INTRODUCTION.

In the post 11 September 2001 scenario, the general perception prevailing in Pakistan is that US will favour Pakistan over India for the achievement of its objectives in South Asia. The recent developments in Afghanistan and the visits of US high officials like Admiral Dennis Blair, commander-in-chief of US Pacific command, to India indicated chances of US-India strategic partnership in future.   

In the post Cold War scenario the traditional ‘rigid alliance’ pattern has experienced a transition to a ‘loose system of alliance’ where the options are kept open in view of rationality and pragmatic pursuance of national interests. The alliance between two countries is usually formulated due to their common interests or a common threat perception. It is imperative for Pakistan that both these factors, be carefully evaluated and policies ought to be formulated for the future scenario, where there are possibilities of India using its relationship with the sole great power in the international community, for coercive measures (strategic and economic) against Pakistan.

The trends prevalent in the US-Pakistan relations are explained before analysing the convergence of US-India interests. In the common interests of United States and Pakistan the “United States perceptions on Pakistan may currently be centred on these indicators: (1) Pakistan should not be allowed to disintegrate into a failed state (2) Pakistan is crucial to furthering US interests in Central Asia (3) Pakistan should be prevented from being Talibanised and (4) Pakistan should be kept engaged to keep its nuclear waywardness under restraint” [1] . These indicators are a result of United State’s security perception of the region and are debatable.  

The engagement of Pakistan by United States started actually even before the September 11 incident. “That the United States is attempting at a resurrection of its relationship with Pakistan is well exemplified by the statements of Peter Rodman, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs in the ‘Times of India’ on August23, 2001 "Our relationship with Pakistan is valuable to us. And I don’t think this Administration is going to lose sight of that but Pakistan has been an ally over many decades. I don’t think, we as a great power should be dispensing with allies, when you know that we think conditions have changed. It’s an Islamic country in a very complicated region of the world. I think it is useful to have a friend in that part of the world”. “The sudden softening of US policy stance towards Pakistan is currently being attributed to oil politics of the Caspian Region, the proposed oil-pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan’s leverage over the Taliban in Afghanistan. What is being implied in these formulations is uncharitable towards the Bush Administration, but then it is the Bush Administration that has to disabuse the minds of analysts that its intentions are otherwise" [2] .  

The recent harmony of interests between US and India is a result of a change in the regional circumstances and the policies of United States. There have been sign of economic, strategic and diplomatic support by United States to India on some of central issues. “Admittedly, the main obstacle to Indo-US bilateral relations during the Cold War was divergence on national security issues, but there has been increasing convergence on these issues since the end of the Cold War. Military-to-military cooperation began from the 1991 ‘Kicklighter Initiative’. During Clinton’s second term joint military exercises were planned before Pokhran intervened. Following India’s endorsement of the NMD, the suspension of military contacts since 1998 was done away with. General Henry Shelton visited India in July 2001 and the Defense Policy Group underwent a revival. The two sides are enhancing navy-to-navy cooperation to ensure free navigation through the Indian Ocean” [3] .   

In opposition to the euphoria in India and concern in Pakistan and China, with regards to the possibility of a US-India strategic alliance, there are some sceptics among the Indians, who are watching these developments with some concern. “What will India get from this entangling alliance? American bases, training facilities and an intelligence establishment could convert us into a semi-colony lacking voice and dignity on the world stage. Increased American infiltration of India will mean:  

• Meddling in Kashmir (the old US preference for Kashmiri “self-determination”).
• Usage of India to settle American scores in the region on the logic that “my ally’s enemy is my enemy”.
• Definite setback to Sino-Indian ties when both countries have common interests in the WTO.
• Doubts in the minds of our friends in Moscow, who fear America’s expansion into Eurasia.
• Dependency of the Indian defence structure on the commercial adjuncts of the Pentagon, like Lockheed Martin & Co” [4] .

“It is getting clearer that the Bush administration intends to sustain the dialogue process with India. Currently, the policymaking community in Washington is deliberating on the need to lift the sanctions imposed on India after the nuclear tests of May 1998. The goal is to lift sanctions in a way that would not create the impression that Washington is rewarding proliferation activities. Secondly, the Bush Administration is making efforts to prevent non-proliferation issues from derailing the Clinton Administration's engagement strategy vis-à-vis India. It has already given assurances to strengthen the bilateral working group on terrorism. It has also hinted at restoring the dialogue on defence issues by Defence Policy Groups, led by the Pentagon and the Indian Ministry of Defence ” [5] .  

The pertinent questions are: what are the determinants of this convergence of interests between India and US? How would they undermine the national interests of Pakistan? What are the compatible ways and means to counter such situations? These questions will be simultaneously addressed through out this paper.    

THE PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED STATES:  

Post cold war history of US-India convergence: The relations between India and United States took a turn towards alignment, after the alleged transfer of missile technology from China to Pakistan. China has acquired the nuclear capability to balance the hegemony of United States and especially after US threatened China with nuclear weapons in the Korean War (1950-53). Although there are themes like a union of regional powers like Russia, China and India to keep the World multi-polar as against the hegemonic designs of big powers like US, there were other complications like the Indo-China rivalry that such alliances could not materialise. China and India had Tibet as a central issue. Moreover there is a claim by China in Arunachal Predesh and Sikkim. Along with a territorial dispute with India, China has supported Pakistan diplomatically and in the fields of defence cooperation. This was the main reason that sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in 1991 on the US claim of transfer of M11 missile technology to Pakistan.  

United States competition with China in the region makes it obligatory for it to maintain a balance of power in the region in accordance to its own perception of security and the evolving patterns of alliances.  “To address the balance of power in South Asia, the United States must seek to lure India away from the emerging Russia-China-Iran-Pakistan entente, and be reversed to favour real American and Indian interests. An American strategic partnership with India, which is becoming Asia's greatest economic power, could resolve the issue of proliferation by offering India its well-deserved role as a member of the nuclear five club” [6] . This was the beginning of the U.S.-India strategic dialogue, confirmed when president Clinton visited India.  

“Many members of the new Bush team perceive India as a potential partner in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region, particularly in fighting Islamic fundamentalism and checking Chinese ambitions. The Defense Department has been lobbying for several years to increase military ties with the country, but these are prohibited by the sanctions imposed by Washington after India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Both Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Powell are expected to re-examine the utility of the sanctions. However, technology transfers and improved military relations between the two countries are unlikely unless India succeeds in improving relations with Pakistan. In this respect, US officials set considerable store by India's moratorium on operations in Kashmir, and Pakistan's restraint along the line of control in the disputed territory” [7] .  

“In addition to personnel issues, the new administration has made organisational changes to the South Asia policy making apparatus:

• The South Asia desk in the National Security Council (NSC) has been moved out of the Middle East section of the council and now reports to the Asia Director.
• More generally, preliminary indicators suggest that the locus of decision-making for regions of secondary importance to Washington will shift from the NSC (which will focus more narrowly on vital US interests and undertake crisis management where necessary) to the State Department. This shift is likely to bring greater stability in policy as career foreign service officials will exert more influence.
• A debate is underway over whether the State Department's South Asia Bureau, created early in the Clinton administration, should be left intact, or whether India and Pakistan should be given separate profiles as the Defense Department has done.
  The new Policy Direction. The United States has had several identifiable interests in South Asia during the post-Cold war period:

• developing a strong economic and strategic relationship with India;
• preserving the integrity of the Pakistani state;
• curbing Islamic extremism;
• containing terrorist activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan where possible;
• preventing a potentially dangerous nuclear arms race on the subcontinent; and
• promoting a peace process in Kashmir” [8] .  

In view of these developments, the fact that there is a convergence of interests between India and US is clear but the fact remains; that Pakistan is an actor in the South Asian scene and no solutions to the problems of South Asia can be accomplished without Pakistan’s involvement.
Economic interests: India offers a huge economic market and incentives for foreign investment. The Indo-US understanding in economic cooperation became significant after the US-India Financial and Economic Forum, a joint declaration on the March 21, 2000 at New Delhi. The principles agreed upon were:  

1.To host a forum on finance and investment issues, macroeconomic policy and international economic developments at regular intervals.  

2.The participation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Reserve, Council of Economic Advisors, and other officials of the US Government and the Securities and Exchange Board of India, Reserve Bank of India, and other officials of the Government of India [9] .
The greatest motivation for US to find economic allies in India is the size of its economy. India can provide good incentives for foreign investments. There have been the understandings of facilitation in trade by the enunciation of the US-India Commercial Dialogue to deepen ties between the Indian and American Business communities. Its aim will be to facilitate trade, and maximize investment opportunities across a broad range of economic sectors, including information technology, infrastructure, biotechnology, and services. Participation will include, as appropriate, representatives of other Cabinet agencies and ministries on both sides. US-India Working Group on Trade will engage in regular discussion to enhance cooperation on trade policy.  The Group will serve as a locus of consultation on a broad range of trade-related issues, including those pertaining to the World Trade Organization. They agree to set up a US-India Science and Technology Forum. The Forum shall promote research and development, the transfer of technology, the creation of a comprehensive electronic reference source for US-India science and technology cooperation, and the electronic exchange and dissemination of information on US-India science and technology cooperation, and other programs consistent with the previous practice of the US-India Foundation [10] .

Strategic: India, after the end of the cold war has had aspirations of a US’s sheriff in South Asia. Moreover, containment of China has always been an objective of the US foreign policy and the history of adversarial relations between India and China and the emergence of China as a major power in the subcontinent, are factors that have made India a favourable ally of US in the region. The other probability of a Sino-Russian convergence has raised the scepticism of United States and in the current situation Iran is an assertive player in the post Taliban scenario. United States feels the need to form an alliance that can guarantee the smooth achievement of its aim and objectives of intervention in Afghanistan.

The spin-off effect of transfer of strategic technology for the promotion of economic benefits is observed in an Indian quest for satellite cooperation with US. Now, as part of a program to accelerate economic modernization, India is seeking U.S. assistance to develop its commercial satellite and space launch capabilities. Although helping India to improve its economy and increasing opportunities for U.S. businesses in India are good foreign policy objectives, history has shown that there are limits to how far the United States should go in transferring sensitive technology that could be used in weapons development or ballistic missile programs [11] . Though such plans have not materialized yet but India can gain immensely especially after the up gradation of its missile technology which India plans to accomplish by launching Agni 3 and 4, as missiles too are tools of launching satellites. President Bush seeks cooperation on missile reduction, to rein in the missile race in South Asia, and it is only possible when there is a shift from the traditional cold war mentality [12] .

The testing of nuclear weapons has been a controversial issue between the major powers and new nuclear states. After the moratorium on nuclear testing the clash of ideas has been minimised. This has become a starting point of an understanding on nuclear issues between India and US. “We have both declared voluntary moratoriums on testing. India understands your concerns. We do not wish to unravel your non-proliferation efforts. We wish you to understand our security concerns” [13] .

The strategic analysts in United States perceive a basic change in the international power structures. The idea of stable and extended deterrence is a justification of this view [14] . The theory of ‘From Preponderance to offshore Balancing’, further justifies United States search for a regional ally in South Asia [15] . General Colin Powell’s statement that India has a potential to keep peace in the vast Indian Ocean area is evidence of US’s acceptance of Indian eminence in the South Asian region [16] .

US paranoia: The US foreign policy seems to be overwhelmed by a concept of a secret enemy in Islam, idea of rouge states and nuclear terrorism etcetera. The writers like Samuel Huntington and the ideas of a clash of civilisations seem to come true to the US in the wake of the recent violent terrorists acts worldwide. The United States seems to understand that it is essential to address the cause of terrorism and find a solution to it, but in the mean time it seems to be convinced of its fears towards Islam and is tentative towards nurturing any alliance with Muslim countries. The unconscious biases are shown at places when Muslims are subjected to discriminatory attitude and where the leaders term their fight against terrorism a crusade. Pakistan’s President has taken serious steps in curbing the menace of extremism and terrorism by regularising the religious parties and banning the extremist pressure groups in Pakistan [17] .  

THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

Pakistan: The 13 December incident has ignited an anti Pakistan sentiment in India, though no solid proof of Pakistan’s involvement in the terrorist attacks has been provided. India has increased the forces on the Pakistan border and the ‘Operation Chivalry’ military exercise lead to further tensions between India and Pakistan. The response of United States in this situation is somewhat soft towards India, and the recent test of a long-range missile Agni, in such tense situation has not received condemnation. This is a concern for Pakistan because till now India has projected this test as a routine test in the series of missile tests; but if the tension is further raised along the border and the jingoist slogans that the BJP leaders raised after the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 are repeated Pakistan will find it self compelled to respond to this test. This will not be helpful in reducing the tensions in the region.

 

India as a major power in the region.

Indira doctrine has been the starting point of Indian ambitions for a dominant status in the region. India is trying to act independently in the South Asian region on the pattern similar to that of US in Afghanistan and Israel in the Middle East, but the main hurdle is the reality the Pakistan can not be compared either to Afghanistan or Palestine nor India to US or Israel.

  Pakistan is willing to accept India as an eminent nation in the region but it is unrealistic for India to portray it self as a dominant region in the region owing to the fact that it still has to achieve a level or economic stability and international moral standing. The fact that the number of people living below poverty in India is much higher that many other developing countries and that the reports of the Amnesty International on the Human rights violations in India, are evidences enough that India’s claims to be a regional power are not all legitimate. The Indian quest for dominance in South Asia has been revived in the past year. Indira doctrine claimed the right to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries if disorder threatens to extend beyond boundaries, the Rajiv doctrine called for the use of military power to obtain political objectives in the region; but India would not tolerate similar intervention from outside [18] . The recent attitude of trying to act independently in coercing Pakistan and other neighbours like the border conflict with Bangladesh confirms Indian aspirations for regional dominance. The recent tensions after the December 13 incident of an attack on the Indian parliament, India has taken unilateral steps to increase its military deployments on the Pakistan border and threatening crossing the line of control and declaring war on Pakistan in a hot pursuit to target the places it considers, harbours terrorists. India has projected that it may choose a strategy for retaliation against acts of terrorism similar to Israel. A "hot pursuit" action—hitting terrorist training camps in Pakistani-controlled territory—might catalyze a small war against Pakistan. But New Delhi appears to have calculated that with American forces on the ground in the country, Pakistan would not be able to escalate to nuclear threats. One indication of an impending war would be if U.S. troops actually pulled out of the region” [19] .  

India cannot be entitled to use force or act unilaterally by virtue of the fact that this act was not in conformity with the Article 51 of the UN charter, whereby a state can act to defend itself against any aggression. “The prerequisites of a state taking such an action are the condition relates to the happening of a specific event that will trigger a state’s right to defend itself (countering the attack), while the second provides the limitation in terms of time (until the SC takes cognisance of the conflict). The attack on India’s parliament by a group of non-state actors cannot be termed as an armed attack. In international law precedents, armed attack generally denotes a state level activity. A solitary strike by a few irresponsible individuals cannot be called an armed attack even though it can be described as an act of terrorism, which it was, and for which reason it has been condemned by Islamabad. Moreover, there is no evidence that the attack was organised by Pakistan. If such small sporadic incidents of terrorist strikes were denoted as armed attacks this would set a dangerous precedent and give states the right to wage warfare on the basis of such strikes. India’s ongoing threat of using force against Pakistan is against Article 51 and the UN Charter” [20] .  

Permanent seat in the UN. Certainly, other countries have strong arguments for obtaining a permanent seat on the council. Japan and Germany, for example, are major contributors to the U.N. budgets. Japan contributes $216 million annually and Germany contributes $104 million, compared with India's annual $350,000. Both Japan and Germany are developed countries and economic powers; India is neither. In pursuing nuclear capabilities, India hopes to demonstrate that, despite its economic problems, it is a major world power and deserves a seat on the council. But acceding to its demands could encourage other developing nations to pursue nuclear capabilities as well, if only to use them as leverage in the United Nations [21] . “A 1997 analysis of U.N. votes showed that India--the fifth highest recipient of U.S. aid in FY 1997--had voted against the United States at the U.N. an astounding 80 percent of the time, more than any of the top 10 aid recipients. Finally, the United States has little reason to expect India to side with its positions in the Security Council if it were to become a permanent member. India, which takes pride in its traditional independent stance, sided with the United States on U.N. votes in 1999 less than 22 percent of the time” [22] .  

Indian strategic interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s bugbear in Afghanistan has been India. But that policy of seeing red every time any Afghan is seen shaking hands with the Indians must be given up and a new non-ISI policy initiated to work on the emerging Tajik leadership on the basis of the transit trade facility that Pakistan can always use as leverage. India will remain marginal even after the end of the war. Its entry in the Afghan arena was a kind of tit-for-tat for the flanking move the ISI was making in Bangladesh, a flawed policy based on the assumption that Mrs Hasina Wajed was pro-India. In fact, India’s role in the new Afghanistan is bound to subside as Kabul will be inclined to act more and more in light of the advice offered by those who fund it. The biggest counter in Pakistan’s favour and against India is that India has exclusively backed the Tajiks while the stage must inevitably be set for the Pakhtun majority to reassert itself through the Loya Jirga next year [23] .  

India’s competition with China:  In the post cold war strategic scene, US has a benign confrontation with China. Beijing's strategic ties with Islamabad also intensified India's concerns that China is supporting an arms race in South Asia. China is selling small arms, armor, and artillery to Burma, which lies along India's borders to the South East. Strategic thinkers in New Delhi are concerned that China's People's Liberation Army could someday gain access to geographically strategic bases in Burma along the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, the world's busiest waterway. China already is building deep-water ports off Burma and overland routes to move goods to and from these ports, as well as radar and listening posts in the Coco Islands. These activities threaten India's aspirations of becoming a regional power that could project its own navy in the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Strait into the South China Sea” [24] . “India's effort to gain U.S. assistance in developing its satellite and space launch capabilities ostensibly is meant to help bring India into the 21st century in telecommunications and commercial enterprise. However, such technologies could be used to advance India's strategic missile programs. Privately, in fact, Indian officials have indicated that New Delhi hopes to develop thermonuclear weapons, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Moreover, some of these officials have argued that India needs a "360 degree" deterrent, suggesting that its future missile programs could target regions other than China” [25] . The fact, which however is overlooked, is the military technological transfer to India from Russia, France and Israel. In view of these the India claims of initiation of and arms race by China are not substantial.  

Like the Clinton Administration, President Bush during the run-up to elections was hard on China. Yet within eight months, his Administration has become as permissive towards China as were his predecessors. The change is significantly notable in terms of nuclear missiles proliferation in South Asia. CIA reports recently indicated that China had shipped a sizeable number of Shaheen I and Shaheen II missiles to Pakistan by the land route i.e. via the Karakoram Highway. The CIA had also authentically indicated that China had passed along solid propulsion missile technology in recent months. The US responses to this serious violation of MTCR by China have been as permissive as the previous Administration.  

These permissive reactions i.e. absence of any sanctions against China, as per US laws, are in marked contrast to what the current US national Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice stated in December 2000 that China is a security concern for USA because Beijing transfers technology for weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Pakistan. The United States has a historical narcisstic obsession for China, which India can do nothing about. But where China does impinge on India’s national security interests and to which sensitivity the United States should be alive to is China’s nuclear weapons and missiles build up of Pakistan with Chinese off-the-self sales, supplies of components in knocked-down kits and transfer of blue prints and technology. United States official permissiveness on this aspect cannot but be perforce construed as complicity in harming India’s national security. Indians have strong feelings on such complicity and permissiveness of China’s attempts to strategically de-stabilise India by proxy through Pakistan” [26] . United States has to take the concerns of both China and Pakistan in to consideration if the problems of secret military transfers in the region have to be addressed.  

CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN 

 

Strategic and Security challenges: Pakistan above all has to counter the Indian nefarious designs. These are further complicated by change of regime in Afghanistan and their friendly tendencies towards India. Indian government has aspirations to exploit the situation against Pakistan, as long as it has an adversarial relationship with it. “Milton Bearden, a former C.I.A. station chief in Pakistan who helped run the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the late nineteen-eighties and worked closely with the I.S.I, believes that the Indian government is cynically using the Parliament bombing to rally public support for the conflict with Pakistan. "The Indians are just playing brinkmanship now—moving troops up to the border," he said. "Until September 11th, they thought they'd won this thing—they had Pakistan on the ropes." Because of its nuclear program, he said, "Pakistan was isolated and sanctioned by the United States, with only China left as an ally. Never mind that the only country in South Asia that always did what we asked was Pakistan."  “A senior Pakistani diplomat depicted India as suffering from "jilted-lover syndrome"—referring to the enormous amount of American attention and financial aid that the Musharraf government has received since September 11th. The diplomat argued that Musharraf has not been given enough credit from the Indian leadership for the "sweeping changes" that have taken place in Pakistan” [27] .

If the United States having been allied to Pakistan in the past, and terming Pakistan as the ‘most allied ally’, can keep its options open and opt for an alignment with its traditional adversary of the cold war years; India, it is prudent for Pakistan to rethink its own pattern of alliances and find the areas of convergence between itself and China, Iran where there has been a history of alliances. If countries like Israel can have a role to play in influencing the foreign policy of US and at the same time foster relationships with India it is important for Pakistan to look for strategic options elsewhere. “Our strategic interests cannot be defined totally in terms of US strategic interests - especially in the face of the continuing US-India-Israel nexus. More than ever before, there is a need for Pakistan to intensify its strategic interaction with China. Also, by now Iran could not be too comfortable with the presence of the US military all around it - from the Gulf to Central Asia. So this may be a fruitful time for Pakistan and Iran to sort out their differences - especially since many of these have lost their relevance with the altered situation on the ground” [28] .

India is receiving military aid from United States, Israel and Russia. Pakistan on the other hand has been militarily inferior to India in conventional weapons. The gap of this difference in the quality and quantity of conventional weapons is being widened, as India has signed a defence deal worth two billion dollars with Israel [29] . Pakistan has to look for military technology and military hardware, and is justified in acquiring it from countries like China.

Nuclear issue: The concern of US pressure to control or suppress Pakistan’s nuclear capability and decision-making has worried the decision makers in Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear weapon are not seen as a guarantee by any other nuclear, non-nuclear or regional power, nor support for Pakistan has been expressed by any Muslim state and Pakistan has not committed to the defence of another nation.  

In the Indo-Pak situation, “Nuclear war is not an option and is a remote possibility, as history of conflicts shows that both the countries have a clear understanding of the nuclear threshold. (as the drivers in a chicken game are interested in chickening the other out and at all costs want to avoid a head-on)  

The nuclear command and control of Pakistan is viable and credible,“ reports have been made after the beginning of the US bombing of Afghanistan (different components of) the nuclear weapons have been moved to (possibly 6) separate locations of the country” [30] . On the contrary, though India has come up with a nuclear doctrine it has not announced its Nuclear Command Authority. Pakistan should highlight this concern internationally so that India is compelled to take security steps for the safeguard of its nuclear installations.  

“In a CNN television interview with Larry King, Musharraf dismissed the American concerns about the integrity of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, depicting them as the thoughts of those in the West "who don't really understand the reality of Pakistan. We have an excellent command-and-control system which we have evolved, and there is no question of their falling into the hands of any fundamentalists" [31] .  

Economic challenges: Mercantile competition with India, re-emergences after the support from the international community in rescheduling the loans and building up a sustainable viable economy to support the defence and needs in addition to gaining maximum opportunities for trade in central Asia are some of the economic challenges facing Pakistan. Considering an option other than the South Asian experience, “Pakistan by allying itself to the west Asian countries can gain immensely in trade and above all diplomatic support” [32] . The energy resources of the Caspian region are of enormous quantity and can provide the solution for the impending needs of the south Asian region. The fact that the developed world is as much dependent on the natural resources to keep all its industries going makes it vital for US to have control or at least a share in the transit of these natural resources. Some of the strategic analysts think that stretching an oil pipeline through the Caspian region and bringing it to south Asia would be unfeasible as it could prove to be more costly in view of its maintenance and the amount of tariffs, but the fact that the natural resources were unexplored and unexploited till the beginning of the past century and the developed countries have become more and more dependent on these resources. If this one factor is eliminated from the economy of the developed countries they are all at a stand still. Since these are non-renewable resources of energy it is essential to look for them in other parts of the world. Pakistan has another option to try to ally itself with the West Asian countries through developing better diplomatic and trade ties with Iran so as to gain access to these natural resources. “Pakistan’s cooperative military linkages with the Gulf countries and the Saudi Arabia offers an inbuilt structural framework. Here, the Irani-Saudi rapprochement and moves towards the normalisation of Iran-Iraq relations will bring stability to the Gulf region. A linkage with Pakistan would extend this stability into west as a whole. Such an alliance will reduce the Gulf region’s technical and military dependence on the West” [33] . Pakistan above all has to find a respite from the problem of Debt that has become overwhelming. This solution has to come by a massive economic boost through agricultural and industrial reforms in the view of the fact that many countries and international donors are interested in giving developmental aid to Pakistan after its union in the coalition against terrorism.  

Diplomatic Challenges:

“Although the administration (US) will continue Clinton's 'tilt' towards India, it will also seek to re-build a relationship with Pakistan. It will do so by attempting to reduce sanctions on both countries, while urging nuclear restraint and encouraging a peace process in Kashmir” [34] . Considering the situation in a rational perspective Pakistan has not been a loser on the diplomatic front. India has not been able to achieve its objectives of coercing Pakistan through military build up or through USA in backing out from its stance on Kashmir, missile defence and nuclear arsenal development. India has left US in a fix, when it calls for US to coerce Pakistan to limit its support to the freedom struggle in Kashmir and at the same time asking US not to interfere or mediate in the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has gained moral ground, in a sense that it has cooperated in all the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute and has shown restraint against all the military and diplomatic truculence of India; on the other hand, the Kashmir problem has been further highlighted internationally. Pakistan has to meet the negative propaganda that India has unleashed and counter it with the truth.  

To rid itself of the allegations of religious extremism. Harry Thomas, Director South Asia, in the present US National Security Council, (served in New Delhi under US Ambassador Frank Wisner, for 3 years) while briefing a group of Indian-Americans at the White House stated that naming Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism would lead to its Talibanisation. Further, he noted: "I am very sympathetic to the victims of terrorism. It’s a stretch to say the Government of Pakistan is a state sponsor of international terrorism." Another US official is quoted as stating: "Just because a terrorist organisation is based or operating from Pakistan does not necessarily mean Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism" [35] .

  In response to the over hyped fears of the Indians of the ‘bomb growing a beard’; there are sympathies for the Muslims fighters all over the world in Pakistan. There are chances of ideologically dedicated scientists and nuclear weapons creating a lethal mix, but how far these individuals can collaborate with an extremist organisation, build a bomb and cause damage are very extreme possibilities.

  “As the US reconsiders its foreign and military aid provisions to Pakistan, this is a critical area where US dollars could make a difference. With over $500 million planned in new American aid to Pakistan, there is certainly a place for dedicated programs supporting education reform. At the very least, aid in kind (books, computers, and other teaching materials) could be provided, to make sure that the assistance is received by those intended and not drained away due to corruption at higher levels” [36] .  

To counter negative propaganda concerning just freedom movement in Kashmir.” The US does not buy Indian views on Kashmir. It condemns cross-border violence, but at the same time, is concerned over the excesses by Indian security forces. Any solution to the issue should be based on the “wishes of the people of J&K” [37] . The US administration having realised that President of Pakistan has taken strong measures to combat extremism in Pakistan must pressure India to undertake the real political reform in Kashmir that can be the only basis for a permanent solution to the conflict in the troubled state. “Incumbent governments that seek to destroy terrorism must distinguish terrorists from political dissidents with whom they can negotiate. The world should not be a place where all acts of political struggle automatically become terrorism” [38] .

Pakistan has to counter the concept of Pakistan being projected as a failed state. India has been continuing an active propaganda against Pakistan, calling it a failed state, over exaggerating the concern of the nuclear bomb falling in the hands of extremists and above all threatening with an economic stagnation of Pakistan. “ India can pursue an economic strangulation of Pakistan by stopping the water flow of the Indus River, the threatening of revoking and pulling out from the Indus basin treaty are evidences enough for Pakistan to be concerned” [39] . Moreover the research and analysis wing of India has been working undercover in Pakistan, undertaking covert operations. The most recent kidnapping of an American journalist, at a critical time of President Musharraf’s visit to United States has also been attributed to Indian agencies. Nine, Raw sponsored terrorists having confessed to have undertaken acts of sabotage during the year 2001-2002, according to Pakistan’s security agencies only goes to show that Indian involvement in destabilizing Pakistan cannot be ignored. These acts are basically aimed to embarrass Pakistan internationally and Pakistan must bring out the facts in response to the Indian claims of Pakistan’s involvement in terrorist acts in India.  

Sino-Russian convergence:  The developments after the end of cold war initiated this alliance after the ideological convergence and party to party ties during the May, 1989 Deng-Gorbachev summit. Pakistan can explore the options of allying regionally with China and Russia. There are massive opportunities for trade and strategic, defence partnership. There have been mutual agreements on 1991 and 1994 treaties delimiting the common border, opposition to NATO expansion, Chinese support to Russia to enter APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Russian commitment to avoid official ties with Taiwan, Russian declaration of Tibet as an integral part of China, military cooperation, arms reduction and conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) [40] .  This strategic convergence can provide an option to the countries that are not in a position to cope with the western economic, military and political pressures. The asymmetry of power that is present in the region will be addressed. It is important to reduce concerns about U.S NMD, for instance for China the concern that NMD might nullify its strategic deterrent. The confidence building will have a positive impact and China could later on help in officiating a rapprochement between Islamabad and Moscow. In view of the Russian inroads in to Afghanistan after the Taliban it becomes important for Pakistan to engage with the Russia and simultaneously play its role for the development and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.    

Conclusion

  Pakistan can convert all the strategic changes to opportunities if it takes cognisance of the situation and act rationally. The two significant developments are the present tension between India and Pakistan and the US high profile policy towards South Asia in pursuance of its war against terrorism. Pakistan being an ally of the US in its policy towards resolving the problems of the region has reasons to believe that it can play a role in fighting terrorism, be it state terrorism or other and seek US cooperation for conflict resolution. US can convince India to cooperate, and US can act as a mediator in easing the current tension between the two countries. “US acknowledge that tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia. India is committed to enhancing cooperation, peace and stability in the region. The United States believes India should forgo nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, India and the U.S. are prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery ” [41] . U.S. interests will be served best if India is encouraged to limit its nuclear and missile programs, to refrain from proliferating missile technologies, and to reach peaceful negotiated agreements on territorial disputes [42] .

 

“It (US) is more likely to intensify its "private" diplomacy, urging both India and Pakistan to resume the aborted summit meetings that were inaugurated by the Indians in Lahore in 1999 (followed by the Agra meeting earlier this year). Washington will also be forthcoming with offers to help India and Pakistan (separately or collectively) verify specific agreements, and it may be able to offer new incentives that would be geared to such agreements. As part of this dialogue process with near-normal relations with both India and Pakistan, Washington is no longer seen as a sanctions-obsessed superpower. Musharraf has thrown in his lot with the United States and India still hopes for a larger strategic relationship with Washington. If the Bush administration can overcome its aversion to "peace processes," it has an opportunity to facilitate one between India and Pakistan” [43] . If a balanced approach towards disarmament and conflict resolution can be initiated, Pakistan can be a part of it.

Pakistan has to keep its options for a strategic alliance with China open. This is in recognition of the fact that a country can choose its allies but not its neighbours; it is in the greatest interests of Pakistan to have a strong regional ally. This alliance can help Pakistan economically as there are prospects of trade with China’s western region of Sinkiang. Pakistan can get a major economic boom as it already has an infrastructure (trade route KKH) and ongoing trade with China. 

Pakistan has to convince US of formulating joint working groups on trade, defence, technological exchange, education, sustainable development and above all fighting violence and terrorism in all forms. This is the most appropriate time to sign agreements on these issues as Pakistan and US are in close collaboration and are working for common goals. These groups will help Pakistan in the problems of governance that it is facing and will prove to be good confidence building measures.

In the final analysis, there are certain realities that Pakistan has to consider, like the geographic location and the pattern of alliances, the economic burden and the domestic political situation. The greatest objective of National policy has to be the economic stability because the strategic and tactical power rests on it. Pakistan has to address its overwhelming problems like foreign debt and seek economic cooperation to build a sustainable economic infrastructure. These objectives can be achieved in the present situation if Pakistan acts in a calculated and rational manner.   

Published in Quarterly Journal “ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY” by Foundation For Research on International Environment National Development & Security. Vol. X, No. 2, Serial no. 38, Winter 2001/02