US mistakes in Afghanistan

The POST, Sun, Sep,02, 2007.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Late realization of mistakes often results in effective damage control. It is not unusual that a decision maker becomes fully aware of the unforeseen consequences only after having confronted the undesired damages. Sometimes decisions have to be taken quickly and desired time-lag is unavailable and consequently a decision is taken without taking full cognizance of the operative circumstances and the gravity of likely implications. The world history is replete with examples of hasty decisions that caused unnecessary complications. 

American policy in Afghanistan appears to be an intriguing case of a long list of mistakes that were committed in the process. Indeed the realization of some of the mistakes are now being recognized and aired in one form or the other. A visiting American scholar has recently categorically stated that the US act of leaving the war ravaged Afghanistan at the mercy of warlords was a blunder. The American policy of distancing itself from stabilization of Afghanistan because of the felt-urgency to move into Iraq was undoubtedly a major mistake which resulted in unanticipated consequences. 

Admittedly it is not too difficult to understand why the Americans felt to quickly move into Iraq but the great haste with which the focus shifted raised many questions. Besides, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend why a limited force was deputed to tackle Afghanistan whereas a very large force was sent to deal with Iraq. Initially the American forces stationed in Afghanistan were around 17,000 where as the forces sent to Iraq were more than 100,000. 

Current reports indicate that the NATO force (including American troops) stationed in Afghanistan is just about 42,000. Perhaps the intriguing aspect of the NATO troops is while many member states have sent their troops but not all are willing to go into the combat zone. They are willing to perform other duties but are not willing to fight against the Taliban. In addition there are another 50,000 Afghan troops. It is a common knowledge that the Afghan troops were not only quickly trained but also lacked the necessary skill to deal with the kind of situation that prevails inside Afghanistan. 

The second major mistake the Americans made in Afghanistan revolves around non-comprehensions of the nature of Taliban. There are Taliban and Taliban but the American lumped all of them in the category bad or militant Taliban. Non-recognition of moderate elements among Taliban was a mistake. It was no different than what the American policy was with regard to Republican Guards in Iraq. Indeed the Republican Guards also had moderate elements but the Americans opted to lump them with others. 

The third major mistake was to rely too heavily upon the Northern Alliance and ignoring a large section of Afghan society-namely the Pakhtoons. This implied castigating the major faction of the Afghan society. Most Pakhtoons felt insulted and even those who were not really sympathetic to Taliban began to generate sympathies for the Taliban. The Taliban were now seen as someone who took up the cause of Afghans in general and Pakhtoons in particular. The Northern Alliance was primarily dominated by the Tajiks who were no more than 20% of the entire population of Afghanistan. Besides, the Northern Alliance was closely allied with India. Consequently the policies were in many ways influenced by the Indian thinking. 

The third mistake was the lack of desired money input for reconstruction purposes. While a lot of money was promised for the reconstruction of Afghanistan at Bonn and Tokyo meetings but some reports indicate that not all of it was delivered which in turn drastically impacted upon the reconstruction activities. The construction activities were further slowed down by two factors like the ongoing war between Taliban and the ISAF/NATO forces and the total lack of Afghan force initially. Admittedly now the Afghan force has been trained though there is lot to be said about their quick training, the Afghan force still lacks adequate skill to wipe out the Taliban. 

The Taliban have also created problems for Pakistan. Being fully aware of the sympathetic element in parts of Pakistan’s tribal area, they try to violate the international norms. Pakistan on the other hand has made strict arrangements to prevent the intended violations of the border. Cognizant of easement clause some of the miscreants with the help of sympathetic elements in tribal areas still violate the border. To plug this kind of violations the Pakistani government has stationed 100,000 troops and established 1000 check posts. But on Afghan side there is no effective check. 

The fourth blunder that is repeatedly committed by the ISAF/NATO troops revolves around indiscriminate bombing in which many civilians have lost their lives. The undesired killing of innocent civilians invariably cause revulsions and influences the neutral elements to turn more hawkish. There have been so many incidents of this type and these have aroused unnecessary suspicions against the NATO. 

The fifth mistake that the American s/Afghan government has inadvertently or deliberately committed revolves around allowing the warlords to continue growing poppy. Reports have frequently appeared that drug money has been used by both the Taliban and the Afghans officials. One report indicated that the drug barons give money to both Taliban and members of Afghan parliament/officials. It has also been stated by the Afghans themselves that the American troops frequently bypass the drug affairs. 

While one can go on and list many other factors that are effectively impeding the advent of stability and peace in Afghanistan, the above mentioned mistakes have made the situation in Afghanistan rather acutely complex. Indeed it needs to be stressed here that the Americans and other supporters of the Afghan regime have realized the committal of such mistakes and in some cases rectification process is well underway. 

The strategy adopted by the Afghan regime and their foreign supporters revolved around covering their own weaknesses and inabilities by putting the blame on Pakistan. Not only this strategy totally failed but it also alienated almost all Pakistanis. However the encouraging development is the increased realization of the inbuilt weaknesses of this strategy and the efforts to cooperate with Pakistan are ostensibly beginning to pay some dividends. Although the erosion of trust deficit would take sometimes but opting for right path is indeed a step in right direction. 

Learning from past mistakes and injecting corrective injections is not only appreciated by all concerned but the chances to gain desired dividends are often brightens. The successful conclusion of first Pakistan-Afghanistan joint Jirga certainly raised hopes for all concerned. It needs to be stressed here that all Pakistani are extremely keen to see the early advent of peace in Afghanistan as it is fully recognized and deemed to be in the interest of both countries.

The writer works for Islamabad Policy research Institute.