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Fact Files Assam insurgency: The Indian nightmare Introduction There are ten active movements for independence in India, apart from four movements for autonomy. Each one of these borders one or the other of India's South Asian neighbours. The bulk of the Indians appear convinced that all these are the brainchild of the ISI. This came across rather strongly when I had occasion to interact with the large number of media personalities and politicians from India, who came for the recent seminar, hosted by 'The News'. It was this startling disclosure of the degree of their conviction, which prompted me to address this subject. While I can neither confirm, nor refute this allegation, I can only lay before my audience the facts, as viewed by Indian and other international sources, for them to judge. Human Rights Watch Report 2000 "Violence remained a salient feature of India's national parliamentary elections. During five stages of polling in September and October 1999, repolling was ordered for hundreds of poll stations as a result of violence and the destruction of ballot papers and ballot boxes. Well over one hundred election-related deaths were reported throughout the country, predominantly in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Kashmir, Bihar, and the northeast region of Assam and Tripura. Most deaths resulted from clashes between supporters of rival parties and from attacks by separatist militants trying to enforce election boycotts. In the Chidambaram constituency of Tamil Nadu, Dalits were not allowed to vote in as many as twenty-three villages as a result of attacks by political parties contesting elections in which the Dalit Panthers of India were also candidates. In clashes that ensued, nearly ten Dalit hamlets were torched. While over two hundred Dalits were arrested, police refused to register cases against caste Hindus. "Police in Andhra Pradesh continued to summarily execute suspected Naxalites in so-called 'encounter killings.' Violence in the northeastern states, particularly Assam, continued throughout the year, claiming many civilian casualties. Members of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a militant group seeking Assam's independence from India, repeatedly clashed with the police and with surrendered ULFA members, now working with the government and referred to as 'SULFA.'" - http://www.hrw.org/ Foreigners are Assam's perennial problem (Excerpts) "Nothing changes in Guwahati, neither the lazy scene nor the over-pushed Assamese. Whenever I return to the city as I have been doing so for the last 40 years - I find the echo of the same problems and the same frustrations. The Assamese are vainly trying to retain their entity, which is eroding every day because of uninterrupted flow of 'foreigners'." "But the issue of 'foreigners' is only a symptom, not the disease. The disease is their realisation that they are fighting a losing battle and that the nation is not even recognising it. They have seen Tripura and Sikkim going into the hands of people coming from across the border, pushing the indigenous population to the background. They fear they will meet the same fate. Their numbers are already down to 38 per cent in what is an Assamese-speaking state. "'Politicians think of elections but my eyes are fixed on the next generation,' says Assam Governor retired Lieutenant General S K Sinha. "'It is no use doing it for Assam alone. West Bengal needs to be fenced too,' he says. After 13 years, fencing is only half done in Assam and the work in West Bengal has not yet been scheduled. The Governor concedes that officials accept bribes to help migration. In fact, he informed the President of it in a special report on infiltration in Assam."While in Calcutta, I found the West Bengal government 'But the issue of foreigners is only a symptom, not the disease. The disease is their realisation that they are fighting a losing battle and that the nation is not even recognising it' waking up to the problem. In the past, it used to dismiss such thinking as communal. But now the attitude has changed. "'We have to stop the migration,' said a minister. The Communist Party of India-Marxist still rationalises that Bengalis from across the border are integrating well culturally with the Bengalis in West Bengal. "It is a pity that the AASU leaders, who came to power after the Assam Accord, did nothing to implement it. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was Chief Minister at that time. The political party the movement's supporters constituted to oust 'foreigners', the Asom Gana Parishad, got embroiled in intrigue and corruption. "People in Assam have given them another chance but again they seem to be failing. But this time, Mahanta has a valid reason. He is in power because of the crucial support from MLAs elected by 'foreigners'." - Kuldip Nayar, Rediff, January 23, 1999 Appeal for human rights to be respected in Assam "Alarmed by the increasing violence in the Indian state of Assam, Amnesty International is renewing its call on all involved in the conflicts there to respect human rights and abide by international humanitarian law.
"'Tension over land, resources, cultural identity and political power has reached a level where the most basic of human rights - the right to life - is being ignored,' Amnesty International said. "'It is essential that those with influence over events in this region - including the Indian government, security forces, political parties, the leadership of armed groups and governments of neighbouring countries - do everything in their power to end the abduction, torture and killing of civilians.' 'Tension over land, resources, cultural identity and political power has reached a level where the most basic of human rights - the right to life - is being ignored' - AI "Amnesty International is calling on all parties to the various conflicts in Assam to recognise that human rights are universal, and to ensure that the basic principles of international humanitarian law are fully adhered to in practice. In particular, armed groups should take the following steps: · Instruct all combatants under their command in the rules of humanitarian law; · Order combatants to humanely treat prisoners, the wounded and those seeking to surrender, whether they are civilians or members of the armed forces, and never to kill them; · Prohibit deliberate, arbitrary and indiscriminate killings of non-combatants under any circumstances; · Prohibit the taking of hostages under any circumstances; · Conduct proper investigations into alleged abuses by their combatants in order to determine responsibility; · Ensure that individuals suspected of committing or ordering deliberate and arbitrary killings are removed from any position of authority or duties which bring them into contact with prisoners or others at risk of abuse. 'During 1994 and 1995, several thousand Muslim settlers were forced to flee the area because of attacks by armed Bodo groups' "On 29 December 1998, a woman leader of a tribal community was beheaded after being pulled out of a bus in Kokrajhar district of Assam. The attack was reportedly carried out by members of the Adivasi Cobra Militants of Assam (ACMA), an armed tribal group. The ACMA are reportedly also responsible for kidnapping civilians. "During 1994 and 1995, several thousand Muslim settlers were forced to flee the area because of attacks by armed Bodo groups. Many remain in relief camps where they continue to be vulnerable to attacks. There are also concerns at an increase in violence by Santhal and other non-Bodo groups in retaliatory attacks. Since May 1998, attacks by Santhal and Bodo armed groups on members of each others' communities have increased and hundreds have been killed. "There have also been reports of increased killings by members of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and allegations that security forces have been supporting the activities of surrendered ULFA members, called SULFA, by attacking existing ULFA members, their sympathisers and relatives. "ULFA has alleged that SULFA, sponsored by the State Government, is carrying out a pattern of political killings, specifically targeting relatives of ULFA functionaries. In response, ULFA threatened in mid-December to attack government ministers and employees and activists of the Asom Gana Parishad (the ruling political party in Assam) if what they term the "secret killings" of its activists did not cease within a month. "In addition to human rights abuses by armed groups in Assam, Amnesty International has highlighted the suppression of human rights activity and the virtual impunity of the security forces, who have also committed widespread human rights violations under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958, which gives them powers to arrest people without warrant and to shoot to kill. The Supreme Court in 1998 upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the face of objections by Amnesty International and other human rights groups, but directed the government to strengthen human rights safeguards in the application of the law." - Amnesty International, January 26, 1999 The nefarious design of Islamic terrorists in Assam (Excerpt) "In May, 1999 the Indian Government received sensational information clearly indicating direct contact between a group of Kashmiri Muslim terrorists and two extremist Muslim terrorist outfits of Assam - Muslim Tiger Force and Revolutionary Muslim Commandos. These Muslim groups, which operate in the North East states, owe their allegiance to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba, two of the world's most murderous Islamic terrorist groups. "Two other Muslim militant organizations, namely, Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA) and Muslim Liberation Army (MLA) are training batches of Muslim terrorists and criminals in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in Poonch and Rajouri sectors. Yet another sensational connection has been unearthed with the discovery of a recent clandestine visit by 'The ISI sponsored elements proceeded to intensify their efforts to target vital installations in the North-East, with the backing of ULFA' Muslim terrorists belonging to the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam to Kashmir and Rajouri sector as 'tourists'. "The ISI sponsored elements proceeded to intensify their efforts to target vital installations in the North East, with the backing of ULFA. The bomb explosion at New Jalpaiguri station in North Bengal on June 22, in which three Army personnel bound for Kargil were among the nine killed, was a clear indicator to the Assamese of the ISI's game-plan to sabotage the war effort and create subversion in the region. "The Kargil conflict, however, revealed the true nature of how ULFA has been affected by ISI designs. Faced with the Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist groups financed by the ISI on the one hand and a steady influx of more illegal Bangladeshi Muslims on the other, the people of Assam are increasingly fearful for the safety and security of their land." - Shamoli Mitra, August 16, 1999, http://www.swordoftruth.com/ "Addressing an election meeting Sonia Gandhi sought the people's support for the two Congress candidates in Barak Valley - Mr. Santosh Mohan Deb at Silchar and Mr. Nepal Das at Karimganj. Ms. Gandhi wondered why the BJP, which was in a 'hot haste' to impose Article 356 in Bihar, was so 'unwilling' to impose it in Assam where insurgency and terrorism had made life 'intolerable'."The Congress (I) President's appeal to the people of Assam 'Throw out both the AGP and the BJP from power, otherwise the future of the country will be bleak. If you trust them, you will be deceived' - Sonia Gandhi was clear: 'Throw out both the AGP and the BJP from power, otherwise the future of the country will be bleak. If you trust them, you will be deceived.' "She said the AGP and the BJP were working hand in hand to 'terrorise'
the people. She was particularly harsh on the AGP Government, dubbing it the
'most useless and ineffective' one Assam had ever seen. Under it unemployment
was rising among the youth. She claimed that government employees and teachers
were going without salary for months and development had come to a grinding
halt." Not a theatre of peace yet 'The ULFA is avowedly opposed to the Constitution and has been refusing to recognise or accept the electoral process in the country' "The timing of the ULFA's demand for a plebiscite could not have been more inappropriate, coming as it did within a month of the Lok Sabha elections. As much as 70 per cent of the State's 1.4 crore voters defied the ULFA's call for poll boycott and exercised franchise. The ULFA is avowedly opposed to the Constitution and has been refusing to recognise or accept the electoral process in the country. Therefore, it has always been calling upon
the people to boycott what it calls the 'sham exercise'. The fact, however,
remains that the majority of the people have been ignoring the outfit's call.
What is indeed significant is that, in a number of cases, the immediate family
members of top ULFA leaders have voted in the just-concluded elections as
also in earlier polls. - Wasbir Hussain, The Hindu, December 04, 1999 BJP has no policy for Bodos: ABSU President "The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) President U.G. Brahma said that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had no policies for the Bodos, and added that if the Bodo problem was not solved soon, the situation will turn dreadful, and that the Government of India would be responsible for such a situation. "Brahma said that the Union Home Minister L.K. Advani had adopted a negative approach to the burning Bodo problem by declaring in Parliament that no separate state for the Bodos would be carved out of Assam. He termed the statement as 'irresponsible' on the part of the Home Minister, and said that the consequences can be dangerous." - Assam Online News, Vol. 4, No. 71, December 31, 1999 Zero tolerance & terrorism "The Government of India had held dialogue with outlawed rebel groups earlier; it is engaged in talks now and has been saying time and again that its doors are always open for negotiations. Why the need then to declare a policy of, what the Prime Minister calls, zero tolerance? After all, it does give out confusing signals to the rebel leaders as well as peace-brokers in areas such as the north east and smacks of double-speak on the government's part. "No one is expecting the Government of India to give in to the demands for sovereign homelands made by sundry insurgent outfits. Similarly, no one is prepared to accept even talk of such a policy as zero tolerance as a means to tackle insurgency movements."Talking about double-speak, the Home Minister, Mr. L. K. 'Mr. Advani is basically talking of a carrot-and-stick policy which has been in operation in insurgency theatres such as the north-east for long' Advani, said, while participating recently in a special discussion in the Lok Sabha on internal security, with special reference to J&K and the north east, that the government was in favour of ending militancy in the country through negotiations within the Constitutional framework. Mr. Advani, at the same time, spoke about the zero tolerance policy. This, he said, means that the government while being keen on evolving negotiated settlements to insurgency problems would not look for or entertain proposals for solutions which seek to put a premium on violence. "Mr. Advani is basically talking of a carrot-and-stick policy which has been in operation in insurgency theatres such as the north east for long. By now, New Delhi's stand is known to everyone, particularly the militant groups: that it is ready to hold unconditional talks with them anywhere in the world without any third party mediation. Most importantly, everyone also knows that the Indian authorities would work for a solution strictly within the framework of the Constitution. Therefore, any rebel group entering into talks with the government must be prepared to work out an agreement within the Constitutional framework. "This being the case, there is no point in talking of zero tolerance because one cannot even remotely think of a military solution to insurgency in the north east, in the same way as the rebels cannot or should not hope to achieve a military victory over Indian forces some day. "Mr. Vajpayee's Government has started talking about things like a zero tolerance policy to stop looking at solutions or entertaining proposals for solutions which seek to put a premium on violence. One must remember here that most of the insurgency movements in the country, particularly in the north east and in J&K, are separatist movements and are unlawful activities under the Indian Constitution, in terms of which secessionism is taboo. Such movements are bound to be violent. And if the government 'Already, such draconian laws as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, and the Disturbed Areas Act are in force in parts of the north-east, providing sweeping powers to security personnel engaged in counter-insurgency operations' decides to go ahead with its new hard line and were to adopt a bullet-for-bullet policy, insurgencies perhaps would never end in the country. "Already, such draconian laws as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, and the Disturbed Areas Act are in force in parts of the north east, providing sweeping powers to security personnel engaged in counter-insurgency operations. In Assam, for instance, there is a unified headquarters of the Army, police and paramilitary forces for anti-insurgency operations. Anything harsher than these measures already existing will only limit the government's options in extreme situations." - Wasbir Hussain, The Hindu, January 5, 2000 "For what they are worth, I set down below impressions from a visit I made last December to the Northeast, after a gap of four-and-a-half years. I had three days in Shillong, which apart from being Meghalaya's capital, houses or educates many from all across the Northeast, three days in Nagaland, and two in Guwahati, Assam's chief city and the Northeast's largest. Two nights were spent in buses, one that took me from Shillong to Dimapur in the plains of Nagaland via Nagaon in Assam, a journey from 5 p.m. to 5 a.m., and another ferrying me from dusk to dawn between Dimapur and Guwahati. "Numerous Naga groups and individuals, including some who walked long distances, met me in the hope that what they told me would reach and influence New Delhi's decision-makers. My attempts to disillusion them were unsuccessful. Since few from New Delhi make the long trip to Nagaland, anyone who does is perceived as a possible link to the powers that be. Many who met me saw themselves as Nagas rather than as Indians, but most of them seemed to understand that a sovereign Nagaland was not what any Indian Lok Sabha was likely to concede. A sentiment conveyed by several Nagas was as follows: 'We want a dialogue with citizens even more than with the government. Citizens in Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai should know us and what we feel, and we want to know them and what they feel.' "In another similarity with other parts of the land, I found that expectations of constructive action or intervention from a state government were minimal. Politicians and bureaucrats were viewed as corrupt and solely self-serving, and there was a tendency in several I met to trace all evil to one or two individuals in power. Irrespective of how horrible (or wrongly maligned) these individuals may be, this tendency to focus on one or two persons, and remove from everyone else the onus of reform, was not reassuring. I wondered which was more disturbing, the degree of misgovernance or the reluctance of civil society to assume responsibility. The question seemed to apply to most of India." - Rajmohan Gandhi, The Hindu, January 15, 2000 Bodo imbroglio "Two other aspects of the situation are also heartening. One is that
the Government of Assam has promised to ensure the implementation of the cease-fire
and the ground rules and the other is the BLT's pledge to lend its full cooperation
in the development activities in the Bodoland areas which have been seriously
affected due to the disturbances and violence arising out of the Bodo agitation,
notwithstanding the fact that the Bodo Autonomous Areas Council was set up
in terms of the Accord of February, 1993. True, the Accord had its deficiency
as the BAC's territory remained undemarcated due to strong opposition from
the non-Bodo section of the population, but before this matter could be settled
through negotiation the militants stepped up their violent activities and
serious ethnic conflicts have rendered thousands of people homeless and helpless
and they have not been properly rehabilitated till now. Now that peaceful
conditions are expected to prevail in the disturbed area if the cease-fire
accord is duly observed by the Bodo militants and the government in its entirety,
all efforts should be directed for the return of peace. announced that Assam is not going to be further divided though it is feared the Centre's decision to set up new states like Uttarkhand and Jharkhand is likely to encourage the Bodos to pursue their demand for a separate Bodoland. The question of further division of Assam is entirely different. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are two large states and can afford to be split, in fact, the States Reorganisation Commission of 1956 suggested division of UP but the government did not accept it. However, the Bodo leadership would be well-advised to demand greater autonomy within the parameter of Assam, it would be wise for them to abandon its demand for a separate state. Admittedly, the Bodos had been neglected in the past by the State Government, but the situation has radically changed and Dispur is now prepared to remove the leeway in the development of the Bodo people which deserves a separate university and a few technical institutions. All these will be no problem provided peaceful condition is allowed in the Bodo areas. As Member of Parliament, S. K. Bwismuthiary, who heads the newly formed Bodoland Parliamentary Party, will be rendering a yeoman's service to the Bodo community if he provides a sound leadership to his people in particular and Assam in general. With the peace process in motion in the Bodo areas, time is now for all concerned to resolve the Bodo imbroglio peacefully and realistically." - The Assam Tribune, Editorial, April 1, 2000 "It is important that both the Assam Government and the Centre must follow up on this surrender. Instead of adding numbers to the S(urrendered) ULFA, they must seriously implement an attractive rehabilitation package for these misguided youth. Though the Army and the police are bound to pick on them to update the intelligence inputs and strengthen counter insurgency measures, it may not be right to deploy the surrendered cadres in these operations. Unless they are fully rehabilitated and reintegrated with their families and society, it cannot spark a full-fledged desertion from these militant groups. So their rehabilitation must get top priority. Just as the Centre is trying to engage the NSCN outfits in Nagaland, the signal must go out to the ULFA and all other groups active in the Northeast that it is high time they gave serious thought to dialogue and a negotiated solution to all outstanding problems. The Assam Governor may be ideally suited to make the preliminary moves and send out serious feelers to all of them to see if they are interested in a constructive dialogue. With one or two senior functionaries of the ULFA in what is called 'effective custody', further developments may be on the anvil. 'Be it in Assam or its neighbouring states, the main problem seems to be the lack of development in the region' "Be it in Assam or its neighbouring states, the main problem seems to be the lack of development in the region. Successive governments at the Centre and in the states have announced huge packages for the sister-states in the Northeast. They need to go further. While inviting the militants and insurgents for talks, the States and the Northeast Council must simultaneously work on a set of priorities in development. Improving transport and communications, generating employment and providing a market for the produce are some urgent steps, the administration in these states must take to send out a strong signal. There is bound to be resistance from the dictatorial leadership of these groups, when they realise that the cadres are deserting them. But care must be taken to provide security to the returning youth and demonstrate that they can be rehabilitated effectively. The cadres have reasons to flee and reject the authoritarian leadership of commanders like Paresh Barua. But they must be shown a viable and attractive alternative in civil society. Mr. Mahanta may not be an inspiring model as a political leader, but he and his colleagues who joined the political mainstream have certainly come a long way. Unfortunately, they have forgotten what they fought for and failed to live up to the expectations of the people. That is the tragedy." -The Hindu, Editorial, April 06, 2000 Support from across border affects anti-insurgency operations: Assam Governor seeks Centre's help "The Governor, in his address to the State Assembly said that the anti-insurgency operations in the state were affected as the insurgents were getting shelter and support from the neighbouring countries like Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh and also staying in neighbouring states. "The Governor said that the State Government was determined and committed to root out militancy. While, the fight against insurgency would go on relentlessly, at the same time the need for a peaceful solution to the problem is also a significant part of the policy of the State Government. He said that the Government would welcome talks for a peaceful solution of the problem of insurgency at any time and at any place. However, he made it clear that the talks must be held within the framework of the Indian Constitution as the integrity of the country is not negotiable. "Lt. Gen. Sinha claimed that the Unified Command structure in the State has managed to contain the activities of the insurgents. He said that 178 militants were killed and 1490 apprehended in 1999. During the year, 177 civilians were killed as compared to 274 in 1997 and 386 in 1998, he revealed. He said that the government was concerned about killings and kidnappings by the militants. Today the militants are on the run and in their desperation, they have started mindless attacks on the ministers and the members of their families. He said that the most unfortunate incident signifying the heightening desperation occurred on February 27 last when the PWD and Forest Minister Sri Nagen Sarma and four others were killed. However, the Governor expressed the hope that the people of the State would ultimately win the final round of battle against insurgency." - Oriental Times, March 22-April 7, 2000 'Lt. Gen. Sinha claimed that the Unified Command structure in the State has managed to contain the activities of the insurgents. He said that 178 militants were killed and 1490 apprehended in 1999' Tackling the ultras "Despite several measures such as joint command of the Army and the civil authority preceded by 'Operation Rhino' a few years ago, the militant outfits - the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Bodo insurgent groups have not abandoned their activities nor have they shown any inclination to come forward for negotiatory talks to resolve the issues on which they have taken arms. Certainly, the insurgent leaderships are not unaware of the fact that public support which initially was in their favour has reached the lowest level as a result a fairly large number of the activists have surrendered before the government and the Army; and significantly, some of them have surrendered on their own before the public. In spite of all these cold facts, the leadership of the ultras has not seen the writing on the wall. One of the reasons for obstinacy on the part of leaderships of the ultra groups is the fact that they have found in Bhutan and Bangladesh convenient places for training and shelter though New Delhi has been urging over the years Dhaka and Thimphu to assist New Delhi by refusing to give the militant groups any assistance whatever. But the Governments of Bhutan and Bangladesh seemed to have ignored the seriousness of the problem posed by the militant groups." - The Assam Tribune, Editorial, May 2, 2000 Swadhinata's death and after "The controversy surrounding the alleged encounter death of senior ULFA leader and deputy publicity secretary of the extremist outfit Swadhinata Phukon, alias Kabiranjan Saikia near Jorhat on the night of May 26 has cast a shadow on a major success achieved by the State police in its fight against insurgents in the State. The police version that Phukon was shot dead when he fired upon the security patrol which waylaid him while coming on a cycle, has been challenged by the local people of the area. According to reports, the ULFA leader who was taking shelter in the official quarter of a lady doctor was picked up and taken away blindfolded and handcuffed by the police. As per reports, the ULFA leader had pleaded for his life saying that he had never been involved in any killing (as a member of the publicity wing, Phukon could be considered as a non-combatant). The local people have now charged the police of killing the ULFA leader in cold blood. This has greatly tarnished the image of the police and in turn the government. A wave of revulsion at the alleged dastardly crime of the police is already apparent from the reaction of the people. "It is an established fact that security forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations also have a hit-list of their own of dreaded rebel leaders who have been a headache to them in their operations. Such rebel leaders are generally killed by the security forces who have a nagging fear that arrests could lead to their return to the operation theatre by taking advantage of judicial processes in the country. Most activists of the armed wing of the insurgent groups know that death is imminent when caught by the security forces. "The haste in which the Nagaon district administration ensured that Phukon's body was cremated without any waste of time indicated the administration's fear of the mood of the people. Phukon's alleged death in encounter with the police also gives a wrong signal on efforts to bring the ULFA to the negotiating table. When a senior leader is allegedly done to death, the message which goes out loud and clear is that the government is now firm in its determination to crush the insurgents without mercy and that the talks strategy is presently under wraps. This definitely reflects the upper hand the security forces are enjoying in the counter-insurgency operations in the state. However, it must be remembered that security operations have never been able to stamp out completely any insurgency so far in the country. Even senior Army officers have admitted the futility of such efforts and have suggested a political solution. Swadhinata Phukon, alias Kabiranjan Saikia could have served the cause of achieving a political solution better alive than dead. Even if Phukon had really died in an encounter all we can say is that an opportunity to open channels of communication with the top ULFA leadership has been lost."-The Assam Tribune, Editorial, May 30, 2000 'It is an established fact that security forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations also have a hit-list of their own of dreaded rebel leaders who have been a headache to them in their operations' Pak. backing N-E insurgents: P.M "The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, charged Pakistan with backing insurgents and separatists in the Northeastern States as 'part of its larger gameplan' to destabilise India and said this had impeded the regions's economic development. "'It is now well established that Pakistan is backing some of these groups as part of its larger gameplan to try and destabilise India,' Mr. Vajpayee said. He was inaugurating a two-day Conference of Governors and Chief Ministers of seven Northeastern States." -The Hindu, January 22, 2000 GOC: ISI using Siliguri corridor to enter Northeast "The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has stepped up its activities in the Northeast, especially in North Bengal and Assam, Lt General HRS Kalkat, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), Eastern Command, said while addressing mediapersons after an investiture ceremony on the occasion of Army Day, Kalkat said ISI was making inroads to the areas through the Siliguri corridor over a period of time. He said with the large immigrant population in the areas, the ground was very fertile for the ISI to operate which was also providing assistance to different insurgent groups in India. Expressing concern over the activities of ISI in the region, Kalkat said, it was making special efforts to prop up militant groups in Assam and cautioned that it is high time to check its sinister activities in India. Referring to overall law and order situation in the Northeast, Kalkat said insurgency continued to be a problem in Manipur while it was low-key in Assam and Nagaland. Kalkat said to ensure a smooth system of disposal of militants, the Unified Command was considered as the best model which had helped control insurgency in Assam and Nagaland and wondered why some of the states in the northeast like Manipur were not inclined to accept this model. Terming the law and order situation in Manipur as the worst, he said there were reports of linkage of politicians with terrorists in that state and advocated for establishing the Unified Command structure there to combat insurgency. He regretted that on several occasions apprehended insurgents had been released by the civil administration despite being confirmed criminals which posed a problem to the Army. - The Northeast Daily, UNI, January 17, 2000 Delhi proclaims truce in Assam fighting "India announced a formal ceasefire with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), one of the main tribal guerilla groups fighting for an independent homeland in Assam. "'In order to create an environment conducive to talks for finding a solution to the Bodo problem, the government has decided to suspend operations against the BLT with immediate effect,' Home Minister L.K. Advani told the Rajya Sabha. "Advani said the BLT had in turn agreed to suspend operations against the Army, paramilitary forces and state police. "More than 10,000 people have died in the past decade in Assam in insurgency related to the Bodo campaign for a tribal homeland. "The BLT has been responsible for numerous acts of sabotage in Assam, including a 1997 train blast that killed 35 people. "The Minister also stressed that efforts would continue to convince other militant groups in the region to end their 'violent and unlawful' activities and come to a negotiating table. 'More than 10,000 people have died in the past decade in Assam in insurgency related to the Bodo campaign for a tribal homeland' "More than 50,000 people have been killed in violence linked to the various separatist insurgencies raging in India's seven northeastern states since 1947. "The Indian government launched a fresh appeal for unconditional peace talks with all separatist groups willing to forsake violence." - Dawn, AFP, March 16, 2000 PM asks states to share burden in fighting militancy "Briefing presspersons an official spokesman said the Prime Minister stressed the need for bolstering the financial health of the North Eastern States. "The spokesman said that the scheme for modernisation of police forces would entail an expenditure of Rs. 285 crores by March 2002. The Government had also sanctioned 14 IR Battalions for the North East where as many as 569 companies of para-military forces were deployed. In addition, there were 105 companies of BSF on the International Border with Bangladesh besides the Army deployment. "It was also pointed out that the Government had approved a scheme for fencing 2429 km of Indo-Bangladesh border and laying of 797 km of roads at a cost of Rs. 1334 crores. The project would be completed by March 2007. "Earlier, the Assam Chief Minister, Mr. P.K. Mahanta, and his Arunachal Pradesh counterpart, Mr. Mukut Mithi, told presspersons that insurgency was not a localised normal law and order problem as the insurgent outfits had links with each other and their common goal was to secede from India. They urged the Centre to deploy adequate forces for combating militancy and strengthening border surveillance to check cross-border movement of insurgent outfits. At the 'It was also pointed out that the Government had approved a scheme for fencing 2429 km of Indo-Bangladesh border and laying of 797 km of roads at a cost of Rs. 1334 crores. The project would be completed by March 2007' same time, they also wanted the Centre to initiate meaningful dialogue with the insurgent groups in consultation with the respective state governments." - The Hindu, June 22, 2000 Assam seeks a ride on the autonomy bandwagon "A controversial push for autonomy in Kashmir is fanning similar sentiments in India's separatist-riven northeast region. The Kashmir State Assembly adopted a resolution calling for greater autonomy, and now some of India's seven northeastern states - 'the Seven Sisters' -- are seriously thinking of following suit. "Any such move would throw down a further challenge to the Central Government in New Delhi, which has voiced its bitter opposition to the Kashmir resolution, even while agreeing to take it under consideration. The Chief Minister of Assam state, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, said the aspirations of people in small states could only be fulfilled with a degree of self-rule, rather than continuing with the present quasi-federal framework. 'The Central Government should hold a debate on the autonomy bill moved by Kashmir and should try and work out a meaningful package instead of just rejecting it outright,' Mahanta told AFP. 'The Chief Minister of Assam state, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, said the aspirations of people in small states could only be fulfilled with a degree of self-rule, rather than continuing with the present quasi-federal framework' "Assam, like Kashmir and several other members of the Seven Sisters family, has lived with a long-running separatist insurgency. And like their Kashmiri counterparts, many Assamese politicians argue that genuine autonomy is the way forward to finally ending the militant violence. 'I firmly believe the small nationalities could prosper only when powers are decentralised and greater autonomy is given to the states,' said Assam Tourist Minister Jagadish Bhuyan. 'There have always been demands for autonomy in the northeast. If
these demands are denied, there is sure to be social tension and convulsion
leading to a sense of alienation, - The Indian Express, July 2, 2000 Assam Insurgency "The human rights situation in the northeastern Indian state of Assam deteriorated rapidly after the Indian Army was deployed in November 1990 to fight against secessionist insurgents. To contain the insurgents and to diminish the support they enjoyed, especially in the rural areas, security forces have indulged in extra-judicial executions, custodial deaths, torture and rape. On the one hand, common villagers are intimidated and terrorized to divulge information about insurgents and on the other, insurgents are physically eliminated. The security operations, conducted under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, give soldiers blanket immunity against any legal interference, have reduced the region to a killing field. And strangely, even though the security actions were initiated to reverse growing insurgency, the subsequent period saw an increase in insurgent activities and mushrooming of insurgent outfits. "The situation, especially the human rights conditions, are not well known outside the region. The national media, both government and non-government controlled, have not given the region (Assam and the adjoining areas) the due coverage. In order to avoid a popular protest against the present policy by the more articulate urban population, the security operations have been confined mainly to the rural areas. The local media, which is more sensitive to the situation, have come under government attack. The groups involved in human rights activities too have come under repeated attacks, as the killing of Cheniram Nath above shows. "Insurgency in the state of Assam rose in a political context, as has happened in the other adjoining states. But the government has chosen to view it solely as a security problem, and has adopted policies to root out insurgency militarily. Not only has it borne no fruit, but it has aggravated the human rights situation drastically. In these and other linked pages, an effort is made to 'Human rights violations in Assam and the adjoining region are due to a pre-meditated and systematic state policy to contain insurgency' paint a non-official picture of the human rights situation in the state of Assam, with information regarding human rights violations and the context in which this has been happening. "Human rights violations in Assam and the adjoining region are due to a pre-meditated and systematic state policy to contain insurgency. Since Independence in 1947, regions of northeastern India, the most backward of all India, have seen uprisings and secessionist activities and as a remedy to that was born the Armed Forces Act (AFSPA) in 1958. Such armed activities spread to Assam and increased in the late 1980's. In particular, insurgent groups managed to increase their local support and to step up fund raising activities by extortion and intimidation of economically advanced groups. In 1990, Surender Paul, an influential member of the tea-producing groups, was killed by insurgents. Soon after, the Army was deployed to flush out the militants. "Army operations began as Operation Bajrang, and has been finally given a more institutional frame work under the Unified Command in the beginning of 1997. The Army operations started with extensive search-and-arrest operations in the villages. Villagers were required to line up in a nearby field, usually in the dead of night, and questioned. Some are taken to Army camps for further questioning, which generally include torture. Many innocents have either lost their lives or have been maimed for life. Villagers have been threatened, harassed, raped, assaulted and killed by soldiers attempting to frighten them into identifying suspected insurgents. These exercises became more intensive if there occurs insurgent activities in the neighborhood. As a result, in the villages of Assam, any insurgent activity signals mass exodus of villagers for fear of Army operations. Since insurgency has an ethnic component, members of particular communities are targeted. "Rapes generally take place during search-and-arrest operations. They also occur, with security personnel, 'Almost all persons picked up for questioning, whether belonging to any insurgent group or not, whether combatant or non-combatant, are tortured for information' belonging to the Army, paramilatary or the state police forces, forcibly entering a house and committing the crime. "Almost all persons picked up for questioning, whether belonging to any insurgent group or not, whether combatant or non-combatant, are tortured for information. Some of the methods used include: electric shocks to genitals, cigarette burns, pulling out of finger-nails, dunking the head under water/urine repeatedly, hanging upside-down for prolonged period, etc. A favorite method of beating is wrapping the victim in a quilt and hitting with a thick bamboo stick. These beatings are difficult to prove as they leave no signs on the outside, though they cause severe internal injury. "In general, intransigent members of insurgent groups are eliminated out-right. Sometimes when the conditions of torture victims deteriorate the victims are killed and the killing passed off as due to an encounter. A standard story put out is that during a swoop on a militant hideout on the basis of the information provided by the victim, a shoot-out took place in which the victim was killed. "A number of vigilante groups are active in the region. Parag Das, a well know human rights activist and journalist, was killed by unidentified gunmen, suspected to be members of a vigilante group. In a well planned and orchestrated operation, suspected gunmen again killed family members of leaders of armed opposition groups in the month of August 1998. "It is of deep concern that an unrestrained and trigger happy security force can be used by vested interests to settle personal scores. In a number of instances, the Army had admitted to acting on 'specific information' but the victims have turned out to be innocent, without any relation to any insurgent group. Chances are very high in such cases that the armymen were tipped off by sources with personal/political vendetta with the victims. "Most of the operations are conducted by security forces either in civil dress, or with identifying insignia missing from their uniforms. They take care to park their vehicles away from the scenes of the operation to avoid identification. 'Most of the operations are conducted by security forces either in civil
dress, or with identifying insignia missing from their uniforms' "In
certain cases, persons picked up by the security forces have simply disappeared.
The army denies having arrested them. "Killings by non-state agencies
have not only continued, but increased. Insurgent outfits continue political
killings and kidnappings. Of particular concern in the recent years has been
ethnic killings in certain regions of Assam, which are generally "The Army operations in Assam are conducted under the infamous Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, revised 1972. Under Section 4 of this Act, any personnel of the Indian Army, above the rank of private (jawan), can shoot to kill, destroy property, search without warrant or arrest anyone, who has committed, is suspected of having committed or about to commit, a cognizable offence. And to invoke this provision, the officer need only be 'of the opinion that it is necessary to do so'. This, in effect, gives the Indian Army the right to kill anybody at will. Under Section 6, no legal proceedings can be brought against Army personnel without the permission of the Central Government. This Section effectively shields the Indian Army completely from any responsibility for its actions. In other words, with this Act, the government of India has imposed an undeclared emergency in the state. This Act is applicable only in the seven northeastern states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. "In 1995 the infamous Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, 1985 (TADA) lapsed, but prisoners arrested under this Act still languish in jails. It is in the process of reenactment under the name of Criminal Law Amendment Law. Among various other powers, this Act conferred on the security forces the ability to detain prisoners without any trial for upto one year. There is a plethora of preventive detention acts which gives the Government and the security forces power to curtail the fundamental rights of life and liberty. The one most often used in the State of Assam is the National Security Act (NSA) 1980. 'Under pressure for its dismal human rights records, the Indian government set up the National Human Rights Commission, under the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. But it is a body without adequate power to enforce human rights' "Under pressure for its dismal human rights records, the Indian government set up the National Human Rights Commission, under the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. But it is a body without adequate power to enforce human rights. Clause 19 of this Act prevents the Commission from investigating any complaints against the armed forces, thus reducing the Commission to a toothless tiger. "The Government has been a flagrant violator of human rights norms. India has signed (and ratified with reservation on Article 9, thus blocking right to statutory compensations) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which along with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights form the backbone of International Law and Convention on Human Rights. According to this Covenant, under Article 4, State Parties can derogate from certain articles in times of emergencies, but not the most central ones like right to life (Article 6), and has to inform other State Parties. With the promulgation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the government has imposed an undeclared emergency and even derogated the right to life but failed to inform the State Parties of an emergency situation in the northeast. This was pointed out in the Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly of the UN in its Fifty-second Session, September 1997. It is also the view of the Report that terrorism and armed insurgency are essentially political in character and that the approach to resolving such problems must also, essentially, be political, and it emphasizes that terrorism should be fought with means that are compatible with the Covenant. "Since India is yet to ratify the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR,
victims of human rights violations cannot make individual submissions to the
Human Rights Commission. This means a victim of Army atrocity has little chance
of obtaining justice within the domestic or international legal system. 'Human
Rights have been violated both by state and non-state agencies in the state
of Assam. The situation continues to get worse' "Insurgency in Assam has a political root. We appeal to the Government to see it as such and formulate its policies accordingly." - http://www.assam.org/assam/humanrights/ Conclusion I am not sure whether this has helped you arrive at a conclusion, or whether, like me, you are still not sure of ISI involvement. Nonetheless, I have concluded that even if the ISI is influential enough, and the South Asian neighbours willing to host their activities, there has to be sufficient indigenous cause for these movements to exist. We will study some other movements in India, in due course, which might help arrive at a conclusion
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