Whither LOC

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

At last they agreed at least over one thing though for different reasons and with different interpretations that the Line of Control (LOC) will never be the permanent border between India and Pakistan. Speaking at Patna Vajpayee said 'there won't be any compromise on the Loc, I mean it clear that LOC would not be converted into international border'. This is precisely what Pakistan has been somewhat consistently asserting that LOC is not a border. It is a temporary arrangement and the Kashmir dispute has to be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

The LOC came into existence following the end of 1971 Indo-Pak wars and subsequent signing of the Simla Agreement. While many clauses of such agreements resulting from the cession of armed hostilities are often similar in nature and undoubtedly important but one specific clause of the Simla Agreement dealing directly with the Kashmir dispute is of particular significance. According to this clause 'the line of control resulting from cease-fire of Dec. 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side'. This clause not only allowed the retention of forcibly occupied territories but also highlighted the existence of Kashmir dispute with allowances to their respective views of the dispute.

For India it meant that she could disassociate the new line from the old UN cease-fire line (that came into existence in 1949) and also keep the strategic posts that she occupied during the course of 1971 war. For Pakistan the LOC symbolized not only its successful resistance to Indian efforts to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute on the basis of status quo favouring India but was also a way to keep the issue alive despite the existence of overwhelming odds against Pakistan. Pakistan went to Simla with the knowledge and awareness that all the tramp cards were held by India: over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war ((POW), large tracts of Pakistani territory, and all the psychological advantages accruing from military victory and the dismemberment of Pakistan. Yet the Pakistani were able to secure the agreement without conceding too much. Perhaps the major concession on Pakistan's part was her acceptance of the transformation of the cease-fire line into the line of control.

Initially India insisted that the cease-fire line should be transformed into an international boundary while Pakistan argued for a return to the UN supervised cease-fire line, as it existed before 1971. Part of the pressure, which Mrs. Gandhi must have felt at the time, was the product of BJP's assertion to get Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) from Pakistan in return for POWs. The compromise between the two extreme positions produced the LOC. Vajpayee has recently confessed that he suggested to the Indian government at the time of Simla negotiations to pressurize Pakistan to hand over the AJK in exchange of Pakistani POWs.

Vajpayee has recently repeated his age-old desire to secure the territories of AJK. In an election speech at Patna he once again highlighted that while the return of AJK would not be a precondition for the resumption of dialogue but the 'return of AJK' would top the agenda of any dialogue with Pakistan in future. One need not to scrutinize carefully the Indo-Pak hostilities to realize that India invariably changes its agenda in congruence with the dictates of the situation. At Agra (May 2001), the top of the Indian agenda was the cross border terrorism, which seemed to have been relegated to a relatively low rung of the priority ladder and the return of AJK is now drummed upward.

An intriguing interpretation that has come from the Chief Minister of Indian Occupied Kashmir Farooq Abdullah needs to be mentioned here. Farooq Abdullah has categorically stated that India cannot occupy Pakistan administered Kashmir and therefore the LOC should be turned into permanent border. He is of the opinion that splitting Kashmir with Pakistan is the only viable solution to the dispute and thus LOC should be made an international border.

The difference in arguments of both Vajpayee and Farooq Abdullah is just another eyewash. Abdullah is a puppet Chief Minister who is heavily dependent upon not voter's support but state authority and centre's backing. In the past Farooq Abdullah has frequently expressed his resentment and even threatened to withdraw his support or support to adopt parliamentary committee's autonomy resolution. It is not in too distant past that Farooq Abdullah made so much fuss over autonomy resolution only to give in quietly to the Hindu overlords of Delhi. Apart from Sheikh Abdullah's work along with his close political friend Chaudury Ghulam Abbas during the initial phase of Kashmiris struggle, the Abdullah family has never really bothered to protect the Kashmiris' interests and has too many times betrayed the aspirations of the locals in order to maintain themselves in power.

Undoubtedly Sheikh Abdullah was relatively a popular leader and many Kashmiris expected that he would be able to secure a fair and a just deal from the India especially in view of his friendship with Nehru. Nehru not only used him during the difficult early phase of the Kashmir dispute and later put him in jail for a very long time but also managed to buy considerable time with a view to complicate the dispute. It was only just before his death Nehru fully realized the folly of his Kashmir policy and wanted to mend the situation but did not live long to resolve the dispute. Compared to Nehru, the successor governments were unable to produce a visionary statesman who could assess accurately the likely dividends that could accrue from Indo-Pak normalization. Each one them were scared of the fact that resolving dispute in accordance with the UN resolution may cost them their governments. Consequently no government was willing to take up the issue sincerely. The policies revolved around what has been known as shifting strategies.

The policies of the current government of India are no different than what the others have demonstrated in the past. In many ways the incumbent BJP regime' negative responces reflect the continuation of ruling elite's mindset. The continuous shifting of policy objectives is meant to provide maximum options to manipulate the situation. The initial focal point was related to what the Indian call cross border terrorism but after Jan. 12 speech by President Musharraf the focus shifted to what the BJP began to stress that Pakistan had not done enough to curb terrorism. In addition they began to demand the handing over of some twenty people. Following the announcement that Pakistan has also prepared a list of terrorists who were being shielded by the Indians, the focus once again shifted to a new slogan namely 'return of AJK territories'.

BJP supporters often argue that this party has always opposed the handing over of any territory that has been occupied by India forcibly or acquired peacefully back to either Pakistan or China or even Bangladesh. This makes it extremely difficult to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Perhaps that's why the BJP somewhat continuously blame Nehru and Mountbatten for introducing article 370 in the Indian constitution, committing India to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris, and taking the dispute to the United Nations. The principled strands are seen as impediments to planned policy pursuits. The inability to attain the policy objectives often finds recourse to blame-game.

While many non South Asian believe that under the operative circumstances LOC is perhaps one of the practical solution of the ongoing complex Kashmir dispute, it is certain that neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis nor the Kashmiris would accept the LOC as a permanent border. As stated above that LOC is a temporary arrangement and a product of cession in armed hostilities, permanent borders are the product of an agreement or a treaty between the concerned parties. Later the agreed border is translated on the soil with the help of experts' surveyors and geographers. This stage is called the delimitation. In the end the final stage of a permanent border is what is called demarcation of the agreed boundary. So far not even the first stage has been agreed upon except both India and Pakistan have asserted that LOC would not be a permanent border