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Fact Files A dehumanised humanity Introduction The Tamil-Sinhala conflict has destroyed political security and economic stability of Sri Lanka. People of Sri Lanka have paid a very heavy price of this ethnic plus religious conflict. More than 61,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced from their homes because of the bloody insurgency headed by LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) aimed at having a separate homeland for Tamils of Sri Lanka. Many outside forces are contributing to the mess, which was created due to
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. These outside forces are regional as well as
extra regional. But later Rajiv Gandhi acted against the interests of the Tamil Tigers, entered into an accord with the Sri Lankan government of President Jayawardane, sent 40,000 troops of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and ordered to disarm the Tamil Tigers within 24 hours. Sri Lankan government did not honour the accord, arrested LTTE cadres who committed suicide under the custody of Sri Lankan army. 'IPKF also came back from Sri Lanka as a humiliated force, Sri Lanka proved to be India's Vietnam, and LTTE boasted of giving the fourth largest army in the world, a bloody nose' LTTE felt that India had stabbed them in the back and as a reaction eliminated Rajiv Gandhi. IPKF also came back from Sri Lanka as a humiliated force, Sri Lanka proved to be "India's Vietnam, and LTTE boasted of giving the fourth largest army in the world, a bloody nose". Commenting on the Indian interference in Sri Lanka, an Indian analyst has
observed: "At the time of the IPKF operations, we were the Big Bad Brother
of the subcontinent". Another analyst has asked a question about the
deployment of IPKF: "Didn't Delhi push more troops into the furnace?"
independence, for later on Tamil Nadu would like to join the Tamil Elam.
The situation is indeed paradoxical. Most of the Indian analysts suggest that
India must keep its hands off Sri Lanka. The role of LTTE has also been very negative and dangerous not only for other communities but also for the Tamil people. According to 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US State Department): LTTE attacked civilians, committed extra-judicial killings, killed prisoners taken on the battlefields, was responsible for disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions, and extortion. LTTE also killed moderate Tamil politicians who favoured a political solution instead of militancy, it ran self-described courts and persons convicted by these courts were killed by public execution and their bodies tied to the lampposts or left for public display. LTTE also infringed on the right of privacy of the people, forcibly recruited children, routinely violated their civil liberties, and operated an unfair court system, and restricted freedom of movements. LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression, it tightly restricts print and broadcast media in areas under its control and in the past killed those reporting and publishing on human rights. It has severely discriminated against ethnic and religious minorities. According to reports, "In 1990, the Muslim community in Jaffna numbering about 75,000 was given 72 hours to leave the peninsula". The Anti View: Don't Betray the Sri Lankan Tamil "On the one hand, India intends to continue the ban on LTTE for a further two years. On the other India also says it is willing to mediate with the banned outfit and the Sri Lankan government, if 'On the one hand, India intends to continue the ban on LTTE for a further two years. On the other India also says it is willing to mediate with the banned outfit and the Sri Lankan government, if both ask for it' both ask for it. India's doublespeak is only getting exposed in the international arena. Instead of losing credibility, it is best that India to keep its hands off the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Its interference will again lead into another waterloo. A ceasefire can be worked out between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, either through Norwegian diplomacy or through the UN. This alone would prevent the likely slaughter of thousands of Sri Lankan soldiers who
are bottled up in "To those who say that the LTTE's recapture of Jaffna will be a boost to the secessionist elements in Tamil Nadu, I say this is utterly stupid. The LTTE had controlled Jaffna earlier too. Furthermore, to enthuse 6 crore Tamils in Tamil Nadu to separate from the Indian Union -- to raise this bogey is a covert operation by anti-Tamil forces, out to exploit the situation. And thereby forcing the government of India to act against the interests of the Tamils. "Mrs. Gandhi never trusted the Sri Lankan government or its then President Jayawardane.In her view, the Sri Lankan government was utterly chauvinistic in its linguistic policy (Sinhala-only Act) and held extremist positions in religious affairs. To expose the Sri Lankan government to the world, in 1983 Mrs Gandhi took me to the United Nations (I was the Electricity Minister of Tamil Nadu then), to appraise the world leaders of the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. "Unfortunately after her assassination, Rajiv Gandhi, who took over as Prime Minister, unlike his mother trusted J.R. Jayawardane. He got rid of experienced senior advisors on Sri Lankan Tamils issue like G. Parthasarathy and present Maharashtra Governor P.C. Alexander. In their place the then external affairs secretary Romesh Bhandari was brought in. Rajiv Gandhi soon worked out the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987. Though the Accord contained some positive aspects, it was inherently defective. The problem was between Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lankan origin in Sri Lanka. The Accord should have been between them, and not between India and Sri Lanka. India can be a guarantor at best to see the implementation of any such agreement. Unfortunately, the Accord was more like a pre arranged marriage by parents without consulting the daughter, the eventual bride. Moreover there was a clause in it, putting the onus on India to disarm the LTTE, within two days of signing of the Accord. 'The problem was between Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lankan origin in Sri Lanka. The accord should have been between them, and not between India and Sri Lanka' "When everything went as planned, the Sri Lankan government stabbed India by arresting LTTE cadres, who ultimately committed suicide under the custody of Sri Lankan Army. The IPKF presence in Sri Lanka could not save their lives. Naturally LTTE was unwilling to go by the accord. Instead of pacifying or renegotiating with the LTTE, Rajiv ordered IPKF to disarm them. That was the fateful decision taken at Delhi in which I too participated. I was asked to leave the meeting because of my strong protests against the decision. Immediately, I met G. Parthasarathy at his residence in Delhi and appraised him of what happened in the meeting he said, "this boy (he was referring to Rajiv) is immature; Everything is gone; Nothing can be saved". His prophecy came true. The intention of the Indian government to "disarm LTTE within 24 hours" almost went on for two years, ending in a historical tragedy, including the death of Rajiv Gandhi. "Unknowingly India is again walking into the trap of the Sri Lankan government. Though the present BJP government claims that they are not following the path of IPKF in Sri Lanka, they are doing the same now, of course without arms and ammunitions. After all when Sri Lanka drove the LTTE from Jaffna, it didn't seek help from India. In fact it was claimed as a historical victory of the Sinhalese over the Tamils, a repeat of a victory obtained by an erstwhile Sinhalese King in 2nd Century. Till today, Sri Lanka has been claiming, the Tamil issue as its internal problem. When the LTTE wants to regain Jaffna, why should the Sri Lankan government make a hue and cry and internationalise the issue? Why should India respond to such a call from the Sri Lankan government? A response, that would only boost the morale of the Sinhalese and its Army. The very fact that Indian Naval chief chose this time to visit Sri Lanka and stay for a week there can only cause misgivings among the Tamils all over the world. The Government of India's claim that the trip was planned long back doesn't hold good. Could it not have been postponed to an appropriate time?" - Panrutti S. Ramachandran, http://www.india-today.com/ntoday/extra/srilanka/reaction.html BJP attitude to Lanka issue unwise: Shobha Warrier (excerpts) "Prabhakarn had declared that his first aim was a Tamil Eelam, and later a greater Eelam which included Tamil Nadu. "Not only Prabhakaran. Even people here, like some Tamil Liberation Army, have also spoken of it. They made their intentions clear at several meetings. "The Centre says it will not offer anything but humanitarian help. What is humanitarian help? The LTTE wants the Sri Lanka forces to vacate Jaffna so that they need not carry on the fight. The LTTE obviously is depleted because of the battle. Probably they have lost some arms also. They do not want a further loss of weapons and men. "They want the Sri Lankan Army to leave Jaffna. India says we will help you to quit! That is, we will help you fulfil the conditions set forth by the LTTE! That is the Indian offer. That is the humanitarian offer. There could be nothing more inhuman between one country and another than this 'humanitarian' offer of the Indian government. 'Pakistan will be the greatest problem, not Sri Lanka, even if it is going to be inimical towards you. If it becomes friendly with China or Pakistan, that may pose problems for India' "Will India not be surrounded by hostile neighbours all around? Pakistan, China and now Sri Lanka. "Pakistan will be the greatest problem, not Sri Lanka, even if it is going to be inimical towards you. If it becomes friendly with China or Pakistan, that may pose problems for India. But the immediate concern is to contain terrorism in Sri Lanka. India is not going to do anything to help. "When India is responsible for the growth of the LTTE. "Yes, we have the moral duty to help. We are part of the problem. We helped the LTTE in weapons, training and funding. Otherwise, it would not have grown to these proportions. On the other hand, we have a duty to Sri Lankan Tamils also; the Jaffna Tamils, because we led them to believe that we will help them achieve a federal setup in Sri Lanka with equal rights along with the Sinhalese. But we have not done anything after the Rajiv-Jaywardene accord. So, it is imperative that India intervenes. "It should be done properly. The Indian government should ask Chandrika Kumaratunga to declare her immediate acceptance of the terms of the Rajiv-Jaywardane accord, and also set a deadline for creation of a federal setup in Sri Lanka. After achieving this through diplomatic pressure, India could go directly and help, even militarily, if the first two conditions are accepted. "Militarily? "Yes, if other points are accepted. Military help should be given only
to see that federal setup comes about there, and that the Lankan government
talks. That way, you will help the Tamils there, and also the Lankan government
to contain terrorism. "And, what is this Eelam? It has already depleted because the Eelam concept originally had not only Jaffna but also the east. Now the east is out. So, they are going to get only half of Eelam, if they get it. And, they don't represent the entire Tamil population in Sri Lanka! "Now that India has distanced itself from what is happening in Sri Lanka, won't others like Pakistan enter the scene? 'The Sri Lankan government will seek help from either China or Israel. But sometime later Pakistan may need the help of the LTTE to increase Inter-Services Intelligence activities in India' "Naturally. If this goes on for some more time, the Sri Lankan government will seek help from either China or Israel. I do not know whether Pakistan can help. But sometime later Pakistan may need the help of the LTTE to increase Inter-Services Intelligence activities in India. "When China enters, India will have to contend with a situation where a foreign superpower gets a foothold." - Cho Ramaswamy, The Rediff Interview, March 16, 2000 The Sri Lankan Imbroglio "As one delves into India's past records, both written and legendary, one is struck by one fact and that is that the Indians have crossed their frontiers, in an effort to move militarily against another country, only twice. Surprisingly, both the times it was Sri Lanka that was the victim of the Indian efforts. The first time it was highly successful, having destroyed the complete Sri Lankan civilisation. This was possibly so because it was an army of monkeys. The next time it was an army of humans who, according to some, was just monkeying around. Though this is disputed very vehemently by the establishment! Whatever the exact position, it is undeniable that the Indian Army returned back from Sri Lanka, to India, if not in disgrace, at least not covered with glory. 'The basic question is, however, why did India become involved in fighting another country's war? What was the need to commit the Indian Armed Forces? Was it raw unadulterated ambition of the Indian leadership?' "What was the exact position? The senior Indian Army officers claim that they were inducted into Sri Lanka to ensure peace between Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan forces and that they were sucked into an armed conflict due to the deviousness of Mr Jayawerdene, the Sri Lankan President. They also accuse the Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian intelligence agencies, of deviousness and not providing them the requisite inputs. They also claimed that they had achieved the tasks allotted to them. "The basic question is, however, why did India become involved in fighting another country's war? What was the need to commit the Indian Armed Forces? Was it raw unadulterated ambition of the Indian leadership? Or was it a sign of Indian naiveté? On the other hand, was there a genuine perception about Indian interests to be protected in that region? In that case, what were the Indian interests that were threatened? These questions need to be delved into to ensure that the Indian taxpayer is not taken for a ride by the powers that be. At the same time it will, hopefully, also ensure that there is a clear-cut perception of Indian interests that need to be protected. What is more important today is, to what degree are Indian interests affected in Sri Lanka and should India intervene, and if so at what level and to what degree? "The end result is that, till today, the impasse continues. Sri Lanka continues to be in a state of civil war. The position is as follows: a. No meaningful political dialogue, between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government appears to be in sight, even now, in mid-2000. Not only that, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are apparently all set to regain control over the Jaffna Peninsula, which she had lost soon after the IPKF had withdrawn. b. Emotional and psychological antagonism between the Hindu Tamils and the Buddhist Sinhalese has only increased, because of continuing war between the Tamil Tigers and the Government. c. The Buddhist clergy are particularly averse to any agreement with the Tamils. However, while earlier they were averse to any Indian initiative, today they are feeling desperate enough to appeal for Indian assistance. d. The Armed Forces have also assumed a dominant role in the political affairs
of Sri Lanka. They have acquired this influence because they have become the
mainstay of the Governmental authority, in North and East Sri Lanka. f. The Tamil Tigers in particular and the Tamils in general are showing a remarkable degree of resilience. Both the source of funds and the source of weapons, notwithstanding, the American Government's declaration of the Tamil Tigers, as a terrorist organisation, are still intact. What is more important, notwithstanding the official announcement by the Government of India and the government of Tamil Nadu, disclaiming any contacts with the Tamil Tigers, for the average Tamilian, in India, there is only admiration, for the way the Tamil Tigers are continuing to fight against odds, for the retention of the Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. Today there appears to be a suppressed sense of jubilation at the successes notched up by the Tamil Tigers. g. With India withdrawing from the scene, Sri Lanka had established contacts with a number of foreign countries for assistance, in terms of funds and weaponry as well as training of their Armed Forces. That this had an adverse effect on the Indian interests in that region is obvious. h. The fallout of any adverse situation for the Sri Lankan Tamils, particularly, if they fail to get some semblance of autonomy, the entire reaction is bound to rebound onto the Indian Tamils. Under the circumstances one wonders if Prabhakaran will ever renounce his demand for Tamil Eelam. i. Pakistan has been remarkably successful in her handling of the Sri Lankan affairs. While she has maintained extremely cordial relations at the government-to-government level, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate has been equally successful in maintaining close relations with the Tamil Tigers. In fact, the Inter Services Intelligence is hand-in-glove with the Tamil Tigers in the disposal of narcotics, with the Tamil Tigers providing the intricacies of the International Tamil Forums and the Inter Services Intelligence providing the narcotics. Both are profiting. j. In the final analysis, the struggle in Sri Lanka is almost donning the look of an Armageddon, the end of which would be the utter destruction of society in Sri Lanka as we understand it." - Lt Col Thakur K S Ludra (Retd), India Votes (www.samachar.com), June 1, 2000 'The ISI are hand-in-glove with the Tamil Tigers in the disposal of narcotics, with the Tamil Tigers providing the intricacies of the International Tamil Forums and the ISI providing the narcotics' India has to take the initiative "After a long spell of silence, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the media that India is monitoring the situation and would act if necessary, only hours before the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister had noted in an interview to an Indian magazine that India would be sucked in by events. After ruling out any military involvement, India will only be drawn in for humanitarian assistance and mediation. But for this, the assent of both sides is a prerequisite. The LTTE is hardly likely to give its consent either for evacuation of the Army or for an Indian role in the peace process. "India is a catalyst to the buildup of diplomatic pressure on the LTTE (with which it has no leverage) to accept the ceasefire and join the Norway-brokered negotiations. Since it is the author of the statement that the Norwegian mediation is not a workable solution, India will have to take the initiative in finding one." - Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta, Rediff, June 3, 2000 What Delhi must do "'Delhi can bring the LTTE to the negotiating table.' This is what Sri Lanka President Chandrika Kumaratunga said nearly three weeks ago. All have been looking towards India since. But its policy is: wait and watch. Neither the Cabinet Committee on National Security nor the Strategic Policy Group of the National Security Council have given any indication of the efforts, if any, to make the LTTE talk with the Sri Lanka government. 'The sympathy for Tamils in India is more exaggerated than real. They have had experience of the LTTE when its members were given shelter in Tamil Nadu a few years ago' "The sympathy for Tamils in India is more exaggerated than real. They have had experience of the LTTE when its members were given shelter in Tamil Nadu a few years ago. Violence and crime engulfed the area where they were settled. The Tamils in India do not want to go back to those days. At the same time, they do not want the Tamils in Sri Lanka to be only drawers of water and hewers of wood. They want them to enjoy equal citizenship in Sri Lanka. "This is why New Delhi's role to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table
is crucial. The 'wait and "This is also an opportune time for the LTTE to wrest the maximum concessions from the Sri Lankan government and to ensure that the Eelam enjoys full autonomy within Sri Lanka. This will require changes in the Sri Lankan Constitution as well as a consensus among political parties in the country. New Delhi can see to it once Prabhakaran comes round." - Kuldip Nayar, Rediff, June 9, 2000 India's Lankan dilemma "Colombo daily The Island wrote, 'Sri Lanka cannot hope much from India in its hour of need…We have to be pragmatic and look elsewhere for immediate assistance'. The comment was made the day Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh arrived in Colombo on what was described by the media as a 'pacifying mission'. "On the face of it, he wanted to reassure the Sri Lankan government that New Delhi was committed to upholding the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and whatever some constituents of the BJP-led coalition said about partitioning the island had no bearing on the government's Lanka policy. Colombo was obviously irritated by voices of support for Tamil Elam from within India's ruling coalition. "Prime Minister Vajpayee had earlier made haste to reaffirm his government's opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, in the wake of the BJP's coalition partners from Tamil Nadu going public to demand backing for a Tamil homeland. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi was the one to cause the most embarrassment to Vajpayee and company, as he proposed a 'Czechoslovak type' solution for Sri Lanka. 'Jaswant Singh's trump card to put across the message of goodwill and friendship was to announce a loan of $100 million for Sri Lanka. Additionally, he said, India will provide rice, wheat and sugar as humanitarian assistance' "Jaswant Singh was all sweet and honey, certainly less pompous than his usual self. He had a busy day in Colombo, a long session of talks with President Chandrika Kumaratunga and also conferring with the leader of the opposition, besides the formal round of discussions with his Lankan counterpart. India will be prepared to mediate between the Lankan government and the LTTE if the two sides agreed to it, he said. "Jaswant Singh's trump card to put across the message of goodwill and friendship was to announce a loan of $100 million for Sri Lanka. Additionally, he said, India will provide rice, wheat and sugar as humanitarian assistance. What transpired in the official talks is anybody's guess. But Jaswant Singh had little to cheer about his mission to Colombo. At the end of the day, he found himself briefing the newsmen all alone. The Lankan Foreign Minister did not turn up to address a joint press conference which was cancelled at the last minute. "The Sri Lankans, needless to say, have been trying hard to keep the 'big brother' in good humour. The Indians were the first to be approached by Colombo for military assistance, as its 40,000 troops besieged in the Jaffna peninsula were on the verge of being overrun by the Tamil Tigers. New Delhi's response was revealing, as Vajpayee government ruled out India's military intervention but offered humanitarian assistance to the Sri Lankan government. In more precise terms, what the Indians said they were prepared to do was to help evacuate the Sri Lankan troops from Jaffna. Ironically, the Indian media created the impression that an Indian-led 'rescue-operation' was in the offing. Security experts were lined up on television channels to debate the pros and cons of the game plan, as if the Lankans had no choice in the matter. "Needless to say, the Indians were thus denied the historic opportunity to accomplish their 'humanitarian assistance' project in Sri Lanka. Some critics suspect a sinister design. The proposed rescue operation, they say, had more to it than the humanitarian urge to save the Lankan troops from a blood bath. It would have, to say the least, given the Tamil Tigers a walkover in Jaffna. It may not suit the BJP to facilitate the growth of Tamil nationalists, but it certainly has a stake in using Tamil insurgency as a leverage in Sri Lanka. "There are several reasons why Vajpayee and company, to be more precise the BJP, is unwilling to support the LTTE's demand for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Notwithstanding the marriage of convenience that the BJP has entered into with regional parties from Tamil Nadu, some of which are known to have a nexus with the LTTE, the 'Sangh Pariwar' could ill-afford to facilitate a process which would eventually promote the cause of a regional force in India. Letting the Tamil Tigers succeed in carving out a Tamil homeland is a dicey game, a dangerous precedent which political pundits fear could have a domino effect in South India. 'The duplicity in New Delhi's Lanka policy is self-explanatory. The Vajpayee government is not supportive of Tamil Elam because it sees it as a potential threat to India's own integrity, but it also does not want Sri Lanka to grow too big for its boots' "The duplicity in New Delhi's Lanka policy is self-explanatory. The Vajpayee government is not supportive of Tamil Elam because it sees it as a potential threat to India's own integrity, but it also does not want Sri Lanka to grow too big for its boots and disregard New Delhi's terms for good conduct. Thus, the Indian strategy is to keep the ethnic conflict alive in Sri Lanka--neither supporting the Tamil Tigers to win independence, nor facilitating the Lankan government's military campaign against the insurgents. "So long as the Tamil Tigers are in a position to militarily engage the Sri Lankan government, they are a handy tool for New Delhi to keep Colombo under constant pressure. Now that the Indians seem to have secured the US endorsement as the regional overlord, they would be hostile to any arrangement that the Sri Lankan government may make for outside military assistance. One wonders how would they react if the Americans were to intervene." - Prof Khalid Mahmud, The News, June 22, 2000 Lull before the storm "In an attempt to trap the Army at Eluthumadaval, the Tigers attacked Tanankilappu, Ariyali and Navatkuli on the flanks. The Army retreated to Chavakkacheri and the Tigers kept up their advance, overrunning Columbuthurai and Gurunagar while advancing to Chavakkacheri. "A small company of Tigers sneaked into Sarasalai, a few kilometres
north of Chavakkacheri and tried in vain to surprise the Army from behind.
Simultaneously, a 'suicide team' attempted an attack on the Jaffna Administration
Centre. According to government sources, 12 members of the squad were killed
and the rest were arrested. "Even if he captures Jaffna, Prabhakaran will not be able to run it smoothly. Its economy is in tatters and donations from abroad alone will not help him salvage the situation. "While people await Indian intervention, political observers ascribe India's cool reaction to Sri Lanka inviting Pakistan for an arms negotiation along with Russia, Britain, Iran, the Czech Republic, Israel and Singapore. "Speculation is rife in the Colombo press about the Indian intervention. Five possibilities are being discussed. One, India is adopting a wait-and-watch policy in the backdrop of the earlier IPKF fiasco. If Jaffna falls India will evacuate the remaining soldiers. Two, India is waiting for Jaffna's fall so that the situation will be more favourable to the Tamils. Three, if the ethnic war continues, India will extend logistical support to the Lankan Army to block the Tigers' arms route. Four, India will neither interfere nor mediate because of pressure from MPs from Tamil Nadu. Five, India will enter the scene only after the 1987 India-Sri Lanka pact is rephrased. 'The fall of Jaffna will be a personal blow to Chandrika since she will be facing the electorate in August. On the other hand, if she is able to maintain the status quo, it will go a long way in boosting her chances' "The fall of Jaffna will be a personal blow to Chandrika since she will be facing the electorate in August. On the other hand, if she is able to maintain the status quo, it will go a long way in boosting her chances." - Andrews Philip, The Week, June 11, 2000 Looking for a saviour "'India is our mother country', says V. Anandasankari of Sri Lanka's Tamil United Liberation Front. 'Every Tamil here wants India to bring the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government to talks.' And so do the non-LTTE Tamil parties in Sri Lanka. 'India and the international community won't allow a division of Sri Lanka. So the question of Eelam does not arise,' avers Varadaraja Perumal of the Eelam People Revolutionary Liberation Front, who was Chief Minister of the north-eastern province. 'We are looking for a federal system for which a new constitution has to be formulated.' "President Chandrika Kumaratunga has been holding talks with various parties, and Anandasankari says that they must prepare an alternative to Tamil Eelam that the LTTE will accept. 'India must convince Prabhakaran to settle for an autonomous north and north-east province within a united Sri Lanka,' says D. Sidharthan of People's Liberation Organisation of Tamils. 'And only India can do that since it is the strongest of the third parties.' S. Thavarajah of Eelam People's Democratic Party says that while plenty of accords on Lanka have been drawn up, the problem has been with their implementation, and here India 'the big brother' should act. - E. Vijayalakshmi/Chennai, The Week, June 11, 2000 "Many critics have labelled the IPKF's role on the island as India's Vietnam. The Sri Lankan Tamils, fed on LTTE propaganda, boasted of giving the fourth largest army in the world, a bloody nose. "The IPKF had successfully eliminated the middle order leadership of the LTTE and broken their stronghold over the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE was forced to take refuge in the jungles of the North and East. The Elephant Pass was open for the first time after the LTTE had taken control of the Jaffna. Movement of goods from the South, East and West was made possible after a long period of time. "However, the IPKF operations were not a complete success. We were unable to unite the different Tamil groups, mainly because of the intransigent attitude of the LTTE. It wanted the whole pie or nothing. "The Research and Analysis Wing was in charge of collation of intelligence.
The less said about them the better. The intelligence agents were afraid for
their lives and hardly dared to venture out of their rooms. All the information
they passed on was acquired from the Army. Things should have been the other
way round. "The entire IPKF operations were politically guided and intelligence oriented. The armed forces had little or no say. Or else, a full-scale military operation without the basic support arm, the artillery, would have never been launched. Tanks and APCs were not used. There was no air cover. Much later, an odd armed helicopter was brought in, for use against an enemy which had taken refuge in the jungles. The only other operation conducted on similar lines was when the Indian Army was asked to flush out militants from the Golden Temple: barefoot, with weapons slung over their shoulders. "To be able to send troops to a neighbouring country for policing or for a military operation one has to have a strong and stable government, be at least a mini superpower, be politically and economically strong, have a strong army, air force and a navy with a medium strike radius (something on the lines of the US Seventh Fleet), and be a nuclear power or at least have some nuclear capability. "At that time we did not fulfill any of the above criteria. A strong and capable government means having no internal threat and being able to convince neighbouring countries of one's 'good intentions.' At the time of the IPKF operations, we were the Big Bad Brother of the subcontinent. Even Bhutan and Nepal had axes to grind with us. "The collapse of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the unsuccessful intervention of the IPKF had led to a stalemate for more than 10 years. No substantial efforts were made by a third party. The recent peace initiative made by Norway is most welcome, and things appear to be a little brighter as there is now an international interest to end the Tamil-Sinhala stand-off, which has wrecked the political security and economic stability of the island. "A word of caution, however, needs to be added to this: similar attempts have failed in the past. Especially the stand taken by the LTTE when Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga proposed peace initiatives. The Tigers have since stepped up their offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. - Colonel John Taylor (retd), Rediff, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/23lanka.htm 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices "The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE regularly committed extrajudicial killings, including killing prisoners taken on the battlefields, and also was responsible for disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions, and extortion. After a period of relative calm at the beginning of of the year, the LTTE began a long series of attacks, killing close 'The LTTE continued to control large sections of the north and east of the country through authoritarian military rule' to 100 civilians, including moderate Tamil politician Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam. In the north, at least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described courts were killed by public execution and their bodies tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display. Through a campaign of killing and intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair elections in January 1998. In addition, the LTTE warned Tamil politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such activity. "The LTTE continued to control large sections of the north and east of the country through authoritarian military rule. It denied those under its authority the right to change their government, infringed on their privacy rights, forcibly recruited children, routinely violated their civil liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted freedom of movement, and severely discriminated against ethnic and religious minorities. "The LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including both targeted attacks and bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On March 9, a bomb planted by an LTTE insurgent exploded on a bus in Colombo, killing 1 person and wounding more than a dozen others. 'The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians' "In April an LTTE bomb exploded on a bus in Kandy, killing 2 persons and wounding 15 others. On July 14, a bomb planted by LTTE insurgents in Batticaloa killed 2 civilians and wounded as many as 29 others. On July 26, LTTE insurgents opened fire on the Ranga hotel in Vavuniya, killing two security force members and three civilians. "The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force prisoners released by the LTTE said that they occasionally had been subjected to torture, including being hung upside down and beaten, having pins inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot rods. "The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the year,
which killed and injured dozens of civilians. In September the LTTE attacked
a Chinese merchant ship, which had "The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The LTTE admits to holding only 15 security forces prisoners, all of whom were captured in 1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of the police officers and security force personnel it has captured in recent years. However, the LTTE released two Army deserters who surrendered to it in 1998. In November the LTTE handed over 11 SLA members who were captured during the year to the ICRC. "Both foreign and national journalists are allowed to go to the conflict areas; however, they must receive advance permission from the Ministry of Defense. The Foreign Ministry also must approve visits to conflict areas by foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in processing requests have been reduced but still prevail. The Government occasionally arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the vicinity of the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours. However, after censorship was imposed in June 1998, the Government became the only source of most news about security and defense matters that could be disseminated to the public legally. "The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. In the past, the LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human rights. "The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas it controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in public places the names of those Tamil civilians whose association with security forces and other Government entities it seeks to prevent. The LTTE has killed Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security forces in establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a political leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998. "The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military checkpoints throughout the city, although the military has reduced the number of checkpoints there compared with 1997. For Tamils, travel from Jaffna to other parts of the country is extremely difficult, due in part to security restrictions imposed by the security forces and in part by the limited availability of transportation to the south. 'The LTTE recruits children for use in battlefield support functions and in combat. It has been confirmed that some of these children are as young as age 13, and some are recruited forcibly' "The LTTE recruits children for use in battlefield support functions and in combat. It has been confirmed that some of these children are as young as age 13, and some are recruited forcibly. In May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Children in Armed Combat that it would not recruit children under the age of 17; however, it is not clear that the LTTE has honored this pledge." - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Conclusion Several factors contributing to the Sri Lankan imbroglio and elusive peace are: Enmity continues to grow between Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese because of the continued war between Sri Lankan government and Tamil Tigers; Buddhist clergy is particularly averse to any compromise with Tamils; Sri Lankan Armed Forces have assumed a dominant role in the political affairs; lack of sincerity on part of the Sinhala political parties to solve the problem; this lack of eagerness to solve the problem on part of Sinhala parties has compelled Tamils to believe that the Sinhalese only understand the language of militancy; successive Sri Lankan governments have betrayed the trust of the Tamil people (LTTE Chief Parabhakaran has declared Sinhala political parties as "essentially chauvinistic organisations", and President Chandrika Kumaratunga as "a modern representative of neo-Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism" and her five year rule as a "curse on the Tamil people"; supply of funds and weapons for both sides i.e. Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers is constantly going on, and in some cases both are beneficiaries of the same source; a severe lack of sufficient interest on the part of the international community in the Tamil issue, except Norway which is leading the peace process and trying its best to bring the warring parties to the negotiation tables; most of the countries involved are playing a negative role, they are more interested in selling their arms and are not interested in the solution of the problem. The best favours that the world community can do to the Sri Lankan people are that: the countries involved must be pressurised to stay away from Sri Lanka; arms supply to both sides i.e. the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, must be halted immediately; both sides must be compelled to declare a cease-fire; the country should be helped to revive its economy; and both sides must be compelled to find a negotiated solution which will guarantee the equality and legitimate rights of every community. One feels like supporting the idea offered by R. Umanath, member Polit Bureau, Communist Party of India (Marxist) wherein he has said: "The best solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka would be to provide autonomy to the Tamils within a united Sri Lanka. A separate 'Tamil Elam' is not an answer to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka." For, even if the LTTE succeeds in getting a separate homeland, the two communities i.e. Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils will continue to live in a state of permanent hostility.One also expects from the Buddhist clergy of Sri Lanka that they will uphold the teachings of great spiritual leader 'The best solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka would be to provide autonomy to the Tamils within a united Sri Lanka. A separate 'Tamil Elam' is not an answer to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka' Buddha who believed in giving up power rather than acquiring it. By offering more to the minorities they will gain more spiritual power, satisfaction, and peace.
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