US and Indo-Pak Nuclear Race?

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

In 1998 a highly respected former American official suggested that American policy in South Asia should be revolving around easing political tension. For years not much efforts have been made towards the easing of political tensions. But the policy that followed as a consequence of nuclear tests of May 1998 was and still continues to be heavily laden with punitive contents than with rational nuggets. The initial American and more specifically President Clinton's reaction reflected more of an emotional outrage than of direction over the Indian detonation in May 1998. Compared to Clinton, President Bush's policy appears to be relatively more realistic. President Bush has recently called for renewed efforts 'to persuade India and Pakistan to constrain their nuclear and missile competition'.

Three aspects of the statement need to be discussed. First, is there a competition between India and Pakistan going on? Second, does persuasion implies only punitive approach? Third, how do you ease political tension? On May 11 and 13, India conducted many nuclear tests disregarding the world opinion and exposing a cleverly concealed policy of ambiguity, which was operative since 1974. Pakistan followed the suit and conducted somewhat same number of tests on May 28 and 30. Since then both countries have refrained from conducting any more tests in congruence with self imposed moratorium on nuclear testing but the concentration seem to have shifted to improving the delivery systems.

Indeed the competition over the improvisation of the missiles has continued. Since the signing of Lahore Declaration in which both countries agreed both to give advance notice to the other side of impending missile tests. Consequently they strictly adhered to their commitments at the times of subsequent missile tests. Improving the capacity to carry more payloads and cover more distance is the main focal point of those engaged in improving the operational abilities of the missiles. Both India and Pakistan are accused of having acquired related material from outside. While it is often alleged that China and North Korea reportedly transferred missile technology, the Indians also acquired nuclear and missile related material from outside sources. According a report published in the News (Sept.9, 2001) quoting CIA that India continues to rely on foreign assistance for key missile technologies in areas where it still lacks engineering or production expertise.

A federal grand jury in San Francisco recently handed down an indictment charging two American executives with conspiracy and violation of export regulations. It was reported in a prestigious Indian newspaper that according to indictment, the company supplied five nuclear pulse generators to India. 'Pulse generators are devices that can be used to calibrate instruments that measures atomic reactions'. The same newspaper also reported that the company in question had a ling standing relationship with India and had been supplying equipments without any real problem. It only proves that India is not as innocent as it claims to be.

Proliferation in South Asia has primarily been caused by the Indian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. As early as 1974 India detonated a nuclear device, which did not attract much criticism. Pakistan's nuclear programme, in many ways, appears to be reactive in nature. India wanted to attain nuclear deterrence against China and Pakistan where as Pakistan's ability is only aimed at containing India.

Both India and Pakistan have not signed NPT and CTBT. Indian has somewhat consistently called for a global nuclear disarmament regime. India is well aware of the fact that such an objective is hard to attain but it does provide sufficient space for India to develop a comprehensive nuclear capability. Being fully cognizant of effective impediments that prevent global disarmament, India opted, in its draft doctrine, a comprehensive programme leading towards the acquisition of all known delivery systems with continuous improvements in terns of payloads and distance. Since Pakistani programme is of reactive nature, it cannot afford to ignore all those developments in India. However it needs to be stressed that Pakistan has repeatedly stated that it would not allow itself to be trapped into nuclear arms race.

The second question that needs to be responded deals with the punitive approaches invariably adopted by the developed countries. For years after Indo-Pak nuclear tests almost all the developed countries refused to recognize the existing reality of India-Pakistan becoming nuclear weapon states and opted for punitive measures such as slapping sanctions. Somehow or the other an impression is gaining grounds among the emerging economies that the developed countries still believe in punitive approaches than much more constructive approach of engagements.

Even the current American non-proliferation policy is heavily dependent upon punitive elements. It consists of persuading or inducing the proliferating governments to change course, convince the proliferators of greater benefits of non-proliferation, make them understand the cost of non-proliferation, and finally deny the supply of material, equipment and technology from abroad. Monitoring and stopping the supplies from various countries implies tighter export controls.

Despite the punitive attitudes of the great and rich powers, both India and Pakistan have demonstrated responsible behaviour in many ways. Both have maintained the self-imposed moratorium on further testing. But have continued to upgrade their missiles. While India has undertaken so many tests of missiles like Agni, Prithivi, Akash, Surya, Nag etc. the Pakistanis have gone ahead with their experiments of Hatfs, Shaheen and Ghuari. It has also been recently reported that Pakistan is planning to test fly Haider-I soon. Both have refrained from sharing the sensitive technologies with other countries despite inducements. Both have held many rounds of talks with US officials on export controls. Both have demonstrated good records on non-proliferation with periodic assertions to further tightening of export controls.

The third question is probably the most important and crux of the South Asia situation. And this deals with the easing of political tension in South Asia. The efforts to stop alleged Indo-Pak nuclear arms race must be accompanied by concerted attempts to ease tension between the two countries. While the US has been encouraging both India and Pakistan to undertake measures to reduce tension and to make Indo-Pak détente a reality the Americans will have to go beyond mere encouragement and devote much more time with a balanced approach in order to attain the desired normalcy between the two. Even the encouragement may stop paying dividends when imbalanced approach towards lifting of sanctions is adopted. To inject real peace in the area the America must make concerted efforts to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute. While many countries in the world acknowledge that Kashmir is a likely nuclear flashpoint, the efforts that are undertaken towards its amicable resolution are somewhat dismal and unimpressive. Not only the Americans must devote similar level of energies and efforts as have been put into the Middle East situation but the European should also make substantial inputs.

The recently held Agra Summit was indeed a good beginning, which, at least started a process of negotiations. The next round is going to be held in New York on 25th Sept. It would be in order if Bush makes a point to meet both India and Pakistanis leaders prior to Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting. The efforts to stop the nuclear arms race would pay the desired dividends provided the real cause of Indo-Pak tension is removed. Thus it is imperative that during the forthcoming UN mela the peace lovers make focused efforts to help both India and Pakistan in resolving this major source of tension.