, and satellite photographs proving that Iraq is rebuilding nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) production facilities anew. Bush says that Iraq can avoid conflict if it adheres to UN resolutions.

Oct. 3: President George W. Bush signed a National Security Presidential Directive authorizing U.S. combat training for Iraqi opposition fighters, allocating $92 million in Defense Department funds to the effort and marking a break from the 1998 directive signed by former President Bill Clinton restricting expenditures to non-lethal instruction. About 5,000 recruits have been identified for an initial training program scheduled to begin next month, the force they will form is expected to eventually number about 10,000. The Iraqis will be instructed in basic combat and special skills to serve as battlefield advisers, scouts and interpreters in support of U.S. ground troops in the event of an invasion. Later phases of the program will include training Iraqis as forward spotters for laser-guided bombs and as military police to run prisoner of war camps inside Iraq. Many of the names of recruits were part of a list of exiles provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in London. The recruits will be trained outside of the United States and not in the Middle East. The move indicates further preparation for a possible attack on Iraq. (The Washington Post)

Oct. 3: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft struck an Iraqi air defense sector headquarters and integrated operations center with precision-guided weapons near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Oct. 1: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a mobile radar in Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, after Iraq placed the mobile radar past the 33rd parallel in the southern no-fly zone, and Iraqi aircraft penetrated the restricted area. (Los Angeles Times, U.S. CENTCOM)

Sept. 28: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military mobile radar near Al Basrah, and a SAM site near Qalat Sikur, in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone at approximately 5:00 p.m. EDT. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Sept. 27: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a SAM control radar and a SAM launcher near Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and an air defense operations center near Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, at approximately 4:30 p.m. EDT. (U.S. CENTCOM)

Sept. 26: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites near Qalat Sikur, about 130 miles southeast of Baghdad, and in Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad at 3:45 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. EDT, respectively. The strikes were in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. (U.S. CENTCOM)

British and U.S. aircraft used precision munitions to strike an Iraqi air defense communications facility near Al Amrah, about 200 miles south of Baghdad, in the southern no-fly zone. (The Associated Press)

Sept. 25: Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike Iraqi air defense facilities near Al Kufa, about 80 miles south of Baghdad, and Al Basrah at approximately 4:45 p.m. EDT. The strikes were in response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. According to the official Iraqi News Agency, Iraqi government officials said that the targets hit were civilian and service installations. They also claimed that civilians were injured at Al Basrah. A U.S. government official produced a classified photograph that showed the targets hit were remote from any houses, stores or major roads, and that although two precision-guided missiles went astray, they hit only empty desert. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld accused Iraq of "lying to inflame the public opinion against the United States." Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that radar targets hit at Al Basrah were in a stretch of desert beyond the military side of the dual-use civilian military airport located there. Rumsfeld emphasized that "the only reason anybody would be out in this vicinity of this particular radar at any time of day would be to actually be functioning as part of the radar team." (U.S. CENTCOM, The New York Times)

Sept. 24: In response to Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an Iraqi radar facility near Al Amarah, about 165 miles southeast of Baghdad, and a defense communications facility in Tallil, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad at approximately 2:15 p.m. EDT. According to an Iraqi military spokesman, coalition aircraft violated Iraqi airspace at about 9:30 p.m. local time flying in from Kuwait, and "attacked… civilian and service installations in Dhi qar and Meisan provinces, hurting one civilian." The spokesman said that coalition aircraft returned to their bases after being fired upon by Iraqi ground air defenses. (U.S. CENTCOM, The Washington Post)

Sept. 20: Hussein announces that Iraq "is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." He appealed to the United Nations to resist the Bush administration's call for support for a military strike against the Iraqi government. Hussein also stated that Baghdad is "ready to cooperate with the Security Council" regarding renewed UN weapons inspections, and demanded that the United Nations lift sanctions on Iraq and force Israel to eliminate all its weapons of mass destruction according to UN resolutions calling for the removal of all such weapons from the Middle East.

Sept. 16: Iraq's foreign minister announced that UN weapons inspections would resume in Iraq "without conditions." UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called the Iraqi move an "indispensable first step towards an assurance that Iraq no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction." The White House, however, emphasized that inspections are not enough, and that the goal should be to disarm Iraq and ensure that it complies with all UN resolutions. U.S. officials are concerned that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein will attempt to dupe inspectors as he has in the past, and is only allowing the inspections in order to weaken U.S. efforts to build an international coalition for action against Iraq. The Bush administration plans to continue to press for a new UN resolution that will state that Iraq is in violation of existing UN resolutions, outline what Iraq must do and make clear the consequences should Iraq fails to comply. (The Washington Post)

The Pentagon asks Britain for permission to build special shelters on its air base on the Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean for as many as six B-2 bombers. Should Britain agree, it would mark the first time B-2 stealth bombers have been based overseas for a combat mission, said a defense official. It would also mark a significant escalation in preparations for possible U.S. military action against Iraq. "Even a small number of B-2s can wipe out Iraqi air defenses in a few days and clear the skies for coalition air power to take out Iraqi targets," said Daniel Goure, a Lexington Institute senior analyst. According to defense officials, the U.S. has also been transferring munitions to warehouses in Diego Garcia and Qatar from the United States. (The Wall Street Journal)

U.S. officials admit that U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq have adopted new tactics designed to cause increased and more lasting damage to Iraqi air defenses. These new tactics include more emphasis on strikes on buildings — especially command and communication links in Iraq's air defense system — and other fixed targets rather than mobile targets such as radars and surface-to-air launchers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the change last month because U.S. and British aircraft were coming under more effective Iraqi fire. British officials have confirmed that RAF Tornado GR.4s will be equipped with stand-off cruise missiles in the next few months when patrolling no-fly zones. (The London Telegraph)

Sept. 15: At 9:35 a.m. local time, American and British aircraft violated Iraqi airspace "flying from bases in Kuwait and carrying out 38 sorties," according to an Iraqi military spokesman. The spokesman said that coalition aircraft attacked civilian and service installations in the Dhi-Qar province, about 230 miles south of Baghdad, and retreated after meeting with Iraqi air defense fire. According to U.S. CENTCOM, the air strikes were carried out in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts. CENTCOM also confirmed that U.S. and British aircraft struck an air defense communications facility near Tallil, about 160 miles southeast of Baghdad. (The Washington Post)

Sept. 12: U.S. President George W. Bush delivers his speech to the United Nations making a case for action against Iraq. Sept. 11 reports on moving CENTCOM headquarters are clarified; the HQ will shift to Qatar in November for the period of a week-long exercise.

Sept. 11: U.S. military sources reveal that U.S. Central Command headquarters will be moved from Tampa, Fla., to Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, the capital of Qatar. Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander in chief, did not confirm this, but he did admit that shifting some operations and personnel to Qatar permanently is under consideration. This move would signify an escalation in preparations for possible military action against Iraq, and the emergence of Qatar as a key strategic U.S. ally in the region.

Sept. 9: 1:30 a.m. EST. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense command and control facility in southern Iraq, near Al Amarah, about 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

Sept. 7: 12:45 p.m. GMT. U.S. Air Force aircraft attacked an Iraqi Silkworm anti-ship missile site in southern Iraq, near Basra, in response to attempts by the radar of an Iraqi Silkworm missile to lock on to a U.S. ship transferring arms and equipment from its al-Udeid base in Qatar to Kuwait. This attack marks an apparent escalation of operations over the no-fly zones--previously coalition forces have concentrated fire on air defense sites directly threatening their aircraft. The Chinese-made Silkworm surface-to-air anti-ship missile has a range of 59 miles, which would allow it to hit any ship preparing to dock in Kuwait.

4:15 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military communications facility in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 100 miles southeast of Baghdad.

Sept. 6: 5:45 p.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a ground-launched anti-ship missile in southern Iraq, near Al Basrah, about 245 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile threats against coalition ships in the Arabian Gulf.

Sept. 5: American and British aircraft participated in an attack on Iraq's major western air defense installation at the H3 airfield, about 240 miles west of Baghdad, close to Jordan. According to the Pentagon, the strike was a response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. Marine Corps Lt. Col. David Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman, said that the raid involved 24 aircraft, including 12 that dropped about 20 bombs. Lapan also stated that there have been three other strikes carried out this year that used 24 total aircraft. The London Daily Telegraph reported that up to 100 aircraft were involved in this strike. If correct, this would be an unusually large strike; U.S. officials refused to confirm that 100 aircraft took part, and later on, the British RAF tried to dispel that impression, saying there had been a mistake. Reportedly, this is the biggest single operation over the country for four years. The raid seemed designed to destroy air defenses to allow easy access for Special Forces helicopters to fly into Iraq via Jordan or Saudi Arabia to hunt down Scud missiles before a possible war.

Sept. 4: Reports surface that a large civilian cargo ship to carry tanks and heavy armor to the Persian Gulf has been contracted by the U.S. Navy. It is chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Command to arrive in the Persian Gulf in late September. This marks the third shipment in a month. The ship will originate from a port on the southeastern coast of the United States. According to the formal tender document, the ship will carry 67 units of track general cargo, containerized cargo and rolling stock in measurements that match those of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank.

Sept. 3: Reports in The Wall Street Journal indicate that U.S. pre-positioned equipment in Qatar has been moved to Kuwait, bringing the total of equipment in the emirate to levels capable of equipping two heavy brigades.

Aug. 30: U.S. and British fighters attacked a major Iraq army intelligence and air-defense installation in southern Iraq, in Ashar, south of Basra, according to Iraqi opposition sources. Four air-to-ground missiles struck the facility. A later attack on Tuesday destroyed a radar site in the north according to Iraqi opposition sources. The hit facility was headquarters to Iraqi Army intelligence in the southern region and was also the site of advanced radar and surveillance equipment used to monitor ground and air traffic in Iran.

2:30 a.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a surface-to-air missile site in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 150 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

Aug. 29: 3:45 p.m. EDT. Coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike a military radar system in southern Iraq, near Al Kut, about 150 miles southeast of Baghdad, in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

Aug. 27: 2:30 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike an air defense command and control facility near An Nukhayb in southern Iraq.

Aug. 26: U.S. CENTCOM stated that, "coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two air defense radar systems near Al Basrah" in southern Iraq, in response to hostile acts by Iraq. According to the official Iraqi News Agency, U.S. and British planes attacked "civilian and service installations in Basrah province". Eight people were killed and nine were injured in "35 sorties" flown from "air bases in Kuwait" according to the Iraqi News Agency. A British Defense Ministry spokesman would not say if British aircraft, U.S. aircraft or both were involved in the strikes.

Allied warplanes hit an Iraqi radar guidance facility in northern Iraq after "an Iraqi missile guidance radar system in an area near Irbil targeted coalition aircraft while they were conducting routing enforcement of the northern no-fly zone," according to U.S. defense officials.

Aug. 25: 2:30 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to strike two air defense radar systems near Al Basrah in southern Iraq.

Aug. 23: U.S. warplanes bombed an air defense site in northern Iraq, near Irbil, after being targeted by an Iraqi missile guidance radar system, according to the U.S. military. In Baghdad, an unidentified Iraqi military spokesman said Iraqi antiaircraft and missile units fired at enemy warplanes, forcing them to leave Iraqi skies, according to the Iraqi News Agency.

Aug. 22: U.S. CENTCOM stated that U.S. aircraft attacked air defense and command and control facilities in the Missan province in southern Iraq "in response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone." According to the Iraqi Air Force Command, three civilians were killed.

Aug. 21: Second tour is given to journalists in August by Iraqi officials of a site that U.S. officials suspect may be a biological weapons facility. (The Washington Post, Aug. 21, 2002, p. A18)

Aug. 20: 1:40 a.m. EDT. In response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft used precision-guided weapons to target an air defense command and control facility in southern Iraq, Al Amarah, about 120 miles southeast of Baghdad.

Aug. 17: 6:30 a.m. EDT. The Pentagon stated that British and U.S. fighter jets used precision-guided weapons to target a mobile radar unit in southern Iraq's no-fly zone in response to recent hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone. Iraq claims the strikes hit civilian and public buildings. Earlier in the week, Britain confirmed that coalition plans attacks targets in the same region.

Aug. 14: 5:00 p.m. EDT. U.S. CENTCOM said that aircraft from the U.S. and British coalition attacked two Iraqi air defense sites in southern Iraq with precision-guided weapons as a response to Iraqi actions that threatened the coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone.

Aug. 13: An announcement is made that two shiploads of military equipment are to be moved into the Persian Gulf.

Aug. 12: Reports appear of U.S. troops buildup at airbases on the Jordanian/Iraqi border.

June 26: Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from a site north of Ayn Zalah while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on an element of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

June 19: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites in the vicinity of Saddam dam while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on an element of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

May 28: Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from a site in the vicinity of Saddam dam while ONW aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attack by dropping precision guided ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

May 1: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites in the vicinity of Saddam dam around 3:20 p.m. local time while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision guided ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

Apr. 19: Iraqi air defense radar actively target coalition aircraft from locations east of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by firing precision ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

March 29: Reports say that reallocation of forces in Afghanistan leaves key U.S. unit, 5th Special Forces Group, available for Iraq buildup.

Feb. 28: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul at U.S. aircraft conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond in self defense to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision munitions on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.

Feb. 4: Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery from sites northeast of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping precision ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.

2001

Nov. 27: (between Nov. 26 and Nov. 28, exact date unknown) Coalition aircraft use precision-guided weapons to strike a command and control facility within the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi threats against coalition planes.

Oct. 13: Coalition aircraft fire precision-guided munitions at a command and control facility within the southern no-fly zone.

Oct. 10: A U.S. Air Force RQ-1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is reported missing during a monitoring mission of the southern no-fly zone.

Oct. 2: U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons, in response to Iraqi threats against aircraft monitoring the zone. A day later, two more anti-aircraft gun sites are struck.

Sept. 27: Coalition aircraft attack anti-aircraft guns and command and control vehicles and equipment in open fields in the southern no-fly zone following Iraqi threats to aircraft monitoring the zone.

Sept. 20: Coalition aircraft strike anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone following Iraqi threats against earlier coalition patrols. A day later, further attacks are launched upon command and control vehicles and equipment in the southern no-fly zone.

Sept. 18: U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.

Sept. 11: A Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is lost in the course of a surveillance mission monitoring the southern no-fly zone.

Sept. 9: Coalition aircraft attack SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi hostile actions against coalition aircraft monitoring the zone.

Sept. 4: Iraqi anti-aircraft guns north of Mosul fire at coalition aircraft conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by delivering munitions on parts of the Iraqi air defense system. In the southern no-fly zone, precision-guided weapons are used to attack anti-aircraft gun and SAM sites.

Aug. 28: Coalition aircraft use precision-guided weapons to attack command and control facilities in the southern no-fly zone. Two days later, a military radar site is struck.

Aug. 27: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft guns from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. In the southern no-fly zone, an unarmed U.S. Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle monitoring the zone is reported missing, possibly crashed or shot down.

Aug. 25: Coalition aircraft fire precision-guided munitions at a mobile early warning radar in the southern no-fly zone in response to Iraqi threats against coalition aircraft.

Aug. 17: Iraqi forces threaten coalition aircraft by firing anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond in self defense to the Iraqi attacks by delivering ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

Aug. 14: In response to Iraqi threats to coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft strike a SAM site.

Aug. 10: Coalition aircraft bomb three communications, radar and missile sites in the southern no-fly zone after Iraq increases efforts to shoot down allied pilots.

Aug. 7: Iraqi forces launch SAM and fired anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

July 18: A U.S. Air Force F-16 Falcon crash at about 10:14 a.m. Turkish local time near Batman, Turkey. The F-16's home base was Aviano Air Base, in Italy. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was flying over Turkey en route to a mission enforcing the northern no-fly zone over Iraq. The piloted ejected and was uninjured.

July 17: U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.

July 7: U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons.

June 25: U.S. aircraft attack anti-aircraft gun sites in the southern no-fly zone. The following day, another anti-aircraft gun site is struck.

June 14: Coalition aircraft are targeted by Iraqi missile guidance radar systems from sites north of Mosul while conducting routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Iraqi gunners later attack aircraft with anti-aircraft artillery fire. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system. The same day, aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone attack a radar site.

June 5: Coalition aircraft attack an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone. The next day, a radar site also in the southern no-fly zone is struck.

May 23: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north and west of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

May 18: U.S. and British warplanes attack an air defense installation 180 miles southeast of Baghdad to counter Iraqi firings of SAM and anti-aircraft artillery in the southern no-fly zone.

April 30: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites northwest of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

April 20: Coalition aircraft strike a mobile early warning radar in the southern no-fly zone using precision-guided weapons in response to hostile Iraqi acts against coalition aircraft.

April 19: U.S. warplanes bomb a mobile early warning radar in southern Iraq in response to Iraq's aggressive action against U.S. and British planes monitoring a no-fly zone over southern Iraq.

April 12: Responding to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire, U.S. aircraft launch precision-guided weapons on an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone.

Apr. 6: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by bombing Iraqi air defense installations.

March 30: Responding to Iraqi anti-aircraft fire, U.S. aircraft launch precision-guided weapons on an anti-aircraft gun site in the southern no-fly zone.

Feb. 22: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft guns from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft are also targeted by Iraqi radar from sites southeast of Mosul. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

Feb. 16: Following Iraqi SAM and anti-aircraft gun fire on U.S. aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft strike air defense targets.

Feb. 13: U.S. aircraft strike Iraqi SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone "following recent Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions."

Feb. 12: Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while coalition aircraft conducted routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. The aircraft responded to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

Feb. 11: U.S. aircraft strike anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone in response to anti-aircraft fire.

Jan. 28: U.S. aircraft strike Iraqi SAM sites in the southern no-fly zone "following recent Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions."

Jan. 24: Iraqi forces launch SAM and fire anti-aircraft artillery from sites north of Mosul while ONW aircraft conduct routine enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. Coalition aircraft respond to the Iraqi attacks by dropping ordnance on elements of the Iraqi integrated air defense system.

Jan. 20: U.S. aircraft launch attacks on radar systems and anti-aircraft guns in the southern no-fly zone. All coalition aircraft depart the area safely.

Jan. 16: U.S. and British aircraft launch attacks on five air defense sites both in the southern no-fly zone and in the central area of Iraq. Some two dozen aircraft participate in the first major military action ordered by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, Jr.

Jan. 1: U.S. aircraft launch two attacks on Iraqi radar sites in the southern no-fly zone.

2000

May 22: As of this date, there had been more than 470 separate incidents of Iraqi SAM and anti-aircraft artillery fire directed against coalition pilots since December 1998. Iraqi aircraft violated the southern no-fly zone more than 150 times during the same period.

April 4: Coalition aircraft target four Iraqi military sites with precision-guided munitions, including a military radar site at Nasiriyah, 17 miles southeast of Baghdad. Iraq says two people were killed in U.S.-British air raid in the south.

Jan. 9: As of this date, there had been more than 420 separate incidents of Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and SAM fire directed at coalition pilots since December 1998. Iraqi aircraft violated the southern no-fly zone more than 140 times since Operation Desert Fox.

1999

Dec. 17: The UNSC adopts Resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Nov. 22: Navy fighters fire missiles at a SAM site after Iraqi anti-aircraft guns fired at a coalition aircraft. The site was located near the city of an-Najaf, about 85 miles south of Baghdad.

Feb. 24: U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft attack two Iraqi SAM sites near Al Iskandariyah, some 30 miles south of Baghdad, in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire and an Iraqi aircraft violation of southern no-fly zone.

Feb. 10: U.S. and British warplanes fire at two air defense sites in Iraq after three waves of Iraqi fighter jets violate the southern no-fly zone.

Jan. 12: Five Iraqi jets violate the southern no-fly zone and two enter the north, bringing the total violations in both zones since Desert Fox to more than 70, Pentagon officials say.

Jan. 5: In two separate incidents, two F-15s and two F-14s fire a total of six missiles at four Iraqi MiG-25s over the southern no-fly zone. None of the missiles finds its target.

1998

Dec. 30: An SA-6 site near Talil fires 6-8 missiles at a Southern Watch aircraft. F-16s retaliate by dropping six GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on the site. They also launch two HARMs "as a preemptive measure" to deter Iraqi radar operators.

Dec. 17: The United States and Britain launch Operation Desert Fox, four nights of strikes against targets throughout Iraq.

Dec. 16: All UNSCOM weapons inspectors are withdrawn for the last time, after Iraqi non-cooperation with their efforts.

Nov. 15: U.S. aborts airstrikes on Iraq as the regime promises cooperation with the UNSCOM weapons inspectors.

Nov. 7: Fifteen UN weapons inspectors are withdrawn from Iraq.

Nov. 1: Iraq halts all cooperation with UNSCOM weapons inspectors.

 
1997

Nov. 20: Following intensive diplomatic activity, an agreement is reached between Iraq and the Russian Federation whereby Iraq accepts the return of the commission with its full complement of staff to resume its work in Iraq. The commission's personnel, who had been temporarily withdrawn to Bahrain, return to Iraq on Nov. 21 and resume their inspection activities the following day.

Nov. 13: Iraq requires the personnel of American nationality working for UNSCOM to leave Iraq immediately. The executive chairman decides the majority of UNSCOM's personnel should withdraw temporarily from Iraq. A skeleton staff remains in Baghdad to maintain UNSCOM's premises and equipment.

Sept. 17: While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

January: The United Nations implements the oil-for-food program, which will permit Iraq to sell oil and direct the funds made toward humanitarian aims.

Jan. 1: The Turkish government approves a continuing air operation from Turkey, and Operation Northern Watch commences.

1996

Dec. 31: Operation Provide Comfort officially ends.

Nov. 4: A Southern Watch F-16CJ fires a HARM missile at an Iraqi mobile missile radar near the 32nd parallel after the pilot received radar warning signals.

Nov. 2: A Southern Watch F-16CJ fires a HARM missile at an Iraqi mobile missile radar near the 32nd parallel after the pilot received radar warning signals. Later analysis indicates that the Iraqi radar had not tracked the aircraft, a conclusion reversed on Nov. 4 after further study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Aug. 31: Iraqi troops enter Irbil in alliance with Kurdish Democratic Party. They withdraw days later.

Sept. 11: Iraqi gunners fire an SA-6 missile at two U.S. F-16s over northern Iraq but miss. A fighter and helicopter briefly violate the southern no-fly zone.

Sept. 3: U.S. President Bill Clinton extends the southern no-fly zone to 33rd parallel.

 
1995

November 1995: The government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high-grade missile components destined for Iraq. Iraq denies that it had sought to purchase these components, although it acknowledged that some of them were in Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation, which confirms that Iraqi authorities and missile facilities have been involved in the acquisition of sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles. UNSCOM retrieves additional similar missile components from the River Tigris. The components had been allegedly disposed of there by Iraqis involved in the covert acquisition.

Aug. 8: Gen. Hussein Kamel, minister of Industry and Minerals and former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programs. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare program than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation hidden on a chicken farm, ostensibly by Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programs. The documentations subsequently lead to further Iraqi disclosures concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon.

July 1: As a result of UNSCOM's investigations and in the light of irrefutable evidence, Iraq admits for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons program but denies weaponization.

 
1994

Oct. 15: The UNSC adopts Resolution 949, which demands that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. Iraq resumes working with UNSCOM.

Oct. 14: Iraq announces that as of Oct. 12 it had withdrawn its troops to their previous positions.

Oct. 8: UNSC meeting expresses "grave concern" over deployment of Iraqi troops near the Kuwait border. In the next two days, United States begins deploying troops to Kuwait.

Oct. 6: Iraq threatens to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and moves troops toward the border with Kuwait.

Iraq does not attempt to challenge coalition aircraft in the no-fly zones during the first nine months of 1994.

 
1993

Dec. 21: Iraqi troops fire on a U.S. patrol near Faydah in northern Iraq. The patrol is within the security zone established on May 22, 1991. The Iraqis were over a mile away and outside the security zone. Baghdad denies Western reports of the incident as "fabricated and baseless."

Aug. 19: Two U.S. F-16s report possible SA-3 missile launches west of Mosul and respond with cluster bombs. Two F-15s drop four laser-guided bombs on the site an hour later.

July 29: In separate incidents, two U.S. Navy EA-6Bs, part of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, fire anti-radar missiles at Iraqi SAM sites after being illuminated by the sites' surveillance radars.

June 29: A Southern Watch F-4G fires an anti-radar missile at an anti-aircraft artillery site after the Iraqis illuminated it and another F-4G patrolling the southern no-fly zone.

June 27: U.S. missile strike is launched against Baghdad on basis of "compelling evidence" that Iraq was involved in the April 1993 assassination attempt on former President Bush in Kuwait.

April 18: An Iraqi radar site illuminates two U.S. F-4Gs flying north of the 36th parallel. The site was south of the parallel. One of the aircraft fires an AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile at the tracking radar and destroyed it.

April 9: Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites fire on Provide Comfort aircraft near the Saddam dam in northern Iraq.

Feb. 3: Iraqi gunners fire at a U.S. aircraft on routine patrol over northern Iraq.

Jan. 22: An F-4G fires two missiles at a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site in northern Iraq.

Jan. 21: An F-16 and an F-4G escorting a French Mirage reconnaissance plane over northern Iraq attack an Iraqi missile battery after the site's search radar began tracking them.

1992

Dec. 27: U.S. fighter planes shoot down an Iraqi aircraft violating the southern no-fly zone.

Aug. 26: Bush announces air exclusion zone below 32nd parallel, banning the flying of both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

July 5: UNSCOM inspectors are denied access to an Iraqi government building in Baghdad. Once a new team of "impartial" advisors are appointed, UNSCOM is allowed to enter the building.

April 5: Iranian warplanes attack rebel bases inside Iraq. Iraq responds by scrambling fighters and (unsuccessfully) pursuing the intruders. U.S. forces do not interfere. The Iraqis continue to fly on succeeding days, effectively overturning the ban on all their flying, which they had observed since March 22, 1991.

 
1991

Oct. 11: UNSC Resolution 715 approves plans for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraqi weapons program. The resolution establishes that Iraq must cooperate fully with UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors.

Oct. 9: A cease-fire is agreed between Kurdish and Iraqi forces.

Oct. 6: Last Kuwaiti oil fires are extinguished.

Sept. 24: Iraq agrees to allow UN helicopters to make unrestricted flights over its territory.

Sept. 6-13: Iraq blocks UNSCOM's use of helicopters to conduct inspections.

Aug. 2-8: UNSCOM uncovers a major Iraqi biological weapons program, including seed stocks of three biological warfare agents and three potential warfare strains.

July 18-20: Iraqi ballistic missile concealment is revealed. UNSCOM discovers and destroys undeclared decoy missiles and launch support equipment.

June 25: The United States announces formation of an intervention force to protect Kurds in northern Iraq.

June 23-28: For the first time, Iraqi troops fire shots to prevent UNSCOM/IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors from intercepting Iraqi vehicles carrying nuclear-related equipment. Equipment is later found and destroyed under cease-fire rules.

June 17: A UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) is established to oversee Iraq disarmament in accordance with UNSC Resolution 687.

April 10: U.S. officials warn Iraq not to interfere with Kurdish relief operations. No Iraqi planes (fixed- or rotary-winged) are to fly north of the 36th parallel.

April 6: Joint Task Force Provide Comfort is formed and deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to conduct humanitarian operations in northern Iraq.

April 3: UNSC Resolution 687 specifies cease-fire conditions and requirements for Iraq disarmament.

March 22: A U.S. F-15C shoots down another Iraqi SU-22 over northern Iraq. That same day, another U.S. pilot forced the pilot of an Iraqi PC-9 (a training aircraft) to eject. Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft stayed on the ground for the next 12 months.

March 20: U.S. F-15C shoots down an Iraqi SU-22 flying over northern Iraq.

March: Iraq puts down revolt in 14 of 18 governorates, with the help of attack helicopters.

March 3: At cease-fire talks with the Iraqis at Safwan, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf warn the Iraqis that coalition forces would shoot down any Iraqi military aircraft flying over the country. However, he allows the Iraqis use of helicopters to aid communication and governance of southern Iraq. He does not anticipate that Iraq will use this permission to suppress revolts using armed helicopters.

March 2: By an 11-to-1 vote, the UNSC approves Resolution 686, outlining the conditions Iraq must meet prior to a formal cease-fire.

Feb. 28: Bush announces a cease-fire, ending the Gulf War.

Feb. 24: Given the failure of several efforts to avert conflict, and the lack of an Iraqi troops' withdrawal from Kuwait, allied forces begin their long-planned land, sea and air offensive aimed at driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Iraqi forces begin destroying Kuwaiti oil wells and other oilfield infrastructure.

Feb. 15: Iraq offers to withdraw from Kuwait. Coalition forces reject the offer due to numerous conditions attached to it.

Jan. 29: Iraqi troops attack Khafji, Saudi Arabia, and are defeated by coalition forces.

Jan. 23: Iraqi military forces deliberately create a huge oil spill in the Persian Gulf, the largest oil spill on record. U.S. officials term the spill an act of "environmental terrorism."

Jan. 22: Iraq launches a Scud missile attack against Israel. This follows similar attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Jan. 16: Coalition air strikes ("Operation Desert Storm") against Iraq begin at midnight.

Jan. 12: The U.S. Congress authorizes Bush to use "all necessary means" to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Jan. 9: Secretary of State James Baker meets Aziz in Geneva in an unsuccessful effort to resolve the conflict.

1990

Dec. 6: First ship with equipment of Germany-based VII Corps offensive troops arrives in Saudi Arabia.

Nov. 29: The UNSC approves Resolution 678 authorizing use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait if Iraq does not withdraw by Jan. 15, 1991.

Nov. 8: The United States announces decision to deploy 200,000 more troops to the Persian Gulf to build up capability for an offensive.

Oct. 29: The UNSC passes Resolution 674 making Iraq liable for damages, injuries and financial losses resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Sept. 1: An emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo calls for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, pay reparations and allow foreigners to leave Iraq and Kuwait.

Aug. 25: The UNSC authorizes naval forces in and around the Persian Gulf to use force to prevent violations of UN economic sanctions on Iraq.

Aug. 18: The UNSC passes Resolution 664 calling on Iraq to release all foreign citizens and warns Iraq against harming them.

Aug. 17: Iraq announces that it will "play host" to citizens of countries in the international coalition using them as "human shields" against possible coalition attacks.

Aug. 14: Syrian forces arrive in Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 13: Pakistan announces it has agreed to send troops to Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 11: Egyptian and Moroccan troops begin arriving in Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 10: An emergency Arab summit meeting in Cairo, Egypt, votes to send Arab troops to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to assist in defending them against possible Iraqi attack.

Aug. 9: The UNSC unanimously declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait "null and void."

Aug. 8: Iraq announces its annexation of Kuwait.

Aug. 6-7: Bush sends U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia to assist in the defense of the kingdom against possible Iraqi aggression. U.S. forces grow to over 200,000 by late October.

Aug. 6: the UNSC passes Resolution 661 imposing a broad trade embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

Aug. 3: Iraq claims it will withdraw from Kuwait by Aug. 5. Convoys of "withdrawn" equipment found by journalists to include captured Kuwaiti material.

Aug. 2: Iraqi forces invade Kuwait in the early morning hours and quickly establish military control of Kuwait. U.S. President George Bush harshly condemns the invasion, orders economic sanctions on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, and freezes Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. The UN Security Council (UNSC) passes Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The UNSC threatens to impose mandatory sanctions against Iraq unless it complies with the resolution. There are six U.S. Navy Middle East Force ships in the Persian Gulf (continuous Middle East Force presence since 1949). USS Independence Carrier Battle Group is in the Indian Ocean and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Battle Group is in the Mediterranean.

July 25: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein meets with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie. Glaspie, perhaps unfortunately, tells Hussein that the United States has no opinion on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.

July 16: Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accuses Kuwaitis of "direct aggression" against Iraq by producing oil above OPEC quotas and slant-drilling into the Rumaila oilfield, which straddles the Kuwait-Iraq border.

Compiled by Colin Robinson , CDI Research Analyst
crobinson@cdi.org http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/iraqaction.cfm

Last updated 28 January 2003 retrieved 02 March 2003.

Planning for a new Iraq

            As Iraqi opposition leaders ended their summit meeting in the Kurdish summer resort of Salahuddin, other Iraqis were discussing plans for a new Iraqi constitution in Washington.

            The meeting, sponsored by an influential think tank close to the Bush administration, revealed that there are still very big disagreements among the opposition about how to restructure Iraq after a possible war.

            With President George W Bush increasingly talking about the need for regime change in Iraq, the debate about what form of government would replace Saddam Hussein has been intensifying.

            But the biggest uncertainty concerns the role that the US itself might play in a post-conflict Iraq.

            Mr Bush has said that US forces will stay "as long as it takes, and not a moment longer" to establish a democratic regime in Iraq, but many observers wonder whether the US has the political will to stay for the time it would take to rebuild political institutions in Iraq.

            Last week, deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz publicly rebuked Army chief of staff General Eric Shinseki for saying that some 100,000 US troops might be needed for several years to keep the peace in Iraq.

Fight over federalism

            The US has also said that the ultimate constitutional arrangements in Iraq would be determined by Iraqis - while in the meantime an interim regime would run the country under an American general.

            But there could be significant disagreements among the opposition on the design of a future constitution.

            According to Rend Rahim Francke of the Iraq Foundation, who was a member of State Department's Iraq working group on democracy, a new Iraq constitution should be federalist, decentralising power away from Baghdad to the provinces, and parliamentary, rather than presidential.

            And it should aim at creating a sense of common citizenship among all Iraqis, as well as giving them all equal rights.

            But she was strongly opposed to dispersing power to ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, rather than to geographic areas like provinces or counties.

            However, another speaker at the conference, Emmanuel Kamber, a deputy chairman of the Iraq National Council, argued strongly for the explicit inclusion in the constitution of a role for ethnic groups.

            He argued that otherwise his own minority group, the Assyrians, who make number up to two million, would continue to be discriminated against, and would lack the geographic base of groups like the Kurds, who largely run their own affairs.

            But Ms Francke said that it was fundamentally undemocratic to give power to ethnic groups, as the larger ones would dominate the political process to the exclusion of everyone else.

            Others pointed out that it was the rule of law, not a guaranteed parliamentary slot, that should be used to protect minorities.

Tackling the army

            The Kurds, who are strongly represented on the new leadership council of the Iraqi opposition, also have an armed militia some 80,000 strong.

            Another speaker at the conference, Efraim Karsh, a professor at King's College in London, said that such militias should be disarmed and the integrated into a reconstituted Iraqi army.

And he said that integrating the army back into society, and ending its privileged status, was one of the biggest problems a new government would face.

But he warned that a bigger problem was the lack of a sense of nationalism in the region, with notions of "pan-Arabism" being promoted by most of Iraq's leaders from the Hashemites to the current Baathist party.

He argued that without that sense of national identity, political institutions were likely to be weak.

Finding the resources

            A big problem for any post-war Iraqi government would be financing reconstruction.

            Patrick Clawson, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, believes that it is vital to restructure the biggest source of income, oil revenues.

            He argues that these revenues, which are the largest source of income for the government, should be distributed to the provinces to give them real power and autonomy.

            And he says that the central government would make still be able to develop new oilfields with the help of foreign companies while retaining the revenue stream from older wells.

            The future of any post-Saddam government in Iraq is still murky, and dependent on many uncertain events.

But the fact that it is being discussed so seriously in Washington at the moment is a sign of how close the war now seems.

By Steve Schifferes, BBC News Online in Washington, Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2816721.stm, 03 March 2003.

 US considers 'Plan B' on Iraq

            
            It is a measure of how anxious the US military has been to deploy forces in Turkey as part of its build-up for possible war with Iraq that it has waited as long as it has for a decision from the Turks.

            Turkey has been seen as the door to a northern front in Iraq into the critical and sensitive Kurdish areas.

            There is a "Plan B" if there is no go-ahead from Ankara, but that is clearly a second-best option.

            US defence officials say they still hope they will get some help from Turkey - including agreement on aircraft reinforcements and overflight rights - but the most important element as far as the Americans have been concerned, and the most controversial for Turkey, has been soldiers on the ground.

             At least one division - the 4th Infantry Division - has been waiting for weeks to see if it will get clearance.

            The fallback positions could involve flying lighter ground forces in from Kuwait or further afield - even, possibly, from the United States.

            Ground forces could move up from Kuwait through western Iraq, but that would take longer and the US supply chain then would be very long.

            These measures would all complicate and slow down an already complex war plan which is meant to rely on speed.

Advanced stage

            It is a sign of how far advanced US preparations are that the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has just signed deployment orders for a further 60,000 troops which the Pentagon are calling "follow-on forces".

            In other words, the US war plan does not depend on them arriving in the region before any conflict could start.

            They could replace forces already there, join in later waves in any attack or possibly provide security in Iraq after a conflict.

The fact that such forces are being mobilised shows just how advanced the US build-up is.

It is not clear when they would begin deploying, but even if they start moving immediately, it could still take them several weeks to arrive.

Meanwhile, the skirmishes in the no-fly zones over Iraq have entered a new phase, with an escalation in air strikes by aircraft from the US and British forces which could help pave the way for an attack.

            At the same time, the Pentagon reports that the Iraqis have also been probing the no-fly zones, to test US and British responses.

            The Americans insist they are still only responding to what they describe as Iraqi provocations, while the Iraqis say the western planes are hitting civilian targets.

            But aircraft from the US and British forces  struck   targets on   16 occasions in the south of Iraq, and twice in the north in February alone.

            And they have expanded their target list to include not just air defences but also surface-to-surface missile systems which the Americans say could threaten US and allied forces.

            The attacks on the Iraqi air defence system seem to have intensified as well but some of those strikes are repeat attacks on the same targets, because the Iraqis keep repairing them.

            That is evidence of how difficult it is to cause lasting damage.

            What is more, most of Iraq's air defences are concentrated around Baghdad and, for the moment, US and British aircraft are leaving those alone.

By Nick Childs, BBC Pentagon Correspondent, Story from BBC NEWS:

 dated 04 March 2003

 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/2817709.stm

 
Question: How strong is the Iraqi army?

 
Whether you are worried, angry or confused, there are thousands of questions surrounding the Iraq crisis. The Iraq Questions Panel is trying to give you some answers.

QUESTION
James Morgan, UK

1)         The regular Iraqi army will offer token resistance - if that - to an allied invasion. But how might the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard and the military/para-military brigades of the intelligence agencies respond to Baghdad being threatened?

2)         Most of the "security state" in Iraq is designed to protect Saddam Hussein. Once he's gone, its prestige and privileges will vanish. Will these organisations continue to pose a threat to peacekeeping forces sent in after war?

ANSWER
From Chris Lincoln-Jones, former Gulf War commander

            The Iraqi regular army is predominantly truck-mounted infantry; the parts of it that have tanks and armoured personnel carriers are equipped with old Russian and Chinese kit. Tanks like the T-62 and T-55 series are the predominant varieties. You are therefore right to assume that these troops will not pose much of a threat to an allied force.

            I will go further and say that senior officers will defect once they are sure that the invasion is committed. They will want to secure favourable terms in a post-conflict Iraq, so capitulation will be quick and this is affected by the fact that these troops are furthest away from Baghdad and not best placed to hide in towns and cities.

            The Republican Guard is a more difficult force to judge. The main body is garrisoned around Baghdad; these soldiers are responsible for the approaches to the city and to bolster the regular army. They are also a threat to the regular army and can maintain loyalty by force; the Guards despise the regular army and we found during the '91 conflict that the army soldiers fear and hate the Guards.

            The equipment these soldiers have include T-72 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. The serviceability of these vehicles is reasonable but there is by no means 100% availability after years of sanctions.

The officers in the Guards are predominantly Sunni and the higher echelons are manned by officers chosen for their loyalty, although this does not necessarily mean that they are all from Tikrit, Saddam's home city.

I doubt that these troops will be prepared to meet allied armoured forces in open battle; they may retreat to cities like Al-Khut or Tikrit and hope to be able to fight there. Getting involved in OBUA (Operations in built up areas) is not something the allies will want to do and indeed it may not be necessary. If your enemy is stuck in a city in Iraq, the only thing they can do is starve or die of thirst; it may therefore possible to negotiate surrender.

Staunch loyalty

            The Special Republican Guard is most likely to remain loyal to Saddam and fight hard. This is because they are most closely linked to the leader and are unpopular due to the privileges they enjoy and the excesses they have committed against the people.

            They are drawn from the ranks of Saddam's most loyal tribal associates and have the most serviceable equipment (T-72 and BMP-2 Infantry fighting vehicles). There are not many of them though; apart from one strong and well-equipped brigade, the majority are security details for regime buildings.

            If the allies really want to go into Baghdad, they may well have to winkle these people out of buildings, a difficult and dangerous task. Again I would argue: "Why bother?" - without the oilfields and access to the agriculture of the Euphrates and Tigris, Saddam has nothing.

Settle scores

            This brings in the second part of this question. The people in Baghdad are likely to see the writing on the wall and may very well start to settle scores. This will do the allies' job for them and the biggest risk of casualties will be in this internecine strife. It might even be possible for the allies to sit around Baghdad and other large central cities and wait for the dust to settle; the morality of this action is of course debateable.

            This is very speculative but the middle classes in Iraq who have been most badly hurt by the sanctions will want the opportunity to improve their lives. A well-executed campaign that avoids collateral damage, mounts a good information operation and quickly aids in reconstruction could blunt all but the most fanatical of Saddam's security forces.

            A post-conflict Baghdad may not be completely safe but I doubt there will be a sniper around every corner. You might like to note that after the Islamic state came to power in Iraq's old enemy Iran, the Shah's security apparatus, the Savak, was purged and then changed its name before carrying on as normal under the new masters. In the world of Realpolitik we might see something of this nature in Iraq.

Story from BBC NEWS: 05 March 2003,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/2821213.stm

 US students protest against war

            Thousands of American high school and university students have walked out of classes in protest against possible conflict in Iraq.

            The National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, which organised the protests, said that more than 300 schools and universities had taken part across the country, from the southern state of Tennessee to New York City and California.

            Thousands of students also rallied for peace in the UK, Sweden, Spain, Australia, Egypt and other countries.

            "We're walking out of our classes because it's completely ridiculous that students in Iraq, who are exactly the same as us, will have to face the consequences of a unilateral war," said coalition spokeswoman Amanda Flott.

            "Also, at a time when many students are already priced out of higher education, the increase in funding for the military will decrease the money available for education, all to support a war that in my mind is not justifiable."

'Expressing their views'

            At California's Stanford University, around 300 students marched, some holding placards declaring "It's the Middle East, not the Wild West" and "The majority of us didn't vote for this war".

Several professors at the university supported their students by cancelling classes or refusing to punish those who had walked out.

"The average student here is pretty liberal and against the war, but they're not very vocal," 20-year-old Kate Skolnick told the Associated Press news agency.

"This is mainly about getting people to express their views."

Students also walked out from educational institutions in Florida, Tennessee, Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Maryland, among others.

In Cambridge, Massachusetts, home of the prestigious Harvard University, about 100 students left their classrooms to express their displeasure at a possible US-led war in Iraq.

"Who says we can be the ones to decide who is safe enough to have weapons?" 14-year-old high school student Anna Ostow said.

"We feel like hurting more people is not going to solve any more problems," she added.

Global protests

            Meanwhile in other parts of the globe students marched against possible conflict.

            In Paris, a lively anti-war rally drew as many as 20,000 students, police authorities told French news agency AFP, although other estimates put figures at around 7,000.

            Students danced and chanted their way down the Boulevard Saint Michel, with reggae and Arab music bands accompanying the marchers, many of whom were also protesting against the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

            The Spanish capital Madrid also saw tens of thousands of student demonstrators hold a noisy protest in the main Puerta del Sol square as part of a 24-hour class boycott, some carrying placards decrying "servile Aznar" - a reference to the Spanish prime minister's staunch support for the US.

            In Australia students from schools in Perth, Adelaide and Sydney walked out of lectures as part of a day of action.

            In Perth, some students burned an Australian flag, while in Sydney others carried banners denouncing the US president and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Reuters news agency reported.

            Protests were also held in Britain, Egypt, Sweden and Bangladesh.

Story from BBC NEWS: 05 March 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/2824145.stm

 
Iraq: A double veto?

            The prospect of a double veto by Russia and France of a new Security Council resolution on Iraq has been raised by the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

            He said in a BBC interview and later at a news conference after talks in London with the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, that Russia would "take a position."

            "Russia will not abstain," he declared.

            If France also wields its veto, as must now be considered possible, it would deny the United States and Britain the vote they seek and they would be thrown back on resolution 1441 to claim legitimacy for an invasion.

            But Russia also disputes that 1441 does provide legal cover. Mr Ivanov, speaking in the Foreign Office in London with Mr Straw at his side, said that 1441 did not "contain provisions for the automatic use of force."

            Earlier in the day, Mr Straw had told the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that 1441 contained "sufficient legal authority."

            British hopes of detaching Russia from the French position therefore appear to have been dashed.

 
Combative Straw

            The Foreign Secretary gave a combative performance in front of the Committee, showing no sign that Britain is wavering in its support for the United States.

            He was given a gentler time from some Conservative members, who support military action, than he was by the Labour party Committee Chairman Donald Anderson. Mr Anderson suggested that the British government threat to bypass the result of a second resolution was "dangerous."

            British officials have not given up, in public at least. They are using the "It's not over until the fat lady sings" argument - that there is some way to go yet.

            They and the Americans still hope that they can muster the nine votes needed to pass a resolution and that this would give them a technical or "moral" majority even if vetoes were used.

            The new draft resolution states that Iraq has "failed to take the final opportunity" afforded to it to disarm.

Leapfrogging

            President Bush meanwhile is indicating that he has made his mind up, however the Council votes and whatever Iraq does now.

            For him, a positive vote would be useful but it would not be necessary.

            Look for example at what the president did in his weekly radio address on Saturday. He engaged in what has become known as "leapfrogging" - that is, he looked ahead to what happens in Iraq next.

            He took it as beyond argument that Saddam Hussein would be removed.

            "The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another", said Mr Bush.

            So, Iraq's last minute moves, such as its destruction of its al-Samoud II rockets, will make no impact in Washington.

            The White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, borrowing from a similar phrase used by Churchill about the Soviet Union, described the Iraqi move as "propaganda wrapped in a lie inside a falsehood."

 
Missing material

            Iraq has now also promised a paper explaining what happened to the so-called "missing material".

            These are stocks of anthrax and VX nerve agent which the UN has suspected that Iraq is keeping.

            Iraq has always said that the material was destroyed but could not produce enough evidence to prove its case.

            This move is unlikely to impress the US or UK.

            Mr Straw dismissed it as the "trickling out of so-called concessions one at a time to buy more time while continuing a policy of concealment."

            He claimed that Iraq could still manufacture a range of chemical and biological weapons and was hiding its stocks by moving them every 12 hours.

By Paul Reynolds, BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

Story from BBC NEWS: 05 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/2820455.stm

Iraq war splits US electorate

 
                The US electorate is deeply split over policy towards Iraq, despite the high level of overall support for military action.

            A fresh analysis of US public opinion polls confirms that there are deep splits in the electorate over the wisdom of military action against Iraq.

            Democrats, women, and older voters are much less likely to express support for attacking Saddam Hussein.

            The failure to build a bipartisan consensus - and the polarisation between Democrats and Republicans - could lead to difficulties for President Bush if his strategy for dealing with Iraq runs into difficulties.

            The latest polls show that President Bush would lose an election, if it were held now, to the Democratic candidate.

            The divisions are much deeper than those during US action against Afghanistan, and echo the kind of differences during the Vietnam War era.

 
Republican war

            According to the latest US opinion poll from ABC News, at the beginning of March 59% of Americans supported President Bush's policy to disarm Saddam Hussein by force - a figure that has been broadly unchanged over several months across a number of polls.

            However, the survey showed:  only 34% supported this policy without reservations 24% had reservations (including the need for support from allies) 37% were opposed to it outright. 67% of men supported Mr Bush, 51% of women

            There are unprecedented differences between Republicans and Democrats over military action.

            Male supporters of Mr Bush's Republican Party were overwhelming supportive, with 89% of Republican men endorsing unilateral action.

            In contrast, only 34% of Democratic women back Mr Bush's policy.

            Other strongly Democrat groups, such as non-whites, are also strongly against the war, with only 35% backing military action.

Anti-war elderly

            And perhaps surprisingly, it is the old rather than the young who are most against the war.

            And people in the Northeast - states like New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts - are less likely to back the war than those from the South or the Midwest.

            The elderly also were more likely to trust Colin Powell rather than President Bush to explain clearly what was at stake.

            These divisions parallel the splits that emerged in the electorate during the close 2000 election, where cultural conservatives from rural areas backed Mr Bush, while big city liberals supported Mr Gore.

            Another poll, carried out by the Pew Research Centre in mid-February, has tracked some of these differences.

            It found that evangelical Protestants supported a war against Iraq much more strongly (85% in favour) than Catholics, non-evangelical Protestants and non-religious Americans.

            It found that college graduates were more reluctant to support a war than those with a high school education.

            And rural areas were much stronger backers of the war than large cities.

War worries

            Among the key reservations among those polled were whether the US takes action against Iraq along with allies, or has to act alone.

            Most Americans (57%) believe that the US should get another UN resolution before taking military action, and even more believe that allies need to be on board before an attack begins.

            The Pew poll also tracked the worries about the possible course of a war, and found that women were much more concerned than men about almost every aspect.

            For example, 65% of women, but only 45% of men, worried a great deal about high US troop casualties, while 65% of women, compared to 48% of men, worried about more terrorist attacks in the United States.

            Similar differences emerged over concerns about high civilian casualties and an all-out war in the Middle East.

            Overall, the polls suggest that the possibility of war is viewed very differently by different groups of the population.

            And even among the majority, there are serious reservations about what strategy to pursue.

            The ABC News/Washington Post poll interviewed 1,022 adults by telephone between Feb 26- March 2. The Pew Center poll was conducted between Feb 12-18 among 1,254 individuals.

By Steve Schifferes, BBC News Online in Washington 06 March 2003,

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/2827367.stm

 
Bush Says Saddam Deceives U.N. Inspectors

            President Bush preparing the nation for the possibility of war, accused Saddam Hussein of trying to deceive U.N. weapons inspectors and must be held accountable by America's allies. "I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons," Bush said. At a prime-time news conference, Bush said the issue will come to a head within a matter of days as the U.N. Security Council decides whether to approve a U.S.-backed resolution authorizing force against Iraq. Bush said Saddam was stalling. "He's trying to buy time. I can understand why. He's been successful for 12 years," the president said.

            Bush said that Saddam was trying to mislead the world by destroying a few of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction while building others. "These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a willful charade," the president said. "Token gestures are not acceptable."

            Bush opened his news conference with a lengthy statement, more than 10 minutes long, accusing the Iraqi leader of refusing to comply with demands for him to disarm.

            Bush said he would act against Saddam regardless of whether other nations are willing to support the U.S. move.

            "The risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow that inaction will make the world safer, is a risk I'm not willing to take for the American people," the president said.

Turning to another hot spot, Bush said the best way to deal with rising tensions with North Korea is to involve other nations in the region, such as China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. "I think the best way to deal with this is in multilateral fashion by convincing those nations that they must stand up to their responsibilities, along with the United States to convince Kim Jong Il that development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation's interests," Bush said.

Bush's prime-time news conference was part of an intensifying campaign to prepare Americans for the possibility of a war that could be just days away. Military leaders say U.S. forces are now ready to strike Iraq.

More than 230,000 troops are now arrayed around Iraq and more are on the way, awaiting a final go-ahead from the president.

Despite stiff opposition, the United States mounted a last-minute diplomatic effort to persuade the U.N. Security Council to approve a resolution authorizing an invasion. France, Germany, Russia and China say they oppose such a resolution.

"If we have to use force, I think a lot of nations will be with us," Bush said. Speaking particularly about France and Germany, Bush said, "We have a disagreement. ... They're still our friends."

The president said the United States will call for a Security Council vote even if it appears certain that the U.S.-backed resolution will be defeated. "It's time for people to show their cards and let people know where they stand in relation to Saddam," he said.

Bush left no doubt that the United States would remove Saddam from power if it comes to war. "We will disarm Iraq. And if we go to war, there will be a regime change and replacing this cancer inside of Iraq will be a government that represents the rights of all the people."

The president said he still hopes that Saddam disarms or that he leaves Iraq on his own.

Bush's news conference came on the eve of a crucial Security Council meeting. On Friday, chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and his counterpart, Mohamed ElBaradei, will report on Iraq's measure of cooperation in eliminating its banned weapons. ElBaradei, the chief nuclear inspector, said, "In my area, inspection is working. We are making progress. There's no reason to scuttle the process."

Blix, too, has said Iraq is cooperating more than it has.

6 March 2003, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl

 
Iraq actively cooperated, says Blix

             UNITED NATIONS, March 5: The chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said on Wednesday that Iraq had actively cooperated with the UN inspectors in the past months and expressed hope that Baghdad would continue to cooperate.

            However, Mr Blix told a press briefing that all of Iraq's biological weapons had not been accounted for. "While it was clear Iraq had dug up more biological arms recently, "it doesn't mean you can say that all biological weapons are accounted for. No, we are not there yet," he said.

            Asked whether he would ask for four more months of inspections in Iraq on the basis of the current level of cooperation, he responded: "They have been very active, I would say, and even proactive in the last month or so, but in the past the track record was not so good and I would not want to suggest that I am confident that this will happen. I hope it will happen," he told reporters.

            On the issue of the Al Samoud 2 missiles, which Iraq is destroying, Hans Blix told reporters: "The missiles is real disarmament. Here weapons that can be used in war are being destroyed in fairly large quantities."

            He also said seven Iraqi scientists have submitted to private interviews under his terms. Previously, scientists had either been questioned in the presence of Iraqi government officials or had tape-recorded the interviews.

            Mr Blix said that he has asked an Arab country, which he did not identify, to host inspectors and potential Iraqi scientists who agree to be interviewed outside Iraq. He said Cyprus was also a possible location for conducting interviews and that several countries had offered asylum for any scientists who want to leave Iraq.

            However, Mr Blix said some of his weapons experts were skeptical of Iraq's suggestion that they could verify Baghdad's claims to have dumped its biological materials more than a decade ago by digging in areas where the Iraqis say the dumping took place.

            Mr Blix could not say whether he thought inspections would continue through the summer, given the massive US troop build-up in the region and the talk of war.

By Masood Haider, Dawn 06 March 2003

http://www.dawn.com/2003/text/top12.htm

 
Saddam trying to divide UN, says Powell

             WASHINGTON, March 5: US Secretary of State Colin Powell accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on Wednesday of deliberately trying to divide the UN Security Council and "split us into arguing factions".

            In a policy statement at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mr Powell declared that President Saddam's effort must fail and urged the UN to back US moves to force Iraq to disarm.

            Mr Powell, who will travel to the United Nations on Thursday, said President Saddam had thrown away his "one last chance" to avoid the "serious consequences" last November when he paid no heed to a United Nations appeal to disarm.

            He said Iraq was hiding machinery to secretly make Al Samoud missiles and did not intend to hand over all of the missiles for disposal by the United Nations.

            "From recent intelligence we know that the Iraqi regime intends to declare and destroy only a portion of its banned Al Samoud inventory," he told the audience.

            "Saddam, in fact, has ordered the continued production of the missiles that you see being destroyed... It has also begun to hide machinery it can use to convert other kinds of engines to power Al Samouds," the secretary of state said.

            He also said that Iraq was hiding banned weapons material from the UN inspectors.

            "Nothing we have seen since the passage of Resolution 1441 indicates that Saddam Hussein has taken the strategic and political decision to disarm," Powell said.

            "The same challenge was given to him, the same instruction was given by the international community ... to Saddam Hussein - 'disarm, give up these weapons of mass destruction, stop threatening your people' - for 12 years Saddam Hussein has given the same answer back repeatedly, 'No, I will not'."

            Agencies add: Reacting to the growing opposition to an invasion, Mr Powell said divisions over Iraq only encouraged President Saddam Hussein to deceive the international community.

            The acknowledged there were divisions at the United Nations and that the Iraqi president was counting on members voting against the use of force to disarm him. But he said it was time to come together.

            "If these divisions continue it will only convince Saddam Hussein that he is right, but I can assure you he is wrong," Powell said.

            "It is now for the international community to confront the reality of Iraq's continuing failure to disarm."

            Powell charged that Iraq's intelligence agencies were trying to deter scientists alleged to have links with its weapons of mass destruction programs from attending interviews with UN inspectors.

            Mr Powell said Iraqi intelligence agencies were "working aggressively to discourage or control interviews".
 

By Anwar Iqbal, Dawn, 06 March 2003

http://www.dawn.com/2003/text/top13.htm

No war, say Paris, Bonn, Moscow: Iraq's disarmament stressed

            PARIS, March 5: Russia, Germany and France said that they remain definitely opposed to a war with Iraq, and that their "common objective remains the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq , in conformity with UN Resolution 1441," in a tripartite declaration made here on Wednesday.

            Two of the three countries - France and Russia - who are permanent members of the UN Security Council, also make it clear that "if the necessity presents itself," they will "not allow to pass" a resolution that would authorize a war with Iraq.

            With regard to the inspections, the three countries said "we take note that the inspections have been giving results that are more and more encouraging," with regard to a list of objectives, among them destruction of the Al-Samoud 2 missiles "which have begun and (are in) progress," as well as Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, "on which the Iraqis have been supplying information," lastly as concerns Iraqi scientists, "with whom interviewing continues."

            According to the declaration, "Russia, Germany and France bring their determined support to Messrs Blix and El-Baradei, and consider that the convening of the (Security) Council on March 7 marks an important step in the process that's been put into place."

            The declaration also stated that the three countries "firmly invite the Iraqi authorities to cooperate more actively with the inspectors with a view to a complete disarmament of their country."

            The declaration also noted that "these inspections cannot go on indefinitely, we consequently desire that the inspections henceforth continue at an accelerated pace. This means, says the declaration, that "we want for the inspectors to specify and create a hierarchy among the questions not yet answered, on a programme-by-programme basis, and that they establish a detailed series of deadlines."

 
By Paul Michaud, Dawn, 06 March 2003

http://www.dawn.com/2003/text/top10.htm

 
US expels Iraqi UN diplomats

            Two Iraqi diplomats have been given 72 hours to leave the United States.

            The United States said the two men, based at the Iraqi mission to the United Nations in New York, "were engaged in activities outside the scope of their official function".

            This is usually diplomatic coding for spying.

            US officials say that 60 other countries will be asked to expel Iraqi diplomats whom, the US says, are really undercover officers who threaten American interests worldwide.

            Sources say that there are 300 Iraqis attached to embassies on the US list.

'In the basement'

            Iraq's UN ambassador said the two men were employed as security guards at the mission.

            Nazih Abdullatif Rahman and Yehia Naeem Suaoud were told on Wednesday evening that they must leave the US by midnight on Friday.

            Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri said that although the two men had the title of attache, their real job was more humble.

            "They are the security personnel of the mission, the guards," he said. "They are living in the basement of the mission."

            He said that US officials were wrong to say the men were doing anything incorrect.

            "They are always talking about their activities being in contradiction of their diplomatic duties, but they are inside the mission all of the time and how do they have the time to do this?"

            Two weeks ago Mohammad Hassan Allawi, a journalist from the official Iraqi News Agency working at the United Nations, was expelled from the United States.

            A BBC correspondent in New York says the latest expulsion comes at a time of high tension at the United Nations.

            Intense lobbying is taking place in support of and against the prospect of a second UN resolution which would give a green light for war against Iraq.

Story from BBC NEWS: 06 March 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/2824347.stm

 

Iraqis prepare for the worst

            As the American military presence in the Gulf continues to build ahead of a possible US-led attack against Iraq, the people of Baghdad are preparing to stand and fight.

        The city's defences are being boosted, with sandbags dotted around street corners and young and old readying themselves to take up arms.

            But the battle to keep fear and panic at bay is not easily won.

            Baghdad professor Wamidh Nadhmi runs through a list of his fears: "We worry about the loss of electricity, about water, about how smart smart bombs are, about Iraqi tanks ploughing into our neighbourhood and turning us into military targets, and about mass-hysteria."

            The fear has grown so great that his students can no longer concentrate.

 
Emergency preparations

            On the streets, a gritty determination keeps away signs of panic. Traffic wardens issue parking tickets, nervous brides and grooms still turn up at the stall of Said Ali Mudeaagha, neatly-bedecked in a black and white turban, and the Sharia courts are still crammed with fractious couples seeking divorce.

            But celebrations for this week's holiday to mark the Muslim New Year were downbeat, and fewer families than usual went to picnic in the palm groves that ring Baghdad.

            Instead, Iraqis spent the day digging boreholes through the foundations of their homes, selling their last assets for vital cash to buy a small generator for when the bombs hit the power stations, and shopping for canaries in the bird market of Old Baghdad.

            Iraqis hope the canaries might detect any use of chemical weapons before it is too late, but the only civilians in the city with gas masks are foreign journalists.

Museum emptied

            Look more closely, and you find that the Arab world's largest museum has packed up its priceless collection of Mesopotamian art and closed its doors.

            And at street corners you'll see piles of sandbags - tell-tale signs, say Baghdadis, that the authorities are digging in for a siege.

"However many planes the Americans fly, they will still have to enter the cities," says Hassib Obeidi, a senior ideologue in the Baath, the political party that has ruled Iraq for the past 35 years.

"The battle for Iraq will be fought in the cities. This isn't Kuwait."

Few find reassurance in the message that Baghdad will be the place where the Baath plan to make their last stand.

Iraq was the first Arab state of the 20th Century to win its independence, and its people do not relish the prospect of becoming the first state to lose it in the 21st.

Young and old vow they will take up arms, of the physical kind if they lack guns, once war begins.

Sixty suicide bombers responded to President Saddam Hussein's appeal for martyrs to join his "army of Jihad".

Armed with dreams of paradise, they marched through the streets of Baghdad on Wednesday vowing to blow themselves up should the US army arrive at the city gates.

But should the patriotism falter and there be a challenge to central authority, Baath apparatchiks armed with machine guns have begun night-time patrols of the streets.

The party has also notified residents that a curfew will be imposed to keep Baghdadis in their homes once the bombing begins.

Even at this late hour, the passport offices are packed.

Religious fever

            Threatened from within and without, terrorised Baghdadis are flocking to their houses of prayer for their last hope of salvation.

            Sunnis cite the tale of Abraham saved from the fires of hell.

Christians scour the Book of Isaiah, studying the tale of Sennacherib, a biblical Assyrian king whose massive army was wiped out by the angel of the Lord as it assembled at the gates of Jerusalem.

Shias recount fabulous reports of levitating turbans as proof that God is working a miracle.

            Secular men splutter Marx at daughters and wives fast-donning the veil.

            The retreat into religious communities also has proved problematic, sparking fears of a flare-up of sectarian tension.

            "Worst of all," says Professor Nadhmi. "Iraqis are now afraid of other Iraqis."

By Nick Pelham, BBC Baghdad Story from BBC NEWS, 06 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2825377.stm

Envoy hands Blair's letter to Musharraf
 

            General (retd) Sir Charles Gutherie, former chief of defence staff of the UK and special envoy of Prime Minister Tony Blair, called on President Gen Pervez Musharraf.

            The special envoy delivered a letter from Mr Blair to the president, a Foreign Office press release said.

            He discussed with the president important regional issues with particular reference to the Iraq question in the context of deliberations within the United Nations Security Council.

            The president informed the special envoy of Pakistan's position on the Iraq issue.

            While underlining Iraq's responsibility in the implementation of UNSC resolutions to the satisfaction of the council, the president said that all efforts should be made to seek a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the problem.

            The expected report of Dr Hans Blix in this context would be of key importance, he said.

07 March 2003,

http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en18807&F_catID=&f_type=source

Pak stresses peaceful solution to Iraqi crisis 

            DOHA: Pakistan has reiterated it favours a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi crisis, adding the fact that Baghdad had begun scrapping Al-Samood 2 missiles was a good gesture.

            In an interview with Qatar daily, The Peninsula, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri Tuesday said that if UN arms inspectors ask for more time, they should be allowed to continue their work.

            Kasuri said his country which is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council was waiting for the chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix’s report which is slated for submission on Friday.

            The foreign minister also called on Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed, Qatari Foreign Minister Ahmed Abdullah and the head of Saudi delegation and deputy foreign minister to the OIC Nazar bin Abid.

 

7 March 2003.
http://www.pakistanlink.com/headlines/march/06/04.html

Kuwait fence 'cut for war'
 

            An internal United Nations document obtained by the BBC says UN observers working in the border area between Iraq and Kuwait have discovered three large gaps cut in an electric fence that separates the two countries.

            According to the observers, the gaps in the fence were discovered earlier this month, shortly after plain-clothed US marines were seen driving through the demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait in unmarked vehicles.

            The UN report concludes that the three gaps in the electric fence are positioned on what is a likely access for any military advance through the demilitarised zone.

            The UN document describes an unauthorised incursion into the sensitive demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait earlier this week.

UN observers monitoring the area discovered 15 men wearing civilian clothes and travelling in unmarked cars.

When approached by UN observers, they said they were US marines and had permission from the Kuwaiti authorities to work in the area.

According to the document, all had military haircuts and three were carrying pistols in shoulder holsters.

The UN report says that shortly after the incursion was discovered, three large gaps were found in the electric fence that marks the border between Iraq and Kuwait.

The report says that where the fence had been breached, the cabling had been laid beneath the ground, presumably to preserve the continuity of the electric charge in the fence.

It says all three gaps are identical in size, about 25 metres wide, and positioned on what the UN observer mission in Kuwait judges is a likely access for any military advance through the demilitarised zone.

By Greg Barrow BBC UN correspondent, 07 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2828031.stm

 

Bush condemns Iraqi 'charade'

            US President George W Bush has accused the Iraqi Government of engaging in a "wilful charade" over disarmament and that refusing to use force to disarm Iraq would present an unacceptable risk.

            In a news conference at the White House, carried live on many American television networks, President Bush gave no new evidence to support his case for a new UN resolution paving the way for war on Iraq, which the United States is seeking in coming days.

            He called on allies to show where they stood on Iraq, saying it was "time for people to show their cards, to let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam".

            The president was speaking at his first full press conference since November, ahead of a crucial report by the chief United Nations weapons inspector later on Friday.

            Mr Bush said the UN weapons inspectors did not need more time, nor more personnel. All they needed was the full co-operation of the Iraqi regime.

            Asked whether he was close to deciding on using force against Iraq, Mr Bush said the US was still in the final stages of diplomacy.

            The United States would call for a vote on a new resolution on disarming Iraq whatever the level of support in the UN Security Council, he said.

            He accused Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein of continuing to hide weapons of mass destruction and building more. He also said Iraq provided funding and training and safe havens for terrorists.

            He also said that he would be "fine" with a decision by President Saddam Hussein to go into exile to avert war as long as Iraq was then disarmed.

Deadline

            The president's remarks come hours before chief weapons inspector Hans Blix is due to present his latest report on Iraqi disarmament to the UN Security Council.

            Britain has said it is ready to amend the wording of a proposed second resolution, so that it would be more acceptable to undecided Council members.

            Iraq could be offered a fresh deadline to disarm in the amended version, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw suggested on Thursday.

            But Mr Straw told BBC News that any more time given to Iraq would be "days and not months".

            The US has indicated room for modification on a new UN resolution, which it is sponsoring with the UK and Spain, saying it was not "written in stone".

            Mr Straw, speaking on a flight to New York, said he was keen to obtain the backing of other key nations.

            "It makes a difference, of course, if by an extra process, going the extra mile in terms of negotiation with our partners, we can achieve an international consensus".

Division

            The council is deeply divided about how best to disarm Iraq.

            China said it backed other states who have threatened to block any resolution paving the way for war.

            However, Beijing did not say whether it would use its power of veto in a vote on a second resolution.

            France, Germany and Russia are demanding that the weapons inspectors get more time in Iraq, saying war must be avoided.

            UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said on Thursday he would be prepared to go to war even if more than one country vetoed a second UN resolution.

            Against the diplomatic backdrop, military preparations for possible war are gathering pace.

            Washington has revealed that aircraft from the US and British forces enforcing the southern no-fly zone in Iraq have more than doubled the number of their patrols.

            Pentagon planners hope that by dramatically increasing flights in this way, they will be able to mask the start of any conflict.

07 March 2003, Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2827553.stm


Bush on Iraq: Key points
 

            President George W Bush used a rare live televised news conference to reiterate why he is determined to disarm Saddam Hussein even if it means war in Iraq.

            President Bush also tackled the aftermath of war in the Gulf, detailed Saddam's "charade", and discussed the situation in North Korea.

On the threat from Saddam

            President Bush said: "Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possess weapons of terror.

"He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists, terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries.

"Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to our people and to all free people."

On the aftermath of war

            Mr Bush said the US was totally committed to protecting the innocent in the event of war and suggested Iraqis would finally get a democracy.

            He said: "We will bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people. We will help that nation to build a just government after decades of brutal dictatorship.

            "The form and leadership of that government is for the Iraqi people to choose. Anything they choose will be better than the misery and torture and murder they have known under Saddam Hussein.

            "If we go to war, there will be a regime change and replacing this cancer inside of Iraq will be a government that represents the rights of all the people."

            Mr Bush insisted he wanted Iraq to be a "place where people can see Shia, Sunni and Kurds can get along in a federation" and a place which was a "catalyst for positive change".

On the destruction of the al-Samoud II missiles

            Mr Bush said: "Iraq's dictator has made a public show of producing and destroying a few missiles, missiles that violate the restrictions set out more than 10 years ago.

            "Yet our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles."

On the shifting of weapons of mass destruction

            Mr Bush said: "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors.

            "In some cases, these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighbourhoods."

On calling a vote on a second UN resolution

            "We will call for a vote no matter what the whip count (predicted vote tally) is.

            "We want people to stand up and say what their opinion is of Saddam Hussein. It is time for people to show their cards and let the world know where they stand."

On how opposition to war could provoke rifts

            Mr Bush said whatever the nature of disagreements with France, Germany and other powers it would not harm relations.

            "They are still our friends and we will deal with them as friends."

            "There was no disagreement when it came to voting on resolution 1441. If they think more time will cause him to disarm, I disagree."

            He said Turkey's failure to support the US by allowing the use of its territory would not stop it remaining a strategic friend.

            "I support Turkey going into the EU. Turkey is a friend. They are a Nato ally, we will continue to work with Turkey.

            "We have got contingencies in place should our troops not be allowed to come through Turkey. It won't cause any more hardship for our troops - I'm confident of that."

On North Korea's nuclear programme

            President Bush said he hoped a multilateral diplomatic solution could prevent North Korea end its defiance of the international community and halt its nuclear weapons programme.

            He said it was a "regional issue" which would involve the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

            "There's a lot of countries that have got a direct stake in whether or not North Korea has a nuclear weapon.

            "We're working the issue hard and I'm optimistic we'll come up with a diplomatic solution. I hope so.

            "I think the best way to deal with this is in multilateral fashion by convincing those nations that they must stand up to their responsibility, along with the United States, to convince Kim Jong-il that the development of a nuclear arsenal is not in his nation's interests.

            "Should he want help in easing the suffering of the North Korean people, the best way to achieve that help is to not proceed forward."

On foreigners now in Iraq

            Mr Bush said all foreign nationals - including UN inspectors and aid workers - would be given notice to leave before any conflict started.

            He said: "We will give people a chance to leave, and we don't want anybody in harm's way who shouldn't be in harm's way.

            "We have no quarrel with anybody other than Saddam and his group of killers."

On the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed

            Mr Bush said the American and Pakistani authorities had captured "the mastermind of the 11 September attacks against our nation".

            He added: "Khalid Sheikh Mohammed conceived and planned the hijackings and directed the actions of the hijackers.

            "We believe his capture will further disrupt the terror network and their planning for additional attacks."

Story from BBC NEWS, 07 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/2828009.stm


President Readies U.S. for Prospect of Imminent War 

            President Bush prepared the country tonight for possibly imminent military action against Iraq, declaring that Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat to the security of the United States and insisting "we really don't need anybody's permission" to defend the United States.

            He said that only days remained for a diplomatic solution and vowed that he would press for a vote on a new resolution at the United Nations in the next few days, even if it appeared that he could not muster a majority 9 of the 15 votes on the Security Council, and despite a French and Russian threat of veto. A defeat would not deter him, he said, from disarming Mr. Hussein.

            Mr. Bush, at a rare prime-time news conference, portrayed himself as the protector of the country and repeatedly invoked the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, saying Mr. Hussein posed a comparable danger.

            He tried anew to link Iraq to terrorists, warning that the country could not afford to wait for Mr. Hussein to unleash his weapons against the United States.

            "I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons," Mr. Bush said, in the first formal East Room news conference in nearly a year and a half. He said Sept. 11 "should say to the American people that we're now a battlefield."

            The president repeatedly stated that Iraq had failed to disarm. "This is a fact," he said. "It cannot be denied."

            He appeared determined to pre-empt a report on Friday by one of the chief arms inspectors, Hans Blix, who is expected to say that Mr. Hussein is finally destroying some of his weapons and that the inspectors need more time to complete their job.

            While portraying Iraq as the most urgent threat, Mr. Bush referred to North Korea's drive to produce nuclear weapons in coming months as a "regional issue," and urged China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to join in pressuring the North, which so far they have not done.

            Despite mounting criticism — from Democrats and Republicans — that he has refused direct talks with North Korea, he said he would not change course.

            Mr. Bush's 50-minute news conference came in the midst of the deepest diplomatic crisis of his presidency.

            France, Germany and Russia appeared to be gaining support for their declaration on Wednesday that they would block passage of any new Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Today, they won backing from China, which said it saw "no need for a new resolution."

Also today, some administration officials admitted to doubts that they have the votes to pass the resolution. But Mr. Bush said that he did not care, and he would use the vote at the United Nations to force countries to "show their cards" on confronting Iraq and the dangers it poses.

"It's now time for this issue to come to a head at the Security Council," Mr. Bush said. "And it will."

Nonetheless, in answering the last question of the evening he hinted that he might agree to some kind of deadline for Mr. Hussein — a British proposal — saying, "I'm not going to tip my hand."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in New York for Friday's Security Council meeting at the United Nations, held separate talks this evening with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Qatar to discuss "various ideas about the resolution, including possible changes to the text," according to his spokesman, Richard Boucher.

"We are seeking a resolution that can obtain maximum support," Mr. Boucher said.

A senior American diplomat said earlier today that he was still unsure a vote will happen, but that if it did, it would probably be next week. The Security Council's calendar has been left empty on Thursday, March 13.

Mr. Bush argued that the United States is not as isolated as it might seem. "When it's all said and done, if we have to use force, a lot of nations will be with us," he said, declining to enumerate how many, or how much it would cost, or how many casualties the United States might suffer.

Still, in the hours before he spoke, there were signs of tension even with the United States' most steadfast partner, Britain.

            The British foreign minister, Jack Straw, increasingly keen to win uncommitted Security Council members, announced that he was open to changes in the pending resolution as long as its main point — that Mr. Hussein had lost his last chance to disarm — remained in force.

            Mr. Straw also implicitly rejected Mr. Bush's oft-stated goal of "regime change," saying that if Mr. Hussein disarmed, "we accept that the government of Iraq stays in place."

            Mr. Bush took the opposite tack, saying clearly that Mr. Hussein had to go. "We are not speculating about the nature of the man," he said. "We know the nature of the man."

            He also explicitly invited Mr. Hussein to exile himself. "That'd be fine with me, just so long as Iraq disarms after he's exiled."

            Fear of defeat in the Security Council has made the White House more open to compromise wording, officials said. The most widely discussed compromise, offered by Canada, envisions disarmament benchmarks for Iraq to meet on a tight deadline, perhaps by March 31. The administration has talked of a much shorter time frame, maybe 72 hours.

            Some of the uncommitted Council members, which include Mexico, Pakistan, Chile, Angola, Cameroon and Guinea, have been given access to British intelligence data as evidence of Iraq's noncompliance.

            But there remains great resistance and some resentment of the way the United States has presented its case. "To be a superpower is not to say what you want to do and expect others to accept it, willingly or no," said one Council diplomat. "To be a superpower is to be a leader, not a dictator."

            The Iraq crisis has provoked a deep rift between the United States and some of its European allies, strained the NATO alliance and drawn widespread protests often marked by virulent anti-Americanism. But Mr. Bush brushed past the trans-Atlantic dispute.

            Addressing the worldwide protests against the prospect of war, Mr. Bush said he prayed daily about the issue. "I pray for guidance and wisdom and strength," he said, adding: "I pray for peace."

            "I recognize there are people who don't like war," he said. "I don't like war. I wish that Saddam Hussein had listened to the demands of the world and disarmed. That was my hope."

            Acknowledging that it would likely be impossible to depose Mr. Hussein without casualties, he said, "If we were to commit our troops — if we were to commit our troops — I would pray for their safety, and I would pray for innocent Iraqi lives, as well."

            Even as he spoke of prayer, Mr. Bush warned, "The risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow that inaction will make the world safer, is a risk that I'm not willing to take for the American people."

            "He's a murderer," he said. "He has trained and financed Al Qaeda type organizations. I take the threat seriously."

            Mr. Bush also reiterated the argument of many members of his administration that the installation of a democratic government in Iraq may act as a catalyst for the spread of democracy in a region dominated by autocratic governments, many of them American allies.

The president refused to say whether the American campaign would be a success whether or not Mr. Hussein is captured or killed in the onslaught. Instead, he referred to plans to ease the burden of ordinary Iraqis, promising that a post-Hussein government would respect minority rights and that American forces would make adequate food and medical supplies available.

Asked whether Turkey's refusal to allow American troops to use its soil for an assault from the north had endangered relations with that country, he waved the concern aside.

"Turkey is a friend," Mr. Bush said, adding that he would not try to block its entry into the European Union. "They're a NATO ally."

Mr. Bush said American planners have "contingencies in place" to proceed without Turkey. "It won't cause any more hardship for our troops; I'm confident of that."

Mr. Bush also said inspectors and relief workers will be given enough time to leave Iraq in the event the United States decides to take military action.

At the United Nations on Friday, Mr. Blix and Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the United Nations inspections for nuclear weapons, are scheduled to report to an open meeting of the Security Council about Iraq's disarmament to date.

They seem likely to declare that Mr. Hussein is finally making progress — he destroyed six more missiles today. Mr. Blix said recently that Iraq is involved in "real disarmament," while the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, has called the destruction of the missiles "the mother of all distractions."

Mr. Blix's office has also produced a 167-page draft report of the remaining disarmament tasks for Iraq. At a news conference at the United Nations on Thursday, Mr. Straw called it "a shocking indictment of the record of Saddam Hussein's deception and deceit, but above all of the danger which he poses to the region and to the world."

Among the unresolved issues, the report circulated to Council members detailed missing mustard gas, the heart of Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal.

It went on to say that a document recently provided by the Iraqi air force left unresolved the whereabouts or status of more than 6,000 bombs and thus some 1,000 tons of chemical warfare agents "not consumed during the Iran-Iraq war" of the 1980's.

The bulky report also noted uncertainty about whether 10,000 liters of anthrax and 19,000 "undisclosed liters of botulinum toxin" are still in Iraq's possession.

Such recitations have thus far proved of little use in winning over the nine votes needed for passage of the resolution backed by the United States.

Reminding his listeners that there was a long deadlock before the passage of the last resolution in November, which threatened Mr. Hussein with "serious consequences" if he failed to disarm immediately and unconditionally, Mr. Straw said, "This is harder."

The reason, he said, is that "what we're inviting people to do is to come to the conclusions that they voted for on the 8th of November, and those are difficult for people."

 By DAVID E. SANGER with FELICITY BARRINGER,

 The New York Times, 7 March  2003 

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/middleeast/07IRAQ.html?pagewanted=3

Hussein, in Rallying His Military, Also Shows Iraqis a Defiant Face

            President Saddam Hussein, cigar in hand, is addressing a small auditorium filled with commanders from the Republican Guard, belittling the deployment of American aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf.

            He reels off statistics about how each is nine stories high and serves 20,000 meals a day. "But in the end, does this aircraft carrier have wheels that enable it to come to Baghdad?" he says to the commanders, led by his son Qusay, a younger, stockier version of himself, seated in the front row.

            "The decisive factor in battle will be a soldier marching on his feet and tanks and mobile or fixed artillery," says Mr. Hussein, speaking from behind a long dais with an Iraqi flag off to his right. "All this talk about what America has is nonsense."

            Such scenes have been unrolling almost nightly for the past week at 9 o'clock on Iraqi television. The first hour, at least, of the news is taken up by coverage of Mr. Hussein's latest meeting with successive groups of military commanders.

            The broadcasts serve several purposes. They are partly to reassure an increasingly edgy nation of 22 million that they will not be overrun in what would be their third major conflict under Mr. Hussein's rule.

            The speeches are also meant to mobilize and rally the military, the president's most common theme being that the bristling array of high-tech American weaponry can be overcome by the determination of Iraqi soldiers defending their own homes.

            Perhaps most important, they show a calm, assured leader exhibiting a certain easy camaraderie with his military commanders, the very men the Bush administration has been trying to encourage to stage a coup d’ tat. The president has not been seen in person by the Iraqi public since a January 2001 military parade, and until these talks started intermittently in January he had not appeared much on Iraq's state-controlled television.

            Mr. Hussein, usually dressed in a three-piece suit, plays a variety of roles during his pep talks. He is part defiant commander-in-chief, part common soldier, part uncle, part folksy farm boy and part preacher. His themes vary widely.

            They include the mundane, like telling the officers to make sure the soldiers bathe often, are well tucked in at night and read books. They include myriad historical and religious references. Advice on military tactics is rife. "We should plan on the basis that the battlefields should be everywhere, the battlefields should be wherever there are people," he advised one group. The meetings have a certain ritualistic quality. Mr. Hussein enters the room to a standing, cheering ovation by the officers, who occasionally erupt into poems or songs of praise.

            He then calls on them one by one to brief him on the state of readiness of their troops. Almost all of the commanders exhibit a stiff, not to say nervous, reverence, saluting when they reach the podium and then rattling off what they have done.

            Most of the time Mr. Hussein discharges them with a gruff "Afiyah," meaning "Well done," and asking them to pass along his salutations to particular tribal leaders in their area. Sometimes he voices criticism.

            In January a special forces commander told him that his men could march 30 miles in 10 hours. "This should be improved," Mr. Hussein said. "When you want to march toward a certain area and hit and run in the same night, then you do not have enough time."

            He tells the commanders that even divisions that take heavy losses should continue fighting and should remain vigilant about their vulnerability to American weapons launched over great distances.

            Much of his rhetoric and imagery is drawn from his upbringing in a rural, tribal culture.

            "I don't need to say that Iraq is attached to your mustache, because after all it is your country," he told one group, using a local expression that means something has been entrusted to you.

            The anticipated fight for Baghdad is a common topic. One officer in tonight's broadcast told the president that his soldiers had been concentrating on urban warfare, including ambushes and mopping-up operations.

            "Baghdad will never fall like it fell before," Mr. Hussein predicted, referring to the city's sacking in the 13th century by Mongol invaders.

            They say that the only place Mr. Hussein feels vaguely safe is Baghdad, where his security apparatus has ensured that the coups and the countercoups of the 1960's will not be repeated.

            Diplomats report that Mr. Hussein is so scrupulous about his security that he is believed not to have used the telephone since the gulf war lest the location of the calls be monitored, and visitors are never quite sure which palace he will use to greet them.

            During the gulf war, Mr. Hussein was reported using a simple car with either himself or an officer as the driver, shifting safe houses daily. Diplomats here expect a repeat performance. Given that Baghdad is a city of some 4.5 million people, larger than all American metropolitan areas except New York and Los Angeles, he has plenty of places to hide.

            No one can predict accurately to what extent Iraqis might take up arms against invaders, although most avow to.

            In his speeches Mr. Hussein mocks the Americans for considering Iraq another Afghanistan and ridicules certain American tactics, like distributing leaflets in the southern half of the country — considered the most vulnerable to an uprising against the government — telling people to not fight because the United States is only after the president.

            "Are they still harboring the illusion that they are capable of toppling Iraq with their leaflets?" he said, adding that his bond with the Iraqi people was much stronger than, say, the love of the Americans for their president. "This love has been going on for 35 years of my being in power," he said.

NEIL MacFARQUHAR, The New York Times, 7 March, 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/middleeast/07BAGH.html?pagewanted=
print&position=top

 War may cost US $95bn 

            US taxpayers will face a bill of up to $95bn for an Iraqi war - and that is assuming the conflict is brief.

            In its latest number-crunching on the US budget, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated war costs at $24bn a month - although more than half of that has already been spent.

            The overall direct cost should not exceed $100bn, the government reckons, but analysts have warned that a prolonged conflict or occuption of Iraq could easily end up costing far more.

            Combined with the effect of tax cuts, the CBO warned that war spending could turn an $891bn cumulative budget surplus for 2004-2013 into a deficit of $1.82 trillion.

            The figure is well below the $5.6 trillion it suggested as a worst-case scenario in 2001, but still means deficits in every one of the ten years under review.

Different ideas

            The CBO's estimates, needless to say, diverge wildly from those of the White House itself.

            The Office of Management and Budget - the President's own number-crunchers - sees a first-year deficit of $307bn, $31bn or 9% less than that predicted by the CBO.

            That still exceeds the $290bn record deficit run up in 1990 when the current incumbent's father was President.

            And the OMB's own ten-year projection is only $80bn less than the CBO's forecast.

            Republicans insist that the $1.5 trillion tax cut they are planning, on top of the one passed on a bipartisan basis earlier in the current administration, will kickstart the economy and reinvigorate the tax take.

Spend what it takes

            And despite the CBO's estimates of the cost of war - which mention $9bn to get the troops home again and $1bn-4bn a month for the US's occupation plans - they say that fiscal worries have to take a back seat to security concerns.

            The economy, however, continues to slide, with February's unemployment figures producing a nasty surprise in the shape of a massive drop in non-farm payrolls.

            And many economists disagree with the administration on the likely effect of the planned tax cuts, saying they are targeted at the wrong groups and unlikely to feed through to USA Inc's bottom line.

Story from BBC NEWS, 07 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/2831865.stm
 

Full text: Blix briefing 

            Here is the full text of chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix's latest progress report to the UN Security Council on disarming Iraq.

            For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of Unmovic. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq.

            The twelfth quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalised ten days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the council up-to-date.

Inspection process

            Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by Unscom in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

            Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad.

            Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome.

            This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

            American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany.

            We are grateful not only to the countries, which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

 
Documents and interviews

            Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections.

            It was a disappointment that Iraq's Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results.

            When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.

            Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. Unmovic has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview.

            In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991.

            The provision of names prompts two reflections.

            The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.

            The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence.

            While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq.

            Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful.

            Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, seven of these during the last week.

            As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist.

            Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found.

            Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

            Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.

            There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD.

            During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations.

            No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.

            I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.

Recent developments

            On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues.

            Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalised, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you.

            As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion.

            Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s.

            We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope it's a temporary break.

Al Samoud missiles

            To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including four training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines have been destroyed under Unmovic supervision.

            Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.

            Two "reconstituted" casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.

            The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.

            More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will require further study and discussion.

            There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991.

            A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs.

            Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site.

            It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced.

            In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

            Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation.

            Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

            With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

            Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted.            

            This appears to be in response to a letter from Unmovic requesting clarification of the issue.

            What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.

            This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.

            Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated immediately, unconditionally and actively - with Unmovic, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002).

            The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:

            The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

            It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance.

            They are nevertheless welcome and Unmovic is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

Other resolutions

            Mr President, Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but Unmovic is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council.

            The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created Unmovic but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month.

            Let me be more specific.

Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs Unmovic to address unresolved disarmament issues and to identify - key remaining disarmament tasks and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme.

Unmovic will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required.

Unscom and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. Unmovic has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues or, rather, clustered issues.

It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities.

It is from the list of these clustered issues that Unmovic will identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks". As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready.

Unmovic is only required to submit the work programme with the "key remaining disarmament tasks" to the Council. As I understand that several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request.

In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to.

Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.

            I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 - including information which has come to light after 1998.

            It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information.

            Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.

            Mr. President, Let me conclude by telling you that Unmovic is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, eg, for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.

            How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks?

            While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions.

            It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.  

Story from BBC NEWS: 07 March 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2830505.stm

Analysis: Final countdown to war 

            Intense diplomatic efforts by supporters and opponents of the proposed new United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq are marking the final days before a vote.

            American and British officials are furious with the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, for - as they see it - underplaying a document accusing Iraq of failing to co-operate properly with inspections.

            They feel that his verbal report to the Security Council has undermined their efforts to swing doubters on the body their way.

The document concerned is called the "clusters" document, as it deals with a number of outstanding disarmament issues.

Mr Blix referred to it in his speech to the Security Council on Friday but not in detail. For reasons he has not explained, he chose not to concentrate on it.

It turns out that the document is far more damning about Iraqi compliance than was Mr Blix's speech.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Sunday that he thought Mr Blix "could have made more of it" - a diplomatic understatement.

The Foreign Office in London lost no time in sending out its own summary - it was e-mailed to the media within minutes of Mr Blix's speech.

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw brandished a well thumbed copy of the 173-page report during his own speech as if to ask why Mr Blix had not produced it himself. Mr Straw called the document "a shocking indictment" of Iraq.

Questions

            The document says, for example, that Iraq might have kept some Scud missiles, 550 mustard gas shells, 350 R-400 bombs capable of chemical and biological warfare and 6,500 chemical bombs, and that there is a "strong presumption that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist".

            The document also says that an unmanned drone aircraft has been found with a wingspan wider than Iraq had claimed, and that this might be capable of exceeding the 150-kilometre (93-mile) range for weapons delivery systems permitted by the UN.

            Mr Powell said that the United States intended to publicise this drone during the period leading up to the vote, which will come at some point this week.

            The British Government will use the long list of questions raised by the report as a benchmark for the compliance required by Iraq by 17 March, the deadline proposed in the new draft resolution.

            The resolution says that Iraq will have failed to take its final opportunity of disarming unless by 17 March "the council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active co-operation".

Propaganda battle

            The "clusters" document is part of the propaganda war now under way as part of the battle to win votes.

            The US and Britain seem to be relying mainly on telephone diplomacy.

            Prime Minister Tony Blair called Chinese President Jiang Zemin, but did not appear to get very far as the Chinese news agency quoted the president as saying that "it's in everyone's interest to take as much time as is needed".

            And Angola, one of the three African countries currently on the council, seems opposed as well.

            Its Deputy Foreign Minister, Jorge Chicote, told the BBC that Angola would not support the draft resolution. Earlier, President Ricardo Lagos of Chile said that the deadline of 17 March left "too little time."

            Despite such comments, both Mr Powell and Mr Straw continue to say that they feel a vote in favour is possible.

            France, meanwhile, is despatching its charismatic Foreign Minister, Dominque de Villepin, to the three African members - Angola, Cameroon and Guinea. Obviously it feels that face-to-face contact at senior level is desirable.

Pleasing the British

            Some observers wonder why the Americans and British are relying on the phone.

            Before the Gulf War in 1991, senior figures from both governments sallied forth across the world seeking support, and building a coalition to get Iraqi forces out of Kuwait was much easier than building one to invade Iraq itself.

            It is possible that the US has concluded that it does not matter in the end whether the resolution is passed or not. It went back to the council only because another resolution mattered to British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

            And Britain, too, while it would like a new resolution, is unlikely to back away from going to war alongside the US.

            At this stage it would be hard as a practical matter to withdraw the British troops from whatever war plan has been agreed.

            The words used on Sunday by Mr Straw to describe what would happen in the event of failure to secure a new Security Council resolution- "We reserve the right to make decisions" - indicate that the decision will be to go to war anyway.

            The hope then would be for a quick campaign. Then Mr Blair would be vindicated. Victory, after all, is the father of many children. 

By Paul Reynolds, BBC News Online world affairs correspondent,
Story from BBC NEWS: 09 March 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2834723.stm

                                         Crucial week ahead in Iraq crisis 

            Members of a deeply divided UN Security Council are bracing themselves for a crucial week in the United Nations, with both sides making a final diplomatic push to win support for their point of view.

            French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is embarking on a whistle-stop tour of three African members of the 15-strong Security Council - Angola, Cameroon and Guinea, whose votes could be decisive.

            Mr de Villepin is anxious to win their backing because the French would rather win this week's vote than veto the resolution, a BBC correspondent in Paris says.

            US Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Sunday there was a "strong chance" that the Security Council would approve a resolution opening the way for military action against Iraq in the near future.

            The United States has called for a vote on the proposed resolution as early as Tuesday in the wake of the latest reports by UN weapons inspectors on Iraqi disarmament.

            Chile, another of the six "swing voters" being wooed by both camps, indicated this weekend that it preferred further weapons inspections.

Upbeat

            Mr Powell acknowledged that the outcome of the Security Council vote, which could vetoed by any of the five permanent members, was still unclear - but he predicted that nine or 10 members would back the proposed resolution.

            "I am encouraged by the discussions I have been having with a number of members of the council," he said on US television.

            Mr Powell said he would present more evidence of Iraq's alleged plans to use pilotless "drone" aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

            But he added that the probability of war was rapidly increasing and he hinted that hostilities might begin before the new resolution's proposed 17 March deadline for Iraq to completely disarm, should America lose the vote at the UN.

            BBC analyst Stephen Cviic says that it is impossible to say whether Mr Powell's optimism is justified, such is the extent of the private arm-twisting.

            But, he adds, whichever way a vote goes, the world's major powers know that the public split over Iraq has been extremely damaging and both sides want to carry the day in the court of public opinion.

            As France's Mr de Villepin prepared to leave on his African tour, Mr Powell said he would not be surprised by a veto from Paris.

Mr Powell said such a move would have a serious effect on Franco-American relations in the short term, although he was sure the two countries would remain allies.

France needs to persuade a majority of Security Council members to oppose the resolution if it is to avoid having to confront the US directly and use its veto.

In other developments:

The man expected to become Turkey's new prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has had talks in Ankara with the US ambassador about the possible deployment of American troops in the country in the event of an attack on Iraq

The head of Iraq's weapons monitoring team, General Hossam Mohammed Amin, says he will continue to co-operate with the UN disarmament process despite the US and British deadline of 17 March

A convoy of UN vehicles carrying civilian staff is seen heading south from the Kuwaiti border with Iraq, as non-essential personnel are withdrawn from the area for their own safety.

Former US President Jimmy Carter criticises American plans for an imminent war against Iraq.

Saudi Arabia urges Iraq to defuse the crisis over its weapons of mass destruction by setting a timetable for disarmament.

Story from BBC NEWS: 10 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2835241.stm


                                               Short may resign over Iraq 

            Clare Short has told BBC News she will resign from the government if Britain goes to war against Iraq without United Nations backing.

            The international development secretary told BBC Radio 4's Westminster Hour she could not "stay and defend the indefensible".

            "If there is not UN authority for military action or the reconstruction of the country, I will not uphold a breach of international law or this undermining of the UN," she told the programme.

            "I will resign from the government," said Ms Short, who described Tony Blair's actions as "reckless".

            Downing Street expressed surprise at Ms Short's comments, with a spokesman insisting she had not expressed such views before to the prime minister.

Wrong forum?

            Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes said she was surprised by Ms Short's comments, which she argued should have been discussed with cabinet colleagues instead of on the airwaves.

            Ms Hughes told BBC Radio 4's Today programme: "At a time of critical importance, when everybody, including the government, wants to get a second resolution, it is surprising to have a cabinet minister expressing her views on the radio, not to the prime minister and her colleagues round the cabinet table."

                        Britain, the US and Spain have put forward a draft resolution to the UN which sets a deadline of 17 March for Baghdad to disarm.

            Downing Street insists that it is confident the Security Council will back the draft resolution in a vote, which is now likely to take place later in the week.

            The UK and US are already planning concessions including agreement to table a list of specific demands on disarmament that Saddam Hussein must meet if he is to avoid a war.

            It is also possible that the 17 March deadline for compliance by Baghdad could be extended.

            Mr Blair spent Sunday at his Chequers official country residence, engaged in an intensive round of telephone diplomacy over the deadline idea.

'Bad atmosphere'

            But Ms Short, who resigned over Labour's support for the last Gulf War, said she was surprised at Tony Blair's "extraordinarily reckless" stance.

            "The whole atmosphere of the current situation is deeply reckless - reckless for the world, reckless for the undermining of the UN in this disorderly world, reckless with our government, reckless with his own future, position and place in history."

            Ms Short said she had raised her objections in frequent detailed discussions with both the prime minister and foreign secretary Jack Straw

            "People like me are being told, 'Yes, all this is under consideration'," she said

            "And then the spin the next day is, 'We are ready for war'."

It was time to put her "cards on the table" and reveal her intentions, Ms Short added.

"I feel the need now, because it is 10 minutes to midnight, to say out loud what I think Britain should do with its influence - because our failure to use our influence properly is so dangerous for the world," Ms Short said.

"We are undermining the UN," she added.

"Allowing the world to be so bitterly divided - the division in Europe, the sense of anger and injustice in the Middle East - is very, very dangerous," Ms Short told Westminster Hour.

"It is a recruiting sergeant for terrorism."

Blair's surprise

            BBC political correspondent John Pienaar said Ms Short's threat had come as a surprise to Downing Street.

            "She isn't just laying down this ultimatum, she is accusing Number 10 of reverting to old habits of spin, saying one thing in private and another thing in public."

            Earlier on Sunday Loughborough MP Andy Reed announced he was quitting as parliamentary aide to environment secretary Margaret Beckett.

            Three other parliamentary private secretaries - MPs who work as assistants to ministers - have publicly indicated they also would step down if action was taken without a new UN resolution.

Story from BBC NEWS: 10 March 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2834971.stm

 

Pakistan won't support war on Iraq: Jamali 

            ISLAMABAD, March 10: The government has decided "not" to support any move that seeks to attack Iraq and create problems for its people. "I want to take parliament into confidence and tell the parliamentarians that Pakistan will not become a party to any decision which leads to bloodshed in Iraq", declared Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

            Speaking in the National Assembly, he said here on Monday that he also wanted to take the nation into confidence to clarify the position of the government on Iraq. "And for this purpose I would address the nation on Tuesday".

            Mr Jamali, who made his brief speech amid slogans by MNAs belonging to MMA, PPP and PML-N, regretted that opposition was not behaving like matured people. "You must listen to me if at all you want me to talk on important national and international issues", he said adding that his government fully believed in taking decisions which were based on consensus.

            The PM pointed out that his government will not help any country to fulfil its "war designs" against Iraq. "We want to go along with other countries to deal with Iraqi problem".

            Later, speaking at a news conference in his chamber, the prime minister criticized the opposition parties for not allowing him to make a policy statement on Iraq. "But let me tell them that minority cannot dictate majority to do this or to do that", he added.

            To a question he said that he has been saying for the last three months that his government did not want to create problems for the Iraqi people by supporting what he termed any "unjust decision". "It will be very difficult for Pakistan to support war in Iraq", Mr Jamali said.

            Asked whether Pakistan will abstain or support new US resolution in the UN Security Council to attack Iraq, he said, "let the time come for voting".

            In reply to a question he said Pakistan-US relations were very good as both the countries had been actively working together against terrorism. "But if some thing is not in the interest of my country then why should we accept that", he asked.

            He told a newsman that he would be visiting the United States on March 27 or 28 to discuss hosts of issues with President Bush. "But my agenda is Pakistan and I would only serve the interests of my country", he assured.

            Talking about opposition's agitation in the nation assembly, Mr Jamali said that his government was ready to open dialogue on the LFO to settle all the issues peacefully and in the spirit of accommodation.

            He made it clear that the LFO was very much a part of the Constitution as all the amendments made in it were in line with the decision of the Supreme Court. "But I want to tell the opposition that let us initiate a dialogue to work out any constitutional package to resolve a standoff on LFO", he added.

            He said he held talks with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Qazi Hussain and Maulana Sami ul Haq on Saturday and invited them for talks on all controversial issues. "I told them that the government would be flexible to discuss LFO with the opposition". But he said that he feared that the opposition wanted to get the assemblies removed by what he termed adhering to politics of agitation. Mr Jamali said that the opposition members were forgetting that the elections of MNAs and Senators were held under LFO provisions and as such it could not be now undone.

            The prime minister made it clear he would not set up a new parliament committee to discuss LFO. "But we are ready to discuss LFO outside the house", he said

            He told a reporter that when people in the previous assemblies enchanted slogans like "go baba go", the democratic institutions were packed by a third force. He said he has directed PML-Q president Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain to hold talks with opposition by once again formally inviting it.

            He said he has personally held talks with many MNAs including Syed Kurshid Shah and Naveed Qamar to resolve the crisis on LFO. He said he expected from the graduate assembly to behave responsibly so that the parliament could be run and people's problems solved at their doorsteps.

            He was asked whether his government was ready to concede certain favours to the opposition on National Security Council (NSC), 58(2)(B) and the removal of president's military uniform. "This could only be possible when the opposition stops taking political mileage in the garb of LFO", he replied.

            "Let the parliament function and this is how we could remove our differences on various constitutional matters", the prime minister said.

            Mr Jamali said some politicians sitting in Jeddah and Dubai were misguiding their members of the parliament on various issues.

            He refused to say any thing when asked whether he has discussed LFO with President Musharraf. "There are many things which cannot be discussed in the public".

            To another question, he said the opposition MNAs were more interested in Mr Sanaullah MPA, who was allegedly manhandled by some security agency, rather than having foreign policy debate on Iraq.

            Mr Jamali told a reporter that he could not do anything to bring 58 Pakistanis who were currently in Guantanamo bay prison in Cuba. "Why had they gone to Afghanistan", he asked.

Ihtashamul Haque, 11 March 2003

http://www.dawn.com/2003/text/top4.htm

Pakistan's 'no' to war 

            Even though it did not constitute a full enunciation of Pakistan's policy on the Iraq crisis, Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali's speech in the National Assembly on Monday does give an indication of Islamabad's position. In spite of the fact that the uproarious scene created by the opposition over the Legal Framework Order had drowned out part of the speech, the broad outline of the government's Iraq policy came out quite clearly. In doing this, Mr Jamali kept his promise that his government would take the nation and parliament into confidence on this highly sensitive issue. Fully aware of the sentiments of the people of Pakistan on the threats of war against Iraq, he made it plain that his government would not support any move that authorized war. He declared categorically, "I want to ... tell the parliamentarians that Pakistan will not become a party to any decision which leads to bloodshed in Iraq."

            Even if it had not been a member of the Security Council at this time, Pakistan would have been on the horns of a dilemma on the Iraqi crisis; its membership of the council has only made the situation doubly difficult. To decide which way to vote in the Security Council calls for a careful consideration of the options available to Pakistan. Indeed, given Pakistan's own security concerns - the situation in Afghanistan, the unresolved Kashmir dispute, and the perpetual tension with India - Islamabad's policy options are rather limited. What complicates matters further is Pakistan's membership of the US-led war on terror and its position as the "front-line" state.

            Obviously, the fate of the resolution would not hinge on Pakistan's vote. Whichever way Islamabad and other non-permanent members of the UN Council vote, it is the permanent members of the council who would decide the issue. America felt confident that it would be able to secure a majority. Nevertheless, this would be a technical majority, because Paris and Moscow made it abundantly clear that they would use their veto power to kill any resolution that closed the door on peace. Pakistan as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference and as a key Muslim country cannot afford to support any resolution that seeks to inflict further human suffering and devastation on Iraq. In this Pakistan must be guided by the fact that the cause of peace is just and must be upheld under all circumstances. An attack on Iraq will be morally and legally unjust.

            Those who were supposed to find Baghdad guilty - the UN inspectors - have found no "smoking gun" in Iraq. The other agency that has been monitoring Iraq - the International Atomic Energy Agency - agrees with the inspectors. The IAEA has also said the Anglo-American "evidence" about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was not authentic. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also thinks there is no case for war. This is the opinion which America's own allies share. This is in addition to world opinion which has unnerved the war lobby, which now seems in a hurry to move in for the kill, because it is not sure whether it would be able to cope with defections within its own ranks. The Jamali government is, thus, on the right track and in right company. Those opposed to war are in tune with the tide of world opinion which says it cannot support any move that authorizes war on Iraq.

Editorial, Dawn, 12 March 2003
http://www.dawn-usa.com/

Pakistan, IMF discuss fall-out of Iraq war

            ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has discussed contingency measures with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deal with the fallouts of the Iraq crisis, the Finance Ministry said on Tuesday.

            Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister's Adviser on Finance, discussed various scenarios with Abbas Mirakhor, Director, representing Pakistan and other regional countries on the IMF Board. The Ministry of Finance and the review mission of the Fund headed by Klaus Enders were also discussing the subject threadbare.

            "Aziz talked about the impact on economy due to crisis in the Middle East and explained various contingency plans to meet the current situation, particularly, in term of higher oil stocks and essential commodities," stated an official statement of the Ministry of Finance after talks with Mirakhor.

            The government fears $1 billion additional oil import bill if war erupts in the Middle East. However, the official foreign exchange reserves in excess of $10.1 billion were enough to pay for 11-month import bill of the country, leaving little short-term room for any immediate pressure on the external sector. The uninterrupted supply of oil, however, would continue to remain the main worry. Major oil suppliers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, were not far away from the war zone.

            The official commitment made with the Fund, in anticipation of Iraq crisis, says: "If any such risks were to materialize, we would seek to protect budget balances by enacting further cuts in low-priority expenditures, while protecting key social spending."

            This would require the government to allow automatic fuel price adjustment, both for retail POL prices and electricity tariffs in the country. With international oil prices rising, the government was facing a difficult situation. If it continues to allow price hike, political backlash would be challenging one, and if it backtracks from agreed commitments, multilateral agencies would react strongly.

            Owing to worse situation of the state-owned enterprises and large outright dollar purchases, the government expects shortfalls in non-tax revenue and loan repayments of about Rs 52.3 billion because of non-payment of debt service by Wapda of about Rs 16.5 billion, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) by Rs 6.1, and the National Highway Authority (Rs 9.8 billion), and a lower profit transfer from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) by Rs 20 billion because of the sterilization cost.

            The financial situation of Wapda remained unsustainable and would require further reforms. According to the IMF estimates, based on world oil prices at the mid-November levels, show a cash deficit of Wapda in the order of Rs 34 billion (0.8 per cent of GDP) for the year. Since oiil prices had actually gone u further to a level of $40 per barrel, the current forecasts would suggest even higher cash shortfall.

            "We plan to strictly apply the formula-based pricing for gas and petroleum products and electricity tariffs, as the existing automatic price adjustment mechanisms have gained broad acceptability, and are transparent and widely understood," the government made this pledge, as part of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreed with the Fund. Total disbursements under the three-year $ 1.4 billion Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) were about $ 591 million.

            Shaukat Aziz discussed current state of the economy with Mirakhor, official hand-out said, adding that the government believes in fiscal responsibility, continuity of reforms and consistency of policy.

Nadeem Malik, 12 March, 2003

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2003-daily/12-03-2003/main/main10.htm

Bush orders Saddam to quit 

            US President George W Bush has given Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war.

            In a televised address to the nation, Mr Bush said it was time for "decades of deceit and cruelty" to end in Iraq.

            "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours," Mr Bush said shortly after 0100 GMT.

            "Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing."

            More than 250,000 US troops are now stationed in the Gulf awaiting orders, along with thousands of British and Australian troops.

            Early reactions to the Bush ultimatum from world leaders were generally negative.

            A statement from the office of French President Jacques Chirac accused Mr Bush of taking "a unilateral decision" that was "contrary to the will of the UN Security Council".

            China's new Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, said Beijing would continue to seek a political settlement "so long as there's one glimmer of hope".

            The US' neighbours Canada and Mexico both said they opposed military action.

            Canada - which provided troops for the 1991 Gulf war - said it would not join an invasion coalition without a further UN resolution.

            But Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi voiced support for Mr Bush, in what correspondents say could be a risk to his popularity at home.

'Clear danger'

            In his address, Mr Bush said the US had the legal right to protect itself.

He warned that Iraq's weapons could be used against Americans by terrorists, including members of Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.

"The danger is clear," he said in his White House speech.

"Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfil their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other," Mr Bush said.

"The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat, but we will do everything to defeat it.

"Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety."

Minutes after Mr Bush finished his speech, US officials announced they had raised the terrorism alert to orange, the second-highest level.

Authorities warned of "multiple attacks" nationally and abroad in the event of a US-led war with Iraq.

Diplomatic failure

            Mr Bush advised all foreign nationals, including journalists and UN weapons inspectors, to leave Iraq immediately.

            On Tuesday morning, weapons inspectors prepared to board planes at Baghdad airport after the UN ordered all its staff out of the country for their own safety.

            Mr Bush said action had to be taken now "because the risks of inaction would be far greater".

            He said he believed in the role of the United Nations and stressed that the US and other countries had tried to ensure the peaceful disarmament of Iraq since the end of the 1991 Gulf war.

            "Peaceful efforts have failed again and again," he said.

            On Monday, diplomacy collapsed at the UN when the US, UK and Spain withdrew a draft resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq, amid threats of a veto from France.

            Referring to France and Russia, Mr Bush criticised permanent members of the UN Security Council who said they would not allow resolutions compelling Iraq to disarm.

            "These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it," Mr Bush said, adding that many other countries supported US policy.

            The Turkish Government has said it will urgently reconsider a US request to base troops on its soil.

            The US wants to deploy about 60,000 troops in Turkey for a possible invasion of northern Iraq, to complement an expected attack from Kuwait in the south.

Appeal to Iraqis

            Mr Bush also used his 13-minute address to send a message to Iraqis, stressing that any military action would be directed against the "lawless men" in power - such as Saddam Hussein and his sons, Qusay and Uday.

            "As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need," the president said.

            "We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free."

            He promised: "The tyrant will soon be gone - the day of your liberation is near".

            The US leader urged Iraqi forces not to destroy oil wells or use chemical weapons.

            He said war criminals would be prosecuted and it would be no good for them to argue that they had only been following orders.

            Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri said earlier that "any child" in Iraq knew a demand for Saddam to go into exile would fail.

Story from BBC NEWS: 18 March 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/2858965.stm

 

Security Council 4721^st Meeting (AM) 

IMPORTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID FOR IRAQ STRESSED, AS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS VOICE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT PROCESS 

Council Hears Report of Chief UN Weapons Inspector

            In a morning meeting of the Security Council today, perhaps only hours or days away from military action in Iraq, members debated the wisdom, indeed, the right under the United Nations Charter and international law, to use force to compel that country’s disarmament of mass destruction weapons.  Agreeing on the need for humanitarian aid for Iraq’s people in the current situation, the Council also heard the presentation of a work programme by the chief weapons inspectors, whose mission had recently been suspended.

            Addressing the impending humanitarian crisis at the end of the debate, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that despite regrets about the suspended inspections process, everyone could agree on the plight of the Iraqi people.  The conflict that was “now clearly about to begin” could only make things worse -- perhaps much worse.  Everything possible must be done to mitigate that imminent disaster, which could easily lead to epidemics and starvation.  Under international law, the responsibility for protecting civilians in conflict fell on the belligerents.  Without in any way assuming or diminishing that ultimate responsibility, the United Nations would do whatever it could to help.

            Today’s ministerial-level meeting came in the wake of an ultimatum issued by United States President George Bush on Monday for Saddam Hussein and his two sons to leave Iraq by this evening or face war.  On one side of the debate was Iraq’s perceived failure to make the strategic decision to comply with 12 years of demands of the international community to disarm.  On the other side, was the view that the inspections had produced tangible results and should be allowed to continue unless or until all roads to the peaceful disarmament of Iraq were exhausted.

            The last Security Council resolution on Iraq, 1441 (2002), adopted unanimously by Council members on 8 November 2002, gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with its obligation to rid itself of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, obligations that dated back to 1991, with the end of the Persian Gulf War.

            Today, Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), said he felt sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq had not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq; that no more time was available for inspections; and that armed action now seemed imminent. 

            Dr. Blix expressed “a sense of relief” that it was possible to withdraw yesterday all United Nations international staff, including that of UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The work programme presented, issued on Monday, would seem to have only limited practical relevance in the current situation.  The UNMOVIC was a subsidiary organ of the Council.  Until the Council took a new decision regarding the role and functions of the Commission, the previous resolutions remained valid to the extent practicable.  It was evidently for the Council to consider the next steps.

            Make no mistake about it, said the Foreign Minister of France, Dominique de Villepin, the choice was between two visions of the world.  To those who chose to use force and thought they could resolve the world’s complexity through swift preventive action, France offered, in contrast, resolute action over time.  Everyone in the room knew the inspections were producing tangible results and offered the prospect of effective disarmament through peaceful means and in short time frames.  Those who hoped to eliminate the dangers of proliferation through armed intervention in Iraq were depriving themselves of a key tool for resolving other crises of the same type.

            Asserting that Baghdad had fulfilled “virtually all” the conditions set by the inspectors and had not put up any serious obstacles, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation said that the inspectors, whose mandates had been suspended and not concluded, had everything necessary to conclude the disarmament process peacefully.  Moreover, no decision had authorized the use of force against Iraq outside the United Nations Charter or the violent overthrow of the leadership of a sovereign State.  If he really had indisputable facts demonstrating that, from the territory of Iraq, there was a direct threat to the security of the United States, then Russia, without any hesitation, would be prepared to use all the means available under the Charter to eliminate such a threat.  The Security Council today, however, was not in possession of such facts, he said.

            The Deputy Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Joschka Fischer, said that, with the world facing imminent war in Iraq, the Council could not remain silent.  The developments of the last few hours had radically changed the international situation and had brought the work of the United Nations to a standstill.  The work programme presented this week by the chief United Nations weapons inspectors had provided clear and convincing guidelines on how to disarm Iraq peacefully in a short period of time.  For that reason, he emphatically rejected the impending “disarmament war”.

            Divergent views were expressed by the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Spain, which had tabled a further resolution on the situation on 7 March containing a deadline of Monday, 17 March, for Iraq’s full compliance.  Failing to win the necessary support for the draft in the Council and amid the threat of a veto by a permanent member, the three announced on Monday that they would not put it to a vote.

            The United States representative said that, under the current circumstances, there was no choice but to set aside the inspectors’ work programme.  It was out of touch with the reality on the ground and could not lead to the results that the Council had demanded, namely, the peaceful disarmament of Iraq.  Under the current circumstances, there was no choice but to set it aside.  Meanwhile, the Council would be faced with the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, a concern shared by his Government, which had dedicated significant resources and was fielding the largest-ever disaster relief team.

            Expressing deep regret that the Council had been unable to agree on the way forward in Iraq, the United Kingdom representative said that it was Iraq’s failure to meet its obligations that had divided the Council.  If Iraq had made genuine efforts to disarm, “we would not be where are are”.  Now, it was important to ensure rapid humanitarian relief for Iraq and allow for the swift removal of sanctions.  He hoped that, together, the United Nations members would make rapid progress on that issue.  He commended the efforts of the inspectors, who bore none of the responsibility for the current situation.

            Saddam Hussein bore sole responsibility for the suspended inspections through his deceit and his choice to choose the path of war, asserted Spain’s representative.  He alone was ultimately responsible for the strong increase in diplomatic, political and military tension over the past few days, and he alone would be responsible for confronting those serious consequences, to which references had been made in resolution 1441 (2002).  The 7 March draft resolution had been designed to ratchet up the pressure on Iraq, but legitimate recourse to the use of force had been based on the sequential logic of previous resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

            Following the presentation of the work programme by Dr. Blix, Gustavo Zlauvinen, representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said the Director-General’s written report had been transmitted today to the Council.

            The Foreign Minister of Guinea, François Lonseny Fall, whose delegation holds the Council presidency for March, spoke, as did Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Farouq al-Shara’.  Statements were also made by the representatives of Pakistan, Mexico, Cameroon, Chile, Angola, China, Bulgaria, and Iraq. 

            The meeting began at 10:43 a.m. and was adjourned at 1:15 p.m.

Background 

            The Security Council met this morning to consider “the situation between Iraq and Kuwait” and to hear the draft work programme of Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Presentation of Work Programme

            HANS BLIX, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, said it might seem strange that he was presenting a draft work programme only after having performed inspections for three and a half months.  There were good reasons, however, why the Council wanted to give the inspections some time after their start to prepare the work programme.  During the months of the build-up of his resources in Iraq, Larnaca and New York, and of inspections in Iraq, he had learned a great deal that was useful in drafting the work programme and in selecting the key remaining disarmament tasks.  It would have been difficult to draft it without that knowledge and practical experience.

            He said that the time lines established in resolution 1284 (1999) had been understood to mean that the work programme was to be presented for the Council’s approval at the latest on 27 March.  In order to meet the wishes of the members, he had made the draft work programme available on Monday.  On that same day, he was constrained, together with other United Nations units, to order the withdrawal of all inspectors and other international staff from Iraq.

            “I naturally feel sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq, that no more time is available for our inspections and that armed action now seems imminent”, he said.

            At the same time, he continued, he felt “a sense of relief” that it was possible to withdraw yesterday all United Nations international staff, including that of UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The Iraqi authorities gave full cooperation to achieve that and the withdrawal to Larnaca took place in a safe and orderly manner.  Some sensitive equipment was also taken to Larnaca, while other equipment was left and the offices sealed.  Some inspection staff would remain for a short time in Larnaca to prepare inspection reports.  Others who had come from the roster of trained staff would go home to their previous positions and could be available again, if the need arose.

            Turning to the draft work programme, he said he was aware of ideas that had been advanced about specific groups of disarmament issues, which could be tackled and solved within specific time lines.  The programme did not propose such an approach, which would have aimed, for example, at addressing and resolving the issues of anthrax and VX in March and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) in April.  To date, he had worked broadly and had not neglected any identified disarmament issues.  It was evidently possible for the Council, however, to single out a few issues for resolution within a specific time, just as the draft programme selected 12 key tasks, progress on which could have had an impact on the Council’s assessment of cooperation of Iraq under resolution 1284 (1999).  Whatever approach was followed, results would depend on Iraq’s active cooperation in substance.

            He noted that, under resolution 1284 (1999), UNMOVIC’s work programme was to be submitted to the Council for approval.  What was drafted and prepared for implementation by a large staff of UNMOVIC inspectors and other resources deployed to Iraq, however, would seem to have only limited practical relevance in the current situation.  The UNMOVIC was a subsidiary organ of the Council.  Until the Council took a new decision regarding the role and functions of the Commission, the previous resolutions remained valid to the extent practicable.  It was evidently for the Council to consider the next steps.

            In its further deliberations, he said he hoped the Council would be aware that it had in UNMOVIC staff a unique body of international experts who owed their allegiance to the United Nations and who were trained as inspectors in the field of weapons of mass destruction.  While the IAEA had a large department of skilled nuclear inspectors and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had a large staff of skilled chemical weapons inspectors, no other international organizations had trained inspectors in the field of biological weapons and missiles.  There was also in the secretariat of UNMOVIC staff familiar with and trained in the analysis, both of specific issues and in the broad questions of proliferation of mass destruction weapons.  With increasing attention being devoted to the proliferation of those weapons, that capability might be valuable to the Council.

The representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), GUSTAVO ZLAUVINEN, informed the Council that Mr. ElBaradei had transmitted the work programme of the Agency today, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1284.  That programme was self-explanatory, and the Director-General would be available at any time in the future to discuss it, should the Council decide to do so.

Statements

            JOSCHKA FISCHER, Deputy Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, said that the world was facing imminent war in Iraq.  The Council could not remain silent.  The developments of the last few hours had radically changed the international situation and had brought the work of the United Nations to a standstill.  Nevertheless, he thanked Dr. Blix for briefing the Council on the work programme.  He fully supported Dr. Blix’s approach, even under the current circumstances.  The work programme had provided clear and convincing guidelines on how to disarm Iraq peacefully in a short period of time.  It was possible to disarm Iraq peacefully.  Peaceful means had not been exhausted.

            For that reason, he emphatically rejected the impending war.  Germany had collaborated with France and Russia to put forward proposals for a disarmament regime with a clear deadline.  Others had also submitted proposals until the last moment.  During the last few days, it had been possible to move closer to a common objective –- to counter the risks posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.  Especially in recent weeks, considerable progress had been made, including with the destruction of the Al-Samoud missiles.  Iraq’s readiness to cooperate was unsatisfactory, hesitant and slow.  Everyone had agreed on that.  However, could that be regarded as grounds for war?  Iraq was meeting more and more the demands in Council resolutions.  Why should we now abandon plans for inspections?

In that connection, he made the following three points.  First, the Council had not failed.  “We must counter that myth.”  The Council had made available the instruments to disarm Iraq peacefully.  The Council was not responsible for what was happening outside the United Nations.  Secondly, under the current circumstances, the policy of military intervention had no credibility.  “It does not have the support of our people.”  It would not have taken much to safeguard the unity of the Council.  There was no basis in the Charter for a regime change with military means.  Thirdly, it was necessary to preserve the inspection regime and to endorse the work programme because both would be needed after the end of military action.  Resolutions 1284 and 1441 were still in force, even if some adjustments were needed.

He was convinced that the United Nations and the Council must continue to play the central role in the Iraqi conflict.  The United Nations was the key institution for the preservation of peace and security and for reconciliation.  The Council bore the primary responsibility for world peace and international security.  The negotiations on the Iraq crisis had shown how relevant and indispensable the peacemaking role of the United Nations was.  The United Nations was the only appropriate framework for peaceful disarmament.  Disarmament wars were not the way forward.

He was deeply concerned over the humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq.  Everything possible must be done to avert a humanitarian disaster.  A large majority of people in Germany and in Europe were greatly troubled by war in Iraq.  That continent had experienced war only too often.  War was a great tragedy for those affected and could only be the last resort when all other peaceful means were exhausted.  Germany had accepted the resort to war in two occasions, when that was the last resort – in Kosovo and Afghanistan.  Today, however, he did not believe that there was no alternative to war.  Iraq could be disarmed by peaceful means.  He would seize any opportunity to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis.

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, said war could be only the last resort, with collective responsibility being the rule.  “Whatever our aversion for Saddam Hussein’s cruel regime, that holds true for Iraq and for all the crises that we will have to confront together”, he said.

He then thanked the inspectors, saying that their programme was a reminder that there was still a clear and credible prospect for disarming Iraq peacefully.  Today’s report confirmed what everybody in the room knew:  “Yes, the inspections are producing tangible results.  Yes, they do offer the prospect of effective disarmament through peaceful means and in shorter time frames.”  The path the States had mapped together in the context of resolution 1441 was still available.  In spite of the fact that it had been interrupted, it would have to resume as soon as possible.  When time came, it would be necessary to complete the Council’s knowledge about Iraq’s programmes and finish disarming Iraq.  The contribution of the inspectors would be decisive at that time.

“Make no mistake about it”, he continued.  “The choice is indeed between two visions of the world.”  To those who chose to use force and thought they could resolve the world’s complexity through swift preventive action, France offered in contrast resolute action over time.  In international relations, nothing lasting could be built without dialogue and respect for others, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example.  To ignore that was to run the risk of creating misunderstanding, radicalization and spiralling violence.  That was even more true of the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts, where stability must be a major objective.

He further expressed regret that those who hoped to eliminate the dangers of proliferation through armed intervention in Iraq were depriving themselves of a key tool for resolving other crises of the same type.  The Iraqi crisis allowed the international community to craft an instrument, through the inspections regime, which was unprecedented and could serve as an example.  “Why, on this basis, not envision establishing an innovative, permanent structure, a disarmament body under the aegis of the United Nations?” he asked.

To those who thought that the scourge of terrorism would be eradicated through the case of Iraq, “we say they run the risk of failing in their objectives”, he added.  An outbreak of force in such an unstable area could only exacerbate the tensions and fractures of which the terrorists fed.  Over and above the division, in the face of those threats, the international community had a collective responsibility to recover its unity.  Together, countries had the duty of healing the wounds of war, providing, as a matter of urgency, the required humanitarian assistance to Iraq.  The Secretary-General had already begun to mobilize various United Nations agencies.  France would take full part in the collective effort to assist the Iraqi people.  The “oil-for-food” programme must continue, with necessary adjustments, and he expected to receive the Secretary-General’s proposals in that regard.

Afterwards, it would be necessary to build peace, he said.  No country by itself had the means to build Iraq’s future.  In particular, no State could claim the necessary legitimacy.  Only the United Nations had the legal and moral authority for such an undertaking.  That action must be guided by the principles of Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity, as well as preservation of its sovereignty.  It was also up to the United Nations to set out the framework for the country’s economic reconstruction, which needed to be transparent and allow for the development of the country’s resources for the benefit of the Iraqis themselves.

It was necessary to remain constantly mobilized, he continued.  In that spirit, France renewed its call for the heads of State and government to meet in the Security Council to respond to the major challenges confronting them.  “Let us intensify our fight against terrorism.  Let us fight mercilessly against its networks with all the economic, juridical and political weapons available to us.  Let us give new impetus to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, he said.  France had already proposed that heads of State and government meet on the sidelines of the next General Assembly to define together the new priorities for action.  It was necessary to recover the initiative in the regional conflicts, in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian one.

Faced with the new world, the international community should be guided by the principles of respect for law, defence of freedom and justice, and the spirit of dialogue and tolerance.  The United Nations had never been so necessary.  It was up to that body to harness all the resolve to meet the challenges, as it was the place where international rules and legitimacy were founded and because it spoke in the name of peoples.  “Confronted with a world in crisis, we have a moral and political obligation to restore the threads of hope and unity”, he said.  The judgment of future generations would depend on the international community’s capacity to meet that great challenge –- in furtherance of its values, its common destiny and peace.

IGOR S. IVANOV, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, said that the Security Council, by unanimously adopting resolution 1441 (2002), took upon itself a serious responsibility to conclude the process of disarming Iraq.  He had no doubt that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, which had deployed in Iraq an effectively functioning inspection machinery, were in a position to carry out their tasks within a realistic time frame.  The reports submitted by the chief inspectors had convincingly showed that the inspectors had succeeded in achieving tangible results.  It was fundamentally important that, thanks to the unity of the world community and the pressure brought to bear on the Iraqi authorities, including a military presence in the region, Baghdad had fulfilled virtually all the conditions set by the inspectors and had not put up any serious obstacles.

He said that the inspectors, if given the opportunity to continue their work, had everything