Who needs to do more?

The POST, Sun, July,2, 2006.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema


It has become somewhat customary for many Afghan officials and some outsiders to repeat periodically a phrase that ‘Pakistan should do more’. A phrase like the one mentioned here can generate different meanings for different people and can easily invoke at least three different interpretations. For the Afghan officials it reflects the notion that either Pakistan is not doing enough or is unable to attain the level which they expect. For the Pakistani officials it appears to be an unnecessary allegation which could have been caused by Afghans’ own inabilities to set their house in order and in consequence they tend to employ what is called as the diversionary techniques. A third interpretation could be that operative constraints and the complexities of the situation are impeding the emergence of real status of efforts being put in by all concerned.

It seems that some of the Afghan officials earnestly believe that Pakistan can do more and it should do more while some others are employing it as a pressurizing lever and diversionary tactics. They tend to disregard the massive amount of efforts Pakistan has already put in.  They feel that Pakistan can control effectively the elements that are still sympathetic to Talibans. Most Talibans are Pakhtoons, the sympathetic elements are also assumed to be Pakhtoons. Since both the bordering provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan have a large Pakhtoon population, hence many Afghan officials assume that Pakhtoon based in Pakistan are supporting and helping the Talibans. This interpretation completely ignores the Kabul regime’s own weaknesses and inabilities. For years they found Pakistan a useful scapegoat and tried to pass the buck on to Pakistan.

Undoubtedly the bulk of supporters of this line of argument are those who either dislike the Pakistani policies or under the strong influence of interested outsiders. It is a well acknowledged fact that the supporters of Northern Alliance have always been working against Pakistan primarily because they intensely disliked Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime. Equally recognized fact is that many of Northern Alliance (NA) members took refuge in Pakistan during their war against the Soviet Union and vociferously appreciated the support Pakistan had extended to them during those difficult years. What is amazing is the fact that the NA people decided to join hands with those who supported the Soviet Union’s Afghan invasion.

Cognizant of the dynamic nature of international relations, it is not surprising to see changes in policies and shifts in alignments. But a shift in alignment is always made in congruence with the dictates of national interest of a country. Given the harrowing experiences of the war against the Soviet Union, the Afghan civil war, and war against US,  opinions are unanimous that the incumbent regime in Afghanistan should engage in securing correct if not friendly relationships with all of its neighbors.  The continuous Afghan dependence upon Pakistan for transit trade, general supplies of essential goods and presence of massive Afghan refugees even after the 16 years after the termination of war against the Soviets etc. makes Pakistan automatically an extremely important neighbor. If the responsible Afghani officials keep on employing the ‘blame game’ policy, the sympathetic Pakistanis who are fully conscious of complex and difficult Afghan situation would be forced to distance themselves.

Many Pakistanis view Afghan stance that Pakistan should do more as nothing more than another Afghan allegation aimed to shift the focus from pressing internal problems which they are unable to resolve. They argue that not only Pakistan went out of the way to accommodate more than four million Afghan refugees most of them are still living in Pakistan but also they have posted more than 80,000 Pakistani soldiers in the tribal region to prevent alleged infiltrations. Recently an additional force of 10,000 has been added. Given the difficult geographical terrain and the porous nature of Pak-Afghan border along with the age old interaction among the tribes inhabiting that region, it would be unrealistic assume that the undesired crossing would be totally plugged. Besides to attain this objective would require similar kind of efforts as has been done by the Pakistanis from the other side of the Durand Line.

A comparative analysis of efforts undertaken by the Pakistanis and the Afghanis clearly indicate that the Afghans need to do much more even to reach half mark of Pakistani efforts. But one should also recognize the limited experience and training of the Afghan forces. The International Security Assistance Force is no more than 20,000 which is not only unfamiliar with the nature of Afghan characteristics but also with the difficult geographical terrain. Yet the ISAF is expected to maintain security order in a huge area. Another factor that is complicating the situation is the resurgence of Taliban activities.

A realistic assessment of the situation clearly supports the third interpretation which is that all concerned need to do more especially both the Afghans and its foreign supporters. While it has been repeatedly recognized by the all concerned including the high Afghan and American officials that Pakistan is continuously making enormous contributions, it is imperative that both the Afghans and the outsiders especially the American need to step up their efforts. Pakistan’s dispatch of another 10,000 troops clearly reflects its deep commitment and determination.

The Afghan government needs to focus on internal weakness especially those which can be controlled if not totally eliminated with a little bit of efforts. They should avoid dwelling too heavily upon the blame game. They must realize and acknowledge the Pakistani assertions that the stability of Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan. They should avoid allowing the use of Afghani soil by the outsider for their agendas such as destabilization of Pakistan. Not only Pak-Afghan trade has exceed a billion mark, Pakistan is keen to see the early advent of stability in Afghanistan which could, in turn, facilitate the much desired gas import from Turkmenistan.

There are two types of outsiders; those who are genuinely concerned with security and stability of Afghanistan and then there are those who are partly helping Afghanistan in its enormous reconstruction task but are also partly using the opportunity to advance their own agenda against a third country. It is up to the Afghan government to be vigilant and strike the requisite balance. It should ensure that its territory is not used for any other purposes by the outsiders except for the specific task for which they are in Afghanistan such as building a road or school or hospital etc.

The precarious situation in Afghanistan implies that it does need help of all concerned. The international community needs to live up to its financial commitments and deliver what it has promised. In addition, the security forces should work in collaboration with the Afghan and Pakistan forces. The existence of tripartite commission consisting of the Americans, the Pakistanis, and the Afghanis can provide the necessary mechanism for collaborative efforts. Indeed it is a suitable form not only to enhance cooperation against terrorism but can also help in removing the misgivings and misperceptions that may crop up from time to time. Intelligence sharing is another aspect that should be regularly and timely executed.

While Pakistan has already taken another step and has sent another 10,000 troop, the ISAF and the Afghan forces should further activate their movements particularly on Pak-Afghan border. The Pakistani efforts to work out a negotiated peace within Waziristan could further help in facilitating the desired plugging of unauthorized infiltrations. However this would also require active and regular patrolling of the border area either jointly or even individually.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.